Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address	 
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of 	 
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces (18-DEC-06, GAO-07-145).  
                                                                 
Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of
Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors 	 
supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive	 
report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the	 
broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq 
and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in
Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller  
General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was 
to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management 
and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our
2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military  
and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the	 
United States.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-145 					        
    ACCNO:   A64284						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to     
Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of  
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces				 
     DATE:   12/18/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Contract administration				 
	     Contract oversight 				 
	     Contract performance				 
	     Contracting officers				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Department of Defense contractors			 
	     Equipment contracts				 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military training					 
	     Service contracts					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Support services					 
	     Army Logistics Civil Augmentation			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-145

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standi

          * [4]DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy an
          * [5]Limited Visibility over All Contractor Support Continues to

               * [6]DOD Continues to be Unable to Provide Military Commanders
                 at
               * [7]Limited Visibility Continues to Hinder DOD's Management
                 and
               * [8]Some Steps Have Been Taken to Address the Issue of
                 Visibilit

          * [9]DOD Still Does Not Have Adequate Contract Oversight Personne
          * [10]DOD Is Not Systematically Collecting or Sharing Institutiona
          * [11]Military Commanders and Contract Oversight Personnel Continu

               * [12]Several GAO Reports Have Discussed, and DOD Has
                 Acknowledged
               * [13]Military Commanders Continue to Receive Limited or No
                 Pre-de
               * [14]Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited
                 or
               * [15]Officials Believe Integrating Information on the Use of
                 Cont

     * [16]Conclusions
     * [17]Recommendation for Executive Action
     * [18]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [19]GAO's Mission
     * [20]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [21]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [22]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [23]Congressional Relations
     * [24]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

December 2006

MILITARY OPERATIONS

High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces

GAO-07-145

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems
Continue to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at
Deployed Locations 10
Conclusions 35
Recommendation for Executive Action 36
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 47
Related GAO Products 53

Table

Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities 10

Figures

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many
Different DOD Agencies 8
Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better
Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces 28

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 18, 2006

Congressional Committees

The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor support
the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on today in locations such as Iraq
and elsewhere throughout Southwest Asia has increased considerably from
what DOD relied on during previous military operations, such as Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the Balkans. Moreover, DOD's reliance on
contractors continues to grow. The Army alone estimates that almost 60,000
contractor employees currently support ongoing military operations in
Southwest Asia. By way of contrast, an estimated 9,200 contractor
personnel supported military operations in the 1991 Gulf War.^1 Similarly,
the spending on contractors supporting deployed forces is significant. For
example, spending on DOD's single largest contract supporting U.S. forces
in Southwest Asia--the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP)--was about $15.4 billion between 2001 and 2004.^2 Today,
contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with communication services;
interpreters who accompany military patrols; base operations support
(e.g., food and housing); weapons systems maintenance; intelligence
analysis; and a variety of other support. Many of these contractors live
and work side by side with their military counterparts and share many of
the same risks and hardships.

Since 1997, we have reported on DOD's management and training shortcomings
related to its use of contractor support to deployed forces.^3 In June
2003, we issued our first comprehensive review of DOD's management and
oversight of contractor support to deployed forces, focusing our efforts
in the Balkans and Southwest Asia.^4 We reported that (1) DOD used
contractors for a wide range of services; (2) DOD and the services had not
identified essential services provided by contractors or developed backup
plans for those services; and (3) guidance and contract language and
oversight varied within DOD and the services, creating challenges that
might hinder the efficient use of contractors. We made several
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve DOD's guidance,
training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command,
recommendations that DOD broadly agreed with. Moreover, we have
established that clear policies, procedures, criteria, and management
oversight are needed to help agencies use resources effectively and
efficiently to meet organizational and program objectives.^5 However, our
audit work on related subjects since 2003 indicated that DOD continued to
face difficulties regarding its use of contractors to support deployed
forces.

^1Estimated figures are used because neither DOD nor the services have a
single point that collects information on contracts that support deployed
forces.

^2Established in 1985, LOGCAP is an Army program that preplans for the use
of global corporate resources to support worldwide contingency operations.
In the event that U.S. forces deploy, contractor support is then available
to a military commander as an option.

^3See the end of this report for a list of prior GAO reports and
testimonies on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces.

Because of continued congressional interest in DOD's use of contractors to
support deployed forces, we prepared this report under the Comptroller
General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative. Specifically, our objective was to determine the extent to
which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors
supporting deployed forces since our last comprehensive review of this
issue in 2003. We focused our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest
Asia.

To address our objective, we met with and obtained documentation from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service headquarters
officials to review changes to key DOD and service guidance and obtain a
comprehensive understanding of their efforts in addressing the issues
raised in our 2003 report. We visited select DOD components based on their
responsibilities for contract management, such as the Defense Contract
Management Agency, and various service commands in the United States,
including the Army Materiel Command, to discuss their roles in managing
and overseeing contractors in deployed locations. We also interviewed
staff officers from six combat units that had been deployed to Iraq
between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their experiences with contractors at
deployed locations. We traveled to Iraq and Kuwait to meet with deployed
combat units, installation commanders, headquarters personnel, and other
military personnel responsible for contracting and contract management at
deployed locations. In addition, we met with 26 U.S. and foreign
contractors providing a variety of services to DOD at deployed locations
to discuss their perspectives on contracting and contract management
issues. We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Details
on our scope and methodology are contained in appendix I.

^4See GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
[25]GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).

^5See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[26]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and Internal
Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [27]GAO-01-1008G (Washington,
D.C.: August 2001).

Results in Brief

Although DOD has taken action to improve its guidance on the use of
contractors to support deployed forces since our 2003 report, a number of
long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight
of contractors at deployed locations. Steps DOD has taken include amending
its acquisition regulations to add standardized deployment language for
contracts that may require contractors to accompany U.S. forces deployed
outside the United States and, in October 2005, issuing the first DOD-wide
instruction on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, which
addresses some of the problems we have previously raised. However, we have
concerns that DOD components are not implementing this instruction. For
example, while the instruction assigns responsibility for monitoring and
managing its implementation to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, there is no focal point
within this office responsible for issues regarding contractor support to
deployed forces. According to officials within the office, given the
multiple issues they are responsible for, implementing the instruction or
taking other steps to improve DOD's management and oversight of
contractors supporting deployed forces is a lower priority. Ultimately,
while DOD's new guidance is a good first step towards improving the
department's management and oversight of contractors, the department
continues to face problems, including:

           o Limited visibility over contractors and contractor activity:
           While DOD policy since 1990 has recognized the importance of
           having visibility over the number of contractors providing
           essential services to U.S. forces and the services they provide,
           DOD continues to lack the capability to provide senior leaders and
           military commanders with information on the totality of contractor
           support to deployed forces. Having this information is important
           in order for military commanders to incorporate contractor support
           into their planning efforts. For example, senior military
           commanders in Iraq told us that when they began to develop a base
           consolidation plan for Iraq they had no source to draw upon to
           determine how many contractor employees were located on each
           installation. As a result, they ran the risk of overbuilding or
           underbuilding the capacity of the consolidated bases. Similarly,
           commanders need visibility over the number of contractor employees
           residing on an installation in order to make informed decisions
           regarding base operations support (e.g., food and housing) and
           force protection. Having limited visibility can also unnecessarily
           increase contracting costs to the government. For example,
           according to an Army Materiel Command official, the Army estimates
           that because of their limited visibility over contractors at
           deployed locations and the government services they are entitled
           to, about $43 million is lost every year on free meals being
           provided to contractor employees who are also receiving a per diem
           allowance for food. DOD's October 2005 instruction requires the
           department to maintain by-name accountability of contractors
           deploying with the force. The Army has taken steps to develop a
           database that could provide this accountability for all DOD
           components and help military commanders incorporate contractor
           support into their planning efforts. However, at the time of our
           review, this database was still in development, and officials
           involved with this effort told us that greater involvement by the
           Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is responsible for
           designating a database to provide this accountability, will be
           needed to direct all DOD components to use this database and
           resolve some additional institutional obstacles.
           o Lack of adequate contract oversight personnel: Although having
           the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor
           performance is critical to ensure the efficient and effective use
           of contractors, most contract oversight personnel we met with told
           us DOD does not have adequate personnel at deployed locations.
           Having too few contract oversight personnel precludes DOD from
           being able to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are
           meeting their contract requirements at every location where the
           work is being performed. For example, a Defense Contract
           Management Agency official responsible for overseeing portions of
           the Army's LOGCAP contract at 27 installations in Iraq told us he
           was unable to visit all of these locations during his 6-month tour
           in Iraq. As a result, he could not effectively monitor the
           contractor's performance at those sites. As we have previously
           reported, when contract oversight personnel are able to review the
           types and levels of services provided by contractors for both
           economy and efficiency, savings can be realized. Without adequate
           contract oversight personnel, DOD is at risk of being unable to
           identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely
           manner. Prior GAO reports make clear that having too few contract
           oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem affecting the
           department's management and oversight of contractors both in the
           United States and at deployed locations. However, the more
           demanding contracting environment at deployed locations creates
           unique difficulties for contract oversight personnel.
           o Limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge: DOD
           has made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and
           experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite
           facing many of the same difficulties managing contractors in Iraq
           that it faced in previous military operations. As early as 1997,
           we recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from previous
           and ongoing operations into its planning and preparation for the
           use of contractor support to deployed forces. However, we found no
           organization within DOD or its components responsible for
           developing procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of
           contractor support at deployed locations. Our review of lessons
           learned that were collected by DOD components, as well as
           discussions with DOD officials and military units deployed to
           Iraq, found that lessons learned on the use of contractor support
           at deployed locations were not routinely gathered and shared. For
           example, we found that a guidebook on the use of a logistical
           support contract almost identical to LOGCAP, which was developed
           by U.S. Army, Europe for the Balkans, was not made available to
           military commanders in Iraq until 2006. As a result, commanders in
           Iraq were unable to take advantage of an important tool to
           increase their familiarity with LOGCAP and build on efficiencies
           the Army had previously identified.
           o Limited or no information on contractor support in
           pre-deployment training: We have pointed out the need for better
           pre-deployment training of military commanders and contract
           oversight personnel on the use of contractor support in several of
           our earlier reports, and DOD has agreed with our recommendations
           addressing this need. However, we found little evidence that
           improvements have been made to include more information on the use
           of contractors in pre-deployment training. Several military
           commanders told us they were unaware of the types of services they
           would be relying on until after they deployed to Iraq. As a
           result, they were unable to adequately plan for the use of
           contractor support. Similarly, several commanders of combat units
           told us that their pre-deployment training did not provide them with
           information on the extent to which they would have to provide
           personnel to escort contractor personnel. As a result, these
           commanders could not incorporate this requirement into their
           planning efforts and were surprised by the substantial portion of
           their personnel they were required to allocate as escorts;
           personnel they had expected to be available to perform other
           functions. Limited or no pre-deployment training on the use of
           contractor support can also lead to confusion regarding roles and
           responsibilities military commanders have in overseeing
           contractors at a deployed location. We found several instances
           where military commanders attempted to direct or ran the risk of
           directing a contractor to perform work outside the scope of the
           contract, despite the fact commanders are not authorized to do so,
           which can result in increased costs to the government. In
           addition, limited or no information on the use of contractors in
           pre-deployment training can inhibit the ability of contract
           oversight personnel to execute their responsibilities. For
           example, the contracting officer's representative for a linguist
           support contract told us his pre-deployment training did not
           adequately prepare him for his responsibilities to review invoices
           submitted by the contractor. We found no DOD or service guidance,
           policy, or doctrine establishing standards to ensure that military
           units incorporate information about contractor support to deployed
           forces in their pre-deployment training. Nevertheless, several
           officials told us that DOD and its components need to include
           information on contractor support into their pre-deployment
           training, including mission rehearsal exercises, and that the use
           of contractors at deployed locations should also be integrated
           into professional military education.

           GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal
           point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior
           level and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading
           DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight at
           deployed locations. The entity that functions as this focal point
           would be responsible for, among other things, improving visibility
           over contractor support at deployed locations and developing
           standards to improve the pre-deployment training of military
           commanders and contract oversight personnel on issues related to
           contractor support to deployed forces.

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
           our recommendation. DOD stated in their comments that they had
           created the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
           Defense (Program Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the
           office of primary responsibility for issues related to contractor
           support. However, it is not clear that this office would serve as
           the focal point dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve
           contract management and oversight. DOD also provided several
           technical comments that we considered and incorporated where
           appropriate.
			  
			  Background

           Since the early 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors
           to meet many of its logistical and operational support needs
           during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian
           assistance missions, ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert
           Storm and operations in the Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to
           Afghanistan and Iraq. Factors that have contributed to this
           increase include reductions in the size of the military, an
           increase in the number of operations and missions undertaken, and
           DOD's use of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. Depending
           on the service being provided by contractors, contractor employees
           may be U.S. citizens, host country nationals,^6 or third country
           nationals.^7 Contracts supporting weapons systems, for example,
           often restrict employment to U.S. citizens, while contracts
           providing base operations support frequently employ host country
           or third country nationals.

           Contracts supporting deployed forces typically fall into three
           broad categories--theater support, external support, and systems
           support. Theater support contracts are normally awarded by
           contracting agencies associated with the regional combatant
           command, for example, the U.S. Central Command or service
           component commands, such as the U.S. Army Central Command, or by
           contracting offices at deployed locations such as in Iraq.
           Contracts can be for recurring services--such as equipment rental
           or repair, minor construction, security, and intelligence
           services--or for the one-time delivery of goods and services at
           the deployed location. External support contracts are awarded by
           commands external to the combatant command or component commands,
           such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of
           Engineers. Under external support contracts, contractors are
           generally expected to provide services at the deployed location.
           LOGCAP is an example of an external support contract. Finally,
           systems support contracts provide logistics support to maintain
           and operate weapons and other systems. These types of contracts
           are most often awarded by the commands responsible for building
           and buying the weapons or other systems.

           The individual services and a wide array of DOD and non-DOD
           agencies can award contracts to support deployed forces.^8 Within
           a service or agency, numerous contracting officers, with varying
           degrees of knowledge about how contractors and the military
           operate in deployed locations, can award contracts that support
           deployed forces. According to DOD estimates, in 2005 several
           hundred contractor firms provided U.S. forces with a wide range of
           services at deployed locations. Figure 1 illustrates the broad
           array of contractor services being provided in Iraq and the DOD
           agency that awarded each contract.

^6A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a citizen
of the country where the work is being performed.

^7A third country national is an employee of a contractor who is neither a
citizen of the United States nor the host country.

^8For example, in 2003 DOD relied on a Department of the Interior
contracting office that specializes in awarding and administering
contracts for other agencies to obtain contractor-provided
intelligence-related services quickly to support U.S. forces in Iraq. See
GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations, [28]GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
2005).

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many
Different DOD Agencies

The customer (e.g., a military unit) for these contractor-provided
services is responsible for identifying and validating requirements to be
addressed by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor's
performance and ensuring that contractor-provided services are used in an
economical and efficient manner. In addition, DOD has established specific
policies on how contracts, including those that support deployed forces,
should be administered and managed. Oversight of contracts ultimately
rests with the contracting officer who has the responsibility for ensuring
that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract. However,
most contracting officers are not located at the deployed location. As a
result, contracting officers appoint contract oversight personnel who
represent the contracting officer at the deployed location and are
responsible for monitoring contractor performance. How contracts and
contractors are monitored at a deployed location is largely a function of
the size and scope of the contract. Contracting officers for large-scale
and high-value contracts such as LOGCAP have opted to have personnel from
the Defense Contract Management Agency monitor a contractor's performance
and management systems to ensure that the cost, product performance, and
delivery schedules comply with the terms and conditions of the contract.
Defense Contract Management Agency officials delegate daily oversight
responsibilities to individuals drawn from units receiving support from
these contractors to act as contracting officer's representatives for
specific services being provided. For smaller contracts, contracting
officers usually directly appoint contracting officer's representatives or
contracting officer's technical representatives to monitor contractor
performance at the deployed location. These individuals are typically
drawn from units receiving contractor-provided services, are not normally
contracting specialists, and serve as contract monitors as an additional
duty. They cannot direct the contractor by making commitments or changes
that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and
conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the
contracting officer and serve as the liaison between the contractor and
the contracting officer. Table 1 provides additional information on the
contract management roles and responsibilities of key DOD personnel.

Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities

Customers:                        Contracting officer:                     
                                                                              
o Develop requirements.           o Interpret the contract.                
                                                                              
o Write statements of work.       o Obligate the government for work under 
                                     the contract.                            
o Obtain funding.                                                          
                                     o Delegate contract management           
o Provide contracting officer's   responsibilities to deployed personnel   
representatives to monitor        who monitor contractor performance.      
contract performance.                                                      
                                     o Ensure that the contractor corrects    
                                     cited deficiencies.                      
Defense Contract Management       Contracting officer's representative:    
Agency:                                                                    
                                     o Provide daily contract oversight.      
o Appoint contracting officer's                                            
representatives for LOGCAP.       o Evaluate quality assurance.            
                                                                              
o Review and approve purchase     o Monitor contract performance.          
requisitions.                                                              
                                     o Evaluate technical performance.        
o Monitor government property.                                             
                                                                              
o Evaluate quality assurance.                                              
                                                                              
o Monitor contract performance.                                            
                                                                              
o Evaluate technical performance.                                          

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems Continue
to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations

A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management and
oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Although DOD has issued
departmentwide guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed
forces and some DOD components have taken some actions to improve
management and oversight of contractors, there is no DOD-wide effort in
place to resolve these long-standing problems. These problems include a
lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support at deployed
locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel; the failure to
collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at
deployed locations; and limited or no training of military personnel on
the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or
professional military education.

DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy and Guidance on the
Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces, but Lack of High-Level Action
Hinders Implementation

In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its guidance
on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. Our report
noted the lack of standardized deployment language in contracts that
support or may support deployed U.S. forces. Since then, in June 2005, DOD
amended its acquisition regulations, the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement, by providing DOD-wide policy and a contract clause
to address situations that may require contractors to accompany U.S.
forces deployed outside the United States. Our 2003 report also noted a
lack of DOD-wide guidance regarding DOD's use of and responsibilities to
contractors supporting deployed forces. Since then, DOD has taken steps to
improve its guidance by issuing the first DOD-wide instruction on
contractor support to deployed forces.^9 Specifically, in October 2005,
DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, entitled Contractor Personnel
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, which states, among other
things, that it is DOD policy to

           o coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements
           that may affect Combatant Commanders' operational plans and
           operations orders with the affected geographic Combatant Commands,
           o ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and
           conditions under which the contractor is to perform and describe
           the specific support relationship between the contractor and DOD,
           and
           o maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying with
           the force and contract capability information in a joint
           database.^10

           DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides guidance on a wide range of
           contractor support issues. For example, the instruction provides
           guidance on when contractors can be used to provide security for
           DOD assets, when medical support can be provided to contractors,
           and commanders' responsibilities for providing force protection
           and security to contractors. In addition, the instruction
           references a number of existing policies and guidance that may
           affect DOD's responsibilities to contractors supporting U.S.
           forces at a deployed location. However, the instruction does not
           address a number of problems we have raised in previous reports.
           For example, although the instruction addresses the need for
           visibility over contractors, it does not address the need to
           provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to collect and
           share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at
           deployed locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the
           use of contractor support.

           While issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 represents a noteworthy
           improvement to DOD's guidance on the use of contractor support to
           deployed forces, we found little evidence that DOD components are
           implementing the guidance. Moreover, Congress has concerns over
           implementation of the instruction as evidenced by a provision in
           the Conference Report accompanying the National Defense
           Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring the Secretary of
           Defense to submit to Congress a report on the department's efforts
           to implement the instruction.^11 DOD Instruction 3020.41 assigns
           responsibility for monitoring and managing the implementation of
           the instruction to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
           Logistics and Materiel Readiness (within the Office of the Under
           Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
           However, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
           Material Readiness is responsible for several policy areas
           including supply chain management and transportation policy. A
           number of assistant deputy under secretaries serve as functional
           experts responsible for these areas. For example, the Assistant
           Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy) serves
           as the principal advisor for establishing policies and providing
           guidance to DOD components for efficient and effective use of DOD
           and commercial transportation resources. However, no similar
           individual is responsible primarily for issues regarding
           contractor support to deployed forces, including implementation of
           the instruction. According to senior officials within the Office
           of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
           Material Readiness, given the multiple issues the office is
           responsible for, addressing contractor support to deployed forces
           issues is a lower priority.

           Consequently, at the time of our review we found that few measures
           had been taken by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
           Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness to ensure that DOD
           components were complying with DOD Instruction 3020.41. For
           example, a senior official with the Office of the Under Secretary
           of Defense for Intelligence told us that the office was not aware
           of its responsibility under the instruction to develop and
           implement, as required, procedures for counterintelligence and
           security screenings of contractors, until our inquiry regarding
           their compliance with that requirement. Similarly, a senior Joint
           Staff official involved in the issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41
           expressed concerns that only some of the senior officials who
           needed to know about the instruction had been made aware that it
           was issued.

           Instead, we found that working groups of subject matter experts
           within the Joint Staff and the services have begun to address the
           instruction's requirements. For example, in May 2006 a working
           group began to draft a new joint publication that provides
           guidance on meeting the requirements of DOD Instruction 3020.41,
           as well as addresses other contractor support issues. As another
           example, beginning in April 2006 the Joint Staff Directorate of
           Logistics organized a joint contingency contract management
           working group consisting of representatives from each of the
           military services, the Joint Staff, and various DOD components
           that meets periodically to discuss issues related to implementing
           the instruction's requirement to maintain by-name accountability
           of contractor personnel supporting deployed forces. However, joint
           contingency contract management working group officials told us
           they have no formal charter designating their responsibilities and
           that they therefore lack the authority to direct DOD components to
           implement the instruction's requirements.

           Working group officials told us they are limited in how much they
           can accomplish without more direct involvement by senior officials
           within the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of
           Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. For example,
           they told us that they will likely need someone at the general
           officer level to act as an advocate for their ongoing efforts to
           implement the instruction's requirements and address other
           contractor support issues. Moreover, a number of senior officials,
           including a general officer responsible for logistics for
           Multi-National Force-Iraq and a senior official from the Office of
           the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
           Logistics, told us that a focused effort within the Office of the
           Secretary of Defense is needed to coordinate efforts to improve
           DOD's management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed
           forces.

           We have previously reported on the benefits of establishing a
           single point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate
           and integrate various DOD efforts to address concerns with
           antiterrorism and the transformation of military capabilities.^12
           For example, DOD recognized the need for a single DOD entity to
           implement and improve the department's antiterrorism guidance. In
           1996, following the Khobar Towers bombing, the Downing task force
           investigated the incident and made recommendations on how to
           prevent or minimize the damage of future attacks. One of the
           central conclusions of the Downing task force was that DOD needed
           a stronger centralized approach to antiterrorism. To implement
           this approach, the task force said, a single DOD entity should be
           designated as responsible for antiterrorism. Further, this entity,
           among other things, should develop and issue physical security
           standards, inspect compliance with these standards, manage
           resources on both a routine and emergency basis, and assist field
           commanders with antiterrorism matters. The task force found in its
           review that the lack of a single DOD entity responsible for
           antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of forces
           in the field. In response to the task force's recommendation, the
           Secretary of Defense established an office within the Joint Staff
           to act as the focal point for antiterrorism. Among other things,
           this office has:

           o improved antiterrorism guidance,
           o established antiterrorism training standards for all levels of
           command, and
           o instituted outreach programs to collect and distribute
           antiterrorism lessons learned.
			  
			  Limited Visibility over All Contractor Support Continues to Hinder
			  DODï¿½s Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations

           Although DOD has long recognized the importance of having
           visibility over all contractor support at deployed locations, the
           department continues to be able to provide senior leaders and
           military commanders with only limited visibility over those
           contractors. This limited visibility continues to hinder the
           management and oversight of contractors in deployed locations,
           including Iraq. In the absence of DOD-wide efforts to address
           these issues, some DOD components at deployed locations and in the
           United States have taken their own steps to improve visibility.
			  
			  DOD Continues to be Unable to Provide Military Commanders at Deployed
			  Locations and Senior Leaders with Visibility over All Contractor Support

           DOD continues to lack the ability to provide military commanders
           and senior leaders with visibility over all contractor support at
           deployed locations, including the range of services being provided
           to U.S. forces and the number of contractor personnel at deployed
           locations. Although most of the contract oversight personnel we
           met with had visibility over the individual contracts for which
           they were directly responsible, including the number and location
           of contractor personnel, this information was not aggregated by
           DOD and was not provided to commanders at higher levels. Many
           officials responsible for managing and overseeing contractors that
           support deployed forces at various levels of command in Iraq told
           us there was no office, database, or other source that could
           provide them consolidated information on all contractor support at
           a deployed location. The following are examples of what commanders
           in Iraq told us:

           o senior commanders within Multi-National Force-Iraq and
           Multi-National Corps-Iraq^13 told us they had no source to go to
           that could provide them with a comprehensive summary of contractor
           services currently being provided U.S. forces in Iraq;
           o the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda, a major
           logistics hub in Iraq with about 10,000 contractor personnel, told
           us he only had limited visibility of the number of contractors at
           his installation and the support they were providing; and
           o a battalion commander from a Stryker brigade told us he was
           unable to determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters
           available to support his unit.

           Moreover, we found that major commands and higher headquarters do
           not maintain a source of information that could provide improved
           visibility over all contractors at deployed locations, as
           illustrated by the following examples:

           o the Army Materiel Command and Air Force Materiel Command were
           unable to readily provide us with comprehensive information on the
           number of contractors they were using at deployed locations or the
           services those contractors were providing to U.S. forces,
           o contracting officials at U.S. Central Command told us that they
           do not maintain centralized information on the contractor support
           within their area of operation, and
           o Air Force headquarters officials determined the Air Force had
           about 500 civilians deployed to Iraq but could not readily
           identify how many of these individuals were contractor personnel
           as opposed to DOD civilians.

           DOD has long recognized the importance of providing visibility
           over contractors supporting deployed forces. As discussed in our
           2003 report, DOD has required since 1990 that DOD components
           maintain visibility over contractors providing essential services
           to U.S. forces and the services they provide. However, in 2003 we
           reported that DOD components were not meeting this requirement and
           that they lacked visibility over all contractor support to forces
           deployed to the Balkans and Southwest Asia. Further, a 2004 Joint
           Staff review of contract management at deployed locations found
           commanders continued to have insufficient visibility over
           contractors operating in deployed locations and recommended that
           DOD provide the combatant commander the capability to maintain
           visibility over contractor personnel and contract capabilities. In
           addition, DOD has been unable to provide Congress with information
           on the totality of contractor support in Iraq, including numbers
           of contractors and the costs of the services they provide.
			  
			  Limited Visibility Continues to Hinder DODï¿½s Management and Oversight
			  of Contractors in Iraq

           Limited visibility over contractor support poses a variety of
           problems for military commanders and senior leaders responsible
           for contract management and oversight in deployed locations such
           as Iraq. With limited visibility over contractors, military
           commanders and other senior leaders cannot develop a complete
           picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors as an
           asset to support their operations. Further, they cannot build this
           reliance on contractors into their assessments of risks associated
           with the potential loss of essential services provided by
           contractors, an issue we discussed extensively in our 2003 report.

           We spoke with several senior military leaders in Iraq who told us
           their lack of visibility over contractor support in Iraq hindered
           their ability to incorporate contractors into their planning
           efforts. For example, a general officer responsible for logistics
           for Multi-National Force-Iraq told us that acquiring visibility
           over all contractor support in Iraq was a top priority because
           Multi-National Force-Iraq did not have the information needed to
           include the presence of contractors in its planning activities. A
           number of Multi-National Force-Iraq officials told us that when
           they began to develop plans to consolidate forward operating bases
           in Iraq, they discovered that while they could determine the
           number and type of military units on those bases, they had no
           means of obtaining similar information about contractors,
           including the number of contractor personnel on each base and the
           support the military was providing them. According to a senior
           Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information,
           Multi-National Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or
           underbuilding the capacity of the consolidated bases to
           accommodate the number of individuals expected to be stationed
           there. Because Multi-National Force-Iraq lacked a source to draw
           upon for information regarding the extent of contractor support in
           Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq issued a fragmentary order^14 in
           April 2006 to base commanders in Iraq to conduct a census of
           contractors residing on the installations. However, at the time of
           our review, this effort had only yielded partial results which an
           Army official familiar with the census effort told us would not
           meet the initial goals of the fragmentary order.

           Limited visibility over contractors and the services they provide
           at a deployed location can also hinder military commanders'
           abilities to fully understand the impact that their decisions can
           have on their installations. For example, when commanders make
           decisions to restrict access of host country nationals to an
           installation, this can result in the loss of some
           contractor-provided services, such as construction or the delivery
           of supplies that may be dependent upon the use of host country
           nationals. Similarly, one of the more frequent concerns
           contractors in Kuwait and Iraq related to us was the impact that
           base commanders' decisions to change policies regarding badging
           requirements and other base access procedures had on their ability
           to provide services to those bases.^15

           Decisions affecting such functions as force protection and base
           operations support also rely on commanders having an accurate
           picture of the contractor assets they have in their area of
           operations and an understanding of the number of contractor
           personnel they have to support. As we reported in 2003, military
           commanders require visibility over contractor support at deployed
           locations because they are responsible for all the people in their
           area of operations, including contractor personnel. Given the
           security situation in Iraq, knowledge of who is on their
           installation helps commanders account for all individuals in the
           event of a mortar attack or other hostile action. For example,
           Army officials assisting the movement of contractors into and out
           of Iraq described to us the difficulties DOD faced determining the
           identity of a contractor who was taken hostage and then killed by
           the insurgency in Iraq. We also met with several military
           commanders who told us that a lack of visibility over contractors
           on their installations complicated their efforts to provide
           contractors with support such as food and housing. Several
           officials told us they regularly had contractor personnel
           unexpectedly show up in Iraq and request support, but were unable
           to verify what DOD-provided support those contractor personnel
           were entitled to. As a result, DOD and its components may be
           providing unauthorized support to contractors. For example, at one
           of the joint contingency contract management working group
           sessions GAO attended, an Army Materiel Command official noted
           that the Army estimates that it loses about $43 million every year
           providing free meals to contractor employees who are also
           receiving a per diem allowance for food.
			  
			  Some Steps Have Been Taken to Address the Issue of Visibility

           In spite of DOD's continued lack of capability to provide
           commanders with the information they need regarding the extent of
           contractor support at a deployed location, we found that some
           steps have been taken to provide commanders with improved
           visibility over the contracts they were directly responsible for.
           For example:

           o In early 2006, the commanding general of Multi-National
           Force-Iraq ordered his major subordinate commands in Iraq to
           provide a head count of non-DOD civilians on their installations,
           including contractor personnel for contracts exceeding $5 million
           per year. The information, captured in a database managed by
           Multi-National Force-Iraq, was needed to provide the general with
           a current count of all tenant organizations operating from the
           various forward operating bases in Iraq.
           o Multi-National Corps-Iraq started a similar effort in February
           2006 to provide the commanding general with detailed contract
           management information on recurring services contracts such as for
           the maintenance of certain aircraft, communications support, and
           power generation.
           o Also in 2006, the corps support command at Logistical Support
           Area Anaconda created a database to track recurring services
           contracts that support the installation.

           While these individual efforts improved visibility over a specific
           set of contractors, we found that no organization within DOD or
           its components has attempted to consolidate these individual
           sources of information that could help improve its visibility over
           all contractor support in Iraq. Several DOD officials in Iraq
           familiar with the individual efforts described above told us that
           while a number of databases have been created to capture
           information on contractors in theater, the information is not
           aggregated at a higher level because no one is responsible for
           consolidating this information. In most cases, these efforts were
           initiated by individual commanders and there is no assurance that
           they would continue when new units with new commanders deployed to
           replace them in the future.

           Individual contractors we spoke with had excellent visibility over
           the number and location of their employees at specific deployed
           locations. For example, the contractors could readily provide us
           with information on the number of employees they had in Iraq in
           support of deployed U.S. forces and the specific installation to
           which those contractors were deployed. This information was
           typically reported on a daily or weekly basis from the contractor
           in Iraq to their corporate headquarters in the United States or
           elsewhere, as well as to the U.S. government agency that had
           awarded the contract. However, we found this information was not
           centrally collected. As discussed previously, there are several
           hundred contractor firms that support deployed forces, including
           in Iraq, and contracts are awarded by numerous contracting offices
           both within DOD and from other U.S. government agencies. With such
           a large and diverse pool of contractors at deployed locations, it
           is impractical for individual commanders to obtain this
           information from contractors on their own. For example, several
           military officials involved in efforts to improve visibility over
           contractors in Iraq told us that while they were generally able to
           obtain information from contractors with large numbers of
           employees, such as the LOGCAP contractor, it was extremely
           difficult to identify as well as collect information from all the
           numerous smaller contractors, who sometimes consisted of only one
           or two individuals.

           As discussed above, in October 2005 DOD issued DOD Instruction
           3020.41, which included a requirement that DOD develop or
           designate a joint database to maintain by-name accountability of
           contractors deploying with the force and a summary of the services
           or capabilities they provide. Currently, no such DOD-wide database
           exists. However, Army Materiel Command and the Assistant Secretary
           of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology have taken
           the initiative to develop a database that could provide improved
           visibility over all contractors supporting U.S. forces in deployed
           locations and enable military commanders to incorporate contractor
           support into their planning efforts.^16 According to Army
           officials, this database is intended to collect information not
           only on the overall number of contractors supporting forces in a
           deployed location but also on the organization or system they are
           supporting and other contract information that could be used by
           commanders to better manage contractors at deployed locations. The
           Army's goal is to require that all contractors supporting deployed
           forces use this database, and in turn, create the central source
           of information to provide commanders with visibility over all
           contractor support at deployed locations. However, as of the time
           of our review, the Army was still in the process of implementing
           the database, and it is uncertain when the process will be
           completed. For example, we found that only a few contractors were
           using the database, and Army officials acknowledged it does not
           currently capture all contractors providing support at deployed
           locations. According to Army and Joint Staff officials familiar
           with these efforts, it is likely that DOD will designate this
           database as the joint database for contractor visibility as
           required by DOD Instruction 3020.41. However, a number of issues
           must first be resolved. For example, efforts are still underway to
           get all the services to agree to enter their data into this
           database. Further, there is disagreement within the Army staff
           regarding whether the Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for
           logistics or personnel has responsibility for the contractor
           visibility database. Several officials we met with who are
           involved with these efforts told us that while the Army Materiel
           Command has made significant progress in developing the database,
           ultimate resolution of these issues will require action by the
           Office of the Secretary of Defense because the Army Materiel
           Command lacks the necessary directive authority to resolve them on
           its own.
			  
			  DOD Still Does Not Have Adequate Contract Oversight Personnel in
			  Place to Oversee and Manage Contractors Supporting U.S. Forces in
			  Deployed Locations

           Having the right people with the right skills to oversee
           contractor performance is critical to ensuring that DOD receives
           the best value for the billions of dollars spent each year on
           contractor-provided services supporting forces deployed to Iraq
           and elsewhere. However, inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee
           and manage contracts that support deployed U.S. forces is another
           long-standing problem that continues to hinder DOD's management
           and oversight of contractors in Iraq. In 2004, we reported that
           DOD did not always have enough contract oversight personnel in
           place to manage and oversee its logistics support contracts such
           as LOGCAP. In addition, in 2005 we reported in our High-Risk
           Series that inadequate staffing contributed to contract management
           challenges in Iraq.^17 While we could find no DOD guidelines on
           the appropriate number of personnel needed to oversee and manage
           DOD contracts at a deployed location, several contract oversight
           personnel told us DOD does not have adequate personnel at deployed
           locations to effectively oversee and manage contractors, as
           illustrated by the following examples:

           o An Army Contracting Agency official told us that due to a
           downsizing of its overall contracting force and the need to
           balance that force among multiple competing needs, the Army is
           struggling to find the capacity and expertise to provide the
           contracting support needed in Iraq.
           o An official with the LOGCAP Program Office told us that, as the
           United States was preparing to commence Operation Iraqi Freedom in
           2003, the office did not prepare to hire additional budget
           analysts and legal personnel in anticipation of an increased use
           of LOGCAP services. According to the official, had adequate
           staffing been in place early on, the Army could have realized
           substantial savings through more effective reviews of the
           increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements.
           o Officials responsible for contracting with Multi-National
           Force-Iraq told us they did not have enough contract oversight
           personnel and quality assurance representatives to allow
           Multi-National Force-Iraq to award more sustainment contracts for
           base operations support in Iraq.
           o The contracting officer's representative for a contract
           providing linguist support in Iraq told us that he had only one
           part-time assistant, limiting his ability to manage and oversee
           the contractor personnel for whom he was responsible. As he
           observed, he had a battalion's worth of people with a battalion's
           worth of problems but lacked the equivalent of a battalion's staff
           to deal with those problems.

           We also found a number of organizational and personnel policies of
           various DOD agencies responsible for contract management and
           oversight contributed to inadequate numbers of personnel to
           oversee and manage contracts that support deployed forces. The
           following are some examples:

           o A 2004 Joint Staff review of the Defense Contract Management
           Agency's responsiveness and readiness to support deployed forces
           in the event of war found that the agency had not programmed
           adequate resources to support current and future contingency
           contract requirements, compromising its readiness to execute its
           mission. The review further found that Defense Contract Management
           Agency manpower shortages were aggravated by internal policies
           that limit the availability of personnel to execute those
           missions.
           o During its 2003 deployment to Iraq, a unit with the 4th Infantry
           Division reported that the divisional contracting structure did
           not adequately support the large volume of transactions that were
           needed in an austere environment. For example, the unit reported
           problems with the quality of services provided by host country
           nationals, which were exacerbated by a lack of contracting
           officer's representatives to properly oversee the performance of
           contracting terms.
           o An official with the Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia
           told us that as of January 2006 the agency had only 18 of the 33
           staff it was authorized and that this number of personnel was not
           enough to support the agency's mission. In contrast, he told us
           that other commands, such as Army Contracting Agency, Korea, were
           authorized more than 130 staff even though they were responsible
           for significantly fewer obligated funds.

           Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor
           its many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not
           be able to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are
           meeting their contract requirements efficiently and effectively at
           each location. For example, a Defense Contract Management Agency
           official responsible for overseeing the LOGCAP contractor's
           performance at 27 installations in Iraq told us he was unable to
           personally visit all 27 locations himself during his 6-month tour
           in Iraq. As a result, he was unable to determine the extent to
           which the contractor was meeting the contract's requirements at
           each of those 27 sites. Moreover, he only had one quality
           assurance representative to assist him. The official told us that
           in order to properly oversee this contract, he should have had at
           least three quality assurance representatives assisting him. The
           contracting officer's representative for an intelligence support
           contract in Iraq told us he was also unable to visit all of the
           locations that he was responsible for overseeing. At the locations
           he did visit he was able to work with the contractor to improve
           its efficiency. However, because he was not able to visit all of
           the locations at which the contractor provided services in Iraq he
           was unable to duplicate those efficiencies at all of the locations
           in Iraq where the contractor provided support. As we previously
           reported in 2000 and 2004, when contract oversight personnel are
           able to review the types and levels of services provided by
           contractors for both economy and efficiency, savings can be
           realized. Conversely, without adequate contract oversight
           personnel in place to manage and oversee contractors, DOD
           continues to be at risk of being unable to identify and correct
           poor contractor performance in a timely manner.

           The inability of contract oversight personnel to visit all
           locations they are responsible for can also create problems for
           units that are facing difficulties resolving contractor
           performance issues at those locations. For example, officials from
           a brigade support battalion told us they had several concerns with
           the performance of a contractor that provided maintenance for the
           brigade's mine-clearing equipment. These concerns included delays
           in obtaining spare parts and a disagreement over the contractor's
           obligation to provide support in more austere locations in Iraq.
           According to the officials, their efforts to resolve these
           problems in a timely manner were hindered because the contracting
           officer's representative was located in Baghdad while the unit was
           stationed in western Iraq. In other instances, some contract
           oversight personnel may not even reside within the theater of
           operations. For example, we found the Defense Contract Management
           Agency's legal personnel responsible for LOGCAP in Iraq were
           stationed in Germany, while other LOGCAP contract oversight
           personnel were stationed in the United States. According to a
           senior Defense Contract Management Agency official in Iraq,
           relying on support from contract oversight personnel outside the
           theater of operations may not meet the needs of military
           commanders in Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher
           operational tempo of a contingency operation in a deployed
           location.

           Although the problems discussed above concern contract management
           and oversight at deployed locations, the lack of adequate contract
           oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, not limited to deployed
           locations. We first designated DOD contract management as a
           high-risk area in 1992, and it remains so today due, in part, to
           concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition
           workforce, including contract oversight personnel. We subsequently
           reported that although DOD had made progress in laying a
           foundation for reshaping its acquisition workforce, it did not yet
           have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan needed to guide its
           efforts. Yet having too few contract oversight personnel presents
           unique difficulties at deployed locations given the more demanding
           contracting environment compared to the United States. For
           example, the deputy commander of a corps support command told us
           that contracting officer's representatives have more
           responsibilities at deployed locations than in the United States.
           Similarly, several officials responsible for contract management
           and oversight told us that the operational tempo for contract
           oversight personnel is significantly higher at deployed locations
           than in the United States.
			  
			  DOD Is Not Systematically Collecting or Sharing Institutional
			  Knowledge on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces

           Despite the fact the DOD and its components face many of the same
           types of difficulties working with contractors in Iraq that they
           faced in prior military operations, DOD still does not
           systematically ensure that institutional knowledge gained from
           prior experience is shared with military personnel at deployed
           locations. We have previously reported that DOD could benefit from
           systematically collecting and sharing its institutional knowledge
           across a wide range of issues to help ensure that it is factored
           into planning, work processes, and other activities.^18 With
           respect to DOD's use of contractors to support deployed forces, in
           1997 we recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from the
           Bosnia peacekeeping mission and other operations in the Balkans to
           improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's LOGCAP
           contract--a recommendation DOD agreed with. Similarly, in 2004 we
           recommended that DOD implement a departmentwide lessons-learned
           program to capture the experience of military units and others
           that have used logistics support contracts--a recommendation DOD
           also agreed with.

           In its responses to the recommendations made in our 1997 and 2004
           reports, DOD stated it would investigate how best to establish
           procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contracts to
           support deployed forces and would make this information available
           DOD-wide. However as of 2006, DOD still had not established any
           procedures to systematically collect and share DOD's lessons
           learned on the use of contracts to support deployed forces.
           Moreover, we found no organization within DOD or its components
           responsible for developing those procedures. By way of comparison,
           we have previously reported that when DOD created a Joint Staff
           office responsible for acting as a focal point for the
           department's antiterrorism efforts, that office was able to
           develop outreach programs to collect and share antiterrorism
           lessons learned and best practices.^19

           While some DOD organizations such as the Joint Forces Command's
           Joint Center for Operational Analysis and the Army's Center for
           Army Lessons Learned are responsible for collecting lessons
           learned from recent military operations, we found that neither
           organization was actively collecting lessons learned on the use of
           contractor support in Iraq. Similarly, Army guidance requires that
           customers receiving services under LOGCAP collect and share
           lessons learned, as appropriate.^20 However, we found no
           procedures in place to ensure units follow this guidance. Further,
           our review of historical records and after-action reports from
           military units that deployed to Iraq found that while units made
           some observations on the use of contractor support, DOD had done
           little to collect those lessons learned or make them available to
           other units that were preparing to deploy. ^21 Moreover, in some
           instances, officials from units we met with told us that their
           current procedures actually preclude the collection and sharing of
           institutional knowledge, such as lessons learned. For example,
           officials with the 3rd Infantry Division, as well as a corps
           support group that deployed to Iraq, told us that their computers
           were wiped clean and the information archived before they
           redeployed to the United States, which hindered opportunities for
           sharing lessons learned with incoming units.

           When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its
           components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being
           unable to build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have
           developed during past operations that involved contractor support.
           For example, the deputy commander of a corps support command
           responsible for much of the contractor-provided logistics support
           in Iraq told us that without ensuring that lessons learned are
           shared as units rotate into and out of Iraq, each new unit
           essentially starts at ground zero, creating a number of
           difficulties until they familiarize themselves with their roles
           and responsibilities. Similarly, lessons learned using logistics
           support contracts in the Balkans were not easily accessible to
           military commanders and other individuals responsible for contract
           oversight and management in Iraq, an issue we also identified in
           2004. For example, during our visit to Iraq we found that a
           guidebook developed by U.S. Army, Europe on the use of a
           logistical support contract almost identical to LOGCAP for
           operations in the Balkans was not made available to military
           commanders in Iraq until mid-2006. According to one official, U.S.
           Army Central Command was aware of this guidebook in Iraq as early
           as late 2003; however, the guidebook was not made available to
           commanders in Iraq until 2006. According to the official, if the
           guidebook had been made available sooner to commanders in Iraq it
           could have helped better familiarize them with the LOGCAP contract
           and build on efficiencies U.S. Army, Europe had identified.
           Similarly, U.S. Army, Europe included contract familiarization
           with its logistical support contractor in mission rehearsal
           exercises of units preparing to deploy to the Balkans. However, we
           found no similar effort had been made to include familiarization
           with LOGCAP in the mission rehearsal exercises of units preparing
           to deploy to Iraq.

           Failure to share other kinds of institutional knowledge on the use
           of contractor support to deployed forces can also impact military
           operations or result in confusion between the military and
           contractors. Several officials we met with from combat units that
           deployed to Iraq as well as contractors supporting U.S. forces in
           Southwest Asia told us that redeploying units do not always share
           important information with new units that are rotating into
           theater, including information on contractors providing support to
           U.S. forces at the deployed location. Such information could
           include the number of contractors and the services they provide a
           unit or installation, existing base access procedures, and other
           policies and procedures that have been developed over time. In
           addition, representatives from several contractor firms we met
           with told us that there can be confusion when new units rotate
           into Iraq regarding such things as the procedures contractors
           should follow to access an installation or in dealing with
           contractors. In some instances, such confusion can place either
           contractors or the military at risk. For example, a contractor
           providing transportation services in Iraq told us that a unit
           responsible for providing convoy security that had just deployed
           to Iraq had not been informed of the existing procedures for
           responding to incidents involving the contractor. The existing
           procedures required the unit to remain with the contractor until
           its equipment could be recovered. However, following an actual
           incident in which a vehicle rolled over, there was confusion
           between the contractor and the unit as to what the required
           actions were.
			  
			  Military Commanders and Contract Oversight Personnel Continue
			  to Receive Limited or No Information on Contractor Support in
			  their Pre-Deployment Training

           DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor
           support to deployed forces in its pre-deployment training of
           military personnel, despite the long-standing recognition of the
           need to provide such information. Military commanders continue to
           deploy with limited or no pre-deployment training on the
           contractor support they will rely on or on their roles and
           responsibilities with regard to managing those contractors.
           Similarly, contract oversight personnel typically deploy without
           prior training on their contract management and oversight
           responsibilities and are often only assigned those
           responsibilities once arriving at a deployed location. Many DOD
           and service officials at various levels of command told us that
           ultimately the key to better preparing military personnel to
           effectively work with contractors in a deployed location is to
           integrate information on the use of contractors into DOD's
           institutional training activities.
			  
			  Several GAO Reports Have Discussed, and DOD Has Acknowledged,
			  the Need to Provide Better Pre-deployment Training on Contractor
			  Support to Deployed Forces

           We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment
           training on the use of contractors to support deployed forces
           since the mid-1990s. Specifically, we reported that better
           training was needed because military commanders are responsible
           for incorporating the use of contractor support while planning
           operations. In addition, as a customer for contractor-provided
           services, military commanders are responsible for identifying and
           validating requirements to be addressed by the contractor as well
           as evaluating the contractor's performance and ensuring the
           contract is used in an economical and efficient manner. Further,
           better training was needed for contract oversight personnel,
           including contracting officer's representatives, because they
           monitor the contractor's performance for the contracting officer
           and act as the interface between military commanders and
           contractors.

           Accordingly, we have made several recommendations that DOD improve
           its training. Some of our prior recommendations highlighted the
           need for improved training of military personnel on the use of
           contractor support at deployed locations, while others focused on
           training regarding specific contracts, such as LOGCAP. In each
           instance, DOD concurred with our recommendation. Figure 2 shows
           the recommendations we have made since 1997.

           Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for
           Better Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed
           Forces

           In addition, according to DOD policy, personnel should receive
           timely and effective training to ensure they have the knowledge
           and other tools necessary to accomplish their missions. For
           example, a March 2006 instruction on joint training policy issued
           by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in part that
           DOD components are to ensure their personnel and organizations are
           trained to meet combatant commanders' requirements prior to
           deploying for operations. It further identified management of
           contractors supporting deployed forces as a training issue to be
           focused on. Nevertheless, we continue to find little evidence that
           improvements have been made in terms of how DOD and its components
           train military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the
           use of contractors to support deployed forces prior to their
           deployment.
			  
			  Military Commanders Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre-deployment
			  Training to Plan For and Manage Contractors at Deployed Locations

           As we have previously reported, limited or no pre-deployment
           training on the use of contractor support can cause a variety of
           problems for military commanders in a deployed location. With
           limited or no pre-deployment training on the extent of contractor
           support to deployed forces, military commanders may not be able to
           adequately plan for the use of those contractors in a deployed
           location. Several military commanders--including the major general
           responsible for logistics for Multi-National Force-Iraq, the
           deputy commander of a corps support command, a base commander, and
           commanders of combat units deployed to Iraq--told us that their
           pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient
           information regarding the extent of contractor support they would
           be relying on in Iraq. Although some of these officials were aware
           of large contracts such as LOGCAP, almost all of them told us they
           were surprised by the large number of contractors they dealt with
           in Iraq and the variety of services that contractors provided. As
           a result, they could not incorporate the use of contractors into
           their planning efforts until after they arrived in Iraq and
           acquired a more complete understanding of the broad range of
           services provided by contractors. Similarly, several commanders of
           combat units that deployed to Iraq told us their pre-deployment
           training included limited or no information on the
           contractor-provided services they would be relying on or the
           extent to which they would have to provide personnel to escort
           contractor personnel. They were therefore unable to integrate the
           need to provide on-base escorts for third country and host country
           nationals, convoy security, and other force protection support to
           contractors into their planning efforts. As a result, the
           commanders were surprised by the substantial portion of their
           personnel they had to allocate to fulfill these missions;
           personnel they had expected to be available to perform other
           functions.

           Limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on
           the use of contractor support to deployed forces can also result
           in confusion regarding their roles and responsibilities in
           managing and overseeing contractors. As discussed above, military
           commanders are responsible for incorporating the use of contractor
           support in their operations planning and, in some instances, for
           evaluating a contractor's performance. However, many officials
           responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq told us
           military commanders who deployed to Iraq received little or no
           training on the use of contractors prior to their deployment,
           leading to confusion over their roles and responsibilities. For
           example:

           o Staff officers with the 3rd Infantry Division told us they
           believed the division was poorly trained to integrate and work
           with contractors prior to its deployment. According to these
           officers, this inadequate training resulted in confusion among the
           officers over the command and control of contractors.
           o Army Field Support Command officials told us many commanders
           voiced concerns that they did not want to work with contractors
           and did not want contractors in their area of operations.
           According to the officials, these commanders did not understand
           the extent of contractor support in Iraq and how to integrate
           LOGCAP support into their own planning efforts. The officials
           attributed this confusion to a lack of pre-deployment training on
           the services LOGCAP provided, how it was used, and commanders'
           roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing the LOGCAP
           contractor.
           o Several Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us
           that although they were only responsible for managing and
           overseeing the LOGCAP contractor, military commanders came to them
           for all contracting questions because they had not been trained on
           how to work with contractors and did not realize that different
           contractors have different contract managers.

           In addition, some contractors told us how crucial it was that
           commanders receive training in their roles and responsibilities
           regarding contractors prior to their deployment because, although
           they do not have the authority to, commanders sometimes direct
           contractors to perform activities that may be outside the scope of
           work of the contract. We found some instances where a lack of
           training raised concerns over the potential for military
           commanders to direct contractors to perform work outside the scope
           of the contract. For example, one contractor told us he was
           instructed by a military commander to release equipment the
           contractor was maintaining even though this action was not within
           the scope of the contract. The issue ultimately had to be resolved
           by the contracting officer. As another example, a battalion
           commander deployed to Iraq told us that although he was pleased
           with the performance of the contractors supporting him, he did not
           know what was required of the contractor under the contract.
           Without this information, he ran the risk of directing the
           contractor to perform work beyond what was called for in the
           contract. As Army guidance makes clear, when military commanders
           try to direct contractors to perform activities outside the scope
           of the contract, this can cause the government to incur additional
           charges because modifications would need to be made to the
           contract and, in some cases, the direction may potentially result
           in a violation of competition requirements.^22

           We found that many military commanders we spoke with had little or
           no prior exposure to contractor support issues in deployed
           locations, exacerbating the problems discussed above. Many of the
           commanders we met with from combat units deployed to Iraq told us
           this was their first experience working with contractors and that
           they had had little or no prior training or exposure to contract
           management. According to officials responsible for contract
           management and oversight in Iraq as well as several contactor
           representatives we met with, it can take newly deployed personnel,
           including military commanders, several weeks to develop the
           knowledge needed to effectively work with contractors in a
           deployed location. For complex contracts such as LOGCAP, these
           officials told us that it can take substantially longer than that.
           This can result in gaps in oversight as newly deployed personnel
           familiarize themselves with their roles and responsibilities in
           managing and overseeing contracts.
			  
			  Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited or No
			  Pre-deployment Training to Effectively Monitor Contractor
			  Performance

           We also found that contract oversight personnel such as
           contracting officer's representatives continue to receive limited
           or no pre-deployment training regarding their roles and
           responsibilities in monitoring contractor performance. Although
           DOD has created an online training course for contracting
           officer's representatives, very few of the contracting officer's
           representatives we met with had taken the course prior to
           deploying to Iraq. In most cases, individuals deployed without
           knowing that they would be assigned the role of a contracting
           officer's representative until after they arrived at the deployed
           location, precluding their ability to take the course. Moreover,
           some of the individuals who took the course once deployed
           expressed concerns that the training did not provide them with the
           knowledge and other tools they needed to effective monitor
           contractor performance. Other officials told us it was difficult
           to set aside the time necessary to complete the training once they
           arrived in Iraq. DOD's acquisition regulations require that
           contracting officer's representatives be qualified through
           training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities
           delegated to them. However, as was the case with military
           commanders, we found that many of the contract oversight personnel
           we spoke with had little or no exposure to contractor support
           issues prior to their deployment, which exacerbated the problems
           they faced given the limited pre-deployment training.

           We found several instances where the failure to identify and train
           contract oversight personnel prior to their deployment hindered
           the ability of those individuals to effectively manage and oversee
           contractors in Iraq, in some cases negatively affecting unit
           morale or military operations. The following are examples of what
           we found:

           o The contracting officer's representative for a major contract
           providing intelligence support to U.S. forces in Iraq had not been
           informed of his responsibilities in managing and overseeing this
           contract prior to his deployment. As a result, he received no
           training on his contract oversight responsibilities prior to
           deploying. Moreover, he had no previous experience working with
           contractors. The official told us that he found little value in
           DOD's online training course and believed this training did not
           adequately prepare him to execute his contract oversight
           responsibilities, such as reviewing invoices submitted by the
           contractor.
           o According to officials from a corps support group deployed to
           Iraq, the group deployed with 95 Army cooks even though their
           meals were to be provided by LOGCAP. However, prior to deploying,
           the unit had neither identified nor trained any personnel to serve
           as contracting officer's representatives for the LOGCAP contract.
           According to unit officials, they experienced numerous problems
           with regard to the quality of food services provided by LOGCAP,
           which impacted unit morale, until individuals from the unit were
           assigned as contracting officer's representatives to work with the
           contractor to improve the quality of its services.
           o According to officials with the Army's Intelligence and Security
           Command, quality assurance representatives responsible for
           assessing the performance of a linguist support contractor did not
           speak Arabic. As a result, it was unclear how they could assess
           the proficiency of the linguists. Some units that used
           interpreters under this contract told us they experienced cases
           where they discovered that their interpreters were not correctly
           translating conversations.
           o Intelligence officials with a Stryker brigade told us a lack of
           contractor management training hindered their ability to resolve
           staffing issues with a contractor conducting background screenings
           of third country nationals and host country nationals. Shortages
           of contractor-provided screeners forced the brigade to use their
           own intelligence personnel to conduct these screenings. As a
           result, those personnel were not available to carry out their
           primary intelligence-gathering responsibilities.

           The frequent rotations of contract oversight personnel, who can
           deploy for as little as 3-4 months, can also hinder DOD's
           management and oversight of contractors in a deployed location.
           Several contractors told us the frequent rotation of contracting
           officer's representatives was frustrating because the contractors
           continually had to adjust to the varying extent of knowledge those
           personnel had regarding the contractor support they were
           responsible for. Moreover, several contractors told us that
           frequent rotations meant that by the time contract oversight
           personnel had familiarized themselves with their responsibilities
           they were preparing the leave the country. If these personnel were
           replaced by individuals who were not familiar with the contract or
           had not received training in their roles and responsibilities,
           problems could occur. For example, a contractor providing food
           services in Iraq told us that while the contract specified a
           21-day menu rotation, some of the newly deployed contracting
           officer's representatives assigned to monitor the contract
           directed the contractor to modify the menu rotation, which
           affected the contractor's inventory of food stores and ran the
           risk of directing the contractor to perform work outside the scope
           of the contract.

           Many contractors told us that a consistent level of pre-deployment
           training would help to ensure some continuity as individuals
           rotate into and out of deployed locations. In addition, several
           contractors, as well as military officials responsible for
           contract management and oversight, told us that the length of
           deployment for contracting officer's representatives is too short
           and that by the time individuals have acquired the knowledge to
           effectively monitor a contract, they are preparing to redeploy.
           For example, senior Defense Contract Management Agency officials
           told us that the current 6-month deployments of contract oversight
           personnel monitoring the LOGCAP contract in Iraq were too short to
           make the most efficient use of personnel who had developed the
           expertise to effectively manage that contract. As a result, senior
           Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us they are
           considering extending the length of deployment for their contract
           oversight personnel assigned to monitor the LOGCAP contract from 6
           months to 1 year.

           We found that contract oversight personnel who had received
           training in their roles and responsibilities prior to their
           deployment appeared better prepared to manage and oversee
           contractors once they arrived at a deployed location. For example,
           the program office for the Army's C-12 aircraft maintenance
           contract developed a 3-day training course that all contracting
           officer's representatives for this contract are required to take
           prior to deploying. This training provides contracting officer's
           representatives with information regarding recurring reporting
           requirements, processes that should be followed to resolve
           disputes with the contractor, and the variety of technical and
           administrative requirements these individuals should be familiar
           with to monitor the contractor's performance. Officials familiar
           with this training course told us that they found the course to be
           very helpful in providing contracting officer's representatives
           with the knowledge and tools necessary to effectively execute
           their responsibilities. As a result, the program office developed
           a similar course for another of its aviation maintenance
           contracts. Similarly, Defense Contract Management Agency officials
           responsible for overseeing LOGCAP told us they are developing a
           standardized process for evaluating the contractor's performance
           in Iraq, which includes ensuring units deploying to Iraq identify
           and train contract oversight personnel for the LOGCAP contract.
			  
			  Officials Believe Integrating Information on the Use of Contractors
			  into DODï¿½s Institutional Training Activities Could Improve the
			  Management and Oversight of Contractors

           Our review of DOD and service guidance, policies, and doctrine
           found no existing criteria or standards to ensure that all
           military units incorporate information regarding contractor
           support to deployed forces in their pre-deployment training.
           According to a official with the Army's Training and Doctrine
           Command, while some steps have been taken to create elective
           courses on issues related to contractor support to deployed
           forces, it is important that all DOD components incorporate this
           information into their existing institutional training so that
           military personnel who may interact with contractors at deployed
           locations have a basic awareness of contractor support issues
           prior to deploying. Moreover, most of the military commanders and
           officials responsible for contract management and oversight we met
           with in deployed locations told us that better training on the use
           of contractors to support deployed forces should be incorporated
           into how DOD prepares its personnel to deploy. Some officials
           believed that additional training should address the specific
           roles and responsibilities of military personnel responsible for
           managing and overseeing contractors in deployed locations. For
           example, the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda
           told us there should be a weeklong pre-deployment course for all
           base commanders specific to contractor support to deployed forces.
           Similarly, the commander of a unit operating Army C-12 aircraft
           stated that the contracting officer's representative training
           developed by the program office, as discussed above, should not
           only be required for all contract oversight personnel but also for
           military commanders of units operating the aircraft.

           Other officials believed that their pre-deployment preparations,
           such as mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate the role
           that contractors have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed
           location. However, we found that most units we met with did not
           incorporate the role of contractor support into their mission
           rehearsal exercises. Moreover, we found no existing DOD
           requirement that mission rehearsal exercises should include such
           information, even for key contracts such as LOGCAP. Several
           officials told us that including contractors in these exercises
           could enable military commanders to better plan and prepare for
           the use of contractor support prior to deploying. For example,
           when a Stryker brigade held its training exercise prior to
           deploying to Iraq, the brigade commander was surprised at the
           number of contractors embedded with the brigade. Initially, he
           wanted to bar all civilians from the exercise because he did not
           realize how extensively the brigade relied on contractor support.
           By including contractors in the exercise, their critical role was
           made clear early on and the brigade's commanders were better
           positioned to understand their contract management roles and
           responsibilities prior to deploying to Iraq. In addition,
           officials responsible for the LOGCAP contract told us they were
           undertaking efforts to include basic information on how to work
           with LOGCAP into the mission rehearsal exercises of units
           deploying to Iraq.

           Many officials we met with in the United States and at deployed
           locations told us that ultimately the issue of better preparing
           military commanders and contract oversight personnel for their
           contract management and oversight roles at deployed locations lies
           with including training on the use of contractors as part of
           professional military education. Professional military education
           is designed to provide officers with the necessary skills and
           knowledge to function effectively and to assume additional
           responsibilities. However, several officials told us that the need
           to educate military personnel on the use of contractors is
           something the military has not yet embraced. As corps support
           command officials observed, the military does a good job training
           logisticians to be infantrymen, but does not require infantrymen
           to have any familiarity with contracting or the roles and
           responsibilities they may have in working with contractors at a
           deployed location.
			  
			  Conclusions

           DOD's reliance on contractor support to deployed forces has grown
           significantly since the 1991 Gulf War and this reliance continues
           to grow. In Iraq and other deployed locations, contractors provide
           billions of dollars worth of services each year and play a role in
           most aspects of military operations--from traditional support
           roles such as feeding soldiers and maintaining equipment to
           providing interpreters who accompany soldiers on patrols and
           augmenting intelligence analysis. The magnitude and importance of
           contractor support demands that DOD ensure military personnel have
           the guidance, resources, and training to effectively monitor
           contractor performance at deployed locations. In prior reports, we
           made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's
           management and oversight of contractor support at deployed
           locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of
           those recommendations. However, DOD has failed to implement some
           of our key recommendations, in part because it has not yet
           institutionally embraced the need to change the way it prepares
           military personnel to work with contractors in deployed locations.
           While we found no contractor performance problems that led to
           mission failure, problems with management and oversight of
           contractors have negatively impacted military operations and unit
           morale and hindered DOD's ability to obtain reasonable assurance
           that contractors are effectively meeting their contract
           requirements in the most cost-efficient manner.

           The difficulties DOD faces regarding contractor support to
           deployed forces are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of
           contracting, with multiple agencies in multiple locations able to
           award and manage contracts that may all provide services to a
           particular military unit or installation. However, DOD's actions
           to date have largely been driven by individual efforts to resolve
           particular issues at particular moments. A lack of clear
           accountability and authority within the department to coordinate
           these actions has hindered DOD's ability to systematically address
           its difficulties regarding contractor support--difficulties that
           currently affect military commanders in Iraq and other deployed
           locations and will likely affect commanders in future operations
           unless DOD institutionally addresses the problems we have
           identified. When faced with similar challenges regarding the
           department's antiterrorism efforts, DOD designated an office
           within the Joint Staff to serve as a single focal point to
           coordinate its efforts, which helped improve its protection of
           military forces stationed overseas. Moreover, the Office of the
           Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
           Logistics has established dedicated organizations to coordinate
           efforts to address departmentwide problems in areas such as supply
           chain management. Unless a similar, coordinated, departmentwide
           effort is made to address long-standing contract management and
           oversight problems at deployed locations, DOD and its components
           will continue to be at risk of being unable to ensure that
           contractors are providing the services they are required to in an
           effective and efficient manner.
			  
			  Recommendation for Executive Action

           To improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors at
           deployed locations, we are recommending that the Secretary of
           Defense appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under
           Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
           at a sufficiently senior level and with the appropriate resources,
           dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve contract management
           and oversight. The entity that functions as the focal point would
           act as an advocate within the department for issues related to the
           use of contractors to support deployed forces, serve as the
           principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and guidance to
           DOD components, and be responsible for carrying out actions,
           including the following six actions:

           o oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility
           over all contractor support to deployed forces, including a
           summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name
           accountability of contractors;
           o develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique
           difficulties of contract management and oversight at deployed
           locations into DOD's ongoing efforts to address concerns about the
           adequacy of its acquisition workforce;
           o lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide
           lessons-learned program that will capture the experiences of units
           that have deployed to locations with contractor support and
           develop a strategy to apply this institutional knowledge to
           ongoing and future operations;
           o develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant
           commanders, and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders
           have access to key information on contractor support, including
           the scope and scale of contractor support they will rely on and
           the roles and responsibilities of commanders in the contract
           management and oversight process, (2) incorporate into their
           pre-deployment training the need to identify and train contract
           oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, and (3)
           ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to
           increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the
           contractor support they will rely on;
           o develop training standards for the services on the integration
           of basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces
           into their professional military education to ensure that military
           commanders and other senior leaders who may deploy to locations
           with contractor support have the knowledge and skills needed to
           effectively manage contractors; and
           o review the services' efforts to meet the standards and
           requirements established above to ensure that training on
           contractor support to deployed forces is being consistently
           implemented by the services.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
           recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD
           also provided several technical comments which we considered and
           incorporated where appropriate.

           DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
           appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of
           Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a
           sufficiently senior level and with the appropriate resources,
           dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve contract management
           and oversight. DOD further stated that the Deputy Under Secretary
           of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness established the
           office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
           Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary
           responsibility for issues related to contractor support. However,
           DOD noted in its comments that the office is not yet fully
           staffed.

           While we commend the department for taking the initiative to
           establish this office and believe that it is appropriately located
           within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, it is not clear that this
           office would serve as the focal point dedicated to leading DOD's
           efforts to improve contract management and oversight. In our
           recommendation, we identified several actions that such a focal
           point would be responsible for implementing. In concurring with
           those recommended actions, DOD offered additional information on
           the steps it intended to take in order to address the recommended
           actions. However, none of these steps included information on the
           roles and responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Deputy
           Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in implementing and
           overseeing these corrective actions. For example, in concurring
           with our recommendation that the focal point develop requirements
           to ensure that mission rehearsal exercises include key
           contractors, DOD specified corrective actions that the Joint
           Staff, the Defense Acquisition University, and the Office of the
           Secretary of Defense would take. However, it is not clear what
           role the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
           (Program Support) would have in meeting this requirement, nor is
           it clear that this office would be the entity responsible for
           ensuring the requirement is met, as stated in our recommendation.

           As noted in the report, a lack of clear accountability and
           authority within the department to coordinate actions intended to
           improve contract management and oversight has hindered DOD's
           ability to systematically address its difficulties regarding
           contractor support in the past. We continue to believe that a
           single focal point with clearly defined roles and responsibilities
           is critical if DOD is to effectively address these long-standing
           problems and we therefore encourage the department to clearly
           identify the roles and responsibilities of the office of the
           Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in
           implementing and overseeing each of the corrective actions
           discussed in our recommendation.

           We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate
           congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will
           also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
           the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov .

           If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me
           at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
           Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
           on the last page of this report. Key contributors include David A.
           Schmitt, Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon, Carole F. Coffey,
           Grace Coleman, Laura Czohara, Wesley A. Johnson, James A.
           Reynolds, Kevin J. Riley, and Karen Thornton.

           William M. Solis
			  Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
			  
^9Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (Oct. 3, 2005).

^10DOD Instruction 3020.41 requires the department to maintain by-name
accountability of contractors deploying with the force, who are defined as
systems support and external support contractors, and associated
subcontractors, specifically authorized in their contract to deploy to
support U.S. forces. At the time of our review, DOD was in the process of
clarifying whether additional contractor personnel should be included in
the joint database.

^11National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 109-702, p. 243 (Sept. 29, 2006).

^12See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks
Remain for Forces Overseas, [46]GAO/NSIAD-00-181 (Washington, D.C.: July
19, 2000) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, [47]GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

^13Multi-National Force-Iraq is responsible for counter-insurgency
operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign
terrorists and for organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's security
forces. Multi-National Corps-Iraq is the tactical unit of Multi-National
Force-Iraq responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq.

^14A fragmentary order, or FRAGO, is an abbreviated form of an operation
order used to inform units of changes in missions and the tactical
situation.

^15We recently reported that military commanders in Iraq have instituted a
variety of base access procedures to address the risk third country and
host country nationals may pose. See GAO, Military Operations: Background
Screenings of Contractor Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack
Critical Information, but U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks
Contractors May Pose, [48]GAO-06-999R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).

^16This database is known as the Synchronized Pre-deployment and
Operational Tracker.

^17See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [49]GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).

^18See GAO, Information Technology: DOD Needs to Leverage Lessons Learned
from Its Outsourcing Projects, [50]GAO-03-371 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25,
2003) and Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid
Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped, [51]GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 9, 1995).

^19See [52]GAO/NSIAD-00-181 .

^20Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
(Dec. 16, 1985).

^21After-action reports provide an official description of the results of
military operations. An after-action report typically includes a summary
of objectives, operational limitations, major participants, a description
of strengths and weaknesses, and recommended actions.

^22For example, it is improper for an agency to order a supply or service
outside the scope of the contract because the work covered by the order is
subject to the Competition in Contracting Act (10 U.S.C. S 2304 and 41
U.S.C. S 253) requirements for competition.

           List of Congressional Committees

           The Honorable John Warner
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Carl Levin
           Ranking Minority Member
			  Committee on Armed Services
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Ted Stevens
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
           Ranking Minority Member
			  Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Ike Skelton
           Ranking Minority Member
			  Committee on Armed Services
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
			  Ranking Minority Member
			  Subcommittee on Defense 
           Committee on Appropriations
			  House of Representatives
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
           has improved its management and oversight of contractors
           supporting deployed forces, we met with DOD, Joint Staff, and
           service headquarters officials to obtain a comprehensive
           understanding of their efforts in addressing the issues raised in
           our June 2003 report. We also reviewed changes to key DOD and DOD
           component policies and other guidance. In some instances, guidance
           was not available. For example, guidance was not available on the
           appropriate number of personnel needed to monitor contractors in a
           deployed location. In those instances, we relied on the judgments
           and views of DOD officials and contract oversight personnel who
           had served in deployed locations as to the adequacy of staffing.
           We visited select DOD components and various military contracting
           commands in the United States based on their role and
           responsibility in managing and overseeing contracts that support
           deployed U.S. forces. Because there was no consolidated list of
           contractors supporting deployed forces available, we asked DOD
           officials at the components and commands we visited to identify,
           to the extent possible, the extent of contractor support to their
           deployed U.S. forces. We focused our efforts on contractors
           supporting military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest
           Asia because of the broad range of services contractors provide
           U.S. forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

           We held discussions with military commanders, staff officers, and
           other representatives from five Army divisions and one Marine
           Expeditionary Force as well as various higher headquarters and
           supporting commands that deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in
           Southwest Asia during the 2003-2006 time frame to discuss their
           experiences working with contractors and the challenges they faced
           managing and overseeing contractors in a deployed location.
           Specifically, we met with unit officials responsible for such
           functions as contracting and contract management, base operations
           and logistical support, and force protection and intelligence.
           These units were selected because, for the most part, they had
           recently returned from Southwest Asia and unit officials had not
           yet redeployed or been transferred to other locations within the
           United States. We also met with representatives from the
           Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International
           Development to discuss the extent to which they have visibility
           over contractors supporting their activities in Iraq. In addition,
           we traveled to deployed locations within Southwest Asia, including
           Iraq, to meet with deployed combat units and to discuss the use of
           contractor support to deployed forces with various military
           commanders, installation commanders, headquarters personnel, and
           other military personnel responsible for contracting and contract
           management at deployed locations.

           We met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors who provide support to
           DOD in Southwest Asia to discuss a variety of contracting and
           contract management issues. For example, we held discussions with
           contractors to obtain an understanding of the types of services
           they provide deployed U.S. forces and the difficulties they have
           experienced providing those services to DOD in a deployed
           location. The contractors we met with reflected a wide range of
           services provided to deployed forces, including theater support,
           external support, and systems support, and represented both prime
           contractors and subcontractors.

           We visited or contacted the following organizations during our
           review:

           Department of Defense:

           o Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA; Houston, TX;
           o Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA
           o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
           Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC

                        o Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
                        Logistics and Materiel Readiness

           o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
           Washington, DC
           o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
           Readiness, Washington, DC
           o U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL
           o U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA

           Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

           o J-3 Operations, Washington, DC
           o J-4 Logistics, Washington, DC
           o J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability, Washington, DC
           o J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Washington, DC

           Department of the Army:

           o Headquarters, Washington, DC

                        o Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel
                        o Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics

           o Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort
           Lewis, WA
           o Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, VA

                        o Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone
                        Arsenal, AL

                                     o Program Executive Office, Aviation
                                     o Program Executive Office, Missiles &
                                     Space

                        o Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, IL

                                     o Program Office, Logistics Civil
                                     Augmentation Program

                        o Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort
                        Monmouth, NJ
                        o Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren,
                        MI

           o Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA
           o Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA

                        o Combined Armed Support Command, Fort Lee, VA

           o Stryker Brigades, Fort Lewis, WA

                        o 2nd Infantry Division

                                     o 3rd Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat
                                     Team

                        o 25th Infantry Division

                                     o 1st Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat
                                     Team

                        o Task Force Olympia
                        o 593rd Corps Support Group

           o U.S. Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA
           o 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA

                        o 2nd Brigade Combat Team

                                     o 26th Brigade Support Battalion

                        o 3rd Sustainment Brigade

                                     o 87th Corps Support Battalion

                        o 4th Brigade Combat Team

                                     o 703rd Brigade Support Battalion

           o 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY

           Department of the Navy:

           o Headquarters, Washington, DC

                        o Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
                        Navy for Acquisition Management

           o 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA

           Department of the Air Force:

           o Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
           o Program Office, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, Tyndall
           Air Force Base, FL

           Other Government Agencies:

           o Department of State, Washington, DC
           o U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC

           Contractors:

           o CACI International, Arlington, VA
           o Dimensions International, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI
           o DUCOM, Inc., Sterling Heights, MI
           o DynCorp International, Irving, TX
           o General Dynamics Land Systems, Fort Lewis, WA
           o Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, TX; Arlington, VA
           o L-3 Communications Corp.

                        o L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical
                        Support, Reston, VA

           o Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Dallas, TX
           o Mantech International, Chantilly, VA
           o M7 Aerospace, San Antonio, TX
           o PWC Logistics, Kuwait
           o Readiness Management Support, Panama City, FL
           o SEI Group, Inc., Huntsville, AL
           o Triple Canopy, Inc., Herndon, VA

           The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country,
           were:

           Iraq:

           o Camp Victory, U.S. Military

                        o Multi-National Force-Iraq
                        o Multi-National Corps-Iraq
                        o Defense Contract Management Agency
                        o 4th Infantry Division

           o Camp Victory, Contractors

                        o Kellogg, Brown and Root
                        o L-3 Communications Corp.

                                     o L-3 Communications ILEX Systems, Inc.
                                     o L-3 Government Services, Inc.

           o International Zone, U.S. Military

                        o Multi-National Force-Iraq
                        o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
                        Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
                        o Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division
                        o Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan

           o International Zone, Contractors

                        o L-3 Communications Corp.

                                     o L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and
                                     Technical Support

                        o Private Security Company Association of Iraq

           o Logistics Support Area Anaconda, U.S. Military

                        o Logistics Support Area Anaconda Garrison Command
                        o 3rd Corps Support Command
                        o Aerial Port of Debarkation operations
                        o Program Management Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

           o Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Contractors

                        o AAI Corporation
                        o DynCorp International
                        o General Atomics Aeronautical Systems
                        o General Dynamics Land Systems
                        o L-3 Communications Corp.

                                     o L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and
                                     Technical Support

                        o M7 Aerospace

           Kuwait:
           o Camp Arifjan, U.S. Military

                        o Coalition Forces Land Component Command
                        o Area Support Group, Kuwait
                        o Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia
                        o Army Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia
                        o Army Materiel Command

           o U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City

           o Camp Arifjan, Contractors

                        o Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co.
                        o British Link Kuwait
                        o Combat Support Associates
                        o Computer Sciences Corporation
                        o IAP World Services
                        o ITT Industries
                        o Kellogg, Brown and Root
                        o Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co.
                        o Tamimi Global Co.

           United Arab Emirates:
           o Dubai, Contractors

                        o Kellogg, Brown and Root
                        o Prime Projects International

           We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
			  
			  Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  Related GAO Products

           Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees
           Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S.
           Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose.
           [31]GAO-06-999R . Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.

           Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of
           Private Security Providers. [32]GAO-06-865T . Washington, D.C.:
           June 13, 2006.

           Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security
           Providers. [33]GAO-05-737 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.

           Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders
           to Support Military Operations. [34]GAO-05-201 . Washington, D.C.:
           April 29, 2005.

           Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to
           Further Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract.
           [35]GAO-05-328 . Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005.

           Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support
           Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. [36]GAO-04-854 .
           Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004.

           Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
           Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans.
           [37]GAO-03-695 . Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.

           Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract
           Cost in the Balkans. [38]GAO/NSIAD-00-225 . Washington, D.C.:
           September 29, 2000.

           Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics
           Civil Augmentation Program. [39]GAO/NSIAD-97-63 . Washington,
           D.C.: February 11, 1997.
			  
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(350739)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-145 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [54]GAO-07-145 , a report to congressional committees

December 2006

MILITARY OPERATIONS

High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces

Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of
Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting
deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these
problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S.
military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to
support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the
Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective
was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and
oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report.
GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor
officials both at deployed locations and in the United States.

[55]What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the
appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD efforts to improve the
management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. DOD
agreed with our recommendation.

DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management
and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some
steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support
deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the
mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this
guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and
accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed
forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of
problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for
military personnel in deployed locations. For example:

           o DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors
           because information on the number of contractors at deployed
           locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any
           organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior
           leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture
           of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their
           operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to
           develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to
           determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq.
           They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the
           capacity of the consolidated bases.
           o DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight
           personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain
           reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract
           requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where
           work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract
           oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate
           personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed
           locations presents unique difficulties.
           o Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and
           overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military
           operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components
           responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect
           and share its institutional knowledge using contractors to support
           deployed forces. As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they
           run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build
           on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations
           that involved contractor support.
           o Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on
           the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or
           professional military education. The lack of training hinders the
           ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of
           contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight
           personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations.
           Despite DOD's concurrence with our previous recommendations to
           improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information
           about contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment
           training.

References

Visible links
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-695
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1008G
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-201
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-999R
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-865T
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-737
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-201
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-328
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-854
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-695
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-225
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-63  
  46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-181
  47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70
  48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-999R
  49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-207
  50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-371
  51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-152
  52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-181
  54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-145
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