Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations
(19-JAN-07, GAO-07-139).
Much of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) funding
is provided in supplemental appropriations when a disaster is
declared, but funds to staff, manage, and operate other FEMA
programs and underlying support functions--what GAO refers to as
its day-to-day operations--compete with other Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and federal priorities for limited
resources. In this environment, FEMA must strategically plan for
and manage its day-to-day operations to ensure they efficiently
and effectively support the agency's disaster relief mission. To
analyze this issue, GAO examined resource trends and management
related to FEMA's day-to-day operations from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2005.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-139
ACCNO: A64989
TITLE: Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and
Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations
DATE: 01/19/2007
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Budget outlays
Budgeting
Budgets
Emergency preparedness
Federal agency reorganization
Financial analysis
Human capital management
Staff utilization
Strategic planning
Natural disasters
Disaster recovery
Disaster planning
Disaster relief aid
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GAO-07-139
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Organizational Changes Created Uncertainty about the Availab
* [4]FEMA's Responsibilities Were in Flux, Which Created Uncertai
* [5]Resource Trends for FEMA's Day-to-Day Operations from Fiscal
* [6]FEMA's Lack of Strategic Management Tools Compounded Problem
* [7]FEMA Lacks a Strategic Workforce Plan
* [8]FEMA Has Not Engaged in Succession Planning
* [9]FEMA Does Not Have a Coordinated or Strategic Approach to Em
* [10]FEMA Does Not Have Business Continuity Plans for Its Day-to-
* [11]Conclusions
* [12]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [13]Agency Comments
* [14]GAO Contact
* [15]Acknowledgments
* [16]GAO's Mission
* [17]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [18]Order by Mail or Phone
* [19]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [20]Congressional Relations
* [21]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
January 2007
BUDGET ISSUES
FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage
Resources for Day-to-Day Operations
GAO-07-139
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 5
Organizational Changes Created Uncertainty about the Availability of
Resources, but FEMA Lacked Adequate Data to Understand the Effect on
Day-to-Day Operations 8
FEMA's Lack of Strategic Management Tools Compounded Problems It Faced in
Coping with Shifting Resources 18
Conclusions 23
Recommendations for Executive Action 24
Agency Comments 25
Appendix I Analysis of Resources for Day-to-Day Operations 27
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33
Tables
Table 1: Summary of FEMA's Regular and Supplemental Appropriations for
Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 6
Table 2: FEMA Organizational Changes, Fiscal Years 2001-2003 8
Table 3: Illustration of Three Entities' Share of DHS FTEs, Funding, and
Assessments for the DHS WCF for Fiscal Year 2005 13
Figures
Figure 1: Programs and Associated Funding That Moved into and out of FEMA
from March 1, 2003 through Fiscal Year 2005 (in Millions of Dollars) 10
Figure 2: Trends in Annual Funding for FEMA's Non-DRF Operations, Fiscal
Years 2001-2005 28
Figure 3: Trends in FTEs for FEMA's Non-DRF Operations, Fiscal Years
2001-2005 29
Figure 4: Estimate of Funding for FEMA's Day-to-Day Operations, Fiscal
Years 2001-2005 31
Figure 5: Estimate of Actual FTEs for FEMA's Day-to-Day Operations, Fiscal
Years 2001-2005 32
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Abbreviations
CORE Cadre of On-call Response/Recovery Employees
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DRF Disaster Relief Fund
DSA Disaster Support Activity
EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FTE full-time equivalent
MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System
ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ONP Office of National Preparedness
PFT permanent full-time
SES Senior Executive Service
WCF Working Capital Fund
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
January 19, 2007
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable David R. Obey
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to lead
the nation in mitigating, responding to, and recovering from major
domestic disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist
incidents. Budgeting for FEMA's mission is inherently difficult because
the number, severity, and timing of disasters are unknown. In recognition
of this fact, a large portion of FEMA's funding is provided in emergency
supplemental appropriations when a disaster is declared, and Congress has
provided FEMA with the authority to hire additional nonpermanent staff and
to leverage support from other agencies quickly. In contrast, funds to
staff, manage, and operate other FEMA programs and underlying support
functions--which we refer to in this report as its day-to-day
operations--are requested in the President's annual budget and, therefore,
compete with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and federal The
mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to lead the
nation in mitigating, responding to, and recovering from major domestic
disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist incidents.
Budgeting for FEMA's mission is inherently difficult because the number,
severity, and timing of disasters are unknown. In recognition of this
fact, a large portion of FEMA's funding is provided in emergency
supplemental appropriations when a disaster is declared, and Congress has
provided FEMA with the authority to hire additional nonpermanent staff and
to leverage support from other agencies quickly. In contrast, funds to
staff, manage, and operate other FEMA programs and underlying support
functions--which we refer to in this report as its day-to-day
operations--are requested in the President's annual budget and, therefore,
compete with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and federal
priorities for resources.^1 Although there are obvious reasons to
distinguish between funding for disasters and for day-to-day operations,
it is important to recognize that day-to-day operations affect FEMA's
ability to deal effectively and as efficiently as possible with disasters.
In this report we examined resources related to FEMA's day-to-day
operations from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005 and asked the
following:
1. What were resource trends for FEMA's day-to-day operations?
2. How did FEMA manage its resources for day-to-day operations?
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed fiscal years 2001 to
2005 budgetary and personnel data from the President's budget, FEMA
operating plans, FEMA and DHS budget documents, and budget and full-time
equivalent (FTE) employee summary tables provided by FEMA. To assess its
reliability, we compared FEMA's budget and personnel data with data in the
President's budget. However, to make information comparable for the
President's fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) restructured fiscal years 2002 and 2003 budget data to
reflect changes that occurred with the creation of DHS in 2003. Because
our review called for a more detailed presentation than what was available
in the President's budget, we relied on FEMA's data. In addition, we
analyzed personnel and training information and reviewed FEMA's workforce
planning contract. We determined that FEMA's budgetary and personnel data
were sufficiently reliable for purposes of providing background
information and showing general trends. We interviewed staff in FEMA's
Office of Budget, officials from the Offices of Plans and Programs,
Training, and Procurement, as well as program managers and staff from the
Mitigation, Response, Recovery, and Human Resources Divisions. We did not
interview FEMA regional managers because FEMA headquarters staff had
primary responsibility for the resource allocations and programs that we
examined. Therefore, we determined that our scope was sufficient and did
not materially affect our findings. At DHS we interviewed staff from the
DHS Budget Office, the Office of Financial Management, and the Office of
the Inspector General. At OMB, we interviewed Resource Management Office
staff with budget and oversight responsibilities for DHS and FEMA about
the start-up of DHS and the role of OMB's Planning Transition Office for
the Department of Homeland Security. This engagement was conducted under
the Comptroller General's authority from November 2005 until October 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
^1The President's budget request also includes some funding for the
Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). This request is based on current DRF balances
and estimates of past and future funding requirements for responding to
presidentially declared disasters.
Results in Brief
Organizational changes caused considerable flux in FEMA's resources from
fiscal years 2001 through 2005. However, resource trends for day-to-day
operations could not be fully understood from available data. Changes in
FEMA's structure and responsibilities occurred multiple times in this
period. FEMA underwent several reorganizations in fiscal years 2001 and
2002, but the most significant change occurred in March 2003 when FEMA
transitioned from an independent agency to a component of the newly
created DHS. From the beginning of fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year
2005, over $1.3 billion in new or significantly expanded programs came
into FEMA, while programs with funding of nearly $1.5 billion were
transferred from FEMA. Although these changes nearly balance in dollar
terms, they mask the disruption in operations and uncertainty about the
availability of resources that accompanied the nearly constant change.
FEMA officials described challenges in responding to these changing
responsibilities and shifting resources with roughly the same number of
FTE employees.^2 At the same time, as a component of DHS, FEMA contributed
to departmental start-up costs and departmental expenses, which reduced
funds available for FEMA's operating expenses. Even though some of these
costs would have been incurred if FEMA had been an independent agency, DHS
billing notifications for fiscal year 2005 indicated that FEMA may have
been assessed a disproportionate amount relative to several larger DHS
entities. Unquestionably these factors affected resources at FEMA, but the
extent to which they affected resources for FEMA's day-to-day operations
cannot be fully understood because FEMA lacks adequate information on
resources associated with its day-to-day operations. For example, FEMA
lacks adequate data on reallocations of resources among programs,
projects, and activities, on staffing levels, and, for some grant
programs, on how much has been allocated. If FEMA collected such data, it
could be used for improved planning and management, and greater
accountability to Congress and the public.
^2FTE is a measure of employment used by the federal government to
calculate the total number of regular straight-time hours worked by
employees divided by the number of compensable hours applicable to each
fiscal year.
Although shifting resources caused by its transition to DHS created
challenges for FEMA, the agency's management of existing resources
compounded these problems. FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools
that help an agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, FEMA
lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital
strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated training effort.
Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to
define staffing levels, identify the critical skills needed to achieve its
mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and future skills
and competencies. In addition, FEMA lacks business continuity plans for
its day-to-day operations. Since FEMA operates somewhat like a volunteer
fire department in that all personnel can be called on to respond to
disasters and none are assigned exclusively to day-to-day operations,
having plans outlining which of these operations are critical and how they
will be maintained when the agency is in disaster relief mode becomes much
more important. FEMA officials told us that nondisaster programs are
maintained on an ad hoc basis when permanent staff are deployed and that
the agency does not have provisions for continuing programs when program
managers are called into response duties. Without an understanding of who
holds a mission-critical position for day-to-day operations and what
minimum level of staffing is necessary even during disaster response,
business continuity and support for the disaster-relief mission are put at
increased risk. Even FEMA staff's strong sense of mission, which was
apparent in our interviews, is no substitute for a plan and strategies for
action.
In this report, we make a series of recommendations to help FEMA better
track its resources for day-to-day operations, identify current and future
staffing needs through workforce planning, ensure leadership capacity
through training and development, and maintain business continuity when a
disaster is declared. We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Director of FEMA to work with Congress in carrying out
these recommendations to help ensure FEMA provides sufficient information
to enable Congress to conduct its oversight role.
o facilitating an understanding of the agency's
operations;
o informing the development, analysis, and debate of
alternative policies;
o supporting a historical perspective from which to
evaluate future plans, budgets, and spending
proposals;
o assessing FEMA's accountability for actual results
when compared to budgets; and
o evaluating program costs.
Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security. DHS did not provide formal comments on the draft report
but did provide technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate. OMB staff also provided technical comments on an excerpt of
the draft that referred to our discussion with OMB; we incorporated these
where appropriate.
Background
In response to concerns about the lack of a coordinated federal approach
to disaster relief, President Carter established FEMA by Executive Order
in 1978 to consolidate and coordinate emergency management functions in
one location. FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance Administration, the
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather
Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of
the General Services Administration, the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration activities from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and civil defense responsibilities from the Defense
Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Between 1979 and 2003,
FEMA's responsibilities expanded to include emergency management for
human-made and technological disasters, such as managing the off-site
consequence of accidents at nuclear power plants, hazardous materials
emergency management, chemical weapons disposal, and hazardous material
disaster mitigation initiatives.
In 2003, FEMA became a component of the Emergency Preparedness and
Response (EP&R) Directorate in the newly created DHS. Much like its FEMA
predecessor, EP&R's mission was to help the nation to prepare for,
mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from disasters.^3 While
FEMA moved intact to DHS and most of its operations became part of the
EP&R Directorate, some of its functions were moved to other organizations
within DHS. In addition, functions that were formerly part of other
agencies were incorporated into the new EP&R organization. Once in the
department, FEMA's preparedness functions were transferred over 2 years to
other entities in DHS,^4 reducing its mission responsibilities. However,
recent legislation transferred many preparedness functions back to FEMA.^5
Today, once again, FEMA's charge is to lead the nation's efforts to
prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other
man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents.
^3The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended, (Pub. L. No. 93-288), known as the Stafford Act, constitutes the
statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities,
especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs. This act authorizes
the President to issue a "major disaster" declaration to provide a wide
range of federal aid to states determined to be overwhelmed by hurricanes
or other disasters. FEMA is tasked with coordinating the response under
the Stafford Act.
^4From enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in November 2002 to
September 2005, 11 preparedness functions or authorities were transferred
from FEMA. In October 2005, FEMA's remaining preparedness functions were
transferred to DHS's new Preparedness Directorate, which was created to
consolidate preparedness assets from across DHS, facilitate grants, and
oversee nationwide preparedness efforts.
^5Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-295, Title VI.
FEMA funding is provided in both regular and supplemental appropriations.
FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which supports a wide range of programs
in response to presidentially declared disasters, receives an annual
regular appropriation that is based on the 5-year average for direct
disaster activity, excluding extraordinary events. Supplemental funding is
requested if funds in the regular appropriation are not sufficient to
respond to specific presidentially declared disasters. The amount of this
funding varies depending on the number and severity of disasters (see
table 1 below for a summary of FEMA's regular and supplemental
appropriations from fiscal years 2001 to 2005). In its regular annual
appropriations FEMA receives not only some funding for its DRF but also
funding to provide for day-to-day agency operations, including financial
management, human resources, procurement, policy direction, and
administration of FEMA programs.^6 Some programs that provide funding,
such as grants to state and local governments--and not to FEMA
operations--are funded in these appropriations as well.
Table 1: Summary of FEMA's Regular and Supplemental Appropriations for
Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005
Millions of dollars
Fiscal year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Regular Disaster Relief Fund $293.6 $611.1 $773.4 $1,767.5 $2,042.4
appropriations
Other regular appropriations 839.8 921.9 2,552.9 1,525.9 1,046.8
Supplemental Disaster Relief 4,383.1 8,007.6 1,925.3 2,245.0 66,385.0
Fund appropriations
Other supplemental 0.0 531.4^a 86.3^b 0.0 100.0^c
appropriations
Source: GAO presentation of FEMA data.
^aThis supplemental funding was for the following activities: $210 million
for fire grants; $25 million for preparedness; $10 million for the Winter
Olympics; $225.4 million for fire grants, the existing national urban
search and rescue system, and interoperable communications equipment; and
$61 million for Cerro Grande Fire Claims.
^bThis supplemental funding was for the Liberty Shield.
^cThis supplemental funding was for the National Disaster Medical System.
^6FEMA administers a mix of programs in the four areas of emergency
management--Preparedness (now known as Readiness), Mitigation, Response,
and Recovery. These programs include the predisaster mitigation, flood
mitigation, map modernization, National Flood Insurance, and public health
programs.
Similar to FEMA's funding arrangement, most of its employees are hired to
perform work related to a specific, presidentially declared disaster. The
majority of FEMA's workforce is comprised of nonpermanent employees with
various terms (from 120 days to 4 years), who are paid out of the DRF. As
with the funding for the DRF, the number of these employees can fluctuate
in response to the number and severity of disasters.^7 The remainder of
FEMA's workforce is comprised of about 2,100 permanent full-time (PFT)
employees, who are paid primarily out of FEMA's nondisaster relief fund
accounts. FEMA also uses contractors to administer some of its programs,
but FEMA does not track data on the level of contract support it receives.
Certain nonpermanent staff, known as the Cadre of On-call
Response/Recovery Employees (CORE), perform functions similar to those
performed by PFT employees.^8 Although paid from the DRF account, the CORE
work alongside PFT employees in headquarters and the regions in both
program offices and support functions, such as human resources and IT, and
both CORE and PFT employees can be deployed to respond to disasters.
^7From fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the following numbers of FTE employees
were paid out of the DRF: fiscal year 2001 = 2,521; fiscal year 2002 =
2,865; fiscal year 2003 = 3,289; fiscal year 2004 = 3,330; fiscal year
2005 = 5,458.
^8According to FEMA officials, the CORE was developed in the early 1990s
to improve management of administrative overhead in the DRF and to make
disaster relief operations more efficient. The number of CORE FTE
employees at FEMA from fiscal years 2001 to 2005 was as follows: fiscal
year 2001 = 706; fiscal year 2002 = 733; fiscal year 2003 = 732; fiscal
year 2004 = 730; fiscal year 2005 = 685.
Organizational Changes Created Uncertainty about the Availability of Resources,
but FEMA Lacked Adequate Data to Understand the Effect on Day-to-Day Operations
To better understand resource trends for FEMA's day-to-day operations,
information about aggregate resource trends should be viewed in the
context of organizational changes, priorities, and the movement of
resources within FEMA and DHS. However, FEMA lacks adequate information on
the resources associated with its day-to-day operations. Without such
data, FEMA cannot strategically plan for and invest in these operations,
which are necessary for fulfilling its disaster-relief mission. Moreover,
it cannot ensure accountability to Congress and the public that these
resources were used efficiently, effectively, or for the highest
priorities.
FEMA's Responsibilities Were in Flux, Which Created Uncertainty about the
Availability of Resources
Even prior to its transition to DHS, FEMA was undergoing organizational
change. In response to domestic terrorist incidents in the 1990s--such as
the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the
Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995--federal
efforts to focus on preparedness against terrorist attacks increased. This
led to the first of several organizational changes between fiscal years
2001 and 2003, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: FEMA Organizational Changes, Fiscal Years 2001-2003
2001 2002 2003
Before 9/11 After 9/11
The President FEMA's new Office of FEMA underwent FEMA became
created an Office National Preparedness another part of the
of National was assigned increased reorganization newly created
Preparedness within responsibility for that split Department of
FEMA working with first preparedness Homeland
responder agencies functions from Security (DHS)
FEMA underwent an readiness and
agencywide response
reorganization to
streamline service
delivery
Source: GAO presentation of information from FEMA, the DHS Office of the
Inspector General, and past GAO work.
Recognizing a need for greater coordination among federal agencies in
responding to a terrorist attack, the President created the Office of
National Preparedness (ONP) within FEMA in May 2001 to provide leadership
in the coordination and facilitation of all federal efforts to assist
state and local emergency management and emergency response organizations.
Specifically, FEMA was to assist with planning, training, equipment, and
exercises necessary to build and sustain capability to respond to any
emergency or disaster. FEMA also underwent an agencywide reorganization in
2001 to streamline the agency and devote more employee effort to service
delivery by bringing together programs that shared complementary missions.
FEMA's Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate merged with its
Response and Recovery Directorate and became the Readiness, Response, and
Recovery Directorate. FEMA also created the External Affairs and
Administration and Resource Planning Directorates.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted additional changes at
FEMA. FEMA led the federal response to aid victims of the September 11
attacks and afterward took on a growing role in promoting emergency
preparedness, largely focused on preparedness for future terrorist
attacks. FEMA's ONP was assigned increased responsibility for working with
first responders, such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public
health personnel, to ensure that they were trained and equipped to deal
with weapons of mass destruction. FEMA underwent another reorganization in
fiscal year 2002, when the Readiness, Response, and Recovery Directorate
that was created in fiscal year 2001 was split into the National
Preparedness Division and the Response and Recovery Division.
In March 2003, FEMA--which had been an independent agency since its
inception--became part of the newly created DHS. In accordance with the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequent determination orders issued
by OMB, FEMA's assets and responsibilities were transferred to DHS's EP&R
Directorate. The Undersecretary of EP&R assumed the responsibilities of
the Director of FEMA, and EP&R retained use of the name FEMA. Many of the
changes in FEMA's resources from 2003 to 2005 can be attributed to FEMA's
transfer to DHS and its shifting organizational responsibilities, as shown
in figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Programs and Associated Funding That Moved into and out of FEMA
from March 1, 2003 through Fiscal Year 2005 (in Millions of Dollars)
In total, over $1.3 billion in funding for new or significantly expanded
programs came into FEMA between the beginning of fiscal year 2003 and
fiscal year 2004, and nearly $1.5 billion left FEMA by fiscal year 2005.
Although the movement of programs and their associated funding in and out
of FEMA nearly balanced in dollar terms, this masks the amount of change
and the challenges described by FEMA officials as the organization, with
roughly the same number of FTE employees, responded to its increased
responsibilities, only in most cases to have them taken away later. In the
transition to DHS in fiscal year 2003, for instance, FEMA gained over $513
million in new programs from HHS. However, by fiscal year 2005, two of
these programs and most of the associated funding were transferred out of
FEMA: the Strategic National Stockpile was transferred back to HHS and the
MMRS was transferred to another component of DHS, leaving in FEMA just $34
million of the more than $513 million in public health programs that had
been transferred to FEMA less than 2 years before.
FEMA also had most of its terrorism-related programs transferred to DHS.
In the transition, nearly $998.9 million in existing FEMA preparedness
programs that were deemed to be terrorism-related were transferred from
FEMA to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) in DHS. Most of what
remained in FEMA was not considered homeland security-related,^9 a
designation based on the National Strategy for Homeland Security and used
by the administration and OMB to evaluate funding priorities.^10 Since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the administration's guidance for
preparation of agency budget submissions has encouraged agencies to hold
nonhomeland security, nondefense funding level.^11 For fiscal years 2003
through 2005 the President's budget requests for most of FEMA's programs
have been consistent with this policy.
In addition to resource fluctuations associated with its changing
responsibilities, some FEMA resources were transferred to establish a
departmental structure at DHS. OMB requested that a total of $125 million
be transferred from component entities for DHS start-up costs. Of this
$125 million, FEMA's share was $32 million. OMB officials involved with
the DHS transition said OMB reviewed the relative size of agency budgets
and staffing levels, their levels of unobligated balances, and the
services they received from their parent departments to get a sense of the
components' appropriate relative share of the start-up costs. Yet,
according to our analysis of a letter from OMB to the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations dated December 20, 2002, FEMA paid
about the same amount as each of the other three larger contributing
agencies, which transferred entities such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Transportation Security Administration, Coast
Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Secret Service.^12
9Homeland Security encompasses those activities that are focused on
combating terrorism and occur within the United States and its
territories. According to the Budget of the U.S. Government, not all
activities carried out by DHS constitute homeland security funding (e.g.,
response to natural disasters, Coast Guard search and rescue activities).
^10The National Strategy for Homeland Security, which was published by the
Office of Homeland Security in July 2002, is available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/ (downloaded Oct. 4, 2006).
^11Since 2003, the President's budget requests for discretionary funding
for nonhomeland security, nondefense programs have increased an average of
2.82 percent per year, while the President's requests for discretionary
funding for Homeland Security and Department of Defense programs have
increased an average of 4.62 percent per year.
After DHS was established, additional payments that FEMA made to support
ongoing departmental operations also affected its resources. In the period
after Hurricane Katrina, the FEMA director who had served through the
storm publicly claimed that FEMA's resources were compromised as a result
of being "taxed" by DHS. Although that individual is no longer at FEMA,
this claim was repeated by current FEMA officials with whom we spoke.^13
These assessments were actually payments made to DHS's Working Capital
Fund (WCF), a type of intragovernmental revolving fund that agencies use
to support services that are shared across the agency. The DHS WCF
supports a number of activities--including payroll, governmentwide
mandated service activities (such as e-government initiatives), and
software licensing, many of which FEMA would have had to pay for as an
independent agency. In fact, FEMA had a WCF when it was an independent
agency before it transferred to DHS. In the transfer, FEMA's WCF became
DHS's WCF.
WCF billing notifications for fiscal year 2005--the first year for which
sufficient data are available--do indicate that FEMA may have been
assessed a disproportionate amount for the WCF compared to several larger
entities in DHS. According to the WCF billing notifications and DHS
officials, the WCF assessments for that year were based on the number of
FTE employees in an entity, the amount of funding that DHS defined as an
entity's "discretionary budget,"^14 or how frequently an entity used a
particular service. The entity with the largest percentage of FTEs was the
Transportation Security Administration. The entity with the largest
percentage of DHS discretionary budget was the U.S. Coast Guard. Table 3
below shows for fiscal year 2005 the share of FEMA, Transportation
Security Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard FTEs and discretionary
funding relative to DHS as a whole, the percent that each organization was
assessed for fiscal year 2005 relative to the total amount assessed by the
WCF, and the percent of the organization's discretionary funding that the
assessment represented.
^12The Department of Justice was to transfer $30 million from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service; the Department of Transportation
was to transfer $25 million from the Transportation Security
Administration and $3.5 million from the Coast Guard; the Department of
the Treasury was to transfer $30 million from the U.S. Customs Service and
$4.5 million from the U.S. Secret Service.
^13Although the term "tax" was used by officials, we use assessment to
describe charges to DHS organizations for centralized services.
^14DHS determined what constituted "discretionary budget." This
distinction is not synonymous with funding that is considered
discretionary based on its distinction as such in an appropriation act.
For example, FEMA received $1,146,800,000 in non-DRF funding (including
supplemental funding) for fiscal year 2005, but DHS determined that its
discretionary funding for the purposes of WCF assessments was
$480,649,000.
Table 3: Illustration of Three Entities' Share of DHS FTEs, Funding, and
Assessments for the DHS WCF for Fiscal Year 2005
Percent of Percent of DHS
DHS FTEs discretionary Percent of WCF
used for funding used Percent of assessment relative
billing for billing total WCF to entity's
DHS entity purposes purposes assessment discretionary budget
Emergency
Preparedness and
Response (FEMA) 1.9 2.08 6.19 3.88
Transportation
Security
Administration 38.2 14.14 6.96 0.64
U.S. Coast Guard 4.8 27.24 5.45 0.26
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
As the table shows, FEMA paid more than the entity with the largest
percentage of DHS's discretionary budget--the U.S. Coast Guard--and nearly
the same amount as the DHS entity with the largest percentage of DHS's
FTEs--the Transportation Security Administration. According to our
analysis of the WCF billing notifications, items that were based on usage
or participation (i.e., are not simply correlated with number of FTEs or
amount of discretionary funding) could have accounted for up to $15.8
million of FEMA's $18.7 million assessment. However, a closer examination
of what DHS labeled algorithms shows that the way usage or participation
was factored into the calculations in many cases was not straightforward;
it was often based on a combination of unweighted variables, some of which
related to the number of FTEs or the amount of funding. This again raises
questions about how assessments actually were determined.^15 Because a
number of usage charges actually related to FTEs or funding, it is
unlikely that an agency with a workforce and budget the size of FEMA's
could have used the same amount of resources as its much larger
counterparts.
A DHS official acknowledged that finding the "right size" of the different
components' assessments has been an ongoing challenge and that the WCF
algorithms are being improved to ensure fairness and equity. Several FEMA
officials with whom we spoke confirmed that the process has improved and
attributed this in part to congressional oversight of the WCF.
FEMA program officials said that FEMA's share of DHS start-up costs and
its assessment for the WCF directly affected the level of service they
were able to provide from fiscal years 2004 to 2005. Several officials
said that the WCF assessments in particular contributed to a hiring
freeze. FEMA reported in its Fiscal Year 2005 Mid-Year Budget Review
report to DHS that it froze hiring for over 500 positions in September
2004 to ensure availability of funding for all onboard staff. DHS
clarified that the hiring freeze was temporary--lasting only until January
2005--and was instituted primarily to allow FEMA to complete a baseline
staffing review and implement its Position Management program.
Nonetheless, nearly all of the FEMA program officials that we spoke with
said that this hiring freeze made it difficult to run existing programs or
contributed to delays in implementing new programs. In addition, FEMA
officials said that the hiring freeze further compounded the effects of
the increases in attrition that began after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.
^15For example, the explanation given for the DHS's Chief Procurement
Officer's Strategic Sourcing Initiative charge was that it was based on
actual usage of several variables. However, the algorithm for that
particular charge was stated as: "Average of Component Percentage (of
Percentage Share of each of three key measures: # of acquisition
personnel, dollar volume, # of transactions) X initiative Amount Required
= Contribution per component." The number of acquisition personnel would
be constrained by FTEs and the dollar volume of transactions would be
constrained by the budget. Furthermore, since the "initiative Amount
Required" is not a straightforward number, it is hard to replicate the
calculation for any component.
Resource Trends for FEMA's Day-to-Day Operations from Fiscal Year 2001 to 2005
Cannot Be Fully Understood, Because FEMA Lacks Adequate Data
Organizational changes unquestionably affected resources at FEMA, but the
extent to which they affected resources for FEMA's day-to-day operations
cannot be fully understood because FEMA lacks adequate information on the
resources associated with such operations. To ensure that FEMA's
day-to-day operations are efficiently and effectively supporting the
agency's disaster relief mission, FEMA must strategically plan for and
manage these functions. Simply having data about transactions or decisions
is not enough; strategic planning and management requires data and tools
that would enable FEMA to identify the resources associated with its
day-to-day operations. However, FEMA lacks adequate data in a number of
areas, including reallocations of resources among programs, projects, and
activities, staffing levels, and, in some cases, FEMA appropriations
allocated for grant programs. Not only would such data help FEMA better
manage its day-to-day resources, but, as we have previously reported,^16
having sufficient information on resource investments, such as budget
documents combined with performance data, provides a valuable tool to
assist members of Congress in their oversight responsibilities.
Throughout all the organizational changes one thing that remained
consistent was that the level of management and oversight of FEMA's
resources once appropriations had been enacted was minimal. For example,
although reprogramming actions--shifts in resources within an
appropriation between offices, divisions, or activities that occur during
the fiscal year--affect resource availability, FEMA does not capture data
in a way that makes it practical to analyze reprogramming trends.
According to FEMA staff, a financial auditing firm had reached the same
conclusions when it tried to perform an analysis of reprogramming actions
several years earlier. A FEMA official said budget analysts receive
between 500 and 1,000 reprogramming requests every year. However, this
official said that budget analysts do not assess the appropriateness of a
reprogramming request; they simply check requests against FEMA's
apportionment to ensure that the funding is available and that the request
complies with applicable rules and laws. Once approved, FEMA captures
information about reprogramming actions on a transaction-by-transaction
basis in its financial management system, which is not equipped to provide
trend information about reprogrammings in the aggregate.^17 Without this
information, FEMA cannot know whether reprogramming decisions made during
the year have gone for the highest organizational priorities or determine
definitively what resources support day-to-day operations. While FEMA is
not required by law to aggregate its reprogramming data, nothing prevents
FEMA from developing additional aggregations of data for management
purposes, particularly in light of its unique operating and funding
environment.
^16GAO, Congressional Oversight: FAA Case Study Shows How Agency
Performance, Budgeting, and Financial Information Could Enhance Oversight,
[23]GAO-06-378 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006).
FEMA not only lacked useful information on funding changes that occurred
during the year, but until fiscal year 2005 it was also unable to produce
accurate information on the number of positions it had and where they were
located in the organization. Despite improvements in the information that
is available, FEMA still uses multiple and disparate systems, managed by
different offices, to gather information about its staff levels. The
Budget Office maintains FTE data; the Human Resources Division maintains
data about the number of "onboard" employees and separations; and the
Office of Plans and Programs maintains the "Manpower Database" to track
the number of positions and their location in the organization.
Moreover, FEMA does not have a positive definition of which activities
constitute its day-to-day operations--FEMA has categorized much of what it
does on a day-to-day basis simply as "nondisaster," even though many of
those activities are necessary to support its disaster relief mission. As
a result, FEMA could not provide information that was sufficient to allow
us to accurately report on the resources associated with its day-to-day
operations. When asked by the DHS Office of the Inspector General and
later by us to identify the resources associated with its operations, FEMA
divided its annual funding and FTE data into three categories--operating
expenses, other FEMA programs, and DRF.^18 The FEMA Budget Office
presented the summary data as: (1) "FEMA without DRF" (the sum of
operating expenses and other FEMA programs), (2) DRF, and (3) total.
Because DRF funding is primarily available only in response to a specific,
presidentially declared disaster, we attempted to use the "FEMA without
DRF"--or "non-DRF"--data as a proxy for day-to-day operations. However,
the non-DRF category presents an inaccurate picture of FEMA's day-to-day
operations for two reasons. First, it includes some funding, such as for
grants, that is not available to FEMA for its day-to-day operations
because FEMA distributes it to states and local governments. Neither
FEMA's Budget Office nor the program offices responsible for grants
administration were able to separate out the amount of funding allocated
for grants from other operating expense funding provided in the same
account. In these cases, rather than demonstrating that consideration had
been given to how much of the resources available for day-to-day
operations should be used instead to fund grants, FEMA could only report
on how much had been obligated for grants, subsidies, and other
contributions. Second, the non-DRF data leaves out a key component of
FEMA's day-to-day operations--the Disaster Support Activity (DSA).
Although part of the DRF, the DSA provides funding for ongoing
capabilities, such as training, that are not readily attributable to any
one specific declared disaster. FEMA has deemed these support expenditures
essential to providing (1) timely disaster response, (2) responsive
customer service, and (3) cost-effective program management and delivery.
(See app. I for more details.) Without a clear understanding of the
resources associated with its day-to-day operations, FEMA lacks the data
that would enable it to identify areas that are working well,
opportunities for improvement and, ultimately, where best to invest
resources.
^17FEMA maintains a paper trail on reallocation requests for 3 years, but
does not have a process or mechanism for analyzing this information.
^18From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003, FEMA's operating expenses
consisted of funding from its Salaries and Expenses account and its
Emergency Management Planning and Assistance account. In fiscal years 2004
and 2005, funding from the following accounts made up FEMA's operating
expenses: Office of the Under Secretary, Preparedness Mitigation Response
and Recovery, and Administrative and Regional Operations. In fiscal year
2005, the following accounts composed FEMA's "other programs":
Pre-Disaster Mitigation, Flood Mitigation Fund, National Flood Insurance
Fund, Emergency Food and Shelter, Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program
Account, Public Health Programs, and Flood Map Modernization. FEMA also
reported data on its supplemental funding in two categories--DRF and
Other. FEMA received supplemental DRF funding every year of our review,
while other supplemental funding was provided only in fiscal years 2002,
2003, and 2005.
FEMA's Lack of Strategic Management Tools Compounded Problems It Faced in Coping
with Shifting Resources
FEMA Lacks a Strategic Workforce Plan
A strategic workforce plan is integral to defining the appropriate level
of staffing, identifying the critical skills needed to achieve the
mission, and eliminating gaps to prepare the agency for future needs.
Strategic workforce planning, also called human capital planning, helps an
organization align its staffing with its current and emerging mission and
programmatic goals. This includes developing long-term strategies for
acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization's total workforce,
including full- and part-time federal staff and contractors. This is
especially important in a dynamic environment in which the need for
changing technologies and skills are coupled with constrained budgets.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, considerable attention was given to the
fact that FEMA had been under its authorized staffing level for several
years,^19 but FEMA has not developed a strategic workforce plan, and
therefore cannot demonstrate that the authorized FTE level and positions
are appropriate. FEMA did not have a strategic workforce plan at any time
between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 and it did not know until January 2005
how many positions it had or where they were located in the organization.
At that time, FEMA inventoried its existing positions and used that
information to establish a "baseline" for the number and type of positions
in the agency. Although FEMA officials said this baseline represented the
organization's staffing needs, in fact it was only the number of positions
in the organization at that point in time and did not represent an
assessment of the agency's composition and needs. In addition, this
baseline does not include any information about the size or composition of
its contractor workforce--which FEMA officials said is a growing component
of the organization's total workforce. Furthermore, FEMA's authorized FTE
levels may not be realistic as funding has become more constrained. OMB's
most recent budget formulation guidance directed all federal agencies to
review their authorized FTE levels to bring them in line with available
funding.
^19Reports issued by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives,
the White House, and the DHS Office of the Inspector General all pointed
to staffing shortages at FEMA as affecting the agency's ability to achieve
its mission in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Many of the FEMA officials
that we spoke with also pointed to staffing as a primary challenge at the
agency.
We are not the first to note FEMA's lack of a strategic workforce plan. In
2001, FEMA received an unsatisfactory rating for Human Capital initiatives
in the President's Management Agenda scorecard, OMB's assessment of the
management of federal agencies. The scorecard results, published in the
Fiscal Year 2003 Budget of the United States Government, noted that FEMA
lacked a strategy for linking human capital to fiscal resources and agency
goals and that FEMA needed to develop a workforce-restructuring plan that
addressed how the agency will attract and retain personnel with the skills
to perform core agency functions including program oversight and analysis.
In 2004, OPM recommended that FEMA develop a comprehensive human capital
plan, including a thorough workforce analysis that establishes staffing
levels aligned with FEMA's mission, goals, and organizational objectives.
Most recently, the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 included a
provision that requires FEMA to develop a strategic workforce plan within
6 months of enactment of the act.
FEMA included workforce planning as a priority in its 2003 to 2008
Strategic Plan and, in September 2005, FEMA awarded a 1-year contract to a
consulting firm to help the agency with the technical aspects of
developing its workforce plan. However, FEMA's workforce planning efforts
have not been conducted in accordance with leading practices in this area.
As we have previously reported, the first step in strategic workforce
planning is to set strategic direction,^20 but according to FEMA
officials, the workforce planning effort is being conducted without such a
perspective. Instead, it is being conducted from the bottom up, division
by division. A FEMA official told us that the instability created by
FEMA's frequent reorganizations has made strategic workforce planning
difficult. Instead of identifying mission-critical needs, the agency began
workforce planning in divisions of FEMA that were relatively stable, that
is, those that were less likely to be reorganized. FEMA's goal is to
complete two divisions per year, with a goal of covering the entire agency
by 2009. However, one official speculated that ongoing changes at DHS and
FEMA may delay the completion of plans for all divisions. Although this
approach may seem pragmatic, it is more likely to result in plans that
meet the immediate needs of individual divisions rather than produce an
integrated, long-term strategy for the entire agency.
^20As we reported in Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, [24]GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003), the
steps of the strategic workforce planning process are as follows: (1) set
strategic direction, (2) conduct a workforce gap analysis, (3) develop
workforce strategies to fill the gaps, and (4) evaluate and revise
strategies. Throughout the process, it is important to have the
involvement of management and employees.
As part of a workforce planning effort, we have noted in previous work
that agencies should develop human capital strategies--including
succession planning, training, and staff development--to eliminate gaps
between the future and current skills and competencies needed for mission
success.^21 FEMA, however, lacks a succession plan and does not have a
coordinated or strategic approach to employee training or development.
FEMA Has Not Engaged in Succession Planning
Succession planning--a process by which organizations identify, develop,
and select their people to ensure an ongoing supply of successors who are
the right people, with the right skills, at the right time for leadership
and other key positions--is especially important for organizations that
are undergoing change.^22 In fact, according to one participant at a GAO
forum on mergers and transformation, private sector experience with
mergers and acquisitions is that over 40 percent of executives in acquired
companies leave within the first year and 75 percent within the first 3
years.^23 Though FEMA's experience was less dramatic, succession planning
was described as nonexistent and several officials cited the lack of
succession planning as the agency's weakest link. Many FEMA managers
described the loss of institutional knowledge when senior employees left
in the transition to DHS and how those Senior Executive Service (SES) and
other managers that remained often covered vacant positions, performing
more than one job at a time. From fiscal year 2002--the last year that
FEMA was an independent agency--through fiscal year 2005, FEMA lost over
25 percent of its permanent SES employees. As SES employees generally
represent the most experienced and senior segment of the federal
workforce, they are critical to leadership continuity, institutional
knowledge, and expertise. Nor was there an experienced mid-level cadre to
mitigate these losses: 16 percent of FEMA's career GS-15 staff were new to
their positions in fiscal year 2004. Although turnover was to be expected,
FEMA must recruit key talent to limit the effect of these departures.
^21See [25]GAO-04-39 .
^22For more information about succession planning, see GAO, Human Capital:
Succession Planning and Management Is Critical Driver of Organizational
Transformation, [26]GAO-04-127T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).
^23GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformation: Lessons
Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies,
[27]GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002), p. 9.
In addition to helping FEMA replace people who have left or are leaving in
the near term, succession planning is important as a forward-looking
exercise to ensure that FEMA can respond to emerging human capital
challenges (e.g., the predicted federal retirement wave). Like the rest of
the government, FEMA faces the possibility of losing a significant
percentage of staff--especially at the managerial and leadership
levels--to retirement. About a third of FEMA's SES and GS-15 leaders were
eligible to retire in fiscal year 2005, and OPM data projects that this
percentage will increase to over half by the end of fiscal year 2010.^24
This increases the importance of thinking about what knowledge, skills,
and abilities are important--simply replacing staff without thought would
miss a chance to set direction for the future.
FEMA Does Not Have a Coordinated or Strategic Approach to Employee Training or
Development for Its Permanent Full-Time Employees
We have previously reported that agencies need to invest resources,
including time and money, to ensure that employees have the information,
skills, and competencies they need to work effectively in a rapidly
changing and complex environment.^25 However, FEMA's training and
development programs are not designed to ensure this because FEMA does not
have a coordinated or strategic approach to training and development
programs for its PFT staff. For example, FEMA's training requirements are
not aligned with reported needs. FEMA training officials identified
training in human resources management, financial management, and subject
matter expertise as the areas of greatest need for the agency, but FEMA's
training requirements do not reflect these. In addition, FEMA does not
prioritize funding to ensure that the most important training needs are
addressed first. We were told that training funds are generally available
on a first-come, first-served basis.
^24Projected retirement eligibility rates as of the end of fiscal year
2010 assume that everyone onboard at the end of fiscal year 2005 stays
employed at FEMA until September 30, 2010. The eligibility rates would
drop as eligible staff retired between October 1, 2005 and September 30,
2010.
^25For additional information on training and development efforts, please
see GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [28]GAO-04-546G
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
Moreover, FEMA does not have an integrated system to track employee
training and, therefore, no way of reliably tracking the cost of training,
who has received it, or how successful it has been. As a result, it is
extremely difficult for the agency to monitor the development of critical
skills and competencies in its employees, have accurate and reliable data
to document the total costs of training efforts, or assess how training
and development efforts contribute to improved performance and greater
capacity to meet new and emerging challenges.
FEMA Does Not Have Business Continuity Plans for Its Day-to-Day Operations
FEMA operates much like a volunteer fire department in that all FEMA
employees are expected to be on call during disaster response and no FEMA
personnel are exclusively assigned to its day-to-day operations. While the
volunteer fire department model may work in addressing a short-term
incident, FEMA staff can be deployed for weeks or months. This makes
planning for business continuity management (e.g., identifying which
day-to-day operations must continue and how they will be staffed) a
paramount concern.^26 However, FEMA does not have guidelines on what
constitutes a mission-critical position and has not conducted an
assessment of what minimum level of support is necessary. As a result, it
has no guidelines for which personnel either cannot be deployed or can be
deployed only if sufficiently trained backups are available--although DHS
Office of the Inspector General staff said that payroll and facilities
support have been left intact during disasters. FEMA officials told us
that nondisaster programs are maintained on an ad hoc basis when permanent
staff are deployed and the agency does not have provisions for continuing
programs when program managers are called into response duties.
Some FEMA managers told us that the lack of such planning has negatively
affected day-to-day operations during disaster response efforts. An
official from one program branch told us that the branch has had as few as
one or two staff members left to run it when 80 percent were called to
work on disaster operations in either the field or headquarters. To
provide a contingency backup for one program, FEMA established
contractor-supported Regional Management Centers in each region. Officials
explained they could not have a $50 million program shut down every time a
disaster occurs. However, the existence of these centers does not prevent
the slowing down of operations during a disaster since there are functions
contractors cannot perform. Only federal employees can set policy, sign
contracts, or disburse grant funding. Without an understanding of who
holds a mission-critical position for day-to-day operations and an
assessment of what minimum level of support is necessary, it is unlikely
that managers or employees can be held accountable for day-to-day
operations and the probability of failure in providing necessary support
for the disaster-relief mission goes up.
^26The goal of business continuity management is to keep operations
running in the event of a disruption to normal business processes. As a
program, it includes activities such as planning, risk analysis, providing
backup facilities, succession plans, and impact assessments.
Conclusions
Whether FEMA is a part of DHS or an independent entity, more attention
needs to be paid to its day-to-day operations. This is an organization
that not only has to deal with the repercussions of the prior year's
hurricane season and the cumulative workload of other earlier disasters
while preparing for future disasters, but also during the period of our
review had been reorganized four times in 3 years, assumed significant
responsibilities for preparedness activities that were subsequently
transferred out, and inherited an assortment of programs from other
agencies, some of which were gone within a year. In this environment,
anything seen as "nondisaster" was likely to get less attention. Since
most of FEMA's day-to-day operations--even those necessary to support
disaster relief activities--are considered "nondisaster" by FEMA,
day-to-day operations were likely to suffer. Without a vision of what
day-to-day operations should be and how they contribute to achieving the
disaster-related mission, FEMA is more likely to continue to react rather
than manage its way through future changes. Even FEMA staff's strong sense
of mission, which was apparent in our interviews, is no substitute for a
plan and strategies for action.
FEMA's piecemeal efforts to address the management challenges we
highlighted are unlikely to produce desired results. These challenges are
not new to FEMA and are not just the result of becoming a component of
DHS. In 2001, FEMA was scored as unsatisfactory in all five areas of the
President's Management Agenda. To make progress, FEMA is going to have to
change the way it does business. In this report we have suggested some
first steps. They include developing meaningful management reports that
allow FEMA to consider tradeoffs in resources for day-to-day operations, a
strategic workforce plan that identifies skills needed now and informs
hiring in the future, training guidelines and requirements tailored to
critical mission needs, a clear business continuity plan for when staff
are deployed, and systems that can help FEMA operate more efficiently and
effectively. Implementing such changes will not only improve the
information available for planning and management, but they will also
provide greater accountability to Congress and the public.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director
of FEMA to take the following actions:
o Define what resources--staff and funding--are associated with
FEMA's day-to-day operations, link the investment of these
resources to achievement of its disaster relief mission, and
collect sufficient data in a way that enables managers to monitor
progress and support resource priorities for these operations.
o In responding to the strategic workforce planning requirements
included in the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-295 Title VI, apply the key principles of strategic
workforce planning discussed in our report on such planning
efforts ( [29]GAO-04-39 ), including
o establishing strategic direction;
o assessing the number of employees and critical
skills that FEMA needs;
o conducting succession planning to identify,
develop, and select people to ensure an ongoing
supply of successors; and
o establishing training and development requirements
and tracking systems to ensure that staff have the
necessary training to carry out their day-to-day and
disaster response functions.
o Develop business continuity plans for the day-to-day operations
to ensure that critical program functions are maintained at a
sufficient level when PFT employees are called to respond to a
disaster. These plans should include clear guidelines on who holds
a mission-critical position at headquarters and, therefore, either
cannot be deployed for disaster-relief efforts or needs to have
alternates designated to provide backup in their absence. FEMA
should consider formally cross-training and preparing ancillary
workforce members (e.g., contractors, employees in other job
titles/descriptions, retirees) to maintain daily functionality in
the presence of anticipated staffing shortages when a disaster
strikes.
o In carrying out these recommendations, FEMA should work with
Congress to ensure that FEMA has provided Congress with the
information necessary to conduct its oversight role. Specifically,
FEMA should work with Congress to ensure that its financial
information is sufficient for use in the following oversight
activities:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary
of Homeland Security. DHS did not provide formal comments on the
draft report but did provide technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate. OMB staff also provided technical
comments on an excerpt of the draft that referred to our
discussion with OMB; we incorporated these where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of OMB, the Director of FEMA, and other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report please
contact me at (202) 512-9142 or irvings@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff making key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Susan J. Irving
Director, Federal Budget Issues
Appendix I: Analysis of Resources for Day-to-Day Operations
Given its mission, much of what the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) does is defined by disasters, and FEMA has largely
divided its operating world into two categories--disaster and
nondisaster. In this division, much of what FEMA does on a
day-to-day basis is categorized as "nondisaster." This masks the
fact that many of these operations are essential to preparing the
agency to carry out its disaster relief mission. When asked by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector
General and later by GAO to identify the resources associated with
its operations, FEMA divided its annual funding and full-time
equivalent (FTE) data into three categories--operating expenses,
other FEMA programs, and Disaster Relief Fund (DRF).^1 The FEMA
Budget Office presented the summary data as: (1) "FEMA without
DRF" (the sum of operating expenses and other FEMA programs), (2)
DRF, and (3) total. Because DRF funding is primarily available
only in response to a specific, presidentially declared disaster,
we attempted to use the "FEMA without DRF"--or "non-DRF"--data as
a proxy for day-to-day operations. However, the non-DRF presents
an inaccurate picture of FEMA's day-to-day operations. Using this
data skews FEMA's resource trends, because resources not
associated directly with its operations, such as grants, cannot be
disaggregated and resources from the DRF that are associated with
its day-to-day operations are not included.
Figure 2 below illustrates this point. If the non-DRF data are
used as a measure of day-to-day operations, it appears that FEMA's
funding for these operations rose significantly from fiscal year
2002 to 2003 and declined sharply from fiscal year 2003 to
2004--with the most dramatic decline occurring in operating
expenses. Over this same period, as shown in figure 3,
corresponding FTEs remained fairly level.
Figure 2: Trends in Annual Funding for FEMA's Non-DRF Operations,
Fiscal Years 2001-2005
Note: FEMA's summary data for "FEMA without DRF" did not include
other supplemental funding or funding for programs that were
transferred out of FEMA at any point over this period. However, we
added funding for these items back in to their appropriate
category to present a more accurate picture of FEMA's actual
funding for "operating expenses" and "other FEMA programs" over
this time period.
Figure 3: Trends in FTEs for FEMA's Non-DRF Operations, Fiscal
Years 2001-2005
Note: FEMA's summary data did not include FTEs from fiscal years
2001 to 2003 for two programs that were transferred out of FEMA in
fiscal year 2003--the Inspector General and the Working Capital
Fund. However, we added the FTE for these programs back in to the
figure to present a more accurate picture of FEMA's actual FTEs
for "operating expenses" and "other FEMA programs" over this time
period.
The non-DRF funding category presents an inaccurate picture of
resources for FEMA's day-to-day operations for two reasons. First,
it includes funding, such as grants, that is not available to FEMA
for its day-to-day operations because FEMA provides it to states
and local governments. Much of the fluctuation seen in figure 2
can actually be attributed to changes in grant programs and
associated funding that occurred through organizational
changes--rather than funding increases and decreases for the same
set of activities. For example, when FEMA's Fire Grants program
grew by $595 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and then
left FEMA by fiscal year 2004, under FEMA's categorization this
appeared as an increase in operational funds in 2003 and a
decrease in 2004. In fact, those resources were passed on in the
form of grants, mostly to state and local governments, and, except
for the administration of the grants, should have had
little--certainly much less than shown--effect on FEMA's resource
trends for its day-to-day operations. Second, this presentation
leaves out a key component of FEMA's day-to-day operations--the
Disaster Support Activity (DSA). Although part of the DRF, the DSA
provides funding for ongoing capabilities, such as training, that
are not readily attributable to any one specific declared
disaster.^2 FEMA itself has deemed these support expenditures
essential to providing (1) timely disaster response, (2)
responsive customer service, and (3) cost-effective program
management and delivery. Since the non-DRF funding category
includes grant resources, which are not spent by FEMA, but
excludes funding for DSA, which clearly supports day-to-day
functions, this category does not present an accurate picture of
FEMA's day-to-day resources.
If FEMA were to create a definition of day-to-day operations that
addresses these issues, changes in FEMA's resource trends might
appear less dramatic. In figure 4 below, we used the non-DRF data
provided by FEMA, added funding for DSA, and excluded funding for
readily identifiable grants (i.e., those that are authorized in
separate appropriation accounts). We were unable to back out
grants that were in appropriations accounts that included both
grant and other funds, because neither FEMA's Budget Office nor
the program offices responsible for grants administration were
able to tell us how much funding was allocated for grants
separately from other operating expense funding provided in the
same account. In these cases, rather than demonstrating that
consideration had been given to how much of the resources
available for day-to-day operations should be used instead to fund
grants, FEMA could only report on how much had been obligated for
grants, subsidies, and other contributions.
Using this definition, funding for FEMA's operating expenses and
DSA appears fairly constant, while funding for FEMA's other
programs rose in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and declined in fiscal
year 2005. During this same period, as shown in figure 5, FEMA's
FTEs for those day-to-day operations also remained relatively
constant.
Figure 4: Estimate of Funding for FEMA's Day-to-Day Operations,
Fiscal Years 2001-2005
Figure 5: Estimate of Actual FTEs for FEMA's Day-to-Day
Operations, Fiscal Years 2001-2005
^1From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003, FEMA's operating expenses
consisted of funding from its Salaries and Expenses account and its
Emergency Management Planning and Assistance account. In fiscal years 2004
and 2005, funding from the following accounts made up FEMA's operating
expenses: Office of the Under Secretary, Preparedness Mitigation Response
and Recovery, and Administrative and Regional Operations. In fiscal year
2005, the following accounts composed FEMA's "other programs":
Pre-Disaster Mitigation, Flood Mitigation Fund, National Flood Insurance
Fund, Emergency Food and Shelter, Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program
Account, Public Health Programs, and Flood Map Modernization. FEMA also
reported data on its supplemental funding in two categories--DRF and
Other. FEMA received supplemental DRF funding every year of our review,
while other supplemental funding was provided only in fiscal years 2002,
2003, and 2005.
^2The following activities are part of disaster support: Fixed Processing
and Storage; Response Readiness; Recovery and Mitigation; Information
Systems; Training; Disaster Support Operations; Disaster Dependent
Management.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Susan J. Irving, (202) 512-9142 or irvings@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Denise Fantone, Tiffany
Tanner, Amy Rosewarne, Brian Friedman, and Heather Hill made
significant contributions to this report. Thomas Beall, Carlos
Diz, William Doherty, Kevin Jackson, Hannah Laufe, John Mingus,
and Gregory Wilmoth also provided key assistance.
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Highlights of [38]GAO-07-139 , a report to congressional committees
January 2007
BUDGET ISSUES
FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage
Resources for Day-to-Day Operations
Much of FEMA's funding is provided in supplemental appropriations when a
disaster is declared, but funds to staff, manage, and operate other FEMA
programs and underlying support functions--what GAO refers to as its
day-to-day operations--compete with other Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and federal priorities for limited resources. In this environment,
FEMA must strategically plan for and manage its day-to-day operations to
ensure they efficiently and effectively support the agency's disaster
relief mission. To analyze this issue, GAO examined resource trends and
management related to FEMA's day-to-day operations from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2005.
[39]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA take steps to better manage resources for its
day-to-day operations, including collecting data that enables managers to
monitor progress and support resource priorities, using leading practices
to develop a strategic workforce plan, and developing business continuity
plans. In carrying out these recommendations, FEMA should work with
Congress to ensure that the information it provides is sufficient for use
in oversight activities.
DHS and OMB staff provided technical comments on a draft of this report,
which we incorporated where appropriate.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) experienced near-constant
organizational change from fiscal years 2001 through 2005 that caused
considerable flux in FEMA's resources. During this period, the most
significant change occurred in March 2003 when FEMA transitioned from an
independent agency to a component of the newly created DHS. From the
beginning of fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, a significant
number of programs and their associated funding moved into and out of
FEMA. Although the amounts nearly balanced, the movement was disruptive to
operations and created uncertainty about the availability of resources.
Programs and Associated Funding That Moved into and out of FEMA from March
1, 2003 through Fiscal Year 2005 (in Millions of Dollars)
FEMA also contributed to DHS start-up costs and ongoing expenses, which
reduced funds available for FEMA's operating expenses. Though FEMA would
have incurred some of these costs as an independent agency, evidence
suggests that FEMA may have been assessed a disproportionate amount
relative to several larger DHS entities. While all of this affected
resources for FEMA's day-to-day operations, the extent cannot be fully
understood because FEMA does not have adequate information on how
resources are aligned with those operations. Such information could be
used to improve planning and management and provide greater accountability
to Congress and the public.
Although these shifting resources created challenges, the way FEMA managed
its existing resources compounded problems. Notably, FEMA lacks a
strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies--such as
succession planning or a coordinated training effort--which are integral
to managing resources. They enable an agency to define staffing levels,
identify the critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate
or mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies. FEMA
also lacks business continuity plans for its day-to-day operations, which
puts support for the disaster-relief mission at increased risk. Even FEMA
staff's strong sense of mission is no substitute for a plan and strategies
for action.
References
Visible links
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-378
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-39
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-39
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-127T
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-293SP
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-546G
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-39
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-139
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