Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a		 
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation	 
before Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities (26-JAN-07,	 
GAO-07-211).							 
                                                                 
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for 	 
projecting and sustaining forces without relying on immediate	 
access to nearby land bases and could be the source of billions  
of dollars of investment. In future security environments, the	 
Department of Defense (DOD) expects to encounter situations of	 
reduced or denied access to areas of operation. Even where	 
forward operating bases are otherwise available, their use may be
politically undesirable or operationally restricted. GAO was	 
asked to address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a	 
comprehensive management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has
developed a joint experimentation campaign plan for joint	 
seabasing, and (3) DOD and the services have identified the costs
of joint seabasing options. For this review, GAO analyzed joint  
requirements documents, experimentation efforts, and service	 
acquisition plans.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-211 					        
    ACCNO:   A65190						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a    
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation	 
before Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities		 
     DATE:   01/26/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad				 
	     Data collection					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Enterprise architecture				 
	     Force structure					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Operations research				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Joint forces					 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-07-211

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management App

          * [4]DOD Has Taken Action to Develop Joint Seabasing
          * [5]DOD's Management Approach Has Not Fully Incorporated Sound M

     * [6]DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan

          * [7]Experimentation Campaign Plans Coordinate and Guide Experime
          * [8]Many Seabasing Experimentation Activities Have Taken Place b
          * [9]DOD Lacks a Systematic Means to Analyze, Communicate, and Di
          * [10]DOD Lacks a Feedback Mechanism to Interpret Results From Joi

     * [11]Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cos

          * [12]Total Ownership Cost Estimates Help Decision Makers Evaluate
          * [13]JCIDS Has Not Yet Produced Cost Estimates for Joint Seabasin
          * [14]Service Acquisitions May Outpace Joint Seabasing Cost Analys
          * [15]Options Cannot Be Compared without Cost Estimates

     * [16]Conclusions
     * [17]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [18]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [19]GAO Contact
     * [20]Acknowledgments
     * [21]GAO's Mission
     * [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [23]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [25]Congressional Relations
     * [26]Public Affairs

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

January 2007

FORCE STRUCTURE

Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and
Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New
Capabilities

GAO-07-211

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Guide
Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives 10
DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform
Decisions About Joint Seabasing 16
Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates is
Uncertain 25
Conclusions 30
Recommendations for Executive Action 31
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Figures

Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process 7
Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing 9
Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles During a
Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian
Island, Washington 19
Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Squadron 28

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Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 26, 2007 January 26, 2007

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Young: 

Future security environments are expected to become increasingly
complicated through unstable international political relationships,
increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors,
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated
operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may encounter
situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of operation. Even
where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use may be politically
undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, or a commander
may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the joint force in a
host nation. As a result, the capability to project and sustain forces in
such antiaccess environments could become increasingly important in
enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and deter aggression or seize
the initiative. Future security environments are expected to become
increasingly complicated through unstable international political
relationships, increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of
nonstate actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In
a complicated operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may
encounter situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of
operation. Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use
may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military
use, or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of
the joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project
and sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become
increasingly important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and
deter aggression or seize the initiative.

Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how
commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting
joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby
land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly,
command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat
power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and
force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on
land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable
concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability.
These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious
and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a
concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing
capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that
could be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of
billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the
development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the
joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the
future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how
commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting
joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby
land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly,
command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat
power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and
force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on
land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable
concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability.
These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious
and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a
concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing
capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that
could be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of
billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the
development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the
joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the
future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess
environment exist and continue to evolve. These include rapid strategic
airlift and fast sealift of forces from the United States to the area of
operation, airfield and port seizure, rapid base construction, and several
others. At a time when DOD is under pressure to control costs, it is
increasingly important for decision makers to evaluate competing
priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-effective solutions
for conducting future military operations.

Joint seabasing represents a major change in the way DOD would manage its
forces. Inherent in implementing an organizational transformation such as
joint seabasing are possible changes in force structure, acquisition,
logistics concepts, command and control, training, and other factors
important to successful military operations. The concept could also have a
significant effect on near- and long-term funding priorities.

You asked us to conduct a review of DOD's assessments and plans to
implement joint seabasing, with particular attention to the following
three questions: (1) To what extent has DOD employed a comprehensive
management approach for developing a joint seabasing capability? (2) To
what extent has a joint experimentation campaign plan been developed,
implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint seabasing options? (3)
To what extent have DOD and the services identified the cost of joint
seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed,
cost-effective decisions?

To assess DOD's management oversight and leadership approach for joint
seabasing, we obtained and analyzed briefings and studies on joint
seabasing, reviewed joint requirements policies and procedures,
interviewed DOD and service officials, and compared DOD's approach with
our prior work on best practices for transformations of large
organizations. To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation
campaign plan has been developed, implemented, and used to inform
decisions on joint seabasing options, we obtained briefings from and
interviewed DOD and service officials on their experimentation efforts,
and examined DOD and service guidance on conducting and leading
experimentation campaigns. To assess the development of cost estimates for
joint seabasing, we obtained and analyzed key briefings, reports, data,
and plans from DOD and the services that included information and analysis
regarding estimated costs related to joint seabasing and conducted
interviews with relevant DOD and service officials. We compared the cost
estimates for joint seabasing to DOD instructions for developing cost
estimates, along with best practices on developing total ownership costs.
We conducted our review from February 2006 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
determined that any data used were sufficiently reliable for our
objective. The scope and methodology used in our review are described in
further detail in appendix I.

Results in Brief

While DOD has taken several actions to establish a joint seabasing
capability, it has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service
initiatives and guide the development of joint seabasing. Specifically,
DOD's management approach has not fully incorporated key sound management
practices or integrated service initiatives. In our prior work, we
identified several key sound management practices at the center of
successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These key sound
management practices include (1) ensuring top leadership drives the
transformation, (2) dedicating an implementation team to manage the
transformation process, and (3) establishing a communication strategy to
create shared expectations and report related progress. DOD has developed
a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is currently assessing the
concept within DOD's joint requirements process. However, the services
have their own seabasing concepts and approaches and there are a number of
ongoing service initiatives. While some service initiatives are in the
early stages of concept development, others are outpacing joint seabasing
in development and are expected to cost billions of dollars. However, DOD
has not provided sufficient leadership to ensure these initiatives are
fully leveraged, properly focused, and complement each other. In addition,
despite recommendations for a joint office to manage and lead joint
seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board, and the Naval
Studies Board, an overarching, dedicated implementation team has not been
established. Without such an implementation team, DOD has no single entity
that can provide day-to-day management of joint seabasing and help to
reach agreement on work priorities. Furthermore, in the absence of a
formal mechanism for communicating joint seabasing information, officials
from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face challenges in determining
what other DOD and research organizations are involved in joint seabasing
and what they are doing. Without a comprehensive management approach, DOD
may not be able to evaluate seabasing options or develop the joint
seabasing capability in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

While DOD has conducted some seabasing experiments, it has not developed
or implemented an overarching joint experimentation campaign plan to
inform decisions about joint seabasing. According to defense best
practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign plan include (1)
designated leaders, (2) clear focus and objectives, (3) a spectrum of
experiments, (4) data collection and analysis, (5) broad dissemination of
results, and (6) a feedback mechanism to discuss and interpret results.
Many seabasing experimentation activities have taken place across the
services, combatant commands, and defense entities, including war games,
modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. However, no overarching
joint seabasing experimentation plan exists within DOD to guide these
efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has primary
responsibility for joint warfighting experimentation, has not taken the
lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation. While the U.S. Joint
Forces Command is in the process of developing an experimentation plan for
joint concepts, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address
joint seabasing. Moreover, it is also unclear the extent to which this
plan will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts because
the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not have the authority to direct the
experimentation activities of the services. Furthermore, while some data
collection and analyses has been done on seabasing experimentation
activities, an overall data collection and analysis plan does not exist to
ensure data were captured and interpreted into findings. Additionally, DOD
lacks a systematic means to communicate and disseminate findings and
observations on joint seabasing experimentation, and obtain feedback.
Without an overarching experimentation plan, DOD may not have a strong
analytical basis to evaluate joint seabasing options.

While service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching milestones
for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete development
of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options.
Total ownership cost estimates include the cost to develop, acquire, own,
operate, and dispose of weapon and support systems and help organizations
analyze and compare options. DOD policy stresses the importance of
identifying the total costs of ownership, including major cost drivers,
while considering the affordability of establishing new capability
requirements. Joint seabasing is currently going through an assessment
within DOD's requirements process that will examine potential approaches
and develop preliminary cost assessments for seabasing options. However,
according to DOD officials, DOD has not yet begun or established a firm
reporting milestone for completing this assessment and it is not clear
whether it will be completed before the services reach upcoming milestones
on programs tied to joint seabasing. For example, the Navy plans to
procure a Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)--a squadron of ships
designed to project and sustain Marine forces--at an estimated cost of
$14.5 billion, along with several supporting surface and air connectors,
as a means to develop a seabasing capability. Furthermore, the Army is
exploring its own initiatives to establish a seabasing capability, such as
modified commercial cargo ships with flight decks. Some of these service
initiatives, such as the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), are
scheduled for milestones in fiscal year 2008 that will guide future
investment decisions. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint
seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress,
decision makers may not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
individual service initiatives.

To facilitate cost-effective evaluation of the joint seabasing concept as
an option for force projection and sustainment in an antiaccess
environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish an
implementation team to provide oversight and develop a management plan for
joint seabasing, (2) direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and
coordinate joint seabasing experimentation efforts, with oversight by the
joint seabasing implementation team, and (3) direct the implementation
team or other appropriate entity to synchronize the development of total
ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options so
decision makers have sufficient information to make informed,
cost-effective investment decisions regarding seabasing initiatives.

DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with our
recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation team
to provide oversight of seabasing initiatives. In its comments, DOD stated
that it is premature to establish additional oversight at this time but
that it will determine if additional oversight is needed after DOD defines
the joint seabasing capabilities needed. DOD also stated that in the
interim the Force Management Joint Capabilities Board, which includes the
services, combatant commands, and other organizations, is providing an
appropriate level of management oversight. We disagree that DOD's current
approach is sufficient to provide effective oversight because (1) DOD has
already begun a number of acquisition programs that support seabasing even
though it has not yet established joint seabasing requirements and (2) the
Force Management Joint Capabilities Board's oversight does not go far
enough in providing comprehensive management oversight of numerous,
disparate service and defense organization initiatives related to joint
seabasing. While the Board is responsible for leading the joint seabasing
capabilities-based assessment, the Board's responsibilities do not
constitute the type of oversight needed to ensure ongoing or planned
service initiatives that may support joint seabasing are coordinated and
complement each other. Because of this, we continue to believe that DOD
should establish an implementation team to provide day-to-day management
oversight of joint seabasing as soon as possible rather than considering
this as an option once joint seabasing capabilities are defined. DOD's
comments and our evaluation of them are on page 33.

Background

In 2002, the Navy's Sea Power 211 vision stated that shore-based
capabilities would be transformed to seabased capabilities whenever
practical to improve the reach, persistence, and sustainability of systems
that are already afloat. The objective for the United States to maintain
global freedom of action is a consistent theme throughout the National
Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy.2 DOD's 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report3 further stated that the future joint force will
exploit the operational flexibility of seabasing to counter political
antiaccess and irregular warfare challenges.

The joint seabasing concept is currently going through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a DOD decision
support process for transforming military forces. Figure 1 shows the JCIDS
process, including the major elements of a capabilities-based assessment.
The purpose of JCIDS is to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military
capability needs. Capabilities represent warfighting needs that are
studied as part of the system's capabilities-based assessment process. The
process identifies warfighter skills and attributes for a desired
capability (Functional Area Analysis), the gaps to achieving this
capability (Functional Needs Analysis), and possible solutions for filling
these gaps (Functional Solution Analysis). The results of this assessment
are used as the basis for identifying approaches for delivering the
desired capability. When identifying these approaches, cost is one factor
that is considered. One way costs are used to evaluate potential
approaches is by developing total ownership cost estimates. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council4 has overall responsibility for JCIDS and
is supported by eight Functional Capabilities Boards (Command and Control,
Battlespace Awareness, Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force
Protection, Force application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training), which
lead the capabilities-based assessment process. DOD's anticipated
timeframe for an operational joint seabasing capability as currently
envisioned in the Joint Integrating Concept is 2015-2025.

1Admiral Vern Clark, USN, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint
Capabilities," Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2002).

2Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America (Washington, D.C.: March 2005) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, National
Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:
2004).

3Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006).

4The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Chairman of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, though the functions of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council chairman are delegated to the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council is the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure,
Resources, & Assessment.

Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process

aDOTMLPF = Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities.

The services are either considering or actively pursuing material
solutions to support seabasing. According to service officials and
documentation, these solutions will play a critical role in enhancing
current seabasing capabilities. For example, the Navy and Marines plan to
acquire the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) along with several
supporting connectors needed for it to be able to achieve its mission. As
part of the seabase, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) will be a
squadron of ships to transport and deliver the personnel, combat power,
and logistic support of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The connectors,
which are envisioned to provide both intertheater lift to the seabase and
intratheater lift within the seabase, include sealift, such as the Joint
High Speed Vessel, Joint High Speed Sealift, and Joint Maritime Assault
Connector (this vessel is intended to replace the Landing Craft Assault
Connector), and airlift, such as the V-22 Osprey and CH-53K heavy lift
helicopter. Figure 2 illustrates and describes several sealift and airlift
connectors. The Army is also exploring new capability initiatives for
establishing a seabasing capability. In conjunction with the Navy and
Marine Corps, the Army is developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint
High Speed Sealift ships. Furthermore, the Army is also in the early
stages of development of its Afloat Forward Staging Base, which is a ship
concept whose mission would be providing aerial maneuver with Army forces
from the sea. One option the Army is exploring for the Afloat Forward
Staging Base is to add flight decks to a commercial container ship, along
with other alterations, as a means to provide aerial maneuver to Army
forces.

Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing

DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Guide Joint
Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives

Although DOD has taken action to begin the development of joint seabasing,
DOD has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to
effectively guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for projecting
and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment and integrate service
initiatives. Specifically, DOD has not fully incorporated sound management
practices--such as providing leadership, dedicating an implementation
team, and establishing a communications strategy--that our prior work has
shown are found at the center of successful transformations.5

DOD Has Taken Action to Develop Joint Seabasing

DOD has taken action to develop joint seabasing by pursuing it within
DOD's Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS
is a key DOD decision support process that uses a capabilities-based
approach to assess existing capabilities, identify capability gaps, and
develop new warfighting capabilities. Within JCIDS, future capability
needs are intended to be developed from top-level strategic guidance such
as the National Military Strategy, a "top-down" approach. Under the former
process, requirements grew out of the individual services' unique
strategic visions, a "bottom-up" approach. In January 2006 we reported
that JCIDS is not yet functioning as envisioned to define gaps and
redundancies in existing and future military capabilities across the
department and to identify solutions to improve joint capabilities.6 We
reported that requirements continue to be defined largely from the "bottom
up"--by the services--although DOD uses the JCIDS framework to assess the
services' proposals and push a joint perspective.

According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics officials, seabasing is going through the JCIDS
process to become more of a joint concept that is developed through input
from the services, combatant commands, and other DOD organizations. DOD
has produced a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept that outlines the
concept for joint seabasing and identifies essential capabilities. Under
JCIDS, the capabilities-based assessment follows a structured, four-step
process. The first step in this process, the Functional Area Analysis,
dated October 2005, identified the seabasing tasks, conditions, and
standards needed to meet military objectives. The Functional Area Analysis
identified such critical joint seabasing tasks as providing for
maintenance of equipment in the joint operations area, attacking
operational targets, and building and maintaining sustainment bases in the
joint operations area. The second step of the capabilities-based
assessment, the Functional Needs Analysis, dated November 2006, provided a
prioritized list of joint seabasing capabilities and capability gaps, and
identifies potential mitigation areas from which the identified capability
gaps may be addressed. The 17 seabasing capability gaps include at-sea
assembly, forcible entry, and conducting operational movement and
maneuver. The analyses that are currently being developed are intended to
further define and organize the capability gaps identified in the
Functional Needs Analysis and recommend potential solutions for
consideration in future analyses.

5GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, [27]GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003).

6GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not
Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid,
[28]GAO-06-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2006).

DOD's Management Approach Has Not Fully Incorporated Sound Management Principles
or Integrated Service Initiatives

Despite pursuing joint seabasing within JCIDS, DOD has not fully
incorporated key sound management practices into its approach for managing
the development of joint seabasing requirements and integrating service
initiatives. In our prior work, we identified several key sound management
practices at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and
transformations. These key sound management practices include (1) ensuring
top leadership drives the transformation, (2) dedicating an implementation
team to manage the transformation process, and (3) establishing a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
progress. Without a management approach that contains these elements, DOD
may be unable to guide and assess joint seabasing in an efficient and
cost-effective manner. Moreover, without central coordination, it is
unclear whether DOD will be able to effectively manage billions of dollars
of potential service investments in interdependent complex platforms,
connectors, and logistics technologies that will need to be coordinated
using a common set of standards, requirements, timeframes, and priorities.

First, although joint seabasing capability development is underway, DOD
has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service initiatives
and guide the development of joint seabasing. While the joint seabasing
JCIDS process is still in the early stages of assessing needed
capabilities, the services have developed their own concepts and
approaches for seabasing, and in some cases systems that will support
joint seabasing are further along than the concept in JCIDS development.
For example, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint High
Speed Vessel are approaching their second major milestone, or decision
point, within DOD's acquisition system, which will initiate systems-level
development, whereas the joint seabasing concept is still being refined.
Preliminary cost estimates for both these systems range from nearly $12
billion to over $15 billion. The 2005 National Research Council
Committee's report, Sea Basing, concluded that developing a system of
systems such as seabasing that is comprised of complex platforms,
connectors, and logistics technologies will require a common set of
standards, requirements, timeframes, and priorities.7 Various ship,
airlift, and sealift connector components of the seabase will need to
interface, and the capabilities of some of these components will be
interdependent. In addition, joint operations from a seabase will require
robust logistics technologies and command and control. Prematurely
developing such systems to meet individual service requirements rather
than joint requirements may result in initiatives that duplicate each
other and systems that are not interoperable and compatible. Moreover, in
addition to the billions of dollars being spent to procure these systems,
it may be costly to realign or adjust the efforts of the services in the
future if they do not meet the joint requirements of seabasing.

In addition, DOD leadership has not provided an official, unified vision
for joint seabasing to guide the transformation, ensure that focus is
maintained on providing a capability that is the best option for
projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, and ensure
that joint seabasing is evaluated against competing options. Joint Staff
officials told us that the joint seabasing JCIDS process has been
addressing how seabasing can be used to counter the problem of projecting
and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, rather than examining
specific solutions. We reported in 2003 that key practices and
implementation steps for successful transformations include ensuring top
leadership drives the transformation.8 We found that leadership must set
the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation. Concerns have been
raised by other organizations about the lack of leadership to guide the
development of joint seabasing. For example, the National Research Council
Committee's report, Sea Basing, stated that "given the complexity of [the
process for developing a joint seabasing capability] and the long-term
nature of the major capital investments by Services in new platforms,
development of advanced technologies, and the introduction of appropriate
joint doctrine, such a unifying vision will be essential in order to best
leverage existing currently programmed and future Service capabilities."9
Also, in 2003 the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing found
that developing the seabase requires persistent, top-down leadership to
coordinate the numerous initiatives--including concepts of operations,
ships, aircraft, weapons, and transportations systems--that support the
seabase.10 Absent leadership, DOD can not be certain joint seabasing has
been evaluated against competing options for projecting and sustaining
forces in an antiaccess environment. Moreover, without leadership that has
the authority, responsibility, and accountability to guide joint seabasing
and integrate service initiatives, DOD cannot be sure that ongoing or
planned initiatives are cost-effective, fully leveraged, properly focused,
and complement each other.

7Committee on Sea Basing, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council
of the National Academy of Sciences, Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint Force
Access From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press,
2005).

8 [29]GAO-03-669 .

Second, DOD has not established a dedicated implementation team to provide
day-to-day management oversight. We reported in 2003 that a dedicated
implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day management of
transformation to ensure various initiatives are integrated.11 Such a team
would ensure that joint seabasing receives the focused, full-time
attention necessary to be sustained and effective, by establishing clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement on work
priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. There are several groups and
DOD organizations tasked with specific responsibilities for developing
joint seabasing within JCIDS; however, none of these organizations have
the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate
initiatives and the acquisition of systems that may support joint
seabasing. For example, the Navy was designated the sponsor of the
Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is responsible for all common
documentation, periodic reporting, and funding actions required to support
the seabasing capabilities development and acquisition process. The Force
Management Functional Capabilities Board is responsible for leading the
seabasing capabilities-based assessment and oversees the sponsor (the
Navy) in developing documents. The Seabasing Working Group was organized
and tasked by the Joint Staff to assist the Force Management Functional
Capabilities Board in completing the joint seabasing analyses. The
Seabasing Working Group is comprised of members from the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, the services, and other organizations, and serves as a
source of expertise and as a joint sounding board for collaboration and
focusing the direction of the analyses. According to Joint Staff
officials, the working group can ask the services and combatant commands
to participate and provide input to the analyses, but they have no
authority to force their participation in the development of the analyses
nor do they have authority over service initiatives that may support joint
seabasing.

9Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.

10Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing (Washington,
D.C.: August 2003).

11 [30]GAO-03-669 .

Recommendations have been made for a joint office to manage and lead joint
seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea
Basing, and the Naval Studies Board,12 but a leadership body has not been
established. In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed that a terms of reference
be developed for a Joint Expeditionary Force Projection/Seabasing
Capabilities Office. According to the Terms of Reference, the office would
organize all joint seabasing-related DOD activities--ranging from
experimentation efforts to solutions development to training--into a
coherent direction. In addition, the office would be comprised of members
from each of the four services and the U.S. Joint Forces Command and would
have limited contract authority. However, DOD officials decided to forgo
the joint office and pursue joint seabasing within the JCIDS process.
According to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, one reason a joint office was not
set up for joint seabasing was because there was no staff available at the
time. According to Joint Staff officials, one downfall to joint seabasing
being developed under the JCIDS process is that consensus is required on
all decisions before moving forward, which may result in compromising
solutions. Although use of the JCIDS process has encouraged the Army, Air
Force, and Marine Corps to participate with the Navy in the development of
the Joint Integrating Concept and JCIDS analyses, the services continue to
pursue their own initiatives. As previously mentioned, some of these
initiatives are still in the early stages of concept development, whereas
other initiatives are further along in the acquisition process ahead of
joint seabasing. A key official from the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Sea Basing told us that the need for a joint office to coordinate
efforts between the services still exists. According to the official, the
lack of action in setting up a joint seabasing office makes achieving
compatible systems to support joint seabasing more difficult considering
some supporting systems are ahead of joint seabasing in the development
process. The Naval Studies Board also recommended a joint planning office
be set up to "correlate Service requirements and advise Service
procurements" so common capabilities among the services can be taken
advantage of and incompatible acquisitions will not be made.13 We and the
DOD Office of the Inspector General have found similar management
challenges14 in DOD's efforts to field other joint capabilities such as
the Global Information Grid and network-centric warfare.15 Without
formally designating a dedicated leadership body to provide day-to-day
management oversight by providing a coherent direction for related
activities, establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities,
helping to reach agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts
coordinated, DOD's ability to develop a joint seabasing capability in an
efficient manner may be hindered. Furthermore, without a dedicated
implementation team, it may be difficult for DOD to sustain joint
seabasing development over a long period of time.

12Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing; Committee
on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.

Third, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that
encourages communication, shares knowledge, and provides information to
DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing initiatives. We previously
reported that creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is
central to forming the partnerships that are needed to develop and
implement the organization's strategies.16 As previously mentioned, there
are numerous groups and DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing and
various initiatives that may affect joint seabasing. The seabasing working
group hosts meetings that provide a forum for discussion on joint
seabasing among members. In addition, it has established a Web site that
posts meeting minutes and various joint seabasing JCIDS analysis
documents. While this Web site provides some transparency into the
analysis process, it does not serve as a central repository for
communicating information on joint seabasing because it does not provide
information on joint seabasing efforts conducted by the services and
combatant commands outside of the JCIDS process. In addition, we found no
evidence of a formal mechanism that communicated joint seabasing
information. Officials from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face
challenges in determining what organizations are involved in joint
seabasing and what they are doing. According to Marine Corps officials,
this impedes their ability to leverage activities and minimize redundancy.
Furthermore, Joint Staff officials have acknowledged that the lack of a
central, authoritative source of information significantly hindered timely
completion of analyses. For example, the data management tool used to
associate essential seabasing capabilities with the appropriate functional
area did not provide a systematic method for identifying relevant
information and some data was missing. Moreover, they also recognized that
a means for identifying DOD-wide initiatives that affect joint seabasing
needs to be established. In the absence of clear communication of joint
seabasing information throughout DOD via an overall communications
strategy, joint seabasing participants may not be able to effectively
leverage activities and minimize redundancy, and the overall development
of joint seabasing may be impeded.

13Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.

14In [31]GAO-06-211 , we state that because the Global Information Grid
will comprise a system of interdependent systems, it needs clearly
identified leadership that has the authority to enforce decisions that cut
across organizational lines. The report found that without a management
approach optimized to enforce decisions across the department, DOD is at
risk of continuing to develop and acquire systems in a stovepiped and
uncoordinated manner. The Inspector General's report, Department of
Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint Warfighting and Readiness:
Management of Network Centric Warfare Within the Department of Defense,
D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004), recommended that DOD
formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes for the overall
development, coordination, and oversight of DOD network-centric warfare
efforts to ensure that ongoing or planned initiatives are properly focused
and complement each other. According to the report, DOD management agreed
with the need for leadership improvements.

15Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing linking
sensors, decision makers, and shooters, which is intended to result in
increased mission effectiveness.

16 [32]GAO-03-669 .

DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform Decisions
About Joint Seabasing

DOD has not developed, implemented, or used an overarching joint
experimentation campaign plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing.
Experimentation campaign plans play an important role in developing
transformational concepts by coordinating and guiding experimentation
efforts using a series of related experiments that develop knowledge about
a concept or capability. Many seabasing experimentation activities have
taken place across DOD and the services; however, an overarching
experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide joint seabasing
experimentation does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces
Command--DOD's leader of joint warfighting experimentation--has not taken
the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts.
Additionally, DOD lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and
disseminate information on joint seabasing experimentation. Moreover, DOD
lacks a feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from joint
seabasing experimental activities.

Experimentation Campaign Plans Coordinate and Guide Experimentation Efforts

According to military experimentation guides, experimentation campaign
plans play an important role in developing transformational concepts by
coordinating and guiding experimentation efforts using a series of related
experiments that develop knowledge about a concept or capability. Taken
together, the results of these experiments can inform decisions about
future research and technology programs, acquisition efforts, risk,
organizational changes, and changes in operational concepts. A
well-planned experimentation campaign provides a framework for much of
what needs to be known about a new concept or capability. According to
defense best practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign
include: (1) designated campaign leaders; (2) clear campaign focus and
objectives; (3) a spectrum of well-designed and sequenced experimental
activities, including studies and analyses, seminars and conferences, war
games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations; (4) data
collection and analyses; (5) broad dissemination of results; and (6) a
feedback mechanism to discuss and interpret results. Experimentation
campaigns that include these aspects can reduce the risk in developing and
fielding a new concept or capability by addressing a spectrum of
possibilities and building upon experimentation activities systematically,
with continual analyses and feedback to interpret the results into useful
information.

Single experiments alone are insufficient to develop transformational
concepts because they can only explore a limited number of variables, and
their contributions are limited unless their findings can be replicated in
other experiments. Campaigns can provide conclusive and robust results
through their ability to replicate findings and conduct experiments in a
variety of scenarios and operating environments. A well-planned
experimentation campaign can mitigate the limitations of a single
experiment by synthesizing outputs from a series of activities into
coherent advice to decision makers.

Many Seabasing Experimentation Activities Have Taken Place but an Overarching
Experimentation Campaign Plan to Guide These Activities Does Not Exist

Many experimentation activities involving seabasing have taken place;
however, an overarching DOD experimentation campaign plan to guide and
coordinate these activities does not exist. All of the services, combatant
commands, and some defense entities have been involved with seabasing
experimentation through war games, studies, workshops, modeling and
simulation, and live demonstrations. For example, in 2004 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff led a war game called Nimble Viking that brought the services
together and addressed gaps in their understanding of the joint seabasing
concept. The services conducted studies addressing gaps in the joint
seabasing concept, such as the Navy's 40 Knot Marine Expeditionary Brigade
study, which identified gaps in conducting forcible entry operations with
Marine Corps forces using seaborne lift capable of speeds of 40 knots.
Moreover, the Marine Corps modeled plans for landing seabased forces from
amphibious ships, the results of which, according to the Marine Corps,
shaved hours off the landing of forces from amphibious ships. In addition,
the U.S. Joint Forces Command and services worked together in cosponsoring
several war games involving joint seabasing, including Unified Course
2004, Joint Urban Warrior 2004, Pinnacle Impact 2003, and Sea Viking 2004.
While many of the reports from these war games recognized joint seabasing
as a potential concept for addressing antiaccess and force projection
issues, they stated that further experimentation was needed before joint
seabasing moved forward.

Additionally, material solutions being developed to support joint
seabasing have undergone planned experimentation and testing activities.
For example, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe that DOD's
Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore program17 could support joint seabasing
logistical operations, such as heavy cargo transfer at sea. To that end,
in June 2006 they sponsored a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise to
transfer equipment and bulk materials from large ships to the beach using
smaller landing craft. Figure 3 shows forces using a barge to move
construction vehicles from ships to shore during a
Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian
Island, Washington.

17Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore is a joint logistical operation to load
or unload ships through inadequate or damaged ports or over a bare beach
when facilities are not available or nonexistent. It is a system of
systems involving sealift, shipboard cranes, ramps, and interfaces, and
lighters. The U.S. Transportation Command oversees developmental and
acquisition efforts for this program.

Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles During a
Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian
Island, Washington

The Navy's Program Executive Office for Ships, which manages the Maritime
Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel programs,
reports that the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) program has
planned and is executing a series of jointly coordinated tests involving
modeling and simulation and live demonstrations. According to the Program
Manager, demonstrations included at-sea evaluation of the Mobile Landing
Platform concept18 and its ability to interface with other vessels
supporting the joint seabase. Additionally, the Navy's Office of Naval
Research is developing a number of technologies, such as internal ship
cargo handling and ship-to-ship cargo transfers, to address capability
gaps in joint seabasing operations.

18The Mobile Landing Platform is a vessel in the planned Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron that would facilitate at-sea cargo
transfer by partially submerging in water to allow cargo to float on and
off of it. The Mobile Landing Platform will link large roll-on/roll-off
cargo ships to smaller ships.

Although joint seabasing experimental activities have taken place, an
overarching experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide these
activities does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not
taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts.
Moreover, involvement in these activities by the services, combatant
commands, and defense entities has been inconsistent due to budget
restraints, other competing priorities, and the lack of timely
coordination and advance notice of events. In May 1998, the Secretary of
Defense designated the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the DOD executive
agent for joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is
responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting
concepts and disseminating the results of these activities to the joint
concept community, which includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Joint Staff, combatant commands, services, and defense agencies. The U.S.
Joint Forces Command is also responsible for coordinating joint
experimentation efforts by developing a biennial joint concept development
and experimentation campaign plan. In January 2006, a memo from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further underscored this
responsibility by providing explicit direction to the U.S. Joint Forces
Command on developing a campaign plan that provided guidance to the joint
concept community on coordinating joint experimentation efforts, and
capturing and disseminating the results of these efforts.19 While the U.S.
Joint Forces Command said it is in the process of developing the plan, it
is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing.
According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, other more near-term
priorities, such as improvised explosive devices and urban warfare, have
prevented them from focusing on joint seabasing during the past few years.

Once the U.S. Joint Forces Command develops and implements the plan, which
it intends to do by fiscal year 2008, it is also unclear the extent to
which this plan will be able to guide and coordinate joint seabasing
experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not
have the authority to direct service and other DOD organizations'
experimentation plans. The services and combatant commands are responsible
for working with the U.S. Joint Forces Command in executing the joint
concept development and experimentation campaign plan, and for providing
them with observations, insights, results, and recommendations related to
all joint experimentation efforts. However, the services and combatant
commands are not required to go through the U.S. Joint Forces Command
before executing their own experimentation activities. Moreover, the U.S.
Joint Forces Command says it does not have authority to make the services
and combatant commands take specific joint actions. Additionally, there
are many entities within the services involved in joint seabasing
experimentation and there are no formalized leaders coordinating service
efforts. As a result, these entities operate independently and do not
coordinate their efforts with the U.S. Joint Forces Command. This lack of
coordination poses risks of duplicating experimentation efforts and
conducting experimentation that does not build upon previous activities.

19Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint Experimentation
(JE) Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006).

Furthermore, no overarching campaign plan to guide joint seabasing
experimentation exists within any other DOD entity. While the Navy and
Marine Corps have seabasing experimentation campaign plans, officials told
us these plans are not overarching within each of the services and it is
unclear the extent to which they are being implemented. For example, a
seabasing experimentation plan exists as part of the Navy's Sea Trial
Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan;20 however, Navy
officials said there is not a lot of joint seabasing experimentation being
conducted within this plan and the plan does not encompass all of the
Navy's efforts. In addition, the Marine Corps has a plan that broadly
focuses on issues that need to be addressed for seabasing capabilities
such as the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High
Speed Vessel. However, its plan does not identify designated leaders and
specific experimentation activities that should take place, nor does the
plan identify timelines, resources, or staff to conduct experimentation.
It also does not contain plans for data collection and analysis or any
provisions for disseminating results. In addition, according to Marine
Corps officials, the plan is not being fully executed due to lack of
funding and staff.

Many service officials expressed concern over the lack of coordination and
guidance on joint seabasing experimentation. They stated that the U.S.
Joint Forces Command has not shown much interest in experimentation for
future concepts such as joint seabasing, instead focusing experimentation
efforts on short-term concepts and immediate priorities such as improvised
explosive devices. One service official commented that there is no single
point of contact for joint seabasing at the U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff states in the Functional Needs
Analysis that more joint experimentation is needed to inform and further
refine capability gaps in the joint seabasing concept.

20Sea Trial is the Navy's process for formulating and testing innovative
operational concepts. At its core is the Sea Trial Concept Development and
Experimentation Campaign Plan, which outlines plans to rapidly mature
concept, technology, and doctrine. Sea Trial supports Sea Power 21, the
Navy's vision for how it will organize, integrate, and transform itself in
the 21st century.

DOD Lacks a Systematic Means to Analyze, Communicate, and Disseminate
Information on Joint Seabasing Experimentation

DOD also lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and disseminate
information about joint seabasing experimentation across the department.
According to military experimentation guides, a significant part of an
experiment consists of gathering data, interpreting it into findings, and
combining it with already known information. Additionally, data collection
and analysis plans are important to experimentation because they ensure
valid and reliable data are captured and understood, and that the analysis
undertaken addresses the key issues in the experiment. However, we found
no overarching data collection and analysis plan to guide the analysis of
joint seabasing experimentation results. Furthermore, officials in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation
division described a lack of analysis in joint seabasing to inform the
capabilities-based assessment, which could lead to inaccurately
identifying gaps in implementing the concept. They said that no
comprehensive analytical framework was ever established to guide
development of the joint seabasing concept; consequently, the value joint
seabasing will bring to the warfighter is unknown. Without an overarching
campaign plan, experimental results for joint seabasing are being obtained
and interpreted using different data collection and analysis methods,
which may lead to inconsistent reporting methods. As a result,
experimentation data may be analyzed, interpreted, and shared
inconsistently and with little transparency across the community.

Additionally, DOD and service officials commented on the lack of
sufficient modeling and simulation tools available to provide valid data
on joint seabasing. Modeling and simulation tools play an important role
in experiments. Unlike live demonstrations, modeling and simulation
techniques can inexpensively vary the values of variables to represent a
wide variety of conditions. They also provide a great deal of control over
the variables in the experiment, which allows for replication. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff noted the absence of high-level modeling tools capable of
end-to-end modeling of seabasing21 in the Functional Needs Analysis,
saying that the absence of this type of modeling precluded effective and
meaningful data to validate warfighter needs and thus limited the depth of
their analysis. Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation division also commented that the
lack of modeling could result in missing critical gaps in the joint
seabasing concept that have not yet been identified. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff identified the U.S. Joint Forces Command as a possible lead for
end-to-end modeling and simulation of joint seabasing because of its role
in joint concept development and experimentation, and its expertise in
developing comprehensive modeling and simulation tools.

21End-to-end modeling involves modeling seabasing throughout the
employment, sustainment, and reconstitution phases.

While some communication takes place among the entities involved with
developing the seabasing concept, there is no established method for
communicating observations, insights, and upcoming events across the
entire community. DOD and service officials described the joint seabasing
community as an informal community of practice, where the services,
combatant commands, and defense entities invite each other to participate
in their experimentation activities. The U.S. Joint Forces Command and the
services track to some degree the experimental efforts of the joint
seabasing community. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says it
tries to leverage off the services' efforts by partnering with them in
experimental activities. However, despite this informal community, DOD and
service officials describe a lack of coordination and awareness of
experimental activities. A Marine Corps official stated that some
officials are more aware than others are; but no one is completely aware
of what is going on across the entire community. In fact, many officials
we spoke with were either unaware or had very little advance notice of an
upcoming war game involving seabasing. Without an established
communication method, joint seabasing experimentation efforts are not
transparent to the entire community, which can contribute to a lack of
consensus on the types of activities that take place, conflicts in
scheduling events, and duplication of efforts.

Additionally, there is no overarching system to disseminate observations
and results on joint seabasing experimentation. The U.S. Joint Forces
Command has a database containing documents and reports from
experimentation activities; however, the database contains different
levels of information based on what the services choose to publish. As a
result, the database is not a comprehensive resource of joint
experimentation information. The Navy's Warfare Development Command22 also
maintains a Web site of information pertaining to its Sea Trial campaign,
which other entities within the Navy contribute to, but it is not
overarching within the Navy. In response to a January 2006 memo from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is
developing an online knowledge management portal to disseminate
information on experimentation activities across the joint concept
community.23 The portal contains a repository of information on
experimentation concepts, projects, and documents; a bulletin board to
post insights and observations; hotlinks to other sites; and a calendar
function for upcoming experimentation activities. The portal also contains
a section on activities relating to joint logistics, and joint deployment
and sustainment; however, it does not yet contain information on joint
seabasing. Furthermore, while the portal has the ability to disseminate
information, it may not be successful in increasing communication across
the joint seabasing community because the services have not been directed
to use the portal in planning their activities.

22The Navy Warfare Development Command mission is to focus and champion
Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of operations
development in a naval, joint, and coalition environment.

DOD Lacks a Feedback Mechanism to Interpret Results From Joint Seabasing
Experimentation

DOD lacks a feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from joint
seabasing experimental activities. Feedback on analyses and findings
produced from experimental activities provides the joint seabasing
experimentation community an opportunity to comment on the results and ask
questions. It also gives the experiment sponsor an opportunity to see how
the work was received, assist in interpreting results, and provide further
advice on how the results should be used. In the context of an
experimentation campaign, it may also give the sponsor an opportunity to
clarify how the results affect the overarching campaign concept. While
individual seabasing experiments may have had some form of feedback, the
lack of an overarching joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan that
includes procedures for providing and obtaining feedback may prevent the
joint seabasing experimentation community from fully realizing how the
results of individual experiments affect the development of joint
seabasing.

23Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint Experimentation
(JE) Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006).

Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates is
Uncertain

While some service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching
milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete
development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint
seabasing options. Understanding estimated total ownership costs helps
decision makers measure the whole cost of owning and operating assets and
make comparisons between competing options. The joint seabasing capability
is being assessed in the JCIDS analysis process. However, DOD has not yet
begun a key study of approaches and their associated costs and may not
complete this study for at least a year. In the meantime, the services are
considering or pursuing systems to enhance seabasing capabilities. For
example, a major Navy-Marine Corps initiative is scheduled to undergo a
major milestone review in fiscal year 2008. Until total ownership cost
estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent
to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.

Total Ownership Cost Estimates Help Decision Makers Evaluate Options

In order to evaluate options and make informed, cost-effective decisions,
decision makers must have an understanding of the total ownership costs
for establishing a desired capability. A total ownership cost estimate
includes the costs to develop, acquire, operate, maintain, and dispose of
all systems required to establish a seabasing capability. Understanding
total ownership cost estimates helps organizations measure the whole cost
of owning and operating assets by providing a consistent framework for
analyzing and comparing options. Total ownership cost estimates can be
used to assess the possible return on investment of new initiatives.
According to DOD guidance,24 all parties involved in the defense
acquisition system must be cognizant of the reality of fiscal constraints
and treat cost as an independent variable when developing systems.
Furthermore, the policy stresses the importance of identifying the total
costs of ownership, including major cost drivers, while considering the
affordability of establishing needed capabilities. Even with future
concepts, such as joint seabasing, where uncertainty exists, total
ownership cost estimates can be developed. According to DOD cost analysis
guidance, in such cases, areas of uncertainty can be quantified using
ranges of cost, thereby giving decision makers, at a minimum, a rough
estimate of the total costs to achieving a desired capability. For systems
of systems, such as seabasing, a total ownership cost estimate should
include research, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and disposition
costs of all systems, primary and support, needed to achieve the desired
end state. Understanding the estimated total ownership costs of seabasing
options can help decision makers make informed decisions to determine the
most cost-effective method of achieving a seabasing capability.
Furthermore, they can be used to more effectively evaluate joint seabasing
against alternative methods of projecting and sustaining forces in an
antiaccess environment.

24Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System,
Section E1.1.4 (May 12, 2003).

JCIDS Has Not Yet Produced Cost Estimates for Joint Seabasing Capability Options
and Timeframes Are Uncertain

Joint seabasing is currently going through the capabilities-based
assessment phase of the JCIDS analysis process. One part of the JCIDS
analysis process is the Functional Solutions Analysis--an operationally
based assessment of all potential approaches, including changes to
doctrine, organization, training, as well as material solutions, to solve
identified capability gaps. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance,
this process will assess the costs of potential approaches to joint
seabasing. For any material approaches that are developed, the cost to
develop, procure, and sustain each approach will be estimated. These
estimates should provide decision makers with some understanding of the
costs of these approaches. However, the timeframe for when these cost
assessments will take place is unclear. According to DOD officials, cost
assessments for joint seabasing approaches have not yet begun and may not
be completed for a year or more. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
guidance does not provide a specific methodology for what level of cost
assessment should take place. Rather, the guidance only states that the
process should "roughly assess" the costs of each identified approach.25

Service Acquisitions May Outpace Joint Seabasing Cost Analysis

Although DOD has not yet begun its analysis of joint seabasing approaches
and costs, the services are either considering or actively pursuing
systems to develop enhanced seabasing capabilities. For example, the
Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007 Budget includes funding for the
development of seabasing ships, including ships for the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) and Joint High Speed Vessels. Furthermore,
the Navy has included eleven ships for its Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future), three Joint High Speed Vessels, and one Joint High Speed Sealift
ship in its Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
Fiscal Year 2007 report to Congress.26 Although the plan could change as
the Navy continues to assess its requirements and address affordability
issues, the Navy estimates that these investments will cost nearly $12
billion.27 The ships the Navy has programmed for the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) do not include the cost of a Landing
Helicopter Deck (LHD) amphibious assault ship, which is planned to be part
of the squadron.28 The Congressional Research Service has reported that
this ship has an estimated cost of $2.2 billion, and that the estimated
cost of the entire Maritime Prepositioning Squadron is about $14.5
billion.29 However, unknown factors remain that could affect these
estimates. Furthermore, the number of connectors required to support the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) is yet to be determined. Within the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron, several factors that
could influence cost--such as manning and ship survivability
levels--remain in flux. Figure 4 shows the ships of the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future).

25CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2005).

26According to 10 U.S.C. S 231, the Secretary of Defense is required to
submit with the Defense Budget, an annual long range plan for the
construction of naval vessels. One requirement of this plan is to include
a detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels
for Navy over the next 30 fiscal years.

27Based on fiscal year 2007 dollars.

28The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal
Year 2007 assumes the transfer of one steam-powered LHD from the
expeditionary warfare ship force to the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) squadron, which could affect the Marine Corps's lift requirement
of 10 operationally available large-deck aviation-capable ships.

29Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for
Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006).

Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Squadron

The Navy and Marine Corps have not yet estimated the total ownership costs
of their preferred options for establishing a seabasing capability.
However, both the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint
High Speed Vessel, which will play a critical role in establishing a joint
seabasing capability, are in development and progressing through DOD's
acquisition system. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) is
approaching its second major milestone, which initiates system development
and demonstration, in mid-2008. Prior to this milestone, a total ownership
cost estimate will be required in order for the Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future) to be validated and approved before program initiation.
Although a total ownership cost estimate may be available for the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron for this milestone, according to
service documentation, the costs of the supporting vehicles and vessels
needed for the squadron to operate as planned for use in joint seabasing
will not be included. Furthermore, one of the ships in the squadron--the
Mobile Landing Platform--is going through its own acquisition process with
its second milestone scheduled in fiscal year 2008. Furthermore, because
the JCIDS analysis process for Joint Seabasing will not produce any cost
assessments for at least 1 year, decision makers risk making substantial
investment concerning the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) without
knowledge of the potential costs of other joint seabasing options. The
Navy plans to acquire the first ship for the squadron in 2009.

The Army is also exploring new initiatives for establishing a seabasing
capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is
developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift ships.
Although not being developed specifically for seabasing, according to
service documentation, these systems will have a significant role in
establishing a seabasing capability. The Army plans to acquire five Joint
High Speed Vessels beginning in fiscal year 2008, with a total acquisition
cost of $210 million for the first ship and $170 million for the remaining
ships. The Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan estimates the Joint High
Speed Sealift ship to cost around $920 million. Furthermore, the Army is
also in the early stages of exploring ideas for its Afloat Forward Staging
Base to provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. One option the Army is
exploring for the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add flight decks to a
commercial container ship, along with other alterations, as a means to
provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. Several research organizations
also recommended this option, because it is seen as a potentially low-cost
means of establishing a seabasing capability. A rough order of magnitude
estimate of the cost to convert a commercial cargo ship is approximately
$300 million to $600 million.30

Options Cannot Be Compared without Cost Estimates

In addition to the options in development, additional means for projecting
and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment exist. However, they
cannot effectively be compared when total ownership costs are not known.
For example, the U.S. Transportation Command is working to enhance the
military's joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities, which utilize
existing assets, such as the Army's Logistics Support Vessel and the
Navy's Improved Navy Lighterage System,31 to deploy and sustain forces by
allowing strategic sealift ships to discharge through austere or damaged
ports, or over a bare beach. Furthermore, the Air Force has developed its
Expeditionary Airbase Operating Enabling Concept. This concept is a
methodology and plan for rapid airbase seizure, establishment, and
operation to support the joint force commander in sustaining forces. Other
possibilities include Army air-dropped or air-landed operations to
roll-back enemy shore-based defense or joint special operations forces to
attack high-value coastal defense assets prior to or in concert with naval
strikes from the sea. Some of these options represent existing
capabilities, which could prove to be a more cost-effective means of
projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Until total
ownership costs are developed, the cost-effectiveness of these options
cannot be effectively evaluated.

Conclusions

While DOD's ability to project and sustain forces in an antiaccess
environment is expected to become increasingly important, DOD has not
taken all of the steps needed to effectively manage joint seabasing
initiatives across the department and evaluate competing options for force
projection and sustainment. Without a comprehensive management approach to
guide and assess joint seabasing, DOD may be unable to ensure that ongoing
or planned joint seabasing initiatives are properly focused and complement
each other and the capability is being developed in an efficient and
cost-effective manner. One consequence of this lack of effective
management is the absence of a joint experimentation campaign plan.
Without a campaign plan to direct experimentation for joint seabasing, DOD
and the services' ability to evaluate and validate their solutions,
coordinate efforts, perform analysis, and disseminate results could be
compromised. As a result, the services risk duplicating experimentation
efforts and developing and fielding seabasing capabilities that are not
compatible or interoperable, and they will be unable to leverage the
results of individual experiments across the joint seabasing
experimentation community to maximize synergies. Furthermore, establishing
a joint seabasing capability could be the source of significant investment
by DOD. Given the challenging fiscal environment facing DOD and the rest
of the federal government, decision makers must make investment decisions
that maximize return on investment at the best value for the taxpayer. By
understanding the estimated total ownership costs of options for
establishing a seabasing capability, decision makers would be in a better
position to make informed decisions about what options are most
cost-effective, and evaluate the costs and benefits of establishing a
seabasing capability against other competing priorities. However, while it
is unclear when DOD will complete its analysis of joint seabasing
approaches and costs, the services are pursuing initiatives and systems to
develop a seabasing capability, some of which are approaching milestones
for investment decisions. If individual systems that support seabasing are
allowed to move forward through the acquisition process before total
ownership cost of seabasing options are developed and made transparent to
DOD and Congress, there is a risk that DOD could make significant
investments to develop a capability that may not be the most
cost-effective means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess
environment.

30According to the Naval Research Advisory Committee report Sea Basing,
Maersk Line, Ltd., in a proposal to the Military Sealift Command,
estimated the cost of converting an S-class container ship at $300
million.

31The Logistics Support Vessel carries cargo and equipment throughout a
theater of operations. This vessel can carry up to 2,000 tons of cargo.
The Improved Navy Lighterage System enables the transfer of cargo from
strategic sealift ships to barges and ferries so cargo can be moved to
shore in cases where ships are unable to offload at ports. The system is
portable and can be stored on the decks of many strategic prepositioning
ships.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To assist decision makers in developing a comprehensive management
approach to guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for force
projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment and integrate
service initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following actions to incorporate sound management principles into DOD's
management of joint seabasing:

           o assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a
           joint seabasing capability and coordinating supporting
           initiatives;
           o establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to
           provide day-to-day management oversight over the services,
           combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved
           in joint seabasing; and
           o develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure
           communication between and among the services, combatant commands,
           Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
           and to provide information on all joint seabasing activities
           across DOD.

To better guide joint seabasing experimentation and inform decisions on
joint seabasing as an option for force projection and sustainment in an
antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense do the
following:

           o Direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and coordinate
           joint seabasing experimentation efforts, under the purview of the
           joint seabasing implementation team. U.S. Joint Forces Command
           should be responsible for developing and implementing a joint
           seabasing experimentation campaign plan to guide the evaluation of
           joint seabasing as a capability for force projection and
           sustainment. Such an experimentation plan should include the
           following elements:

                        o a clear focus and objectives for joint seabasing
                        that encompass near-, mid-, and long-term
                        experimentation plans;
                        o a near-term plan for joint seabasing
                        experimentation that includes events for the next
                        fiscal year, participants, timelines, and resources
                        that will be used to support the events;
                        o a spectrum of joint experimentation activities that
                        include wargaming, comprehensive modeling and
                        simulation, live demonstrations, workshops,
                        symposiums, and analysis;
                        o a data collection and analysis plan to capture and
                        evaluate results; and
                        o a method for communicating observations, results,
                        upcoming activities, and feedback across the joint
                        seabasing experimentation community.

           o Direct that the services collaborate with the U.S. Joint Forces
           Command in developing, implementing, and using the joint seabasing
           experimentation campaign plan.

           o Direct that the services utilize and contribute to the U.S.
           Joint Forces Command's knowledge management portal by providing
           their observations, insights, results, and planned activities to
           the portal for use by the joint seabasing experimentation
           community.

To assist decision makers in evaluating the costs of joint seabasing
options against the capabilities that joint seabasing could provide the
joint warfighter as a means for force projection and sustainment in an
antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the implementation team or other appropriate entity to synchronize
development of total ownership cost estimates for the range of joint
seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient information to use in
making investment decisions on service seabasing initiatives.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation team.
In its comments, DOD stated that it is premature to establish additional
oversight at this time and that in the interim the Force Management Joint
Capabilities Board is providing an appropriate level of management
oversight. As discussed below, in view of the magnitude of potential DOD
investments in seabasing and DOD's need to efficiently manage future
resources and distinguish between needs and wants, we continue to believe
that an implementation team is needed to coordinate disparate service and
defense organization initiatives related to seabasing and urge the
department to further consider the need for action now rather than waiting
until after it establishes joint requirements. In addition, although DOD
partially agreed with our other recommendations, its comments did not
indicate that it would take specific actions beyond those it has already
begun and which we evaluated as part of our review. In light of DOD's
stated agreement with the intent of our recommendations, we urge the
department to develop specific actions and plans to implement our
recommendations.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding leadership and
accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and
coordinating supporting initiatives. DOD stated that the Joint Staff is
assigned responsibility to develop the Joint Seabasing Concept and the
resulting capability and that there is clear and accountable leadership
established within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint
Capabilities Board to accomplish this development. While the Joint Staff,
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Capabilities Board
have oversight and responsibilities within JCIDS, we found that none of
these organizations have the overall authority, responsibility, and
accountability to coordinate joint seabasing initiatives and the service
acquisitions that may support joint seabasing. As discussed in the report,
the services have their own seabasing concepts and some service
initiatives are outpacing joint seabasing in development. DOD has not
provided sufficient leadership to ensure these initiatives are fully
leveraged, properly focused, and complement each other. Because of the
potential for billions of dollars to be spent to procure these systems, we
continue to believe our recommendation has merit and that assignment of
clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint seabasing
capability and coordinating supporting initiatives is needed.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation that an overarching, dedicated
implementation team be established to provide day-to-day management
oversight over the services, combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing. DOD commented that the
joint seabasing concept is still being developed within the JCIDS and the
Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is providing the
appropriate level of management oversight. DOD stated that it is premature
to establish additional oversight at this time and that after the needed
joint seabasing capabilities have been defined, the department will
determine if additional oversight is necessary. We believe that the Force
Management Functional Capabilities Board's oversight does not go far
enough in providing comprehensive management oversight for joint
seabasing. While the Board is responsible for leading the joint seabasing
capabilities-based assessment and oversees the sponsor (the Navy) in
developing documents, the Board's responsibilities do not constitute the
type of oversight needed to ensure ongoing or planned service initiatives
that may support joint seabasing are coordinated and complement each
other. We continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that
creation of an implementation team to provide day-to-day management
oversight of joint seabasing is needed. Therefore, we urge the department
to create such a team now rather than waiting until needed joint seabasing
capabilities are defined.

DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding implementing a
communications strategy for all joint seabasing activities in DOD. DOD
stated that the JCIDS process, Joint Capabilities Boards, and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council provide for communication between the Joint
Staff, all four services, the combatant commands, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). However, as discussed in our report, we found
that while the Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant commands,
OSD, and others participate in the JCIDS process, the information shared
is not all inclusive and it is not always clear who is involved in joint
seabasing and what they are doing. A DOD-wide communication strategy that
provides a framework to effectively manage activities can support the
overall development of joint seabasing by (1) providing better information
for the participants in organizing and planning initiatives and (2)
enabling the participants to minimize redundancy by leveraging activities
being conducted by others. We continue to believe, as we have recommended,
that a communications strategy should be developed and implemented.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendations regarding coordination of
joint seabasing experimentation efforts and development of a joint
experimentation campaign plan. DOD stated that the Joint Staff, with
service, combatant command, and OSD support, is developing a draft Joint
Capabilities Document that recommends a joint seabasing experimentation
plan. However, DOD's comments did not address which organization would be
responsible for developing the experimentation campaign plan. As we
recommended, we continue to believe that the U.S. Joint Forces Command
should be charged with developing and implementing the joint seabasing
experimentation campaign plan. As noted in our report, the U.S. Joint
Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for joint warfighting
experimentation. In this role the command is responsible for conducting
joint experimentation on new warfighting concepts, disseminating the
results of these activities, and coordinating joint experimentation
efforts.

DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's knowledge management portal. DOD concurs that a common
portal should be established and used by the services. DOD stated that the
U.S. Joint Forces Command's knowledge management portal is one option that
will be considered in order to share joint seabasing experimentation
observations, insights, results, and planned activities. While we support
DOD's plans to establish a knowledge management portal for joint force
projection and sustainment experimentation, we continue to believe our
recommendations merit action and that DOD should direct the services to
use the U.S. Joint Forces Command's knowledge management portal to share
information on joint seabasing rather than consider it an option.

Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding
development of total ownership costs for joint seabasing options. DOD
stated that once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the
required joint seabasing capabilities, total ownership costs for the
options to satisfy the needed capability gaps will be developed as part of
the DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution and acquisition
processes. We support DOD's plans to develop total ownership costs;
however, as our report points out, we do not believe that these actions
alone will sufficiently ensure that total ownership costs for all joint
seabasing options are synchronized. While total ownership costs will be
estimated and synchronized for those options being developed in DOD's
JCIDS process for joint seabasing, the services are either considering or
actively pursuing systems to develop their own seabasing capabilities.
Some of these systems are approaching major milestone reviews for
investment consideration. Requiring that total ownership cost estimates be
developed for only those options developed in DOD's joint seabasing JCIDS
will provide decision makers with an incomplete picture of all joint
seabasing options. Without ensuring that total ownership cost estimates
are developed as we recommended for both joint seabasing options being
developed in JCIDS and those options being developed by the services, DOD
will risk making investment decisions that may not be the most
cost-effective means of establishing a joint seabasing capability.

DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II
of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has employed
a sound management approach for developing a joint seabasing capability,
we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
joint staff, two combatant commands, the four military services, and the
private sector; received briefings from relevant officials; and reviewed
key documents. We compared DOD's approach with best practices for managing
and implementing major efforts. To identify these best practices, we
reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations.
In the absence of a comprehensive planning document, we used relevant
questions derived from the identified best practices in interviews with
officials and in analyzing pertinent documents such as the August 2005
Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, and instructions and manuals on DOD's
Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), including (1)
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005); (2) the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005); and
(3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff White Paper on Conducting a
Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Under the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (January 2006). We also
interviewed officials involved in the development of the joint seabasing
to obtain information on how involved the services, combatant commands,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in
developing joint seabasing, what their respective roles and
responsibilities were, the level of authority available to direct the
services and combatant commands to participate in the JCIDS analyses, how
information on joint seabasing development efforts and initiatives was
shared, how initiatives that may support joint seabasing were coordinated,
and other issues. In addition, we examined the Seabasing Working Group Web
site to identify what information was being communicated through the Web
site.

To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation campaign plan has
been developed, implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint
seabasing options, we obtained briefings and interviewed officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
U.S. Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. We also discussed the status of joint
seabasing experimentation efforts and the extent to which they coordinated
with each other in conducting joint seabasing experimentation. We examined
DOD guidance to identify and clarify roles and responsibilities for
leading joint warfighting experimentation. To identify key aspects for
conducting experimentation campaigns, we reviewed books and publications
on experimentation campaigns, including Code of Best Practice: Campaigns
of Experimentation; Code of Best Practice: Experimentation; Guide for
Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation; and The Role of
Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. We obtained and reviewed
DOD and service reports and briefings containing the analyses and findings
of experimentation activities. We also attended an Army
Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise demonstrating the unloading and
loading of equipment to the shore when port facilities are inadequate,
unavailable, or nonexistent.

To assess the extent to which DOD and the services identified the cost of
joint seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed,
cost-effective decisions, we reviewed official statements, obtained
briefings from, and interviewed officials from, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, Defense Science Board, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments. We examined DOD documents and data including, but not limited
to, the President's Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Budget, the Department of the
Navy Ships and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables, and the Report to
Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY 2007. We assessed the reliability of the data used through discussions
with knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data used were
sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We reviewed statements by the
Congressional Budget Office and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments. We also reviewed reports on seabasing including, but not
limited to, Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow by the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Sea Basing by the Defense Science
Board, Sea Basing by the Naval Research Advisory Committee, and Seabasing:
Ensuring Joint Force Access From the Sea by the National Research Council.
To identify guidance on cost estimating and total ownership costs, we
reviewed DOD documentation, including DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense
Acquisition System (May 12, 2003), DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System (April 5, 2002), Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (May 11, 2005), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (May 11, 2005). We also reviewed our prior work on cost
estimating and total ownership cost.

We conducted our review from February 2006 to October 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards at the following
locations:

           o Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

                        o Office of Force Transformation
                        o Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
                        o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
                        Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

           o The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

                        o Office of Force Structure Resources and
                        Assessment--Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division

           o U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia

                        o Joint Experimentation Directorate
                        o Joint Futures Lab

           o U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
           o Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

                        o Office of Expeditionary Warfare
                        o Office of Assessments, Seabasing Pillar

           o Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
           o U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
           o Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island
           o Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia
           o Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
           o Marine Corps Combatant Development Command, Quantico, Virginia

                        o Capabilities Development Directorate, Seabasing
                        Integration Division
                        o Operations Analysis Division, Mission Area Analysis
                        Branch
                        o Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

           o Offices of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.

                        o Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
                        and Plans
                        o Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

           o Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia

                        o Army Capabilities Integration Center

           o Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia

                        o Deployment Process Modernization Office

           o Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief
           of Staff for Air, Space, and Information Operations Plans, and
           Requirements, Washington, D.C.

                        o Concepts, Strategy, and Wargaming Division

           o Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia
           o Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C.
           o LMI Government Consulting, McLean, Virginia
			  
			  Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  GAO Contact

           Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]
			  
			  Acknowledgments

           In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini,
           Assistant Director; Sarah Baker; Renee Brown; Nicole Harms;
           Margaret G. Holihan; Ian Jefferies; Kevin L. O'Neill; Roderick
           Rodgers, Analyst-in-Charge; and Rebecca Shea made key
           contributions to this report.
			  
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-211 .

To view the full product, including the scope
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For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
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Highlights of [43]GAO-07-211 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives

January 2007

FORCE STRUCTURE

Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and
Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New
Capabilities

Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and
sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land bases
and could be the source of billions of dollars of investment. In future
security environments, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to
encounter situations of reduced or denied access to areas of operation.
Even where forward operating bases are otherwise available, their use may
be politically undesirable or operationally restricted. GAO was asked to
address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a comprehensive
management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has developed a joint
experimentation campaign plan for joint seabasing, and (3) DOD and the
services have identified the costs of joint seabasing options. For this
review, GAO analyzed joint requirements documents, experimentation
efforts, and service acquisition plans.

[44]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop a management approach that includes senior
leadership involvement, a dedicated implementation team, and a
communications strategy; and develop an experimentation campaign plan and
total ownership cost estimates for seabasing options. DOD agreed with the
recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation team.

While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it
has not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess
joint seabasing. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices
for developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating
an implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is
developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are
sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient
leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives
are outpacing DOD's analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not
established an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to
ensure joint seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that
efforts are effective and coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a
communications strategy that shares information among the organizations
involved in seabasing. Without a comprehensive management approach
containing these elements, DOD may be unable to coordinate activities and
minimize redundancy among service initiatives.

DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although many
seabasing experimentation activities--including war games, modeling and
simulation, and live demonstrations--have taken place across the services,
combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching joint
seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because the
U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint
seabasing experimentation, although it has been tasked with developing a
biennial joint experimentation campaign plan for future joint concepts.
While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing the
plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint
seabasing or will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation
efforts. Without a plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the services'
ability to evaluate solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results
could be compromised.

While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching
milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete
development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint
seabasing options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based
assessment process that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates
for seabasing options. However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study
that will identify potential approaches, including changes to doctrine and
training as well as material solutions, and produce preliminary cost
estimates. DOD officials expect the study will not be complete for a year
or more. Meanwhile, the services are actively pursuing a variety of
seabasing initiatives, some of which are approaching milestones which will
guide future program investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for
joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and
Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.

References

Visible links
  27. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
  28. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-211
  29. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
  30. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
  31. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-211
  32. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
  33. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
  34. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  35. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  36. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
  37. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
  38. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  39. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  40. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  41. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  42. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-211
  43. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07211.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-211
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