Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to
Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated
National Priorities (19-JAN-07, GAO-07-143).
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the
Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and
mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks
at home or overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed
the U.S. military to define the nature and potential requests for
military capabilities needed to respond to 15 National Planning
Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The Army's
chemical units are key players in this mission. GAO was asked to
evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and biological
units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units
and commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and
(2) units also tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially
National Guard and Reserve units--are adequately prepared for
this mission. During this review, we analyzed readiness data and
other preparedness indicators for 78 Army chemical units.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-143
ACCNO: A64987
TITLE: Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are
Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness
and Stated National Priorities
DATE: 01/19/2007
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Combat readiness
Decontamination
Defense capabilities
Homeland security
Military training
Protective equipment
Weapons of mass destruction
M17 Mask
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GAO-07-143
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equip
* [4]Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low
* [5]Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Read
* [6]Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels
* [7]Army chemical companies have shortages in their key
specialt
* [8]Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened
* [9]Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform The
* [10]Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key
equipment
* [11]Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering
* [12]Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defens
* [13]Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Comp
* [14]Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Ad
* [15]Conclusions
* [16]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [18]GAO Contact
* [19]Staff Acknowledgments
* [20]GAO's Mission
* [21]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [22]Order by Mail or Phone
* [23]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [24]Congressional Relations
* [25]Public Affairs
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 7
Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and
Trained to Perform Their Missions 16
Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and
Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful 31
Conclusions 35
Recommendations for Executive Action 36
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48
Figures
Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component 8
Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System 9
Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System 10
Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System 11
Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
System 12
Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System 13
Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type 14
Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006 20
Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
2000 through 2006 22
Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System 25
Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System 26
Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
Army Units, as of July 2006 27
Abbreviations
BIDS Biological Integrated Detection System
DOD Department of Defense
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive
CERFP CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
CST Civil Support Teams
HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
January 19, 2007
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Shays:
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the United States is likely
to be faced with adversaries abroad who possess a wide range of asymmetric
capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons, which challenge
our military forces' ability to fight and win conflicts overseas.
Additionally, the United States continues to believe that nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the
possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest
security challenges facing our country.1 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review report states that DOD must be prepared to respond to and mitigate
the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas. All of the military
services-- the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps--plan and execute
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense programs, ranging
from basic research to procurement and sustainment.
1 For the purposes of this report, the term weapons of mass destruction
means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to
cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people
through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1) toxic or poisonous
chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease organism, or (3) radiation or
radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. S 2302 (1).
The Army, however, is the only service2 that includes dedicated chemical
and biological units3 as a standard part of its force structure. The
Army's chemical units provide the following capabilities: chemical and
biological detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke
screening.4 Additionally, certain Reserve component chemical units have
been given the mission of providing hazardous materials reconnaissance and
mass casualty decontamination in the event of a WMD attack on the
homeland. These designated units are rotated annually on the Joint Task
Force-Civil Support's5 force deployment list. These units' personnel and
equipment remain with the unit; they are not reassigned to deploying units
in support of ongoing operations overseas.
The National Guard is creating a new regionally based force that would
support the WMD-Civil Support Teams (CST) in the event of a WMD attack on
the homeland. WMD-CSTs are federally funded, state-controlled National
Guard units whose mission is to assist civil authorities in the United
States in responding to incidents involving WMD, including chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons
and agents. Specifically, the WMD-CSTs are to identify CBRNE agents and
substances, assess current or projected consequences, and advise civil
authorities on response measures. They do not perform any decontamination
functions. Unlike traditional National Guard units, each team is composed
of 22 members who are on full-time duty.6 The new National Guard regional
forces, called CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), are
composed of Army and Air National Guard units who will support local,
state, and federal agencies in managing the consequences of a CBRNE event
by providing capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency
medical services, and casualty search and rescue.7 Existing Army National
Guard chemical companies will perform the personnel decontamination
function.
2 One exception is that the Marine Corps has a Chemical Biological
Incident Response Force that, when directed, is to deploy and/or respond
to a credible threat of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to assist local, state, or
federal agencies and unified combatant commanders in the conduct of
consequence management operations. This force accomplishes its mission by
providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty
search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care
and stabilization of contaminated personnel. However, chemical and
biological defense in the Marine Corps is generally considered an
additional duty performed by regular marines rather than by specialized
chemical or biological units. We recently reported that this force had
some operational challenges. See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Marine Corps Response Force Has Developed Many Capabilities, but Critical
Operational Challenges Remain, [26]GAO-05-2C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3,
2004).
3 Hereinafter referred to as "chemical units."
4 Smoke screening is the act of providing large-area obscurant screening
intended to enhance a commander's ability to conceal and therefore deploy
and maneuver forces.
5 The Joint Task Force-Civil Support, part of U.S. Northern Command, will
provide dedicated domestic CBRNE command and control in support of the
responsible lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management
operations.
All of the services' chemical and biological defense training, except for
medical courses, is located at the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri. The U.S. Army Chemical School Doctrine Division is
responsible for joint, multiservice, and Army doctrine development for
operations related to nuclear/biological/chemical contamination avoidance,
protection, decontamination, and smoke screening.
The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, as well as other DOD
publications, have emphasized the need to address the increasing threat
posed by WMD, including chemical and biological weapons. Toward this end,
DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since
2001, and it is increasing funding for its Chemical and Biological Defense
Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent) for the next 5 years
beginning in fiscal year 2006. The department plans to use these funds
primarily for improving its research, development, and testing
infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to improve defenses against
emerging chemical and biological threats. However, experiences during
preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed continuing weaknesses in
the preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or biological
attack that were identified during the Persian Gulf War. We and DOD's
Inspector General have published multiple reports addressing continued
problems in aspects of DOD's chemical and biological defense preparedness.
While potential opponents have been assessed to be technologically capable
of sustaining certain levels of chemical and biological warfare, there is
still disagreement on the specific extent to which this capability has
actually been developed.
6 We recently issued a report on these teams' mission and management: GAO,
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, [27]GAO-06-498
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006).
7 The National Guard has already placed 12 certified force packages on the
ground. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
increased the Army National Guard end strength and, in the conference
report, the conferees recommended that this end strength include 5
additional certified force packages. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687
(2005).
At your request, we evaluated the preparedness of Army chemical units.
Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) units tasked with
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also
tasked with the homeland defense mission--especially Army National Guard
and Army Reserve chemical units--are adequately prepared for this mission.
To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical and
biological defense support to combat units and commands are adequately
staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from the office of
the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army
Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and
officials from a nonprobability sample of Army chemical companies. We
selected companies from each Army component and from each type of chemical
company. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because some elements of the population have
no chance of being selected. We obtained readiness data from the Army
Readiness Management System and reviewed readiness reports for all 78
chemical companies from fiscal years 2000 through 2006. To assess whether
Army chemical companies are adequately staffed to perform their missions,
we obtained personnel data from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel and compared personnel authorized with personnel on-hand for all
of the chemical companies and Army-wide. We determined that the readiness
and personnel data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which active, National Guard, and Reserve Army
chemical companies have the equipment needed to perform their missions, we
obtained chemical equipment requirements from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR
Database, and compared those requirements to what the data indicated that
the chemical units had on-hand. We also obtained and analyzed data on
other types of mission-essential items and compared authorizations to what
the data indicated were on hand in chemical units and Army-wide. The data
from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database were of undetermined reliability
because we received them close to our reporting deadline and, therefore,
were not able to conduct a full reliability assessment. However, we
corroborated the system data we used with officials from the Office of the
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the
National Guard Bureau, and selected Army chemical units.
To assess the extent to which units also tasked with the homeland defense
mission--especially Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units--are
adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data obtained in the
first objective, contacted officials from the U.S. Northern Command, and
obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical units
to perform chemical and biological homeland defense missions. We also
discussed this mission with some National Guard and Reserve chemical units
who had been given this mission. We reviewed and analyzed current and
planned chemical and biological defense doctrine and discussed the
applicability of this doctrine to the newly emerging homeland defense
missions with officials from the U.S. Army Chemical School and U.S. Army
Reserve Command. We conducted our review from July 2005 through June 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our
assessments of data reliability, other than that for the U.S. Army
EQUIPFOR Database, showed that the data we used were sufficiently reliable
for this report. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology
is contained in appendix I.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated
September 29, 2006.8 That report provides additional details on the
readiness of the Army's chemical units.
Results in Brief
Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their
missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current
operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and
abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological
defenses since 2001, there is a misalignment between the high priority DOD
places on chemical and biological defense and the current low level of
preparedness characterizing Army chemical companies, particularly in the
National Guard and Reserve. Problems occurring primarily as the result of
personnel shortages related to current operations are now causing most of
the Army chemical units expected to perform these missions to report low
readiness ratings--in other words, they are not considered sufficiently
qualified for deployment. The low readiness ratings reflect critical
personnel shortages, particularly in the key occupational
specialty--chemical operations. Army chemical unit readiness is also
being compromised by shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as
decontamination equipment. For example, Army chemical units, particularly
in the National Guard and Reserve, currently lack a substantial portion of
their authorized light decontamination equipment. Because they lack key
personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for their
wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army National Guard and
Reserve chemical unit readiness problems have historically been attributed
to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently these have been greatly
exacerbated by personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units
in support of current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a
specific plan in place to resolve long-standing shortages in chemical
defense personnel and equipment. Until the Army develops a specific plan
to address personnel and decontamination equipment shortfalls and the
transfer of chemical operations specialists to deploying units, adequate
chemical defense forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack
at home or abroad.
8 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to
Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
Priorities, GAO-06-867C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
Homeland Security Council involve CBRNE response, the ability of Army
chemical units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to be
concurrently prepared to perform either their original warfighting
chemical and biological defense mission or their homeland defense mission
is doubtful. According to Army Reserve Command officials, no criteria have
thus far been established for determining how many and which units are
needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on the
United States. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data
list contains a limited number of chemical units that must be ready to
perform homeland defense missions, this list, according to U.S. Northern
Command planning documents, is intended to provide only an initial
response force. The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel and
equipment from units on this deployment list to deploying units overseas.
However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of units to
support the homeland defense mission, because no criteria have been
established to determine how many and which chemical units are needed.
Since most chemical units are already at a low state of readiness, their
ability to respond in the event of a mass casualty WMD attack on the
United States is doubtful. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events
at home and abroad, we believe that leaving chemical units in such a low
state of readiness and dual tasking them will result in an increasing
operational risk to both the homeland defense and warfighting missions.
Further, although some Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units are
currently being trained and equipped to meet both new homeland defense and
ongoing wartime chemical and biological defense missions, the Army has not
updated doctrine for addressing these new missions, and Army Chemical
School officials told us that this doctrine would not be completed until
at least June 2007. However, it is unclear whether officials will meet
this date, given the low priority updating the doctrine has received in
the past.
We are recommending several actions to align DOD's stated emphasis on
responding to and mitigating effects from WMD incidents at home and abroad
with the actual readiness of the Army's chemical units. However, in
written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with two
recommendations but disagreed with our recommendations to address
long-standing chemical unit personnel and equipment shortages.
Specifically, DOD disagreed with our recommendation to develop a specific
plan to address chemical unit personnel shortfalls. In general, the
department stated that we did not fully consider the Army's current
accession and recruitment plan as a solution to chemical unit personnel
shortfalls and questioned our method for measuring unit readiness for
homeland defense missions. As discussed in this report, we did consider
the recruitment plan and found it has had a limited effect on personnel
shortfalls, and we used the only available DOD metric because there is no
other metric available to measure readiness of chemical units. The
department also disagreed with our recommendation to develop a plan to
address decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are
fielded because the department believes these issues are addressed in its
Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum. In our view, that
approach does not address many of the issues we highlight in our
recommendation, such as training and logistics support. We continue to
believe our recommendations have merit. DOD's comments and our evaluation
of them are discussed in the agency comments section of this report.
Background
The Army Chemical Corps is comprised of brigades, battalions, companies,
and detachments that perform a variety of chemical and biological defense
missions. However, the chemical company is the primary operative unit that
performs the majority of these missions. Of the Army's 78 chemical
companies, about three-fourths (74 percent) are located in the Army
National Guard or Army Reserve. Two of these companies are actually
multicomponent--composed of both active and Reserve platoons--but are
counted as Reserve companies because their headquarters platoons are part
of the Army Reserve. Figure 1 illustrates the division of the Army's
chemical companies between the active, Reserve, and National Guard
components.
Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component
The Army's chemical companies provide the following capabilities:
1. Biological detection-Biological detection units provide
monitoring, sampling, detection, and identification of biological
agents through the use of a detector suite in a Lightweight
Multipurpose Shelter mounted on a dedicated, high-mobility,
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The detector suite is called
the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS), and hence these
units are commonly referred to as BIDS units (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System
2. Decontamination-Decontamination units perform decontamination
operations in direct support of either fighting forces or
operations at fixed sites, such as strategic ports of embarkation
and debarkation. The decontamination mission is performed using
primarily either heavy or light decontamination equipment. The M12
Heavy Decontamination System consists of a pump, tank, and water
heater mounted on a 5-ton truck, and it performs both equipment
and terrain decontamination (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System
The M17 Light Decontamination System is a portable, lightweight, compact,
engine-driven pump and water heating system used to perform mostly
personnel and equipment decontamination (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System
3. Reconnaissance-Chemical reconnaissance companies perform
reconnaissance--that is, they conduct surveillance, monitoring,
and sampling in hostile territory--often using the lightly
armored, wheeled FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance System (see fig. 5) or a similar system mounted on
other vehicles such as a HMMWV.
Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
System
4. Smoke screening-Smoke companies use smoke-generating equipment
(see fig. 6) to provide large-area obscurant screening intended to
enhance the commander's ability to conceal and thus deploy and
maneuver forces.
Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System
Most of the Army's chemical companies are multifunctional--that is, the
company may perform a combination of capabilities, such as reconnaissance
and decontamination; smoke and decontamination; and smoke,
decontamination, and reconnaissance. Most of the Army's chemical companies
are smoke/decontamination companies, as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type
In addition to their wartime chemical and biological defense missions,
certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve chemical units have also been
given homeland defense missions. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996 mandated the enhancement of domestic preparedness
and response capability for terrorist attacks involving nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.9 In response to this
mandate, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an assessment for
integrating the National Guard and the Army Reserve into ongoing WMD
domestic preparedness programs. This assessment, led by the Under
Secretary of the Army, was completed in January 1998. The assessment
recommended the training of Reserve component chemical companies for
domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and
decontamination and specified additional equipment lists to enable the
needed capabilities. It also required the creation of Military Support
Detachments, now known as WMD-CSTs. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
approved this plan in January 1998 and directed its implementation.
According to an Army official, the fiscal year 1999 Army budget included
funds for addressing the increased support requirements associated with
terrorist use of WMD in the United States. Specifically, the support
requirement included the establishment of 10 WMD-CSTs (later increased to
55 authorized) to perform identification of CBRNE agents and substances,
assess current or projected consequences, and advise civil authorities on
response measures; the establishment of WMD patient decontamination teams
within existing standard National Guard and Reserve chemical companies;
and the training and equipping of standard National Guard and Reserve
units to conduct WMD reconnaissance. A March 1999 U.S. Army Forces Command
message required the training and equipping of standard National Guard and
Reserve chemical units to perform NBC reconnaissance and mass casualty
decontamination. Additionally, in October 2001, the Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans directed that U.S. Army Forces Command,
with support from Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Director of
Military Support, refine the domestic reconnaissance and casualty
decontamination mission for standard Army chemical units and develop
operational requirements documents and training support packages. However,
by 2005, the Army was still in the process of designing and implementing
its response to these tasks, and the needed doctrine and training support
packages had not been completed. This and other problems raised questions
regarding the readiness of the Army's chemical units to perform their
assigned missions and led to a 2005 congressional request that we perform
this review.
9 Public Law 104-201, S 1411 (1996).
In response to an initiative from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
the National Guard is in the process of creating additional regional
forces to support WMD-CSTs in the event of a WMD attack. According to the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the mission of the 17 currently
authorized CERFPs is to support local, state, and federal agencies
managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to
conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and
casualty search and rescue. Army National Guard chemical companies will
perform the decontamination function of the CERFPs.
Both Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies perform their
homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities under the
direction of the U.S. Northern Command. One of the U.S. Northern Command's
missions is, when requested by civil authorities and directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide support to civil
authorities for response and recovery from incidents such as CBRNE events.
Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and Trained to
Perform Their Missions
The vast majority of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in the
National Guard and Reserve, are currently reporting readiness levels so
low that their ability to perform their mission is in doubt. Our analysis
of Army active duty, National Guard, and Reserve chemical unit readiness
and personnel data determined that most of these units' readiness is
currently being affected by severe personnel shortages, especially in key
chemical occupational specialties. They are also experiencing key
equipment shortages, and both these factors are adversely affecting
chemical unit training. Under these conditions it is questionable whether
most of these units would be able to respond effectively to significant
wartime or terrorist CBRNE events, and the Army appears to lack a specific
plan for remedying this condition.
Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low
As of March 2006, most of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in
the National Guard and Reserve, were reporting the two lowest states of
readiness measured by the Army's Unit Status Reporting System.10 In fact,
the overall readiness of the Army's chemical companies began to decline
precipitously from already low levels in early 2004. According to Army
officials, this decline in readiness was primarily attributable to the
transfer of resources from chemical units to other types of units
deploying to support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army
chemical companies reporting the lowest level of readiness doubled from
March 2000 to March 2006. Specific details on the readiness ratings and
readiness trends of the Army's chemical companies are included in the
classified version of this report.11
Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Readiness Rates
Severe personnel shortages created primarily by the transfer of chemical
unit personnel to other types of units deploying in support of Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the primary reason why Army
chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are
reporting low readiness levels. Long-standing shortages in key
occupational specialties are now becoming worse and further exacerbating
chemical company personnel shortages.
Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels
The impact of these shortages on chemical companies is demonstrated by
comparing the staffing levels authorized with the staffing levels actually
filled. Army units are designed to perform certain defined missions and
are authorized a specific number of personnel in order to be able to
conduct their missions. Active Army chemical units are relatively
well-staffed in relation to their authorized levels. However, about 74
percent of the Army's chemical companies are located in the National
Guard and Reserve, and these companies are presently staffed far below
their authorized levels.
10 The Unit Status Report is the Army's primary mechanism for measuring
and reporting a unit's readiness, i.e., the unit's ability to perform its
wartime mission. The Unit Status Report provides a snapshot of the status
of the unit's overall readiness (C rating). Unit Status reports are
submitted monthly by active Army units, and quarterly by Army National
Guard and Reserve units. The Army measures four areas of readiness:
personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. There are
five levels for rating readiness. The highest level, C1, indicates that
the unit is prepared to undertake its full wartime mission. At C2 the unit
is able to undertake most of its wartime mission and at C3 the unit is
able to undertake many, but not all, portions of its wartime mission. C4
is the lowest level and, at this level, the unit is not prepared and
requires additional resources or training to conduct its wartime mission.
In addition, the C5 level indicates that the unit is undergoing an
Army-directed resource action and is not prepared, at the time of the
report, to perform its wartime mission.
11 GAO-06-867C.
Current operational plans for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have little or no requirement for chemical companies. As a result,
soldiers from chemical companies are being reassigned to address personnel
shortages in deploying units. For example, in one state we contacted,
three Army National Guard chemical companies are currently staffed at
22-45 percent of their authorized levels due to the transfer of 141
soldiers to other deploying Army National Guard units, such as military
police units, from that state. These units were already suffering low fill
rates before the transfer of soldiers to deploying units. The three
companies together were authorized 401 soldiers, but only 275 soldiers had
been assigned--a fill rate of 69 percent. Currently, the only soldiers in
these three chemical companies who are not deployed are those ineligible
for deployment because they either (1) have not received the training
required for deployment or (2) do not meet deployment standards due to
medical reasons.
Active Army chemical companies have significantly better personnel fill
rates than Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies. Overall,
active Army chemical companies do not need to be supplemented with
soldiers transferred from other units in order to deploy. However, our
data show that Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies will
require extensive personnel increases in order to deploy. According to
Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the overall fill rates for
these companies will not improve until Army personnel requirements for
Operation Iraqi Freedom are significantly reduced. As long as the Army
National Guard and Reserve are tasked to provide a significant portion of
the units deployed to Iraq, chemical companies as well as other low demand
units will be used as a source of soldiers to fill deploying units. In
addition, these officials stated that concrete plans to bring their
chemical company fill rates back to pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom levels are
not currently in place, or being developed, due to the Army's focus on
supporting current operations.
Army chemical companies have shortages in their key specialties
Chemical company personnel fill problems are being exacerbated by
Army-wide shortages in occupational specialties that are key to chemical
units. The Army classifies the jobs its soldiers perform as military
occupational specialties. Army units are comprised of many occupational
specialties, such as mechanics, supply personnel, and truck drivers. The
primary specialty in chemical companies is the chemical operations
specialist. We determined, based on interviews with Army chemical
officials, that three occupational specialty groups are critical to
chemical companies in the performance of their missions: chemical
operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics (that is,
chemical equipment repairer, wheeled vehicle mechanic, tracked vehicle
mechanic, and fuel and electrical repairer). These specialties are also
found in other types of Army units. For example, most combat units have an
assigned chemical officer or noncommissioned officer to advise their
commander on chemical and biological defense matters.
Chemical companies are staffed significantly below their authorized levels
for chemical operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics, and
these shortages exist Army-wide. However, as shown in figure 8, these
shortages are greater for the chemical companies than for the Army as a
whole.
Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006
Army officials told us that the primary reason for the greater shortage in
chemical companies is that very few chemical companies are deployed;
therefore, as the need for deployable personnel has arisen, many of these
soldiers have been transferred to deploying units.
Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened
The Army has historically had difficulty recruiting and retaining the
primary chemical company occupational specialty, the chemical operations
specialist, but shortages of this occupational specialty are currently
worsening despite Army efforts to reverse this trend. Army officials told
us that staff for the chemical occupational specialty has always been
difficult to recruit and retain because of the high aptitude scores
required. In addition, they said that chemical unit training with real and
simulated agents is limited, chemical unit personnel are often assigned
nonchemical additional duties, and chemical unit equipment often is also
used for more mundane tasks. For example, decontamination equipment such
as the M17 and M12 can also be used for washing vehicles and operating
showers for troops in the field. Officials also told us that there are
limited promotion opportunities in the chemical operations career field,
making it difficult to retain personnel in this specialty.
The military services have offered enlistment or reenlistment bonuses to
critical specialties in order to attract and retain personnel in these
specialties. Although bonuses offered to chemical operations specialists
led to some improvement in fill rates in the past, this has perpetually
been one of the Army's underfilled military occupational specialties.12
Fill rates for chemical operations specialists were on the increase
between 2000 and 2003. According to Army officials, this increase was due
to (1) enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for personnel who selected the
chemical operations specialty as their primary military occupational
specialty and (2) the efforts of Army recruiters. However, as shown in
figure 9, the fill rates for this specialty began a steady decline in
2004, especially in the Army National Guard and Reserve.
12 See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel and Retention Challenges, [28]GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
17, 2005).
Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
2000 through 2006
According to Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the subsequent
decline in chemical operations specialist fill rates is directly
attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, as operations continued in
Iraq, certain critical, nonchemical specialties were required due to the
declining security situation. As a result, chemical operations specialists
were often retrained, reclassified, and assigned to other units, such as
military police units. Second, the fill rate for chemical operations
specialists declined because, according to Army officials, this specialty
is considered by recruits to be less attractive than other military
occupational specialties. Recruits have historically been drawn to combat
military occupational specialties, such as infantrymen, and to
specialties, such as military police and mechanics, which more directly
correspond to civilian jobs. Furthermore, many recruits want the
opportunity to serve in Iraq, and they have a much better chance of doing
so if they enlist as infantrymen or military police.
In addition, the shortage of chemical operations specialists has worsened
in part because once transferred, retrained, or reclassified, these
specialists often opt not to return to chemical units or specialties. For
example, as discussed earlier, three Army National Guard chemical
companies in one state lost a significant number of personnel to deploying
units from that state. Of the 275 soldiers assigned to these three
companies, 141 soldiers (51 percent) of those assigned were transferred to
other deploying units. Of the 141 transferred, 129 went to military police
companies, and most of these soldiers were retrained and reclassified as
military police. The remaining 12 soldiers were transferred to a support
battalion that deployed to Kuwait. National Guard officials from this
state are not expecting many of these soldiers to return to their former
chemical companies when their military police companies return because,
according to these officials, these soldiers will have developed new
camaraderies within their current units and as a result will not transfer
back to their former chemical companies. Consequently, unless DOD requires
soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to units requiring
those specialties, National Guard officials will need to recruit
additional soldiers into chemical operations specialties in order to
address personnel shortfalls.
In one case, an entire Army National Guard chemical company from a
different state was retrained and reclassified as military police and
deployed to Germany as a military police company in order to assume the
mission of an active duty military police company deploying to support the
global war on terrorism. According to National Guard officials from that
state, when this unit returns, it will remain a military police company.
Other chemical companies from this state have lost personnel due to their
transfer to other deploying units, including military police units. Army
National Guard officials from this state also told us that increased
recruitment of chemical operations specialists would be needed to refill
these units with the required number of personnel.
Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform Their Missions
After personnel shortages, the second major reason for Army chemical
companies' reporting low readiness rates is the shortage of key equipment,
thus hampering their ability to perform their missions. Army chemical
doctrine states that chemical units will perform both heavy and light
decontamination functions. But the heavy and light decontamination
equipment in use today by Army chemical companies is old and difficult or
costly to maintain, previous attempts to replace it have failed, and the
fielding of new replacement equipment is not scheduled to begin until at
least fiscal year 2009.
The M12 Heavy Decontamination System and the M17 Light Decontamination
System are the two primary types of decontamination equipment currently
found in Army chemical units. The M12 is 35 years old and is scheduled to
be replaced by a joint system beginning in fiscal year 2012. Army chemical
company personnel told us that while recently refurbished and adequate to
perform most functions, the M12 is inadequate to support all of the Army's
heavy decontamination requirements. This has recently resulted in
emergency purchases of alternate heavy decontamination equipment from
commercial sources to meet standard operational requirements. For example,
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, heavy chemical companies equipped with the
M12 were tasked with performing fixed-site (such as seaport and airfield)
decontamination, including spraying decontaminant on buildings or large
pieces of equipment, if needed. However, according to a Corps chemical
officer, the M12 cannot effectively reach higher than a one-story building
or the upper surfaces of large aircraft. As a result, U.S. Central Command
submitted an Operational Needs Statement requesting a different mobile
decontamination system to provide the heavy decontamination support needed
for terrain, large area, and fixed-site decontamination operations.
Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the same new
systems for U.S. Army forces in Korea in order to enhance the nuclear,
biological, and chemical defense preparedness in this theater. These
requests were approved, and DOD subsequently purchased new commercial
heavy decontamination equipment--116 Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination
Systems costing $14.2 million--to meet these requirements (see fig. 10).
Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System
Light decontamination companies are assigned the M17 Light Decontamination
System to perform tactical personnel and equipment decontamination. This
system is also typically fielded to Army combat units to enable them to
decontaminate their own personnel and equipment (see fig. 4).
The M17 is also an old system (20 years old) that has reached the end of
its service life. This system has been seriously affected by long-standing
maintenance problems, and it has been difficult for the Army to obtain the
needed repair parts. The Army consequently implemented a modernization
program to replace the M17's engine and upgrade the system's hose/wand
assembly. However, this effort was terminated because its costs were
greater than those to purchase a new commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
replacement system, called the Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System
(see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System
With the termination of the M17 overhaul program, the decontamination
system program manager determined that any future lightweight
decontamination system requirements would be filled by the Karcher
Multipurpose Decontamination System until the replacement system is
fielded, currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. As with the
M12, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, one Army Corps submitted an
Operational Needs Statement requesting a new, improved light
decontamination system, due to the mission capability problems of the M17.
Subsequently, another Army corps, an Army organization in Korea, and the
Marine Corps all submitted Operational Needs Statements requesting the
procurement of an alternative to the M17. Consequently, DOD purchased 410
Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination Systems, costing approximately $8.2
million, to provide the required light decontamination capability.
Furthermore, the Army--particularly the National Guard and Reserve--does
not have sufficient M17s to meet the numbers currently authorized. As
shown in figure 12, the fill rate of M17s for the Army as a whole is less
than 52 percent; the fill rates for the National Guard and Reserve are
about 13 percent and 56 percent, respectively. For the chemical companies
we reviewed, the fill rate for M17s is about 65 percent, since it is a
mission-critical piece of equipment, but that is still well below required
levels. Five Army National Guard chemical companies we visited had never
received their authorized M17s or Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination
System substitute equipment, even though these units had been activated in
2002 and this piece of equipment is a mission-critical item.
Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
Army Units, as of July 2006
Note: These data are of undetermined reliability.
DOD has long recognized the need to replace its aging decontamination
systems. However, the Modular Decontamination System, an attempted
replacement program for both the M12 and M17 begun in 1993, was
unsuccessful and was officially terminated in 2003. According to an Army
Chemical School memorandum, this system did not keep up with the emerging
requirements of the Army's transformation, and the planned replacement
system continued to be plagued with reliability deficiencies. According to
officials from the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
Biological Defense, the M17 and M12 will not be replaced by new, joint
systems until at least fiscal years 2009 and 2012, respectively. In the
meantime, the Army will resort to equipping units with commercial systems,
in limited quantities, as an interim solution. However, the suitability of
these commercial off-the-shelf systems for serving as interim replacements
for the M12 and M17 has not been fully determined. For example, as
commercial-off-the-shelf systems, they have not been ruggedized or tested
for suitability in a tactical field environment. Since they have not been
type-classified as standard military equipment, they are not recognized as
standard issue items or included on chemical unit equipment lists.
Furthermore, questions remain regarding logistical support issues, such as
spare parts, maintenance, and training support. It is presently unclear
how many commercial decontamination systems will be required in the
interim, how these will be integrated with the new systems planned for
delivery after fiscal year 2009, or how effectively the Army will be able
to address its near-term decontamination mission requirements. At the time
of our review, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
Biological Defense had identified several options for addressing the
replacement of M12s and M17s with interim commercial equipment, but no
decision had yet been reached. After we completed our work on this
assignment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense told us that they are now evaluating steps that would ensure that
the commercial decontamination equipment and existing M12s and M17s will
be integrated with the new, joint systems currently under development. A
recommendation in this report on this subject remains, however, since
these actions have not yet been completed.
Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key equipment
A further contributing factor to the chemical companies' readiness problem
is the Army-wide shortage of other key equipment. The Army chemical
companies we visited, especially in the National Guard and Reserve,
reported shortages of other key pieces of equipment that hamper their
ability to perform their mission. Military units cannot deploy without
other mission-critical equipment, including chemical monitors, weapon
night-vision sights, and radio sets. Since these items are in short supply
across the Army, nondeploying units have transferred them to deploying
units to support current operations. We previously reported on the extent
of this problem in the National Guard and concluded that growing equipment
shortages resulting from the need to fully equip deploying units (1) make
it unclear whether units will be able to maintain acceptable levels of
equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home and (2) hamper the
ability of nondeployed forces to train for future missions.13
Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering
Personnel and equipment shortages, as well as other priority requirements,
have had an adverse impact on some chemical companies' ability to train
collectively for their wartime chemical defense mission. Chemical
companies are required to train for the tasks on their Mission Essential
Task Lists14 as well as complete other priority training as designated by
their headquarters. For example, due to the high pace of current
operations, all Army soldiers are required to train on "warrior skills,"
the individual skills in which all soldiers need to be proficient if
deployed.
Transferring soldiers from nondeploying units to deploying units to
support current operations has had a negative impact on chemical
companies' ability to train for their chemical mission-essential tasks.
For example, two Army National Guard chemical companies that we visited
have been unable to conduct unit-level training because of the requirement
to transfer soldiers to other deploying National Guard units from that
state. Further, another National Guard chemical company we visited told us
they were unable to train for their mission-essential tasks due to the
transfer of 44 soldiers to a deploying unit.
We visited four active-duty chemical companies at one Army installation
that had not been able to train together as a unit for their chemical and
biological defense mission because they were being used as trainers for
other Army units that were deploying from that installation for Operation
Iraqi Freedom. This training consisted of tasks such as convoy operations,
individual readiness training, and live-fire training. One unit also
operated the equipment movement site, where deploying units' equipment was
located prior to being shipped to the port of debarkation. Performing
these missions was a full-time responsibility, and as a result, these
companies told us they had not trained for their mission-essential tasks
since June 2005. However, as of April 2006, three of the four units had
recently resumed unit-level training for their chemical and biological
missions. The fourth unit still had not been able to train due to
personnel shortages. This unit had only about 50 percent of its authorized
personnel, and as a result the unit was unable to train for its
mission-essential tasks. This unit's headquarters battalion transferred
the company's soldiers to other active-duty chemical companies so that
those units, which were also short of personnel due to the transfer of
personnel to deploying units, were able to conduct their unit-level
mission training.
13 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, [29]GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).
14 The Mission Essential Task List is a statement of the tasks a unit is
required to accomplish in order to perform its wartime missions. For
example, tasks on a biological detection company's task list include
conducting mobilization and deployment operations, biological surveillance
operations, and force protection/antiterrorism operations.
Equipment shortages have similarly adversely affected chemical companies'
ability to train for their mission-essential tasks. For example, three
Army National Guard chemical companies we contacted from one state have a
chemical decontamination mission, but only two of them had received any
decontamination equipment; in this case, they received only 4 of the 54
decontamination systems authorized. As a result, these three companies,
activated in September 2003, have never had the opportunity to conduct
unit-level decontamination training. Additionally, five Army National
Guard chemical companies we visited from another state have similar
equipment shortages that impede their ability to train for their mission.
All these chemical companies have a chemical decontamination mission, but
none have been issued M17 light decontamination systems. To improvise, one
company conducted annual training using M12 heavy decontamination systems
and commercial sprayers. But since these substitute decontamination
systems are markedly different from the authorized light decontamination
system in performance and application, company personnel told us that the
training experience was not nearly as effective as it would have been if
conducted with the authorized decontamination systems.
Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and Warfighting
Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful
Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units' ability to perform not
only their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission
but also their homeland defense mission is doubtful. DOD is currently
tasked with planning how the U.S. military will support the response to
the Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios, 12 of which
involve a CBRNE response. Selected National Guard and Reserve chemical
units are being trained and equipped for homeland defense missions, and a
limited number of active duty and Reserve units have been placed on the
Joint Task Force-Civil Support's deployment list to be prepared to respond
to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, near-simultaneous mass
casualty attacks on the United States. The Army is prohibiting the
transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to
units that are deploying overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is
an adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission
because no criteria have been established to determine how many and which
chemical units are needed. Further, the poor readiness of these units, as
described above, and inadequate doctrine to guide these units in the
procedures needed for operating in the homeland defense environment, may
compromise their ability to perform these missions.
Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Compromise Unit
Preparedness for Homeland Defense Missions
DOD's strategy for homeland defense and civil support calls for its
warfighting forces to be trained and equipped for domestic CBRNE
consequence management to support its interagency partners in responding
to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, simultaneous mass
casualty attacks within the United States, in addition to their
warfighting chemical and biological defense missions.15 The standing
consequence management execute order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff specifically directs the U.S. Northern Command to be prepared to
execute multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE consequence management
operations for up to three incidents within the U.S. Northern Command area
of responsibility. Moreover, in the spring of 2006, the Secretary of
Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential
requests for DOD capabilities needed to support its response to 15
National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council.16
Twelve of these scenarios involve a CBRNE response, and 6 involve a
specifically chemical or biological response. Army National Guard and
Reserve chemical companies have been given the hazardous materials
reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination portions of the homeland
defense mission. However, according to Army Reserve Command officials, no
criteria have thus far been established for determining how many and which
units are needed to perform this mission. Without such criteria, it is
uncertain whether adequate chemical units will be available to respond to
near-simultaneous mass casualty attacks on the United States.
15 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
(Washington, D.C.: June 2005).
16 Department of Defense, Strategic Planning Guidance Fiscal Years
2008-2013 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).
In fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Army Reserve Command began training and
equipping selected standard chemical units for domestic reconnaissance and
mass casualty decontamination missions. As of April 2006, 12 platoons in 4
companies had been trained and equipped for hazardous materials
reconnaissance. Additionally, 178 additional Army Reserve chemical
soldiers have been trained for hazardous materials reconnaissance, for a
total of 430 trained and certified hazardous materials technicians.
Further, 75 platoons in 25 companies have been trained and equipped for
mass casualty decontamination, and about 3,500 Army Reserve chemical and
medical soldiers have been trained to perform mass casualty
decontamination operations. The National Guard has designated certain
standard chemical companies to provide the personnel decontamination
function for the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP). These
companies are also expected to continue to maintain the skills necessary
to perform their wartime mission. Consequently, the Army must ensure that
the chemical units tasked with performing homeland defense missions are
ready to perform them, along with their warfighting missions. However, the
Unit Status Report is designed only to address unit readiness for major
combat operations. DOD currently does not have readiness measures designed
to assess unit readiness to conduct domestic missions. We previously
reported, though, that traditional readiness measures are likely adequate
for some types of units to determine their preparedness to successfully
conduct their domestic missions.17 As of July 2006, five National Guard
decontamination companies, about 375 personnel, had been trained and
equipped to provide personnel decontamination as part of their homeland
defense mission. The National Guard Bureau plans to train and equip an
additional five decontamination companies during the remainder of fiscal
year 2006.
17 GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern
Command's Mission, but Challenges Remain, [30]GAO-04-622C (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004).
The Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains certain
chemical units that must be ready to perform CBRNE consequence management
operations in support of civil authorities. Specifically, one Reserve
chemical company, two active duty platoons, and two Reserve platoons are
currently on this deployment list. As such, the Army is not allowing the
reassignment of personnel or equipment from these units to units deploying
in support of current operations. To provide additional surge capacity,
Army Reserve Command officials have unofficially designated two additional
companies as exempt from the reassignment of personnel and equipment to
support ongoing operations. The force structure identified is strictly an
initial response capability; additional forces will be required and will
have to be requested using established request-for-forces processes.
However, other Reserve chemical companies with a homeland defense mission
that are not currently on the deployment list have lost personnel due to
transfers to deploying units. Unless DOD prohibits the transfers of
personnel from all chemical units with homeland defense missions into
units supporting other operations, there may not be sufficient Reserve
chemical units available to provide surge capacity if needed.
Since many chemical units are already stressed due to their support of
ongoing operations and are reporting low readiness levels, it is unclear
whether they would be ready to support consequence management operations
in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack in the United States. We have
previously reported that although DOD has met the Northern Command
requirements for forces to be made available should a CBRNE event occur,
DOD acknowledges that it has become increasingly difficult to meet all
expected requirements because of the high pace of operations, which may
include the forces that would be requested or directed to support civil
authorities for CBRNE events.18 Additionally, we reported that Northern
Command officials are particularly concerned about a domestic CBRNE attack
and have asked for forces to be dedicated to this mission. We also
reported that DOD still plans to continue with its present practice of
trying to balance the competing demands of the various combatant
commanders and the use of dual-purpose units to accomplish CBRNE missions
both at home and abroad. Further, the Quadrennial Defense Review states
that military forces are also to be prepared for conducting a "long war"
in the future. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and
abroad, we continue to believe there is operational risk to both the
homeland defense and the warfighting missions in not only leaving chemical
units in such a low state of readiness but also dual tasking them.
18 GAO-04-622C .
Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Adequately Reflect
Homeland Defense Missions
The Army published doctrine in December 200119 on nuclear, biological, and
chemical consequence management that mentions the reconnaissance and mass
casualty decontamination capabilities of the National Guard and Army
Reserve. According to an Army Reserve Command senior official, however,
this doctrine was published in the early stages of developing the Army
Reserve's CBRNE domestic response capabilities, and consequently this
doctrine is now out of date. In the past 3 years, the Army Reserve has
made progress in this area, having completely revised and improved the
tactics, techniques, and procedures for these missions. For example, in
2001, it took approximately 1- 1/2 hours for a single mass casualty
decontamination line to be set up and become operational. By the summer of
2005, Army Reserve soldiers were able to perform the same operation with
the latest procedures and equipment in an average of 20 minutes.
However, the Army Chemical School has not updated the doctrine needed for
addressing these homeland defense missions. A 2001 memorandum from the
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans specifically states
that Army chemical units have a mission to provide nuclear, biological,
and chemical reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination in support
of domestic emergencies involving WMD. The memorandum goes on to list
several other defense directives and publications that identify this
mission. Further, it specifically directs Army Forces Command, along with
Training and Doctrine Command and the Director of Military Support, to
refine the homeland defense mission and develop operational requirements
documents and training support packages. However, according to an official
from the Army Chemical School's homeland security office and documents
provided by the school, DOD has not been told what military capabilities
are required to support civil authorities in the event of a terrorist
attack involving WMD, making it more difficult to write doctrine. In
addition, the Army did not provide funding for the school to update its
doctrine or provide training for the Reserve component homeland defense
missions until fiscal year 2006. Since the Army did not consider these
missions to be warfighting missions, it gave them a low priority for
funding, even though DOD considers defending against a chemical and
biological attack to be a national priority. Once the funding was
received, the Army Chemical School began exploring options to revise
current doctrine to include comprehensive tactics, techniques, and
procedures on the hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty
decontamination homeland defense missions. The school finalized its plan
to update its doctrine in March 2006.
19 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.21: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence
Management (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo: Dec. 2001).
Army Chemical School officials told us that it typically takes 24-36
months to update doctrine to incorporate a new mission, but they are
accelerating this process and plan to complete revised doctrine, to
include the homeland defense missions, by June 2007. The chemical
companies we visited with homeland defense missions told us that they need
updated doctrine to provide guidance on how to operate effectively in the
unique homeland defense environment because of differences between
homeland defense and tactical wartime missions. Further, the new equipment
that has been fielded to these units is nonstandard equipment and,
therefore, the chemical companies lack guidance on how to properly
integrate it with their standard wartime military equipment. As a result,
without doctrine to guide their efforts, Army National Guard and Reserve
chemical companies cannot ensure that they are meeting DOD needs,
prioritizing their training requirements appropriately, and properly
integrating new equipment with existing items.
Conclusions
The readiness of Army chemical units--particularly in the National Guard
and Reserve--is so low that it is doubtful whether most of these units can
now perform their missions. The absence of a plan to address the personnel
and equipment shortfalls that are primarily responsible for these
readiness problems makes it unclear whether and when these problems will
be corrected. Consequently, we believe there is a misalignment between
DOD's stated national priorities, especially the Secretary of Defense's
requirement for military forces to be able to respond to the Homeland
Security Council's 12 National Planning Scenarios requiring a CBRNE
response, and the current readiness of Army chemical units. Moreover, it
is unclear whether Army chemical units affected by low readiness, but
tasked with both wartime and homeland defense chemical and biological
missions, can perform both effectively, especially given the lack of
criteria to determine how many and which units are needed to support civil
authorities in the event of multiple, near-simultaneous attacks on the
United States. Even though DOD considers responding to and mitigating the
effects of WMD attacks on the United States to be a national priority, the
Army did not consider funding the completion of doctrine for the Reserve
component homeland defense mission to be a priority. Consequently, the
U.S. Army Chemical School has not yet updated the doctrine needed for
performing homeland defense missions, leaving chemical units assigned
these missions with only limited guidance on how to accomplish them.
Unless DOD takes the steps needed to address long-standing gaps in
chemical unit readiness and doctrine, we question whether these units will
be able to perform either their warfighting or homeland defense missions
effectively.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To align DOD's stated emphasis on responding to and mitigating the effects
from WMD incidents at home and abroad with the readiness of Army chemical
units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to take the following actions:
o Develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical
unit personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing
operations, particularly for chemical operations specialists.
o This plan should specifically address and discuss options such
as
o the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer
of personnel from chemical units with homeland
defense missions into units supporting other
operations;
o requiring soldiers in chemical occupational
specialties to return to assignments requiring that
specialty after deployments, as long as shortages
continue in that specialty;
o other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these
personnel; and
o the risks associated with not taking such steps.
o Determine how many and which active, National Guard, and Army
Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense
missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous
CBRNE attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure
that for these units, the homeland defense mission is given
priority over other missions.
o Develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning
in fiscal year 2009. This plan should determine
o the total number of systems needed during the
interim period, by type of system (M12, M17, Karcher,
or Falcon) to maintain the needed decontamination
capability;
o how the interim systems will be integrated with
retained M12 and M17 systems;
o how training and logistical support for the interim
systems will be addressed; and
o whether the interim systems should be
type-classified and standardized as official military
equipment with a national stock number, and added to
units' official equipment lists.
o Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological
defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with
our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop
a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit
personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing
operations, particularly for chemical operations specialists, and
cited several reasons as a basis for their position. First, DOD
stated that we are discounting the Army's accession and
recruitment plan, which strives for 100 percent fill of all units.
We acknowledge that the Army does have an agencywide accession and
recruitment plan, and the goal is 100 percent fill of all units.
However, as we discuss in this report, that plan by itself has not
been fully successful and has had little positive long-term impact
on chemical unit personnel shortages. Specifically, while the
recruitment and retention bonuses--which are a part of the Army's
plan--were helping to alleviate chemical operations specialist
shortages to some extent, the transfer of chemical unit personnel
to other deploying units for Operation Iraqi Freedom negated those
gains. Second, DOD disagreed with our use of the Unit Status
Report to gauge the readiness of the chemical forces to support a
homeland defense mission. In their comments, the department points
out that the Unit Status Report is designed to evaluate an
organization's ability to support wartime missions, not a homeland
defense mission, and that the Army is developing improved
readiness metrics in support of evolving DOD and Joint Staff
reporting requirements, which will include the readiness for
contingency operations such as homeland defense missions. We agree
that the Unit Status Report is designed to address readiness for
major combat operations. However, DOD also acknowledges there is
no other metric currently available to measure readiness for
homeland defense missions. DOD also stated that some unit
personnel who are not available for a major combat operations
deployment are available for a homeland defense mission. Our
analysis shows that chemical unit personnel shortages are severe
and primarily a result of personnel transfers to deploying units;
therefore, DOD's statement that unit personnel could be available
for a homeland defense mission is in our opinion, invalid. Because
of the severe personnel shortages in most chemical units, we
continue to believe our recommendation has merit and is an
important step that should be taken by the Army.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Army to determine how many and which active,
National Guard, and Army Reserve chemical units will be needed to
perform homeland defense missions, including responding to
multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on the United States,
and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units, the homeland
defense mission is given priority over other missions. DOD agreed
that the capability requirements for homeland defense, including
the number and type of chemical units, must be identified in the
context of an interagency, DOD, and Army assessment process. DOD
further states that the Chief of Staff of the Army has identified
improvement of homeland defense as a focus area with the intent of
identifying Army contributions to homeland defense as well as gaps
and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved to
support the joint force. However, DOD then stated that, with some
exceptions, the Army generally does not develop force structure to
identify specific units for specific missions beyond those
supporting the Joint Task Force-Civil Support because such
designation limits the pool of units that can be deployed for
overseas requirements, greatly increasing the burden on the
deployable units. While we believe the above DOD actions are good
first steps, we do not believe DOD's comments address the overall
intent of our recommendation, which was to ensure DOD identified
all forces needed to respond to homeland defense missions and
develop a plan to ensure that these forces are available and ready
for those missions. Specifically, as we highlight in this report,
the units designated to support the Joint Task Force-Civil Support
are only intended to be an initial response capability, and
additional forces would be required to support multiple,
near-simultaneous attacks on the homeland. The low readiness
levels of units not associated with the Joint Task Force, combined
with the potential deployment of personnel from other units in
support of overseas operations, could inhibit DOD's ability to
provide the planned surge capacity needed for supporting DOD's
execute order on multiple, near- simultaneous homeland defense
missions. DOD's response does not indicate how, or to what extent,
this homeland defense requirement will be prioritized compared
with other missions, and our recommendation to do this is both
valid and important to accomplish. Without a clear set of
priorities for chemical unit response capabilities, DOD increases
the risk that it may not be able to provide the forces required to
respond to its own stated homeland defense requirements.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
the Army to develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's
decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are
fielded. DOD stated that while the equipment information contained
in the report is generally correct as of the time the information
was collected, our recommendation does not accurately depict the
current situation. Since a draft of this report was provided to
DOD for comment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
and Biological Defense developed a plan that addresses replacement
and future fielding of decontamination equipment and this plan was
funded in the Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum.
Although we have not analyzed this plan in-depth, it appears to be
a good first step in meeting the Army's decontamination needs as
long as the procurement and fielding of replacement systems stays
on track. However, in its comments, DOD did not discuss whether
its plan will address the specifics of our recommendation,
including how training and logistics support for the interim
systems will be addressed and whether the interim systems should
be type-classified and standardized as official military equipment
with a national stock number and added to units' official
equipment lists. We maintain that these steps are necessary so
that appropriate training and logistical support will be available
and accountability over these interim systems can be maintained.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to set a definitive deadline
for completing chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect
new homeland defense missions. Although DOD agreed that updated
chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland
defense missions is a high priority, they did not set a deadline
because they believe any deadline must account for the impact on
other high-priority doctrine development projects, particularly
those supporting ongoing combat operations. We continue to believe
that without a deadline, development of this doctrine will be
uncertain, leaving chemical units without much-needed doctrine to
address the unique requirements associated with their homeland
defense missions.
DOD's comments are included in appendix II. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send
copies to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. If you have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
or dagostinod@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing
chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met
with officials from the office of the U.S Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, National
Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to define the
population of Army chemical units. Using the information provided,
we determined that in fiscal year 2006, the Army had 78 chemical
companies tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
support to combat units and commands. We did not include command
and control units (brigades and battalions) and units smaller than
companies, such as detachments, in our population since the actual
chemical and biological defense mission is largely performed at
the company level.
To determine the overall readiness levels of Army chemical
companies in our population and reasons why units were reporting
low readiness rates, we obtained and analyzed data from the Army
Readiness Management System for fiscal years 2000 through 2006. We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes by comparing the system data with the readiness data
reports submitted by the companies we visited (see below). We also
reviewed reliability assessments conducted by other GAO teams. To
further assess the preparedness of Army chemical companies to
perform their missions, we visited five active duty Army chemical
companies located at Fort Hood, Texas; five Army National Guard
chemical companies in Alabama and Texas; and five Army Reserve
chemical companies in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. We selected
units to visit from each Army component--active, National Guard,
and Reserve--and from each type of chemical unit--biological
detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening.
We discussed personnel fill rates, the adequacy of decontamination
equipment, fill rates for mission-essential equipment items, and
training issues with officials from each of these companies. We
also discussed chemical company mission preparedness with
officials from the Kentucky Army National Guard, and the Army
Reserve's 81st and 90th Regional Readiness Commands.
To assess whether Army chemical companies are adequately staffed
to perform their missions, we obtained and analyzed data provided
by officials from the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel. This office provided us with personnel data for the
entire Army, which includes our universe of 78 chemical companies.
It included authorized and assigned soldiers segregated by grade
and military occupational specialty as of February 2006. To assess
the reliability of the personnel data, we reviewed data
reliability assessments prepared on the same data system by
another GAO team and performed electronic testing of the data. We
also corroborated system data with officials at selected sites and
interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined
that the personnel data we used were sufficiently reliable for our
reporting purposes.
To determine the extent to which the Army chemical companies have
the equipment needed to perform their mission, we obtained and
analyzed data as of July 2006 from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR
Database. We determined the equipment fill rates by comparing the
equipment authorized to the equipment on-hand of selected chemical
and other mission-essential equipment for the 78 chemical
companies and compared this with overall Army equipment fill
rates. Because we received the Army EQUIPFOR Database data close
to our reporting deadline, we were not able to conduct a full
reliability assessment. Consequently, these data are of
undetermined reliability. However, as noted above, we used the
Army EQUIPFOR Database as only one source of information for
findings about equipment readiness. In addition, we corroborated
system data with officials at the Office of the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, National Guard
Bureau, and selected Army chemical units. We also discussed
decontamination equipment issues with officials at the chemical
units we visited and with officials from the office of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs; the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology;
and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
To determine the extent to which units with the additional
homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve
chemical units--are adequately prepared for this mission, we used
the data collected in the first objective, contacted officials
from U.S. Northern Command, and obtained planning documents that
describe the use of Army chemical units to perform chemical and
biological decontamination and reconnaissance functions for
homeland defense. We discussed these missions with officials from
the Army Reserve Command and National Guard Bureau. We also
reviewed and analyzed current chemical and biological defense
doctrine and discussed the applicability of this doctrine to the
newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials from the
Army Chemical School and Army Reserve Command. We also discussed
the chemical and biological homeland defense doctrine that is
being developed with Army Chemical School officials and discussed
homeland defense doctrine needs with officials from the chemical
companies we visited that had been assigned homeland defense
missions.
We performed our work from July 2005 through June 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, William W. Cawood,
Assistant Director; Hamid Ali; Jane Ervin; Robert Malpass;
Enemencio Sanchez; Kimberly Seay; and Cheryl Weissman made key
contributions to this report.
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Highlights of [40]GAO-07-143 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
January 2007
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit
Preparedness and Stated National Priorities
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department of
Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the effects of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or overseas. Moreover,
the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature
and potential requests for military capabilities needed to respond to 15
National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The
Army's chemical units are key players in this mission.
GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and
biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also
tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and
Reserve units--are adequately prepared for this mission. During this
review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators for
78 Army chemical units.
[41]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends actions to address long-standing chemical unit personnel
and equipment shortages; and better enable Army chemical units to perform
wartime and homeland defense missions. DOD generally agreed with two
recommendations and disagreed with those to address unit personnel and
equipment shortages. GAO continues to believe its recommendations have
merit.
Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their
missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current
operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and
abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological
defenses since 2001 and plans to increase funding for this program during
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there is a misalignment between the high
priority DOD states that it places on chemical and biological defense and
the current low level of chemical unit readiness. Most of the Army's
chemical and biological units, particularly in the National Guard and
Reserve, are reporting the lowest readiness ratings--meaning that they are
not considered sufficiently qualified for deployment. This situation
reflects critical personnel shortages, particularly in their key
occupational specialty--chemical operations--and shortages of
mission-critical equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key
personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for their
wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit
readiness problems have historically been attributed to personnel and
equipment shortages, and recently these have been greatly exacerbated by
personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units in support of
current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in
place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel and equipment. Until
the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and decontamination
equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical operations specialists
to deploying units, adequate chemical defense forces may not be available
in the event of a WMD attack at home or abroad.
Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
Homeland Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army
chemical and biological units, especially National Guard and Reserve
units, to concurrently perform both their original warfighting chemical
and biological defense mission and their homeland defense mission is
doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list
contains a limited number of chemical and biological units that must be
ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list,
according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are
intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the
transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to
deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an
adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission because
no criteria have been established to determine how many and which chemical
units are needed. In the event of multiple near-simultaneous WMD attacks
in the United States, additional chemical units would be required--but
most chemical and biological units are already at a low state of readiness
and DOD has not updated doctrine for addressing the new homeland defense
missions.
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Relations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
January 2007
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit
Preparedness and Stated National Priorities
GAO-07-143
References
Visible links
26. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-2C
27. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498
28. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-134
29. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111
30. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-622C
40. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143
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