Influenza Pandemic: Federal Executive Boards' Ability to	 
Contribute to Pandemic Preparedness (28-SEP-07, GAO-07-1259T).	 
                                                                 
The federal executive boards (FEB) bring together federal agency 
and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside	 
Washington, D.C., to discuss issues of common interest, including
pandemic influenza. This testimony addresses the FEBs' emergency 
support roles and responsibilities, their potential role in	 
pandemic influenza preparedness, and some of the key challenges  
they face in providing emergency support services. The issues	 
discussed in the testimony are based on the GAO report, The	 
Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of  
Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency	 
Operations (GAO-07- 515, May 2007). GAO selected 14 of the 28	 
FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of	 
federal employees or had recent emergency management experience. 
In this report, GAO recommended that the Director of the Office  
of Personnel Management (OPM) work with the Federal Emergency	 
Management Agency (FEMA) to formally define the FEBs' role in	 
emergency planning and response. In completing the FEB strategic 
plan, OPM should also establish accountability for the boards'	 
emergency support activities and develop a proposal to address	 
the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. While not	 
commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM said it is	 
building a business case through which to address the resources  
FEBs need to continue operations.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1259T					        
    ACCNO:   A76815						        
  TITLE:     Influenza Pandemic: Federal Executive Boards' Ability to 
Contribute to Pandemic Preparedness				 
     DATE:   09/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Continuity of operations plan			 
	     Emergency management				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Emergency response plans				 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Influenza						 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Pandemic						 
	     Public health					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Performance measures				 

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GAO-07-1259T

   

     * [1]Background
     * [2]Scope and Methodology
     * [3]FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibi
     * [4]FEBs' Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in
     * [5]The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support
     * [6]Contacts and Acknowledgments
     * [7]GAO's Mission
     * [8]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [9]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [10]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [11]Congressional Relations
     * [12]Public Affairs

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery Expected                        INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 
at 10:00 a.m. EDT Friday,                                                  
September 28, 2007                                                         
                                                    Federal Executive Boards' 
                                    Ability to Contribute to Pandemic         
                                    Preparedness                              
                                    Statement of Bernice Steinhardt, Director 
                                    Strategic Issues                          

GAO-07-1259T

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC

Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Pandemic Preparedness

What GAO Found

Located in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the FEBs are
interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management
practices and improve intergovernmental relations. The FEBs bring together
the federal agency leaders in their service areas and have a long history
of establishing and maintaining communications links, coordinating
intergovernmental activities, identifying common ground, and building
cooperative relationships. The boards also partner with community
organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local civic
affairs.

OPM, which provides direction to the FEBs, and the boards have designated
emergency preparedness, security, and safety as an FEB core function and
are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set
of performance standards for their emergency support activities. Although
not all FEB representatives agreed that the boards should play an expanded
role in emergency service support, many of the FEB representatives cited a
positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. As one of their
emergency support activities, the FEBs and FEMA, often working with the
General Services Administration, host emergency planning exercises and
training for federal agencies in the field.

The FEBs' emergency support role with its regional focus may make the
boards a valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The
distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the
nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each
community it affects. As a natural outgrowth of their general civic
activities and through activities such as hosting emergency preparedness
training, some of the boards have established relationships with, for
example, federal, state, and local governments; emergency management
officials; first responders; and health officials in their communities.
Some of the FEBs are already building capacity for pandemic influenza
response within their member agencies and community organizations by
hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. The communications
function of the FEBs is also a key part of their emergency support
activities and could be an important asset for pandemic preparedness and
response.

The FEBs, however, face key challenges in providing emergency support, and
these interrelated issues limit the capacity of the FEBs to provide a
consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and
response. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans,
which may contribute to federal agency officials being unfamiliar with
their capabilities. In addition, with no congressional appropriations, the
FEBs depend on host agencies and other member agencies for their
resources. This has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs
nationwide and creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and
committing to provide emergency support services.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the federal executive boards
(FEB) and, in particular, their ability to contribute to the nation's
efforts to prepare for a potential influenza pandemic and help protect
federal employees, approximately 85 percent of whom work outside the
greater Washington, D.C., area. Located in 28 cities with a large federal
presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to
strengthen federal management practices and improve intergovernmental
relations. FEBs bring together the federal agency leaders in their service
areas and have a long history of establishing and maintaining
communication links, coordinating intergovernmental activities,
identifying common ground, and building cooperative relationships. The
boards also partner with community organizations and participate as a
unified federal force in local civic affairs.

In a recent report to you, we examined the FEBs and concluded that the
regional focus of the FEBs' emergency support services could aid in
pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts. ^[13]1 We also
observed that the boards face several key challenges in carrying out their
emergency support role. My statement today will review our findings and
present the actions we believe need to be taken to take better advantage
of these unique organizations.

                                   Background
											  
The nature of pandemic influenza presents distinctive challenges. Unlike
incidents that are discretely bounded in space or time (e.g., most natural
or man-made disasters), a pandemic is not a singular event, but is likely
to come in waves, each lasting weeks or months, and pass through
communities of all sizes across the nation and the world simultaneously.
While a pandemic will not directly damage physical infrastructure, such as
power lines or computer systems, it will threaten the operation of
critical systems by potentially removing from the workplace the essential
personnel needed to operate them. According to the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, the center of gravity of the
pandemic response will be in communities. ^[14]2 The distributed nature of
a
pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation over a
period of months or longer, means that the federal government's support to
any particular state, tribal nation, or community will be limited in
comparison to the aid it mobilizes for disasters such as earthquakes or
hurricanes, which strike a more confined geographic area over a shorter
period of time. This makes it essential to have joint and integrated
planning across all levels of government and the private sector to ensure
that available plans and response actions are complementary, compatible,
and coordinated.

^1GAO, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of
Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations,
GAO-07-515 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2007).

^2Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C: May 2006).

Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the FEBs are composed of the
federal field office agency heads and military commanders in the FEBs'
areas of service. The FEBs' overall mission over the past 46 years has
included supporting and promoting national initiatives and responding to
the local needs of federal agencies and their communities through
activities such as the Combined Federal Campaign and local scholarship
programs. The regulations that guide the boards ^[15]3 describe emergency
operations as one of their functions, although the boards are not intended
to be first responders. The regulations also state that the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for overseeing and
directing the operations of all of the FEBs consistent with the law and
with the directives of the President. Research has shown that systems like
the FEBs have proven to be valuable public management tools because they
can operate horizontally, across agencies in this case, and integrate the
strengths and resources of a variety of organizations in the public,
private, and nonprofit sectors to effectively address critical public
problems, such as pandemic influenza. ^[16]4

However, determining the appropriate emergency operations for the FEBs to
provide is challenging because of several limitations. Although membership
by agency heads on the boards is required, active participation is
voluntary in practice, and the boards operate with no independent
authority. The FEBs also have no congressional charter and receive no
congressional appropriation but rather depend on voluntary
contributions from their member agencies. The boards also rely on a host
agency, generally the one with the greatest number of employees in the
area, to provide staff, usually one or two full-time personnel, including
an executive director.

^3 5 C.F.R. S 960.

^4 See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), and Donald P. Moynihan, Leveraging
Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations (Washington,
D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2005).

Scope and Methodology

This statement is based on our May 4, 2007, report, requested by the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. ^[17]5 Our objectives in that report were to
(1) identify the actions FEBs have taken to fulfill their emergency
           preparedness and response roles and responsibilities, (2) describe
           the key challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles and
           responsibilities, and (3)
           evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency
           preparedness and response to pandemic influenza. We selected 14 of
           the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinated the greatest
           number of federal employees or had recent emergency management
           experience. The selected FEBs were Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston,
           Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Denver, Minnesota, Los Angeles, New
           Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and
           Seattle. We interviewed at least two key FEB representatives,
           including the chairs or vice chairs and the executive directors
           from the 14 selected boards. Additionally, we reviewed FEB
           documents, such as annual reports, monthly activity reports,
           minutes, and correspondence, at the selected sites. We also
           interviewed OPM and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
           officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C., and two FEMA
           regional directors based in Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas.
           We conducted our work from March 2006 through February 2007 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

^5GAO-07-515.

FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are
Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards

To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system, OPM
and the boards are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will include
a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness, security, and
employee safety. The plan will increase accountability by including
expectations and measures to assess how well each FEB is performing the
activities. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs can add value to
regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for communication, coordination,
and capacity building but acknowledge that the emergency activities of the
FEBs have varied from board to board. The inclusion of the emergency
support function in the strategic plan is intended to provide a more
consistent delivery of FEB emergency preparedness and response programs
and activities for the federal workforce across the system of 28 boards.

At the time of our review, all of the 14 boards in our study had some type
of emergency communications network and emergency preparedness council in
place. The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant information
to support emergency preparedness and response coordination, and OPM
expects the boards to establish notification networks and communications
plans to be used in emergency and nonemergency situations. The boards are
also expected to disseminate relevant information received from OPM and
other agencies regarding emergency preparedness information and to relay
local emergency situation information to parties such as OPM, FEB members,
media, and state and local government authorities.

According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also includes
coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it expects the
boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local emergency
officials and to assess local emergency situations in cooperation with
federal, state, and local officials. Although all of the boards reported
some involvement of state and local officials in their emergency
activities, the degree of board connections with state and local officials
varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for example, reported
strong relationships with state and local government officials, state and
local emergency management leaders, and private sector businesses. The
Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director reported that the board partners
with state and local government representatives, the private sector, law
enforcement, and first responders, all of which are key players in
assessing local emergency situations. On the other hand, the Chicago FEB
executive director said that because Chicago is so large, the board has
few established relationships with state and local officials. The chair of
the Boston FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for some state
officials but not city officials.

The FEBs have played a role in responding to past emergencies. For
example, when the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building was bombed on
April 19, 1995, the FEB staff knew all of the agencies in the Murrah
Building; the home telephone numbers of critical staff; the city, county,
and state principals in Oklahoma City; and which federal agencies were
available to provide immediate relief and support. During hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, according to a FEMA official, the New Orleans FEB
executive director established and maintained an essential communication
link between FEMA's Office of National Security Coordination and OPM. The
New Orleans FEB also served as a conduit for information between
Washington and local federal agencies and was able to provide status
updates to identify common needs or problems that agency leaders were
facing that required expedited assistance to resolve. As another example,
during nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political conventions
or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to contain the
potential disturbance to federal agencies' operations.

Looking ahead, however, representatives from 14 of the 28 FEBs disagreed
on the role the boards should play in emergency service support,
particularly during an emergency. Without adequate staff and resources,
some of the executive directors expressed concern that they will not be
able to meet expectations. One executive director, for example, commented
that there was a general expectation within his board's metropolitan
federal community that the FEB will assume a significant leadership role
during a possible future emergency. He observed, however, that limited and
declining funding does not provide for an effective communication system.
Consequently, he felt that this expectation was unrealistic and may
contribute to major misunderstandings in the event of a significant
emergency. On the other hand, several of the executive directors felt that
the FEBs would be able to accomplish much more in this area with
additional resources. For example, one executive director, with an
emergency operations background, emphasized that if the boards were given
dependable funding and increased stature within the federal government by
formal recognition of their emergency support role, their return on
investment in terms of emergency support functions would be substantial.

Despite the varying perspectives on an expanded emergency support role for
the FEBs, many of the executive directors or chairs from the boards cited
a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. An
important FEB emergency support responsibility is facilitating continuity
of operations (COOP) ^[18]6 and other emergency planning, and the FEBs
work with FEMA and the General Services Administration (GSA) to develop
and strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most of
the boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often lead by
FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises. The
exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be used to
develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services
provided by their agencies. For example, a FEMA official testified in May
2006 that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New
Orleans, Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the many
COOP training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations
were instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery and
reconstitution efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
^[19]7 According to a FEMA director, many of the agencies in the field
have COOP policies, procedures, and planning in place in part because the
FEBs have assisted FEMA in accomplishing its responsibilities as lead
agent for federal executive branch COOP programs.

FEBs' Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness and Response

As mentioned previously, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents
different concerns than localized natural disasters, may make the FEBs a
valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The distributed
nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the nation dictate
that the response will be largely addressed by each community it affects.
The FEBs' connections to their local communities could play an important
part, as predisaster relationship building and planning are often the
cornerstones of this type of incident management.

Many of the FEBs have cultivated relationships within their federal,
state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community
organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. For
example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal Campaign and
scholarship programs, bring the boards into contact with local charities
and school boards. Through activities such as hosting emergency
preparedness training or through participation in certain committees,
some of the FEBs have established relationships with emergency management
officials, first responders, and health officials in their communities. In
addition, through their facilitation of COOP exercises and training, the
FEBs bring together government leaders, health officials, and first
responders in a venue where the parties can share ideas, discuss plans,
and coordinate approaches.

^6COOP planning  is an  effort  conducted by  agencies  to ensure  that  the
capability exists to  continue essential  agency functions  across a  wide
range of potential emergencies.

^7Statement of Robert Shea, Acting Director of Operations, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, House Committee on Government Reform, May 24, 2006.

In terms of current pandemic planning, some of the FEBs are already
building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member
agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza
training and exercises. For example, some of the boards have been involved
in pandemic influenza-related activities that range from informational
briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises that included nonprofit
organizations, the private sector, and government. A number of FEBs have
held pandemic influenza tabletop exercises. Pandemic influenza tabletop
exercises are based on a series of possible events that could occur during
an outbreak of pandemic influenza with scenarios constructed to facilitate
problem solving and to provoke thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities.
For example, the Boston FEB, together with the Massachusetts Emergency
Management Agency and FEMA, held a pandemic influenza tabletop exercise in
November 2006. The exercise objectives included goals such as helping to
increase the awareness of federal, state, local, and tribal government
agencies of the requirement to incorporate pandemic influenza procedures
into COOP planning and identifying special considerations for protecting
the health and safety of employees and maintaining essential government
functions and services during a pandemic outbreak. The Seattle FEB, with
the assistance of FEMA and the City of Seattle, sponsored an all-day
conference in October 2006 called "Pandemic Flu: Get Smart, Get Ready!
Conversation Tools and Tips."

The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic influenza
planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board hosted its first
pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a follow-up exercise in
October 2006. The October exercise included approximately 180 participants
from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and local
government, and the private sector. The Minnesota FEB executive director
noted that Minnesota has excellent state and local government
relationships, which help to facilitate planning of this nature. Examples
of partnerships the board has with state and local entities include those
with the State of Minnesota Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, the Minnesota Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber of
Commerce, and the American Red Cross. In addition, the Minnesota FEB
executive director serves on the board of directors of the Association of
Minnesota Emergency Managers as the federal agency liaison, a newly
created partnership with the organization.

The communications function of the boards is also a key part of their
emergency support activities and could be an important asset for pandemic
preparedness and response. For example, many of the FEBs are already
active in disseminating pandemic influenza preparedness materials. The
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan also
emphasizes that government and public health officials must communicate
clearly and continuously with the public throughout a pandemic, and the
plan recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and coordinated messages
will be necessary. For example, when asked about the role they envision
the FEBs playing in the response to a pandemic, the Dallas-Fort Worth FEB
representatives said that because the board is viewed by its member
agencies as a credible source of information, the board's role should be
to coordinate communications among member agencies. They gave the example
of the Department of Health and Human Services working through the board
to disseminate medical information to the local community.

During pandemic influenza, the FEBs have the potential to broaden the
situational awareness of member agency leaders and emergency coordinators
and provide a forum to inform their decisions, similar to what the FEBs
provide for other hazards, such as inclement weather conditions. A FEMA
official noted that FEBs have vital knowledge of the federal agencies in
their jurisdictions, which can provide valuable situational awareness to
community emergency responders.

Finally, some of the FEBs are considering the role they can play during
pandemic influenza in assisting member agencies by supporting human
capital functions, such as supporting the federal workforce and
coordinating the deployment of personnel among member agencies as may be
appropriate. Several FEB representatives said, for example, that they were
considering how they could provide assistance in coordinating support to
federal agencies responding to pandemic influenza, such as addressing
personnel shortages by locating available resources among member agencies.

The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services

The FEBs face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support role.
Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a
consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and
response.

First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. According to
both FEB directors and FEMA officials, the FEBs could carry out their
emergency support role more effectively if their role was included in
national emergency management plans. FEMA officials from two different
regions said they felt the boards could be used more effectively and that
they add value to the nation's emergency operations. They agreed with
several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who said the boards
lack recognition within the federal government's emergency response
structure and their value in emergency support was often overlooked by
federal agency officials unfamiliar with their capabilities. A FEMA
regional director noted that it is very important that the FEB emergency
support role is understood, and he believed including the boards in
emergency management plans was an opportunity to communicate the role of
the FEBs and how they could contribute in emergencies involving the
federal workforce.

In addition, varying FEB capabilities test the boards' ability to provide
consistent levels of emergency support services across the country. The
FEBs differ substantially in the size of their formal jurisdictions and in
the number of federal employees and agencies served by each board. The map
in appendix I shows the varying service areas of the 28 boards, and the
table in appendix II shows how the number of federal employees and
agencies served varies by FEB. As noted earlier, the FEBs also have no
congressional charter and receive no congressional appropriation but
rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member agencies. This
has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs nationwide, and the
levels of support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses,
personnel, and equipment vary considerably.

The FEBs' dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for their
resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and
committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding in a
particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an individual
board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives characterized the
board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some expressed concern that
their activities will be further affected by reduced agency funding and
resource support as agency budgets grow more constrained. When boards'
funding is precarious, the executive directors
spend the majority of their time soliciting resources from member
agencies, without adequate time or resources to focus on mission-related
activities. Some federal agencies that have voluntarily funded FEB
positions in the past have begun to withdraw their funding support.
Several FEB representatives felt the uncertainty about the funding of the
FEBs raises questions as to the survivability of the system and its
ability to fulfill its emergency support function.

To address these challenges, our report recommended that OPM work with
FEMA to develop a memorandum of understanding, or some similar mechanism,
that formally defines the FEB role in emergency planning and response. We
also recommended that OPM initiate discussion with the Department of
Homeland Security and other responsible stakeholders to consider the
feasibility of integrating the FEB emergency support responsibilities into
the established emergency response framework, such as the National
Response Plan. Finally, we recommended that OPM continue its efforts to
establish measures and accountability for the FEBs' emergency support
responsibilities and develop a proposal for an alternative to the current
voluntary contribution mechanism that would address the uncertainty of
funding sources for the boards. OPM's work on a strategic plan with the
FEBs affords the opportunity to complete the development of clear
expectations for the FEBs in emergency operations and to develop
appropriate performance measures for these expectations. OPM also has an
opportunity, as part of this planning process, to consider alternative
funding arrangements that would better match the roles envisioned for the
FEBs. OPM said it is building a business case through which to address the
resources FEBs need to continue operations and that institutionalized
relationships with partners such as FEMA can help address funding issues.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my statement.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you might have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Bernice
Steinhardt, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or
[20][email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include
William J. Doherty, Assistant Director, and Judith C. Kordahl.

^a Includes civilian agencies in Guam.

  Appendix II: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in
                      Descending Order of Employees Served

FEB                Federal employees served     Number of federal agencies 
Los Angeles                             118,250                        230 
San Antonio                              91,130                         68 
Oklahoma                                 78,681                        252 
Honolulu-Pacific                         72,155                         96 
San Francisco                            70,000                        150 
Baltimore                                69,488                        140 
Chicago                                  64,803                        180 
St. Louis                                62,155                         82 
New York City                            61,578                        152 
Atlanta                                  58,020                        120 
Dallas-Fort Worth                        49,855                        144 
Philadelphia                             48,238                        154 
Seattle                                  47,233                        147 
Boston                                   45,479                        150 
Denver                                   39,161                        160 
Kansas City                              38,906                        134 
Newark                                   38,270                         79 
Minnesota                                35,806                        120 
South Florida                            35,672                        129 
Detroit                                  32,733                         85 
New Mexico                               32,102                         94 
Oregon                                   31,000                        225 
Houston                                  29,419                        115 
Cleveland                                25,842                         91 
Pittsburgh                               24,898                        107 
New Orleans                             20,141a                        71a 
Buffalo                                  15,935                        100 
Cincinnati                               14,727                         90 

Source: OPM.

^aNumbers are under review because of Hurricane Katrina.

(450631)

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Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [25][email protected] (202) 512-4400  U.S.
Government Accountability Office,  441 G  Street NW,  Room 7125  Relations
Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs

Susan Becker, Acting Managing Director, [26][email protected] (202) 512-4800
U.S.  Government  Accountability  Office,  441  G  Street  NW,  Room  7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

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References

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  20. mailto:[email protected]
  21. http://www.gao.gov/
  22. http://www.gao.gov/
  23. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  24. mailto:[email protected]
  25. mailto:[email protected]
  26. mailto:[email protected]
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