Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has 
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks	 
(04-SEP-07, GAO-07-1195).					 
                                                                 
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September
1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18	 
benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the		 
achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from	 
commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June	 
2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to	 
report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory	 
progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether
the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed  
government documents and interviewed officials from U.S.	 
agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made	 
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were  
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have	 
completed since May 2003.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1195					        
    ACCNO:   A75587						        
  TITLE:     Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi	      
Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic  
Benchmarks							 
     DATE:   09/04/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Audits						 
	     Benchmark testing					 
	     Economic stabilization				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Legislation					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Iraq						 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-1195

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Legislative Benchmarks
     * [3]Security Benchmarks
     * [4]Economic Benchmark
     * [5]Conclusions
     * [6]Recommendations
     * [7]Agency Comments
     * [8]Issue
     * [9]Status

          * [10]Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Polit
          * [11]Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of

     * [12]Issue
     * [13]Status
     * [14]Issue
     * [15]Status
     * [16]Issue
     * [17]Status
     * [18]Issue
     * [19]Status
     * [20]Issue
     * [21]Status

          * [22]Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation

     * [23]Issue
     * [24]Status

          * [25]Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made
          * [26]Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist

     * [27]Issue
     * [28]Status
     * [29]Issue
     * [30]Status
     * [31]Issue
     * [32]Status
     * [33]Issue
     * [34]Status
     * [35]Issue
     * [36]Status
     * [37]Issue
     * [38]Status
     * [39]Issue
     * [40]Status
     * [41]Issue
     * [42]Status
     * [43]Issue
     * [44]Status

          * [45]Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are
          * [46]Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotec

     * [47]Issue
     * [48]Status

          * [49]Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are U
          * [50]Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large

     * [51]Issue
     * [52]Status

          * [53]Legislative Benchmarks
          * [54]Security Benchmarks
          * [55]Economic Benchmark

     * [56]GAO Comments
     * [57]GAO Comments
     * [58]GAO Contacts
     * [59]Staff Acknowledgements
     * [60]GAO's Mission
     * [61]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [62]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [63]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [64]Congressional Relations
     * [65]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ

Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks

GAO-07-1195

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Legislative Benchmarks 4
Security Benchmarks 7
Economic Benchmark 13
Conclusions 13
Recommendations 14
Agency Comments 14
Appendix I Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review 19
Issue 19
Status 19
Appendix II Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform 23
Issue 23
Status 23
Appendix III Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation 25
Issue 25
Status 25
Appendix IV Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions 28
Issue 28
Status 28
Appendix V Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation 31
Issue 31
Status 31
Appendix VI Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation 33
Issue 33
Status 33
Appendix VII Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament 35
Issue 35
Status 35
Appendix VIII Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees 38
Issue 38
Status 38
Appendix IX Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades 40
Issue 40
Status 40
Appendix X Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority 42
Issue 42
Status 42
Appendix XI Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law 44
Issue 44
Status 44
Appendix XII Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens 46
Issue 46
Status 46
Appendix XIII Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control 50
Issue 50
Status 50
Appendix XIV Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations 55
Issue 55
Status 55
Appendix XV Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently
58
Issue 58
Status 58
Appendix XVI Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights 61
Issue 61
Status 61
Appendix XVII Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues 64
Issue 64
Status 64
Appendix XVIII Benchmark 18 - False Accusations 68
Issue 68
Status 68
Appendix XIX Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 70
Appendix XX Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report 72
Appendix XXI Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 73
Appendix XXII Comments from the Department of State 77
GAO Comments 86
Appendix XXIII Comments from the Department of Defense 88
GAO Comments 91
Appendix XXIV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 92

Figures

Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks 5
Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks 8
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) 11
Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad 48
Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) 52
Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007
56
Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 70

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced
and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO.
However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other
material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you
wish to reproduce this material separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

September 4, 2007

Congressional Committees:

Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of troops
and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic goal of
creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and be an
ally in the War on Terror. These troops have performed courageously under
dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans'
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of
20071 (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007,2
an independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met
18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of
the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to
advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the
Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and
promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained in the Act were
derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi
government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for information on
the origin of these benchmarks.)

The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed
to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster
conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy recognizes that
the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve
political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening
extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi government. Amid such
violence, it became increasingly difficult for Iraqi leaders to make the
compromises necessary to foster reconciliation through the passage of
legislation aimed at reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing
hydrocarbon revenues more equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new
strategy was aimed at providing the Iraqi government with the time and
space needed to help address reconciliation among the various segments of
Iraqi society.

1Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.

2GAO is providing this report to Congress on September 4th, 2007, the
first business day following September 1st.

As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of whether
or not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative, security, and
economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the status of the
achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks, eight address
legislative actions, nine address security actions, and one is
economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to
report in July and September 2007 on the status of each benchmark, and to
provide an assessment on whether satisfactory progress is being made
toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met.
In order to meet our statutory responsibilities in a manner consistent
with GAO's core values, we decided to use "partially met" criteria for
selected benchmarks. See appendices I-XVIII for information on our
assessment and the status of the achievement of each benchmark, and
appendix XX for a comparison of GAO's assessment with the administration's
July 2007 initial benchmark assessment report. We are also issuing a
separate, classified report on selected benchmarks.

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus,
Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the
government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22
to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May
2003.3 We provided drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for
review and comment. We received formal written comments from State and
Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency and
National Intelligence Council which we incorporated as appropriate. This
letter and each appendix describe the detailed criteria we used in making
our assessments of the 18 benchmarks. As required by the mandate, we made
a determination of whether all 18 benchmarks had been met. For 14 of the
18 benchmarks, we developed criteria for assessing whether the benchmark
was "partially met." For the remaining 4 benchmarks, we determined that
they should be judged as "met" or "not met" because the nature of the
individual benchmarks did not lend themselves to a "partially met"
assessment.

3For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [66]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [67]http://www.gao.gov for a
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.

Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains unclassified
information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our review in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix XXI
contains a detailed description of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall we found that:

           o The constitutional review process is not complete, and laws on
           de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and
           amnesty have not passed;
           o Violence remains high, the number of Iraqi security forces
           capable of conducting independent operations has declined, and
           militias are not disarmed; and
           o Funding for reconstruction has been allocated but is unlikely to
           be spent.

           As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should
           balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi government benchmarks with
           the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and
           other goals of the United States. In addition, future
           administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to
           Congress if they depicted the status of each legislative
           benchmark, provided data on broader measures of violence from all
           relevant U.S. agencies, and assessed the performance and loyalties
           of Iraqi security forces.

           Legislative Benchmarks
 
           Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the
           eight legislative benchmarks and partially met another.4
           Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the
           Iraqi legislature are protected through existing provisions in the
           Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws;
           however, minorities among the Iraqi population are vulnerable and
           their rights are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi government
           partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on
           the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but
           will not be implemented until April 2008.5

           Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark
           requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met.
           Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional
           review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the
           resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing
           between federal and regional governments over issues such as
           distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative
           benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights the status of
           the legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and
           implementation.
			  
4For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met." For the constitutional review,
we would have considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with
Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, (1) the Constitutional Review
Committee had been formed; (2) the Council of Representatives had voted on
the recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the
Council, (3) a national referendum had been held on the proposed
amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark
partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review process
were completed.

5Because this law will not be implemented until April 2008, publication in
the Official Gazette has been deferred, according to State officials, who
assert that a delay in implementation is in the best interest of Iraq.

Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks

aThe Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.

bThe Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out in
Article 138 of the Constitution.

cThe draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according
to UN.

dAccording to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the
election date, though to date this is unclear.

As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform has been
drafted but has yet to be enacted.6 Hydrocarbon legislation is in the
early stages of legislative action; although three key components have
been drafted, none are under active consideration by the Council of
Representatives.7 Although the government of Iraq has established an
independent electoral commission and appointed commissioners, the
government has not implemented legislation to establish provincial council
authorities, provincial elections law, or a date for provincial elections.
No legislation on amnesty or militia disarmament is being considered
because the conditions for a successful program, particularly the need for
a secure environment, are not present, according to U.S. and Iraqi
officials.

Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have
been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi
cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, this boycott
ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of
national unity and further undermines Iraq's already faltering program of
national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq's senior Shi'a, and Sunni
Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts
to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws, as
well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held
without charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of
Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information on
these legislative benchmarks).

6According to U.S. and other officials and documents, enacting legislation
generally includes the following steps, though the process is evolving:
The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have authority to
draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature--either a committee or 10 members
--has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the Presidency
Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed on legal soundness and
subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in the Ministry of
Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature must first pass through its Legal
Committee. The legislation then proceeds through three readings. The
legislation is presented at the first reading. The relevant committee may
amend the law and the Speaker's Office places it on the calendar. After
the first reading, the legislature discusses the proposed law at a second
reading. At the third reading, a final vote is taken article by article.
Laws that receive an affirmative vote are sent to the Presidency Council,
which can disapprove the law. The legislature can override the disapproval
with a three-fifths majority. This ratification process only applies
during the transition period when the Presidency Council is in existence.
Final laws are published in the Official Gazette and become effective on
the date of publication in the gazette unless stipulated otherwise. The
Prime Minister issues an order to implement the law. Laws are implemented
by the appropriate ministry, commission, or government office and
implementing guidance is written.

7For additional information on Iraq's hydrocarbon sector, see GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Oil
Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, [68]GAO-07-1107T (Washington,
D.C.: July 18, 2007).

The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of
these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what step
in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future reporting
should provide this important detail, as we display in figure 1.

Security Benchmarks

Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine
security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political,
communications, economic, and services committees8 in support of the
Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition assistance, 32 of
the planned 34 Joint Security Stations9 across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7
benchmarks, the Iraqi government partially met 2 and did not meet five.
(see fig. 2)

8In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering
Committee and six subcommittees to coordinate political, economic, and
military activities and make decisions in support of the Baghdad Security
Plan. According to a State department official, the executive committee's
major objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi
government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part
of the Baghdad security plan. We defined this benchmark as "met" if the
committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan;
defined this benchmark as "partially met" if at least half of the
committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and
defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the committees
were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. For additional
information, see appendix VIII.

9Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the
administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to
improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in
Baghdad neighborhoods. We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of
the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this
benchmark as "partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security
Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less
than half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. For
additional information, see appendix XIV.

Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks

The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three
trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.10 Since February
2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army battalions equaling
three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the Baghdad Security Plan.
The administration's July 2007 report to Congress noted problems in
manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that the three brigades were
operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our classified report provides
additional information on the readiness levels and performance of these
units, which supports our assessment of this benchmark.

10We defined this benchmark as "met" if the Government of Iraq had
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some of
the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations;
and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to
support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each
unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on
their reliability.

The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that the
Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws
regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation.11 Even though the
Baghad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe havens, and U.S.
commanders report satisfaction with the coalition's ability to target
extremist groups, opportunities for creating temporary safe havens exist
due to the political intervention of Iraqi government officials (see
discussion in appendix X) and the strong sectarian loyalties and militia
infiltration of security forces.

The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian
violence and eliminate militia control of local security.12As discussed in
appendix XIII, militia control of local security forces remains a problem.
Several U.S. and UN reports have found that militias still retain
significant control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad
and other areas of Iraq.

On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian
violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The
administration's July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data
demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the
Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged that
precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine if the
decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is difficult
since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known. Given this
difficulty, broader measures of population security should be used in
judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting civilians and
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as
additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 3, the average
number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the
last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is
largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than
civilians.

11We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did not
allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet some existed;
and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi government had no
stated policy on safe havens.

12We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was
eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there
was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence
was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated.

Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)

While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major
religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections.13 For
2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September. Our classified
report provides further information on measurement issues and trends in
violence in Iraq obtained from other U.S. agencies. The unclassified
August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that
Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some
Sunni insurgents, have reduced al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities and
restricted its freedom of movement. However, the NIE further noted that
the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among
civilians remains high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile
attacks.

13Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 4
years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5,
2005; and September 24, 2006.

For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that:

           o The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to
           make tactical and operational decisions without political
           intervention, resulting in some operational decisions being based
           on sectarian interests.14 
           o The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces
           were providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S.
           reports have cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part
           of Iraqi security forces.15 
           o Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of
           independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July
           2007.16 
           o Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false
           accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to
           U.S. government officials, little has changed since the
           administration's July 2007 report.17

           (See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on
           these security benchmarks).
			  
14We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not face
political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and
operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi
commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making
tactical and operational decisions.

15We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces provided
even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "not met"
if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the
law.

16We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq increased
the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of
Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable
of operating independently.

17We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.			  

           Economic Benchmark
			  
           The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and
           spend $10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in
           reconstruction funds when it passed its 2007 budget in February,
           2007. The New Way Forward in Iraq cited Iraq's inability to spend
           its own resources to rebuild critical infrastructure and deliver
           essential services as an economic challenge to Iraq's
           self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an important
           source of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United States
           has obligated most of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for
           reconstruction and stabilization activities since 2003.

           However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the
           Iraqi government will be spent by the end of Iraq's fiscal year,
           December 31, 2007.18 Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports
           that Iraq's central ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24
           percent, of the approximately $6.5 billion in capital project
           funds allocated to them through July 15, 2007. The remaining funds
           from the $10 billion were allocated to the provinces and the
           Kurdish region. (See appendix XVII for further information on the
           economic benchmark)
			  
			  Conclusions

           As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met
           4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government
           has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to
           advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would
           promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of
           particular concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional
           review that could promote greater Sunni participation in the
           national government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that
           would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders
           recently signing a unity accord, the polarization of Iraq's major
           sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shi'a factions
           diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its
           potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian
           reconciliation.

           Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While
           the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian
           violence, measuring such violence may be difficult since the
           perpetrator's intent is not clearly known. Other measures of
           violence, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show that
           violence has remained high through July 2007.
			  
18We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and
either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they would
be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable or
unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We
defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been allocated.

           As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance
           the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military
           progress, homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the
           United States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks
           would be more useful to the Congress if they clearly depicted the
           status of each legislative benchmark, provided additional
           quantitative and qualitative information on violence from all
           relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance and
           loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition
           operations.
			  
			  Recommendations

           In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
           transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
           recommend that:

                        1. The Secretary of State provide information to the
                        President that clearly specifies the status in
                        drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi
                        legislation;
                        2. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
                        appropriate agencies, provide information to the
                        President on trends in sectarian violence with
                        appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative
                        and qualitative measures of population security, and
                        3. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
                        appropriate agencies, provides additional information
                        on the operational readiness of Iraqi security forces
                        supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly
                        information on their loyalty and willingness to help
                        secure Baghdad.

           As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these
           recommendations.
			  
			  Agency Comments

           We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
           Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central
           Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the
           Central Intelligence Agency provided technical comments, which we
           incorporated as appropriate.

           The Department of State provided written comments, which are
           reprinted in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical
           comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as
           appropriate. State agreed with our recommendation to provide the
           President with additional information on the specific status of
           key Iraqi legislation in preparing future reports to Congress.
           State suggested that we note the standards we used in assessing
           the 18 benchmarks differ from the administration's standards. The
           highlights page and introduction of our report discuss these
           differing standards. State also suggested that we take into
           consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as the
           communique released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007.
           We added additional information to the report about this
           communique and related developments.

           The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which
           are reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with
           technical comments and suggested wording changes that we
           incorporated as appropriate. Defense agreed with our
           recommendations to provide, in concert with other relevant
           agencies, information to the President on trends in sectarian
           violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative
           and qualitative measures of security. Defense also agreed to
           provide the President with additional information on the
           operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the
           Baghdad security plan.

           DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our
           conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence
           are unclear. Further information on DOD's views, and our response,
           are contained in our classified report. However, the additional
           information that DOD provided did not warrant a change in our
           assessment of "not met." We note that the unclassified August 2007
           NIE stated that the overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on
           and casualties among civilians, remains high, Iraq's major
           sectarian groups remain unreconciled, and levels of insurgent and
           sectarian violence will remain high over the next six to twelve
           months.

           DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of "not met" for the
           training and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations
           in Baghdad and provided additional information on this issue.
           While acknowledging that some of these Iraqi units lacked
           personnel, fighting equipment, and vehicles, the U.S. commander
           embedded with the units attested to their fighting capabilities.
           Based on this additional information, and our classified and
           unclassified information, we changed our rating from "not met" to
           "partially met."

           DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark
           related to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional
           information describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted
           operations in Sadr City. For example, from January to August 2007,
           Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted over eighty
           operations that span each sector of Sadr City. However, due to
           sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security forces, and
           support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain
           the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition
           forces. Based on this additional information, we changed this
           assessment to "partially met."

           We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of
           Congress. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's
           Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

           If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
           contact me on (202) 512- 5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff,
           Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979.
           Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
           Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Key
           contributors to this report are included in appendix XXIV.

           David M. Walker
			  United States Comptroller General

           Enclosures

           List of Congressional Committees

           The Honorable Carl Levin
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable John McCain
           Ranking Member
			  Committee on Armed Services
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Foreign Relations
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Daniel Inouye
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Ted Stevens
           Ranking Member
			  Subcommittee on Defense
			  Committee on Appropriations
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Judd Gregg
           Ranking Member
			  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
             Related Programs
           Committee on Appropriations
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Ike Skelton
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Duncan Hunter
           Ranking Member
			  Committee on Armed Services
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable Tom Lantos
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Foreign Affairs
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable John P. Murtha
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
			  Ranking Member
			  Subcommittee on Defense
			  Committee on Appropriations
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
			  Chairwoman
			  The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
           Ranking Member
			  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
             Related Programs
			  Committee on Appropriations
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Tom Davis
           Ranking Member
			  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable John F. Tierney
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Christopher Shays
			  Ranking Member
			  Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
             Affairs 
			  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
			  House of Representatives
			  
			  Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review

           Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the
           constitutional review.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in
           October 2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such
           as claims over disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending
           the Constitution is critical to reaching national agreement on
           power sharing among Iraq's political blocs and furthering national
           reconciliation, according to Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials, and
           the Iraq Study Group report.
			  
			  Status

           Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review
           Committee (CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet
           complete.2 First, the review committee's work is not finished. In
           a May 23, 2007 report, the CRC recommended a package of
           constitutional amendments to the Iraq Council of Representatives.
           However, the package did not resolve the powers of the presidency;
           disputed territories, including Kirkuk; and the relative powers of
           the regions versus the federal government. The CRC received an
           extension until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the
           outstanding issues, but, according to the chairman of the CRC,
           Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on these
           issues. Second, once resolved, the Iraqi legislature must approve
           the package of amendments by an absolute majority vote. Finally,
           if a package of amendments is approved, the Iraqi people will need
           to vote on the amendments in a referendum within 2 months after
           the legislature approves them.
			  
1For the constitutional review, we would have considered the benchmark as
met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, the
Constitutional Review Committee had been formed; the Council of
Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the review committee;
and, if approved by the Council, a national referendum had been held on
the proposed amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the
benchmark partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional
review process were completed. See benchmark 2 for a description of the
criteria for meeting legislative benchmarks.

2The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1) the
Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents to the
Council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that could be
made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be presented
to the Council all at once for a vote upon them and are approved with the
agreement of an absolute majority of the members of the Council; and (3)
the articles amended by the Council shall be presented to the people in a
referendum within two months from the date of approval by the Council and
the referendum will be successful if approved by the majority of voters
and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more
governorates.

           Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political
			  Accommodation

           To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution,
           Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on the
           following three contentious issues.

           o Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a
           member of the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have
           greater power. The Constitution gives the presidency such powers
           as accrediting ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council
           the power to approve or disapprove legislation in the current
           electoral term.3 However, the legislature can adopt any
           disapproved legislation by a three-fifths majority vote. In
           contrast, the prime minister, selected from the legislature's
           largest political bloc, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
           names the ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of
           Ministers. The Council directs the work of all government
           ministries and departments, develops their plans, and prepares the
           government budget. The high-ranking Sunni official said that
           giving the presidency more power could allow for better power
           sharing among Iraq's political groups.
           o Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the
           Constitution addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a
           census and a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by
           December 31, 2007 to determine the will of its citizens. According
           to the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) prime minister,
           Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region and must be returned to
           Kurdistan. Under the former regime's policy of
           Arabization--removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing
           them with Arab families--areas of Kirkuk were given to other
           governorates, according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want
           the referendum held by the date specified in the Constitution.
           Other Iraqi legislators believe that the Kirkuk referendum should
           be deferred because of the disputes over the borders of Kirkuk and
           continuing displacement of people in the area.
			  
3According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral term, which
is 4 years, a presidency council consisting of a president and 2
vice-presidents is in place and exercises the powers of the presidency. If
these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the start of the next
electoral term, power will revert to a single president and the power to
approve and disapprove legislation that is explicitly granted to the
presidency council will lapse. The president will then have the power to
ratify and issue laws passed by the legislature, although such laws are
considered ratified 15 days after the president receives them.
			  
           o Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed
           several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of
           the federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but
           has not achieved compromise among major political factions on
           these amendments. In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article
           111 of the Constitution to clearly state that the federal
           government shall collect oil revenues and distribute them equally
           to all Iraqis in accordance with the national budget law.
           According to the United Nations, this amendment would provide the
           federal government exclusive authority for oil revenues. In
           contrast, the existing constitutional framework is widely
           interpreted as allowing regions to define how and whether they
           share locally generated oil revenues.4 For this reason, the
           Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed amendment.
			  
			  Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the
			  Review

           If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments,
           the Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments
           will be considered approved if an absolute majority of the
           legislature votes for the package. One challenge is simply holding
           a vote.

           Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29,
           2007, several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government,
           including Iraq's largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in
           the legislature could form an absolute majority to pass a package
           of amendments, it would defeat the purpose of trying to reach a
           broad political accommodation.

           If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the
           government must hold a national referendum within 2 months of
           approval. According to the United Nations, before a referendum can
           occur, the Iraq Electoral Commission must develop a valid voting
           roster, educate the public about
           the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and locate and
           staff polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High
           Electoral Commission stated that it faced challenges to developing
           a valid voting roster because of the large movement of displaced
           persons--an estimated 800,000 since February 2006.5
			  
4Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction between
regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive
authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority and
regional powers have the right to amend the application of the national
legislation within that region.

5United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Humanitarian Briefing on the
Crisis in Iraq, May 2007.
           
			  Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform

           Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification
           reform.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the
           Ba'athist party, removed Ba'athist leaders and senior party
           members from government, and banned them from future employment in
           the public sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and
           removal of even junior members of the party from upper-level
           management in government ministries, universities, and hospitals.
           Most of Iraqi's technocratic class was pushed out of government
           due to de-Ba'athification and many Sunni Arabs remain angry about
           policies to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society, according to the Iraq
           Study Group report.
			  
			  Status

           Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation
           to reform de-Ba'athification, none has sufficient support among
           Iraq's political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi
           legislature, according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on
           reforming the current de-Ba'athification policy and many Iraqis
           are concerned by the prospects of former Ba'athist tormenters
           returning to power. However, according to an August 2007 U.S.
           interagency report, Iraq's senior Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish
           political leaders signed a Unity Accord, including consensus on
           draft legislation on de-Ba'thification reform. Such a law would
           need to be drafted, passed by the Council of Representatives, and
           implemented.

           According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely
           promote reconciliation if the reforms target Ba'athists who had
           command responsibility within the party or committed human rights
           violations or other crimes.2 Removing individuals based purely on
           party membership increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi
           public will see the system as unfair, according to these
           officials. Draft legislation on de-Ba'athification reform, dated
           July 2007 before the Unity Accord, provides for a special
           commission, a panel of judges to make decisions, and the right to
           appeal the panel's decisions. The draft legislation also specifies
           that the commission will be dissolved 6 months after the law is
           passed.
			  
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

2The doctrine of command responsibility holds that individuals can be
liable for actions they did not actually commit if: (1) they issued orders
to those who committed the human rights violations or crimes; (2) they
should have known or should have been in a position to know that their
subordinates were committing human rights violations or crimes; or (3)
they did not take reasonable measures to prevent the human rights
violations or other crimes or did not punish the perpetrators.

           Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation

           Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
           distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq
           without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and
           enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy
           resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and
           other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely
           recognized, as is the need to create a new legal framework for the
           development and management of the country's oil sector. The oil
           sector accounts for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and
           over 90 percent of its revenues. The timely and equitable
           distribution of these revenues is essential to Iraq's ability to
           provide for its needs, including the reconstruction of a unified
           Iraq.
			  
			  Status

           The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the
           four separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to
           ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of
           August 2007, the Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of
           legislation: (1) hydrocarbon framework legislation that
           establishes the structure, management, and oversight for the oil
           sector; (2) revenue-sharing legislation; and (3) legislation
           restructuring the Ministry of Oil. However, none of the
           legislation is currently under consideration by Iraq's parliament
           (Council of Representatives). A fourth piece of legislation
           establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has not been
           drafted, according to State officials.

           Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi
           cabinet (Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the
           Oil and Gas Committee of Iraq's parliament for review in July
           2007. However, before the legislation was submitted to the
           parliament, the Iraqi government amended the draft to address
           substantive changes made by the Shura council. According to State,
           the Shura council reviews draft legislation to ensure
           constitutionality and to avoid contradictions with Iraq's legal
           system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional Government
           (KRG) did not agree to the council's revisions. Accordingly, the
           Oil and Gas Committee chairman is taking no legislative action
           until the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG agree on a new draft,
           according to State. It is not clear if this legislation will
           include annexes intended to allocate the control of particular oil
           fields and exploration areas to either the central or regional
           governments. According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain
           under consideration.
			  
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

           Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable
           distribution of Iraq's financial resources, including oil and gas
           revenues. The central government and the KRG agreed on draft
           revenue-sharing legislation2 in June 2007. However, the Iraqi
           cabinet has not yet approved the legislation and submitted it to
           Iraq's parliament for consideration.

           This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the
           Iraqi Constitution regarding the role of the federal government
           and regions and the management of oil revenues. Under the existing
           Constitution, if there is a contradiction between regional and
           national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive
           authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority
           and regional powers have the right to amend the application of the
           national legislation within that region. As oil revenue sharing is
           not a power exclusively reserved for the federal government in the
           existing Constitution, according to officials, regions may
           determine how and whether they share locally generated oil
           revenues with the remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated
           in the federal law.3 In response, the Iraqi Constitutional Review
           Committee has proposed amendments to the Constitution that would
           provide for the national collection and distribution of oil
           revenues.

2This legislation is also referred to as the "Law of Financial Resources"
and the "Revenue Management Law."

3The Kurdistan National Assembly (Kurdish Regional parliament) has passed
a "Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law" (also referred to as the "Petroleum Law of
the Kurdistan Region - Iraq"), in August, 2007, which conditions
cooperation with the federal authorities in the oil sector on a set of
comprehensive conditions. According to the UN, it would likely take time
for full agreement on these arrangements to be reached and for
implementation of national revenue sharing to begin. It is unclear how
this will affect the national debate on revenue sharing or the hydrocarbon
framework legislation at this time. According to the State Department, the
United States continues to believe that Iraq's interests are better served
by the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will
help foster national unity and promote reconciliation.

           Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but
           has not yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according
           to State.

           Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is
           being drafted, according to State.
			  
			  Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions

           Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form
           semi-autonomous regions.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
			  
			  Issue

           Iraq's Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to
           enact a law that defines the executive procedures needed to form
           regions within 6 months of the date of its first session. Some
           Iraqi legislators believe that the right to form regions, with
           authority similar to the Kurdistan region, would help protect
           their rights.
			  
			  Status

           In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing
           procedures to form regions, but the law delays implementation for
           18 months.2 According to U.S. officials, this means that no steps
           to form regions, such as holding provincial referendums, can be
           taken before April 2008. According to State, this is in the best
           interests of Iraq as it will allow the government to deal with
           some outstanding issues. The United Nations has identified two
           issues that may impact implementation of this law--the ongoing
           review of Iraq's Constitution and the capacity of new regional
           governments.

           According to members of Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee
           (CRC), the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18
           months to allow the constitutional review process to be completed.
           Some of the proposed amendments to the constitution would clarify
           the powers of the federal government versus regions and
           governorates For example, according to the United Nations, the CRC
           proposed amendments that would give federal law priority over
           regional law with respect to water, customs, ports, and oil and
           revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments would give the federal
           government exclusive power over electricity generation, railways,
           and pension funds.3 Moreover, the constitutional review could also
           help resolve the status of disputed areas, which could impact
           regional boundaries. Until the constitutional review is completed
           and the constitutional referendum is held, residents in areas
           considering regional formation may not have all the information
           they need to make decisions.
			  
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

2Iraq has 18 governorates and the Iraqi Constitution states that one or
more governorates have the right to organize into a region. Article 117 of
the Constitution further recognizes the region of Kurdistan, which
consists of three provinces in northern Iraq. The final version of the law
on executive procedures regarding the formation of regions states that a
region consists of one province or more.

           The capability of the regions to govern themselves will also
           impact implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution
           accords significant executive, judicial, and management
           authorities to the regions. The regions have responsibility for
           maintaining their internal security forces, administering
           allocations from national revenues, and maintaining
           representational offices in embassies and consuls. Moreover, the
           law on formation of regions provides that once formed, the regions
           must undertake to create elected provisional legislative councils.
           According to the United Nations, this will require a substantial
           investment of resources and significant management responsibility.
           GAO has reported on significant shortages of competent personnel
           in national ministries charged with delivering services to the
           Iraqi people; moreover, these shortages are greater at the
           provincial level of government, according to State and USAID
           officials. We have also reported that the poor security situation
           and high levels of violence have contributed to the continued and
           accelerating "brain drain" of professional Iraqis that would be
           needed to manage the new regional administrations.4
		
3The lack of clarity about power sharing between federal and regional
governments is highlighted by problems over power generation. As of the
summer of 2007, a number of provinces have been ignoring the federal
government's shared authority over power generation and distribution by
failing to provide their required allocations of power to Baghdad,
contributing to national blackouts. In August 2007, these provincial
authorities were threatening to disconnect their local power generating
sources from the national electricity grid.

4GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, [69]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9.
2007); GAO, forthcoming Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry
Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [70]GAO-07-903 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2007).			  

           Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation

           Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent
           High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial
           council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many
           Sunnis boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi'a and Kurd
           provincial councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations.
           To redress the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial
           councils, Iraq needs to hold new provincial elections, but must
           first establish an electoral commission, write provincial election
           laws, define provincial powers so voters know the stakes, and set
           a date for elections.
			  
			  Status

           Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented
           legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission
           (IHEC), it has not enacted and implemented legislation
           establishing a provincial elections law, provincial council
           authorities, or a date for provincial elections.

           o Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented
           legislation to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in
           establishing the commission. According to the U.S. government, the
           Council of Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January
           23, 2007, and subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners,
           as required under the law, in a process the UN deemed in
           compliance with international standards. However, a provision in
           the IHEC law requires the COR to nominate and the Board of
           Commissioners to appoint the directors of the Governorate
           Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve of these positions are
           vacant, but, according to State, the process of appointing the
           directors is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC to
           establish and update a voter registry in collaboration with the
           Governorate and Regional Electoral Offices. However, before they
           can complete an update of the voter registry (which was last
           updated in mid-2005), an election law must be enacted that defines
           the residency and voter eligibility requirements. Finally, the
           IHEC still needs a budget to fund its activities.
			  
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

           o Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial
           elections. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime
           Minster's office is drafting legislation governing provincial
           elections, including setting a date for elections to occur.
           However, according to the Embassy, some key political parties are
           hesitant to hold provincial elections due to concerns that they
           will lose representation, potentially to more extreme parties.
           Additionally, several parties are demanding that any election law
           ensure that eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be
           allowed to vote.
           o Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities
           and structures of local governments, has not been enacted and
           implemented. According to the U.S. government, the draft
           legislation has been approved and submitted to the Council of
           Representatives, where it has had two of the three required
           readings. However, the U.S. government reported in July 2007 that
           changes were being considered, particularly related to the powers
           of the governor and the authority of the federal government at the
           local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with the draft,
           including that it cedes most power to the provinces. The United
           Nations pointed out that the draft fails to clarify the role of
           the governorate and that the draft law does not deal adequately
           with the effective delivery of public goods and services in the
           governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8, 2007, the
           relevant COR committee presented a report outlining suggested
           changes to the law, some of which the Embassy supported.

           o The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial
           elections. The Iraq Study Group emphasized the need for provincial
           elections at the earliest possible date. The Embassy is urging the
           Iraqi government to take the legislative and administrative action
           necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. According to the
           U.S. Embassy, it is intensively engaged with the Iraqi government
           and the COR at all levels to expedite legislation or amendments to
           existing legislation that will allow provincial elections to take
           place and secure funding for elections.

           In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark
           should be partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission
           has been established and the benchmark calls only for its
           establishment. However, the benchmark requires more than the
           establishment of the IHEC, and Iraq has not enacted and
           implemented a provincial elections law, provincial council
           authorities, or a date for provincial elections, as required by
           the benchmark.
			  
			  Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation

           Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
           Issue

           Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and
           others who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool
           to promote reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In
           addition, the Iraqi government and coalition forces hold thousands
           of detainees, some of whom could be eligible for an amnesty
           program when conditions are right.
			  
			  Status

           The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty,
           according to U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful
           program are not present. As figure 2 in the cover letter shows,
           many steps remain in the legislative process, including drafting
           the legislation and obtaining approval in the Iraqi cabinet and
           Council of Representatives. However, the government of Iraq is not
           pressing for the development of amnesty legislation.
			  
			  Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation

           Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister's
           national reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has
           been made. The plan called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not
           involved in crimes against humanity or terrorist acts. At that
           time, the Iraqi government announced that it would release 2,500
           detainees; 2,500 prisoners were subsequently released. According
           to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-scale releases have been
           made since 2006, and there has been little discussion of amnesty
           since then. However, the Prime Minister's office and Iraq's
           Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee sponsored
           a workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended that
           amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national
           reconciliation and that the government's military has to be
           superior to armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty.
			  
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

           The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United
           Nations takes the position that in considering the categories of
           perpetrators to be included or excluded in amnesty, international
           law does not allow amnesty to be granted to those who committed
           genocide, crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of
           international humanitarian law. In addition, Iraqi government
           officials have recommended that an amnesty program consider all
           detained individuals held by Iraq and by coalition forces. There
           are currently thousands of detainees, including over 24,000 held
           by coalition forces. According to multinational force officials,
           there could be considerably more detainees in the future as the
           Baghdad security plan progresses. The Coalition's Task Force 134
           is building and expanding prison facilities to accommodate
           additional detainees.
			  
			  Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament

           Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong
           militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces
           are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the
           Constitution of Iraq.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are
           responsible for sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and
           have heavily infiltrated the Iraqi army and national police.
           Efforts to dissolve or bring militias under control have been
           ongoing since 2004. In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis in a
           nationwide poll agreed that militias should be dissolved.
			  
			  Status

           The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming
           militias. CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces
           and militias within Iraq, except for those allowed under the
           Order.2 Multiple steps are needed to enact and implement further
           legislation to disarm militias. More importantly, according to
           U.S. officials, conditions are not right for a traditional
           disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR);
           accordingly, there is currently no momentum in the government of
           Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias pose a severe challenge to
           stability and reconciliation in Iraq.
			  
			  Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made i
			  Demobilizing Them

           Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq.
           According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash
           al-Mahdi (the militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often
           operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to
           detain and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. A June
           2007 Defense Department report further notes that many Jayash
           al-Mahdi fighters have left Baghdad as a result of expanded
           coalition and Iraqi presence. They now engage in ethnic and
           sectarian violence in northern and central Iraq and have increased
           conflict with the Badr Organization in southern Iraq leading to a
           significant increase in attacks against the coalition in Basrah.
           The June 2007 report also states that Shi'a militia infiltration
           of the Ministry of Interior is a problem. Militia influence
           impacts every component of the Ministry, particularly in Baghdad
           and other key cities.

1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."

2Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and
Oversight Issues ( [71]GAO-04-902R, Washington, D.C.:  June 28, 2004).

           Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been
           made to disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias
           numbering an estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition
           and reintegration process in 2004. The Coalition Provisional
           Authority estimated that 90 percent of these fighters would
           complete the transition and reintegration process by January 2005.
           However, according to the administration's July 15, 2007 report,
           no armed group has committed to disarm. Moreover, according to
           U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR commission has not
           developed a plan for DDR and has not received funding for its
           work.
			  
			  Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist

           A May 2007 UN assessment on DDR for Iraq states that minimum
           requirements for a successful DDR program in Iraq include a secure
           environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an
           overarching political agreement, sustainable funding, and
           appropriate reintegration opportunities. GAO's reports and
           analysis show that these conditions do not exist in Iraq. For
           example:

           o As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, the overall level of
           attacks against Iraqi civilians, coalition personnel, and Iraqi
           security forces has risen since 2003, creating a poor security
           environment. Classified and unclassified GAO reports provide
           further information on security in Iraq..3 
           o In June 2006, the prime minister sought to include insurgent
           groups as part of his reconciliation plan. However, according to
           administration and DOD reports, efforts at reconciliation have
           stalled. In addition, Iraqi officials reject terrorist groups,
           such as al Qaeda in Iraq, and a report done for the U.S. Embassy
           comments that some groups cannot be reconciled. Also, the support
           of external actors is an important element of disarmament and
           demobilization, but according to U.S. reports, some external
           groups are not helpful. For example, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
           Guard provides deadly arms and funding to Iraq's militias and
           contributes to the ongoing instability.
			  
3GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces, [72]GAO-07-612T ) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007); GAO,
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight, ( [73]GAO-07-308SP ) Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007; GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and
Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, ( [74]GAO-06-217C
) Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.

           The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007
           budget and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from
           the Iraq Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government
           of Iraq for this purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for
           DDR and has not made progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is
           uncertain whether such funding is needed at this time.
			  
			  Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees

           Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services
           committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1
			  
			  Issue

           The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security
           plan2 in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad and
           surrounding areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi
           security forces implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but
           these operations failed to reduce violence for a variety of
           reasons. Unlike the earlier operations, the current Baghdad
           Security Plan encompasses political, economic, and security
           activities that the Iraqi government needed to coordinate at the
           national level.
			  
			  Status

           In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive
           Steering Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees
           to coordinate political, economic and military activities and make
           decisions in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a
           Department of State official, the executive committee's major
           objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the
           Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's
           population as part of the Baghdad Security Plan. Each of the
           subcommittees addresses one of six issues related to the plan's
           implementation: economics, services, political, communication,
           popular mobilization, and security. The executive committee and
           subcommittees meet on a weekly basis.

           The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi
           Prime Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level
           Iraqi ministry officials chair the various subcommittees. For
           example, a deputy prime minister chairs the economic subcommittee
           and the services subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant
           Iraqi ministries serve on each subcommittee. Two senior U.S.
           officials are observers to the executive committee and attend its
           weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or U.S. embassy official is also
           assigned to each subcommittee. This official provides advice on
           the subcommittees' agendas and other support when called upon.
			  
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the committees were established in
support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if at least half of the committees were established in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if less
than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan.

2The current Baghdad security plan is also known as Operation Fardh
al-Qanoon.

           According to a Department of State official, the executive
           committee and subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi
           government provided sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in
           implementing the Baghdad Security Plan. For example, when the
           Iraqi Army provided brigades that were not at full strength, the
           executive committee and security subcommittee identified forces
           from other parts of the country to move to Baghdad. The committees
           also found ways to house and feed the Iraqi troops supporting the
           security plan. In addition, the communication subcommittee has
           helped publicize the security plan's goals and the other
           subcommittees' efforts to get resources to Baghdad districts that
           have been cleared of insurgents.

           We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or
           subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the
           implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the
           administration's July 2007 report to Congress stated that the
           effectiveness of each committee varied.
			  
			  Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades

           Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
           operations.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
			  
			  Issue

           During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces
           refused to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of
           the previous Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the
           President said that the Iraqi government had agreed to resolve
           this problem under the current plan and had committed three
           additional Iraqi brigades to support the new plan.

			  Status

           Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army
           battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support
           the Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the
           administration stated that the Iraqi government had difficulty
           deploying three additional army brigades to Baghdad at sufficient
           strength. In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that
           current present for duty rates for deployed units is 75 percent of
           authorized strength. However, the July 2007 administration report
           stated that the government has deployed battalions from multiple
           Iraqi Army divisions to provide the required three
           brigade-equivalent forces to support the Baghdad security plan.
           After the initial deployment of the required brigades, the Iraqi
           government began the rotation plan. 19 units have currently
           deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan. Several of these
           units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every 90 days
           in accordance with the plan. In addition, all of the Iraqi units
           had pre-deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The
           administration's July 2007 report states that progress toward this
           benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been
           satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad.

           However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance
           of the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been
           varied. Some units had performed exceptionally well, proven
           themselves and raised their readiness ratings. Others had marked
           time and slowly regressed over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19
           Iraqi units that had supported operations in Baghdad, 5 units had
           performed well while the remaining had proven to be problematic
           for several reasons: lack of personnel, lack of individual
           fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct their assigned
           missions. We obtained classified information that indicates other
           problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified briefing
           report provides more information on this benchmark.
			  
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq had provided
three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of battalions,
to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some of the units
were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations; and as "not
met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to support
Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each unit's
transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on their
reliability. Consequently, our determination of "partially met" was based
largely on classified information. (see classified appendix).

           Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority

           Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this
           plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in
           consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention,
           to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni
           insurgents and Shi'ite militias.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the
           Baghdad security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in
           part, because Iraqi political and sectarian interference prevented
           forces from taking action against militias. According to the
           administration's initial assessment, Iraq's Prime Minister stated
           that political or sectarian interference in the affairs of the
           Iraqi security forces will not be tolerated, and actions have been
           taken to address political intervention.
			  
			  Status

           In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of
           Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi
           commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security
           plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in
           consultation with U.S. commanders without political intervention.
           The report noted that political intervention in the conduct of
           some security operations continues even though new rules of
           engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have come into
           effect and commanders have been given the authority to attack
           insurgents and militias.
			  
           According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and
           political interference in the conduct of military operations
           continues. Tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong
           within many Iraqi military units, hindering efforts to take
           actions against militias. These loyalties are often the basis for
           relationships between key officers in units and higher-level
           authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command. For
           example, sectarian militias control many local police.
           Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed
           loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi'a militias making it
           difficult to target Shi'a extremist networks. Further, according
           to DOD, evidence exists of target lists emanating from the Office
           of the Commander in Chief that bypassed operational commanders and
           directed lower-level intelligence officers and commanders to make
           arrests, primarily of Sunnis. In addition, sectarian bias in the
           appointment of senior military and police commanders continues,
           giving rise to suspicions that political considerations may drive
           Iraqi commanders' decisions about which operations to undertake or
           support.

1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not face
political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and
operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi
commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making
tactical and operational decisions.

           In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the
           brigade commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion
           commanders have been replaced for failure to command or enforce
           non-sectarian operations.
			  
			  Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the
           Law

           Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed
           enforcement of the law.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights
           report, the Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights
           violations in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added
           to the increasing violence against the civilian population during
           2006. In support of the Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime
           Minister pledged to provide even-handed enforcement of the law.
			  
			  Status

           According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured
           that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed
           enforcement of the law. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on
           International Religious Freedom2 reported that Iraq's
           Shi'a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in
           sectarian-based human rights violations, as well as tolerating
           abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions
           in the governing coalition. According to the commission, the Iraqi
           government through its security forces has committed arbitrary
           arrest, prolonged detention without due process, targeted
           executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In committing
           these abuses, the security forces target Sunnis on the basis of
           their religious identity, as well as terrorists and insurgents.

           Furthermore, the commission reported that the Iraqi government
           tolerates and fails to control religiously motivated attacks and
           other abuses carried out by Shi'a militias, specifically Jayash
           al-Mahdi and Badr Organization. These militias have targeted
           Sunnis on the basis of their religious identity and have committed
           such abuses as abductions, beatings, targeted killings,
           intimidation, forced resettlement, murder, rape, and torture.
           According to the commission's report, relationships between these
           militias and leading Shi'a factions within Iraq's ministries and
           governing coalition indicate that the Jayash al-Mahdi and Badr
           Organization are parastate actors operating with impunity or even
           with governmental complicity.
			  
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces provided
even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "not met"
if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the
law.

2U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington D.C.: May
2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom was created
by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor
violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or
belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to
give independent policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of
State, and Congress.

           In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the
           Iraqi government and security forces continue to engage in
           sectarian-based abuses. State's March 2007 human rights report3
           cited widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent
           involvement in extrajudicial killings throughout the country.
           These incidents included Shi'a militia members wearing police
           uniforms and driving police cars in carrying out killings and
           kidnapping in the southern city of Basra. In addition, death
           squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis
           and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs,
           largely with impunity.

           The administration's July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi
           government and many Iraqi security force units are still applying
           the law on a sectarian basis when left on their own. The report
           attributed any progress made by the security forces in enforcing
           the law more even-handedly to the presence of coalition units and
           embedded training teams, rather than to the Iraqi government.
			  
3U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007).

           Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens

           Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki
           said ``the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for
           any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political
           affiliation."

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
			  
			  Issue

           As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the
           Baghdad security plan, previous plans to secure Baghdad have
           failed, in part, because political and sectarian interference and
           rules of engagement in place for those plans prevented Iraqi and
           coalition forces from entering neighborhoods that are safe havens
           to those fueling the sectarian violence. On January 6, 2007, the
           Iraqi Prime Minister stated, "The Baghdad security plan will not
           offer a safe shelter for outlaws regardless of their ethnic and
           political affiliations, and we will punish anyone who hesitates to
           implement orders because of his ethnic and political background."
			  
           Status

           Although the Iraqi government has allowed MNF-I to conduct
           operations in all areas of Baghdad, temporary safe havens still
           exist due to strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration
           of security forces. According to State, terrorist safe havens are
           defined as ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a
           country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a
           threat to U.S. national security interests are able to organize,
           plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in
           relative security because of inadequate governance capacity,
           political will, or both.

           U.S. commanders report overall satisfaction with their ability to
           target any and all extremist groups. In commenting on our draft
           report, DOD stated that coalition forces and Iraqi security forces
           conducted over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr
           City from January to August 2007. According to DOD, the surge has
           resulted in significant reductions in safe havens for al Qaeda in
           Iraq inside Baghdad and in al Anbar and Diyala provinces. In
           previous Baghdad operations, the Iraqi government prevented Iraqi
           and coalition forces from going into Sadr City. Although MNF-I
           conducts operations in Sadr City, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces
           maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border of Sadr
           City, with none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In addition
           to Joint Security Stations, MNF-I established about 30 coalition
           outposts throughout Baghdad, including one on the border of Sadr
           City.
			  
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did not
allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet some existed;
and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi government had no
stated policy on safe havens.

Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad

However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security
forces and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain
the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition forces.
Thus temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which supports a rating
of partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes some of the conditions
that allow safe havens to exist. For example, the Shi'a militia continues
to function as the de facto government in Sadr City. Further, militia
influence impacts every component of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior,
particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities, according to the DOD
report.

Our classified briefing report provides more information on the existence
of safe havens.

Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control

Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia
control of local security.

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1

Issue

During 2006, according to State and UN reports,2 insurgents, death squads,
militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians,
largely on a sectarian basis. In addition, the number of internally
displaced persons in Iraq sharply increased following the February 2006
bombing of the Samarra mosque, primarily as a result of sectarian
intimidation and violence that forced many people from their homes. By the
end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become
divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were increasingly controlled by
armed groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these areas.3
In January 2007, the President announced that the United States would
increase force levels in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign
to reduce sectarian violence and bring security to Baghdad.

Status

While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia
control over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a serious
problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq.

According to the administration's July 2007 report to Congress, MNF-I data
showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since
the start of the Baghdad security plan. MNF-I counts sectarian incidents
and murders in determining trends in sectarian violence.4 The
administration's July 2007 report concluded that the Iraqi government,
with substantial coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress
toward reducing sectarian violence. The report acknowledged that precise
measurements vary, and it was too early to determine if the decrease would
be sustainable.

1We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was
eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there
was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence
was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated.

2U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights
Report (Sept. 1-Oct. 31, 2006); UNAMI, Human Rights Report (Nov. 1-Dec.
31, 2006).

3According to State's human rights report, an overall campaign aimed at
forcibly displacing citizens was the main reason for the increasing
polarization of areas within and outside Baghdad during 2006. State noted
numerous reports that indicated a Shi'a militia, the Jayash al-Mahdi, was
responsible for a growing number of raids and killings of Sunni citizens
in Baghdad and other parts of the country during the year.

GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been reduced
because measuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator's
intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks targeting civilians
and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as
additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 5, the average
number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the
last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is
largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than
civilians.

4DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: June
2007).

Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)

While overall attacks declined in July compared with June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major
religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections.5 For
2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September.

The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq6 (NIE) also reports
that the level of overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on and
casualties among civilians, remains high. Further, the NIE states that
Iraq's security will continue to improve modestly, but that levels of
insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high over the next 6 to 12
months. Similarly, recent March and June 2007 United Nations reports state
that attacks against civilians persist and the continuing systematic,
widespread attacks against the civilian population in Iraq are tantamount
to crimes against humanity and violate the laws of war.

5Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 4
years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5,
2005; and September 24, 2006.

6National Intelligence Council, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some
Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive, Update to NIE,
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead (Washington,
D.C.: August 2007).

The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced
from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found
that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February
2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi
citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to 50,000 people
will continue to be displaced each month even if the security plan
succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently, the number of
displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000 to 100,000 each
month, according to the Red Crescent.

The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues,
imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. As
the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently reported,
most of Iraq's internally displaced persons are moving from mixed areas7
to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely because of direct threats or
forcible displacement from their homes due to their religious and
sectarian identities. Where population displacements have led to
significant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have diminished to some extent
because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal
enclaves.

Our classified report provides further information on trends associated
with violence in Iraq.

7According to a UN report, sectarian violence was most pronounced in areas
with diverse ethnic and religious groups or where such groups were located
in close proximity to each other, such as in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, and
Mosul. Anbar province, where attack levels have decreased significantly
over the past several months, is a predominantly Sunni Arab province.

Militia control over local security forces - the second part of the
benchmark--has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports have
stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over
local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For example,
in July 2007, the administration reported that militia presence is still
strong and will likely remain so until the security situation begins to
stabilize. The report stated that the Iraqi government has made
unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local
security, which continues to negatively affect the public perception of
the authority and fairness of the Iraqi government. In addition, DOD's
June 2007 report to Congress called militia influence of local police a
significant problem and added that some security forces remain prone to
intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs. Further, the
Department of State's human rights report characterized Iraqi police
effectiveness as seriously compromised by militias and sectarianism, with
rampant corruption and a culture of impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the
United Nations reported cases of possible collusion between armed militia
and Iraqi security forces in raids and security operations, as well as the
failure of these security forces to intervene and prevent kidnapping and
murder and other crimes.

Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations

Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods
across Baghdad.

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1

Issue

Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and
Iraqi forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of insurgents.
The current Baghdad security plan and the related increase of U.S. and
Iraqi forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents, militias, and
organized criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a security presence
in those areas; and provide for follow-on assistance efforts. As part of
this effort, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are establishing Joint
Security Stations across Baghdad to improve population protection by
providing a continuous presence in Baghdad's neighborhoods.

Status

As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition
assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security Stations
in Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security Stations that
had achieved initial or full operational capability.

1We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint
Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were
established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of
the planned Joint Security Stations were established.

Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007

Note: Figure 6 shows the 28 joint security stations that were located in
Baghdad's security districts as of August 9, 2007. Three additional joint
security stations are located in Baghdad but are outside of the security
districts, and another joint security station has been transferred to
Iraqi control.

Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the
administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to
improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in
Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater oversight of Iraqi security
forces by U.S. military personnel.

Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently

Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently.

GAO Assessment: Not met1

Issue

In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi
military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and
police. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in an
effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security
responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government, and ultimately withdraw
U.S. troops from Iraq. The coalition began embedding transition teams with
Iraqi security forces in 2005 to help develop their ability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. These teams use the Operational Readiness
Assessment process to evaluate the readiness of Iraqi security force units
to conduct operations with or without coalition support.2

Status

While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly
leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units
operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 2007.3
According to the administration's July 2007 report, an Iraqi unit can be
considered independent if it has achieved an Operational Readiness
Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.4

Manning shortages as well as logistics and sustainment shortfalls have
contributed to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable of
operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and militia
influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces. In June
2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target of most
enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for the
majority of casualties, contributing to the decline in the readiness of
some Iraqi units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi security forces.
Annual attrition is estimated to be between 15 and 18 percent for the
Iraqi army and between 20 and 22 percent for the police. In addition,
according to a June 2007 report from DOD to Congress, only about 65
percent of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time
due to a liberal leave policy and absences without leave. To increase the
number of soldiers on hand for operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I
decided that they will increase manning to 120 percent of authorization
levels.5

1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq increased
the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of
Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable
of operating independently.

2The Operational Readiness Assessment was previously known as the
Transitional Readiness Assessment process.

3As of May 2007, the Iraqi army had established over 100 battalions.

4In 2006, MNF-I changed the definition of a level 1 unit. Previously, in
guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use in evaluating
Iraqi security forces, a level 1 unit was said to be fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations. In 2006, MNF-I
removed the words "fully" and "independent" from the definition. DOD
officials could not provide a rationale for the change.

Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police
units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics
support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi forces' limited
capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume missions from
MNF-I and requires continued development in some key areas through the end
of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December 2008 goal for the Iraqi
government to provide day-to-day items such as food, water, and
electricity to the Ministry of Defense's National Depot. In addition, the
Ministry of Interior aims to become self sufficient in procuring and
managing repair parts by the end of 2008.

MNF-I and the Iraqi government continue to struggle with sectarian and
militia influences while trying to develop the Iraqi security forces.
Because of the sectarian leaning of some national police units, MNF-I is
providing continuing oversight of Iraqi security forces. In addition,
militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of the Interior,
especially in Baghdad and other key cities, according to DOD. This
influence, along with corruption and illegal activity, constrains progress
in the development of Ministry of Interior forces.

5The administration's July 2007 interim assessment stated that the number
of units assessed at level 1 had decreased, in part, due to a 20-percent
increase in unit authorization levels.

Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights

Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature are protected.

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1

Issue

Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba'athist
regime. Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to
ensure broad representation and fairness in the new Iraq.

Status

The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council of
Representatives' by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of minorities
throughout Iraq remain unprotected.

Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected

The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws include
provisions to ensure the full participation of minority political parties
within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These provisions include:

           o Article 39 of Iraq's Constitution, which guarantees the freedom
           to form and join associations and political parties and also
           prohibits forcing any person to join in any party, society, or
           political entity or to continue membership in it.
           o Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which
           guarantees the freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of
           all members of the Council of Representatives. This guarantee is
           made regardless of a representative's party or political
           affiliation in a way that does not contradict the provisions of
           the Constitution, including the freedom of objective opposition,
           constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation between the
           Council of Representatives and other constitutional institutions.

1We considered this benchmark as "met" if the Iraqi government had laws or
regulations ensuring the rights of minority parties in the legislature and
minority parties received these rights; considered this benchmark as
"partially met" if the Iraqi government had such laws but did not protect
these rights; and considered this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi
government had no law or regulation protecting minority party rights.

           According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights
           in the legislature are protected and they are not physically
           intimidated. The legislators also said that they have the right to
           speak before Parliament, and to offer legislation even though they
           are often not consulted on legislative issues. According to the
           U.S. government, the electoral system--provincial proportional
           representation--that was used to elect the current Council was
           chosen in 2005 to balance a number of factors, including the
           ability of women and small minority parties to gain
           representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December
           2005 includes members from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen,
           Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities.
			  
			  Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected

           Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the
           legislature, widespread violence across Iraq has seriously
           compromised the government's ability to protect human rights.
           According to the United Nations, attacks against religious and
           ethnic minorities continued unabated in most areas of Iraq,
           prompting these communities to seek ways to leave the country.2
           The conflicts reportedly bear the mark of sectarian polarization
           and "cleansing" in neighborhoods formerly comprised of different
           religions.3 According to a non-governmental organization, all of
           Iraq's minority communities have suffered violations that include
           destruction and defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of
           congregations gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming,
           and murder of religious and civic leaders and individuals
           including children; and forced conversion to Islam using tactics
           such as death threats, rape, and forced marriage.4

           In comments on this benchmark, State wrote that GAO should not
           refer to the general human rights problems of Iraqi minorities
           because to do so goes beyond the scope of the benchmark and State
           addresses these problems in other reports. We disagree. We
           assessed this benchmark as met based on our interpretation of the
           benchmark and our criteria. However, we believe it is important to
           provide some context of minority rights in Iraq. Iraqi legislators
           we interviewed insisted that the situation in their communities
           has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, their
           freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability
           to engage fully in Iraq political life.
			  
2UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, Jan. 1- Mar. 31,
2007.

3Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? (Washington D.C.: Mar. 23,
2007).

4Preti Taneja, Minority Rights Group International, Assimilation, Exodus,
Eradication: Iraq's Minority Communities Since 2003 (United Kingdom:
February 2007).

           Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi
           Revenues

           Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
           reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services
           on an equitable basis.

           GAO Assessment: Partially met1
			  
			  Issue

           The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's
           inability to fully spend its own resources to rebuild its
           infrastructure and deliver essential services as a critical
           economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds
           are a necessary source of financing for Iraq's rebuilding effort,
           particularly since the United States has obligated most of the $40
           billion it provided to Iraq for reconstruction since 2003.
           However, the government of Iraq has had difficulty spending its
           resources on capital projects. In 2006, the government spent only
           22 percent of its non-provincial capital projects and
           reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the critical oil sector,
           which provides over 90 percent of Iraq's revenues, the government
           spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil
           reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq
           committed to spending $10 billion on capital projects and
           reconstruction.
			  
			  Status	

           The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for
           capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget
           in February 2007, including capital funds for the provinces based
           on their populations. However, available data from the government
           of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show that,
           while spending has increased compared with spending in 2006, a
           large portion of Iraq's $10 billion capital projects and
           reconstruction budget in fiscal year 2007 will likely go unspent.2
           Iraq's Financial Management Law generally requires budgeted funds
           to be spent by the end of the fiscal year. The Ministry of Oil and
           the provinces (excluding the Kurdistan region) were allocated
           almost half of the government's 2007 capital projects and
           reconstruction budget; however, they are unlikely to spend a large
           share of their budgets in 2007, according to U.S. and coalition
           officials. We are conducting a review of U.S. efforts to help Iraq
           spend its budget and will issue a separate report at a later date.
			  
1We would have considered this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been
allocated and either the funds had been spent or there was a high
likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We
would have considered this benchmark as "partially met" if funds were
allocated but it was not clear that the funds would be spent by the end of
the fiscal year. We would have considered the benchmark as "not met" if
the funds had not yet been allocated or if funds were allocated but
clearly not spent.

2Iraq's fiscal year begins on January 1st.

           Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are Unlikely
			  to Spend a Large Share of their 2007 Capital Projects and
			  Reconstruction Budgets

           The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraqi government
           ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the $6.25
           billion allocated to their capital projects and reconstruction
           budgets through July 15th, just over half-way through the fiscal
           year.3 This level of spending already exceeds the $1.4 billion
           spent in 2006. However, Iraqi ministries have less than 6 months
           left in the year to spend the remaining 76 percent of their
           budgets. In its July 2007 report, the administration cited
           satisfactory progress with this benchmark because the Ministry of
           Finance was releasing funds to ministries and provinces. The U.S.
           Embassy reported that the Ministry of Finance released 25 percent
           and 10 percent of 2007 capital project and reconstruction budget
           funds to ministries and provinces, respectively, in the first 5
           months of the year. However, funding releases are not expenditures
           and may not be a reliable indicator of future spending by
           ministries and provinces. The administration's report noted that
           capacity constraints and security problems may affect Iraq's
           ability to accelerate its spending and procurement activities.
			  
			  Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share
			  of Their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets

           The Ministry of Oil's capital project and reconstruction budget
           for 2007 is $2.4 billion, almost a quarter of the government's
           total. The ministry has already surpassed last year's spending
           total; however, U.S. officials stated that the ministry is not
           likely to spend a large share of its capital projects and
           reconstruction budget due to a variety of challenges, including a
           difficult security environment and burdensome and complex
           procurement rules. According to U.S. officials, the ministry has
           undertaken reform efforts to eliminate bottlenecks in the budget
           execution process. The U.S. Embassy reported that the Ministry of
           Oil had spent $500 million through July 15, 2007, or 21 percent of
           its budget for the year. However, the Special Inspector General
           for Iraq Reconstruction reported statements by U.S. officials that
           the ministry may not have spent all of these funds, but instead
           shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing
           Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the
           Oil Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget.4
			  
3The expenditure data presented by the U.S. Embassy are preliminary data
provided by the Ministry of Finance and do not include figures for the
Kurdistan region or the other provinces. In its official May 2007 monthly
report, the Ministry of Finance did not report any expenditures for
capital projects and reconstruction. In the absence of official data, the
information presented by the U.S. Embassy provides an indication of Iraq's
ability to spend its capital projects and reconstruction budget in the
first half of the year.

           In addition, the government provided over $2 billion, or over 20
           percent of the 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget, to
           the provinces (not including the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region)
           based on their populations.5 These funds are in addition to $2
           billion 2006 provincial funds for capital projects, most of which
           had not been transferred to the provinces until November and
           December of 2006.6 U.S. and foreign officials stated that the
           provinces have little experience planning and executing
           infrastructure projects and are likely to spend little of their
           2007 capital projects and reconstruction budgets. According to
           information collected and reported by Provincial Reconstruction
           Teams, the provinces had committed 44 percent of their 2007
           allocation to contracts for capital projects, as of July 15,
           2007.7 However, it is not clear whether the value of committed
           contracts is a reliable indicator of actual spending. Given the
           capacity and security challenges currently facing Iraq, many
           committed contracts may not be executed and, therefore, would not
           result in actual expenditures.8 The Government of Iraq is
           undertaking a number of initiatives, including budget execution
           training sessions, to help provincial officials spend their
           capital budgets, according to U.S. officials.
			  
4Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report and
Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, July 30,
2007).

5The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation of $1.56 billion, or
16 percent of the total 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget.
U.S. officials believe the Kurdistan region is able to execute its budget
successfully because of its years of experience as a semi-autonomous
region.

6The $2 billion in 2006 capital project and reconstruction funds for the
provinces did not include the Kurdistan region, which received a separate
allocation. The government of Iraq permitted the provinces to carry over
$1.3 billion in unspent 2006 funds. Unspent 2007 capital funds for the
provinces may not be carried over, according to U.S. officials.

7This percentage differs from preliminary Ministry of Finance data
provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicating that the
provinces "spent and committed" 18 percent of their 2007 allocations for
capital projects and reconstruction, as of July 15, 2007.

8The term "commitment" in Iraq is similar to an obligation under the U.S.
budget process, although the government of Iraq's official expenditure
data, as reported by the Ministry of Finance, does not include commitments
or obligations.

           Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations

           Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or
           making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security
           Forces.

           GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
			  
			  Issue

           According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers
           may be discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian
           manner if Iraq's political authorities undermine or make false
           accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
			  
			  Status

           Iraq's political authorities continue to undermine and make false
           accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S.
           government officials, little has changed since the U.S.
           Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment. Each
           month the U.S. government receives reports alleging wrongdoing by
           ISF members considered by MNF-I to be non-sectarian in their
           approach to security. The U.S. assessment further stated that in
           most cases the U.S. government was unable to determine the
           validity of these allegations but believed them to be untrue. The
           assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the
           independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi
           government does not adequately address the accusations. According
           to MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of
           military officers, but the cases did not provide justification or
           specific charges against the officers. Further information is
           classified.

           The U.S. government further reported that anecdotal evidence
           suggests that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing
           allegations even-handedly. According to U.S. government reporting,
           the de-Ba'athification Commission fabricated charges to cleanse
           Sunni officers from military units, and the Office of Commander in
           Chief has issued questionable judicial warrants as a more recent
           technique to target Sunni commanders. In addition, the ISF's
           formal command structure is compromised by influential sectarian
           leaders linked to the security ministries. These actions have
           reportedly led to the arrest and detention of several military
           officials. According to U.S. officials, this tactic is primarily
           used against Sunni Ministry of Defense officials and does not
           occur at the predominantly Shi'a Ministry of Interior. The U.S.
           government also reported that some Sunni politicians have made
           unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials. Moreover, Iraqi
           government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some members of
           the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have
           publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they
           continue to ignore sectarian activities, according to the U.S.
           government.
			  
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.

Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks

Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks

aIraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in
September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October
16, 2006.

bIn December 2006, MNF-I and the government of Iraq agreed to establish
joint security stations.

Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

aAccording to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for
these benchmarks.

Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 20071 (the Act) requires GAO to
submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of
whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in
the Act and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. This report
(1) provides an assessment of whether or not the Iraqi government has met
18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, and (2) provides
information on the status of the achievement of each benchmark. These
benchmarks address 8 legislative, 9 security and 1 economic-related
action.

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus,
Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the
government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, including a visit from July
22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.2 We provided drafts
of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which
we incorporated as appropriate. Although we analyzed classified data, this
report only contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We
conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Legislative Benchmarks

To determine if the Iraqi government is completing actions related to
review of the Iraqi Constitution; enacting and implementing legislation on
de-Ba'athification, the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources,
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, the independent high electoral
commission, provincial elections, provincial council authorities, amnesty,
and militia disarmament; and ensuring that the rights of minority
political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we took a number
of actions. Specifically, we interviewed and reviewed documentation from
the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for
Peace, IFES3, the Independent High Electoral Commission, non-governmental
organizations, and the Departments of Defense and State in Washington,
D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included the
administration's July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi
Constitution, draft laws related to each of the benchmarks, the
International Compact with Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and UN
analyses of the laws addressed by the benchmarks.

1Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.

2For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [75]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [76]http://www.gao.gov for a
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.

For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we relied
on prior GAO reporting4 and updated information where appropriate. We
interviewed and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, UN, U.S.
Institute for Peace, and State Department in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad,
Iraq. We compared central government draft oil laws with the Iraqi
Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional Government Oil and Gas law.

Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration's report on
progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of
Representatives Bylaws. We interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, Iraq,
including the leader of the Iraqi Minority Council. We also reviewed human
rights reports from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and
the U.S. government to determine whether the rights of minorities
throughout Iraq are protected.

Security Benchmarks

To determine if the Iraqi government is (1) establishing supporting
political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; (2) providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations; (3) providing Iraqi commanders
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad Security Plan without
political intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are
providing even-handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6)
reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control
of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security stations;
(8) increasing the number of security units capable of operating
independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi
Security Forces, we took a number of actions.

3IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election
Systems.

4GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's
Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, [77]GAO-07-1107T
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007) and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated
Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors,
[78]GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007).

Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other
documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting committees.
We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and reports showing the
Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and analyzed the U.S.
Department of Defense Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) formerly
known as Transitional Readiness Assessments, for these units. In addition,
we reviewed classified and unclassified assessments of the authorities
granted to unit commanders, the level of sectarian influence and levels of
militia infiltration of army and police units, and reports of incidents
where Iraqi officials interfered with the chain of command.

To understand the range of methodological issues associated with measuring
levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information related to
broader trends in population security, we interviewed officials from the
U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense in Washington, D.C.,
and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; the United
Nations; and the International Organization for Migration in Washington,
D.C., Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We also met with these officials
to discuss the other benchmarks.

Economic Benchmark

To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is allocating and
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects,
including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, we
interviewed U.S. government officials and contractors, and obtained and
analyzed supporting documents. We interviewed officials in Washington D.C.
and Baghdad with the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
U.S. Agency for International Development; the Embassy Iraq Transition
Assistance Office; and consultants to the Ministry of Finance. To assess
progress in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues we reviewed official
Iraqi Ministry of Finance capital budget and expenditure data for fiscal
years 2006 and 2007 provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and
unofficial Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation data on
capital expenditures reported by Multinational Force-Iraq.

We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget execution
by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S. Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations to the
provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital funding
allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and expenditure
data with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising the Ministry of
Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and State, the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World Bank, IMF, public
accountants and Iraqi government budget implementation documents. We found
that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of showing
trends in budget expenditures.

Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 6.

See comment 5.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 11.

See comment 10.

See comment 9.

See comment 8.

See comment 7.

See comment 13.

See comment 12.

See comment 18.

See comment 17.

See comment 16.

See comment 15.

See comment 14

See comment 19.

See comment 21.

See comment 20.

The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated
August 30, 2007.

GAO Comments

           1. We agree with State that legislation on the Iraq High Electoral
           Commission has been enacted and implemented. However, our
           assessment of "not met" on the electoral benchmark is based on the
           Iraqi government not enacting and implementing three of four
           components of this benchmark--legislation on provincial
           authorities, provincial elections, and an election date.
           2. We have highlighted the different standards of assessment
           between our report and the administration's reports. We also
           specify our assessment criteria in the cover letter and each
           appendix to make our judgments fully transparent.
           3. We have included information about the recent communique in the
           cover letter and appendices as appropriate.
           4. We have included information about the Kurdish Regional
           Government's new law and the U.S. position on it in the appendix
           on hydrocarbon legislation.
           5. Our report acknowledges the progress that the Iraqi government
           has made in allocating and spending $10 billion of fiscal year
           2007 funds on capital projects and reconstruction. While these
           funds have been allocated, our report also notes that a large
           portion of these funds will likely go unspent. Consequently, we
           rated this benchmark as "partially met."
           6. We disagree with State's comment. We assessed this benchmark as
           "met." However, Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the
           situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work
           in the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the
           legislature, and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political
           life. Thus we included additional relevant information about
           minority human rights in Iraq.
           7. See comment 6.
           8. See comment 6.
           9. We revised our text.
           10. Under our criteria, we considered the benchmark as "not met"
           because the Constitutional Review Committee was still continuing
           work on devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi
           legislature had not voted on the package, and a referendum had not
           been held.
           11. We added information to our already existing reference to the
           Kurdish National Assembly legislation.
           12. We revised this sentence.
           13. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met.
           14. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
           15. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
           16. Our paragraph provides context for the committees' work and
           the text makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we
           retained our original language.
           17. See comment 6.
           18. See comment 6.
           19. See comment 5.
           20. We revised the text.
           21. See comment 6.

Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See States response in appendix XXII.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 7.

See comment 6

See comment 5

See comment 4.

See comment 3

The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter dated August 30, 2007.

GAO Comments

           1. We have revised the text.
           2. We have revised the text.
           3. We have modified the sentence by adding not "always."
           4. We have replaced this chart.
           5. We have qualified the sentence by adding "parts of ."
           6. We disagree with DOD's comment. The Iraq benchmark calls for
           increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating
           independently. A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness,
           particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence.
           DOD's June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has
           constrained the development of MOI forces.
           7. DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are
           in the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we
           report. We are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it
           is from a published DOD source and we do not have further
           documentation on the new figure.

Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

GAO Contacts

Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]

Staff Acknowledgements

Steve Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton,
Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet
Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.

In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M
Burke-Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern,
Debra Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel
Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer,
Mary Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis,
Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.

(320511)

GAO's Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( [79]www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
[80]www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: [81]www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [82][email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [83][email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548

Public Affairs

Susan Becker, Acting Manager, [84][email protected] (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
D.C. 20548

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [85]GAO-07-1195 .

For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [86]GAO-07-1195 , a report to Congressional Committees

September 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ

Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks

Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007,
on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained
in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The
benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government
in June 2006.

In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and
September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward
meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met.

To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed
officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also
made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since
May 2003.

[87]What GAO Recommends

In future reports to Congress on the benchmarks, we recommend that the
Secretaries of State and Defense: (1) specify clearly what step in the
Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached; (2) identify trends
in sectarian violence together with broader measures of population
security; and (3) better identify the operational readiness of Iraqi
security forces.

State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our
assessment of certain benchmarks.

The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with
the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of
the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of
August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not
meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. (See next page). Overall, key legislation
has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the
Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These
results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces.

The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected.
The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and
implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in
October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other
legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee
has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution.
Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification,
oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia
disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in
achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what
step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached.

Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local
security, eliminated political intervention in military operations,
ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable
of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no
false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian
violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is
difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of
population security show differing trends.

Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of
allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data
indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been
spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in
Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the
military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of
the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress
would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this
report.

References

Visible links
  66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  67. http://www.gao.gov/
  68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1107T
  69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-903
  71. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-902R
  72. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-612T
  73. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  74. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-217C
  75. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  76. http://www.gao.gov/
  77. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1107T
  78. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677
  79. http://www.gao.gov/
  80. http://www.gao.gov/
  81. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  82. mailto:[email protected]
  83. mailto:[email protected]
  84. mailto:[email protected]
  85. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195
  86. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195
*** End of document. ***