Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to
the 2005 Round (06-SEP-07, GAO-07-1203R).
This correspondence follows up an August 1, 2007, meeting to
discuss concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates
and the potential loss of expertise and experience from the
closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since
the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth as part of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) round became effective. The work since the independent
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (the
Commission) recommendations became effective has been done under
the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on
his own initiative and has focused on the implementation of
realignment and closure actions. This brief summary reviews our
public observations made in 2005 about the 2005 BRAC round,
specifically those related to Fort Monmouth. Also reviewed, under
the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own
initiative, is the methodology of a forthcoming DOD report on the
transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-1203R
ACCNO: A75807
TITLE: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations
Related to the 2005 Round
DATE: 09/06/2007
SUBJECT: Base closures
Base realignments
Cost analysis
Cost effectiveness analysis
Defense capabilities
Defense cost control
Military bases
Military facilities
DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program
DOD Cost of Base Realignment Action
Model
Fort Monmouth (NJ)
******************************************************************
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GAO-07-1203R
* [1]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [2]Order by Mail or Phone
September 6, 2007
The Honorable Frank Lautenberg
The Honorable Robert Menendez
United States Senate
The Honorable Rush Holt
The Honorable Frank Pallone
The Honorable Jim Saxton
The Honorable Christopher Smith
House of Representatives
Subject: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to
the 2005 Round
This correspondence is in follow-up to our August 1, 2007, meeting to
discuss your concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates and
the potential loss of expertise and experience from the closure of Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since the recommendation to
close Fort Monmouth as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round became effective. As we discussed
with you, our BRAC work since the independent Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission's (the Commission) recommendations became effective
has been done under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct
reviews on his own initiative^1 and has focused on the implementation of
realignment and closure actions. Consistent with our approach, we offered
to briefly summarize the observations we made in 2005 publicly about the
2005 BRAC round, specifically those related to Fort Monmouth, under the
authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own
initiative, and you believed this would be helpful. As such, the objective
of this correspondence is to summarize the observations we made publicly
on the 2005 BRAC round prior to the Commission's final recommendations. We
also agreed to review, under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct reviews on his own initiative, the methodology of a forthcoming
DOD report on the transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
The law authorizing the 2005 BRAC round^2 directed us to independently
assess DOD's process and recommendations and report by July 1, 2005.^3 As
such, we issued a report on that date and testified before the Commission
twice in 2005.^4 Subsequently, we have initiated several engagements under
the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own
initiative to review implementation of certain BRAC actions because of
broad congressional interest in these actions. Some of the engagements
that we are currently undertaking address, in part, issues that you
raised. We will provide copies of those reports related to the closure of
Fort Monmouth when they are completed.
^131 U.S.C. S 717.
^2P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (2001).
^3GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
To prepare this correspondence, we relied on our report on the 2005 BRAC
decision-making process and our testimonies before the Commission in May
2005 and July 2005.^5 We did not perform additional interviews,
information gathering, or analysis to prepare this correspondence. We did
not reevaluate or reassess our earlier findings. Additionally, we reviewed
the Commission's final report and included information from that report,^6
where applicable, to provide context for how the issues we previously
identified were addressed by the Commission. We limited the scope of this
correspondence to those issues raised in our report and testimonies on the
2005 BRAC decision-making process, but included updated information from
our BRAC work issued since 2005, as appropriate. Our previous work on
which this correspondence was based was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
Prior to the Commission's final decisions in September 2005, we presented
numerous observations about DOD's 2005 BRAC recommendations and
decision-making process. While we found that DOD used a fundamentally
sound overall process that was generally logical, well documented, and
reasoned to determine its BRAC recommendations, we identified limitations
with DOD's cost and savings estimates and potential human capital
challenges in implementing some of the recommendations, among other
observations. We noted that projected savings could be overestimated. For
example, in 2005, we found that some of DOD's assumptions related to
business process reengineering were not validated and the actual savings
for these recommendations would be based on how the recommendations were
implemented. Also in 2005, we identified the potential loss of expertise
and experience due to fewer than anticipated civilian employees moving to
a gaining base as a potential issue for some closure and realignment
actions.
Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.
^4GAO, Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC
Rounds, GAO-05-614 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005); and Military Bases:
Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection Process
and Recommendations, GAO-05-905 (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005).
^5GAO-05-785, GAO-05-614, and GAO-05-905.
^6Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure and
Realignment Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.: Sept. 8,
2005).
Background
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round.^7 In May 2005, the Secretary of Defense made
public 222 recommendations that were estimated to generate net annual
recurring savings of $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012. In making
its 2005 realignment and closure recommendations, DOD applied legally
mandated selection criteria that included military value, costs and
savings, economic impact to local communities, community support
infrastructure, and environmental impact. BRAC legislation directed the
Secretary of Defense in applying this criteria to give priority
consideration to the military value over other criteria. In fact, military
value was the primary consideration for making BRAC recommendations, as
reported by both DOD and the Commission. DOD established a structured and
largely sequential process for obtaining and analyzing data that provided
an informed basis for identifying and evaluating realignment and closure
options. DOD incorporated into its analytical process several key
considerations required by BRAC legislation, including the use of
certified data,^8 basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan,
and emphasizing its military value selection criteria. Additionally, the
Secretary of Defense established three goals for the 2005 BRAC round: (1)
reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) transforming DOD
by aligning the infrastructure with the defense strategy, and (3)
fostering jointness across DOD. In our 2005 report, we stated our belief
that the recommendations overall would produce savings and noted that the
extent of transformational and joint progress would vary.
The Commission was an independent body that had the authority to change
the Secretary's recommendations if it determined that the Secretary
deviated substantially from the legally mandated selection criteria and
the force structure plan. The Commission formulated its list of
recommendations based on DOD's proposed recommendations and the
Commission's analysis of the extent to which DOD followed the selection
criteria and the force structure plan. For example, the Commission found
that DOD substantially deviated from military value and two of the other
selection criteria and the force structure plan and removed the proposed
realignment of the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate and a
related program manager from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, from the recommendation that included the closure of
Fort Monmouth. After the Commission's review in 2005, it forwarded a list
of 182 recommendations for base closures or realignments to the President.
The Commission estimated that its recommendations would generate net
annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012.
The Commission's recommendations were accepted in their entirety by the
President and Congress,^9 became effective November 9, 2005, and
constitute the set of recommendations that DOD was in the process of
implementing at the time of this correspondence.
^7The first round in 1988 was authorized by the Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended (Pub. L. No.
100-526, Title II, (1988)). Subsequently, additional BRAC rounds were
completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized by the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (Pub. L. No.101-510, Title
XXIX (1990)). The latest round--BRAC 2005--was authorized by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title
XXX (2001)).
^8The law that established certain provisions of the BRAC process (Pub. L.
No. 101-510, section 2903 (c)(5)) required specified DOD personnel to
certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information
provided to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the
realignment or closure of a military installation was accurate and
complete. During the BRAC process, data were certified by senior officials
at DOD installations.
We Made Numerous Observations about the 2005 BRAC Recommendations and
Process
While we concluded that DOD used a fundamentally sound overall process, we
also made numerous observations about the department's BRAC
recommendations and decision-making process. On the one hand, we reported
that DOD's decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations
was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned. On the other hand,
we also identified limitations with cost and savings estimates and certain
human capital challenges related to the potential loss of experience and
expertise after certain recommendations were implemented, among other
observations.
Limitations with Cost and Savings Estimates
In our assessment of DOD's 2005 BRAC round, we reported that DOD's
decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations was
generally logical, well documented, and reasoned and we stated our belief
that the 2005 BRAC recommendations would produce savings overall; however,
we identified some limitations with cost and savings estimates. As in all
previous BRAC rounds, DOD used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
(COBRA) model to provide a standard quantitative approach to compare
estimated costs and savings across various proposed recommendations. The
COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and averages but
is not intended to and consequently does not present budget quality
estimates, as we pointed out in 2005 (GAO-05-785, p. 242).^10 As a result,
COBRA-developed cost and savings estimates cannot be assumed to represent
the actual costs that Congress will need to appropriate funds to complete
implementation of BRAC recommendations, nor will they fully reflect the
savings to be achieved after implementation. In other words, the costs of
implementation identified in COBRA are likely to be different than the
costs that DOD will incur to complete implementation. We have examined
COBRA in the past, as well as during our review of the 2005 BRAC round,
and found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing
potential costs and savings among alternative closure and realignment
scenarios with the caveat that the estimates do not represent budget
quality data. Nonetheless, we raised a number of issues related to the
cost and savings estimates resulting from realignment and closure
decisions including the following.
^9The President was required to approve or disapprove the Commission's
recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005. After they were
approved, the recommendations were forwarded to Congress, which had 45
days or until the adjournment of Congress to disapprove the
recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the recommendations
became binding.
^10Budget quality estimates were to be developed once BRAC decisions were
made and detailed implementation plans were developed.
o Reassigning military personnel could provide a false sense of
savings. We reported that nearly half (47 percent) of the
projected net annual recurring savings from DOD's BRAC
recommendations were associated with eliminating positions
currently held by military personnel. However, rather than
reducing end strength levels, DOD intended to reassign or shift
these personnel to other areas, which may enhance capabilities in
these other areas, but also limits dollar savings available
outside of the personnel accounts for other uses. Although we
agree that transferring personnel to other positions may enhance
capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to
another area of need, we do not believe that such transfers
produce a tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other
defense priorities outside the military personnel accounts because
these personnel will remain in the end strength (GAO-05-785, p.
22-23). The Commission concurred with our position and rejected
the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, in part
because the Commission believed that the closure would result in a
cost increase and not a savings. The Commission stated their
belief that savings were unlikely because the Air Force planned to
use the positions for other missions, meaning the incumbents would
remain in the Air Force continuing to draw salaries and benefits
(Commission report, p. 160). In contrast, DOD considers military
personnel reductions attributable to BRAC recommendations as
savings because the reductions in military personnel allow DOD to
reapply these military personnel to support new capabilities and
to improve operational efficiencies. We would note that the
counting of "savings" in this way is a long-standing disagreement
between DOD and us.
o Magnitude of savings from business process reengineering efforts
was uncertain. About $500 million, or about 9 percent, of the
projected net annual recurring savings from DOD's proposed
recommendations was based on business process reengineering
efforts, but the expected efficiency gains from these
recommendations were based on assumptions that were subject to
some uncertainty and had not been validated. We reported that
actual savings would be shaped by how the recommendations were
implemented (GAO-05-785, p. 24-26). In June 2007 we reported that
the Navy had revised its cost and savings estimates for its
recommendation to create fleet readiness centers and, while
projected savings from the recommendation are still likely to be
substantial, they are subject to some uncertainties and further
efforts will be required to assess actual savings as the
recommendation is implemented.^11 The Commission also expressed
concern about the savings that DOD claimed for business process
reengineering-related recommendations and questioned the
assumptions the department used to support these projected savings
(Commission report, p. 330).
o Lengthy payback periods for many recommendations. Many of DOD's
proposed recommendations are likely to experience lengthy payback
periods--the time required for cumulative estimated savings to
exceed cumulative estimated costs--which, in some cases, called
into question whether the department would be gaining sufficient
monetary value for the up-front investment cost required to
implement its recommendations and the time required to recover
this investment. More than one-third of DOD's proposed
recommendations would have taken more than 6 years to pay back or
would never produce savings. The longer payback period associated
with certain recommendations was due, in part, to the Secretary's
stated goal for the 2005 BRAC round of transformation, including
rebasing in the United States of about 47,000 forces stationed
overseas, recommendations to move activities from leased space to
military installations, and recommendations involving the reserve
components that are projected to have a combination of relatively
high military construction costs and relatively low annual
recurring savings (GAO-05-785, p. 41-42). For example, in May 2007
we reported that our analysis of the Air Force's recommendations
related to the Air National Guard showed that implementing these
recommendations would result in a net annual recurring cost of $53
million, rather than a net annual recurring savings of $26 million
as estimated by the Commission.^12 The Commission reported that
the 2005 BRAC round was different from previous rounds in that the
historical goal of achieving savings was not always the primary
consideration and other goals, such as transformation, led to
proposed recommendations that had long payback periods or would
never pay back (Commission report, p. 3).
^11GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness
Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and
Overcome Certain Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
o Differences between communities and DOD on cost and savings
estimates. During our July 2005 testimony before the Commission,
we noted that we had observed a number of instances, such as the
closure of Fort Monmouth, where there were disagreements between
what installation officials believed it would cost to implement
certain BRAC recommendations and what DOD included in the COBRA
model. We stated in our July 2005 testimony that we believed these
differences would be worked out over time as implementation plans
were developed, but we also suggested that at least some of the
differences needed to be reconciled between the Commission, DOD,
and affected installations. The Commission's final report does not
state what actions the Commission took to address this suggestion.
o Savings assumptions for some civilian and military personnel
reductions lacked manpower studies. In 2005, we identified issues
with the assumptions that two joint cross-service groups used to
determine personnel reductions for closure and realignment
actions, which raised questions about projected savings. In the
absence of more precise manpower studies, the groups used generic
savings factors to estimate the number of personnel positions that
could be eliminated when organizations were co-located or
consolidated. However, these reductions were based on assumptions
that had undergone limited testing and full savings realization
depends upon the attainment of these personnel reductions
(GAO-05-785, p. 157, 229). The Commission expressed a concern that
manpower reductions for at least one recommendation, which created
several joint bases, were determined through the application of a
formula and not through deliberations among commanders of affected
installations and, therefore, manpower reductions were directed by
the recommendation rather than derived from manpower studies and
analyses of the functions to be carried out (Commission report, p.
219-222).
^12GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation
of Air National Guard Recommendations, GAO-07-641 (Washington, D.C.: May
16, 2007).
o Full estimated environmental restoration costs were uncertain.
Consistent with prior BRAC rounds, DOD excluded estimated
environmental restoration costs from its cost and savings
estimates on the premise that restoration is a liability that the
department must address regardless of whether a base is kept open
or closed. Our prior work has shown that environmental costs can
be significant, accounting for about one-third, or $8.3 billion,
of the $23.3 billion in costs incurred through fiscal year 2003
for implementing BRAC actions from the four previous rounds. As
for the 2005 BRAC round, we reported in January 2007 that, while
the expected environmental cleanup costs from the 2005 BRAC round
are not fully known, DOD data indicate that about $950 million
will be needed to clean up those bases that were closed in the
2005 BRAC round.^13 As we stated in testimony before the
Commission in 2005, environmental restoration has the potential to
slow the transfer of unneeded base property freed up by the BRAC
process to communities surrounding those bases, which has adverse
effects on BRAC communities, as this property cannot be put to
productive reuse until cleanup is substantially completed. In this
regard, we stated that it is critical that the department
adequately plan for and fund environmental restoration
requirements to provide for the expedited transfer of unneeded
property to others for subsequent reuse (GAO-05-905, p. 29). The
Commission agreed with our concerns (Commission report, p. 335).
o Certain other expected costs and savings to the government were
not accounted for. As we reported in 2005, the BRAC legislation
required that DOD take into account the effect of proposed
closures and realignments on the costs of any other activity of
the department or any other federal agency that may be required to
assume responsibility for activities at military installations.
While the military services and joint cross-service groups were
aware of the potential for these costs, estimated costs were not
included in the cost and savings analyses because it was unclear
what actions an agency might take in response to the BRAC action
(GAO-05-785, p. 44-45). The Commission report recommended that in
the future the department improve coordination with other affected
federal agencies so that savings estimates do not ignore the
increased or shifted costs of federal operations to agencies
outside of DOD (Commission report, p. 308).
Additionally, although not required to be included in DOD's cost
and savings analysis, costs associated with transition assistance,
planning grants, and other assistance made available to affected
communities by DOD and other agencies could add to the total costs
to the government of implementing BRAC. We reported that in the
prior four BRAC rounds, four federal government agencies provided
nearly $2 billion in assistance through fiscal year 2004 to
communities and individuals. DOD officials said these agencies are
slated to perform similar roles in the 2005 round. However, in
contrast to other BRAC rounds, assistance will likely be needed
not only for communities surrounding bases that are losing
missions and personnel, but also communities that face
considerable challenges dealing with large influxes of personnel
and military missions. These personnel increases are likely to
place additional demands on community services, including the
provision of adequate housing and schools and increased demand for
roads and utilities. Some communities may not have adequate
resources to address needs related to the large influxes of people
in the short term and, consequently, the federal government may
have to provide some assistance, thereby increasing BRAC
implementation expenditures (GAO-05-785 p. 47-52).
^13GAO, Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded
Property, GAO-07-166 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).
Potentially offsetting some of these costs, we reported in 2005
that the cost and savings estimates excluded anticipated revenue
from the sale of unneeded former base property or the transfer of
property to communities through economic development conveyances.
The potential for significant revenue exists at certain locations
(GAO-05-785, p. 47-48). We noted in our July 2005 testimony that
there was an indication that the department would place greater
emphasis on selling property as a disposal process, but details
were still being formulated at that time.
o DOD's past efforts at tracking actual cost and savings had been
limited. In our testimony before the Commission we stated that the
department proposed various actions where likely savings would
depend on how the actions were implemented, but the details of
their implementation had yet to be developed. We noted that we
believed it would be important for DOD to develop clearly defined
implementation plans and to monitor the implementation of these
actions to ensure compliance with proposed actions and to help
ensure that these savings in fact occurred. In our assessment of
the 2005 BRAC process we recommended that DOD establish mechanisms
for tracking and periodically updating savings estimates as the
BRAC recommendations are implemented. DOD concurred with this
recommendation.
Human Capital Challenges
We identified the potential loss of human capital skills, including
expertise and experience, as an issue for some of DOD's proposed
realignment and closure actions. We pointed out to the Commission that
gaining bases may face challenges if fewer people moved. For example,
related to the proposed but subsequently overturned closure of Naval
Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine, officials from one of the joint cross-service
groups estimated that it would have taken up to 8 years to fully develop
skills associated with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines. Officials
at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, expressed a similar concern about the
proposed closure of that installation and transfer of a large portion of
the work to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We noted in our July 2005
testimony before the Commission that should there be BRAC actions where
the loss of personnel is extensive, particularly for those skills
requiring extensive education, training, and experience, the department
could face challenges in replacing these critical skills. In this regard,
we noted that it was important that the department develop transition
plans that recognize the loss of human capital skills and provide for
replacement capability to minimize disruption to ongoing defense
operations. We also concluded in 2005 that without such a plan, the
department's ability to provide the necessary support to military forces
could be at risk (GAO-05-905, p. 25-26).
The Commission's report included concerns about the loss of intellectual
capital as a result of some closure or realignment actions. For example,
the Commission specifically noted that the loss of some intellectual
capital was to be expected from the relocation of technical activities
from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Commission report
stated that the Commission agreed with DOD's view that the loss of
intellectual capital was an implementation challenge that must be managed
with careful planning and sequencing. The Commission concluded that the
adverse effects of moving existing programs could be managed over the
6-year implementation period by properly sequencing the movement of
programs to ensure no loss in service, or by providing temporary redundant
or duplicative capabilities as necessary to ensure continuous and
uninterrupted program integrity. Further, the Commission report stated
"the department pointed out that there is a nationally recognized science
and technology workforce in Maryland containing the highest percentage of
professional and technical workers (about 24 percent)." To address the
potential loss of intellectual capital, the Commission recommended that
the Secretary of Defense submit a report to certain congressional
committees that addresses aspects of the potential loss of expertise and
experience. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of
Defense submit a report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction
that movement of operations, functions, or activities from Fort Monmouth
to the Aberdeen Proving Ground will be accomplished without disruption of
support to the Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency
operations and that safeguards exist to ensure that necessary redundant
capabilities have been put in place to mitigate the potential degradation
of such support, and to ensure maximum retention of critical workforce.
Also, the Commission noted that they believed congressional oversight on
this issue may benefit from a review by us (Commission report, p. 10-12).
Because the Commission suggested our review in its findings on the closure
of Fort Monmouth and you have requested that we review the methodology of
the DOD report, we will review the methodology after DOD issues its
report.
Agency Comments
Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.
_________
We are sending copies of this correspondence to the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services; the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,
Subcommittees on Defense; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate
and House Committees on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies; the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; members of the Congressional
delegations from Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; the
Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will also make copies to others upon request. In addition, the
correspondence will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[3]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this correspondence, please
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or [4]leporeb@gao.gov . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this correspondence.
Brian J. Lepore
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
(351089)
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