    Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to
    Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated
    National Priorities (19-JAN-07, GAO-07-143).

    The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the
    Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and
    mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks
    at home or overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed
    the U.S. military to define the nature and potential requests for
    military capabilities needed to respond to 15 National Planning
    Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The Army's
    chemical units are key players in this mission. GAO was asked to
    evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and biological
    units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with
    providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units
    and commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and
    (2) units also tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially
    National Guard and Reserve units--are adequately prepared for
    this mission. During this review, we analyzed readiness data and
    other preparedness indicators for 78 Army chemical units.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-143
        ACCNO:   A64987
      TITLE:     Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are
    Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness
    and Stated National Priorities
         DATE:   01/19/2007
      SUBJECT:   Biological warfare
    	     Chemical warfare
    	     Combat readiness
    	     Decontamination
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Homeland security
    	     Military training
    	     Protective equipment
    	     Weapons of mass destruction
    	     M17 Mask

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-07-143

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background
         * [3]Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equip

              * [4]Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low
              * [5]Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Read

                   * [6]Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels
                   * [7]Army chemical companies have shortages in their key
                     specialt
                   * [8]Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened

              * [9]Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform The

                   * [10]Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key
                     equipment

              * [11]Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering

         * [12]Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defens

              * [13]Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Comp
              * [14]Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Ad

         * [15]Conclusions
         * [16]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [18]GAO Contact
         * [19]Staff Acknowledgments
         * [20]GAO's Mission
         * [21]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [22]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [23]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [24]Congressional Relations
         * [25]Public Affairs

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 5
    Background 7
    Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and
    Trained to Perform Their Missions 16
    Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and
    Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful 31
    Conclusions 35
    Recommendations for Executive Action 36
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44
    Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48

    Figures

    Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component 8
    Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System 9
    Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System 10
    Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System 11
    Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
    System 12
    Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System 13
    Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type 14
    Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
    Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006 20
    Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
    2000 through 2006 22
    Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System 25
    Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System 26
    Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
    Army Units, as of July 2006 27

    Abbreviations

    BIDS Biological Integrated Detection System
    DOD Department of Defense
    CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive
    CERFP CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages
    COTS commercial off-the-shelf
    CST Civil Support Teams
    HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
    NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
    WMD weapons of mass destruction

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    January 19, 2007

    The Honorable Christopher Shays
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations
    Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
    House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Shays:

    The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the United States is likely
    to be faced with adversaries abroad who possess a wide range of asymmetric
    capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons, which challenge
    our military forces' ability to fight and win conflicts overseas.
    Additionally, the United States continues to believe that nuclear,
    biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the
    possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest
    security challenges facing our country.1 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense
    Review report states that DOD must be prepared to respond to and mitigate
    the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas. All of the military
    services-- the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps--plan and execute
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense programs, ranging
    from basic research to procurement and sustainment.

    1 For the purposes of this report, the term weapons of mass destruction
    means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to
    cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people
    through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1) toxic or poisonous
    chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease organism, or (3) radiation or
    radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. S 2302 (1).

    The Army, however, is the only service2 that includes dedicated chemical
    and biological units3 as a standard part of its force structure. The
    Army's chemical units provide the following capabilities: chemical and
    biological detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke
    screening.4 Additionally, certain Reserve component chemical units have
    been given the mission of providing hazardous materials reconnaissance and
    mass casualty decontamination in the event of a WMD attack on the
    homeland. These designated units are rotated annually on the Joint Task
    Force-Civil Support's5 force deployment list. These units' personnel and
    equipment remain with the unit; they are not reassigned to deploying units
    in support of ongoing operations overseas.

    The National Guard is creating a new regionally based force that would
    support the WMD-Civil Support Teams (CST) in the event of a WMD attack on
    the homeland. WMD-CSTs are federally funded, state-controlled National
    Guard units whose mission is to assist civil authorities in the United
    States in responding to incidents involving WMD, including chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons
    and agents. Specifically, the WMD-CSTs are to identify CBRNE agents and
    substances, assess current or projected consequences, and advise civil
    authorities on response measures. They do not perform any decontamination
    functions. Unlike traditional National Guard units, each team is composed
    of 22 members who are on full-time duty.6 The new National Guard regional
    forces, called CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), are
    composed of Army and Air National Guard units who will support local,
    state, and federal agencies in managing the consequences of a CBRNE event
    by providing capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency
    medical services, and casualty search and rescue.7 Existing Army National
    Guard chemical companies will perform the personnel decontamination
    function.

    2 One exception is that the Marine Corps has a Chemical Biological
    Incident Response Force that, when directed, is to deploy and/or respond
    to a credible threat of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
    high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to assist local, state, or
    federal agencies and unified combatant commanders in the conduct of
    consequence management operations. This force accomplishes its mission by
    providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty
    search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care
    and stabilization of contaminated personnel. However, chemical and
    biological defense in the Marine Corps is generally considered an
    additional duty performed by regular marines rather than by specialized
    chemical or biological units. We recently reported that this force had
    some operational challenges. See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense:
    Marine Corps Response Force Has Developed Many Capabilities, but Critical
    Operational Challenges Remain, [26]GAO-05-2C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3,
    2004).

    3 Hereinafter referred to as "chemical units."

    4 Smoke screening is the act of providing large-area obscurant screening
    intended to enhance a commander's ability to conceal and therefore deploy
    and maneuver forces.

    5 The Joint Task Force-Civil Support, part of U.S. Northern Command, will
    provide dedicated domestic CBRNE command and control in support of the
    responsible lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management
    operations.

    All of the services' chemical and biological defense training, except for
    medical courses, is located at the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort
    Leonard Wood, Missouri. The U.S. Army Chemical School Doctrine Division is
    responsible for joint, multiservice, and Army doctrine development for
    operations related to nuclear/biological/chemical contamination avoidance,
    protection, decontamination, and smoke screening.

    The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, as well as other DOD
    publications, have emphasized the need to address the increasing threat
    posed by WMD, including chemical and biological weapons. Toward this end,
    DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since
    2001, and it is increasing funding for its Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent) for the next 5 years
    beginning in fiscal year 2006. The department plans to use these funds
    primarily for improving its research, development, and testing
    infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to improve defenses against
    emerging chemical and biological threats. However, experiences during
    preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed continuing weaknesses in
    the preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or biological
    attack that were identified during the Persian Gulf War. We and DOD's
    Inspector General have published multiple reports addressing continued
    problems in aspects of DOD's chemical and biological defense preparedness.
    While potential opponents have been assessed to be technologically capable
    of sustaining certain levels of chemical and biological warfare, there is
    still disagreement on the specific extent to which this capability has
    actually been developed.

    6 We recently issued a report on these teams' mission and management: GAO,
    Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
    Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, [27]GAO-06-498
    (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006).

    7 The National Guard has already placed 12 certified force packages on the
    ground. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
    increased the Army National Guard end strength and, in the conference
    report, the conferees recommended that this end strength include 5
    additional certified force packages. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687
    (2005).

    At your request, we evaluated the preparedness of Army chemical units.
    Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) units tasked with
    providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
    commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also
    tasked with the homeland defense mission--especially Army National Guard
    and Army Reserve chemical units--are adequately prepared for this mission.

    To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical and
    biological defense support to combat units and commands are adequately
    staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from the office of
    the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army
    Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and
    officials from a nonprobability sample of Army chemical companies. We
    selected companies from each Army component and from each type of chemical
    company. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
    inferences about a population because some elements of the population have
    no chance of being selected. We obtained readiness data from the Army
    Readiness Management System and reviewed readiness reports for all 78
    chemical companies from fiscal years 2000 through 2006. To assess whether
    Army chemical companies are adequately staffed to perform their missions,
    we obtained personnel data from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
    Personnel and compared personnel authorized with personnel on-hand for all
    of the chemical companies and Army-wide. We determined that the readiness
    and personnel data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

    To assess the extent to which active, National Guard, and Reserve Army
    chemical companies have the equipment needed to perform their missions, we
    obtained chemical equipment requirements from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR
    Database, and compared those requirements to what the data indicated that
    the chemical units had on-hand. We also obtained and analyzed data on
    other types of mission-essential items and compared authorizations to what
    the data indicated were on hand in chemical units and Army-wide. The data
    from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database were of undetermined reliability
    because we received them close to our reporting deadline and, therefore,
    were not able to conduct a full reliability assessment. However, we
    corroborated the system data we used with officials from the Office of the
    Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the
    National Guard Bureau, and selected Army chemical units.

    To assess the extent to which units also tasked with the homeland defense
    mission--especially Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units--are
    adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data obtained in the
    first objective, contacted officials from the U.S. Northern Command, and
    obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical units
    to perform chemical and biological homeland defense missions. We also
    discussed this mission with some National Guard and Reserve chemical units
    who had been given this mission. We reviewed and analyzed current and
    planned chemical and biological defense doctrine and discussed the
    applicability of this doctrine to the newly emerging homeland defense
    missions with officials from the U.S. Army Chemical School and U.S. Army
    Reserve Command. We conducted our review from July 2005 through June 2006
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our
    assessments of data reliability, other than that for the U.S. Army
    EQUIPFOR Database, showed that the data we used were sufficiently reliable
    for this report. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology
    is contained in appendix I.

    This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated
    September 29, 2006.8 That report provides additional details on the
    readiness of the Army's chemical units.

    Results in Brief

    Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
    support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their
    missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current
    operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and
    abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological
    defenses since 2001, there is a misalignment between the high priority DOD
    places on chemical and biological defense and the current low level of
    preparedness characterizing Army chemical companies, particularly in the
    National Guard and Reserve. Problems occurring primarily as the result of
    personnel shortages related to current operations are now causing most of
    the Army chemical units expected to perform  these  missions to report low
    readiness ratings--in other words, they are not considered sufficiently
    qualified for deployment.  The low readiness ratings reflect critical
    personnel shortages, particularly in the key occupational
    specialty--chemical operations.  Army chemical unit readiness is also
    being compromised by shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as
    decontamination equipment.  For example, Army chemical units, particularly
    in the National Guard and Reserve, currently lack a substantial portion of
    their authorized light decontamination equipment. Because they lack key
    personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for their
    wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army National Guard and
    Reserve chemical unit readiness problems have historically been attributed
    to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently these have been greatly
    exacerbated by personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units
    in support of current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a
    specific plan in place to resolve long-standing shortages in chemical
    defense personnel and equipment. Until the Army develops a specific plan
    to address personnel and decontamination equipment shortfalls and the
    transfer of chemical operations specialists to deploying units, adequate
    chemical defense forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack
    at home or abroad.

    8 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to
    Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
    Priorities, GAO-06-867C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).

    Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
    Homeland Security Council involve CBRNE response, the ability of Army
    chemical units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to be
    concurrently prepared to perform either their original warfighting
    chemical and biological defense mission or their homeland defense mission
    is doubtful. According to Army Reserve Command officials, no criteria have
    thus far been established for determining how many and which units are
    needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on the
    United States. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data
    list contains a limited number of chemical units that must be ready to
    perform homeland defense missions, this list, according to U.S. Northern
    Command planning documents, is intended to provide only an initial
    response force. The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel and
    equipment from units on this deployment list to deploying units overseas.
    However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of units to
    support the homeland defense mission, because no criteria have been
    established to determine how many and which chemical units are needed.
    Since most chemical units are already at a low state of readiness, their
    ability to respond in the event of a mass casualty WMD attack on the
    United States is doubtful. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events
    at home and abroad, we believe that leaving chemical units in such a low
    state of readiness and dual tasking them will result in an increasing
    operational risk to both the homeland defense and warfighting missions.
    Further, although some Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units are
    currently being trained and equipped to meet both new homeland defense and
    ongoing wartime chemical and biological defense missions, the Army has not
    updated doctrine for addressing these new missions, and Army Chemical
    School officials told us that this doctrine would not be completed until
    at least June 2007. However, it is unclear whether officials will meet
    this date, given the low priority updating the doctrine has received in
    the past.

    We are recommending several actions to align DOD's stated emphasis on
    responding to and mitigating effects from WMD incidents at home and abroad
    with the actual readiness of the Army's chemical units. However, in
    written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with two
    recommendations but disagreed with our recommendations to address
    long-standing chemical unit personnel and equipment shortages.
    Specifically, DOD disagreed with our recommendation to develop a specific
    plan to address chemical unit personnel shortfalls. In general, the
    department stated that we did not fully consider the Army's current
    accession and recruitment plan as a solution to chemical unit personnel
    shortfalls and questioned our method for measuring unit readiness for
    homeland defense missions. As discussed in this report, we did consider
    the recruitment plan and found it has had a limited effect on personnel
    shortfalls, and we used the only available DOD metric because there is no
    other metric available to measure readiness of chemical units. The
    department also disagreed with our recommendation to develop a plan to
    address decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are
    fielded because the department believes these issues are addressed in its
    Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum. In our view, that
    approach does not address many of the issues we highlight in our
    recommendation, such as training and logistics support. We continue to
    believe our recommendations have merit. DOD's comments and our evaluation
    of them are discussed in the agency comments section of this report.

    Background

    The Army Chemical Corps is comprised of brigades, battalions, companies,
    and detachments that perform a variety of chemical and biological defense
    missions. However, the chemical company is the primary operative unit that
    performs the majority of these missions. Of the Army's 78 chemical
    companies, about three-fourths (74 percent) are located in the Army
    National Guard or Army Reserve. Two of these companies are actually
    multicomponent--composed of both active and Reserve platoons--but are
    counted as Reserve companies because their headquarters platoons are part
    of the Army Reserve. Figure 1 illustrates the division of the Army's
    chemical companies between the active, Reserve, and National Guard
    components.

    Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component

    The Army's chemical companies provide the following capabilities:

               1. Biological detection-Biological detection units provide
               monitoring, sampling, detection, and identification of biological
               agents through the use of a detector suite in a Lightweight
               Multipurpose Shelter mounted on a dedicated, high-mobility,
               multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The detector suite is called
               the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS), and hence these
               units are commonly referred to as BIDS units (see fig. 2).

    Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System

               2. Decontamination-Decontamination units perform decontamination
               operations in direct support of either fighting forces or
               operations at fixed sites, such as strategic ports of embarkation
               and debarkation. The decontamination mission is performed using
               primarily either heavy or light decontamination equipment. The M12
               Heavy Decontamination System consists of a pump, tank, and water
               heater mounted on a 5-ton truck, and it performs both equipment
               and terrain decontamination (see fig. 3).

    Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System

    The M17 Light Decontamination System is a portable, lightweight, compact,
    engine-driven pump and water heating system used to perform mostly
    personnel and equipment decontamination (see fig. 4).

    Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System

               3. Reconnaissance-Chemical reconnaissance companies perform
               reconnaissance--that is, they conduct surveillance, monitoring,
               and sampling in hostile territory--often using the lightly
               armored, wheeled FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
               Reconnaissance System (see fig. 5) or a similar system mounted on
               other vehicles such as a HMMWV.

    Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
    System

               4. Smoke screening-Smoke companies use smoke-generating equipment
               (see fig. 6) to provide large-area obscurant screening intended to
               enhance the commander's ability to conceal and thus deploy and
               maneuver forces.

    Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System

    Most of the Army's chemical companies are multifunctional--that is, the
    company may perform a combination of capabilities, such as reconnaissance
    and decontamination; smoke and decontamination; and smoke,
    decontamination, and reconnaissance. Most of the Army's chemical companies
    are smoke/decontamination companies, as shown in figure 7.

    Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type

    In addition to their wartime chemical and biological defense missions,
    certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve chemical units have also been
    given homeland defense missions. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Act of 1996 mandated the enhancement of domestic preparedness
    and response capability for terrorist attacks involving nuclear,
    radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.9 In response to this
    mandate, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an assessment for
    integrating the National Guard and the Army Reserve into ongoing WMD
    domestic preparedness programs. This assessment, led by the Under
    Secretary of the Army, was completed in January 1998. The assessment
    recommended the training of Reserve component chemical companies for
    domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and
    decontamination and specified additional equipment lists to enable the
    needed capabilities. It also required the creation of Military Support
    Detachments, now known as WMD-CSTs. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
    approved this plan in January 1998 and directed its implementation.

    According to an Army official, the fiscal year 1999 Army budget included
    funds for addressing the increased support requirements associated with
    terrorist use of WMD in the United States. Specifically, the support
    requirement included the establishment of 10 WMD-CSTs (later increased to
    55 authorized) to perform identification of CBRNE agents and substances,
    assess current or projected consequences, and advise civil authorities on
    response measures; the establishment of WMD patient decontamination teams
    within existing standard National Guard and Reserve chemical companies;
    and the training and equipping of standard National Guard and Reserve
    units to conduct WMD reconnaissance. A March 1999 U.S. Army Forces Command
    message required the training and equipping of standard National Guard and
    Reserve chemical units to perform NBC reconnaissance and mass casualty
    decontamination. Additionally, in October 2001, the Army Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Operations and Plans directed that U.S. Army Forces Command,
    with support from Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Director of
    Military Support, refine the domestic reconnaissance and casualty
    decontamination mission for standard Army chemical units and develop
    operational requirements documents and training support packages. However,
    by 2005, the Army was still in the process of designing and implementing
    its response to these tasks, and the needed doctrine and training support
    packages had not been completed. This and other problems raised questions
    regarding the readiness of the Army's chemical units to perform their
    assigned missions and led to a 2005 congressional request that we perform
    this review.

    9 Public Law 104-201, S 1411 (1996).

    In response to an initiative from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
    the National Guard is in the process of creating additional regional
    forces to support WMD-CSTs in the event of a WMD attack. According to the
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the mission of the 17 currently
    authorized CERFPs is to support local, state, and federal agencies
    managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to
    conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and
    casualty search and rescue. Army National Guard chemical companies will
    perform the decontamination function of the CERFPs.

    Both Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies perform their
    homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities under the
    direction of the U.S. Northern Command. One of the U.S. Northern Command's
    missions is, when requested by civil authorities and directed by the
    President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide support to civil
    authorities for response and recovery from incidents such as CBRNE events.

    Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and Trained to
    Perform Their Missions

    The vast majority of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in the
    National Guard and Reserve, are currently reporting readiness levels so
    low that their ability to perform their mission is in doubt. Our analysis
    of Army active duty, National Guard, and Reserve chemical unit readiness
    and personnel data determined that most of these units' readiness is
    currently being affected by severe personnel shortages, especially in key
    chemical occupational specialties. They are also experiencing key
    equipment shortages, and both these factors are adversely affecting
    chemical unit training. Under these conditions it is questionable whether
    most of these units would be able to respond effectively to significant
    wartime or terrorist CBRNE events, and the Army appears to lack a specific
    plan for remedying this condition.

    Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low

    As of March 2006, most of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in
    the National Guard and Reserve, were reporting the  two lowest states of
    readiness measured by the Army's Unit Status Reporting System.10 In fact,
    the overall readiness of the Army's chemical companies began to decline
    precipitously from already low levels in early 2004. According to Army
    officials, this decline in readiness was primarily attributable to the
    transfer of resources from chemical units to other types of units
    deploying to support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army
    chemical companies reporting the lowest level of readiness doubled from
    March 2000 to March 2006. Specific details on the readiness ratings and
    readiness trends of the Army's chemical companies are included in the
    classified version of this report.11

    Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Readiness Rates

    Severe personnel shortages created primarily by the transfer of chemical
    unit personnel to other types of units deploying in support of Operations
    Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the primary reason why Army
    chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are
    reporting low readiness levels. Long-standing shortages in key
    occupational specialties are now becoming worse and further exacerbating
    chemical company personnel shortages.

      Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels

    The impact of these shortages on chemical companies is demonstrated by
    comparing the staffing levels authorized with the staffing levels actually
    filled. Army units are designed to perform certain defined missions and
    are authorized a specific number of personnel in order to be able to
    conduct their missions. Active Army chemical units are relatively
    well-staffed in relation to their  authorized levels. However, about 74
    percent of the  Army's chemical companies are located in the National
    Guard and Reserve, and these companies are presently staffed far below
    their authorized levels.

    10 The Unit Status Report is the Army's primary mechanism for measuring
    and reporting a unit's readiness, i.e., the unit's ability to perform its
    wartime mission. The Unit Status Report provides a snapshot of the status
    of the unit's overall readiness (C rating). Unit Status reports are
    submitted monthly by active Army units, and quarterly by Army National
    Guard and Reserve units. The Army measures four areas of readiness:
    personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. There are
    five levels for rating readiness. The highest level, C1, indicates that
    the unit is prepared to undertake its full wartime mission. At C2 the unit
    is able to undertake most of its wartime mission and at C3 the unit is
    able to undertake many, but not all, portions of its wartime mission. C4
    is the lowest level and, at this level, the unit is not prepared and
    requires additional resources or training to conduct its wartime mission.
    In addition, the C5 level indicates that the unit is undergoing an
    Army-directed resource action and is not prepared, at the time of the
    report, to perform its wartime mission.

    11 GAO-06-867C.

    Current operational plans for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
    Freedom have little or no requirement for chemical companies. As a result,
    soldiers from chemical companies are being reassigned to address personnel
    shortages in deploying units. For example, in one state we contacted,
    three Army National Guard chemical companies are currently staffed at
    22-45 percent of their authorized levels due to the transfer of 141
    soldiers to other deploying Army National Guard units, such as military
    police units, from that state. These units were already suffering low fill
    rates before the transfer of soldiers to deploying units. The three
    companies together were authorized 401 soldiers, but only 275 soldiers had
    been assigned--a fill rate of 69 percent. Currently, the only soldiers in
    these three chemical companies who are not deployed are those ineligible
    for deployment because they either (1) have not received the training
    required for deployment or (2) do not meet deployment standards due to
    medical reasons.

    Active Army chemical companies have significantly better personnel fill
    rates than Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies. Overall,
    active Army chemical companies do not need to be supplemented with
    soldiers transferred from other units in order to deploy. However, our
    data show that Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies will
    require extensive personnel increases in order to deploy. According to
    Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the overall fill rates for
    these companies will not improve until Army personnel requirements for
    Operation Iraqi Freedom are significantly reduced. As long as the Army
    National Guard and Reserve are tasked to provide a significant portion of
    the units deployed to Iraq, chemical companies as well as other low demand
    units will be used as a source of soldiers to fill deploying units. In
    addition, these officials stated that concrete plans to bring their
    chemical company fill rates back to pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom levels are
    not currently in place, or being developed, due to the Army's focus on
    supporting current operations.

      Army chemical companies have shortages in their key specialties

    Chemical company personnel fill problems are being exacerbated by
    Army-wide shortages in occupational specialties that are key to chemical
    units. The Army classifies the jobs its soldiers perform as military
    occupational specialties. Army units are comprised of many occupational
    specialties, such as mechanics, supply personnel, and truck drivers. The
    primary specialty in chemical companies is the chemical operations
    specialist. We determined, based on interviews with Army chemical
    officials, that three occupational specialty groups are critical to
    chemical companies in the performance of their missions: chemical
    operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics (that is,
    chemical equipment repairer, wheeled vehicle mechanic, tracked vehicle
    mechanic, and fuel and electrical repairer). These specialties are also
    found in other types of Army units. For example, most combat units have an
    assigned chemical officer or noncommissioned officer to advise their
    commander on chemical and biological defense matters.

    Chemical companies are staffed significantly below their authorized levels
    for chemical operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics, and
    these shortages exist Army-wide. However, as shown in figure 8, these
    shortages are greater for the chemical companies than for the Army as a
    whole.

    Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
    Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006

    Army officials told us that the primary reason for the greater shortage in
    chemical companies is that very few chemical companies are deployed;
    therefore, as the need for deployable personnel has arisen, many of these
    soldiers have been transferred to deploying units.

      Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened

    The Army has historically had difficulty recruiting and retaining the
    primary chemical company occupational specialty, the chemical operations
    specialist, but shortages of this occupational specialty are currently
    worsening despite Army efforts to reverse this trend. Army officials told
    us that staff for the chemical occupational specialty has always been
    difficult to recruit and retain because of the high aptitude scores
    required. In addition, they said that chemical unit training with real and
    simulated agents is limited, chemical unit personnel are often assigned
    nonchemical additional duties, and chemical unit equipment often is also
    used for more mundane tasks. For example, decontamination equipment such
    as the M17 and M12 can also be used for washing vehicles and operating
    showers for troops in the field. Officials also told us that there are
    limited promotion opportunities in the chemical operations career field,
    making it difficult to retain personnel in this specialty.

    The military services have offered enlistment or reenlistment bonuses to
    critical specialties in order to attract and retain personnel in these
    specialties. Although bonuses offered to chemical operations specialists
    led to some improvement in fill rates in the past, this has perpetually
    been one of the Army's underfilled military occupational specialties.12
    Fill rates for chemical operations specialists were on the increase
    between 2000 and 2003. According to Army officials, this increase was due
    to (1) enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for personnel who selected the
    chemical operations specialty as their primary military occupational
    specialty and (2) the efforts of Army recruiters. However, as shown in
    figure 9, the fill rates for this specialty began a steady decline in
    2004, especially in the Army National Guard and Reserve.

    12 See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
    Personnel and Retention Challenges, [28]GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
    17, 2005).

    Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
    2000 through 2006

    According to Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the subsequent
    decline in chemical operations specialist fill rates is directly
    attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, as operations continued in
    Iraq, certain critical, nonchemical specialties were required due to the
    declining security situation. As a result, chemical operations specialists
    were often retrained, reclassified, and assigned to other units, such as
    military police units. Second, the fill rate for chemical operations
    specialists declined because, according to Army officials, this specialty
    is considered by recruits to be less attractive than other military
    occupational specialties. Recruits have historically been drawn to combat
    military occupational specialties, such as infantrymen, and to
    specialties, such as military police and mechanics, which more directly
    correspond to civilian jobs. Furthermore, many recruits want the
    opportunity to serve in Iraq, and they have a much better chance of doing
    so if they enlist as infantrymen or military police.

    In addition, the shortage of chemical operations specialists has worsened
    in part because once transferred, retrained, or reclassified, these
    specialists often opt not to return to chemical units or specialties. For
    example, as discussed earlier, three Army National Guard chemical
    companies in one state lost a significant number of personnel to deploying
    units from that state. Of the 275 soldiers assigned to these three
    companies, 141 soldiers (51 percent) of those assigned were transferred to
    other deploying units. Of the 141 transferred, 129 went to military police
    companies, and most of these soldiers were retrained and reclassified as
    military police. The remaining 12 soldiers were transferred to a support
    battalion that deployed to Kuwait. National Guard officials from this
    state are not expecting many of these soldiers to return to their former
    chemical companies when their military police companies return because,
    according to these officials, these soldiers will have developed new
    camaraderies within their current units and as a result will not transfer
    back to their former chemical companies. Consequently, unless DOD requires
    soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to units requiring
    those specialties, National Guard officials will need to recruit
    additional soldiers into chemical operations specialties in order to
    address personnel shortfalls.

    In one case, an entire Army National Guard chemical company from a
    different state was retrained and reclassified as military police and
    deployed to Germany as a military police company in order to assume the
    mission of an active duty military police company deploying to support the
    global war on terrorism. According to National Guard officials from that
    state, when this unit returns, it will remain a military police company.
    Other chemical companies from this state have lost personnel due to their
    transfer to other deploying units, including military police units. Army
    National Guard officials from this state also told us that increased
    recruitment of chemical operations specialists would be needed to refill
    these units with the required number of personnel.

    Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform Their Missions

    After personnel shortages, the second major reason for Army chemical
    companies' reporting low readiness rates is the shortage of key equipment,
    thus hampering their ability to perform their missions. Army chemical
    doctrine states that chemical units will perform both heavy and light
    decontamination functions. But the heavy and light decontamination
    equipment in use today by Army chemical companies is old and difficult or
    costly to maintain, previous attempts to replace it have failed, and the
    fielding of new replacement equipment is not scheduled to begin until at
    least fiscal year 2009.

    The M12 Heavy Decontamination System and the M17 Light Decontamination
    System are the two primary types of decontamination equipment currently
    found in Army chemical units. The M12 is 35 years old and is scheduled to
    be replaced by a joint system beginning in fiscal year 2012. Army chemical
    company personnel told us that while recently refurbished and adequate to
    perform most functions, the M12 is inadequate to support all of the Army's
    heavy decontamination requirements. This has recently resulted in
    emergency purchases of alternate heavy decontamination equipment from
    commercial sources to meet standard operational requirements. For example,
    during Operation Iraqi Freedom, heavy chemical companies equipped with the
    M12 were tasked with performing fixed-site (such as seaport and airfield)
    decontamination, including spraying decontaminant on buildings or large
    pieces of equipment, if needed. However, according to a Corps chemical
    officer, the M12 cannot effectively reach higher than a one-story building
    or the upper surfaces of large aircraft. As a result, U.S. Central Command
    submitted an Operational Needs Statement requesting a different mobile
    decontamination system to provide the heavy decontamination support needed
    for terrain, large area, and fixed-site decontamination operations.
    Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the same new
    systems for U.S. Army forces in Korea in order to enhance the nuclear,
    biological, and chemical defense preparedness in this theater. These
    requests were approved, and DOD subsequently purchased new commercial
    heavy decontamination equipment--116 Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination
    Systems costing $14.2 million--to meet these requirements (see fig. 10).

    Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System

    Light decontamination companies are assigned the M17 Light Decontamination
    System to perform tactical personnel and equipment decontamination. This
    system is also typically fielded to Army combat units to enable them to
    decontaminate their own personnel and equipment (see fig. 4).

    The M17 is also an old system (20 years old) that has reached the end of
    its service life. This system has been seriously affected by long-standing
    maintenance problems, and it has been difficult for the Army to obtain the
    needed repair parts. The Army consequently implemented a modernization
    program to replace the M17's engine and upgrade the system's hose/wand
    assembly. However, this effort was terminated because its costs were
    greater than those to purchase a new commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
    replacement system, called the Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System
    (see fig. 11).

    Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System

    With the termination of the M17 overhaul program, the decontamination
    system program manager determined that any future lightweight
    decontamination system requirements would be filled by the Karcher
    Multipurpose Decontamination System until the replacement system is
    fielded, currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. As with the
    M12, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, one Army Corps submitted an
    Operational Needs Statement requesting a new, improved light
    decontamination system, due to the mission capability problems of the M17.
    Subsequently, another Army corps, an Army organization in Korea, and the
    Marine Corps all submitted Operational Needs Statements requesting the
    procurement of an alternative to the M17. Consequently, DOD purchased 410
    Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination Systems, costing approximately $8.2
    million, to provide the required light decontamination capability.

    Furthermore, the Army--particularly the National Guard and Reserve--does
    not have sufficient M17s to meet the numbers currently authorized. As
    shown in figure 12, the fill rate of M17s for the Army as a whole is less
    than 52 percent; the fill rates for the National Guard and Reserve are
    about 13 percent and 56 percent, respectively. For the chemical companies
    we reviewed, the fill rate for M17s is about 65 percent, since it is a
    mission-critical piece of equipment, but that is still well below required
    levels. Five Army National Guard chemical companies we visited had never
    received their authorized M17s or Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination
    System substitute equipment, even though these units had been activated in
    2002 and this piece of equipment is a mission-critical item.

    Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
    Army Units, as of July 2006

    Note: These data are of undetermined reliability.

    DOD has long recognized the need to replace its aging decontamination
    systems. However, the Modular Decontamination System, an attempted
    replacement program for both the M12 and M17 begun in 1993, was
    unsuccessful and was officially terminated in 2003. According to an Army
    Chemical School memorandum, this system did not keep up with the emerging
    requirements of the Army's transformation, and the planned replacement
    system continued to be plagued with reliability deficiencies. According to
    officials from the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
    Biological Defense, the M17 and M12 will not be replaced by new, joint
    systems until at least fiscal years 2009 and 2012, respectively. In the
    meantime, the Army will resort to equipping units with commercial systems,
    in limited quantities, as an interim solution. However, the suitability of
    these commercial off-the-shelf systems for serving as interim replacements
    for the M12 and M17 has not been fully determined. For example, as
    commercial-off-the-shelf systems, they have not been ruggedized or tested
    for suitability in a tactical field environment. Since they have not been
    type-classified as standard military equipment, they are not recognized as
    standard issue items or included on chemical unit equipment lists.
    Furthermore, questions remain regarding logistical support issues, such as
    spare parts, maintenance, and training support. It is presently unclear
    how many commercial decontamination systems will be required in the
    interim, how these will be integrated with the new systems planned for
    delivery after fiscal year 2009, or how effectively the Army will be able
    to address its near-term decontamination mission requirements. At the time
    of our review, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
    Biological Defense had identified several options for addressing the
    replacement of M12s and M17s with interim commercial equipment, but no
    decision had yet been reached. After we completed our work on this
    assignment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
    Defense told us that they are now evaluating steps that would ensure that
    the commercial decontamination equipment and existing M12s and M17s will
    be integrated with the new, joint systems currently under development. A
    recommendation in this report on this subject remains, however, since
    these actions have not yet been completed.

      Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key equipment

    A further contributing factor to the chemical companies' readiness problem
    is the Army-wide shortage of other key equipment. The Army chemical
    companies we visited, especially in the National Guard and Reserve,
    reported shortages of other key pieces of equipment that hamper their
    ability to perform their mission. Military units cannot deploy without
    other mission-critical equipment, including chemical monitors, weapon
    night-vision sights, and radio sets. Since these items are in short supply
    across the Army, nondeploying units have transferred them to deploying
    units to support current operations. We previously reported on the extent
    of this problem in the National Guard and concluded that growing equipment
    shortages resulting from the need to fully equip deploying units (1) make
    it unclear whether units will be able to maintain acceptable levels of
    equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home and (2) hamper the
    ability of nondeployed forces to train for future missions.13

    Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering

    Personnel and equipment shortages, as well as other priority requirements,
    have had an adverse impact on some chemical companies' ability to train
    collectively for their wartime chemical defense mission. Chemical
    companies are required to train for the tasks on their Mission Essential
    Task Lists14 as well as complete other priority training as designated by
    their headquarters. For example, due to the high pace of current
    operations, all Army soldiers are required to train on "warrior skills,"
    the individual skills in which all soldiers need to be proficient if
    deployed.

    Transferring soldiers from nondeploying units to deploying units to
    support current operations has had a negative impact on chemical
    companies' ability to train for their chemical mission-essential tasks.
    For example, two Army National Guard chemical companies that we visited
    have been unable to conduct unit-level training because of the requirement
    to transfer soldiers to other deploying National Guard units from that
    state. Further, another National Guard chemical company we visited told us
    they were unable to train for their mission-essential tasks due to the
    transfer of 44 soldiers to a deploying unit.

    We visited four active-duty chemical companies at one Army installation
    that had not been able to train together as a unit for their chemical and
    biological defense mission because they were being used as trainers for
    other Army units that were deploying from that installation for Operation
    Iraqi Freedom. This training consisted of tasks such as convoy operations,
    individual readiness training, and live-fire training. One unit also
    operated the equipment movement site, where deploying units' equipment was
    located prior to being shipped to the port of debarkation. Performing
    these missions was a full-time responsibility, and as a result, these
    companies told us they had not trained for their mission-essential tasks
    since June 2005. However, as of April 2006, three of the four units had
    recently resumed unit-level training for their chemical and biological
    missions. The fourth unit still had not been able to train due to
    personnel shortages. This unit had only about 50 percent of its authorized
    personnel, and as a result the unit was unable to train for its
    mission-essential tasks. This unit's headquarters battalion transferred
    the company's soldiers to other active-duty chemical companies so that
    those units, which were also short of personnel due to the transfer of
    personnel to deploying units, were able to conduct their unit-level
    mission training.

    13 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
    Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
    Transformation Initiatives, [29]GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
    2005).

    14 The Mission Essential Task List is a statement of the tasks a unit is
    required to accomplish in order to perform its wartime missions. For
    example, tasks on a biological detection company's task list include
    conducting mobilization and deployment operations, biological surveillance
    operations, and force protection/antiterrorism operations.

    Equipment shortages have similarly adversely affected chemical companies'
    ability to train for their mission-essential tasks. For example, three
    Army National Guard chemical companies we contacted from one state have a
    chemical decontamination mission, but only two of them had received any
    decontamination equipment; in this case, they received only 4 of the 54
    decontamination systems authorized. As a result, these three companies,
    activated in September 2003, have never had the opportunity to conduct
    unit-level decontamination training. Additionally, five Army National
    Guard chemical companies we visited from another state have similar
    equipment shortages that impede their ability to train for their mission.
    All these chemical companies have a chemical decontamination mission, but
    none have been issued M17 light decontamination systems. To improvise, one
    company conducted annual training using M12 heavy decontamination systems
    and commercial sprayers. But since these substitute decontamination
    systems are markedly different from the authorized light decontamination
    system in performance and application, company personnel told us that the
    training experience was not nearly as effective as it would have been if
    conducted with the authorized decontamination systems.

    Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and Warfighting
    Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful

    Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units' ability to perform not
    only their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission
    but also their homeland defense mission is doubtful. DOD is currently
    tasked with planning how the U.S. military will support the response to
    the Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios, 12 of which
    involve a CBRNE response. Selected National Guard and Reserve chemical
    units are being trained and equipped for homeland defense missions, and a
    limited number of active duty and Reserve units have been placed on the
    Joint Task Force-Civil Support's deployment list to be prepared to respond
    to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, near-simultaneous mass
    casualty attacks on the United States. The Army is prohibiting the
    transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to
    units that are deploying overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is
    an adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission
    because no criteria have been established to determine how many and which
    chemical units are needed. Further, the poor readiness of these units, as
    described above, and inadequate doctrine to guide these units in the
    procedures needed for operating in the homeland defense environment, may
    compromise their ability to perform these missions.

    Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Compromise Unit
    Preparedness for Homeland Defense Missions

    DOD's strategy for homeland defense and civil support calls for its
    warfighting forces to be trained and equipped for domestic CBRNE
    consequence management to support its interagency partners in responding
    to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, simultaneous mass
    casualty attacks within the United States, in addition to their
    warfighting chemical and biological defense missions.15 The standing
    consequence management execute order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff specifically directs the U.S. Northern Command to be prepared to
    execute multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE consequence management
    operations for up to three incidents within the U.S. Northern Command area
    of responsibility. Moreover, in the spring of 2006, the Secretary of
    Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential
    requests for DOD capabilities needed to support its response to 15
    National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council.16
    Twelve of these scenarios involve a CBRNE response, and 6 involve a
    specifically chemical or biological response. Army National Guard and
    Reserve chemical companies have been given the hazardous materials
    reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination portions of the homeland
    defense mission. However, according to Army Reserve Command officials, no
    criteria have thus far been established for determining how many and which
    units are needed to perform this mission. Without such criteria, it is
    uncertain whether adequate chemical units will be available to respond to
    near-simultaneous mass casualty attacks on the United States.

    15 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
    (Washington, D.C.: June 2005).

    16 Department of Defense, Strategic Planning Guidance Fiscal Years
    2008-2013 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).

    In fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Army Reserve Command began training and
    equipping selected standard chemical units for domestic reconnaissance and
    mass casualty decontamination missions. As of April 2006, 12 platoons in 4
    companies had been trained and equipped for hazardous materials
    reconnaissance. Additionally, 178 additional Army Reserve chemical
    soldiers have been trained for hazardous materials reconnaissance, for a
    total of 430 trained and certified hazardous materials technicians.
    Further, 75 platoons in 25 companies have been trained and equipped for
    mass casualty decontamination, and about 3,500 Army Reserve chemical and
    medical soldiers have been trained to perform mass casualty
    decontamination operations. The National Guard has designated certain
    standard chemical companies to provide the personnel decontamination
    function for the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP). These
    companies are also expected to continue to maintain the skills necessary
    to perform their wartime mission. Consequently, the Army must ensure that
    the chemical units tasked with performing homeland defense missions are
    ready to perform them, along with their warfighting missions. However, the
    Unit Status Report is designed only to address unit readiness for major
    combat operations. DOD currently does not have readiness measures designed
    to assess unit readiness to conduct domestic missions. We previously
    reported, though, that traditional readiness measures are likely adequate
    for some types of units to determine their preparedness to successfully
    conduct their domestic missions.17 As of July 2006, five National Guard
    decontamination companies, about 375 personnel, had been trained and
    equipped to provide personnel decontamination as part of their homeland
    defense mission. The National Guard Bureau plans to train and equip an
    additional five decontamination companies during the remainder of fiscal
    year 2006.

    17 GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern
    Command's Mission, but Challenges Remain, [30]GAO-04-622C (Washington,
    D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004).

    The Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains certain
    chemical units that must be ready to perform CBRNE consequence management
    operations in support of civil authorities. Specifically, one Reserve
    chemical company, two active duty platoons, and two Reserve platoons are
    currently on this deployment list. As such, the Army is not allowing the
    reassignment of personnel or equipment from these units to units deploying
    in support of current operations. To provide additional surge capacity,
    Army Reserve Command officials have unofficially designated two additional
    companies as exempt from the reassignment of personnel and equipment to
    support ongoing operations. The force structure identified is strictly an
    initial response capability; additional forces will be required and will
    have to be requested using established request-for-forces processes.
    However, other Reserve chemical companies with a homeland defense mission
    that are not currently on the deployment list have lost personnel due to
    transfers to deploying units. Unless DOD prohibits the transfers of
    personnel from all chemical units with homeland defense missions into
    units supporting other operations, there may not be sufficient Reserve
    chemical units available to provide surge capacity if needed.

    Since many chemical units are already stressed due to their support of
    ongoing operations and are reporting low readiness levels, it is unclear
    whether they would be ready to support consequence management operations
    in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack in the United States. We have
    previously reported that although DOD has met the Northern Command
    requirements for forces to be made available should a CBRNE event occur,
    DOD acknowledges that it has become increasingly difficult to meet all
    expected requirements because of the high pace of operations, which may
    include the forces that would be requested or directed to support civil
    authorities for CBRNE events.18 Additionally, we reported that Northern
    Command officials are particularly concerned about a domestic CBRNE attack
    and have asked for forces to be dedicated to this mission. We also
    reported that DOD still plans to continue with its present practice of
    trying to balance the competing demands of the various combatant
    commanders and the use of dual-purpose units to accomplish CBRNE missions
    both at home and abroad. Further, the Quadrennial Defense Review states
    that military forces are also to be prepared for conducting a "long war"
    in the future. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and
    abroad, we continue to believe there is operational risk to both the
    homeland defense and the warfighting missions in not only leaving chemical
    units in such a low state of readiness but also dual tasking them.

    18 GAO-04-622C .

    Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Adequately Reflect
    Homeland Defense Missions

    The Army published doctrine in December 200119 on nuclear, biological, and
    chemical consequence management that mentions the reconnaissance and mass
    casualty decontamination capabilities of the National Guard and Army
    Reserve. According to an Army Reserve Command senior official, however,
    this doctrine was published in the early stages of developing the Army
    Reserve's CBRNE domestic response capabilities, and consequently this
    doctrine is now out of date. In the past 3 years, the Army Reserve has
    made progress in this area, having completely revised and improved the
    tactics, techniques, and procedures for these missions. For example, in
    2001, it took approximately 1- 1/2 hours for a single mass casualty
    decontamination line to be set up and become operational. By the summer of
    2005, Army Reserve soldiers were able to perform the same operation with
    the latest procedures and equipment in an average of 20 minutes.

    However, the Army Chemical School has not updated the doctrine needed for
    addressing these homeland defense missions. A 2001 memorandum from the
    Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans specifically states
    that Army chemical units have a mission to provide nuclear, biological,
    and chemical reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination in support
    of domestic emergencies involving WMD. The memorandum goes on to list
    several other defense directives and publications that identify this
    mission. Further, it specifically directs Army Forces Command, along with
    Training and Doctrine Command and the Director of Military Support, to
    refine the homeland defense mission and develop operational requirements
    documents and training support packages. However, according to an official
    from the Army Chemical School's homeland security office and documents
    provided by the school, DOD has not been told what military capabilities
    are required to support civil authorities in the event of a terrorist
    attack involving WMD, making it more difficult to write doctrine. In
    addition, the Army did not provide funding for the school to update its
    doctrine or provide training for the Reserve component homeland defense
    missions until fiscal year 2006. Since the Army did not consider these
    missions to be warfighting missions, it gave them a low priority for
    funding, even though DOD considers defending against a chemical and
    biological attack to be a national priority. Once the funding was
    received, the Army Chemical School began exploring options to revise
    current doctrine to include comprehensive tactics, techniques, and
    procedures on the hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty
    decontamination homeland defense missions. The school finalized its plan
    to update its doctrine in March 2006.

    19 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.21: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
    Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence
    Management (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo: Dec. 2001).

    Army Chemical School officials told us that it typically takes 24-36
    months to update doctrine to incorporate a new mission, but they are
    accelerating this process and plan to complete revised doctrine, to
    include the homeland defense missions, by June 2007. The chemical
    companies we visited with homeland defense missions told us that they need
    updated doctrine to provide guidance on how to operate effectively in the
    unique homeland defense environment because of differences between
    homeland defense and tactical wartime missions. Further, the new equipment
    that has been fielded to these units is nonstandard equipment and,
    therefore, the chemical companies lack guidance on how to properly
    integrate it with their standard wartime military equipment. As a result,
    without doctrine to guide their efforts, Army National Guard and Reserve
    chemical companies cannot ensure that they are meeting DOD needs,
    prioritizing their training requirements appropriately, and properly
    integrating new equipment with existing items.

    Conclusions

    The readiness of Army chemical units--particularly in the National Guard
    and Reserve--is so low that it is doubtful whether most of these units can
    now perform their missions. The absence of a plan to address the personnel
    and equipment shortfalls that are primarily responsible for these
    readiness problems makes it unclear whether and when these problems will
    be corrected. Consequently, we believe there is a misalignment between
    DOD's stated national priorities, especially the Secretary of Defense's
    requirement for military forces to be able to respond to the Homeland
    Security Council's 12 National Planning Scenarios requiring a CBRNE
    response, and the current readiness of Army chemical units. Moreover, it
    is unclear whether Army chemical units affected by low readiness, but
    tasked with both wartime and homeland defense chemical and biological
    missions, can perform both effectively, especially given the lack of
    criteria to determine how many and which units are needed to support civil
    authorities in the event of multiple, near-simultaneous attacks on the
    United States. Even though DOD considers responding to and mitigating the
    effects of WMD attacks on the United States to be a national priority, the
    Army did not consider funding the completion of doctrine for the Reserve
    component homeland defense mission to be a priority. Consequently, the
    U.S. Army Chemical School has not yet updated the doctrine needed for
    performing homeland defense missions, leaving chemical units assigned
    these missions with only limited guidance on how to accomplish them.
    Unless DOD takes the steps needed to address long-standing gaps in
    chemical unit readiness and doctrine, we question whether these units will
    be able to perform either their warfighting or homeland defense missions
    effectively.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To align DOD's stated emphasis on responding to and mitigating the effects
    from WMD incidents at home and abroad with the readiness of Army chemical
    units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
    the Army to take the following actions:

               o Develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical
               unit personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing
               operations, particularly for chemical operations specialists.

               o This plan should specifically address and discuss options such
               as

                            o the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer
                            of personnel from chemical units with homeland
                            defense missions into units supporting other
                            operations;
                            o requiring soldiers in chemical occupational
                            specialties to return to assignments requiring that
                            specialty after deployments, as long as shortages
                            continue in that specialty;
                            o other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these
                            personnel; and
                            o the risks associated with not taking such steps.

               o Determine how many and which active, National Guard, and Army
               Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense
               missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous
               CBRNE attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure
               that for these units, the homeland defense mission is given
               priority over other missions.

               o Develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination
               equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning
               in fiscal year 2009. This plan should determine

                            o the total number of systems needed during the
                            interim period, by type of system (M12, M17, Karcher,
                            or Falcon) to maintain the needed decontamination
                            capability;
                            o how the interim systems will be integrated with
                            retained M12 and M17 systems;
                            o how training and logistical support for the interim
                            systems will be addressed; and
                            o whether the interim systems should be
                            type-classified and standardized as official military
                            equipment with a national stock number, and added to
                            units' official equipment lists.

               o Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological
               defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions.

    			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

               In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with
               our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop
               a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit
               personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing
               operations, particularly for chemical operations specialists, and
               cited several reasons as a basis for their position. First, DOD
               stated that we are discounting the Army's accession and
               recruitment plan, which strives for 100 percent fill of all units.
               We acknowledge that the Army does have an agencywide accession and
               recruitment plan, and the goal is 100 percent fill of all units.
               However, as we discuss in this report, that plan by itself has not
               been fully successful and has had little positive long-term impact
               on chemical unit personnel shortages. Specifically, while the
               recruitment and retention bonuses--which are a part of the Army's
               plan--were helping to alleviate chemical operations specialist
               shortages to some extent, the transfer of chemical unit personnel
               to other deploying units for Operation Iraqi Freedom negated those
               gains. Second, DOD disagreed with our use of the Unit Status
               Report to gauge the readiness of the chemical forces to support a
               homeland defense mission. In their comments, the department points
               out that the Unit Status Report is designed to evaluate an
               organization's ability to support wartime missions, not a homeland
               defense mission, and that the Army is developing improved
               readiness metrics in support of evolving DOD and Joint Staff
               reporting requirements, which will include the readiness for
               contingency operations such as homeland defense missions. We agree
               that the Unit Status Report is designed to address readiness for
               major combat operations. However, DOD also acknowledges there is
               no other metric currently available to measure readiness for
               homeland defense missions. DOD also stated that some unit
               personnel who are not available for a major combat operations
               deployment are available for a homeland defense mission. Our
               analysis shows that chemical unit personnel shortages are severe
               and primarily a result of personnel transfers to deploying units;
               therefore, DOD's statement that unit personnel could be available
               for a homeland defense mission is in our opinion, invalid. Because
               of the severe personnel shortages in most chemical units, we
               continue to believe our recommendation has merit and is an
               important step that should be taken by the Army.

               DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the
               Secretary of the Army to determine how many and which active,
               National Guard, and Army Reserve chemical units will be needed to
               perform homeland defense missions, including responding to
               multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on the United States,
               and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units, the homeland
               defense mission is given priority over other missions. DOD agreed
               that the capability requirements for homeland defense, including
               the number and type of chemical units, must be identified in the
               context of an interagency, DOD, and Army assessment process. DOD
               further states that the Chief of Staff of the Army has identified
               improvement of homeland defense as a focus area with the intent of
               identifying Army contributions to homeland defense as well as gaps
               and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved to
               support the joint force. However, DOD then stated that, with some
               exceptions, the Army generally does not develop force structure to
               identify specific units for specific missions beyond those
               supporting the Joint Task Force-Civil Support because such
               designation limits the pool of units that can be deployed for
               overseas requirements, greatly increasing the burden on the
               deployable units. While we believe the above DOD actions are good
               first steps, we do not believe DOD's comments address the overall
               intent of our recommendation, which was to ensure DOD identified
               all forces needed to respond to homeland defense missions and
               develop a plan to ensure that these forces are available and ready
               for those missions. Specifically, as we highlight in this report,
               the units designated to support the Joint Task Force-Civil Support
               are only intended to be an initial response capability, and
               additional forces would be required to support multiple,
               near-simultaneous attacks on the homeland. The low readiness
               levels of units not associated with the Joint Task Force, combined
               with the potential deployment of personnel from other units in
               support of overseas operations, could inhibit DOD's ability to
               provide the planned surge capacity needed for supporting DOD's
               execute order on multiple, near- simultaneous homeland defense
               missions. DOD's response does not indicate how, or to what extent,
               this homeland defense requirement will be prioritized compared
               with other missions, and our recommendation to do this is both
               valid and important to accomplish. Without a clear set of
               priorities for chemical unit response capabilities, DOD increases
               the risk that it may not be able to provide the forces required to
               respond to its own stated homeland defense requirements.

               DOD disagreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
               the Army to develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's
               decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are
               fielded. DOD stated that while the equipment information contained
               in the report is generally correct as of the time the information
               was collected, our recommendation does not accurately depict the
               current situation. Since a draft of this report was provided to
               DOD for comment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
               and Biological Defense developed a plan that addresses replacement
               and future fielding of decontamination equipment and this plan was
               funded in the Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum.
               Although we have not analyzed this plan in-depth, it appears to be
               a good first step in meeting the Army's decontamination needs as
               long as the procurement and fielding of replacement systems stays
               on track. However, in its comments, DOD did not discuss whether
               its plan will address the specifics of our recommendation,
               including how training and logistics support for the interim
               systems will be addressed and whether the interim systems should
               be type-classified and standardized as official military equipment
               with a national stock number and added to units' official
               equipment lists. We maintain that these steps are necessary so
               that appropriate training and logistical support will be available
               and accountability over these interim systems can be maintained.

               DOD agreed with our recommendation to set a definitive deadline
               for completing chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect
               new homeland defense missions. Although DOD agreed that updated
               chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland
               defense missions is a high priority, they did not set a deadline
               because they believe any deadline must account for the impact on
               other high-priority doctrine development projects, particularly
               those supporting ongoing combat operations. We continue to believe
               that without a deadline, development of this doctrine will be
               uncertain, leaving chemical units without much-needed doctrine to
               address the unique requirements associated with their homeland
               defense missions.

               DOD's comments are included in appendix II. DOD also provided
               technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as
               appropriate.

               As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
               contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
               until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send
               copies to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. If you have any
               questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
               or dagostinod@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of
               Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
               last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
               this report are listed in appendix III.

               Sincerely yours,

               Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
    			  Defense Capabilities and Management

    			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

               To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing
               chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
               commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met
               with officials from the office of the U.S Army Deputy Chief of
               Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, National
               Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to define the
               population of Army chemical units. Using the information provided,
               we determined that in fiscal year 2006, the Army had 78 chemical
               companies tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
               support to combat units and commands. We did not include command
               and control units (brigades and battalions) and units smaller than
               companies, such as detachments, in our population since the actual
               chemical and biological defense mission is largely performed at
               the company level.

               To determine the overall readiness levels of Army chemical
               companies in our population and reasons why units were reporting
               low readiness rates, we obtained and analyzed data from the Army
               Readiness Management System for fiscal years 2000 through 2006. We
               determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our
               purposes by comparing the system data with the readiness data
               reports submitted by the companies we visited (see below). We also
               reviewed reliability assessments conducted by other GAO teams. To
               further assess the preparedness of Army chemical companies to
               perform their missions, we visited five active duty Army chemical
               companies located at Fort Hood, Texas; five Army National Guard
               chemical companies in Alabama and Texas; and five Army Reserve
               chemical companies in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. We selected
               units to visit from each Army component--active, National Guard,
               and Reserve--and from each type of chemical unit--biological
               detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening.
               We discussed personnel fill rates, the adequacy of decontamination
               equipment, fill rates for mission-essential equipment items, and
               training issues with officials from each of these companies. We
               also discussed chemical company mission preparedness with
               officials from the Kentucky Army National Guard, and the Army
               Reserve's 81st and 90th Regional Readiness Commands.

               To assess whether Army chemical companies are adequately staffed
               to perform their missions, we obtained and analyzed data provided
               by officials from the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
               Personnel. This office provided us with personnel data for the
               entire Army, which includes our universe of 78 chemical companies.
               It included authorized and assigned soldiers segregated by grade
               and military occupational specialty as of February 2006. To assess
               the reliability of the personnel data, we reviewed data
               reliability assessments prepared on the same data system by
               another GAO team and performed electronic testing of the data. We
               also corroborated system data with officials at selected sites and
               interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined
               that the personnel data we used were sufficiently reliable for our
               reporting purposes.

               To determine the extent to which the Army chemical companies have
               the equipment needed to perform their mission, we obtained and
               analyzed data as of July 2006 from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR
               Database. We determined the equipment fill rates by comparing the
               equipment authorized to the equipment on-hand of selected chemical
               and other mission-essential equipment for the 78 chemical
               companies and compared this with overall Army equipment fill
               rates. Because we received the Army EQUIPFOR Database data close
               to our reporting deadline, we were not able to conduct a full
               reliability assessment. Consequently, these data are of
               undetermined reliability. However, as noted above, we used the
               Army EQUIPFOR Database as only one source of information for
               findings about equipment readiness. In addition, we corroborated
               system data with officials at the Office of the Army Deputy Chief
               of Staff for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, National Guard
               Bureau, and selected Army chemical units. We also discussed
               decontamination equipment issues with officials at the chemical
               units we visited and with officials from the office of the Army
               Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs; the Office of the Assistant
               Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology;
               and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
               Defense.

               To determine the extent to which units with the additional
               homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve
               chemical units--are adequately prepared for this mission, we used
               the data collected in the first objective, contacted officials
               from U.S. Northern Command, and obtained planning documents that
               describe the use of Army chemical units to perform chemical and
               biological decontamination and reconnaissance functions for
               homeland defense. We discussed these missions with officials from
               the Army Reserve Command and National Guard Bureau. We also
               reviewed and analyzed current chemical and biological defense
               doctrine and discussed the applicability of this doctrine to the
               newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials from the
               Army Chemical School and Army Reserve Command. We also discussed
               the chemical and biological homeland defense doctrine that is
               being developed with Army Chemical School officials and discussed
               homeland defense doctrine needs with officials from the chemical
               companies we visited that had been assigned homeland defense
               missions.

               We performed our work from July 2005 through June 2006 in
               accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    			  Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

    			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    			  GAO Contact

               Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431

    			  Staff Acknowledgments

    			  In addition to the contact named above, William W. Cawood,
               Assistant Director; Hamid Ali; Jane Ervin; Robert Malpass;
               Enemencio Sanchez; Kimberly Seay; and Cheryl Weissman made key
               contributions to this report.

    			  GAO�s Mission

               The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
               investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
               meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
               the performance and accountability of the federal government for
               the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
               evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
               recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
               informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
               commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
               accountability, integrity, and reliability.

    			  Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

               The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
               no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each
               weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
               correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of
               newly posted products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
               select "Subscribe to Updates."

    			  Order by Mail or Phone

               The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
               are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
               Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
               Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
               discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

               U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
               Washington, D.C. 20548

               To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
               (202) 512-6061

    			  To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

               Contact:

               Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
               fraudnet@gao.gov Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
               (202) 512-7470

    			  Congressional Relations

               Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202)
               512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7125 Washington, D.C. 20548

    			  Public Affairs

               Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202)
               512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

    (350894)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143 .

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above.

    For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
    dagostinod@gao.gov.

    Highlights of [40]GAO-07-143 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
    Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, Committee
    on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

    January 2007

    CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

    Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit
    Preparedness and Stated National Priorities

    The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department of
    Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the effects of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or overseas. Moreover,
    the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature
    and potential requests for military capabilities needed to respond to 15
    National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The
    Army's chemical units are key players in this mission.

    GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and
    biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with
    providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
    commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also
    tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and
    Reserve units--are adequately prepared for this mission. During this
    review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators for
    78 Army chemical units.

    [41]What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends actions to address long-standing chemical unit personnel
    and equipment shortages; and better enable Army chemical units to perform
    wartime and homeland defense missions. DOD generally agreed with two
    recommendations and disagreed with those to address unit personnel and
    equipment shortages. GAO continues to believe its recommendations have
    merit.

    Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
    support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their
    missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current
    operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and
    abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological
    defenses since 2001 and plans to increase funding for this program during
    fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there is a misalignment between the high
    priority DOD states that it places on chemical and biological defense and
    the current low level of chemical unit readiness.  Most of the Army's
    chemical and biological units, particularly in the National Guard and
    Reserve, are reporting the lowest readiness ratings--meaning that they are
    not considered sufficiently qualified for deployment. This situation
    reflects critical personnel shortages, particularly in their key
    occupational specialty--chemical operations--and shortages of
    mission-critical equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key
    personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for their
    wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit
    readiness problems have historically been attributed to personnel and
    equipment shortages, and recently these have been greatly exacerbated by
    personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units in support of
    current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in
    place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel and equipment. Until
    the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and decontamination
    equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical operations specialists
    to deploying units, adequate chemical defense forces may not be available
    in the event of a WMD attack at home or abroad.

    Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
    Homeland Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army
    chemical and biological units, especially National Guard and Reserve
    units, to concurrently perform both their original warfighting chemical
    and biological defense mission and their homeland defense mission is
    doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list
    contains a limited number of chemical and biological units that must be
    ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list,
    according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are
    intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the
    transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to
    deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an
    adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission because
    no criteria have been established to determine how many and which chemical
    units are needed. In the event of multiple near-simultaneous WMD attacks
    in the United States, additional chemical units would be required--but
    most chemical and biological units are already at a low state of readiness
    and DOD has not updated doctrine for addressing the new homeland defense
    missions.

    Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security
    and International Relations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
    House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    January 2007

    CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

    Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit
    Preparedness and Stated National Priorities

    GAO-07-143

    References

    Visible links
      26. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-2C
      27. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498
      28. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-134
      29. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111
      30. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-622C
      40. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143
    *** End of document. ***