Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to 
the 2005 Round (06-SEP-07, GAO-07-1203R).			 
                                                                 
This correspondence follows up an August 1, 2007, meeting to	 
discuss concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates 
and the potential loss of expertise and experience from the	 
closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since  
the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth as part of the	 
Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure  
(BRAC) round became effective. The work since the independent	 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (the		 
Commission) recommendations became effective has been done under 
the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on	 
his own initiative and has focused on the implementation of	 
realignment and closure actions. This brief summary reviews our  
public observations made in 2005 about the 2005 BRAC round,	 
specifically those related to Fort Monmouth. Also reviewed, under
the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own
initiative, is the methodology of a forthcoming DOD report on the
transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1203R					        
    ACCNO:   A75807						        
  TITLE:     Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations    
Related to the 2005 Round					 
     DATE:   09/06/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Base closures					 
	     Base realignments					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military facilities				 
	     DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program		 
	     DOD Cost of Base Realignment Action		 
	     Model						 
                                                                 
	     Fort Monmouth (NJ) 				 

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GAO-07-1203R

   

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September 6, 2007

The Honorable Frank Lautenberg
The Honorable Robert Menendez
United States Senate

The Honorable Rush Holt
The Honorable Frank Pallone
The Honorable Jim Saxton
The Honorable Christopher Smith
House of Representatives

Subject: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to
the 2005 Round

This correspondence is in follow-up to our August 1, 2007, meeting to
discuss your concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates and
the potential loss of expertise and experience from the closure of Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since the recommendation to
close Fort Monmouth as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round became effective. As we discussed
with you, our BRAC work since the independent Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission's (the Commission) recommendations became effective
has been done under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct
reviews on his own initiative^1 and has focused on the implementation of
realignment and closure actions. Consistent with our approach, we offered
to briefly summarize the observations we made in 2005 publicly about the
2005 BRAC round, specifically those related to Fort Monmouth, under the
authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own
initiative, and you believed this would be helpful. As such, the objective
of this correspondence is to summarize the observations we made publicly
on the 2005 BRAC round prior to the Commission's final recommendations. We
also agreed to review, under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct reviews on his own initiative, the methodology of a forthcoming
DOD report on the transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

The law authorizing the 2005 BRAC round^2 directed us to independently
assess DOD's process and recommendations and report by July 1, 2005.^3 As
such, we issued a report on that date and testified before the Commission
twice in 2005.^4 Subsequently, we have initiated several engagements under
the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own
initiative to review implementation of certain BRAC actions because of
broad congressional interest in these actions. Some of the engagements
that we are currently undertaking address, in part, issues that you
raised. We will provide copies of those reports related to the closure of
Fort Monmouth when they are completed.

^131 U.S.C. S 717.

^2P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (2001).

^3GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

To prepare this correspondence, we relied on our report on the 2005 BRAC
decision-making process and our testimonies before the Commission in May
2005 and July 2005.^5 We did not perform additional interviews,
information gathering, or analysis to prepare this correspondence. We did
not reevaluate or reassess our earlier findings. Additionally, we reviewed
the Commission's final report and included information from that report,^6
where applicable, to provide context for how the issues we previously
identified were addressed by the Commission. We limited the scope of this
correspondence to those issues raised in our report and testimonies on the
2005 BRAC decision-making process, but included updated information from
our BRAC work issued since 2005, as appropriate. Our previous work on
which this correspondence was based was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

Prior to the Commission's final decisions in September 2005, we presented
numerous observations about DOD's 2005 BRAC recommendations and
decision-making process. While we found that DOD used a fundamentally
sound overall process that was generally logical, well documented, and
reasoned to determine its BRAC recommendations, we identified limitations
with DOD's cost and savings estimates and potential human capital
challenges in implementing some of the recommendations, among other
observations. We noted that projected savings could be overestimated. For
example, in 2005, we found that some of DOD's assumptions related to
business process reengineering were not validated and the actual savings
for these recommendations would be based on how the recommendations were
implemented. Also in 2005, we identified the potential loss of expertise
and experience due to fewer than anticipated civilian employees moving to
a gaining base as a potential issue for some closure and realignment
actions.

Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.

^4GAO, Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC
Rounds, GAO-05-614 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005); and Military Bases:
Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection Process
and Recommendations, GAO-05-905 (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005).

^5GAO-05-785, GAO-05-614, and GAO-05-905.

^6Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure and
Realignment Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.: Sept. 8,
2005).

Background

DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round.^7 In May 2005, the Secretary of Defense made
public 222 recommendations that were estimated to generate net annual
recurring savings of $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012. In making
its 2005 realignment and closure recommendations, DOD applied legally
mandated selection criteria that included military value, costs and
savings, economic impact to local communities, community support
infrastructure, and environmental impact. BRAC legislation directed the
Secretary of Defense in applying this criteria to give priority
consideration to the military value over other criteria. In fact, military
value was the primary consideration for making BRAC recommendations, as
reported by both DOD and the Commission. DOD established a structured and
largely sequential process for obtaining and analyzing data that provided
an informed basis for identifying and evaluating realignment and closure
options. DOD incorporated into its analytical process several key
considerations required by BRAC legislation, including the use of
certified data,^8 basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan,
and emphasizing its military value selection criteria. Additionally, the
Secretary of Defense established three goals for the 2005 BRAC round: (1)
reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) transforming DOD
by aligning the infrastructure with the defense strategy, and (3)
fostering jointness across DOD. In our 2005 report, we stated our belief
that the recommendations overall would produce savings and noted that the
extent of transformational and joint progress would vary.

The Commission was an independent body that had the authority to change
the Secretary's recommendations if it determined that the Secretary
deviated substantially from the legally mandated selection criteria and
the force structure plan. The Commission formulated its list of
recommendations based on DOD's proposed recommendations and the
Commission's analysis of the extent to which DOD followed the selection
criteria and the force structure plan. For example, the Commission found
that DOD substantially deviated from military value and two of the other
selection criteria and the force structure plan and removed the proposed
realignment of the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate and a
related program manager from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, from the recommendation that included the closure of
Fort Monmouth. After the Commission's review in 2005, it forwarded a list
of 182 recommendations for base closures or realignments to the President.
The Commission estimated that its recommendations would generate net
annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012.
The Commission's recommendations were accepted in their entirety by the
President and Congress,^9 became effective November 9, 2005, and
constitute the set of recommendations that DOD was in the process of
implementing at the time of this correspondence.

^7The first round in 1988 was authorized by the Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended (Pub. L. No.
100-526, Title II, (1988)). Subsequently, additional BRAC rounds were
completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized by the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (Pub. L. No.101-510, Title
XXIX (1990)). The latest round--BRAC 2005--was authorized by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title
XXX (2001)).

^8The law that established certain provisions of the BRAC process (Pub. L.
No. 101-510, section 2903 (c)(5)) required specified DOD personnel to
certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information
provided to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the
realignment or closure of a military installation was accurate and
complete. During the BRAC process, data were certified by senior officials
at DOD installations.

We Made Numerous Observations about the 2005 BRAC Recommendations and
Process

While we concluded that DOD used a fundamentally sound overall process, we
also made numerous observations about the department's BRAC
recommendations and decision-making process. On the one hand, we reported
that DOD's decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations
was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned. On the other hand,
we also identified limitations with cost and savings estimates and certain
human capital challenges related to the potential loss of experience and
expertise after certain recommendations were implemented, among other
observations.

Limitations with Cost and Savings Estimates

In our assessment of DOD's 2005 BRAC round, we reported that DOD's
decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations was
generally logical, well documented, and reasoned and we stated our belief
that the 2005 BRAC recommendations would produce savings overall; however,
we identified some limitations with cost and savings estimates. As in all
previous BRAC rounds, DOD used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
(COBRA) model to provide a standard quantitative approach to compare
estimated costs and savings across various proposed recommendations. The
COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and averages but
is not intended to and consequently does not present budget quality
estimates, as we pointed out in 2005 (GAO-05-785, p. 242).^10 As a result,
COBRA-developed cost and savings estimates cannot be assumed to represent
the actual costs that Congress will need to appropriate funds to complete
implementation of BRAC recommendations, nor will they fully reflect the
savings to be achieved after implementation. In other words, the costs of
implementation identified in COBRA are likely to be different than the
costs that DOD will incur to complete implementation. We have examined
COBRA in the past, as well as during our review of the 2005 BRAC round,
and found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing
potential costs and savings among alternative closure and realignment
scenarios with the caveat that the estimates do not represent budget
quality data. Nonetheless, we raised a number of issues related to the
cost and savings estimates resulting from realignment and closure
decisions including the following.

^9The President was required to approve or disapprove the Commission's
recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005. After they were
approved, the recommendations were forwarded to Congress, which had 45
days or until the adjournment of Congress to disapprove the
recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the recommendations
became binding.

^10Budget quality estimates were to be developed once BRAC decisions were
made and detailed implementation plans were developed.

           o Reassigning military personnel could provide a false sense of
           savings. We reported that nearly half (47 percent) of the
           projected net annual recurring savings from DOD's BRAC
           recommendations were associated with eliminating positions
           currently held by military personnel. However, rather than
           reducing end strength levels, DOD intended to reassign or shift
           these personnel to other areas, which may enhance capabilities in
           these other areas, but also limits dollar savings available
           outside of the personnel accounts for other uses. Although we
           agree that transferring personnel to other positions may enhance
           capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to
           another area of need, we do not believe that such transfers
           produce a tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other
           defense priorities outside the military personnel accounts because
           these personnel will remain in the end strength (GAO-05-785, p.
           22-23). The Commission concurred with our position and rejected
           the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, in part
           because the Commission believed that the closure would result in a
           cost increase and not a savings. The Commission stated their
           belief that savings were unlikely because the Air Force planned to
           use the positions for other missions, meaning the incumbents would
           remain in the Air Force continuing to draw salaries and benefits
           (Commission report, p. 160). In contrast, DOD considers military
           personnel reductions attributable to BRAC recommendations as
           savings because the reductions in military personnel allow DOD to
           reapply these military personnel to support new capabilities and
           to improve operational efficiencies. We would note that the
           counting of "savings" in this way is a long-standing disagreement
           between DOD and us.

           o Magnitude of savings from business process reengineering efforts
           was uncertain. About $500 million, or about 9 percent, of the
           projected net annual recurring savings from DOD's proposed
           recommendations was based on business process reengineering
           efforts, but the expected efficiency gains from these
           recommendations were based on assumptions that were subject to
           some uncertainty and had not been validated. We reported that
           actual savings would be shaped by how the recommendations were
           implemented (GAO-05-785, p. 24-26). In June 2007 we reported that
           the Navy had revised its cost and savings estimates for its
           recommendation to create fleet readiness centers and, while
           projected savings from the recommendation are still likely to be
           substantial, they are subject to some uncertainties and further
           efforts will be required to assess actual savings as the
           recommendation is implemented.^11 The Commission also expressed
           concern about the savings that DOD claimed for business process
           reengineering-related recommendations and questioned the
           assumptions the department used to support these projected savings
           (Commission report, p. 330).

           o Lengthy payback periods for many recommendations. Many of DOD's
           proposed recommendations are likely to experience lengthy payback
           periods--the time required for cumulative estimated savings to
           exceed cumulative estimated costs--which, in some cases, called
           into question whether the department would be gaining sufficient
           monetary value for the up-front investment cost required to
           implement its recommendations and the time required to recover
           this investment. More than one-third of DOD's proposed
           recommendations would have taken more than 6 years to pay back or
           would never produce savings. The longer payback period associated
           with certain recommendations was due, in part, to the Secretary's
           stated goal for the 2005 BRAC round of transformation, including
           rebasing in the United States of about 47,000 forces stationed
           overseas, recommendations to move activities from leased space to
           military installations, and recommendations involving the reserve
           components that are projected to have a combination of relatively
           high military construction costs and relatively low annual
           recurring savings (GAO-05-785, p. 41-42). For example, in May 2007
           we reported that our analysis of the Air Force's recommendations
           related to the Air National Guard showed that implementing these
           recommendations would result in a net annual recurring cost of $53
           million, rather than a net annual recurring savings of $26 million
           as estimated by the Commission.^12 The Commission reported that
           the 2005 BRAC round was different from previous rounds in that the
           historical goal of achieving savings was not always the primary
           consideration and other goals, such as transformation, led to
           proposed recommendations that had long payback periods or would
           never pay back (Commission report, p. 3).

^11GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness
Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and
Overcome Certain Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).

           o Differences between communities and DOD on cost and savings
           estimates. During our July 2005 testimony before the Commission,
           we noted that we had observed a number of instances, such as the
           closure of Fort Monmouth, where there were disagreements between
           what installation officials believed it would cost to implement
           certain BRAC recommendations and what DOD included in the COBRA
           model. We stated in our July 2005 testimony that we believed these
           differences would be worked out over time as implementation plans
           were developed, but we also suggested that at least some of the
           differences needed to be reconciled between the Commission, DOD,
           and affected installations. The Commission's final report does not
           state what actions the Commission took to address this suggestion.

           o Savings assumptions for some civilian and military personnel
           reductions lacked manpower studies. In 2005, we identified issues
           with the assumptions that two joint cross-service groups used to
           determine personnel reductions for closure and realignment
           actions, which raised questions about projected savings. In the
           absence of more precise manpower studies, the groups used generic
           savings factors to estimate the number of personnel positions that
           could be eliminated when organizations were co-located or
           consolidated. However, these reductions were based on assumptions
           that had undergone limited testing and full savings realization
           depends upon the attainment of these personnel reductions
           (GAO-05-785, p. 157, 229). The Commission expressed a concern that
           manpower reductions for at least one recommendation, which created
           several joint bases, were determined through the application of a
           formula and not through deliberations among commanders of affected
           installations and, therefore, manpower reductions were directed by
           the recommendation rather than derived from manpower studies and
           analyses of the functions to be carried out (Commission report, p.
           219-222).
			  
^12GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation
of Air National Guard Recommendations, GAO-07-641 (Washington, D.C.: May
16, 2007).

           o Full estimated environmental restoration costs were uncertain.
           Consistent with prior BRAC rounds, DOD excluded estimated
           environmental restoration costs from its cost and savings
           estimates on the premise that restoration is a liability that the
           department must address regardless of whether a base is kept open
           or closed. Our prior work has shown that environmental costs can
           be significant, accounting for about one-third, or $8.3 billion,
           of the $23.3 billion in costs incurred through fiscal year 2003
           for implementing BRAC actions from the four previous rounds. As
           for the 2005 BRAC round, we reported in January 2007 that, while
           the expected environmental cleanup costs from the 2005 BRAC round
           are not fully known, DOD data indicate that about $950 million
           will be needed to clean up those bases that were closed in the
           2005 BRAC round.^13 As we stated in testimony before the
           Commission in 2005, environmental restoration has the potential to
           slow the transfer of unneeded base property freed up by the BRAC
           process to communities surrounding those bases, which has adverse
           effects on BRAC communities, as this property cannot be put to
           productive reuse until cleanup is substantially completed. In this
           regard, we stated that it is critical that the department
           adequately plan for and fund environmental restoration
           requirements to provide for the expedited transfer of unneeded
           property to others for subsequent reuse (GAO-05-905, p. 29). The
           Commission agreed with our concerns (Commission report, p. 335).

           o Certain other expected costs and savings to the government were
           not accounted for. As we reported in 2005, the BRAC legislation
           required that DOD take into account the effect of proposed
           closures and realignments on the costs of any other activity of
           the department or any other federal agency that may be required to
           assume responsibility for activities at military installations.
           While the military services and joint cross-service groups were
           aware of the potential for these costs, estimated costs were not
           included in the cost and savings analyses because it was unclear
           what actions an agency might take in response to the BRAC action
           (GAO-05-785, p. 44-45). The Commission report recommended that in
           the future the department improve coordination with other affected
           federal agencies so that savings estimates do not ignore the
           increased or shifted costs of federal operations to agencies
           outside of DOD (Commission report, p. 308).

           Additionally, although not required to be included in DOD's cost
           and savings analysis, costs associated with transition assistance,
           planning grants, and other assistance made available to affected
           communities by DOD and other agencies could add to the total costs
           to the government of implementing BRAC. We reported that in the
           prior four BRAC rounds, four federal government agencies provided
           nearly $2 billion in assistance through fiscal year 2004 to
           communities and individuals. DOD officials said these agencies are
           slated to perform similar roles in the 2005 round. However, in
           contrast to other BRAC rounds, assistance will likely be needed
           not only for communities surrounding bases that are losing
           missions and personnel, but also communities that face
           considerable challenges dealing with large influxes of personnel
           and military missions. These personnel increases are likely to
           place additional demands on community services, including the
           provision of adequate housing and schools and increased demand for
           roads and utilities. Some communities may not have adequate
           resources to address needs related to the large influxes of people
           in the short term and, consequently, the federal government may
           have to provide some assistance, thereby increasing BRAC
           implementation expenditures (GAO-05-785 p. 47-52).
			  
^13GAO, Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded
Property, GAO-07-166 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).

           Potentially offsetting some of these costs, we reported in 2005
           that the cost and savings estimates excluded anticipated revenue
           from the sale of unneeded former base property or the transfer of
           property to communities through economic development conveyances.
           The potential for significant revenue exists at certain locations
           (GAO-05-785, p. 47-48). We noted in our July 2005 testimony that
           there was an indication that the department would place greater
           emphasis on selling property as a disposal process, but details
           were still being formulated at that time.

           o DOD's past efforts at tracking actual cost and savings had been
           limited. In our testimony before the Commission we stated that the
           department proposed various actions where likely savings would
           depend on how the actions were implemented, but the details of
           their implementation had yet to be developed. We noted that we
           believed it would be important for DOD to develop clearly defined
           implementation plans and to monitor the implementation of these
           actions to ensure compliance with proposed actions and to help
           ensure that these savings in fact occurred. In our assessment of
           the 2005 BRAC process we recommended that DOD establish mechanisms
           for tracking and periodically updating savings estimates as the
           BRAC recommendations are implemented. DOD concurred with this
           recommendation.
			  
Human Capital Challenges			  

We identified the potential loss of human capital skills, including
expertise and experience, as an issue for some of DOD's proposed
realignment and closure actions. We pointed out to the Commission that
gaining bases may face challenges if fewer people moved. For example,
related to the proposed but subsequently overturned closure of Naval
Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine, officials from one of the joint cross-service
groups estimated that it would have taken up to 8 years to fully develop
skills associated with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines. Officials
at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, expressed a similar concern about the
proposed closure of that installation and transfer of a large portion of
the work to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We noted in our July 2005
testimony before the Commission that should there be BRAC actions where
the loss of personnel is extensive, particularly for those skills
requiring extensive education, training, and experience, the department
could face challenges in replacing these critical skills. In this regard,
we noted that it was important that the department develop transition
plans that recognize the loss of human capital skills and provide for
replacement capability to minimize disruption to ongoing defense
operations. We also concluded in 2005 that without such a plan, the
department's ability to provide the necessary support to military forces
could be at risk (GAO-05-905, p. 25-26).

The Commission's report included concerns about the loss of intellectual
capital as a result of some closure or realignment actions. For example,
the Commission specifically noted that the loss of some intellectual
capital was to be expected from the relocation of technical activities
from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Commission report
stated that the Commission agreed with DOD's view that the loss of
intellectual capital was an implementation challenge that must be managed
with careful planning and sequencing. The Commission concluded that the
adverse effects of moving existing programs could be managed over the
6-year implementation period by properly sequencing the movement of
programs to ensure no loss in service, or by providing temporary redundant
or duplicative capabilities as necessary to ensure continuous and
uninterrupted program integrity. Further, the Commission report stated
"the department pointed out that there is a nationally recognized science
and technology workforce in Maryland containing the highest percentage of
professional and technical workers (about 24 percent)." To address the
potential loss of intellectual capital, the Commission recommended that
the Secretary of Defense submit a report to certain congressional
committees that addresses aspects of the potential loss of expertise and
experience. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of
Defense submit a report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction
that movement of operations, functions, or activities from Fort Monmouth
to the Aberdeen Proving Ground will be accomplished without disruption of
support to the Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency
operations and that safeguards exist to ensure that necessary redundant
capabilities have been put in place to mitigate the potential degradation
of such support, and to ensure maximum retention of critical workforce.
Also, the Commission noted that they believed congressional oversight on
this issue may benefit from a review by us (Commission report, p. 10-12).
Because the Commission suggested our review in its findings on the closure
of Fort Monmouth and you have requested that we review the methodology of
the DOD report, we will review the methodology after DOD issues its
report.

Agency Comments

Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.

                                   _________

We are sending copies of this correspondence to the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services; the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,
Subcommittees on Defense; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate
and House Committees on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies; the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; members of the Congressional
delegations from Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; the
Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will also make copies to others upon request. In addition, the
correspondence will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[3]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this correspondence, please
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or [4][email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this correspondence.

Brian J. Lepore
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

(351089)

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