Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to 
Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion	 
Centers (27-SEP-07, GAO-07-1241T).				 
                                                                 
In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist	 
activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for	 
information sharing, the federal government--including the	 
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE),
who has primary responsibility for governmentwide information	 
sharing, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the	 
Department of Justice (DOJ)--is taking steps to partner with	 
fusion centers. This testimony is based on GAO's draft report on 
state and local fusion centers. It addresses (1) the status and  
characteristics of the centers and (2) to what extent federal	 
efforts help alleviate challenges fusion centers identified. In  
conducting this work GAO reviewed center-related documents and	 
conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the	 
PM-ISE, and semistructured interviews with 58 state and local	 
fusion centers. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1241T					        
    ACCNO:   A76771						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal    
Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local		 
Information Fusion Centers					 
     DATE:   09/27/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Domestic intelligence				 
	     Federal aid to states				 
	     Federal funds					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Government information dissemination		 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Information centers				 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Information management				 
	     Information systems				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Local governments					 
	     Security clearances				 
	     State governments					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Information sharing				 

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GAO-07-1241T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Devel
     * [3]Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to
     * [4]Contact Information
     * [5]GAO's Mission
     * [6]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [7]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [8]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [9]Congressional Relations
     * [10]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism
Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Thursday, September 27, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by
State and Local Information Fusion Centers

Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-07-1241T

Madam Chair, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
our ongoing work on state and local fusion centers. Since the events of
September 11, 2001, most states and some local governments have, largely
on their own initiative, established fusion centers to address gaps in
homeland security and law enforcement information sharing by the federal
government and to provide a conduit of this information within the state.
Although fusion centers vary because they were primarily established to
meet state and local needs, a fusion center is generally "a collaborative
effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and
information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist
activity."^1 Fusion centers may include a range of federal, state, and
local entities and collect and analyze information related to homeland
security, terrorism, and law enforcement.

With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing
factor in the nation's lack of preparedness for the September 11 attacks,
a number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The Homeland Security Act requires
that the President, among other things, prescribe and implement procedures
under which federal agencies can share relevant and appropriate homeland
security information with other federal agencies and with appropriate
state and local personnel, such as law enforcement agencies and first
responders.^2 The Intelligence Reform Act, as amended in August 2007 by
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act), mandates a more extensive information-sharing regime.^3
It requires the President to take action to facilitate the sharing of
terrorism and homeland security information by establishing an Information
Sharing Environment (ISE). This environment is to combine policies,
procedures, and technologies that link people, systems, and information
among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the
private sector. This act also requires, among other things, that the
President appoint a program manager to oversee development and
implementation of the ISE, which the President did in April 2005.

^1See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New
Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the
Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence, Public
Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).

^2See Pub. L. No. 107-296, S 892, 116 Stat. 2135, 2253-55 (2002).

^3See Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004), amended
by Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 504, 121 Stat. 266, 313-17 (2007).

Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical
source of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for
providing terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal
sources, the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE),^4 the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking
steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers as part of the overall
information sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued a plan for implementing
the ISE in November 2006 that incorporated presidentially approved
recommendations for federal, state, local, and private sector information
sharing. Recognizing that the collaboration between fusion centers and
with the federal government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's
overall analytic capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan
envisions that the federal government, through the ISE, will rely on a
nationwide network of fusion centers as the cornerstone of information
sharing with state and local governments. Under the plan, DHS and DOJ are
to work with states to designate a primary fusion center to serve as the
statewide or regional hub to interface with the federal government and
through which to coordinate the gathering, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of terrorism-related information.

In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions related
to fusion centers.^5 For example, the act requires the Secretary of DHS,
in consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-ISE, and others, to
establish a state, local, and regional fusion center initiative within DHS
to establish partnerships with fusion centers that will, among other
things, provide operational and intelligence advice and assistance, as
well as management assistance, and facilitate close communication and
coordination between fusion centers and DHS. In addition, the initiative
is to provide training to fusion centers and encourage the centers to
participate in terrorism threat-related exercises conducted by DHS.

^4On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-ISE
and its staff within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

^5See Pub. L. No. 110-53 S 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section 210A
to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135).

My testimony today discusses our draft report on state and local fusion
centers. The report is currently at DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE for review
and comment and we expect to issue it next month. Specifically, I will
discuss (1) the stages of development and characteristics of state and
local fusion centers and (2) the extent to which efforts under way by the
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by
fusion centers.

In conducting this work, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and
documents and interviewed officials--including many of those from the
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ--who are involved with those entities' efforts to
support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from
organizations conducting research on state and local information sharing,
including officials at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) who
released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.^6 We also conducted
semistructured telephone interviews with officials from all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and 8 local jurisdictions. Specifically, from
February through May 2007, we spoke with the director (or his or her
designee) of every state fusion center, the District of Columbia center,
and 8 local centers to obtain information about the centers'
characteristics, challenges encountered, and support received from DHS and
DOJ. ^7 Our selection criteria for local fusion centers included their
relationship with the state fusion center, their stage of development, and
geographic diversity. While we did contact officials in all state fusion
centers, we did not contact officials in all local fusion centers;
therefore our results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion
centers.^8 Finally, to obtain detailed information about centers'
operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site visits to fusion
centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond, Virginia;
Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New York City, New
York. We performed our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

^6See Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options
for Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).

^7For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer to
centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate
regions.

^8Data were not available to determine the total number of local fusion
centers.

Summary

Established by state and local governments generally to improve
information sharing and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion
centers across the country are in varying stages of development--from
operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as of
September 2007.^9 Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively
new, having been opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened within
the couple of years after the attacks of September 11. The majority had
missions and scopes of operations that included more than just
counterterrorism-related activities, such as a focus on all crimes.
Adopting a broader focus helped provide information about all threats and
increased the center's sustainability, for instance, by including
additional stakeholders who could provide staff and support. Law
enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the
operational centers we contacted. However, the centers varied in their
staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43
operational fusion centers we contacted reported that they had federal
personnel assigned to their centers. Thus far, products disseminated and
services provided vary from bulletins to in-depth reports.

In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating information
sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have several efforts under
way that begin to address challenges that fusion center officials
identified in establishing and operating their centers.^10 DHS and DOJ
have made efforts to provide fusion centers access to federal information
systems, but some fusion center officials cited challenges accessing
relevant, actionable information and managing multiple information
systems. As a result, these center officials said that their ability to
receive and share information with those who need it may be limited.
Additionally, both DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have
provided clearances to state and local officials and have set timeliness
goals for the issuance of new clearances, but some fusion center officials
told us they had encountered challenges obtaining and using security
clearances. Further, while law and executive order provide that a security
clearance granted by one federal agency should generally be accepted by
other agencies, officials also encountered difficulties with federal
agencies, particularly DHS and FBI, accepting each others' clearances.
Notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers
and DHS's grant funding to support their establishment and enhancement,
fusion center officials noted challenges obtaining personnel and ensuring
sufficient funding to sustain the centers. To help address funding issues,
DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal
grants funds. Finally, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had
challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed
a need for the federal government to establish standards for fusion center
analyst training to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and
DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They
have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document is in
draft as of September 2007.

^9We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local areas.
However, 1 state did not plan a fusion center. For that reason, we have
responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 in the planning or
early stages of development.

^10We present information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing and
operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more than one
challenge related to a particular area, for example, related to guidance
and training.

Because of officials' concerns about sustaining their centers and
recognizing that doing so is critical if the federal government's
nationwide network of fusion centers is to succeed, in our draft report,
we are recommending that the federal government determine and articulate
its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide
resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability.

State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics

Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments have
established or are in the process of establishing fusion centers.
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their
centers as operational as of September 2007, ranging from having limited
operations and functionality to being fully operational and functional.
Specifically, officials in 35 states, the District of Columbia, and 7
local jurisdictions we contacted described their fusion centers as
operational. Officials in 14 states and 1 local jurisdiction considered
their centers to be in the planning or early stages of development, and 1
state did not plan to have a fusion center, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We Contacted,
as of September 2007

Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local area
established a fusion center. To improve information sharing--related to
homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement--among federal, state,
and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks
of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons. Thirty-four of the
operational centers are relatively new, having been opened since January
2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of
September 11. The majority had missions and scopes of operations that
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities. For example,
23 of the 36 operational fusion centers that provided us mission
statements had missions that involved collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related information. Further,
11 fusion centers had missions that involved enhancing, supporting, or
coordinating information and intelligence dissemination to both law
enforcement and homeland security agencies. Adopting a broader focus
helped provide information about all threats, because of the link of many
crimes to terrorist activity, and increased the centers' sustainability,
for instance, by including additional stakeholders.

Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the
operational centers we contacted. However, the centers varied in their
staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. A few centers we
contacted had fewer than 5 employees, while others had over 80. At least
34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported that they
had federal personnel assigned to their centers. For example, DHS has
assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational centers included
in our review. About three quarters of the operational centers we
contacted also reported that the FBI has assigned personnel, including
intelligence analysts and special agents, to their centers. Additionally,
12 of the operational centers we contacted were colocated in an FBI field
office or with an FBI task force. Finally, 19 of the 43 operational
centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ components represented in
their centers, including personnel from Customs and Border Protection;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; United States Secret Service; United
States Coast Guard; Transportation Security Administration; United States
Attorneys Office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug
Enforcement Administration; or the United States Marshals Service.

Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's unclassified
networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), containing, among other things,
terrorism and related information.^11 For example 40 of the 43 operational
centers reported they had access to HSIN, while 39 reported having access
to LEO. In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the
process of obtaining access to DHS's classified network of secret-level
homeland security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of
obtaining access to FBI's classified systems containing, among other
things, secret-level investigative case files. Products disseminated and
services provided also vary. Fusion centers reported issuing a variety of
products, such as daily and weekly bulletins on general criminal or
intelligence information and intelligence assessments that, in general,
provide in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime. In
addition some centers provide investigative support for law enforcement
officers.

^11HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool for
communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security information.
LEO serves as a real-time online controlled access communications and
information-sharing data repository for sensitive but unclassified
information about, among other things, antiterrorism, intelligence, law
enforcement, and criminal justice.

Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some
Reported Challenges

DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in information
sharing, have undertaken efforts that begin to address challenges fusion
center officials identified in establishing and operating their centers,
such as accessing information, obtaining security clearances, obtaining
and retaining personnel, obtaining funding, and finding sufficient
guidance and training.

Fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple
information systems. DHS and FBI have provided information system access,
such as to HSIN and LEO, to a number of state and local fusion centers and
have outlined plans to provide greater access to their classified
networks. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted still
reported challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or
networks. For example, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS
and FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to their
classified systems. In these centers, fusion center personnel must rely on
federal personnel who are assigned to the center or other state personnel
assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant
information, and share it with them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion
centers reported challenges meeting system security requirements or
establishing the technical capabilities necessary to access information
systems, and DHS and FBI have taken some steps to address these
challenges.

In addition, officials at 30 of the fusion centers found the multiple
systems or heavy volume of often redundant information a challenge to
manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers said that they had difficulty with
what they perceived to be the high volume of information their center
receives, variously describing the flow of information as "overwhelming,"
"information overload," and "excessive." For example, officials said that
center personnel must sort through the large amount of information, much
of which is not relevant to the center, to find information that is useful
or important to them. Additionally, officials in 18 fusion centers find
the lack of integration among these multiple, competing, or duplicative
information systems challenging, or said they wanted a single mechanism or
system through which to receive or send information. Officials from the
PM-ISE's office said they are collaborating with other agencies, including
DHS and DOJ, on an effort to review existing federal information systems
and users' needs to determine opportunities to streamline system access.
This review is in accordance with recommendations that fusion centers made
during the National Fusion Center Conference in March 2007. Specifically,
fusion centers recommended the federal government explore using a single
sign-on or search capability, which would facilitate accessing multiple
systems. However, it is too early to tell whether the efforts by the
PM-ISE's office will address the challenges reported by fusion centers.

Both DHS and FBI have provided security clearances for state and local
personnel in order to access classified information and have set goals to
reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security clearance. For
example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret clearance, and FBI
set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret clearance and 6 to 9
months to complete a Top Secret clearance. DHS and FBI have also provided
centers with information about the security clearance process and time
frames, stating that processing time for individual security clearances
can vary, depending on complexity. However, obtaining and using security
clearances represented a challenge for 44 of the 58 fusion centers we
contacted. Further, while law and executive order provide that a security
clearance granted by one government agency should generally be accepted by
other agencies, officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and FBI, accepting each others'
clearances. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion
centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security
clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the
clearance process because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry
out their own processes without central coordination.

Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing
challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion
centers reported challenges with obtaining and maintaining funding when
establishing and operating their centers, challenges that some of these
officials also said affected their centers' sustainability. For example,
officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with federal,
state, and local agencies not being able to detail personnel to their
fusion center, particularly in the face of resource constraints. Fusion
centers rely on such details as a means of staffing the centers and
enhancing information sharing with other state and local agencies.
Furthermore, officials in 20 of the centers we contacted said that they
faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified personnel.
For instance, an official from one fusion center said that finding
personnel with the expertise to understand the concept behind the
development of the center and to use the tools to build the center was
challenging, while an official at another fusion center acknowledged that
there was a very limited number of qualified candidates in the state from
which to hire personnel. To support fusion centers, DHS and FBI have
assigned personnel to centers. As of September 2007, DHS has assigned
intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion centers we
contacted. In addition, DHS was in the process of staffing 8 additional
centers and has plans to place officers in a total of 35 fusion centers by
the end of fiscal year 2008. The FBI has also assigned personnel to about
three quarters of the fusion centers we contacted and continues to do so.

In terms of funding, officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered
challenges with the complexity of the federal grant process, uncertainty
as to whether they would receive federal funds, or declining federal
funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported having
difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that these issues
created confusion for their centers over the steps needed to secure
federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and created
concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to sustain their capabilities
for the long term. Fusion center officials identified challenges with
restrictions on the use of federal grant funds, unclear and changing grant
guidance, and a lack of understanding of how federal funding decisions are
made.^12 DHS has made several changes to help address these challenges by
taking steps to ease the grant process and by adjusting some of the
restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. For example, DHS
expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the area of allowable costs
for information sharing and collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by
states to develop and enhance their fusion centers, particularly by hiring
contract or government employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing
information technology hardware, software, and communication equipment;
hiring consultants to make recommendations on fusion center development;
or leasing office space for use by a fusion center.

^12A primary federal funding source for fusion centers is DHS's Homeland
Security Grant Program, which awards funds to state, local, and tribal
governments to enhance their ability to prepare for, prevent, and respond
to terrorist attacks and other major disasters. The Homeland Security
Grant Program consists of five interconnected programs, three of which can
be used by states and local jurisdictions, at their discretion, for fusion
center-related funding.

While these funds are helpful, fusion center officials were concerned
about the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term.
The federal government, through the ISE, has stated that it expects to
rely on a nationwide network of fusion centers as the cornerstone of
information sharing with state and local governments, but ISE plans or
guidance to date do not articulate the long-term role the federal
government expects to play in sustaining these centers, especially in
relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. It is critical
for center management to know whether to expect continued federal
resources, such as grant funds, facility support, personnel, and
information systems over the long term. While the federal government
generally cannot commit future resources, articulating the extent to which
it plans to help support these centers in the long term is important for
fusion center management in their planning efforts and sustaining the
network.

DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken some steps to develop guidance and
provide technical assistance to fusion centers to help address their
challenges in the areas of guidance and training. For instance, in August
2006, DHS and DOJ issued jointly developed Fusion Center Guidelines that
outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and operating fusion
centers--for example, ensuring appropriate security measures are in place
for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion
centers we contacted said that they found the guidelines generally good or
useful, although others said they were not specific enough to address
their challenges. Officials at 19 fusion centers said they lacked guidance
on specific policies and procedures on information sharing or lacked
national standards and guidelines on training or qualifications for
analysts. Furthermore, officials at 31 of the fusion centers we contacted
said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11
centers we contacted, most of whom were operational centers that had been
in existence for more than 2 years, expressed a need for the federal
government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts. DHS
and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance service program for fusion
centers and, along with the PM-ISE, sponsored regional and national
conferences and are developing a baseline capabilities document to provide
more specific guidelines for fusion centers. However, as of September 2007
the baseline capabilities document is in draft.

In closing, Madam Chair, state and local governments created fusion
centers to fill their information needs, and the centers have attracted
the attention of the federal government as it works to improve information
sharing with state, local, and tribal entities in accordance with the
Homeland Security and Intelligence Reform Acts. Indeed, the PM-ISE's
implementation plan envisions that the federal government will work to
promote fusion center initiatives to facilitate effective terrorism
information sharing nationwide and designates fusion centers as the focus
of sharing with state, local, and tribal governments. To date, DHS's and
DOJ's efforts to assist fusion centers, such as providing access to
information systems, security clearances, personnel, funding, and
guidance, have begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center
directors identified to us. However, it is also important for fusion
center management to understand the federal government's role with respect
to these centers since this affects state and local governments' support
to centers. However, many fusion center officials were uncertain about the
level of future resources and the sustainability of federal support.
Although the federal government cannot make promises regarding future
resources, articulating whether the federal government views its role in
providing resources, such as grant funding, facilities, personnel, and
information-sharing systems, to fusion centers as a short-term start-up
effort or for the long-term sustainability of operations is important for
fusion center management in their planning efforts and sustaining the
network.

In our draft report, which is now at the agencies for review and comment,
we are recommending that the federal government determine and articulate
its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide
resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability. Particular
emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center
functions that support a national information-sharing capability as
critical nodes of the ISE. We provided the agencies a statement of facts
for our draft report and discussed the recommendation with them to obtain
their comments. The Deputy PM-ISE generally agreed with the
recommendation, and the agencies provided us technical details, which we
incorporated. All agencies will be sending official comments on the draft
report later.

Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this
time.

Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence
at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Susan Quinlan, Assistant Director;
Michael Blinde; Jill Evancho; and Mary Catherine Hult.

(440661)

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To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [17]GAO-07-1241T .

For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [18]GAO-07-1241T , testimony before the Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment

September 27, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by
State and Local Information Fusion Centers

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent,
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing
that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal
government--including the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment (PM-ISE), who has primary responsibility for governmentwide
information sharing, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ)--is taking steps to partner with fusion
centers.

This testimony is based on GAO's draft report on state and local fusion
centers. It addresses (1) the status and characteristics of the centers
and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges fusion
centers identified. In conducting this work GAO reviewed center-related
documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the
PM-ISE, and semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion
centers.

[19]What GAO Recommends

In its draft report, GAO is recommending that the federal government
determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it
expects to provide resources to centers to help ensure their
sustainability. GAO's draft report is currently at DHS, DOJ, and the
PM-ISE for review and comment.

Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to
address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country
vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the
planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described
their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since
January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state
bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the
majority of the operational centers GAO contacted. However, the centers
varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. At least
34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported that they
had federal personnel assigned to their centers. Products disseminated and
services provided vary.

DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address some of
the challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have
provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but
fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple
information systems. Both DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and
set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and
using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers
contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and
officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of
which affected these centers' sustainability. They said that these issues
made it difficult to plan for the future, and created concerns about the
fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long term. To
support fusion centers, both DHS and FBI have assigned personnel to the
centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to
address restrictions on the use of federal grant funds. These individual
agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and
funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the
long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is
critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal
resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal
government, through an information sharing environment, expects to rely on
a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with
state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken
steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion
centers, for instance by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating
centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had
challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed
a need for the federal government to establish standards for fusion center
analyst training to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and
DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They
have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document is in
draft as of September.

References

Visible links
  11. http://www.gao.gov/
  12. http://www.gao.gov/
  13. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  14. mailto:[email protected]
  15. mailto:[email protected]
  16. mailto:[email protected]
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1241T
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1241T
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