Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance
Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support
Programs (07-FEB-07, GAO-07-219).
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced over 1 million people and
affected some of the poorest areas of the country. Many of those
affected by the hurricanes received federal assistance from the
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security),
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamp, Unemployment
Insurance (UI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) programs beforehand and others were newly eligible after
the storms. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO
assessed the (1) challenges the hurricanes created for programs
to take applications and pay benefits, (2) factors that helped or
hindered programs' efforts, and (3) areas that warrant further
attention and actions being taken to improve programs' disaster
response. To do this work, GAO reviewed policies, reports, and
plans, and interviewed program officials at the federal level and
in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-219
ACCNO: A65647
TITLE: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could
Enhance Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal
Support Programs
DATE: 02/07/2007
SUBJECT: Disaster planning
Disaster recovery
Disaster relief aid
Emergency preparedness
Erroneous payments
Federal aid programs
Federal aid to states
Federal response plan
Federal social security programs
Federal/state relations
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Rita
National response plan
Program evaluation
Program management
State-administered programs
Strategic planning
Food Stamp Program
Social Security Program
Supplemental Security Income Program
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Program
Unemployment Insurance Program
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GAO-07-219
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Programs Provide Routine Services and Some Disaster Assistan
* [4]Basis for Federal Support Programs Assisting Disaster Victim
* [5]Widespread Devastation and Displacement of People Created Se
* [6]Hurricanes Caused Widespread Devastation and Large-Scale Dis
* [7]Demand for Services Rose Sharply after the Storms
* [8]Disaster Planning, Service Delivery Options, and Access to F
* [9]Programs with Disaster Plans for Service Delivery Were Bette
* [10]Flexible Service Delivery Options Helped Expedite Applicatio
* [11]Flexible Staffing
* [12]Options to Take Applications
* [13]Options for Issuing Benefits
* [14]Additional Funding Was Available for Increased Costs,
but So
* [15]Gaps in Disaster Response Remain; Efforts Under Way Hold Pro
* [16]Programs Faced Challenges Balancing Program Integrity with A
* [17]Hurricanes Highlighted the Long-standing Challenge to Ease I
* [18]Programs Are Taking Steps to Improve Disaster Preparedness,
* [19]Federal Efforts to Improve Delivery of Human Services during
* [20]Conclusions
* [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [22]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [23]Objectives:
* [24]Literature Reviews
* [25]Review of Federal Requirements
* [26]Contacts with States and State Advocacy Groups
* [27]Contacts with Federal Agencies and National Advocacy Groups
* [28]GAO Contact
* [29]Acknowledgments
* [30]GAO's Mission
* [31]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [32]Order by Mail or Phone
* [33]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [34]Congressional Relations
* [35]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
February 2007
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA
Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of Certain State-Administered
Federal Support Programs
GAO-07-219
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of
Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs (GAO-07-219)
On page 26, in line 5 of the second paragraph, "see table 5" is revised to
read "see table 3." On page 27, in line 3 of the second paragraph, "see
table 6" is revised to read "see table 4." On page 28, in line 1 of the
third paragraph, "Table 7" is revised to read "Table 5." On page 30, in
line 6 of the first paragraph, "see table 8" is revised to read "see table
6." On page 38, in line 3 of the last paragraph, "in table 9" is revised
to read "in table 7." On page 41, in the last line of the second
paragraph, "in table 10" is revised to read "in table 8."
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 5
Widespread Devastation and Displacement of People Created Service Delivery
Challenges such as Unprecedented Demand 10
Disaster Planning, Service Delivery Options, and Access to Funding
Facilitated Response, but Not All Programs Had These Measures in Place 21
Gaps in Disaster Response Remain; Efforts Under Way Hold Promise for
Improving Human Service Programs' Disaster Response 34
Conclusions 44
Recommendations for Executive Action 45
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 50
Appendix II Comments from the Social Security Administration 54
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Health & Human Services 56
Appendix IV Comments from the U.S Department of Labor 61
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 63
Related GAO Products 64
Tables
Table 1: Selected Federal Support Programs 6
Table 2: Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Functions That Support
Taking Applications and Issuing Benefits 7
Table 3: Program Application Options before the Hurricanes, by State26
Table 4: Program Benefit Payment Methods before the Hurricanes, by State
27
Table 5: Lessons Learned about Strategies to Facilitate Response and
Considerations for Disaster Planning 29
Table 6: Program Funding 31
Table 7: Some of the Initiatives States We Reviewed Are Exploring to
Improve Disaster Preparedness 39
Table 8: Selected White House Report Recommendations to HHS to Improve the
Delivery of Human Services during Disasters 41
Figures
Figure 1: FEMA Designated Disaster Counties for Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita 11
Figure 2: SSA District Office in Downtown New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina and Flooding 12
Figure 3: Disaster Food Stamp Recipients under Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
14
Figure 4: Food Stamp Recipients in Hurricane-Affected States, August to
December 2005 15
Figure 5: UI Claims in Hurricane Affected States, August to December 2005
16
Figure 6: DUA Initial Applications Nationwide, January 2001 to August 2006
17
Figure 7: States That Requested TANF Contingency Funds Following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 19
Figure 8: Nationwide Social Security and SSI Immediate Payments, August 31
to October 31, 2003, through 2006 21
Figure 9: Lake Charles Food Stamp and TANF Program Office Damaged by
Hurricane Rita 24
Figure 10: DUA Payment Process 33
Abbreviations
ACF Administration for Children and Families
APHSA American Public Human Services Association
COOP continuity of operations DHS Department of Homeland Security
DUA disaster unemployment assistance
EBT electronicbenefit transfer
EFT electronic fund transfer
ESF emergency support function
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FNS Food and Nutrition Service
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
IG Office of Inspector General
NASWA National Association of State Workforce Agencies
NRP National Response Plan
OPHEP Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness
PIN personal identification number
SSA Social Security Administration
SSI Supplemental Security Income
TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
UI Unemployment Insurance
USDA Department of Agriculture
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
February 7, 2007
Congressional Committees:
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29,
2005, and alone caused more damage than any other natural disaster in the
history of the United States. Hurricane Rita followed less than a month
later, adding to the devastation. These hurricanes displaced over 1
million residents in the most directly affected states--Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas--and affected some of the poorest areas
in the country. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided
cash payments to help individuals and households with immediate disaster
assistance such as shelter, clothing, and personal necessities. Beyond
this FEMA aid, many in the affected areas were receiving assistance from
other federal programs before the hurricanes, and others who lost their
homes, employment, or other forms of support became newly eligible for
assistance after the storms. Key among these programs are Old Age,
Survivors; and Disability Insurance (Social Security); Supplemental
Security Income (SSI); the Food Stamp Program; Unemployment Insurance
(UI); and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs.
Because millions of individuals and families nationwide rely on benefits
and services provided by these programs, assessing these programs'
hurricane response could help better prepare for ensuring Americans'
income security in future emergencies. Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, and alone caused more damage
than any other natural disaster in the history of the United States.
Hurricane Rita followed less than a month later, adding to the
devastation. These hurricanes displaced over 1 million residents in the
most directly affected states--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas--and affected some of the poorest areas in the country. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided cash payments to help
individuals and households with immediate disaster assistance such as
shelter, clothing, and personal necessities. Beyond this FEMA aid, many in
the affected areas were receiving assistance from other federal programs
before the hurricanes, and others who lost their homes, employment, or
other forms of support became newly eligible for assistance after the
storms. Key among these programs are Old Age, Survivors; and Disability
Insurance (Social Security); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); the Food
Stamp Program; Unemployment Insurance (UI); and the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) programs. Because millions of individuals and
families nationwide rely on benefits and services provided by these
programs, assessing these programs' hurricane response could help better
prepare for ensuring Americans' income security in future emergencies.
These programs primarily provide cash or food assistance to replace lost
employment income or help low-income individuals meet basic needs, and
represent a significant federal financial investment. In a recent year,
Social Security and SSI provided $530.3 billion in income support
nationwide, while the Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs combined provided
over $92 billion in benefits and services to eligible individuals during
the same time period. To assist Congress in identifying what lessons can
be learned to improve federal response following major disasters such as
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we prepared this report under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative.
Specifically we assessed (1) the challenges Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
created in the immediate aftermath for these programs to take applications
and pay benefits; (2) what helped the programs expedite applications and
benefit payments after the hurricanes, and what issues, if any, emerged;
and (3) which areas warrant further attention, and what actions are being
taken to address these. These programs primarily provide cash or food
assistance to replace lost employment income or help low-income
individuals meet basic needs, and represent a significant federal
financial investment. In a recent year, Social Security and SSI provided
$530.3 billion in income support nationwide, while the Food Stamp, UI, and
TANF programs combined provided over $92 billion in benefits and services
to eligible individuals during the same time period. To assist Congress in
identifying what lessons can be learned to improve federal response
following major disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we prepared
this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct
evaluations under his own initiative. Specifically we assessed (1) the
challenges Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created in the immediate aftermath
for these programs to take applications and pay benefits; (2) what helped
the programs expedite applications and benefit payments after the
hurricanes, and what issues, if any, emerged; and (3) which areas warrant
further attention, and what actions are being taken to address these.
To do this work, we reviewed policies, procedures, and other relevant
documents for the five programs, as well as recent reports on the response
to Hurricane Katrina.^1 We interviewed headquarters and regional officials
for each of the four agencies that oversee the five selected federal basic
support programs: the Social Security Administration (SSA)--Social
Security and SSI; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)--Food Stamp
Program; U.S. Department of Labor (Labor)--UI; and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)--TANF. In addition to regular food stamps
and UI benefits, the Food Stamp and UI programs also have disaster
components to provide assistance in response to major disasters. In this
report, we refer to Social Security and SSI as federally administered
programs because the federal government establishes key program policies,
funds all benefit and administrative costs, and operates offices primarily
with federal employees. In contrast, we refer to the Food Stamp, UI, and
TANF programs as state-administered because states are responsible for
operating program offices and, to varying degrees among the programs,
share responsibility with the federal government for setting policies and
procedures, and providing funding.
We conducted site visits in Louisiana and Texas to meet with federal,
state, and local officials and conducted phone interviews with state
officials in Alabama and Mississippi and federal officials in Atlanta who
are responsible for regional program oversight. We also conducted phone
interviews with state officials in Florida to learn about their experience
in responding to recent tropical storms and hurricanes and in hosting
evacuees from Hurricane Katrina. To obtain insights on hurricane victims'
perspectives on programs' hurricane response, we interviewed national and
state advocacy groups for beneficiaries. In addition, we reviewed federal,
state, and office-specific disaster preparedness plans and guidance. To
assess the reliability of data on applications filed and benefits
received, we reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed federal
officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We coordinated with
the federal Offices of the Inspector General (IG) and state auditors on
these and other issues. We also spoke with a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) official about plans for the delivery of federal disaster
assistance. We conducted our work between November 2005 and December 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for more information about our objectives, scope, and
methodology.
^1These reports include U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of
Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C:
Feb. 15, 2006); The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); and U.S.
Senate, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).
Results in Brief
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread destruction and displacement
of people, resulting in challenges for federal basic support programs,
including an unparalleled demand for services. Many individuals from the
affected region moved to various locations throughout the country, and in
some areas, the programs had to serve a large concentration of evacuees.
The demand for disaster food stamps, regular food stamps, UI benefits, and
disaster unemployment assistance rose sharply. Newly available federal
TANF funds for evacuees were used to provide aid to needy families
affected by the hurricanes. In contrast, Social Security and SSI did not
experience a large increase in new applications, but did experience
increased demand for the replacement of lost or missed benefits.
Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to federal
contingency funding helped facilitate hurricane response, but not all
programs had these measures in place. The federally administered Social
Security and SSI programs had service delivery disaster plans in place to
address an unprecedented demand for replacement benefits. Disaster
planning at the service delivery level varied across the
state-administered federal programs, and in some cases, these programs
struggled to ramp up capacity quickly to try to meet demand. In addition,
while some programs had preexisting service delivery options that helped
expedite services after the hurricanes, other programs did not have these
options available. For example, SSA had the flexibility to shift staff
where needed and already had a nationwide 800 number and an Internet
application process to expedite services for Social Security and SSI prior
to Katrina. In contrast, the UI programs in Louisiana and Mississippi had
always required in-office visits for filing claims. After the hurricane,
Labor helped both states route calls from their residents to UI claims
takers in other states with call centers--an innovative action for this
program. Access to federal contingency funds was also important for
expediting services, and Congress and agencies acted quickly to address
immediate funding needs.
Gaps remain in the areas of preventing improper payments, easing access to
services, and improving disaster planning for the state-administered
programs, although efforts are under way that may address these areas. As
program officials relaxed some program rules to better ensure that those
eligible received aid, the risk of improper payments increased. Some
efforts are under way to identify improper payments that occurred and
whether sufficient internal controls were in place. Sharing this type of
information among programs and states can help reduce programs'
vulnerability to fraud and abuse during emergencies. Even though some
efforts were made to ease individuals' access to aid, disaster victims
still faced difficulties accessing aid from multiple programs, a
long-standing problem even under routine conditions. In addition, to
address some gaps in service delivery planning, USDA is revising its
disaster food stamp program handbook and taking other steps to improve
disaster planning. Labor has similar efforts under way, including
developing information for states on improving disaster preparedness. HHS
officials cited legislative restrictions that limit their ability to
regulate states, emphasizing that TANF disaster planning is a state
responsibility. However, HHS has not systematically worked with states to
get information on states' TANF disaster preparedness or identify
promising practices for dissemination. The White House study on federal
response to Hurricane Katrina, noting some of the difficulties in the
delivery of human services, recommended that HHS take a leading role in
improving disaster response in delivering human services. In response, HHS
has taken initial steps to work with states and other federal agencies to
explore ways to improve the delivery of human services for disaster
victims. More attention to specific plans for collecting and disseminating
promising practices and exploring case management approaches would
strengthen this promising effort.
To build on HHS' recent efforts to improve the delivery of human services
during disasters, we recommend HHS take several actions, including drawing
on its existing human services network and expertise to explore further
case management options for service delivery during disasters as well as
collecting and disseminating information on promising practices related to
disaster planning, service delivery, and mitigating risks for improper
payments. Finally, to better ensure disaster preparedness for the TANF
program, we recommend that HHS work with states to see what steps may be
needed to ensure key planning elements are in place.
In commenting on a draft of this report, SSA, USDA, and Labor agreed with
our findings. HHS agreed with our recommendations related to its recent
efforts to improve the delivery of human services. However, HHS disagreed
with our recommendation that it work with states on TANF disaster
preparedness, stating that it is more appropriate to address TANF issues
as part of HHS' comprehensive cross-program planning efforts, rather than
requiring a separate initiative for TANF, singling it out as a special
case, and reinforcing a "siloed approach" to delivering services. We agree
with HHS that it is essential that its effort to improve human services
during disasters look across multiple programs and not take a fragmented
approach. However, we still think that HHS needs to have more systematic
information about state TANF programs' preparedness to carry out its
federal oversight responsibilities for this important income support
program for low-income families. It can obtain this information through
its cross program effort or in other ways and we have clarified our
recommendation language to reflect that. We also provided DHS a copy of
the draft and incorporated its technical comments as appropriate.
Background
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affected over 1 million people and caused
extensive damage in the four most directly affected states: Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Many of those affected depended on
federal assistance programs such as Social Security, SSI, the Food Stamp
Program, UI, and TANF before the hurricanes. While all of these are
federal programs, some are funded, designed, and administered by a
combination of federal and state governments.
Programs Provide Routine Services and Some Disaster Assistance
The Social Security and UI programs pay cash benefits to replace lost
employment income when individuals stopped working. The Food Stamp, SSI,
and TANF programs pay cash benefits or provide other assistance to help
low-income individuals meet their basic needs. Besides the routine
assistance these programs provide, the Food Stamp and UI programs also
offer disaster food stamps and disaster unemployment assistance (DUA) in
the event of a major disaster. Table 1 describes the benefits and services
of each program.
Table 1: Selected Federal Support Programs
Source: GAO analysis of USDA, SSA, HHS, and Labor program information.
Although the programs serve similar needs, the federal and state
governments have varying roles and levels of responsibility for each
program. Table 2 illustrates the federal and state responsibilities for
key program areas. The federally administered Social Security and SSI
programs are fully funded by SSA and staffed by federal employees.^2
Generally, eligibility rules and benefit amounts are established in
federal law. During emergency situations, any of SSA's regional
commissioners has the authority to invoke disaster procedures to expedite
the processing of initial claims generated as a result of a disaster. In
addition, SSA has ongoing "immediate payment" procedures to replace
payments to beneficiaries who cannot access their monthly benefits by mail
or direct deposit.^3 Once invoked, the procedures are in effect for all
related claims taken nationwide. Over 1,300 SSA offices provide Social
Security and SSI services to the public.
^2The states have responsibility for making disability determinations
under the standards and criteria set forth by SSA and with funding from
the federal government.
^3SSA may issue immediate payments when (1) a recipient's benefits are
delayed, (2) a recipient's eligibility for Social Security or SSI has
already been determined, and (3) the recipient has a financial emergency.
Table 2: Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Functions That Support
Taking Applications and Issuing Benefits
Source: GAO analysis of SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS program statutes,
guidance, and information.
Legend: Federal responsibility Federal and State shared responsibility
State responsibility
The other programs are all state-administered federal programs in which
the federal government and states vary in their responsibilities. USDA
fully funds food stamp and disaster food stamp benefits and generally sets
program rules and benefit levels nationally. States pay 50 percent of
administrative costs, have some options to set program rules,^4 and
operate Food Stamp Program offices. The UI program is funded by state and
federal taxes on employers. Labor oversees and monitors state UI programs,
and states determine eligibility criteria, benefit amounts, and duration
of payments, which vary across states.^5 While Labor oversees the DUA
program, FEMA funds the benefits and administrative costs for this
program. For the TANF program, states receive funds from HHS in the form
of a capped block grant.^6 Federal funding levels do not vary based on
caseload, although TANF emergency and loan funds were created by law as
safety net mechanisms for states to access additional federal resources in
the event of a recession or other emergency. Within federal guidelines,
each state determines what aid and services to provide, what eligibility
requirements to use, and how to deliver the services. As a result, state
programs vary widely. States typically have local or regional welfare
offices, and in the states we reviewed, most of the Food Stamp and TANF
programs are co-located.
^4The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 makes available to
states various options that are intended to simplify food stamp program
rules, streamline food stamp eligibility and benefit rules, and help
ensure that food stamp participants experience as smooth a transition from
welfare to work as possible.
^5Most states pay a maximum of 26 weeks of UI benefits, which may be
extended in times of high unemployment.
^6To receive its TANF block grant funds, each state must contribute its
own funds up to a specified level.
Eligibility rules for the disaster food stamp and DUA programs are relaxed
to allow individuals who might not qualify for regular program benefits to
receive disaster assistance. For example, a broad range of resources are
counted to determine eligibility for regular food stamps, whereas only
accessible resources such as cash and savings accounts are considered for
disaster food stamps. Based on household size, the Disaster Food Stamp
Program automatically pays applicants the maximum monthly allotment
payable under the regular Food Stamp Program. In addition, regular food
stamp clients may receive a supplemental amount that increases their
monthly benefit to the maximum monthly disaster benefit allotment. In the
past, disaster food stamp applications were generally accepted over a
period of 7 days, and applicants received 1 month of benefits. DUA
benefits are provided to individuals who were affected by the disaster but
do not qualify for regular UI program benefits. Eligible individuals may
include persons who are self-employed or have a short work history. Before
applying for DUA, individuals must apply for UI and be found ineligible.
Applicants normally must file for DUA within 30 days and are allowed 21
days to submit the required supporting documentation. Individuals can
receive DUA for up to 26 weeks.
Basis for Federal Support Programs Assisting Disaster Victims
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act) primarily established the programs and processes for the
federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to
states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified
private nonprofit organizations. Upon a governor's request, the President
can declare an "emergency" or a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act,
which triggers specific types of federal relief. For Hurricane Katrina,
the President made a major disaster declaration for Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005. For Hurricane Rita, the
President made the same declaration for Louisiana and Texas on September
24, 2005. These declarations authorized the federal government to engage
in various emergency response activities, such as providing temporary
housing and disaster unemployment assistance.^7
For purposes of the National Response Plan (NRP), presidentially-declared
disasters under the Stafford Act are considered incidents of national
significance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA may
activate certain provisions of the National Response Plan (NRP) to
coordinate federal support for disaster response. One provision specified
in the NRP cites expediting the processing of new claims for federal
benefits as a goal.^8 While the NRP specifically mentions Social Security
and DUA benefits, there are additional federal requirements for continuing
federal benefit payments during emergencies.
Federal agencies have been required since 1999 to have plans in place to
ensure they could continue essential functions such as benefit payments in
the event of an emergency. FEMA provided federal agencies guidance for
developing continuity-of-operation (COOP) plans to address events that
could disrupt normal agency operations and directed them to develop plans
for their headquarters and subcomponent levels. However, the guidance did
not explicitly direct federal agencies in the actions they should take
regarding program services provided by states.
^7The Food Stamp Act and the Stafford Act authorize USDA to establish
temporary emergency standards of eligibility and to provide emergency
benefits to replace food lost in a disaster.
^8The NRP designates 15 emergency support functions (ESF) that address
specific disaster response needs. ESF-6, identified as "Mass Care,
Housing, and Human Services," cites expediting the processing of federal
benefits.
Widespread Devastation and Displacement of People Created Service Delivery
Challenges such as Unprecedented Demand
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused large-scale destruction and
displacement of people, resulting in challenges for federal basic support
programs such as an unparalleled demand for services. Many people in the
affected areas depended on federal assistance before the hurricanes and
needed help to continue getting their aid. As a result of the hurricanes,
many others were newly eligible because they had lost their homes or jobs,
or were temporarily displaced. The demand for food stamps, disaster food
stamps, UI, and DUA benefits rose sharply. Newly available federal TANF
funds were used to provide aid to needy families affected by the
hurricanes. In contrast, Social Security and SSI did not have a large
increase in new applications, but did experience a large increase in
requests for the replacement of lost or missing benefits.
Hurricanes Caused Widespread Devastation and Large-Scale Displacement
FEMA designated 117 counties and parishes across Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas as disaster counties. (See fig. 1.) Most people
fled the area as a result of the hurricanes. Homes, businesses, and entire
communities were damaged or destroyed. According to the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, an estimated 1.2 million people age 16 and over
evacuated as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The U. S. Census estimated
that the population of disaster-designated counties in Louisiana alone
decreased by almost 345,000 between July 1, 2005, and January 1, 2006. In
contrast, Mississippi's population decreased by approximately 42,000, and
Alabama's population remained about the same. According to the Red Cross,
8 months following the disasters, more than 750,000 persons remained
displaced across all 50 states.
Figure 1: FEMA Designated Disaster Counties for Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita
In addition to facing the large number of hurricane victims seeking
assistance, the programs we reviewed faced challenges providing services
after the hurricanes because of damage and disruption to their own
facilities. In hurricane-affected areas, records, equipment, and program
offices were damaged or destroyed. Coastal areas in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama were heavily damaged. Many program offices
were closed for only a few days, but several damaged facilities did not
open for months, and a few were permanently closed as a result of the
destruction, such as the SSA district office in New Orleans shown in
figure 2.
Figure 2: SSA District Office in Downtown New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina and Flooding
Demand for Services Rose Sharply after the Storms
In the aftermath of the hurricanes, demand for services increased
dramatically for all programs. Many individuals in the hurricane-affected
states already depended on federal assistance programs before the
hurricanes. For example, the Urban Institute estimated that about 21
percent of the people in Orleans Parish, the county that includes New
Orleans, were receiving food stamps in 2000.^9 According to SSA data, over
1.2 million Social Security beneficiaries were located in counties
affected by Hurricane Katrina. Demand for services rose significantly for
the many hurricane victims who were newly eligible, adding to the existing
demand for services of those already receiving benefits.
^9The Urban Institute, Katrina: Demographics of a Disaster (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
Disaster Food Stamps and Regular Food Stamp Program: Caseloads for
disaster food stamps and regular food stamps increased significantly
following the hurricanes. In addition to providing disaster food stamps to
hurricane victims in the disaster-affected states, USDA--for the first
time ever--adopted a policy of providing disaster food stamps to evacuees
nationwide. Usually disaster food stamps are available only in areas where
the disaster occurred. This new policy authorized states across the
country to provide the maximum monthly food stamp benefits to Katrina
victims for up to 3 months.^10 Seventeen states, including the 4
hurricane-affected states--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas--issued disaster food stamps to evacuees.
With the new evacuee policy and significant need for disaster food stamps
in the hurricane-affected states, caseloads for the Disaster Food Stamp
Program far exceeded those of any previous disaster. For example, USDA
issued $274 million for disaster food stamp assistance during the 2004
disaster season. In contrast, USDA issued over $680 million for disaster
food stamp assistance to close to 1.5 million households as a result of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Figure 3 shows the number of households that
received disaster food stamps in each hurricane-affected state and in all
other states. Households who would not normally qualify for regular food
stamps because of their income or resources could apply for and receive
disaster food stamps if they met certain program requirements.
^10USDA revised the evacuee policy after it was issued to include
hurricane evacuees who relocated to another area within their home state.
Figure 3: Disaster Food Stamp Recipients under Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Note: Disaster food stamp numbers for the hurricane affected states
include both disaster food stamps paid to hurricane victims in the
hurricane-affected states and to evacuees from other states. States were
not required by USDA to report the number of evacuees they served.
Therefore, these totals may exclude some evacuee recipients because some
states reported evacuees served and some did not.
Caseloads for regular food stamps also increased following the hurricanes.
As shown in figure 4, Louisiana and Texas experienced a dramatic rise in
new recipients of regular food stamps following Hurricane Katrina. The
number of recipients continued to rise after Hurricane Rita. Alabama and
Mississippi had smaller but significant increases in their caseloads.
Figure 4: Food Stamp Recipients in Hurricane-Affected States, August to
December 2005
Note: Numbers reflect recipients of regular food stamps only, not disaster
food stamps.
In addition to new applicants applying for disaster food stamps, in the
affected areas most regular Food Stamp Program recipients received
benefits to replace food destroyed in the disaster as well as automatic
supplements without having to apply at a disaster site. According to USDA,
Alabama issued $4.3 million in supplemental benefits to almost 30,000
households. Mississippi provided supplemental benefits to over 224,000
households, totaling more than $24.1 million. Louisiana provided 282,626
households with over $33.3 million in supplemental benefits as a result of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
UI and DUA programs: More than half a million people lost their jobs
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--as a result the UI program had a
sharp rise in applicants for regular UI and DUA benefits. Regular UI
claims increased across all four states following Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. (See fig. 5.) Louisiana and Mississippi experienced a substantial
jump in UI claims after Hurricane Katrina. For example, in Louisiana,
regular UI claims increased by approximately 134, 000 in September
2005--an increase of over 900 percent.
Figure 5: UI Claims in Hurricane Affected States, August to December 2005
The DUA program received a greater number of applications following the
hurricanes than for any other disaster in the history of the program. Over
233,000 DUA claims were filed, compared with just over 7,000 filed after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, according to Labor data. (See fig. 6.)
In addition, on March 6, 2006, Congress extended DUA benefits for eligible
individuals for an additional 13 weeks beyond the 26 weeks DUA is
typically payable.^11 As shown in figure 6, this caused an additional
surge in claims. The majority of DUA claims were filed in
Louisiana--almost 185,000. According to Labor, after hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, a total of $413.7 million was paid in DUA benefits to
beneficiaries from the four affected states--far more than FEMA paid
following any disaster or in any other year in the 32-year history of the
program.
^11The Katrina Emergency Assistance Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-176.
Figure 6: DUA Initial Applications Nationwide, January 2001 to August 2006
Although hurricane evacuees may file for UI and DUA benefits in the state
to which they evacuated, they receive benefits from the state where they
were employed. Therefore, the increase in UI claims reflects an increase
in workloads both for the state where the claims were taken, and for the
state where the claims were adjudicated and benefits paid. For example, in
Texas 38,000 Louisiana evacuees received UI and DUA benefits during
November 2005. Almost 300,000 Louisiana evacuees across the country
received over $1 billion in regular UI and DUA benefits following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
TANF: The TANF program also experienced an increase in workloads as new
federal funding became available for evacuees. Congress passed legislation
on September 21, 2005, to ease states' access to the existing TANF
contingency and loan funds.^12 We had previously reported that the
contingency fund, as originally established in 1996, has not proven to be
an inviting option to states in need for several reasons, including the
requirement that states use increased amounts of their own funds to be
eligible for the additional federal funds.^13 The post-hurricane
legislation eliminated this funding requirement and gave all states that
were assisting hurricane victims immediate access to TANF contingency
funds to provide short-term, nonrecurrent payments to evacuees from
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The maximum contingency fund
amount each state was eligible to receive was 20 percent of its annual
TANF block grant. In total, 20 states requested TANF contingency funds to
provide emergency cash assistance to evacuees.^14 (See fig. 7.)
Information on the total hurricane victim and evacuee TANF caseload is not
readily available, however. HHS asked states to report on the total number
of newly approved evacuee families receiving TANF cash assistance or
nonrecurrent, short-term benefits through the end of October 2005, but
reporting did not continue beyond that time. Based on our interviews with
hurricane-affected states, we have some indication that regular TANF
caseloads were not affected overall, but the evacuee program contributed
to increased workloads in those states that provided emergency benefits.
^12TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-68.
^13Our previous report noted that the usefulness of the contingency fund
could be improved for hard-pressed states if Congress eliminated
restrictive requirements for states to provide a share of contingency
funding, and limits on the amount of contingency funds to which each state
has access. (See GAO, Welfare Reform: Challenges in Maintaining a
Federal-State Fiscal Partnership, [36]GAO-01-828 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
10, 2001) and GAO, Welfare Reform: Challenges in Saving for a "Rainy Day,"
[37]GAO-01-674T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2001).
^14Regional HHS officials we interviewed said that some states may not
have accessed contingency funds because they did not get many evacuees,
and some states thought they had sufficient resources to enroll evacuees
in their own TANF program.
Figure 7: States That Requested TANF Contingency Funds Following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
In addition, Congress gave Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi access to
TANF loan funds--a loan in name only, not expected to be repaid--to
support hurricane victims within their own state. These states were given
access to an additional 20 percent of their block grant amounts.
Mississippi and Alabama chose to implement emergency TANF programs for
hurricane-affected residents of their own states that were consistent with
the one time, emergency payments they provided to evacuees from other
states. Instead of providing emergency payments, Louisiana established a
contract with Louisiana Family Recovery Corps to provide services such as
mental health services to families across the state that were displaced by
the hurricanes.
Social Security and SSI: SSI and Social Security experienced a significant
increase in requests for immediate payments following the hurricanes, but
did not have a large rise in new applicants. From August 31, 2005, to
October 31, 2005, 110,141 immediate payments were made nationwide. This is
a dramatic increase when compared to similar time periods in previous
years. For example, in 2004, 23,697 immediate payments were issued
nationwide during the same time period. While Social Security and SSI
programs did not experience a large increase in new applicants after the
hurricanes, these programs may see an increase over time. SSA officials we
interviewed said that some hurricane victims may have long-term health
issues, making them eligible for SSI and/or Social Security Disability
Insurance.^15 Others who are eligible may eventually choose to retire and
apply for Social Security.
^15SSI is based on financial need and Social Security Disability Insurance
is based on having a Social Security earnings record.
Figure 8: Nationwide Social Security and SSI Immediate Payments, August 31
to October 31, 2003, through 2006
Disaster Planning, Service Delivery Options, and Access to Funding Facilitated
Response, but Not All Programs Had These Measures in Place
Disaster planning, flexible service delivery options, and access to
federal contingency funds helped facilitate programs' hurricane response,
but not all programs had these measures in place. Programs with
pre-existing disaster plans in place were better positioned than other
programs to meet the unprecedented demand for services. Some programs had
flexibility and preexisting service delivery options that facilitated
taking applications and issuing benefits. These included call centers,
Internet application processes, and debit card systems to pay benefits.
Some programs put new procedures and systems in place to expedite services
and pay benefits, but in some cases, officials encountered difficulties
implementing new options. In addition, access to federal contingency funds
was also important for expediting services, and Congress and agencies
acted quickly to address immediate funding needs.
Programs with Disaster Plans for Service Delivery Were Better Prepared to
Address Unprecedented Demand
Social Security and SSI were the only programs for which the federal
government had authority for service delivery and had disaster policies
and procedures already in place to respond to emergencies and disasters.
SSA used FEMA guidance to develop COOP plans for the Social Security and
SSI programs. SSA was prepared to set up temporary, full-service offices
because the agency has an agreement with the General Services
Administration (GSA) to secure trailers and leased office space on short
notice. Other plans enabled SSA to communicate with more than 1,200 SSA
employees directly affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. On a routine
basis, SSA employees are given telephone numbers to call to receive
instructions during emergencies. SSA also provided detailed guidance to
regional offices and offices that serve the public and required them to
have plans in place. The regional officials we contacted told us they
review offices' plans annually and require managers to review procedures
with staff periodically.
While SSA had clear federal lines of authority for all aspects of program
service delivery during disasters, the other agencies we reviewed did not.
Federal planning requirements and guidance vary across the
state-administered federal programs. The Food Stamp Act requires states to
have plans to address certain events related to operating a Disaster Food
Stamp Program. USDA additionally provides states guidance in a number of
areas such as strategies for issuing food stamp benefits when routine
procedures cannot be used.^16 States must review disaster food stamp
program plans annually, make revisions as necessary, and submit revisions
to USDA. According to USDA officials, states generally run a large-scale
disaster food stamp program at off-site locations such as civic centers or
sports stadiums that can accommodate more applicants than local food stamp
offices could serve. Food Stamp Program officials in Mississippi had a
partnership with the state emergency management agency to provide tents,
water, security personnel, and other necessities. In contrast, there are
no federal requirements for states to develop disaster plans for the UI,
DUA, and TANF programs, and Labor and HHS officials told us they have not
provided states guidance on the issue; therefore, states have flexibility
in developing disaster plans.
However, even with disaster planning for the Food Stamp Program, we found
that some local Food Stamp Program and TANF offices in the states we
reviewed were overwhelmed in the aftermath of the hurricanes. Similarly,
some local UI programs were also unprepared for a large-scale disaster.
Local food stamp, TANF, and UI officials we visited in Louisiana reported
difficulty finding supplies, additional security, and facilities to manage
the large volume of people seeking services. In an extreme example,
Hurricane Rita damaged the food stamp/TANF office in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, destroying most of the building, furnishings, and equipment.
(See fig. 9.) After Hurricane Rita, officials relocated to another office,
but initially did not have any state or federal assistance to find
supplies and basic office equipment as well as security and other
assistance to manage large crowds of people seeking disaster food stamps.
At first, local officials used their personal cell phones to conduct
business.
^16Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), USDA, Electronic Benefit Transfer
(EBT) Disaster Plan Guide, (Alexandria, Virginia: October 2000) and FNS
Handbook 320 Disaster Food Stamp Program, (Alexandria, Virginia: 2005).
USDA plans to issue an update of the handbook in 2007.
Figure 9: Lake Charles Food Stamp and TANF Program Office Damaged by
Hurricane Rita
Flexible Service Delivery Options Helped Expedite Applications and Ensure
Payments, but Not All Programs Had These Options in Place
Programs that had flexible service delivery options in place before the
hurricanes or could quickly implement them were better positioned to
manage increased demand and the mobility of evacuees than other programs.
These service delivery options included: flexible staffing, options for
taking applications, and alternatives for issuing benefits.
Flexible Staffing
Social Security and SSI had greater flexibility than state-administered
federal programs to shift staffing where needed. SSA deployed 171
employees from across the country to help out in areas serving large
numbers of hurricane victims. SSA shifted all workloads from offices
forced to close to other offices and opened temporary locations in GSA
trailers or in other federal buildings. The Food Stamp and UI programs
shifted staff from other duties and other locations within their states to
address increased demand for services. For example, Florida officials sent
food stamp eligibility workers from other parts of the state to the
panhandle area, where evacuees were concentrated. However, even with
additional staff, some programs in Louisiana and Mississippi did not have
enough staff statewide to meet demand.
State-administered federal programs also relied on temporary workers and
help from other states, but these arrangements were not always in place.
UI officials in Texas, who were prepared to hire temporary workers as part
of routine operations, could quickly recruit workers for call centers.
While other states offered to help, Food Stamp and UI program officials in
hurricane-affected states did not have arrangements in place before the
hurricanes to easily make use of out-of-state workers. USDA, Labor, and
the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA)--a professional
association of state and local human services program officials--helped
recruit workers from other states. This included helping to work through
agreements and logistics for out-of-state workers, but in some cases,
these arrangements were cumbersome. For example, it took about 5 weeks to
work out an agreement for Texas to help take UI claims for Louisiana,
according to regional Labor officials. In total, 15 states sent about 163
Food Stamp Program workers, and 21 states sent workers or helped take UI
and DUA claims for the hurricane-affected states.
Options to Take Applications
SSA had application options in place for Social Security and SSI that
facilitated its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Even though these
programs did not experience a sharp increase in new applications, they had
the following options in place:
o nationwide 800 number,
o call centers,
o an Internet application process, and
o electronic data exchanges among states for birth certificates
and other documents needed for new claims or for reconstructing
lost paper files.
SSA relied on its telephone and Internet services to serve those who were
newly eligible, as well as those already receiving services. In addition,
SSA had software in place that enabled its staff to flag applicants from
disaster-affected areas for expedited service.
State-administered federal programs with application options that were not
dependent on in-office visits were better positioned to respond to
significant increases in applications and to evacuees crossing state lines
than other programs. Before the hurricanes, application options for the
Food Stamp, TANF, and UI programs varied by state. (See table 3.)
Table 3: Program Application Options before the Hurricanes, by State
Source: GAO analysis of program information from SSA, HHS, USDA, and Labor
and states.
aSSI applicants can complete disability reports online, but must complete
an interview in person or over the phone to apply for benefits.
bMost supplemental and replacement benefits were done automatically
without the need for an application form.
^cIn Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, some exceptions are made
for special needs cases to allow individuals to apply via telephone.
Some states adopted new forms and procedures to expedite processing of
applications after Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana and Mississippi developed
an abbreviated, Web-based application form for UI and DUA. Texas officials
developed an abbreviated application form for the Food Stamp Program and
implemented an online system to input applications with laptop computers.
Florida officials also developed a shortened application to run an
emergency TANF program for hurricane evacuees and changed their online
application so individuals could self-identify if they did not have the
required documentation. Food stamp employees in Alabama and Mississippi
manually completed simplified application forms at sites designated for
disaster food stamps and sent the forms to a centralized data entry
location to expedite processing.
The UI programs in Louisiana and Mississippi adapted call center
technology to completely change the way UI and DUA claims were taken in
their states. Before Hurricane Katrina, both states mainly required
in-office visits for filing claims. After the hurricane, the Mississippi
UI program set up call centers to take UI and DUA claims. In addition,
Labor helped Mississippi and Louisiana route calls from their residents to
UI claims takers in other states with call centers--an action that had
never been taken before. At the same time, interstate claims presented
some challenges to the UI program. In Louisiana and Mississippi, phone
service was disrupted in some areas, and the few operational phone lines,
overwhelmed with calls, were busy for extended periods. Other states
taking claims for Louisiana and Mississippi could not easily get applicant
information from program officials. A national client advocacy group told
us that some hurricane victims grew frustrated and gave up.
Options for Issuing Benefits
For Social Security, SSI, and the Food Stamp Program, benefit payment
methods are determined on a federal level and are consistent across
states. (See table 4.) Payment procedures for the UI program and TANF are
determined by each state and can vary across states.
Table 4: Program Benefit Payment Methods before the Hurricanes, by State
Source: GAO analysis of program information from SSA, HHS, USDA, Labor and
states.
aProgram recipients use electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards.
SSA could provide immediate emergency checks nationwide--an important
measure because Hurricane Katrina disrupted mail delivery of monthly
Social Security checks, and many SSA and SI beneficiaries in the
hurricane-affected areas were dependent on this income source. The
emergency payments were not the usual U.S. Treasury checks, but
third-party drafts drawn on a commercial bank and often completed by hand.
After Hurricane Katrina hit, SSA asked the vendor to produce a large
supply of these blank checks quickly and developed a letter for financial
institutions to help authenticate the third-party draft checks. SSA also
worked with the Louisiana Banking Association to help reassure banks that
the checks were legitimate.
Programs that had debit card systems before the hurricanes were able to
provide benefits without interruption, but some experienced challenges
processing and issuing benefits. Food stamp recipients use electronic
benefit transfer (EBT) cards with personal identification numbers (PIN),
which work much like debit cards. These cards can be used across all
states with the exception of cards issued by the state of Wyoming.^17 The
Food Stamp and TANF programs in all the states we interviewed use debit
card systems for both food stamps and TANF and could continue paying
benefits to those who evacuated or relocated to other states. However,
Louisiana experienced some disruption in activating new debit cards
because the 800 number used to provide PINs was routed through New
Orleans, where the telephone lines were down. The state's EBT vendor set
up a system to issue debit cards with pre-selected PINs until the 800
number was restored. In addition, some retailers did not know how to
process EBT transactions manually in areas where telephone service and
electronic communications were disrupted. The Louisiana UI program,
overwhelmed in efforts to issue unemployment checks, rushed to implement a
debit card system and encountered a number of challenges. For example, it
was difficult to distribute debit cards to evacuees located around the
state and country.
Table 5 presents a summary of strategies we identified that facilitated
hurricane response for taking applications and paying benefits, as well as
actions to consider for disaster planning. Some practices were specific to
planning and preparing for disasters. Others were steps programs were
taking to streamline procedures and use technology to improve routine
program operations, such as online applications and call centers.
^17For this report, EBT cards will be referred to as debit cards.
Table 5: Lessons Learned about Strategies to Facilitate Response and
Considerations for Disaster Planning
Source: GAO analysis of program information from and interviews with SSA,
USDA, Labor, HHS, states, and professional and advocacy organizations.
Additional Funding Was Available for Increased Costs, but Some Funding
Questions Remain for State-Administered Federal Programs
The availability of federal and state funds to meet the increased demand
for assistance was key to facilitating program response, although the
funding structure varied greatly among the programs. Funding varies as to
the source--federal funds, state funds, or a combination--and as to
whether the funding levels are fixed or open-ended entitlements from which
eligible applicants are guaranteed receipt. (See table 6.) For Social
Security and SSI, federal funding was available and there were no funding
constraints that limited SSA's ability to deliver services. In contrast,
all other programs had some role for states to share costs or a new
federal funding source was made available, creating some uncertainty and
confusion.
Table 6: Program Funding
Source: GAO analysis of SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS program information.
aAll individuals who qualify for Social Security or UI receive assistance.
However, these programs are traditionally considered to be different from
other entitlement programs because they have work history requirements.
bFederal SSI benefits are augmented by state funds in some states.
cLoan funds are loans in name only--states are not expected to repay them.
Congress used its existing authority to appropriate these funds under the
loan program, but the loans were intended to function similar to the
contingency funds.
dThere is a spending cap on the amount states may spend of their federal
TANF funds and their state maintenance-of-effort funds on certain
administrative activities.
USDA provided some additional funding to address increased demand for
disaster food stamps and regular foods stamps. This included paying 50
percent of the administrative costs to have food stamp workers from other
states help the hurricane-affected states. In addition, USDA reimbursed
Florida for sending teams of state officials to Louisiana and Mississippi
to provide technical assistance on setting up disaster sites.
Congress provided access to TANF contingency funds for any state to be
reimbursed for providing short-term, one time payments to evacuees, but
some states may not have been prepared to run such a program.^18 According
to HHS officials, some states had rules and procedures to run a one-time
emergency program as part of their regular TANF program and others did
not. For example, states such as Arkansas modified their state TANF plans
to operate an emergency program. However, HHS officials said that some
states may have needed approval from their state legislature, which could
have prevented them from implementing an emergency program for evacuees in
a timely manner. In addition, HHS officials also said that restrictions
associated with the Katrina contingency funds may have discouraged states
from using the funding. For example, contingency funds had to be provided
directly to hurricane victims, and states were prohibited from using the
funds to pay third parties such as child care providers. Given concerns
about potential fraud and abuse, states may have considered it more
appropriate to pay third parties for services rather than giving money to
hurricane victims.
^18By providing cash assistance through short-term, one-time payments,
recipients do not need to meet federal work requirements or time limits on
assistance that are in place for ongoing cash aid funded with other
federal TANF funds.
Labor provided funds to hurricane-affected states to help the UI program
address increased demand, but Labor and state officials we interviewed
said the payment process for DUA is time-consuming and may not cover all
costs incurred during major disasters. Labor provided additional funds to
hurricane-affected states that helped them repair damaged facilities, hire
temporary workers, and reimburse states that helped take UI claims. Labor
officials said they had some reserve administrative funding available
because unemployment claims had been lower than expected before the
hurricanes. However, Labor officials also said that during a normal
program year, these funds would not have been available. In contrast, FEMA
funds both benefits and administrative costs for DUA. Labor and some state
officials we interviewed said that the DUA funding process is
time-consuming. In some cases, states had to borrow state funds to
continue paying benefits or withhold disaster benefits while waiting for
funding. Funding requests go through various levels of approval at both
Labor and FEMA--ranging from 8 to 32 days--and states may need to repeat
the process multiple times because funding is provided in small
increments. (See fig. 10.) In addition, FEMA does not reimburse states for
the administrative costs of taking DUA claims that are denied. Labor
officials said that when a large number of DUA claims are taken, states
have to absorb the costs for denied claims. For example, Alabama UI
officials said that about 44 percent of their DUA claims for Hurricane
Katrina were denied. Labor also noted that FEMA does not reimburse states
for automation of DUA claims processing or DUA-related disaster
preparedness and said it hopes to work with FEMA on these issues.
Figure 10: DUA Payment Process
Gaps in Disaster Response Remain; Efforts Under Way Hold Promise for Improving
Human Service Programs' Disaster Response
Gaps remain in the areas of preventing improper payments, easing access to
services, and improving disaster planning for state-administered programs,
although efforts are under way that may address these areas. As program
officials relaxed some program rules to better ensure that those eligible
received aid, the risk of improper payments increased. Some efforts are
under way to identify improper payments that occurred and whether
sufficient internal controls were in place. Even though some efforts were
made to ease individuals' access to aid, disaster victims still faced
difficulties accessing aid from the multiple human service programs
providing it, a long-standing problem even under routine conditions. In
addition, federal agencies have taken steps designed to improve states
planning for service delivery for the Food Stamp, UI, and DUA programs,
although HHS needs more information on the planning needs of state TANF
programs. In response to the White House study on hurricane response, HHS
has taken initial steps to work with states and other federal agencies to
explore ways to improve the delivery of human services for disaster
victims. More attention to specific plans for collecting and disseminating
promising practices and exploring case management approaches would
strengthen this promising effort.
Programs Faced Challenges Balancing Program Integrity with Access to Services
after the Hurricanes
Balancing program access with preventing improper payments is a
long-standing challenge states face in their daily operations that became
more apparent following the hurricanes. In the wake of the hurricanes,
verification rules typically in place for state-administered programs were
sometimes eased to help individuals who lacked documents customarily used
to establish identity or eligibility to be assisted by programs. For
example, USDA allowed states to accept a signed affidavit as proof of
identity from food stamp applicants who lacked identity documents and
postponed verifying disaster victims' eligibility for benefits until
December 2005.^19 Alabama officials we interviewed also said they allowed
TANF applicants to self-declare their eligibility. Labor waived rules to
allow states to pay DUA benefits based on applicants' self-reported
employment information and allowed applicants 90 days to submit supporting
documents. To facilitate UI and DUA payments, Louisiana automatically gave
claimants 12 weeks of benefits and suspended requirements for them to make
weekly reports to confirm their continuing eligibility.^20 Officials for
these state-administered programs acknowledged that they focused on easing
access to services to meet people's needs during the disaster while at the
same time realizing that relaxing controls to provide emergency payments
may have increased risks for improper payments.
^19 Individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina were not asked non-financial
questions that would affect their eligibility and states' verification of
individuals' eligibility, unless questionable, was postponed until
December 2005. States accepting applications from evacuees were still
expected to verify identity and other eligibility factors such as
residency and resources when possible or when deemed questionable.
Immediately following the hurricanes, it was also sometimes difficult for
states to take their usual preventive measures to screen applicants to
determine if they were currently participating in or had provided false
information to the program to which they applied. States sometimes took
special measures to determine applicants' eligibility for program
assistance. For example, in Florida, food stamp program integrity
officials were present at application intake sites to monitor for
suspicious activity and review questionable cases. Alabama and Florida
sent food stamp applications to centralized locations for electronic
processing where the states' computer systems were used to identify
current program participation within their respective states.^21
States also took measures to identify ineligible individuals after making
payments. When victims applied to programs in other states, program
administrators for some of the states we reviewed told us they usually
contacted the applicant's home state to determine if the applicant was
already enrolled in the home state's program. However, because the
telephone services were unavailable for prolonged periods in some
areas--parts of Louisiana were without service for about 6 weeks--state
officials sometimes could not use routine procedures to determine whether
out-of-state evacuees were receiving food stamps or disaster food stamps
in their home states. In such situations, some states used other measures
to identify ineligible individuals. For example, the American Public Human
Services Association asked states to send Louisiana lists of evacuees
receiving food stamp benefits in their state to ensure Louisiana knew
individuals were receiving food stamp benefits while out of state. HHS
regional officials in Dallas said that New Mexico and Oklahoma took the
initiative to notify Louisiana when they enrolled evacuees in their TANF
programs. For the UI program, Labor worked with businesses to make sure
employers notified Louisiana of workers who returned to work. Following
the hurricanes, Louisiana began matching its state's UI participant rolls
to the National Directory of New Hires to identify individuals working in
other states and therefore ineligible to receive UI benefits.^22 As for
the TANF program, in 2006 Louisiana began monitoring TANF debit card use
to identify participants who resided out-of-state and were therefore no
longer be eligible for TANF.
^20Under state law, Louisiana has the flexibility to suspend certain rules
or regulations that may prevent or hinder providing necessary services to
help cope with an emergency. Labor officials said that even though they
understood why Louisiana provided 12 weeks of benefits and suspended
weekly reporting requirements, it advised the state that taking this
action created a conflict with federal Unemployment Compensation law and
DUA regulations.
^21As required by the Food Stamp Act, USDA and the states have a quality
control system in place for regular food stamp payments. The act
additionally requires the states to have a fraud prevention plan when
operating the disaster food stamp program.
Our work and that of the programs' IG offices have highlighted programs'
vulnerability to fraud when providing assistance to disaster victims. In
the case of FEMA assistance, we reported that the lack of appropriate
controls for confirming disaster victims' eligibility for assistance
resulted in millions of dollars in questionable payments.^23 Like FEMA,
making payments to disaster victims increased the programs' we reviewed
risk for fraud. The SSA IG and the USDA IG found reasonable controls were
in place to prevent and detect improper payments for the Social Security
and SSI programs and for the Food Stamp Programs in Alabama and Florida.
The USDA IG has conducted a similar review for Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas and plans to issue its report in early 2007. The Labor IG has issued
several management letters to Labor program officials to assist them in
reducing potential fraud. These letters reported some potential fraud such
as individuals receiving multiple UI and/or DUA benefits in Louisiana or
Mississippi, while also receiving other work-related assistance from the
same or another state. The HHS IG has not conducted or planned any work
specifically related to TANF assistance provided hurricane victims,
although it has looked more generally at improper payments under selected
states' TANF programs. Under the TANF block grant, states bear the main
fiscal risk of improper payments although the federal government has an
interest in ensuring funds are properly spent.^24
^22The National Directory of New Hires is a federal-level database of
information on newly hired employees nationwide.
^23GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse, [38]GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
^24GAO, TANF and Child Care Programs; HHS Lacks Adequate Information to
Assess Risk and Assist States in Managing Improper Payments,
[39]GAO-04-723 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004).
Hurricanes Highlighted the Long-standing Challenge to Ease Individuals' Access
to Multiple Programs
Disaster victims also faced difficulty accessing needed aid from multiple
programs providing assistance, another long-standing problem even under
routine conditions. Our earlier work has highlighted the cumbersome
process that applicants who are eligible for more than one form of aid
have to go through to apply for each program.^25 They typically visit
several different program offices and repeatedly provide some of the same
information for each application. The difficulty of seeking aid from
multiple programs and providers can be exacerbated during disasters. For
example, we previously reported that when multiple charitable
organizations offered assistance to victims of the September 11
terrorists' attacks, victims faced a maze of service providers and felt
that they needed help finding and accessing the available assistance.^26
A review of the overall federal response as well as our work pointed out
some of the situations faced by those seeking aid after the hurricanes.
The 2006 White House study of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina
reported that some efforts to assist those in need were undermined by
difficulties victims encountered in their attempts to obtain program
services. For example, the report noted that the disaster recovery centers
established to help victims were not always set up to take applications
for all services needed or to assist victims with services they were
currently receiving. Similarly, an advocacy group for low-income families
that we interviewed said it was especially difficult for hurricane victims
with children or without transportation to visit more than one location to
apply for multiple programs.
Our previous work indicates that service delivery challenges posed by
multiple providers can be mitigated if sufficient attention is paid to
enhancing coordination among service providers and on easing access to
aid. As we noted in our report on assistance provided after September 11,
the existence of established working relationships among relevant federal
programs and states--with frequent contacts and an understanding of each
other's roles and responsibilities--can make a difference in performance
in the chaos of a disaster. In that report, we also noted that regarding
easing access to aid for those eligible, several strategies can help
improve access. These include the following:
^25GAO, Means-Tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility is
Cumbersome and Can Be Simplified, [40]GAO-02-58 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2,
2001).
^26GAO, September 11: More Effective Collaboration could Enhance
Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters, [41]GAO-03-259
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002).
1. a clearinghouse of available assistance can help inform victims
in need of aid;
2. the provision of case management services can help to identify
gaps in service, target aid to those most in need, and provide aid
over the long term;^27
3. the adoption of a simplified, one-stop application process that
could minimize applicants' burden by streamlining the process and
might include questions that can help to minimize fraud and abuse;
and
4. data sharing across programs, in addition to easing the
application process, could help to reduce the risks of improper
payments due to duplicate payments and reduce the costs of program
administration.^28
While any data-sharing efforts face challenging privacy issues and
inherent differences in program requirements, they hold potential for
improving access for people in need as well as more efficient program
administration.^29
Programs Are Taking Steps to Improve Disaster Preparedness, but Gaps Remain for
TANF
The states we reviewed are exploring a variety of initiatives to improve
disaster preparedness for the Food Stamp, UI, and DUA programs, as shown
in table 7. For example, Florida officials said they plan to train UI
claim takers statewide to take DUA applications as a way to increase
staffing levels when needed. Also, as a way to expedite disaster food
stamp processing, Alabama is developing a Web-based application form to
allow clients to pre-register online and take completed forms to
application processing sites. On the other hand, initiatives to develop
formal disaster preparedness plans for the TANF program were not being
taken by any of the states we reviewed. As discussed earlier, no federal
requirements exist for TANF disaster planning at the state level.
^27In some human service programs, program funds may be used for case
management services. Also, recent amendments to the Stafford Act allow the
use of federal funds for case management under certain conditions. Pub. L
No. 109-295.
^28GAO, Human Service Programs: Demonstration Projects Could Identify Ways
to Simplify Policies and Facilitate Technology Enhancements to Reduce
Administrative Costs, [42]GAO-06-942 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2006).
^29For more information on data sharing challenges, see GAO, The Challenge
of Data Sharing: Results of a GAO-Sponsored Symposium on Benefit and Loan
Programs, [43]GAO-01-67 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2000).
Table 7: Some of the Initiatives States We Reviewed Are Exploring to
Improve Disaster Preparedness
Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by states.
At the federal level, SSA headquarters administrators are taking actions
to help improve disaster preparedness for Social Security and SSI program
services. After responding to an emergency or disaster situation, SSA
routinely solicits feedback from SSA employees involved in its disaster
response to identify lessons learned. SSA uses the feedback it receives to
compile lessons learned and to revise the agency's disaster strategies.
For example, SSA officials we interviewed noted they sometimes needed a
means to contact other government agencies outside of normal work hours.
In light of the recent feedback, SSA formally compiled information for
contacting key U.S. Department of the Treasury officials around the clock
if events arise concerning payments to SSA customers. SSA issued a memo
reminding all regions of the employee emergency 800-number and the
procedures for providing employees cards that contain the number. Also,
beginning in 2007, SSA plans to take additional steps to remind employees
of the importance of knowing the agency's emergency contact procedures. In
addition to broadly sharing information within the agency, SSA also shares
its experiences with postal delivery and customers' benefit payments with
the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Department of the Treasury, respectively.
Federal officials for the Food Stamp Program are also pursuing initiatives
to improve disaster preparedness for this program. USDA sponsored a
national meeting that representatives from all states attended to discuss
food stamp debit card issues and plans to revise the current Disaster Food
Stamp Program Handbook to highlight some of the strategies states used for
Hurricane Katrina and to clearly outline all the waiver choices available
to states.
Labor is also taking steps to improve disaster preparedness for the UI
program. Labor officials said that an assessment conducted after Hurricane
Katrina found that most states are not adequately prepared for emergencies
that exceed their processing capacity for the UI program. To help states
prepare for future disasters, Labor established a new DUA coordinator
position to assist state coordinators when needed and provided
recommendations to FEMA to streamline the DUA funding process. In
addition, Labor has contracted to document federal and state UI program
administrators' lessons learned, assess state UI disaster preparedness,
and draw on the disaster strategies of others such as SSA and FEMA. The
contractor also plans to help Labor develop issue papers with
recommendations for improving disaster preparedness. Time will tell
whether these steps will lead to improved preparedness among state
programs or whether additional guidance from Labor will be warranted.
HHS has taken some steps to work with states on disaster preparedness for
the TANF program but does not have plans to work more systematically with
all states to assess whether additional planning is needed. HHS said that
officials in its Atlanta office, covering Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee,
reviewed these states' overall state disaster preparedness plans, noting
how widely these plans varied in the degree of detailed information
included. This region took other actions, including sharing practices
within the hurricane-affected region. For example, HHS regional staff held
meetings in 2006 with state commissioners and program representatives for
TANF and other HHS programs in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi. HHS said
it had plans to visit three additional states to discuss disaster
preparedness if travel funds permit. HHS also said that TANF disaster
preparedness is a state responsibility and, as we noted earlier, there are
no specific federal requirements for state TANF programs to have plans in
place. In addition, HHS has noted its lack of authority to regulate
states. In creating the TANF block grant, Congress emphasized the
importance of state flexibility, and to that end, legislation restricted
HHS' regulatory authority over the states except to the extent expressly
provided in the law. With states having flexibility in developing disaster
plans as well as HHS' limited role, HHS does not have any systematic
information on states' preparedness nationwide for providing TANF
assistance in disasters.
Federal Efforts to Improve Delivery of Human Services during Disasters Hold
Promise
In response to the White House study recommendations for improving human
service programs response to disaster, HHS has taken steps to clarify and
enhance its national role in coordinating emergency human services within
the existing structure of the National Response Plan.^30 Human services
refer to a broad array of federal programs that can provide disaster
assistance to victims, including the ones we address in this report and
others. The White House study contained a number of recommendations that
echo our findings in this report and in our previous work related to
improving service delivery. Selected study recommendations are shown in
table 8.
Table 8: Selected White House Report Recommendations to HHS to Improve the
Delivery of Human Services during Disasters
Source: GAO analysis of the recommendations contained in the White House
study.
In response to the White House study recommendations issued in February
2006, HHS has developed a strategy to facilitate delivery of emergency
human services at multiple levels within HHS and across other federal
programs providing human services. To oversee its efforts, HHS identified
human services coordinators within the Secretary's Office of Public Health
Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) and the Administration for Children and
Families (ACF), which oversees the TANF program as well as other key
programs that provide aid to low-income and vulnerable individuals and
families. HHS has also created an interagency human services work group to
compile information on ways to improve human services programs' response
to a disaster and to establish a mechanism to coordinate planning for
service delivery among federal agencies.
^30HHS' strategy is designed to better integrate the delivery of human
services into the National Response Plan's Emergency Support Function
6--the delivery of mass care, housing, and human services; the coordinator
for this support function is DHS.
HHS' efforts also include links to state program agencies, which are
important when states have key service delivery responsibilities that
determine response. At the regional level, ACF human services coordinators
will work with state and federal agencies and non-government organizations
to coordinate planning efforts to address human services needs during
disasters. At the local level, ACF regional administrators will coordinate
support for state agencies administering HHS programs, and to the extent
possible, for other federal human service programs.
In addition, other HHS efforts are under way:
o On the basis of input on major human services needs during the
Hurricane Katrina response, HHS is creating an inventory of the
federal infrastructure and resources (such as databases of
emergency volunteers or federally funded health centers) available
to assist disaster victims as well as information on existing
federal waiver authorities that can help human services programs
adjust to meet disaster needs.
o For future disasters, HHS is working with states to ensure that
they have a plan to use disaster recovery centers to enroll
individuals in HHS programs. HHS plans to have staff on-site at
disaster recovery centers to help states enroll and re-enroll
disaster victims in human services programs at a single location.
HHS participation at the disaster recovery center level would be
in response to a state's request through FEMA and would likely
entail on-site technical assistance.
o HHS solicited and received suggestions from state agencies and
private businesses on the feasibility of using a debit card system
as a simple and efficient means to deliver assistance to disaster
victims. HHS plans to convene a panel that includes persons with
technical and programmatic expertise to evaluate the suggestions
and decide the next steps, which officials said could be to pilot
debit card use.
As HHS continues to develop information on options for facilitating the
delivery of human services to disaster victims, HHS officials say they are
considering other approaches, including case management. More
specifically, HHS noted that many of its programs provide case management
within each program and that its Office of Refugee Resettlement operates a
case management network that could serve as a model for the use of a case
management system for all federal and state programs for major disasters.
However, HHS had not developed further information on this promising
approach, such as a study paper, to facilitate further consideration of
case management. Also, while HHS' efforts have generally focused on
measures program administrators can take to deliver human services
assistance to disaster victims, HHS efforts have not placed as much
emphasis on collecting and sharing information with program administrators
on strategies for mitigating risks for improper payments. Sharing
information on how fraud occurred and on the promising practices that can
be used during emergencies to reduce programs' vulnerability to fraud and
abuse can help program administrators and policymakers make informed
decisions about reasonable controls for emergency payments and provide
enhanced oversight.
HHS' initial approach shows promise and is in keeping with strategies that
are key to enhancing human services programs' response to future events,
discussed earlier, such as involving states and exploring ways to ease
access, such as through case management. HHS will also face hurdles due to
the number of programs involved, the variation in program requirements, as
well as the variation across states and localities in program policies and
service delivery approaches. At the same time, HHS is well positioned to
make progress in this area, particularly because of its expertise in
administering human services programs, experience working with vulnerable
populations typically targeted by these programs, its regional presence,
and its long-standing working relationships with states.
In addition to HHS' efforts focused on human services programs, DHS has
recently created an interagency task force on disaster assistance
coordination, based on an executive order issued in August 2006.^31 The
task force's mission is to improve the promptness and efficiency with
which disaster victims obtain access to federal disaster assistance. Its
initial plan, due by March 2007, will explore several strategies,
including a single and streamlined point of application for assistance; a
clearinghouse that includes information on all forms and sources of
disaster assistance (federal, state, local, and private sector); as well
as controls to reduce improper payments. DHS has formed the interagency
task force, which includes a representative of HHS, and expects to
implement all elements of the plan by December 2008.
HHS officials told us that they are participating on the DHS task force
and have provided some information to DHS about the steps they have taken
to improve disaster response across federal programs. HHS officials said,
however, that the HHS interagency taskforce last convened in August 2006
and will not reconvene until HHS has more clarification on how its efforts
relate to DHS' and where coordination is needed. HHS has developed
timetables for some aspects of the work it plans to do, but these time
frames may change in order to support and not conflict with DHS' work.
Conclusions
The scope and destruction of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought
widespread displacement of residents in affected states, creating
extraordinary challenges for the federal basic support programs we
reviewed and testing these programs' capacities to quickly and effectively
respond. Despite the efforts these programs made to serve those in need,
the magnitude of the challenges exposed differences in programs' disaster
preparedness for the federally administered and the state-administered
programs. While the role of the federal government in disaster
preparedness is clear for the federally administered Social Security and
SSI programs, the role of federal oversight varies for state-administered
federal programs. In these programs, states play an important role in
preparedness and make key decisions about program operations generally. At
the same time, because of the large number of people served and the
significant federal investment in these programs, the federal government
has an important role to play in ensuring that these programs are taking
appropriate steps to prepare nationwide and in facilitating the sharing of
information across states. The steps USDA and Labor are taking should help
state programs increase their preparedness to quickly expand capacity and
better meet increased demand in the event of a major disaster in the
future. While we acknowledge certain restrictions on HHS' ability to
regulate states, HHS needs to know more about state TANF programs'
preparedness to carry out its federal oversight responsibilities.
^31The executive order states that it is the policy of the federal
government that disaster victims eligible for financial or other
assistance delivered by any department or agency of the executive branch
(federal disaster assistance) are to have prompt and efficient access to
federal disaster assistance, as well as information regarding assistance
available from state and local government and private-sector sources.
Federal agencies and states we reviewed are generally taking actions to
improve preparedness of their respective programs. In addition, HHS has
taken a significant step by initiating a broad effort to explore how
preparedness and response can be improved across human services programs.
The inherent difficulties of moving forward on issues that involve
numerous federal agencies as well as states, while at the same time
changing long-standing ways of doing business, call for sustained
attention and leadership commensurate with the daunting challenges.
Sustaining and building upon the existing momentum will not be easy but
could lead to meaningful changes in the future. With appropriate focus and
follow-through, these efforts could result in useful information on
lessons learned and promising approaches that could be widely disseminated
in the near term. In the longer term, these efforts could lead to
coordinated service delivery approaches that are effective and efficient
in getting available assistance to those in need, resulting in an overall
improved response by human services programs in future events. This would
benefit those directly affected by disasters and lead to improved use of
government resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action
In recognition of the importance of HHS' effort to improve the delivery of
human services in future disasters, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS
or his designee take the following steps to strengthen its efforts:
o Work with DHS and its interagency work group to determine the
most efficient and effective way to conduct HHS' work related to
improving the provision of human services during disasters without
duplicating efforts.
o Establish mechanisms for routinely collecting and disseminating
information on promising practices for delivering human services
during disasters. These mechanisms should help ensure that
information can be collected from and provided to state and local
officials directly involved in service delivery, as well as draw
on the experiences of other federal programs. Key areas of focus
should include:
o disaster planning,
o service delivery, and
o eligibility determination and verification
procedures that mitigate risks for making improper
payments during an emergency situation.
o Develop specific information on options for implementing case
management services across federal assistance programs during
disasters, drawing on its human services expertise and in concert
with other federal agencies as appropriate.
In addition, to better ensure the disaster preparedness of the TANF
program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS, as part of its overall
efforts or separately as needed, develop a systematic approach to work
with all states to identify key elements of disaster planning needed for
the TANF program, share this information among states, and take steps to
understand the extent to which all states have these key planning elements
in place, and to consider whether additional actions are warranted to
better ensure disaster preparedness among state TANF programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided SSA, USDA, HHS, and Labor with a draft of this report for
comment. In commenting on the draft, SSA, USDA, and Labor agreed with our
findings as they pertain to their programs. HHS agreed with the three
recommendations related to its recent efforts to improve the delivery of
human services and disagreed with our recommendation to work with states
to address disaster planning for state TANF programs. We also provided DHS
a copy of the draft and incorporated its technical comments as
appropriate. Written comments from SSA, HHS, and Labor appear in
appendixes II, III, and IV.
SSA appreciated being cited for its flexibility and efforts to perform
needed activities and services in the face of many challenges posed by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It also echoed one of the report's themes,
acknowledging the importance of easing access to services in future
emergencies.
In its comments, Labor noted that it hopes to work with FEMA to address
some of the funding issues for administering DUA that we identified as
well as some additional administrative issues and we have added that
information to the report. Labor also noted that some of the steps one of
the states took to facilitate eligible individuals access to UI and DUA
payments created a conflict with Federal Unemployment Compensation law and
DUA regulations for issuing payments. We have added that information to
the report.
Regarding HHS' response to our recommendations, it agreed with our
recommendation about working with DHS and its interagency work group to
improve the delivery of human services during disasters and noted that it
is already participating in these efforts. As our recommendation notes, it
is also important that the HHS and DHS efforts do not duplicate each
other. In addition, HHS agreed with our recommendation about establishing
mechanisms for routinely collecting and disseminating promising practices
for delivering human services during disasters and said it has already
initiated these efforts. HHS also agreed with our recommendation on
developing options for implementing case management services across
federal assistance programs during disasters and noted that it will look
to engage DHS and its interagency work group in collaborating on this
effort.
HHS disagreed with our recommendation that it work with states on TANF
disaster preparedness. HHS stated that it is more appropriate to address
TANF issues as part of its comprehensive cross-program planning efforts,
rather than requiring a separate initiative for TANF, singling it out as a
special case, and reinforcing a "siloed approach" to delivering services.
It also cited its belief that TANF disaster preparedness is an appropriate
state responsibility and that there are no federal requirements for such
planning, as we have already noted in the report. We agree with HHS that
it is essential that its effort to improve human services during disasters
look across multiple programs and not take a fragmented approach. Our
recommendation did not specify the particular approach HHS should take to
work with states to understand their level of preparedness for TANF. HHS
can obtain this information through its cross-program effort or in other
ways and we have clarified our recommendation language to reflect that.
Also, we focus on TANF among HHS programs because it was the HHS program
included in this report; we did not review other HHS programs. We also
understand and believe that we state clearly in the report the limitations
on HHS' authority to regulate states. However, we remain convinced that
HHS, as part of its federal oversight responsibilities, should do more to
obtain systematic information about all state TANF programs to identify
whether additional steps are needed to ensure that this important income
support program for low-income families is prepared for disasters. HHS
also provided some additional information on steps it has taken to explore
TANF preparedness with some states and we have added this information to
the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Social Security
Administration; the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, and Labor; appropriate congressional committees, and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov . Please contact me at (202)
512-7215 if you have any questions about this report. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Barbara D. Bovbjerg
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security
Issues
Congressional Committees
The Honorable Max Baucus
Chairman
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable David Obey
Chairman
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education
and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jim McDermott
Chairman
The Honorable Jerry Weller
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
The Honorable Michael R. McNulty
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Johnson
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Social Security
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives:
Our report addresses the efforts of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (Social Security), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food
Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) programs to provide individuals with financial assistance
in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The federal agencies that
oversee these programs are the Social Security Administration
(SSA)--Social Security and SSI; U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA)--Food Stamp; U.S. Department of Labor (Labor)--UI; and U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--TANF. The focus of our work
is the disaster planning that federal and state agencies carry out
specific to service delivery rather than information technology-related
disaster planning. We designed our study to provide information on (1)
challenges the hurricanes created for the programs to take applications
and pay benefits; (2) measures that helped programs take applications and
pay benefits, and (3) the actions programs are taking to improve future
disaster responses and what else may be needed. We used a mix of
approaches that included (1) reviews of related reports, federal
requirements, and federal and state agency data and (2) contacts with
state, federal, and private-sector officials.
We used data from SSA, USDA, and Labor to quantify the hurricanes' impact
on taking applications and issuing benefit payments. To assess the
reliability of those data elements, we (1) reviewed relevant documentation
and (2) interviewed federal agency officials knowledgeable about the data.
We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. Additional details on our review are presented below.
We visited program offices in Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, and New Orleans,
Louisiana, and in Austin, Houston, and Dallas, Texas. We also conducted
interviews of officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. We conducted
our work from November 2005 through December 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Literature Reviews
To gain an understanding of the challenges programs faced and to identify
issues key to our work, we reviewed others' assessments of governments'
and private-sector hurricane response.^1 We used previously issued GAO
reports to provide information on disaster victims' access to human
service programs and programs' attention to preventing improper payments.
Review of Federal Requirements
We reviewed federal rules for funding program benefit payments and
administrative costs, including (1) the Stafford Act, (2) the QI, TMA, and
Abstinence Programs Extension and Hurricane Katrina Unemployment Relief
Act, and the TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005.^2 Based on
the National Response Plan, Presidential Decision Directive 67, FEMA
Federal Preparedness Circular 65, the Food Stamp Act, and USDA guidance to
states, we developed information on programs' disaster-related
responsibilities. These documents spell out federal requirements for
programs' disaster-related responsibilities. We used the FEMA and USDA
disaster planning guidance to identify key strategies for major disasters.
Contacts with States and State Advocacy Groups
We interviewed state Food Stamp Program, UI, and TANF officials
responsible for program policy and administration to develop information
on their states' disaster response and to obtain related documents. We
visited Louisiana and Texas--states which have sustained significant
damage and both sheltered the greatest number of evacuees--to conduct
in-person interviews with state headquarters officials having policy or
administrative responsibilities. In Louisiana we visited Baton Rouge, Lake
Charles, and New Orleans to interview office managers and staff in two
Food Stamp/TANF^3 and two UI offices to obtain information on their
experiences in providing services following the hurricanes. We
additionally met with a State Disability Determination Services office
manager to obtain information on the hurricanes' effect on SSA disability
workload.^4 In Texas, we visited Austin, Dallas, and Houston to conduct
similar interviews with office managers and staff in two Food Stamp/TANF
offices and one UI call center.
^1U. S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative. (Washington, D.C: Feb. 15, 2006); The White House,
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); and Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina.,OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.:
March 2006).
^2Pub. L. No. 109-91 and Pub. L. No. 109-68, respectively.
^3The states we reviewed generally provided food stamps and TANF services
out of a common office.
Of the states for which major disaster declarations were made for
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we contacted Alabama and Mississippi--the
other states where individuals received federal cash disaster assistance.
We conducted telephone interviews with state headquarters officials also
responsible for program policy and administration to similarly develop
information on their states' disaster response and to obtain
documentation. Based on federal, state, and private-sector officials
identifying Florida as a state employing innovative disaster strategies,
we conducted telephone interviews with Florida Food Stamp, UI, and TANF
program administrators to develop information on their recent experience
with Hurricane Wilma and innovative disaster strategies. Our findings are
limited to the states we reviewed and are not generalizable to other
states.
For each state affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we also attempted
to contact one organization that advocates for populations the programs
serve to obtain advocates' views on programs' hurricane response and areas
warranting attention. The advocacy groups we spoke with are the Center for
Public Policy Priorities, Public Policy Center of Mississippi, and
Southeast Louisiana Legal Services. Finally, as another effort to obtain
states perspectives, we contacted by e-mail the state audit agency for
each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to inquire about any
work they had ongoing or information they could provide related to our
study.
Contacts with Federal Agencies and National Advocacy Groups
At the federal level, we interviewed SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS
headquarters and regional officials responsible for program policy and
administration to obtain information on their disaster response and to
obtain documentation. We conducted interviews with SSA, USDA, Labor, and
HHS officials in headquarters locations and in regional offices for the
states we visited. We additionally visited two offices in Louisiana and
two offices in Texas to interview SSA office managers and staff who
provided Social Security and SSI program services to the public in the
hurricanes' aftermath. As with the states, we conducted telephone
interviews with federal regional officials that oversee the federal basic
support programs in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. We met with HHS
headquarters officials to obtain information on HHS' plans for responding
to the White House's recommendations that it devise and evaluate
strategies to streamline disaster victims' access to human services
programs. We additionally interviewed a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) official to determine DHS' plan to implement the Executive Order
requiring it to chair a task force set up to make recommendations for
improving delivery of federal disaster assistance. At that the time of our
work, each of the respective federal Offices of the Inspectors General
(IG) were reviewing the controls programs had in place to prevent improper
payments. To avoid duplicating their work, we did not assess programs'
controls. However, when available, our report includes information on the
IGs' findings.
^4SSA contracts to have State Disability Determination Services (DDS)
evaluate Social Security and SSI claimants' medical disability. DDS staff
are state employees, but the federal government fully funds DDS
operations. SSA is State DDS' only client, and in all areas except
personnel-related issues (e.g., compensation, employee benefit, etc.) DDS
staff take direction from SSA.
We also drew on information obtained at a conference we attended sponsored
by the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA) in December
2005, for human service agencies, and telephone interviews with
representatives of APHSA, the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC), the
National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA), and the National
Employment Law Project to obtain additional insights on programs' disaster
response and assistance provided victims. We additionally met with APHSA
officials and NASWA to obtain more details of their organizations'
insights on the programs' disaster response.
Appendix II: Comments from the Social Security Administration
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Health & Human Services
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S Department of Labor
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Barbara D. Bovbjerg (202) 512-7215
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Gale Harris, Assistant Director;
Laura Heald, Analyst-in-Charge; Jacquelyn Stewart; Maura Hardy; and Amanda
Mackison made significant contributions to this report. In addition, Cheri
Harrington, Olivia Herman, and Bill Keller provided assistance in data
collection; Tovah Rom provided writing assistance, Jessica Botsford
provided legal assistance, Mimi Nguyen assisted with the graphics, and
Monika Gomez and Lise Levie provided technical assistance.
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(130557)
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Highlights of [65]GAO-07-219 , a report to congressional committees
January 2007
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA
Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of Certain State-Administered
Federal Support Programs
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced over 1 million people and affected
some of the poorest areas of the country. Many of those affected by the
hurricanes received federal assistance from the Old Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance (Social Security), Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) programs beforehand and others were newly
eligible after the storms. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO
assessed the (1) challenges the hurricanes created for programs to take
applications and pay benefits, (2) factors that helped or hindered
programs' efforts, and (3) areas that warrant further attention and
actions being taken to improve programs' disaster response. To do this
work, GAO reviewed policies, reports, and plans, and interviewed program
officials at the federal level and in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas.
[66]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS take steps, such as disseminating information on
promising practices and further study of case management approaches as
part of its efforts to improve delivery of human services during
disasters, as well as work with states to collect information on the need
for TANF disaster planning. HHS agreed with the recommendations on actions
to strengthen its recent efforts but did not agree to address TANF
planning specifically.
The mass destruction and displacement of people caused by the hurricanes
created new challenges, including an unprecedented demand for services
from these five programs. The demand for food stamps and UI benefits, and
the disaster assistance they provide, rose sharply. New evacuee policies
were created to provide food stamps and TANF assistance to evacuees
nationwide. In contrast, Social Security and SSI had a significant
increase for replacement benefits, but did not have a large increase in
new applications.
Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to
contingency funding facilitated response, but not all programs had these
elements in place. The federally administered Social Security and SSI
programs had service delivery disaster plans in place to meet demand.
However, such strategies were sometimes lacking for the state-administered
Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs. Flexible service delivery options such
as 800 numbers and Internet application services and debit cards for
issuing benefits expedited services. Last, access to contingency funding
was key to facilitating disaster response.
Gaps remain in preventing improper payments, easing access to services,
and improving disaster planning for the state-administered programs,
although new efforts hold potential for addressing these areas. Some
program officials said they relaxed program rules to better ensure that
those in need received aid, which may have increased the risk of improper
payments. Program officials are taking actions to address improper
payments, although more sharing of information across programs and states
would be useful. Regarding access to services, disaster victims sometimes
faced difficulties accessing aid from multiple programs, a long-standing
problem exacerbated by a disaster. The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has begun a promising effort--with links to state program
administrators--to improve delivery of human services during disasters.
This effort would be strengthened by additional actions, including
collecting and disseminating information on service delivery and improper
payments during disasters. Finally, to address planning gaps, federal
officials are working with states to improve service delivery planning for
the Food Stamp and UI programs, although HHS needs to work more
systematically with states to assess the need for additional planning for
state TANF programs.
Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Program Functions Vary
Source: GAO analysis.
Legend: Federal responsibility Federal and state shared responsibility
State responsibility
References
Visible links
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-828
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-674T
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-655
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-723
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-58
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-942
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-67
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1013
46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-944
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-655
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712
50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-347
51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-414
52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-723
53. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-58
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259
55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-935
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?HEHS-00-119
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-114
65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-219
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