Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has 
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks	 
(04-SEP-07, GAO-07-1220T).					 
                                                                 
This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or	 
not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act	 
requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these 
benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to  
be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially	 
met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires 
the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is 
being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover	 
Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within 
Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population,	 
provide essential services to the population, and promote	 
economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S.	 
agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the	 
Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the		 
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands;  
the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency;
the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These 
officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National	 
Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007,
most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were  
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and		 
testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted  
our review in accordance with generally accepted government	 
auditing standards.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1220T					        
    ACCNO:   A75588						        
  TITLE:     Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi	      
Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic  
Benchmarks							 
     DATE:   09/04/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Benchmark testing					 
	     Economic stabilization				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Legislation					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-07-1220T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Origins of the Benchmarks
     * [3]GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks
     * [4]Most Legislative Benchmarks Have Yet to Be Enacted and Imple
     * [5]Mixed Results in Achieving Security Benchmarks
     * [6]Comparison of GAO and Executive Branch Assessments
     * [7]Conclusions
     * [8]Recommendations
     * [9]Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
     * [10]GAO's Mission
     * [11]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [12]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [13]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [14]Congressional Relations
     * [15]Public Affairs
     * [16]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf

          * [17]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, September 4, 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ

Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks

Statement of David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States

GAO-07-1220T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to appear today to discuss our report1 on whether or not the
government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on
the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's
core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and
used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act
requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is
being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi
government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society,
improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services
to the population, and promote economic well-being.

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the
Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These
officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General
David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22
to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May
2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Summary

In summary, we found

The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the
Iraqi government in June 2006.

The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18
benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains
high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10
billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the
courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in
several areas, including Anbar Province.

1GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and
Economic Benchmarks ( [18]GAO-07-1195 ) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).

2Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28.

The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights
of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The
government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue
sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament.

It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key
security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the
perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of
population security show differing trends.

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the
achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with
homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the
United States.

Origins of the Benchmarks

The benchmarks contained in the Act were derived from commitments
articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed in
subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and
January 2007 (see fig. 1). Iraq's commitments to these benchmarks were
most recently stated in the May 2007 International Compact for Iraq.

Figure 1: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks

aIraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in
September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October
16, 2006.

bIn December 2006 the Multi-National Force-Iraq and government of Iraq
agreed to establish the Joint Security Stations.

GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not
been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi
government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds.

Figure 2: GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks

Most Legislative Benchmarks Have Yet to Be Enacted and Implemented

The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights
of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The
government also partially met one benchmark -- to enact and implement
legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October
2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative
benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not
completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the
government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue
sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The
administration's report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but
provided little information on what step in the legislative process each
benchmark had reached. We provide that information below.

Figure 3: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks

Notes:

aThe Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.

bThe Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out in
Article 138 of the Constitution.

cThe draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according
to the United Nations.

dAccording to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the
election date, though to date this is unclear.

Mixed Results in Achieving Security Benchmarks

Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local
security, eliminated political intervention in military operations,
ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable
of independent operations, and ensured that political authorities made no
false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian
violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is
difficult to measure perpetrators' intents, and various other measures of
population security from different sources show differing trends. As
displayed in figure 4, average daily attacks against civilians have
remained unchanged from February to July 2007.

Figure 4: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)

Comparison of GAO and Executive Branch Assessments

Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1,
2007,3 on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks
contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these
benchmarks. The Act requires the administration to report in July and
September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward
meeting the benchmarks. As stated previously, we considered and used a
"partially met" rating in several circumstances. Figure 5 compares the two
assessments.

3GAO provided this report to Congress on September 4, 2007, the first
business day following September 1, 2007.

Figure 5: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

aAccording to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for
these benchmarks.

Conclusions

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
had not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. The
Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006
to advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote
national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular
concern is the lack of progress on de-Ba'athification legislation that
could promote greater Sunni participation in the national government and
comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast
oil wealth. In late August, Iraq's senior Shi'a, Sunni Arab and Kurdish
political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster
greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on
de-Ba'thification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up
a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges.
However, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and
fighting among Sh'ia factions further diminishes the stability of Iraq's
governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for
sectarian reconciliation.

Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the
Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it is
unclear whether violence has been reduced. Measuring such violence may be
difficult since the perpetrators' intents are not clearly known. Other
measures, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show that
violence has remained high through July 2007.

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the
achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and homeland
security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future
administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to the
Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative
benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information on
violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance
and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition operations.

Recommendations

In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency
on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that:

           1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President
           that clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and
           implementing Iraqi legislation;
           2. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate
           agencies provide information to the President on trends in
           sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader
           quantitative and qualitative measures of security; and
           3. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate
           agencies provide additional information on the operational
           readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security
           plan, particularly information on their loyalty and willingness to
           help secure Baghdad.

We provided drafts of the report accompanying this testimony to the
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as
appropriate. We received written comments from the Departments of State
and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency
and National Intelligence Council, which are included in the report. State
and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our
assessment of certain benchmarks. Although we analyzed classified data,
including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, the
testimony and report only contain unclassified information, as of August
30, 2007. We issued a classified report to supplement the information
discussed in our report.4

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please
contact me at (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Key contributors to
this testimony include Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Timothy
Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick,
Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.

4 [19]GAO-07-1223 C.

In addition, Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie Burke-Johnson, Joe Carney,
Miriam Carroll, Debbie Chung, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Aniruddha
Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster, Patrick
Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary Moutsos,
Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor, and
Christina Werth provided technical assistance.

(320358)

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