Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's	 
Efforts to Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters	 
(28-MAR-07, GAO-07-193).					 
                                                                 
Concerns about the safety and health of workers involved in the  
response to Hurricane Katrina included their exposure to	 
contaminated floodwaters and injuries from working around debris.
The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health	 
Administration (OSHA) is responsible for coordinating federal	 
efforts to protect the safety and health of workers involved in  
the response to large national disasters. Under the Comptroller  
General's authority, GAO initiated a number of Katrina-related	 
reviews. For this review, GAO examined (1) what is known about	 
the number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf 
Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina; (2) the extent to which  
OSHA tracked injuries and illnesses sustained by these workers;  
and (3) how well OSHA met the safety and health needs of workers.
To address these issues, GAO reviewed reports; analyzed data;	 
interviewed federal, state, and local officials; and conducted	 
site visits.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-193 					        
    ACCNO:   A67384						        
  TITLE:     Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve     
OSHA's Efforts to Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters
     DATE:   03/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Contractor personnel				 
	     Data collection					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Employees						 
	     Health care services				 
	     Health hazards					 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Monitoring 					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Occupational health and safety programs		 
	     Occupational safety				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Protective equipment				 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-07-193

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]The Role of OSHA in Occupational Safety and Health
          * [4]The Role of OSHA in a Disaster

     * [5]No One Collected Information on the Total Number of Response
     * [6]OSHA Was Unable to Collect Information on Workers' Injuries

          * [7]Several Factors Hindered OSHA's Efforts to Collect Data on I
          * [8]Available Data from Four Agencies Show Over 3,000 Injuries a
          * [9]Eleven Worker Fatalities Related to Hurricane Katrina Report

     * [10]OSHA Provided Assistance to Many Agencies and Workers, but I

          * [11]OSHA Established Operations Quickly, Developed Health and Sa

               * [12]OSHA Quickly Established Operations in the Gulf
               * [13]OSHA Developed a Health and Safety Plan for the Entire
                 Respo
               * [14]OSHA Provided Information on Common Hazards on Its Web
                 Site
               * [15]OSHA Intervened at Work Sites by Correcting Potential
                 Hazard
               * [16]OSHA Sampled Air, Water, Soil, and Noise Levels at Many
                 Work

          * [17]Disagreements with FEMA and Lack of Awareness of OSHA's Role

               * [18]OSHA and FEMA Disagreed about Implementation of the
                 Annex an
               * [19]Many Agency Officials Were Not Aware of OSHA's Role in a
                 Lar
               * [20]OSHA Was Not Invited to Participate in Emergency
                 Preparednes

          * [21]OSHA Was Only Partially Successful in Providing Training, Di

               * [22]Some of OSHA's Training Was Delayed, and Some Agencies
                 Did N
               * [23]OSHA Distributed Some Protective Equipment to Workers
                 but Wa
               * [24]The Need for Mental Health Services Exceeded the
                 Assistance
               * [25]Although OSHA Provided Some Information and Training to
                 Nonf

     * [26]Conclusions
     * [27]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [28]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

          * [29]Analysis of Agency Documents
          * [30]Site Visits
          * [31]Data from Federal Agencies on Injuries and Illnesses
          * [32]Data on Federal and State Workers' Compensation Claims

     * [33]GAO's Response to OSHA's Comments
     * [34]GAO Contact
     * [35]Acknowledgments
     * [36]GAO's Mission
     * [37]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [38]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [39]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [40]Congressional Relations
     * [41]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

March 2007

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to Protect Workers' Safety
and Health in Disasters

GAO-07-193

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2
Background 5
No One Collected Information on the Total Number of Response and Recovery
Workers Deployed to the Gulf Coast, but 10 Federal Agencies Collected Data
on Their Workers 10
OSHA Was Unable to Collect Information on Workers' Injuries and Illnesses
12
OSHA Provided Assistance to Many Agencies and Workers, but Its Efforts to
Meet the Safety and Health Needs of All Workers Were Hampered by Several
Factors 15
Conclusions 39
Recommendations for Executive Action 40
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 45
Appendix II Data on the Estimated Number of Federal Workers Who Responded
to Hurricane Katrina and Their Injuries and Illnesses 48
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Health & Human Services 59
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Labor 61
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 71
Related GAO Products 72

Tables

Table 1: Number of Fatalities Reported by OSHA and Other Federal Agencies
50
Table 2: Reported Number of Injuries and Illnesses for EPA, August 2005 to
June 2006 52
Table 3: Reported Types of Injuries and Illnesses for EPA, August 2005 to
June 2006 53
Table 4: Reported Number of Injuries and Illnesses for USACE, August 2005
to June 2006 54
Table 5: Reported Types of Injuries and Illnesses for USACE, August 2005
to June 2006 55
Table 6: Reported Exposures for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to March
2006 56
Table 7: Reported Injuries for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to March
2006 56
Table 8: Reported Health Effects for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to
March 2006 57
Table 9: Reported Timing of Symptoms for Health Effects for the Coast
Guard, November 2005 to March 2006 57

Figures

Figure 1: Estimated Number of Federal Employees in the Gulf Coast Area on
the First Day of Each Month, September 2005 to April 2006 11
Figure 2: Animals Such as Snakes and Alligators Presented Hazards to
Workers in the Gulf Coast Area 17
Figure 3: Selected Quick Cards Developed by OSHA for Hurricane Katrina 19
Figure 4: Selected Fact Sheets Developed by OSHA for Hurricane Katrina 20
Figure 5: Work Zones with Equipment Not Protected from Traffic by Safety
Cones 22
Figure 6: Workers on a Water Tower without Fall Protection Such As Guard
Rails or Safety Harnesses 23
Figure 7: Workers on a Roof without Safety Harnesses and with Poorly
Secured Ladders 24
Figure 8: Airborne Hazards on the Gulf Coast 26
Figure 9: OSHA Field Staff Sampling the Air, Water, and Soil on the Gulf
Coast by Pinning a Small Personal Monitor to a Worker, Taking Water
Samples, and Taking Soil Samples 27
Figure 10: Driving Hazards Faced by Workers in the Gulf Coast Area 33
Figure 11: Safety Brochures in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese 38

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense EPA Environmental Protection Agency FEMA Federal
Emergency Management Agency NRP National Response Plan OSHA Occupational
Safety and Health Administration USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 28, 2007

Congressional Committees

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, federal
agencies undertook one of the largest rescue and recovery efforts in
American history. Several agencies sent workers to the three states that
suffered the most damage from the hurricane: Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. Various reports have raised concerns about the safety and
health of workers involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina and the
dangers they faced, from animals such as snakes and alligators to
floodwaters contaminated by chemicals, oil, corpses, and fecal matter.
Public health advisories also warned about high temperatures and the
potential spread of diseases such as West Nile Virus resulting from
mosquitoes that breed in standing water. In addition, worker advocacy
groups, public health advisors, and representatives of the Congress have
raised concerns about the possibility of latent illnesses among workers
deployed to the Gulf, especially in light of such illnesses among workers
involved in rescue and recovery efforts at the World Trade Center disaster
site. Many workers at the site in New York were not aware that they had
developed debilitating respiratory conditions or post-traumatic stress
disorders until months or years after they left the site. After Hurricane
Katrina hit the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, federal agencies undertook
one of the largest rescue and recovery efforts in American history.
Several agencies sent workers to the three states that suffered the most
damage from the hurricane: Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Various
reports have raised concerns about the safety and health of workers
involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina and the dangers they faced,
from animals such as snakes and alligators to floodwaters contaminated by
chemicals, oil, corpses, and fecal matter. Public health advisories also
warned about high temperatures and the potential spread of diseases such
as West Nile Virus resulting from mosquitoes that breed in standing water.
In addition, worker advocacy groups, public health advisors, and
representatives of the Congress have raised concerns about the possibility
of latent illnesses among workers deployed to the Gulf, especially in
light of such illnesses among workers involved in rescue and recovery
efforts at the World Trade Center disaster site. Many workers at the site
in New York were not aware that they had developed debilitating
respiratory conditions or post-traumatic stress disorders until months or
years after they left the site.

The safety and health of workers responding to Hurricane Katrina is
addressed in a section, or "annex," of the National Response Plan (NRP) of
December 2004, the federal plan for responding to domestic emergencies and
disasters. As lead agency for carrying out the provisions of the Worker
Safety and Health Support Annex (the Annex), the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for
coordinating the worker safety and health efforts of responders--including
federal, state, local and tribal governments, and private and nonprofit
organizations--in protecting the safety and health of their workers when
the Annex is implemented. OSHA's responsibilities under the Annex include
identifying and assessing health and safety hazards, providing technical
advice and support to safety officials, and collecting data on exposures
and injuries. Given the large numbers of workers who responded to
Hurricane Katrina and concerns about their health and safety, we addressed
the following questions: (1) What is known about the number of response
and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane
Katrina? (2) To what extent did OSHA track injuries The safety and health
of workers responding to Hurricane Katrina is addressed in a section, or
"annex," of the National Response Plan (NRP) of December 2004, the federal
plan for responding to domestic emergencies and disasters. As lead agency
for carrying out the provisions of the Worker Safety and Health Support
Annex (the Annex), the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for coordinating the worker
safety and health efforts of responders--including federal, state, local
and tribal governments, and private and nonprofit organizations--in
protecting the safety and health of their workers when the Annex is
implemented. OSHA's responsibilities under the Annex include identifying
and assessing health and safety hazards, providing technical advice and
support to safety officials, and collecting data on exposures and
injuries. Given the large numbers of workers who responded to Hurricane
Katrina and concerns about their health and safety, we addressed the
following questions: (1) What is known about the number of response and
recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane
Katrina? (2) To what extent did OSHA track injuries and illnesses
sustained by these workers? (3) How well did OSHA meet the safety and
health needs of these workers?

To address these objectives, we reviewed reports and documents related to
the federal response efforts for Hurricane Katrina and other recent
disasters; interviewed officials from 10 federal agencies identified by
FEMA and OSHA as having deployed response and recovery workers to the Gulf
Coast: OSHA; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Coast Guard; the Department of
Defense (DOD); the National Guard; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE); and the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services,
and the Interior. We also conducted site visits in Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana where we interviewed federal officials in all three states
and selected state and local officials who were part of the rescue and
recovery efforts. To obtain information on the number of response and
recovery workers who responded to Hurricane Katrina, we contacted the 10
agencies identified by FEMA and OSHA and asked them to provide information
on the number of workers each agency employed in the Gulf Coast. To obtain
information on injuries and illnesses sustained by these workers, we asked
these same agencies for this information for their workers. Of the 10
agencies, only four--USACE, EPA, the Coast Guard, and the Department of
the Interior--had data on workers' injuries and illnesses that were
sufficiently reliable for us to report. We also obtained data on injuries
and illnesses related to Hurricane Katrina from workers' compensation
claims filed by federal workers, and information on worker fatalities from
OSHA and other federal agencies. To assess the reliability of the
agencies' data, we talked with agency officials about their data
quality-control procedures and reviewed relevant documentation. We
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. Finally, we interviewed workers' rights organizations, including
the Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, Boat People SOS, the Center to
Protect Workers' Rights, and the New York Committee for Occupational
Safety and Health. We conducted our work from October 2005 to December
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
For additional information, see appendix I.

Results in Brief

No one, including OSHA, was responsible for collecting information on the
total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf in
response to Hurricane Katrina, and no one collected it, but 10 federal
agencies provided estimates showing that, on October 1, 2005 (the month
with the largest total number of federal workers), the agencies had about
49,000 federal workers in the Gulf Coast area. In addition, six of these
agencies estimated that their contractors had over 5,100 workers in the
area as of December 1, 2005 (the month with the largest total number of
contractor employees), but three of the other four did not track the
number of workers employed by their contractors, and one did not employ
contractors for the response.

Although OSHA was responsible for tracking injuries and illnesses for
federal response and recovery workers, including federal contractor
employees, deployed to the Gulf Coast during the response to Hurricane
Katrina, the agency was unable to collect usable information from federal
agencies on their workers' injuries and illnesses. OSHA could not track
workers' injuries and illnesses because the agency (1) had not developed a
process for collecting this information prior to the disaster, (2) was not
directed by FEMA to track this information right away, and (3) received
incomplete and unreliable data from federal agencies once it attempted to
collect the information. In the 8 months between the time the National
Response Plan and the Annex was issued and Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf
Coast, OSHA focused its efforts on introducing the Annex to agencies that
might respond to a disaster and did not develop a process for collecting
data on workers' injuries and illnesses. In addition, OSHA, like all other
agencies under the NRP, must wait for FEMA to assign it specific
responsibilities for each disaster and authorize funding for these
activities, but FEMA did not direct OSHA to collect data on federal
workers' injuries and illnesses until more than 3 weeks after the
hurricane struck. After receiving this assignment from FEMA, OSHA tried to
obtain the data from the logs that OSHA requires agencies to keep at each
work site on workers' injuries and illnesses. However, not all agencies
that deployed workers to the Gulf Coast provided these logs to OSHA as
requested, and those that did provided incomplete and unreliable data.
OSHA and other agencies also reported nine worker fatalities attributed to
work-related accidents, including three employees of federal contractors
and six nonfederal workers or volunteers.

OSHA provided assistance to many response and recovery workers who
responded to Hurricane Katrina, but OSHA's efforts to meet all workers'
safety and health needs were hampered by several factors. OSHA used its
own funds to quickly establish operations in the Gulf area prior to
receiving authorization from FEMA in the form of a mission assignment
implementing the Annex. OSHA developed health and safety plans; provided
information on common safety hazards to many agencies and workers;
intervened in thousands of potentially hazardous situations; and assessed
air, water, soil, and noise hazards at many worksites. However,
disagreements between OSHA and FEMA about which agency was in charge of
providing safety and health assistance to federal agencies and workers and
how and when the Annex would be implemented delayed some of OSHA's efforts
to provide assistance. Once OSHA began its efforts, some agencies' lack of
awareness about the role OSHA plays in a disaster further hindered its
ability to provide assistance. For example, many agency officials did not
know that, in a disaster, OSHA provides technical assistance rather than
conducting inspections of work sites or that OSHA can provide assistance
such as assessing safety hazards and recommending the proper protective
equipment for workers. This lack of understanding contributed to agencies'
not requesting OSHA's assistance during the response and not inviting OSHA
to participate in emergency preparedness exercises in the months leading
up to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, although OSHA provided valuable
assistance to many agencies and workers, it was not able to ensure that
all workers' needs for training, protective gear, and mental health
services were met. The training OSHA provided was delayed for several
weeks because FEMA did not officially authorize OSHA to carry out its
responsibilities under the Annex until more than 3 weeks after the
hurricane, and some agencies did not request training from OSHA because
they did not realize it was available. OSHA provided some personal
protective equipment to workers in the Gulf Coast area but had not
developed a plan for ensuring that workers had needed protective equipment
as required by the Annex and FEMA, and some workers did not have equipment
to protect them from hazards. For example, National Guard officials told
us that some of their federalized workers did not have equipment such as
rubber boots to protect them from contaminated floodwaters. OSHA also had
difficulty getting counselors to provide mental health services in the
locations and during the hours they were needed, and it did not coordinate
with the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure that workers
had needed mental health services. Finally, coordinating the safety and
health needs of nonfederal workers--including state and local government
workers, many immigrants, and volunteers--was not part of OSHA's assigned
responsibilities for Hurricane Katrina (nor any other federal agency's
responsibility), and some of their needs were not met.

We are recommending that the Secretaries of the Departments of Labor and
Homeland Security direct the Administrators of OSHA and FEMA to improve
their ability to meet workers' safety and health needs in the event of a
future disaster in several areas, including clearly defining the criteria
to be used in deciding when OSHA will be responsible for carrying out its
duties under the Annex to the NRP; clarifying OSHA's and FEMA's roles
under the Annex; and proactively working to provide information to other
federal, state, and local agencies about the role that OSHA plays in a
major disaster and the assistance it can provide. We are also recommending
that the Secretary of Labor direct OSHA to establish a process for
collecting data on injuries and illnesses sustained by workers who respond
to disasters and develop, implement, and monitor an incident personal
protective equipment program as defined in the Annex. Finally, we are
recommending that the Secretaries of the Departments of Labor and Health
and Human Services develop a plan for coordinating and providing mental
health services in the event of a future disaster. In responding to a
draft of this report, officials with the Departments of Health and Human
Services and Homeland Security agreed with our recommendations and
provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. The
Department of Health and Human Services provided general written comments.
(See app. III for a copy of its comments.) The Department of Labor agreed
with one of our recommendations and, while it did not comment on the other
recommendations, stated generally that we did not give the agency enough
credit for the actions it took during its response to Hurricane Katrina
and disagreed with some of the findings. (See app. IV for a copy of the
agency's comments and our response.) The Departments of Labor and the
Interior; the Coast Guard; and the National Guard also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Although they were
provided with a draft for comment, DOD did not respond to our request for
comments. Officials with EPA, USACE, and the Department of Agriculture
told us that they had no comments.

Background

The Role of OSHA in Occupational Safety and Health

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 authorizes OSHA to set
occupational safety and health standards, rules, and regulations and to
enforce their compliance. OSHA uses two approaches--enforcement and
compliance assistance.

Enforcement is carried out primarily by using compliance officers to
inspect employer work sites. Employers whose work sites fail to meet
federal safety and health standards face sanctions, such as paying
penalties for violations of safety and health standards. In this
enforcement capacity, OSHA targets employers for inspection using injury
and illness rates for industries and specific work sites. OSHA also
conducts inspections when employers report fatalities or serious injuries
and when workers file complaints alleging that a violation of a safety or
health standard exists that threatens physical harm or that an imminent
danger exists at their work sites.

Cooperative programs, in contrast, use a variety of incentives to
encourage employers to work with OSHA to reduce hazards and institute
practices that foster safer and healthier working conditions. Such
incentives include free consultations, recognition for exemplary safety
and health systems, and exemption from routine inspections.

OSHA has direct enforcement responsibility for federal workers in all
states and for private sector workers in about half the states. In the
remaining states, OSHA has granted approval for the states to conduct
their own enforcement of private sector, state, and local government work
sites.^1 None of the three states most affected by Hurricane Katrina
conducts its own worker safety and health program; OSHA provides direct
oversight for workers in these states.

OSHA is organized by regional and area offices. The three states most
affected by Hurricane Katrina are located in OSHA's Region 4 (Mississippi
and Alabama) and Region 6 (Louisiana). Its area offices in these states
are located in Jackson, Mississippi; Mobile, Alabama; and Baton Rouge,
Louisiana

Federal and private sector employers are required by OSHA to maintain
records documenting certain work-related injuries and illnesses: those
that result in death, 1 or more days away from work, restricted work, loss
of consciousness, or a significant injury or illness diagnosed by a
physician. Each employer's work site is required to record illness and
injury data on a form known as an "OSHA 300 log." While employers are not
required to submit these logs to OSHA, they must be available for
inspection upon request. Federal agencies are required to submit summary
information to OSHA about their safety and health programs on an annual
basis, but these reports generally do not contain information on specific
injuries and illnesses sustained by their workers.

^1At present, 22 states have been approved by OSHA to operate their own
enforcement programs covering all private sector workers and state and
local public sector workers, and 4 have been approved to cover state and
local public sector workers only.

The Role of OSHA in a Disaster

Based on lessons learned during the response to the World Trade Center
disaster, OSHA now uses its statutory enforcement discretion during a
disaster to exempt selected employers from normal enforcement operations
and provide technical assistance and consultation in combination with
traditional enforcement as required by the incident.^2 At the World Trade
Center, OSHA made this decision based on the recognition that a rescue
effort should not be hampered, that enforcement takes time and can affect
the speed of the correction of safety and health hazards, and that its
goal was protection, not citation. The Assistant Secretary of OSHA, in
conjunction with regional administrators, makes the decision when to
exercise its enforcement discretion and move to a technical assistance
role, and when to return to traditional enforcement

While federal, state, and local agencies as well as private sector
employers are responsible for ensuring the safety and health of their
workers, OSHA is responsible for coordinating with other federal
cooperating agencies to provide safety and health technical assistance to
response and recovery workers involved in the response to a disaster. The
federal cooperating agencies are DOD; the Departments of Energy, Health
and Human Services, and Homeland Security; and EPA.

As the lead coordinating agency for the Worker Safety and Health Support
Annex (the Annex), OSHA's coordination responsibilities include

           1. providing occupational safety and health technical advice and
           support to safety officials at the Joint Field Office, a temporary
           federal facility established at the site of a disaster to
           coordinate federal assistance to affected jurisdictions;
           2. developing and implementing site-specific occupational safety
           and health plans and ensuring that the plans are coordinated and
           consistent among multiple sites;
           3. identifying and assessing health and safety hazards and
           characterizing the incident environment, to include continued
           monitoring of incident safety on a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week
           basis;
           4. monitoring responder personal exposure on a 24-hours-a-day,
           7-days-a-week basis, including monitoring for chemical and
           biological contaminants, noise, heat or cold, and ionizing
           radiation;
           5. monitoring the medical condition of responders and, in
           conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services,
           evaluating the need for longer term monitoring;
           6. assessing responder safety and health resource needs and
           identifying sources for those assets;
           7. developing, implementing, and monitoring an incident personal
           protective equipment program--including the selection, use, and
           decontamination of the equipment; implementation of a respiratory
           protection fit-test program--and distribution of equipment;
           8. collecting and managing data on exposures, accidents, and
           injuries to facilitate consistent formatting and data sharing
           among response organizations;
           9. communicating with labor unions, contractors, and other
           organizations regarding responder safety and health issues;
           10. coordinating and providing incident-specific responder
           training;
           11. providing psychological first aid during and after incident
           response and recovery activities; and
           12. identifying, in coordination with the Department of Health and
           Human Services, appropriate immunization and prophylaxis for
           responders and recovery workers.

^2OSHA retains the ability to enforce regulations and issue citations even
when it is in a technical assistance role and may cite employers that do
not comply with the suggestions of OSHA staff or if there is an employee
complaint or a fatality.

Even though OSHA has been assigned responsibility for coordinating the
activities in the Annex, during an actual disaster, FEMA must issue a
"mission assignment" that authorizes OSHA to receive reimbursement for
carrying out some or all of these activities, depending on the needs of
the disaster and which groups are covered during each response effort.
Without a mission assignment, services provided by an agency cannot be
reimbursed by FEMA.^3 For Hurricane Katrina, FEMA issued mission
assignments to OSHA tasking it with 11 of the 12 activities listed in the
Annex for federal agencies and their workers, including federal contractor
employees. The only activity in the Annex for which OSHA was not assigned
responsibility for Hurricane Katrina was monitoring the medical conditions
of responders, including assessing the need for long-term medical
monitoring because, according to FEMA, it does not have the authority
under the Stafford Act to pay for the collection and management of data
for long-term studies or analysis.^4 FEMA also did not assign
responsibility to OSHA, or any other federal agency, for coordinating the
safety and health of nonfederal workers, except workers employed by
federal contractors. State and local agency employees, private sector
employees other than those employed by federal contractors, and volunteers
were not covered under the Annex.^5 OSHA had difficulty addressing the
needs of nonfederal workers not covered under its mission assignment, but
was able to provide some assistance to these workers using its own funds.

^3Reimbursement is provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) 42 U.S.C. S 5147.

^4In the mission assignment FEMA issued to OSHA implementing the Annex for
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA stated that it did not have authority under the
Stafford Act to pay for the collection and management of data for
long-term studies or analysis.

^5In order for state and local agency workers in a state to be covered by
the Stafford Act in a disaster, the governor of the affected state must
specifically request services from FEMA. For Hurricane Katrina, none of
the governors of the three states requested assistance with safety and
health issues.

No One Collected Information on the Total Number of Response and Recovery
Workers Deployed to the Gulf Coast, but 10 Federal Agencies Collected Data on
Their Workers

No one, including OSHA, was assigned responsibility for collecting data on
the total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf and
no one collected it, but 10 federal agencies were able to provide
estimates of the number of federal workers they deployed to the Gulf for
specific points in time. However, only six of them tracked the number of
workers employed by their contractors.^6 According to FEMA and OSHA, 10
federal agencies deployed response and recovery workers to the Gulf in
response to Hurricane Katrina: the Departments of Agriculture, the
Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Coast Guard; DOD; EPA; FEMA;
OSHA; USACE; and the National Guard. We asked officials from these 10
agencies to provide us with the total number of response and recovery
workers they had in the Gulf Coast from August 2005 through April 2006.
Agency officials said they did not collect data in a way that would enable
them to provide us with unduplicated counts of workers who rotated in and
out of the Gulf Coast area. All 10 agencies, however, told us they could
provide us with estimates of the number of workers they had in the Gulf
Coast area at any specific point in time. Therefore, we asked them to
provide us with information on the number of workers they employed in the
three states on the first of each month for the period from September 2005
to April 2006.

As shown in figure 1, the agencies estimated that they had about 31,000
federal employees in the Gulf Coast area on September 1, 2005. That number
increased to approximately 49,000 workers on October 1, 2005, and dropped
to about 8,500 workers on April 1, 2006.

^6National Guard officials told us the agency did not employ any
contractor personnel during the response to Hurricane Katrina.

Figure 1: Estimated Number of Federal Employees in the Gulf Coast Area on
the First Day of Each Month, September 2005 to April 2006

The National Guard reported having the largest number of federal
employees--about 31,000--in the Gulf Coast area on October 1, 2005, and
FEMA reported the second largest number--about 4,800 workers. The Coast
Guard reported the third largest number of federal employees in
October--approximately 3,100 workers. OSHA reported that it had 84 staff
in the Gulf Coast area on the first of October and November 2005.

Of these 10 federal agencies, only six of the agencies that employed
contractors in the Gulf area--EPA, OSHA, FEMA, and the Departments of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Interior could provide
data on the number of employees their contractors employed. These agencies
estimated that their contractors had over 5,100 workers in the Gulf Coast
area on December 1, 2005, the month with the largest total number. FEMA
and EPA reported the most contractor employees: FEMA estimated that it had
approximately 3,800 contractor employees at one point, and EPA estimated
that its contractors had about 1,200 workers in the Gulf area. The other
agencies reported much smaller numbers of contractor employees, ranging
from 1 worker to 150. USACE and Coast Guard officials told us they could
provide us with information on the number of contracts they issued, but
they did not know the number of workers employed under each of these
contracts. Officials with DOD told us that, although DOD employed
contractors in the Gulf area, they did not track the number of workers
employed by their contractors. National Guard officials told us that they
did not employ any contractors.

OSHA Was Unable to Collect Information on Workers' Injuries and Illnesses

Although OSHA was directed by FEMA to collect information from federal
agencies on injuries and illnesses sustained by federal workers during the
response to Hurricane Katrina, the agency was unable to collect useable
information from all of the agencies that deployed workers to the Gulf.
Four federal agencies provided some information to us on their workers who
were injured or became ill, and OSHA and other agencies provided
information on worker fatalities that occurred during the response.

Several Factors Hindered OSHA's Efforts to Collect Data on Injuries and
Illnesses

Although the Annex assigned responsibility to OSHA for collecting data on
workers' injuries and illnesses during disasters, and FEMA directed OSHA
to collect this information from federal agencies for Hurricane Katrina,
several factors hindered OSHA's efforts to collect these data as required.
OSHA did not establish a process for gathering these data between the time
the Annex was issued in December 2004 and when Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast in late August 2005. According to OSHA officials, during this
8-month period, they focused their efforts on introducing federal, state,
and local agencies to OSHA's new role under the Annex in a disaster rather
than developing a process for collecting data on workers' injuries and
illnesses during a response.

The second factor that hindered OSHA's ability to collect data on workers'
injuries and illnesses was that fact that FEMA did not issue a mission
assignment directing OSHA to collect these data for federal agencies'
workers until more than 3 weeks after the hurricane hit the Gulf. FEMA
instructed OSHA to track workers' injuries and illnesses across all
federal agencies that deployed workers to the Gulf in the mission
assignment it issued to OSHA on September 21, 2005, more than 3 weeks
after the hurricane struck on August 29, 2005.

Third, OSHA tried to collect data on injuries and illnesses for federal
workers in the Gulf Coast area from the logs that OSHA requires agencies
to maintain at each worksite on workers' injuries and illnesses but
received incomplete or unreliable data from federal agencies. In November
2005, OSHA asked federal agencies and their contractors to submit their
injury and illness logs for worksites located in the Gulf area to OSHA
headquarters on a monthly basis. However, according to OSHA officials,
because they did not request agencies to provide their injury and illness
logs to OSHA until five or six weeks after the hurricane hit, and because
agencies are normally not required to send their logs to OSHA, not all
agencies submitted their logs. In addition, many of the agencies could not
separate data for workers assigned to the Gulf Coast area temporarily
since employers are not required to establish separate logs for temporary
worksites expected to be in operation for one year or less. Some agencies
provided their logs to OSHA, but the data they provided were incomplete
and unreliable, according to OSHA officials. For example, one agency's
logs included information on accidents involving heavy equipment but did
not contain information on the related injuries to workers. OSHA officials
cited several reasons for the poor quality of the data, including the fact
that the agencies may have placed a low priority on recording injuries and
illnesses while responding to a disaster.

In technical comments on the draft report, OSHA officials stated that
neither their efforts to educate the federal community about the Annex nor
the more than 3-week delay in receiving its mission assignment prevented
them from developing a system for collecting injury and illness data.

In a mission assignment, FEMA tasked OSHA to collect these data in order
to facilitate consistent formatting and data sharing among response
organizations. OSHA could then use the data to track emerging trends in
the types of injuries and illnesses sustained by workers so that
appropriate measures, such as providing specific safety training and
information on hazards, could be taken to address emerging safety issues
and prevent or reduce injuries and illnesses. Although OSHA was unable to
use injury and illness data to track emerging trends, it did identify some
injuries and illnesses that occurred during the response through the
information it obtained from other federal agencies at the Interagency
Safety Committee meetings held at the Joint Field Office in each state.

Available Data from Four Agencies Show Over 3,000 Injuries and Illnesses

Because OSHA could not provide data on injuries and illnesses, we asked
the 10 agencies that deployed workers to the Gulf Coast area for these
data. However, although agency officials told us they collected
information on the injuries and illnesses for their workers on the injury
and illness logs required by OSHA, most of them could not separate out
this information for workers sent to the Gulf Coast. Four of the 10
agencies--EPA, USACE, the Coast Guard, and the Department of the
Interior--collected information on the injuries and illnesses their
workers sustained in the Gulf Coast area using their own data systems. The
four reported that their workers sustained over 3,000 injuries and
illnesses from the end of August 2005 through June 2006 including minor
injuries that would not have been recordable on the OSHA logs. The most
frequently cited injuries were bites from insects such as mosquitoes and
dogs; sunburn; exposure to floodwater; heat stress; and exposures to
chemicals, infectious or biological agents, mold, and carbon monoxide.
(See app. II for additional information on the injury and illness data
provided by these four agencies.) The data were not comparable across the
four agencies because each one collected different types of information
and categorized it differently. For example, EPA used nonstandard,
detailed descriptions of the illness or injury, such as "tripped on wire
and bruised knee," while the Coast Guard described the health effects of
injuries or exposures using consistent and concise categories, such as
"infected skin" and "skin laceration."

The Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Program, another
source of data on injuries and illnesses, reported that federal workers
filed 770 claims related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from August 2005
through June 2006.^7 While data on the number of claims were reliable, the
information on the nature and causes of the injuries and illnesses was not
reliable. Therefore, we could not use it to identify the types of injuries
and illnesses sustained by federal workers in the Gulf Coast area.

Eleven Worker Fatalities Related to Hurricane Katrina Reported

OSHA and other agency officials identified 11 fatalities of workers
involved in response and recovery work for Hurricane Katrina from
September 2005 through June 2006, 9 of which occurred as a result of
work-related accidents.^8 No worker fatalities directly related to the
response were reported in Alabama. In Louisiana and Mississippi, three
federal agency contractor employees died in work-related accidents,
including two employees of FEMA subcontractors and an employee of a USACE
subcontractor. (See app. II for additional information.)

^7Officials with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs told us they
could not use their computer database to distinguish claims for injuries
or illnesses related to Hurricane Katrina from those related to Hurricane
Rita, a hurricane that caused extensive damage in Texas and Louisiana in
September 2005.

^8Some of the fatalities reported involved workers that were not covered
under OSHA's mission assignment, such as volunteers or private sector
employees.

OSHA Provided Assistance to Many Agencies and Workers, but Its Efforts to Meet
the Safety and Health Needs of All Workers Were Hampered by Several Factors

Although FEMA did not issue a mission assignment to OSHA implementing the
Annex until more than 3 weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf
Coast, OSHA was able to establish several of its operations within hours
of the hurricane. FEMA officials told us that all of the NRP's annexes
take effect when the NRP is implemented, but OSHA officials said they must
first receive a mission assignment from FEMA to receive funding and begin
the work as described in the Annex. OSHA used its own staff and budget to
establish operations and provide assistance to utility workers in the Gulf
Coast before to receiving authorization from FEMA. OSHA staff developed
health and safety plans, provided information on safety and health hazards
to many workers, and intervened in thousands of potentially hazardous
situations. OSHA staff also assessed air, water, soil, and noise hazards
at many worksites. However, OSHA waited to provide assistance that
involved substantial funding--such as deploying worker safety and health
trainers and purchasing protective gear for other federal agencies--until
FEMA formally authorized OSHA to receive reimbursement for these
activities through mission assignments. Disagreements between OSHA and
FEMA delayed issuance of the mission assignment that implemented the
Annex, which delayed OSHA's efforts to provide assistance to workers. In
addition, lack of awareness by other agencies about OSHA's role in a
disaster further hindered its efforts. Because of these and other factors,
the agency was unable to ensure that all workers' needs for safety and
health assistance were met, including obtaining needed training,
protective gear, and mental health services, and OSHA had difficulty
addressing the needs of nonfederal workers not covered under its mission
assignments.

OSHA Established Operations Quickly, Developed Health and Safety Plans, Provided
Valuable Information, Intervened in Hazardous Situations, and Sampled Work Sites

  OSHA Quickly Established Operations in the Gulf

OSHA effectively used its existing relationships with private companies
and another federal agency to quickly establish its operations in the Gulf
Coast area and provide safety and health assistance to workers. Through
these relationships, OSHA quickly set up staging areas for its staff,
obtained needed equipment, and provided safety and health information to
workers early in the response. For example, when OSHA had difficulty
finding housing for its staff in New Orleans, it contacted a chemical
company that is part of one of OSHA's cooperative programs, and the
company gave OSHA space in its parking lot for recreational vehicles that
OSHA used to house several of its field staff. OSHA also obtained support
from the Mine Safety and Health Administration, another agency within the
Department of Labor, for almost 3 months after the hurricane. The agency
provided OSHA with two large trailers equipped with satellite
communications that it uses for mine rescue operations. OSHA used the
trailers as mobile command post centers to communicate with other agencies
at a time when communication in the area was very difficult. The agency
also gave OSHA generators to power electricity and plumbing.

OSHA also capitalized on relationships with utility companies established
during previous responses to hurricanes in the three affected states to
target its safety and health assistance. Utility companies are among the
first responders on the scene of hurricanes, restoring power and
communications in the affected areas. OSHA accompanied the utility
companies to staging areas each morning to brief workers on safety and
distribute printed safety information. OSHA also advised utility workers
on using the proper safety equipment. For example, although utility
workers were trained on how to safely handle downed power lines, some were
not aware that they needed to wear boots with steel shanks to prevent
puncture wounds from debris containing nails and other sharp objects or
that floodwater and drainage pipes could contain alligators, snakes, or
other animals. Figure 2 shows some of the wildlife encountered by
Hurricane Katrina response workers.

Figure 2: Animals Such as Snakes and Alligators Presented Hazards to
Workers in the Gulf Coast Area

  OSHA Developed a Health and Safety Plan for the Entire Response and Helped
  Other Federal Agencies Develop Their Own Plans

OSHA developed a health and safety plan for the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina that included all responders and hazards commonly
encountered. The plan included information on how to

           o monitor exposures;
           o provide adequate supplies of protective gear that was

                        o appropriate for the hazard,
                        o fitted to the employee, and
                        o inspected, repaired or replaced as necessary;

           o provide training on safety and health hazards that was

                        o conducted before deployment,
                        o applicable to general conditions,
                        o customized for different sites, and
                        o customized for specific tasks;

           o develop decontamination procedures; and
           o provide psychological first aid and other mental health
           services.

OSHA also assisted other federal agencies in developing similar plans for
their workers and ensured that all of the plans were coordinated and
consistent across the response.

  OSHA Provided Information on Common Hazards on Its Web Site and in Public
  Places on the Gulf Coast

OSHA also provided information about hazards on its Web site and directly
to workers at public places such as hardware stores where they purchased
materials. For example, OSHA developed 58 small, laminated "quick cards"
and 1-page fact sheets in English and Spanish with information about
hazards and how to address them, such as how to safely handle traffic in
work zones, how to operate a chain saw safely, how to work safely with
electricity, how to prevent falls, and how to use ladders safely. See
figures 3 and 4 for selected quick cards and fact sheets distributed by
OSHA.

Figure 3: Selected Quick Cards Developed by OSHA for Hurricane Katrina

Figure 4: Selected Fact Sheets Developed by OSHA for Hurricane Katrina

OSHA also provided pre-recorded public service announcements on its Web
site with information on safe work practices that could be aired by local
radio stations and stores. According to OSHA officials, one large national
hardware chain played the public service announcements over its
loudspeaker system in stores in the Gulf area as a safety and health
reminder for its customers.

  OSHA Intervened at Work Sites by Correcting Potential Hazards

From the beginning of the response in August 2005 through June 2006,
OSHA's field staff intervened in more than 15,000 potentially hazardous
situations at work sites throughout the Gulf--6,800 in Louisiana and 8,320
in Alabama and Mississippi.^9 OSHA targeted these visits based on
information it received from other federal agencies and utility companies
about work sites with large numbers of workers or potential hazards. As
shown in figures 5, 6, and 7, OSHA staff intervened in many different
types of hazardous situations, including work zones containing equipment
not protected from traffic by safety cones and individuals working on
water towers and roofs without proper fall protection such as safety
harnesses and guard rails.

^9OSHA refers to these visits to work sites by its field staff in which
potentially hazardous situations were identified and corrected as
"interventions."

Figure 5: Work Zones with Equipment Not Protected from Traffic by Safety
Cones

Figure 6: Workers on a Water Tower without Fall Protection Such As Guard
Rails or Safety Harnesses

Figure 7: Workers on a Roof without Safety Harnesses and with Poorly
Secured Ladders

OSHA staff offered advice on safety and health measures and followed up to
make sure hazards were corrected. For example, an OSHA official in
Louisiana stopped work at a site until unprotected workers in an aerial
lift 50 feet above the ground received safety harnesses and orange cones
were placed around the lift to protect against traffic. On the few
occasions when an employer did not follow OSHA's recommendations, or if
there were repeat problems with an employer, OSHA would elevate its
concerns to company management or to the federal agency that contracted
with the company and this usually brought abut the needed changes,
according to OSHA officials. For example, OSHA staff told a supervisor at
one worksite that workers repairing a bridge needed safety harnesses to
protect them from falls, but the workers did not have the equipment when
OSHA visited the next day. OSHA staff then called the owner of the
company, who promptly provided the safety equipment and made sure the
workers used it.

Other federal agencies asked OSHA to intervene in hazardous situations.
For example, EPA asked OSHA to monitor the health of workers at the site
of an oil spill where more than a million gallons of crude oil leaked from
an above-ground storage tank. FEMA asked OSHA to provide a hazardous
materials specialist to accompany its staff to jails and Department of
Justice buildings in New Orleans and assess what protective gear was
needed to enter and inspect buildings and to a local hospital to assess
general safety and health hazards. FEMA also asked OSHA to conduct
air-monitoring tests and assess hazards at local courts and other public
buildings in the area, and OSHA staff advised FEMA on how to properly
ventilate temporary housing trailers contaminated with formaldehyde gas
emitted by construction materials such as plywood and rugs.

Officials with OSHA and other federal agencies told us that the technical
assistance OSHA provided during the response was well received and was
more effective in protecting workers than if the agency had been operating
in an enforcement mode. The officials noted that enforcement actions can
take months to complete due to the legal requirements of an investigation,
the amount of documentation required, and the due process provided to
employers to appeal citations. By providing technical assistance and
immediately addressing hazardous situations, OSHA officials said they were
able to assist many more workers and correct more hazardous situations
during the response than if they had been operating in an enforcement
mode. OSHA typically conducts about 1,500 inspections each year in the
three affected states--about 430 in Alabama, about 530 in Louisiana, and
about 500 in Mississippi--but intervened in over 15,000 potentially
hazardous situations during approximately 11 months of the response.

  OSHA Sampled Air, Water, Soil, and Noise Levels at Many Work Sites

In addition to providing safety and health technical assistance, OSHA also
took more than 6,000 samples at work sites throughout the Gulf Coast area
to assess air, water, soil, and noise hazards. As shown in figure 8,
workers in the Gulf Coast area faced many airborne hazards.

Figure 8: Airborne Hazards on the Gulf Coast

EPA was responsible for sampling the general environment--such as the air,
water, and soil--in order to assess the dangers to the public, while OSHA
was responsible for sampling worksites for hazardous substances harmful to
workers. For example, OSHA field staff pinned small personal monitors on
workers' clothing to sample for potential exposure to hazardous chemicals
and substances, and sampled water and soil at worksites (see fig. 9).

Figure 9: OSHA Field Staff Sampling the Air, Water, and Soil on the Gulf
Coast by Pinning a Small Personal Monitor to a Worker, Taking Water
Samples, and Taking Soil Samples

OSHA field staff also monitored unoccupied buildings for carbon monoxide
that may have accumulated from the use of generators before the building
was vacated and to determine whether the siding and shingles contained
asbestos. OSHA officials told us they posted the results of the samples
taken on the agency's Web site and said they are developing a data
management system for future disasters that will provide faster access to
sampling results.

Disagreements with FEMA and Lack of Awareness of OSHA's Role Hindered OSHA's
Efforts to Assist Other Agencies

OSHA and FEMA disagreed about how and when to implement the Annex and
about each agency's responsibilities in the rescue and recovery effort. As
a result, some of OSHA's efforts to provide assistance were delayed.
Additionally, before Hurricane Katrina, OSHA provided limited information
to federal, state, and local agencies about the Annex, and many agencies
did not understand the services OSHA can provide or that OSHA provides
technical assistance, not enforcement, in a disaster. This may have
contributed to agencies not inviting OSHA to participate in emergency
preparedness exercises held prior to Hurricane Katrina or asking for
OSHA's help during the response and recovery efforts once the storm hit.

  OSHA and FEMA Disagreed about Implementation of the Annex and about Each
  Other's Roles and Responsibilities

FEMA did not issue a mission assignment to OSHA implementing the Annex
until September 21, 2005--more than 3 weeks after the hurricane hit the
Gulf Coast. Before Hurricane Katrina, FEMA and OSHA had not developed
criteria or procedures for implementing the Annex in a disaster.^10 FEMA
officials told us that all of the NRP's annexes take effect when the NRP
is implemented; however, OSHA said it must first receive a mission
assignment from FEMA to receive funding and begin its work as described in
the Annex. OSHA used its own staff and budget to establish operations and
provide assistance to workers in the Gulf before receiving authorization
for reimbursement from FEMA. However, OSHA delayed activities that
involved substantial funding, such as deploying worker safety and health
trainers and purchasing protective gear for other federal agencies, until
FEMA formally authorized funding through mission assignments, assuring
that such activities would be reimbursed. However, although FEMA and OSHA
were developing procedures for their operations in future disasters, as of
December 2006, these procedures did not contain criteria that clearly
defined when and how OSHA will carry out its responsibilities under the
Annex or the type or magnitude of disasters in which OSHA will be
involved.

FEMA and OSHA also disagreed about which agency was in charge of worker
safety and health for the response and recovery efforts and which workers
should be covered. The agency in charge assumed the role of Safety
Coordinator at the Joint Field Office in each state, where the federal
agencies met to coordinate their response and recovery efforts. Because of
their disagreement about leadership, FEMA and OSHA each fulfilled the role
of Safety Coordinator for different periods of time in Louisiana, Alabama,
and Mississippi, and other federal agencies did not know which agency was
consistently and officially in charge. In addition, some FEMA officials
viewed the role of the Safety Coordinator as providing support only to
FEMA employees and personnel at FEMA-managed facilities. In contrast, OSHA
officials saw the role of the Safety Coordinator as supporting all federal
workers, including federal contractor employees involved in the response.
For example, both FEMA and OSHA officials in Mississippi identified a need
for driver training because of the large number of motor vehicle
accidents. FEMA's Safety Coordinator in Mississippi sought the driver
training for FEMA staff only, while, under its mission assignment, OSHA
had already worked with the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences to develop a similar program that was available to all federal
responders.

^10A majority of the disaster response efforts FEMA oversees involve
small, regional disasters, such as flooding in a single county. FEMA
oversees 50 to 60 such disasters annually.

In addition, under the Annex, OSHA is responsible for coordinating with
the Department of Health and Human Services to monitor the medical
conditions of responders and evaluate the need for long-term medical
monitoring. However, FEMA did not direct OSHA to coordinate this activity
in the mission assignments issued for Hurricane Katrina because, according
to FEMA officials, they do not have the authority under the Stafford Act
to pay for the collection and management of data for long-term studies or
analysis. Although it is not clear whether there is a need for this type
of monitoring for response and recovery workers involved in the response
to Hurricane Katrina, the fact that some workers at the World Trade Center
disaster did not exhibit symptoms of illnesses until months or years after
they left the site, and others developed acute conditions at the site that
later worsened or became chronic, highlights the importance of considering
these issues for rescue and recovery workers who responded to Hurricane
Katrina or for those involved in future disasters.

FEMA and OSHA are in the process of developing new procedures for future
disasters. However, the procedures do not specify the type or magnitude of
disaster in which OSHA will be involved, and they include FEMA's
definition of the scope of the Safety Coordinator as providing safety and
health support only to FEMA employees and personnel at FEMA-managed
facilities, not OSHA's definition that covers all responders, including
federal contractor employees at all facilities. As a result, OSHA may have
difficulty providing assistance to all workers involved in future response
efforts. The new procedures also do not resolve the issue of how OSHA will
be able to monitor the medical condition of responders or evaluate the
need for long-term medical monitoring in future disasters as described in
the Annex, given that FEMA does not believe it can authorize such
activities or reimburse them under the Stafford Act.

  Many Agency Officials Were Not Aware of OSHA's Role in a Large Disaster

OSHA officials told us they did not have enough time to conduct extensive
outreach to other federal agencies in the months between the issuance of
the NRP in December 2004 and the end of August 2005 when Hurricane Katrina
hit the Gulf Coast. They said they planned to inform other federal
agencies about the Annex and OSHA's new role in large disasters through a
committee comprised of the key federal agencies that have a role in the
Annex in responding to disasters. OSHA was in the process of developing
this committee when Hurricane Katrina hit, but these efforts were
suspended during the response.^11

OSHA's efforts to inform state and local agencies about its role under the
Annex were limited to making presentations and staffing information booths
at training sessions conducted by the Department of Homeland Security
after the NRP and Annex became effective in April 2005. The sessions were
offered in seven cities to state and local emergency and health officials
from fire departments, police departments, and local hospitals. The
Department of Homeland Security chose to visit cities it considered likely
targets in future terrorist attacks: the District of Columbia, Chicago,
New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, Miami, and Houston. According to OSHA and
FEMA officials, the presentations were attended by individuals from
federal, state, and local agencies; trade groups; and support personnel.
OSHA officials also said they provided information about the Annex at
meetings and conferences held by organizations such as the National
Governors' Association. These presentations, however, were not targeted to
the key state and local agencies involved in disaster response efforts,
such as state emergency management agencies.

Officials from several federal, state, and local agencies told us that
they did not understand OSHA's role in a disaster response, including
providing information on potential hazards, recommending proper protective
gear, and testing for hazardous substances at work sites. They also did
not know that, in a disaster, OSHA switches from enforcing regulations by
conducting inspections of work sites to providing technical assistance.
National Guard and EPA officials we interviewed told us they did not know
OSHA's role in disaster response. Representatives from state police and
fire departments in Louisiana, the state highway patrol in Alabama, and
the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association--an organization that
represents officers from more than 50 different federal law enforcement
agencies--said they did not know that OSHA provides technical assistance
in a disaster or that they could have asked for OSHA's help.

^11The Annex assigns responsibility to OSHA for establishing a Worker
Safety and Health Support Annex Coordination Committee. This
committee--comprised of officials from DOD, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences, the Coast Guard, and EPA--is responsible for coordinating
the assets needed to protect worker safety and health at all levels of
government during a disaster.

  OSHA Was Not Invited to Participate in Emergency Preparedness Exercises Held
  Prior to Katrina

Because many federal, state, and local agency officials did not understand
the assistance OSHA could provide in a disaster or its role under the
Annex, OSHA was not invited to participate in many of the emergency
preparedness exercises the agencies held prior to Hurricane Katrina.
Moreover, in the few exercises to which OSHA was invited, the Annex was
never implemented. For example, OSHA attended a national emergency
preparedness exercise conducted by FEMA in June 2005 that simulated a
response to a large, destructive hurricane, but the exercise did not
include implementing the safety and health Annex. OSHA headquarters
officials told us they thought the Annex was not implemented during these
exercises because other agency officials did not fully understand the
assistance OSHA can provide in a disaster or its new role under the Annex.
OSHA's participation in state and local emergency preparedness exercises
held prior to Hurricane Katrina was also limited. Two of OSHA Area Office
Directors in the affected states told us they had difficulty getting
invited to participate in state and local emergency preparedness
exercises, and often when they were invited, they did not play an active
role in the exercise. For example, the Director of OSHA's Mobile Area
Office told us he attended regional training exercises on his own
initiative. It took him a year to convince the sponsoring agencies that
OSHA provides assistance in a disaster, at which point they incorporated
OSHA into an exercise involving a chemical spill from a railroad car, but
OSHA's services were not used during the exercise.

Since its response to Hurricane Katrina, OSHA officials say the agency has
been invited to participate in more emergency response exercises where the
Annex is implemented and the agency plays an active role. OSHA officials
also told us they plan to participate in an exercise sponsored by EPA in
2007 that will simulate a large chemical spill. OSHA's regional and area
office directors told us they continue to look for opportunities to
participate in regional, state, and local emergency preparedness
exercises.

OSHA Was Only Partially Successful in Providing Training, Distributing
Protective Gear, Serving Nonfederal Workers, and Providing Mental Health
Services

  Some of OSHA's Training Was Delayed, and Some Agencies Did Not Request Needed
  Training from OSHA Because They Did Not Realize It Was Available

Because OSHA and FEMA disagreed about the process for issuing the mission
assignment authorizing OSHA to receive reimbursement for its safety and
health training to workers, FEMA did not issue it until more than 3 weeks
after the hurricane hit the Gulf Coast. As a result, OSHA and its
cooperating agency, the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences, reported that trainers who were ready to begin work in the
aftermath of the storm were not deployed to Mississippi until October 2005
or to Louisiana until November 2005. In addition, some agencies did not
ask OSHA to provide training because they did not realize that OSHA
offered this type of training. For example, EPA regional officials told us
that, although their response managers noted a need for driver safety
training in October 2005 because of the large number of motor vehicle
accidents that occurred in the Gulf Coast area during the initial response
efforts, it was not provided until March 2006 because it took them several
months to determine that OSHA could provide this training. Workers faced
many hazardous driving conditions during the response to Hurricane
Katrina, including missing road signs or signs pointing the wrong
direction, debris-strewn streets, intersections without working traffic
signals, and lack of street lights--which made nighttime driving
especially hazardous. (See fig. 10.)

Figure 10: Driving Hazards Faced by Workers in the Gulf Coast Area

  OSHA Distributed Some Protective Equipment to Workers but Was Not Prepared to
  Establish a Protective Equipment Program, As Required

FEMA authorized OSHA to receive reimbursement for establishing a personal
protective equipment program as described in the Annex for other federal
agencies that included the selection, ad hoc distribution, fit, use, and
decontamination of equipment for the response to Hurricane Katrina. While
OSHA field staff distributed ear plugs, eye goggles, respirators, and
safety vests to workers throughout the Gulf from supplies they had on hand
for the use of OSHA staff, the agency was unprepared to establish a
program that included procuring and distributing needed equipment on an ad
hoc basis to other agencies as required by its mission assignment from
FEMA. In its lessons learned from the World Trade Center disaster, OSHA
recognized the need to ensure an adequate supply of personal protective
equipment before a future incident and to develop a program to ensure for
the storage, transportation, and distribution of this equipment through
FEMA and other federal agencies. However, OSHA did not have such a program
in place prior to Katrina, and OSHA and FEMA disagreed on how to obtain
personal protective equipment: OSHA ordered equipment from its Cincinnati
Technology Center, while FEMA ordered equipment from its contractor. In
addition, OSHA had not made prior arrangements for storing the equipment
during the response. OSHA and FEMA resolved their disagreements about
suppliers and OSHA arranged to store equipment in its area offices and
FEMA-managed facilities near the Joint Field Offices in Louisiana and
Mississippi, but these difficulties delayed the provision of some
equipment to workers and highlighted the need to establish a personal
protection equipment program in advance of a disaster.

Some federal agency officials reported needing advice on proper protective
gear, and other officials reported a shortage of equipment. For example,
National Guard officials in Louisiana told us they would have liked
information from OSHA on the hazards workers were facing, recommendations
on how to protect workers, and assistance in obtaining protective
equipment such as rubber boots needed to protect workers from contaminated
floodwaters. USACE officials told us they had difficulty obtaining
sufficient supplies of protective equipment such as gloves and reflective
vests.

OSHA officials told us the agency has not yet fully addressed what the
personal protective equipment program, as defined in the Annex, should
entail. Issues to be addressed include obtaining agreement with FEMA on
how such equipment should be purchased and where it will be stored, how
the equipment will be distributed at disasters, and which workers will be
entitled to receive the equipment.

  The Need for Mental Health Services Exceeded the Assistance OSHA Provided

FEMA tasked OSHA with coordinating with the Department of Health and Human
Services to ensure that mental health assistance was provided to workers
during the response to Hurricane Katrina.^12 However, OSHA did not
coordinate with them to ensure that all workers in the Gulf area who
needed mental health services received them, and OSHA had difficulty
obtaining these services. OSHA and FEMA officials told us it was difficult
to get mental health counselors to go to the base camps where workers
lived during the response and to get counselors to provide services during
off-hours to workers who did not have standard work schedules. They also
said it was difficult to obtain mental health services for non-FEMA
employees because while FEMA believed its contract with a unit of the
Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Occupational Health , to
provide counseling would cover all federal workers responding to Hurricane
Katrina, the contractor interpreted the contract to only cover FEMA
workers. In addition, instead of sending counselors to work sites
throughout the Gulf, the contractor provided a toll-free number for
workers to call. This was not an effective way to provide services because
phone service in the Gulf was widely disrupted, and OSHA and FEMA
officials said they thought on-site counseling was a better way to help
workers. Although the contractor eventually provided services to non-FEMA
employees by sending counselors to work sites and base camps in the Gulf
area and distributing literature about available services, these efforts
did not begin until late December 2005--too late to address the needs of
response workers who were most in need of these services and the needs of
many recovery workers involved early in the response.

^12Specifically, OSHA was tasked with providing short-term psychological
first aid during and after incident response and recovery activities.
Psychological first aid is an approach to help children, adolescents,
adults and families in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism.
It is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by traumatic events
and to foster short-and long-term adaptive functioning and coping.

According to a FEMA official, the agency recently began an effort to
review its contracts to ensure that non-FEMA employees are explicitly
covered in the event of a future disaster response. However, OSHA
headquarters officials told us that, in their opinion, ensuring that
mental health services are available to workers in a disaster response
should not be part of OSHA's responsibilities under the Annex because the
agency does not have the resources needed; this responsibility should be
placed with a federal agency that has subject matter expertise and access
to appropriate mental health resources, such as the agencies within the
Department of Health and Human Services. OSHA officials we interviewed
said they are coordinating with FEMA and the Department of Health and
Human Services to improve the delivery of psychological first aid and
informational materials during future disasters. Such efforts include
distributing pamphlets to workers and their families throughout the Gulf
area; consulting with other agencies to learn what types of mental health
assistance are most appropriate for workers who respond to disasters;
developing pamphlets on mental health issues for employers, employees, and
their families; and distributing these pamphlets to OSHA area offices and
other federal agencies to use during future disaster responses.

  Although OSHA Provided Some Information and Training to Nonfederal Workers in
  the Gulf, the Safety and Health Needs of Some Workers Were Not Met

Although OSHA staff intervened to assist any worker when they observed
unsafe work practices, some of the safety and health needs of nonfederal
workers not covered by OSHA's mission assignments for Hurricane
Katrina--state and local government employees, immigrants, and
volunteers--involved in the response were not met.^13 OSHA officials in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi said it was difficult to address the
needs of these populations. The mission assignment FEMA issued to OSHA
only covered federal workers and federal contractor employees. OSHA's
efforts, therefore, were focused on those workers, and no other federal
agency had responsibility for meeting the safety and health needs of
nonfederal workers. OSHA had limited access to state and local workers
because the states did not request the agency's assistance. OSHA also had
difficulty addressing the needs of immigrant workers because of language
barriers, low literacy levels among some immigrants, the transience of
many employers that hire immigrant workers, and immigrants' fear of
deportation and the federal government. In addition, OSHA had no authority
to compel volunteer workers in the Gulf to follow safe work practices.

Some state and local agency officials reported that they could have
benefited from additional assistance from OSHA, including information
about potential hazards and protective equipment for their workers. For
example, Louisiana state troopers involved in recovering bodies were
provided with boots and gloves, but officials said they would have liked
additional information on potential hazards and guidelines on appropriate
protective gear such as waders and on proper decontamination procedures.
Similarly, many state and local agencies reported that they did not have
waders to protect workers from contaminated flood waters. An official with
the New Orleans Police Department told us the only staff who had waders to
use during rescue efforts were fishermen and hunters who owned their own
waders. However, because the governors of the three states most affected
by Hurricane Katrina did not request OSHA's assistance, the mission
assignments issued to OSHA by FEMA did not cover state or local workers,
they only covered federal workers. As a result, OSHA's efforts were
focused on providing assistance to federal agencies and workers.

^13Some immigrants may have been employed by federal contractors and,
therefore, covered under OSHA's mission assignments, but many of these
workers were not employed by federal contractors.

Several advocacy groups have issued reports highlighting the worker safety
and health issues among immigrant workers in the Gulf Coast area who
lacked information on hazards, training, and protective equipment. For
example, a study by the Advancement Project, the National Immigration Law
Center, and the New Orleans Worker Justice Coalition concluded that, in
their opinion, the level of health and safety training and equipment
provided to many workers in the Gulf area, including immigrants, fell well
below federal standards.^14

OSHA trained its staff on the cultural aspects of working with immigrant
populations, hired some bilingual field staff, and built relationships
with immigrant advocacy groups. For example, OSHA's Mississippi Area
Office hired several Hispanic staff to provide training to immigrant
workers and participated in several local cultural events and job fairs to
improve workers' awareness of OSHA's role in protecting workers. In
addition, OSHA officials in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi developed
worker safety literature in Spanish and Vietnamese, two languages
frequently used by non-English speaking workers in the Gulf Coast area,
and distributed the literature at cultural events sponsored by immigrant
groups. The unit that conducted most of OSHA's training in the Gulf area
through an interagency agreement, the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences, developed brochures in Spanish and Vietnamese.^15 (See
fig. 11.)

^14The Advancement Project, the National Immigration Law Center, and the
New Orleans Worker Justice Coalition, And Injustice For All: Workers'
Lives in the Reconstruction of New Orleans, (2006).

^15The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences is part of the
Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health.

Figure 11: Safety Brochures in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese

OSHA officials told us they issued five public service announcements in
Spanish and translated 26 safety and health technical assistance documents
into Spanish and 3 into Vietnamese. They also said they worked closely
with the Mexican Consulate offices in Houston, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia
to address concerns about the safety of Hispanic workers involved in the
response. For example, according to OSHA, the consulate in Houston
arranged several events in New Orleans designed to give the Hispanic
community a chance to raise concerns and meet with OSHA staff. In
addition, OSHA officials said they worked with local Catholic churches to
reach Hispanic workers in the New Orleans area.

OSHA also raised concerns about the safety and health of volunteers who
arrived in the Gulf Coast area to assist in the recovery efforts,
including concerns about the lack of training and protective equipment
among the volunteers. For example, OSHA staff encountered several
volunteers working on roofs without the proper training or proper fall
protection. OSHA staff intervened when they encountered such situations
and, according to agency officials in the Gulf area, provided on-site
training and protective equipment to volunteer workers when it was
available.

Conclusions

Although OSHA did not have a lot of time to prepare for its new role in a
disaster between the time the NRP became effective and when Hurricane
Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the agency moved quickly to provide
assistance to workers who were part of the early response effort and those
involved in recovery work. In preparing for future disasters, however, it
is important for OSHA to note the areas in which its efforts in responding
to Hurricane Katrina could have been improved. Without the ability to
collect data on injuries and illnesses sustained by workers involved in
disaster recovery efforts, OSHA cannot fulfill its role as defined in the
Annex to identify trends and use this information to prevent further
injuries and illnesses by informing workers and their employers about
potential safety and health hazards. Furthermore, unless OSHA and FEMA
clearly define their roles, the type and magnitude of the disasters in
which OSHA will be involved, and how and when the Annex will be
implemented, there may continue to be delays in providing critical
assistance and information needed to protect workers in future disasters.
As a result, workers may sustain injuries and illnesses that could have
been prevented. In addition, if OSHA and FEMA do not resolve the issue of
who is responsible for assessing the need and paying for long-term medical
monitoring of workers involved in a response effort, these needs may not
be met in future disasters.

Because OSHA has not taken a proactive role in educating many federal,
state, and local agencies and their workers about the role the agency
plays in large disasters, some of the agencies do not know about the
assistance OSHA can provide or how to request it. Similarly, by not
seeking opportunities to participate in emergency preparedness exercises
held by federal, state, and local agencies, OSHA has not been able to
demonstrate the assistance it can provide or how the agencies can obtain
its services during a disaster. As a result, without knowledge of OSHA's
role, it is unlikely that state and local agencies will request OSHA's
assistance in future disasters, hampering the agency's ability to meet the
safety and health needs of nonfederal workers, many of whom are first
responders. Further, because OSHA was not prepared to establish a program
for providing information on what protective equipment is needed or how to
use it during future disasters or for ensuring that agencies obtain
adequate supplies of equipment, workers may not be properly protected from
potential hazards. Finally, some workers' needs for mental health services
in future disasters may not be not met, and the full extent of workers'
unmet mental health needs will not be known because OSHA has not
coordinated with the Department of Health and Human Services to determine
how it will assess the need for mental health services or ensure that
these services are provided to rescue and recovery workers.

Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve the ability to meet workers' safety and health needs
in the event of a future disaster, the Secretaries of the Departments of
Labor and Homeland Security should direct the Administrators of OSHA and
FEMA to

           o clearly define the criteria to be used in deciding when OSHA
           will be responsible for carrying out its duties under the Worker
           Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan,
           including the types and magnitude of disasters in which OSHA will
           be involved, and

           o clearly define OSHA's and FEMA's roles under the Worker Safety
           and Health Support Annex, including resolving the issue of how the
           need for long-term medical monitoring of workers involved in the
           response to future disasters will be met; and

           o proactively work to provide information to federal, state, and
           local agencies about OSHA's role in a disaster and the assistance
           it can provide under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex,
           including seeking opportunities for OSHA to participate in
           emergency preparedness exercises at federal, state, and local
           levels.

In addition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor should direct OSHA
to

           o establish a process for collecting data on injuries and
           illnesses sustained by workers who respond to disasters as defined
           in the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National
           Response Plan, such as requiring employers to record injuries and
           illnesses on logs maintained at each disaster work site and
           periodically submit them to OSHA during the response;

           o use the information collected on injuries and illnesses to
           identify safety and health hazards and analyze injury and illness
           trends; and

           o develop, implement, and monitor an incident personal protective
           equipment program as defined in the Worker Safety and Health
           Support Annex.

In order to improve the ability to meet workers' needs for mental health
services in the event of a future disaster, the Secretaries of the
Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services should

           o develop a plan for coordinating and providing mental health
           services to response and recovery workers as described in the
           Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response
           Plan.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of the Departments
of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the
Interior, and Labor; EPA; the Coast Guard; DOD; the National Guard; and
USACE for comment. We received written comments from the Departments of
Health and Human Services and Labor, which are reproduced, along with our
response in appendixes III and IV. Both agencies also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with our
recommendations. The Department of Labor agreed with our recommendation
for OSHA to establish a process for collecting data on injuries and
illnesses sustained by workers who respond to disasters as defined in the
Annex, although it noted several challenges in doing so. Although the
agency did not comment on the other recommendations, it disagreed with our
findings in several areas and provided additional information on the
actions it took to provide assistance to agencies and workers. Officials
with the Department of Homeland Security stated in oral comments that they
agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided written
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department
of the Interior, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not
respond to our request for comments. Officials with EPA, USACE, and the
Department of Agriculture told us that they had no comments on the report.

We will make copies of this report available upon request. In addition,
the report is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about the report, please contact me at (202)
512-5988 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Key contributors to the report are listed in appendix V.

Daniel Bertoni
Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Harkin
Chairman
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Patty Murray
Chairman
Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate

The Honorable George Miller
Chairman
Committee on Education and Labor
House of Representatives

The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable James T. Walsh
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Henry Cuellar
Chairman
The Honorable Charles W. Dent
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We met with OSHA national, regional, and area office officials to obtain a
general understanding of their specific roles and responsibilities under
the National Response Plan (NRP) and the Worker Safety and Health Support
Annex (the Annex). We documented the steps OSHA took to ensure the safety
and health of workers in the Gulf Coast area during the response to
Hurricane Katrina; the extent of the agency's coordination with other
federal, state, and local government officials; and the lessons learned
that included any new initiatives that had been implemented or were being
considered.

We also met with officials from federal agencies that, according to OSHA
and FEMA officials, deployed federal workers and contractor employees to
the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina: OSHA; FEMA; EPA; the
Coast Guard; DOD; the National Guard; USACE; and the Departments of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Interior. As a part of our
interviews, we asked about them the extent of their involvement with OSHA,
lessons learned, and specific initiatives being implemented or planned to
address the challenges faced by their workers during Hurricane Katrina. In
addition, we interviewed representatives of several workers' rights groups
to obtain their perspectives on the role OSHA played in protecting the
safety and health of workers involved in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, including the safety and health of the immigrant population.
These groups included Boat People SOS, the Mississippi Immigrants Rights
Alliance, the Center to Protect Workers' Rights, and the New York
Committee for Occupational Safety and Health. We also reviewed several
studies on emergency preparation, response, and recovery efforts conducted
prior to and during Hurricane Katrina.

We conducted our work from October 2005 to December 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards.

Analysis of Agency Documents

We reviewed provisions of the NRP and the Annex to identify the specific
roles and responsibilities of OSHA in an incident of national disaster or
a catastrophic event. We also reviewed state emergency management plans in
Alabama and Louisiana to determine whether these state plans had
provisions for ensuring the safety and health of rescue and recovery
workers. Mississippi did not have a current state emergency management
plan.

Site Visits

To provide some perspectives on the extent of OSHA effectiveness for
ensuring safety and health of workers at the state and local levels, we
conducted site visits in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, the states
that suffered the most damage from Hurricane Katrina. We spoke with OSHA
regional and area officials as well as federal officials from FEMA, EPA,
and USACE. We also interviewed many state and local response and recovery
workers, including state police in Louisiana and Mississippi; local law
enforcement in New Orleans, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi;
firefighters in New Orleans, Louisiana; the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries; the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality;
and a county emergency management official in Mississippi. In addition, in
March 2006, we attended a conference sponsored by the National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences that discussed the various lessons
learned and challenges federal agencies encountered during the responses
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Data from Federal Agencies on Injuries and Illnesses

Because OSHA was unable to collect useable data on the number of injuries
and illnesses sustained by federal workers in the Gulf Coast area, we
asked the 10 agencies that sent rescue and recovery workers to the Gulf
Coast to provide this information. Although agency officials told us that
they tracked illnesses and injuries on the work site logs that OSHA
requires them to maintain, they were not able to separate out this
information for all workers deployed to the Gulf Coast because injuries
and illnesses are recorded at the work sites where workers are permanently
assigned, not the work sites to which they were temporarily assigned
during the response.

We asked these agencies whether they maintained their own data on workers
who were injured or became ill as a result of their work in the Gulf area.
Four of the 10 agencies--EPA, USACE, the Coast Guard, and the Department
of the Interior--provided data on injuries and illnesses for workers
deployed to the Gulf Coast that were sufficiently reliable for us to
report. However, each of these agencies used different methods to report
this information. In an effort to summarize the injury and illness data
reported by the agencies, we developed a coding scheme for classifying and
combining the data on injuries and illnesses provided by EPA and USACE
into more consistent and concise categories. For example, we classified an
injury described in USACE's data as "contractor chain saw operator
suffered laceration," as a "laceration," and an injury described in EPA's
data as "employee lost his footing and fell onto the deck landing," as a
"trip/fall." We determined that the codes used by the Coast Guard were
sufficiently reliable in coding scheme to use to report the number and
types of injuries and illnesses sustained by their workers. We received
the data from the Department of the Interior too late to include it in its
entirety but provided a brief summary of the types of injuries and
illnesses sustained by its workers in the Gulf Coast area (see app. II).

In addition, to determine the number and types of injuries and illnesses
sustained by their workers, we looked at the nature and causes of the
injuries and illnesses reported by the four agencies and, where possible,
the number of injuries and illnesses reported for each month. Because some
incidents reported by EPA and USACE contained more than one injury or
illness, we used more than one code to report on the type of injury or
illness sustained. For example, we classified an injury reported by EPA
where an employee had "pulled and strain neck and back from a motor
vehicle accident," as a "motor vehicle accident" and a "pain/strain." As a
result, the total number of injuries and illness reported by the agencies
may differ from the numbers we reported.

Data on Federal and State Workers' Compensation Claims

Because the data on injuries and illnesses provided by the federal
agencies on their workers were limited, we obtained information on
workers' compensation claims filed by federal workers from the Department
of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs in order to obtain
more information about injuries and illnesses sustained by federal workers
involved in the response. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
provided us with data on 770 claims related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
filed from August 2005 through June 2006.^1 However, we found that the
data provided to us on claims filed by federal workers were not
sufficiently reliable to use in reporting the types of injuries and
illnesses sustained by federal workers involved in the response.

^1Officials with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs told us they
could not separate claims related to Hurricane Katrina from claims related
to Hurricane Rita using the information recorded in their database.

Appendix II: Data on the Estimated Number of Federal Workers Who Responded
to Hurricane Katrina and Their Injuries and Illnesses

Officials with OSHA and FEMA told us the following federal agencies sent
workers to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi--the three states that
sustained the most damage from Hurricane Katrina--to perform rescues and
conduct recovery work such as clearing debris:

           1. the Department of Agriculture;
           2. the Department of the Interior;
           3. the Coast Guard;
           4. FEMA;
           5. EPA;
           6. the Department of Health and Human Services, including the
           Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National
           Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Office
           of Force Readiness and Deployment, and the Substance Abuse and
           Mental Health Services Administration;
           7. OSHA;
           8. USACE;
           9. DOD, including the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; and
           10. the National Guard.

In early May 2006, we asked these agencies to provide us with the number
of employees and contract employees they employed in the three states to
assist with rescue and recovery work related to Hurricane Katrina from the
beginning of the response through April 1, 2006. Many agency officials
told us that they could not provide the total number of workers for the
entire period because they did not collect data in a way that would enable
them to provide us with unduplicated counts of workers who rotated in and
out of the Gulf Coast area. However, many said they could provide us with
estimates of the total number of workers for specific points in time so we
requested such data from all 10 agencies.

We asked them to provide the total number of full-time equivalent workers
they employed in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi on the first day of
each month from September 1, 2005, through April 1, 2006. We also asked
them to exclude employees of other agencies that were temporarily assigned
to them or volunteers who were not government employees or contractors.
All of the agencies submitted estimates for their federal employees
working in the Gulf area, although some agencies were not able to provide
information on all personnel deployed to the Gulf Coast.^1 Only 6 of the
10 agencies tracked information on the number of workers employed by their
contractors in these three states to work on response and recovery work
related to Hurricane Katrina: the Departments of Agriculture, the
Interior, Health and Human Services, EPA, OSHA, and FEMA. Although
officials with three of the other four agencies--the Department of
Defense, USACE, and the Coast Guard--said they employed contractors in the
Gulf, they did not track the number of workers employed by their
contractors. Officials from the National Guard told us they did not employ
contractors in the Gulf Coast area.

We obtained data from OSHA and the other agencies on 11 response and
recovery workers who died in the Gulf, 9 of whom were killed in
work-related accidents. OSHA provided information on 10 fatalities, 9 of
which were work-related, and USACE on 2 fatalities, one of which was
work-related.^2 All of the other agencies said that none of their workers
was killed during the response to Hurricane Katrina. (See table 1 for
additional information on these fatalities.)

^1DOD, for example, did not track the number of active duty Navy personnel
who assisted with rescue and recovery efforts in the Gulf because the Navy
base was damaged by the hurricane and they were not able to report this
information.

^2Both OSHA and USACE provided us with information on one of the
fatalities.

Table 1: Number of Fatalities Reported by OSHA and Other Federal Agencies

State       Description of incident      Employer            Work-related? 
Louisiana   A worker was struck by a     Employee of a       Yes           
               bulldozer at a debris site.  federal                           
                                            subcontractor for                 
                                            USACE                             
Louisiana   A worker was crushed during  Employee of a       Yes           
               the installation of a parked federal                           
               trailer that was             subcontractor for                 
               accidentally released and    FEMA                              
               ran over him.                                                  
Louisiana   A worker who was attempting  Nonfederal employee Yes           
               to reinstall electrical      or volunteer                      
               services to a residence was                                    
               electrocuted.                                                  
Louisiana   A worker suffered a massive  Nonfederal employee No            
               heart attack while sitting   or volunteer                      
               in a company truck.                                            
Louisiana   A maintenance worker fell 18 Nonfederal employee Yes           
               feet to his death after      or volunteer                      
               receiving an electric shock.                                   
Mississippi A worker operating a tractor Employee of a       Yes           
               to clear debris died when    federal                           
               the tractor overturned into  subcontractor for                 
               a ditch with 5 1/2 feet of   FEMA                              
               water, pinning the operator                                    
               under the tractor.                                             
Mississippi A worker was killed when a   Nonfederal employee Yes           
               75 foot pole fell from a     or volunteer                      
               forklift and struck him.                                       
Mississippi A worker fell 40 feet to the Nonfederal employee Yes           
               floor of a warehouse.        or volunteer                      
Mississippi Two workers on a casino      Nonfederal          Yes           
               barge were overcome by       employees or                      
               hydrogen sulfide fumes and   volunteers                        
               drowned.                                                       
Mississippi Employee died on the way to  Employee of a       No            
               work as the result of a car  federal                           
               accident.                    subcontractor for                 
                                            USACE                             

Source: GAO analysis of OSHA and USACE data.

Because OSHA was unable to collect data on the number of injuries and
illnesses sustained by federal workers in the Gulf Coast area, we asked
the 10 agencies that sent workers to the Gulf Coast area to provide this
information. Although agency officials told us that they tracked illnesses
and injuries on the worksite logs that OSHA requires them to maintain,
they were not able to separate out this information for all workers
deployed to the Gulf Coast because injuries and illnesses are recorded at
the worksites where workers are permanently assigned, not the worksites to
which they were temporarily assigned during the response.

We asked these agencies whether they maintained their own data on workers
who were injured or became ill as a result of their work in the Gulf Coast
area. Four of the 10 agencies--EPA, USACE, the Coast Guard, and the
Department of the Interior--provided data on injuries and illnesses for
workers in the Gulf area that were sufficiently reliable for us to report.
However, each agency used different descriptions of the injuries and
illnesses to report the information collected. In an effort to summarize
the data reported by the agencies, we developed our own categories to use
in classifying and collapsing the descriptions of injuries and illnesses
provided by EPA and USACE into more consistent and easily understood
categories. For example, for an injury described in USACE's data as
"contractor chain saw operator suffered laceration," we reclassified it as
a "laceration;" and for an injury described in EPA's data as "employee
lost his footing and fell onto the deck landing," we reclassified it as a
"trip/fall." We determined that the descriptions and categories used by
the Coast Guard were sufficiently clear to use in reporting the number and
types of injuries and illnesses sustained by their workers. We received
the data from the Department of the Interior too late to reclassify it and
report it in its entirety, but we provided a brief summary of the types of
injuries and illnesses sustained by its workers deployed to the Gulf Coast
on page 58.

To determine the number and types of injuries and illnesses sustained by
their workers deployed to the Gulf Coast, we looked at the nature and
causes of the injuries and illnesses reported by the agencies and, where
possible, the number of injuries and illnesses reported for each month.
Because some incidents reported by EPA and USACE contained more than one
injury and/or illness, we used more than one code to report on the type of
injury and illness sustained. For example, where EPA reported that an
employee had pulled and strain neck and back from a motor vehicle
accident, we classified it as "motor vehicle accident" and "pain/strain."
As a result, the total number of injuries and illness reported by these
agencies may differ from the types of injuries and illnesses reported for
that same time frame.

EPA reported information on the number of injuries and illnesses sustained
by their federal workers and contractor employees. (See table 2.)

Table 2: Reported Number of Injuries and Illnesses for EPA, August 2005 to
June 2006

Month     Region 4 Region 6 Total 
August           0        0     0 
September        0        7     7 
October          1       22    23 
November         1       32    33 
December         0       14    14 
January          0       13    13 
February         0       12    12 
March            0        7     7 
April            0        5     5 
May              0        8     8 
June             0        2     2 
Total            2      122   124 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.

Note: These numbers represent data on EPA agency personnel, employees of
their contractors, and employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority. At
OSHA's request, EPA collected data on all types and causes of hurricane
response-related injuries and illnesses. However, according to EPA, the
totals do not include some minor injuries and illnesses.

EPA also provided information on the types of injuries and illnesses these
workers sustained. (See table 3.)

Table 3: Reported Types of Injuries and Illnesses for EPA, August 2005 to
June 2006

Type of Injury or Illness          Region 4 Region 6 Total 
Cut/scrape/bruise                         0       43    43 
Skin condition                            0       16    16 
Pain/strain                               0       13    13 
Animal/insect bite                        0       12    12 
Sprain/fracture                           1       10    11 
Irritation                                0        9     9 
Chemical Splash                           0        6     6 
Trip/fall                                 0        4     4 
Medical condition                         0        3     3 
Chemical exposure                         0        3     3 
Infection                                 0        2     2 
Exhaustion/dehydration/heat stress        0        2     2 
Smoke exposure                            0        1     1 
Nausea                                    0        1     1 
Burn                                      0        1     1 
Viral infection                           0        1     1 
Motor vehicle accident                    0        1     1 
Seizure                                   0        1     1 
Acute appendectomy                        0        1     1 
Rupture                                   1        0     1 
Total                                     2      130   132 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.

USACE reported information on the number of injuries and illnesses
sustained by their federal workers and contractor employees. (See table
4.)

Table 4: Reported Number of Injuries and Illnesses for USACE, August 2005
to June 2006

Month     Total 
August        0 
September    64 
October      99 
November     49 
December     40 
January      95 
February     70 
March        75 
April        46 
May          17 
June          7 
Total       562 

Source: GAO analysis of USACE data.

USACE also reported information on the types of injuries and illnesses
sustained by these workers. (See table 5.)

Table 5: Reported Types of Injuries and Illnesses for USACE, August 2005
to June 2006

Injury/Illness Category Total 
Motor vehicle accident    247 
Motor vehicle rollover     90 
Property damage            62 
Struck by object           48 
Trip/fall                  25 
Cut/scrape/bruise          24 
Animal/Insect bites        13 
Laceration                 11 
All other injuries         11 
Pain/strain                 8 
Fire                        7 
Sprain/fracture             6 
Broken limb                 5 
Limb caught in object       4 
Skin conditions             3 
Operational stress          3 
Unknown                     3 
Burn                        2 
Contusion                   2 
Medical conditions          2 
Fatality                    2 
Violence                    2 
Muscle spasm                1 
Heat exposure               1 
Gastrointestinal            1 
Total                     583 

Source: GAO analysis of USACE data.

The Coast Guard provided information on injuries and illnesses sustained
by their workers and contractor employees from November 2005 though March
2006 in several different categories. According to Coast Guard officials,
about 5 percent of the data it received on illnesses and injuries that
occurred during this period had not been entered into its injury and
illness tracking system. It reported data on the number of types of
exposures their federal workers and contractor employees experienced
during the response. (See table 6.)

Table 6: Reported Exposures for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to March
2006

Type of Exposure                                                     Total 
Animal vector (e.g., bites from insects such as mosquitoes or        1,171 
animals such as snakes and dogs)                                           
Sunburn                                                              1,002 
Floodwater                                                             737 
Heat stress                                                            727 
Chemicals                                                              684 
Infectious agents or biological agents                                 659 
Mold exposure                                                          562 
Carbon monoxide                                                        246 
Total number of exposures                                            5,788 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

The Coast Guard also reported the number of injuries sustained by their
federal workers and contractor employees. (See table 7.)

Table 7: Reported Injuries for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to March
2006

Injuries                 Total 
Penetrating injury         419 
Slips, trips, falls        136 
Total number of injuries   555 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

In addition, the Coast Guard provided data on the health effects of the
injuries and illnesses sustained by their federal workers and contractor
employees. (See table 8.)

Table 8: Reported Health Effects for the Coast Guard, November 2005 to
March 2006

Health Effects                              Totals 
Sinus infections                               299 
Diarrhea                                       196 
Skin rash                                      179 
Dehydration                                    174 
Other (e.g., cough, fatigue, flu, headache)    157 
Joint pain                                     151 
Loss of appetite                               139 
Muscle strain                                  138 
Depression                                     134 
Nausea                                         132 
Difficulty concentrating                       128 
Skin lacerations                                87 
Cramps                                          61 
Vomiting                                        50 
Skin puncture                                   50 
Infected skin                                   45 
Confusion                                       38 
Excessive weight loss                           22 
Total number of health effects               2,180 
No known long-term health effects            1,295 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

The Coast Guard noted which symptoms occurred during workers' deployment
and which occurred post-deployment. (See table 9.)

Table 9: Reported Timing of Symptoms for Health Effects for the Coast
Guard, November 2005 to March 2006

Symptoms During and Post Deployment to the Gulf Coast Area Total 
Symptoms while deployed                                      729 
Symptoms post deployment                                     506 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Finally, the Department of the Interior reported that 90 workers sustained
injuries or illnesses during the response to Hurricane Katrina from August
2005 through April 2006. They included injuries such as falls, slips and
trips; strains from lifting; dermatitis from exposure to poison ivy; and
reactions from exposures to toxins, dust, gas or chemicals.

We took several steps to assess the reliability and reasonableness of the
data the agencies provided. To assess the reliability of the agencies'
data, we talked with agency officials about their data quality control
procedures and reviewed relevant documentation. For example, we asked
about the types of procedures and systems they had in place to ensure that
the data were collected and reported consistently. We found the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Health & Human Services

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Labor and GAO's Response

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 5.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 6.

See comment 8.

See comment 7.

See comment 10.

See comment 9.

GAO's Response to OSHA's Comments

           1. We disagree that our report does not fairly and adequately
           capture the actions OSHA took to prevent occupational injuries and
           illnesses and work-related fatalities in the Hurricane Katrina
           response operations. The information on pages 15 through 27of the
           report details many of these activities, but the purpose of the
           report was to provide a broader picture of OSHA's overall
           effectiveness. While the magnitude of the activities accomplished
           by OSHA's field staff was noteworthy, the agency's overall
           effectiveness was hampered by its lack of preparation for
           implementing its responsibilities under the Annex at the national
           level. This was also noted by the Department of Homeland
           Security's National Preparedness Task Force, which stated in its
           technical comments that, "As a signatory agency, Department of
           Labor should have anticipated and put in place mechanisms to
           ensure the success of OSHA in meeting their Workforce Safety
           responsibilities." In addition, our work focused on OSHA's
           activities through December 2006, not December 2005.
           2. Although OSHA provides more detailed information about its
           action during the response to Hurricane Katrina, our report
           mentions many of these same activities. For example, on page 33 of
           the report, we stated that OSHA distributed personal protective
           equipment to many agencies and workers; on pages 25 to 27, we
           noted that OSHA sampled many worksites for hazards; on pages 19
           and 20, we provided examples of the quick cards and fact sheets
           OSHA developed and distributed throughout the Gulf; and on page
           21, we discussed the thousands of interventions that the agency's
           staff conducted.
           3. We agree that OSHA, nor any other federal agency, was
           responsible for collecting information on the number of workers
           deployed to the Gulf area in response to Hurricane Katrina. In the
           absence of such information, we attempted to collect it ourselves
           but, as noted in the report, were not entirely successful because
           many of the agencies we contacted did not have systems in place
           for tracking the number of workers deployed.
           4. We noted on page 9 of the report that the mission assignment
           FEMA issued to OSHA implementing the Annex for Hurricane Katrina
           included all of the activities listed in the Annex except
           long-term medical monitoring. We measured the effectiveness of
           OSHA's performance only against those activities included in its
           mission assignment.
           5. Despite OSHA's efforts, as noted on page 32 of the report,
           other agency officials told us that there still were gaps in the
           training provided to workers involved in the response effort and
           additional information was needed about available training.
           6. While we agree that establishing a personal protective
           equipment program for a disaster response is a difficult and
           complex task, we continue to believe that the underlying issue is
           the need for OSHA to define how it will implement and monitor such
           a program as specified in the Annex. The issues that OSHA raises
           need to be addressed in developing an incident personal protective
           equipment program for future disasters, including developing a
           process for deciding what providing equipment on an "ad-hoc" basis
           means, what types of equipment will be provided, who will provide
           it, which workers will receive it, and where will it be stored.
           7. We disagree with OSHA's comment that our statement about its
           lack of coordination with the Department of Health and Human
           Services is inaccurate. Our statement is based on OSHA's lack of
           coordination before the disaster in order to ensure that the
           cooperating agencies were adequately prepared to meet the mental
           health needs of workers. Furthermore, in technical comments on the
           report, the Department of Homeland Security's National
           Preparedness Task Force also noted this lack of coordination. It
           stated that OSHA did not seek assistance from cooperating agencies
           that have provided mental health services during major events in
           the past, such as the Department of Health and Human Services'
           Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
           8. We disagree with OSHA's assertion that the report does not
           accurately reflect the awareness of the Annex among federal
           agencies before Hurricane Katrina. As noted in the report, many of
           the agency officials we interviewed who were in charge of
           day-to-day operations in the Gulf area were not aware of OSHA's
           role or the services it could provide. We continue to believe that
           OSHA needs to provide information to federal, state, and local
           agencies about its role in a disaster, including seeking
           opportunities to participate in emergency preparedness exercises
           at all levels of government. Because so many responders are
           associated with nonfederal agencies, it is particularly important
           for OSHA to reach out to state and local agencies to provide this
           information.
           9. We used the word "suspend" to describe the fact that, in its
           press releases, OSHA noted that it had "exempted" large areas of
           the three affected states from its normal enforcement operations
           for specific periods and limited its inspections to cases
           involving fatalities, catastrophic accidents, or complaints, as
           noted on page 7 of the report. We changed the wording of the
           report in response to OSHA's technical comments and no longer use
           the term "suspend." However, we believe that this is an accurate
           reflection of the change in OSHA's activities during a disaster.
           10. The challenges OSHA recognizes in its comments regarding the
           use of its standard recordkeeping forms (OSHA forms 300 and 301)
           to collect data on injuries and illnesses sustained by workers
           during a disaster correctly identify some of the drawbacks
           involved in using the forms for this purpose. OSHA's comments also
           emphasize the need for it to develop a process for collecting
           needed data that overcomes the challenges identified. We disagree,
           however, that the forms are a good platform on which to build such
           a process. They do not contain detailed information on injuries,
           and employers are not required to include many of the more minor
           injuries and illnesses sustained by workers, such as those
           requiring only first aid. In addition, the use of the logs could
           cause confusion among federal agencies about whether the standard
           rules for recording injuries and illnesses are to be applied. For
           example, federal agencies are not normally required to submit
           their injury and illness logs to OSHA, but OSHA will need to
           obtain this information on a timely basis during a disaster
           response in order to monitor injuries and illnesses and identify
           trends.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Daniel Bertoni, (202) 512-5988 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

Revae E. Moran, Assistant Director, and Karen A. Brown, Analyst in Charge,
managed all aspects of the assignment. Amanda M. Mackison, Claudine L.
Pauselli, and Linda W. Stokes made significant contributions to the
report. In addition, James D. Ashley, Lise Levie, Sheila R. McCoy, Jean L.
McSween, David Perkins, and Tovah Rom provided key technical and legal
assistance.

Related GAO Products

September 11: HHS Has Screened Additional Federal Responders for World
Trade Center Health Effects, but Plans for Awarding Funds for Treatment
Are Incomplete. GAO-06-1092T. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2006.

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans and
Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6
Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2006.

GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1,
2006.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance.
GAO-06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.

September 11: Monitoring of World Trade Center Health Effects Has
Progressed, but Not for Federal Responders. GAO-05-1020T. Washington,
D.C.: September 10, 2005.

(130530)

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Highlights of [43]GAO-07-193 , a report to congressional committees

March 2007

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to Protect Workers' Safety
and Health in Disasters

Concerns about the safety and health of workers involved in the response
to Hurricane Katrina included their exposure to contaminated floodwaters
and injuries from working around debris. The Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for
coordinating federal efforts to protect the safety and health of workers
involved in the response to large national disasters. Under the
Comptroller General's authority, GAO initiated a number of Katrina-related
reviews. For this review, GAO examined (1) what is known about the number
of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to
Hurricane Katrina; (2) the extent to which OSHA tracked injuries and
illnesses sustained by these workers; and (3) how well OSHA met the safety
and health needs of workers. To address these issues, GAO reviewed
reports; analyzed data; interviewed federal, state, and local officials;
and conducted site visits.

[44]What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Labor, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services designed to improve OSHA's efforts
during future disasters. Labor agreed with the recommendation to establish
a system to better track injuries and illnesses but disagreed with some of
the findings on which the other recommendations were based. The other two
agencies agreed with the recommendations in the report.

No one, including OSHA,was responsible for collecting information on the
total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast
in response to Hurricane Katrina and no one collected it, but 10 federal
agencies provided estimates showing that, on October 1, 2005, the agencies
had about 49,000 federal workers in the Gulf Coast area. In addition, six
of these agencies estimated that their contractors had about 5,100 workers
in the area on December 1, 2005, but the other four either did not track
the number of workers employed by their contractors or did not employ
contractors.

Although OSHA was responsible for tracking the injuries and illnesses that
federal response and recovery workers sustained during the response to
Hurricane Katrina, the agency's efforts to collect it were delayed and it
was unable to collect usable information. According to OSHA, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must assign and fund specific
responsibilities for each disaster. However, FEMA did not direct OSHA to
collect injury and illness data until more than 3 weeks after the
hurricane struck. OSHA attempted to collect the data, but the information
federal agencies provided were incomplete and unreliable. OSHA and other
agencies did track fatalities. They reported nine worker fatalities
attributed to work-related accidents: three employees of federal
contractors and six nonfederal workers or volunteers.

OSHA provided assistance to many response and recovery workers who
responded to Hurricane Katrina, but not all workers' safety and health
needs were met. OSHA quickly established operations in the Gulf area;
intervened in thousands of potentially hazardous situations; and assessed
air, water, soil, and noise hazards at many work sites. However,
disagreements between OSHA and FEMA about which agency was in charge of
providing safety and health assistance to federal agencies and workers and
how it would be provided delayed some of OSHA's efforts. Also, some
agencies' lack of awareness about the role OSHA plays in a disaster
further hindered its ability to provide assistance. As a result, OSHA did
not fully meet workers' safety and health needs, particularly their need
for training and protective equipment. OSHA also did not coordinate with
the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure that workers had
needed mental health services, and OSHA was not assigned responsibility
for coordinating the needs of nonfederal workers, including state and
local agency workers; many immigrants; and volunteers.

Workers at an EPA Hazardous Waste Collection Facility near New Orleans,
Louisiana

Source: GAO.

References

Visible links
  43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-193
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