Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks
(04-SEP-07, GAO-07-1195).
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September
1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18
benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the
achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from
commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June
2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to
report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory
progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether
the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed
government documents and interviewed officials from U.S.
agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have
completed since May 2003.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-1195
ACCNO: A75587
TITLE: Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi
Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks
DATE: 09/04/2007
SUBJECT: Audits
Benchmark testing
Economic stabilization
Foreign governments
Foreign policies
Interagency relations
International relations
Iraq War and reconstruction
Legislation
Policy evaluation
Security assessments
Program implementation
Iraq
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GAO-07-1195
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Legislative Benchmarks
* [3]Security Benchmarks
* [4]Economic Benchmark
* [5]Conclusions
* [6]Recommendations
* [7]Agency Comments
* [8]Issue
* [9]Status
* [10]Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Polit
* [11]Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of
* [12]Issue
* [13]Status
* [14]Issue
* [15]Status
* [16]Issue
* [17]Status
* [18]Issue
* [19]Status
* [20]Issue
* [21]Status
* [22]Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation
* [23]Issue
* [24]Status
* [25]Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made
* [26]Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist
* [27]Issue
* [28]Status
* [29]Issue
* [30]Status
* [31]Issue
* [32]Status
* [33]Issue
* [34]Status
* [35]Issue
* [36]Status
* [37]Issue
* [38]Status
* [39]Issue
* [40]Status
* [41]Issue
* [42]Status
* [43]Issue
* [44]Status
* [45]Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are
* [46]Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotec
* [47]Issue
* [48]Status
* [49]Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are U
* [50]Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large
* [51]Issue
* [52]Status
* [53]Legislative Benchmarks
* [54]Security Benchmarks
* [55]Economic Benchmark
* [56]GAO Comments
* [57]GAO Comments
* [58]GAO Contacts
* [59]Staff Acknowledgements
* [60]GAO's Mission
* [61]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [62]Order by Mail or Phone
* [63]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [64]Congressional Relations
* [65]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
September 2007
SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks
GAO-07-1195
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Legislative Benchmarks 4
Security Benchmarks 7
Economic Benchmark 13
Conclusions 13
Recommendations 14
Agency Comments 14
Appendix I Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review 19
Issue 19
Status 19
Appendix II Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform 23
Issue 23
Status 23
Appendix III Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation 25
Issue 25
Status 25
Appendix IV Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions 28
Issue 28
Status 28
Appendix V Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation 31
Issue 31
Status 31
Appendix VI Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation 33
Issue 33
Status 33
Appendix VII Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament 35
Issue 35
Status 35
Appendix VIII Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees 38
Issue 38
Status 38
Appendix IX Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades 40
Issue 40
Status 40
Appendix X Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority 42
Issue 42
Status 42
Appendix XI Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law 44
Issue 44
Status 44
Appendix XII Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens 46
Issue 46
Status 46
Appendix XIII Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control 50
Issue 50
Status 50
Appendix XIV Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations 55
Issue 55
Status 55
Appendix XV Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently
58
Issue 58
Status 58
Appendix XVI Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights 61
Issue 61
Status 61
Appendix XVII Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues 64
Issue 64
Status 64
Appendix XVIII Benchmark 18 - False Accusations 68
Issue 68
Status 68
Appendix XIX Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 70
Appendix XX Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report 72
Appendix XXI Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 73
Appendix XXII Comments from the Department of State 77
GAO Comments 86
Appendix XXIII Comments from the Department of Defense 88
GAO Comments 91
Appendix XXIV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 92
Figures
Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks 5
Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks 8
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) 11
Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad 48
Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) 52
Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007
56
Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 70
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced
and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO.
However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other
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wish to reproduce this material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 4, 2007
Congressional Committees:
Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of troops
and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic goal of
creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and be an
ally in the War on Terror. These troops have performed courageously under
dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans'
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of
20071 (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007,2
an independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met
18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of
the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to
advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the
Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and
promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained in the Act were
derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi
government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for information on
the origin of these benchmarks.)
The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed
to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster
conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy recognizes that
the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve
political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening
extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi government. Amid such
violence, it became increasingly difficult for Iraqi leaders to make the
compromises necessary to foster reconciliation through the passage of
legislation aimed at reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing
hydrocarbon revenues more equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new
strategy was aimed at providing the Iraqi government with the time and
space needed to help address reconciliation among the various segments of
Iraqi society.
1Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.
2GAO is providing this report to Congress on September 4th, 2007, the
first business day following September 1st.
As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of whether
or not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative, security, and
economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the status of the
achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks, eight address
legislative actions, nine address security actions, and one is
economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to
report in July and September 2007 on the status of each benchmark, and to
provide an assessment on whether satisfactory progress is being made
toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met.
In order to meet our statutory responsibilities in a manner consistent
with GAO's core values, we decided to use "partially met" criteria for
selected benchmarks. See appendices I-XVIII for information on our
assessment and the status of the achievement of each benchmark, and
appendix XX for a comparison of GAO's assessment with the administration's
July 2007 initial benchmark assessment report. We are also issuing a
separate, classified report on selected benchmarks.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus,
Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the
government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22
to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May
2003.3 We provided drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for
review and comment. We received formal written comments from State and
Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency and
National Intelligence Council which we incorporated as appropriate. This
letter and each appendix describe the detailed criteria we used in making
our assessments of the 18 benchmarks. As required by the mandate, we made
a determination of whether all 18 benchmarks had been met. For 14 of the
18 benchmarks, we developed criteria for assessing whether the benchmark
was "partially met." For the remaining 4 benchmarks, we determined that
they should be judged as "met" or "not met" because the nature of the
individual benchmarks did not lend themselves to a "partially met"
assessment.
3For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [66]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [67]http://www.gao.gov for a
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.
Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains unclassified
information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our review in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix XXI
contains a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall we found that:
o The constitutional review process is not complete, and laws on
de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and
amnesty have not passed;
o Violence remains high, the number of Iraqi security forces
capable of conducting independent operations has declined, and
militias are not disarmed; and
o Funding for reconstruction has been allocated but is unlikely to
be spent.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should
balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi government benchmarks with
the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and
other goals of the United States. In addition, future
administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to
Congress if they depicted the status of each legislative
benchmark, provided data on broader measures of violence from all
relevant U.S. agencies, and assessed the performance and loyalties
of Iraqi security forces.
Legislative Benchmarks
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the
eight legislative benchmarks and partially met another.4
Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the
Iraqi legislature are protected through existing provisions in the
Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws;
however, minorities among the Iraqi population are vulnerable and
their rights are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi government
partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on
the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but
will not be implemented until April 2008.5
Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark
requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met.
Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional
review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the
resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing
between federal and regional governments over issues such as
distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative
benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights the status of
the legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and
implementation.
4For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met." For the constitutional review,
we would have considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with
Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, (1) the Constitutional Review
Committee had been formed; (2) the Council of Representatives had voted on
the recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the
Council, (3) a national referendum had been held on the proposed
amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark
partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review process
were completed.
5Because this law will not be implemented until April 2008, publication in
the Official Gazette has been deferred, according to State officials, who
assert that a delay in implementation is in the best interest of Iraq.
Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks
aThe Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.
bThe Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out in
Article 138 of the Constitution.
cThe draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according
to UN.
dAccording to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the
election date, though to date this is unclear.
As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform has been
drafted but has yet to be enacted.6 Hydrocarbon legislation is in the
early stages of legislative action; although three key components have
been drafted, none are under active consideration by the Council of
Representatives.7 Although the government of Iraq has established an
independent electoral commission and appointed commissioners, the
government has not implemented legislation to establish provincial council
authorities, provincial elections law, or a date for provincial elections.
No legislation on amnesty or militia disarmament is being considered
because the conditions for a successful program, particularly the need for
a secure environment, are not present, according to U.S. and Iraqi
officials.
Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have
been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi
cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, this boycott
ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of
national unity and further undermines Iraq's already faltering program of
national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq's senior Shi'a, and Sunni
Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts
to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws, as
well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held
without charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of
Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information on
these legislative benchmarks).
6According to U.S. and other officials and documents, enacting legislation
generally includes the following steps, though the process is evolving:
The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have authority to
draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature--either a committee or 10 members
--has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the Presidency
Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed on legal soundness and
subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in the Ministry of
Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature must first pass through its Legal
Committee. The legislation then proceeds through three readings. The
legislation is presented at the first reading. The relevant committee may
amend the law and the Speaker's Office places it on the calendar. After
the first reading, the legislature discusses the proposed law at a second
reading. At the third reading, a final vote is taken article by article.
Laws that receive an affirmative vote are sent to the Presidency Council,
which can disapprove the law. The legislature can override the disapproval
with a three-fifths majority. This ratification process only applies
during the transition period when the Presidency Council is in existence.
Final laws are published in the Official Gazette and become effective on
the date of publication in the gazette unless stipulated otherwise. The
Prime Minister issues an order to implement the law. Laws are implemented
by the appropriate ministry, commission, or government office and
implementing guidance is written.
7For additional information on Iraq's hydrocarbon sector, see GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Oil
Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, [68]GAO-07-1107T (Washington,
D.C.: July 18, 2007).
The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of
these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what step
in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future reporting
should provide this important detail, as we display in figure 1.
Security Benchmarks
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine
security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political,
communications, economic, and services committees8 in support of the
Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition assistance, 32 of
the planned 34 Joint Security Stations9 across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7
benchmarks, the Iraqi government partially met 2 and did not meet five.
(see fig. 2)
8In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering
Committee and six subcommittees to coordinate political, economic, and
military activities and make decisions in support of the Baghdad Security
Plan. According to a State department official, the executive committee's
major objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi
government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part
of the Baghdad security plan. We defined this benchmark as "met" if the
committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan;
defined this benchmark as "partially met" if at least half of the
committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and
defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the committees
were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. For additional
information, see appendix VIII.
9Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the
administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to
improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in
Baghdad neighborhoods. We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of
the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this
benchmark as "partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security
Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less
than half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. For
additional information, see appendix XIV.
Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three
trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.10 Since February
2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army battalions equaling
three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the Baghdad Security Plan.
The administration's July 2007 report to Congress noted problems in
manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that the three brigades were
operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our classified report provides
additional information on the readiness levels and performance of these
units, which supports our assessment of this benchmark.
10We defined this benchmark as "met" if the Government of Iraq had
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some of
the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations;
and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to
support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each
unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on
their reliability.
The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that the
Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws
regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation.11 Even though the
Baghad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe havens, and U.S.
commanders report satisfaction with the coalition's ability to target
extremist groups, opportunities for creating temporary safe havens exist
due to the political intervention of Iraqi government officials (see
discussion in appendix X) and the strong sectarian loyalties and militia
infiltration of security forces.
The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian
violence and eliminate militia control of local security.12As discussed in
appendix XIII, militia control of local security forces remains a problem.
Several U.S. and UN reports have found that militias still retain
significant control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad
and other areas of Iraq.
On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian
violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The
administration's July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data
demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the
Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged that
precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine if the
decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is difficult
since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known. Given this
difficulty, broader measures of population security should be used in
judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting civilians and
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as
additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 3, the average
number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the
last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is
largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than
civilians.
11We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did not
allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet some existed;
and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi government had no
stated policy on safe havens.
12We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was
eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there
was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence
was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated.
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)
While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major
religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections.13 For
2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September. Our classified
report provides further information on measurement issues and trends in
violence in Iraq obtained from other U.S. agencies. The unclassified
August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that
Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some
Sunni insurgents, have reduced al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities and
restricted its freedom of movement. However, the NIE further noted that
the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among
civilians remains high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile
attacks.
13Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 4
years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5,
2005; and September 24, 2006.
For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that:
o The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to
make tactical and operational decisions without political
intervention, resulting in some operational decisions being based
on sectarian interests.14
o The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces
were providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S.
reports have cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part
of Iraqi security forces.15
o Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of
independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July
2007.16
o Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false
accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to
U.S. government officials, little has changed since the
administration's July 2007 report.17
(See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on
these security benchmarks).
14We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not face
political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and
operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi
commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making
tactical and operational decisions.
15We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces provided
even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "not met"
if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the
law.
16We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq increased
the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of
Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable
of operating independently.
17We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
Economic Benchmark
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and
spend $10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in
reconstruction funds when it passed its 2007 budget in February,
2007. The New Way Forward in Iraq cited Iraq's inability to spend
its own resources to rebuild critical infrastructure and deliver
essential services as an economic challenge to Iraq's
self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an important
source of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United States
has obligated most of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for
reconstruction and stabilization activities since 2003.
However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the
Iraqi government will be spent by the end of Iraq's fiscal year,
December 31, 2007.18 Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports
that Iraq's central ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24
percent, of the approximately $6.5 billion in capital project
funds allocated to them through July 15, 2007. The remaining funds
from the $10 billion were allocated to the provinces and the
Kurdish region. (See appendix XVII for further information on the
economic benchmark)
Conclusions
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met
4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government
has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to
advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would
promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of
particular concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional
review that could promote greater Sunni participation in the
national government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that
would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders
recently signing a unity accord, the polarization of Iraq's major
sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shi'a factions
diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its
potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian
reconciliation.
Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While
the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian
violence, measuring such violence may be difficult since the
perpetrator's intent is not clearly known. Other measures of
violence, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show that
violence has remained high through July 2007.
18We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and
either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they would
be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable or
unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We
defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been allocated.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military
progress, homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the
United States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks
would be more useful to the Congress if they clearly depicted the
status of each legislative benchmark, provided additional
quantitative and qualitative information on violence from all
relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance and
loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition
operations.
Recommendations
In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
recommend that:
1. The Secretary of State provide information to the
President that clearly specifies the status in
drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi
legislation;
2. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
appropriate agencies, provide information to the
President on trends in sectarian violence with
appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative
and qualitative measures of population security, and
3. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
appropriate agencies, provides additional information
on the operational readiness of Iraqi security forces
supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly
information on their loyalty and willingness to help
secure Baghdad.
As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these
recommendations.
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the
Central Intelligence Agency provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
The Department of State provided written comments, which are
reprinted in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical
comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as
appropriate. State agreed with our recommendation to provide the
President with additional information on the specific status of
key Iraqi legislation in preparing future reports to Congress.
State suggested that we note the standards we used in assessing
the 18 benchmarks differ from the administration's standards. The
highlights page and introduction of our report discuss these
differing standards. State also suggested that we take into
consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as the
communique released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007.
We added additional information to the report about this
communique and related developments.
The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which
are reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with
technical comments and suggested wording changes that we
incorporated as appropriate. Defense agreed with our
recommendations to provide, in concert with other relevant
agencies, information to the President on trends in sectarian
violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative
and qualitative measures of security. Defense also agreed to
provide the President with additional information on the
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the
Baghdad security plan.
DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our
conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence
are unclear. Further information on DOD's views, and our response,
are contained in our classified report. However, the additional
information that DOD provided did not warrant a change in our
assessment of "not met." We note that the unclassified August 2007
NIE stated that the overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on
and casualties among civilians, remains high, Iraq's major
sectarian groups remain unreconciled, and levels of insurgent and
sectarian violence will remain high over the next six to twelve
months.
DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of "not met" for the
training and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations
in Baghdad and provided additional information on this issue.
While acknowledging that some of these Iraqi units lacked
personnel, fighting equipment, and vehicles, the U.S. commander
embedded with the units attested to their fighting capabilities.
Based on this additional information, and our classified and
unclassified information, we changed our rating from "not met" to
"partially met."
DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark
related to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional
information describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted
operations in Sadr City. For example, from January to August 2007,
Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted over eighty
operations that span each sector of Sadr City. However, due to
sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security forces, and
support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain
the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition
forces. Based on this additional information, we changed this
assessment to "partially met."
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of
Congress. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512- 5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff,
Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are included in appendix XXIV.
David M. Walker
United States Comptroller General
Enclosures
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Chairwoman
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable John F. Tierney
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review
Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the
constitutional review.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in
October 2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such
as claims over disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending
the Constitution is critical to reaching national agreement on
power sharing among Iraq's political blocs and furthering national
reconciliation, according to Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials, and
the Iraq Study Group report.
Status
Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review
Committee (CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet
complete.2 First, the review committee's work is not finished. In
a May 23, 2007 report, the CRC recommended a package of
constitutional amendments to the Iraq Council of Representatives.
However, the package did not resolve the powers of the presidency;
disputed territories, including Kirkuk; and the relative powers of
the regions versus the federal government. The CRC received an
extension until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the
outstanding issues, but, according to the chairman of the CRC,
Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on these
issues. Second, once resolved, the Iraqi legislature must approve
the package of amendments by an absolute majority vote. Finally,
if a package of amendments is approved, the Iraqi people will need
to vote on the amendments in a referendum within 2 months after
the legislature approves them.
1For the constitutional review, we would have considered the benchmark as
met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, the
Constitutional Review Committee had been formed; the Council of
Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the review committee;
and, if approved by the Council, a national referendum had been held on
the proposed amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the
benchmark partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional
review process were completed. See benchmark 2 for a description of the
criteria for meeting legislative benchmarks.
2The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1) the
Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents to the
Council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that could be
made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be presented
to the Council all at once for a vote upon them and are approved with the
agreement of an absolute majority of the members of the Council; and (3)
the articles amended by the Council shall be presented to the people in a
referendum within two months from the date of approval by the Council and
the referendum will be successful if approved by the majority of voters
and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more
governorates.
Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political
Accommodation
To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution,
Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on the
following three contentious issues.
o Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a
member of the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have
greater power. The Constitution gives the presidency such powers
as accrediting ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council
the power to approve or disapprove legislation in the current
electoral term.3 However, the legislature can adopt any
disapproved legislation by a three-fifths majority vote. In
contrast, the prime minister, selected from the legislature's
largest political bloc, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
names the ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of
Ministers. The Council directs the work of all government
ministries and departments, develops their plans, and prepares the
government budget. The high-ranking Sunni official said that
giving the presidency more power could allow for better power
sharing among Iraq's political groups.
o Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the
Constitution addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a
census and a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by
December 31, 2007 to determine the will of its citizens. According
to the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) prime minister,
Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region and must be returned to
Kurdistan. Under the former regime's policy of
Arabization--removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing
them with Arab families--areas of Kirkuk were given to other
governorates, according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want
the referendum held by the date specified in the Constitution.
Other Iraqi legislators believe that the Kirkuk referendum should
be deferred because of the disputes over the borders of Kirkuk and
continuing displacement of people in the area.
3According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral term, which
is 4 years, a presidency council consisting of a president and 2
vice-presidents is in place and exercises the powers of the presidency. If
these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the start of the next
electoral term, power will revert to a single president and the power to
approve and disapprove legislation that is explicitly granted to the
presidency council will lapse. The president will then have the power to
ratify and issue laws passed by the legislature, although such laws are
considered ratified 15 days after the president receives them.
o Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed
several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of
the federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but
has not achieved compromise among major political factions on
these amendments. In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article
111 of the Constitution to clearly state that the federal
government shall collect oil revenues and distribute them equally
to all Iraqis in accordance with the national budget law.
According to the United Nations, this amendment would provide the
federal government exclusive authority for oil revenues. In
contrast, the existing constitutional framework is widely
interpreted as allowing regions to define how and whether they
share locally generated oil revenues.4 For this reason, the
Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed amendment.
Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the
Review
If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments,
the Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments
will be considered approved if an absolute majority of the
legislature votes for the package. One challenge is simply holding
a vote.
Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29,
2007, several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government,
including Iraq's largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in
the legislature could form an absolute majority to pass a package
of amendments, it would defeat the purpose of trying to reach a
broad political accommodation.
If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the
government must hold a national referendum within 2 months of
approval. According to the United Nations, before a referendum can
occur, the Iraq Electoral Commission must develop a valid voting
roster, educate the public about
the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and locate and
staff polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High
Electoral Commission stated that it faced challenges to developing
a valid voting roster because of the large movement of displaced
persons--an estimated 800,000 since February 2006.5
4Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction between
regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive
authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority and
regional powers have the right to amend the application of the national
legislation within that region.
5United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Humanitarian Briefing on the
Crisis in Iraq, May 2007.
Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform
Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification
reform.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the
Ba'athist party, removed Ba'athist leaders and senior party
members from government, and banned them from future employment in
the public sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and
removal of even junior members of the party from upper-level
management in government ministries, universities, and hospitals.
Most of Iraqi's technocratic class was pushed out of government
due to de-Ba'athification and many Sunni Arabs remain angry about
policies to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society, according to the Iraq
Study Group report.
Status
Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation
to reform de-Ba'athification, none has sufficient support among
Iraq's political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi
legislature, according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on
reforming the current de-Ba'athification policy and many Iraqis
are concerned by the prospects of former Ba'athist tormenters
returning to power. However, according to an August 2007 U.S.
interagency report, Iraq's senior Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish
political leaders signed a Unity Accord, including consensus on
draft legislation on de-Ba'thification reform. Such a law would
need to be drafted, passed by the Council of Representatives, and
implemented.
According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely
promote reconciliation if the reforms target Ba'athists who had
command responsibility within the party or committed human rights
violations or other crimes.2 Removing individuals based purely on
party membership increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi
public will see the system as unfair, according to these
officials. Draft legislation on de-Ba'athification reform, dated
July 2007 before the Unity Accord, provides for a special
commission, a panel of judges to make decisions, and the right to
appeal the panel's decisions. The draft legislation also specifies
that the commission will be dissolved 6 months after the law is
passed.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
2The doctrine of command responsibility holds that individuals can be
liable for actions they did not actually commit if: (1) they issued orders
to those who committed the human rights violations or crimes; (2) they
should have known or should have been in a position to know that their
subordinates were committing human rights violations or crimes; or (3)
they did not take reasonable measures to prevent the human rights
violations or other crimes or did not punish the perpetrators.
Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation
Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq
without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and
enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy
resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and
other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely
recognized, as is the need to create a new legal framework for the
development and management of the country's oil sector. The oil
sector accounts for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and
over 90 percent of its revenues. The timely and equitable
distribution of these revenues is essential to Iraq's ability to
provide for its needs, including the reconstruction of a unified
Iraq.
Status
The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the
four separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to
ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of
August 2007, the Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of
legislation: (1) hydrocarbon framework legislation that
establishes the structure, management, and oversight for the oil
sector; (2) revenue-sharing legislation; and (3) legislation
restructuring the Ministry of Oil. However, none of the
legislation is currently under consideration by Iraq's parliament
(Council of Representatives). A fourth piece of legislation
establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has not been
drafted, according to State officials.
Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi
cabinet (Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the
Oil and Gas Committee of Iraq's parliament for review in July
2007. However, before the legislation was submitted to the
parliament, the Iraqi government amended the draft to address
substantive changes made by the Shura council. According to State,
the Shura council reviews draft legislation to ensure
constitutionality and to avoid contradictions with Iraq's legal
system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) did not agree to the council's revisions. Accordingly, the
Oil and Gas Committee chairman is taking no legislative action
until the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG agree on a new draft,
according to State. It is not clear if this legislation will
include annexes intended to allocate the control of particular oil
fields and exploration areas to either the central or regional
governments. According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain
under consideration.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable
distribution of Iraq's financial resources, including oil and gas
revenues. The central government and the KRG agreed on draft
revenue-sharing legislation2 in June 2007. However, the Iraqi
cabinet has not yet approved the legislation and submitted it to
Iraq's parliament for consideration.
This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the
Iraqi Constitution regarding the role of the federal government
and regions and the management of oil revenues. Under the existing
Constitution, if there is a contradiction between regional and
national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive
authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority
and regional powers have the right to amend the application of the
national legislation within that region. As oil revenue sharing is
not a power exclusively reserved for the federal government in the
existing Constitution, according to officials, regions may
determine how and whether they share locally generated oil
revenues with the remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated
in the federal law.3 In response, the Iraqi Constitutional Review
Committee has proposed amendments to the Constitution that would
provide for the national collection and distribution of oil
revenues.
2This legislation is also referred to as the "Law of Financial Resources"
and the "Revenue Management Law."
3The Kurdistan National Assembly (Kurdish Regional parliament) has passed
a "Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law" (also referred to as the "Petroleum Law of
the Kurdistan Region - Iraq"), in August, 2007, which conditions
cooperation with the federal authorities in the oil sector on a set of
comprehensive conditions. According to the UN, it would likely take time
for full agreement on these arrangements to be reached and for
implementation of national revenue sharing to begin. It is unclear how
this will affect the national debate on revenue sharing or the hydrocarbon
framework legislation at this time. According to the State Department, the
United States continues to believe that Iraq's interests are better served
by the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will
help foster national unity and promote reconciliation.
Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but
has not yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according
to State.
Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is
being drafted, according to State.
Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions
Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form
semi-autonomous regions.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
Issue
Iraq's Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to
enact a law that defines the executive procedures needed to form
regions within 6 months of the date of its first session. Some
Iraqi legislators believe that the right to form regions, with
authority similar to the Kurdistan region, would help protect
their rights.
Status
In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing
procedures to form regions, but the law delays implementation for
18 months.2 According to U.S. officials, this means that no steps
to form regions, such as holding provincial referendums, can be
taken before April 2008. According to State, this is in the best
interests of Iraq as it will allow the government to deal with
some outstanding issues. The United Nations has identified two
issues that may impact implementation of this law--the ongoing
review of Iraq's Constitution and the capacity of new regional
governments.
According to members of Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC), the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18
months to allow the constitutional review process to be completed.
Some of the proposed amendments to the constitution would clarify
the powers of the federal government versus regions and
governorates For example, according to the United Nations, the CRC
proposed amendments that would give federal law priority over
regional law with respect to water, customs, ports, and oil and
revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments would give the federal
government exclusive power over electricity generation, railways,
and pension funds.3 Moreover, the constitutional review could also
help resolve the status of disputed areas, which could impact
regional boundaries. Until the constitutional review is completed
and the constitutional referendum is held, residents in areas
considering regional formation may not have all the information
they need to make decisions.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
2Iraq has 18 governorates and the Iraqi Constitution states that one or
more governorates have the right to organize into a region. Article 117 of
the Constitution further recognizes the region of Kurdistan, which
consists of three provinces in northern Iraq. The final version of the law
on executive procedures regarding the formation of regions states that a
region consists of one province or more.
The capability of the regions to govern themselves will also
impact implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution
accords significant executive, judicial, and management
authorities to the regions. The regions have responsibility for
maintaining their internal security forces, administering
allocations from national revenues, and maintaining
representational offices in embassies and consuls. Moreover, the
law on formation of regions provides that once formed, the regions
must undertake to create elected provisional legislative councils.
According to the United Nations, this will require a substantial
investment of resources and significant management responsibility.
GAO has reported on significant shortages of competent personnel
in national ministries charged with delivering services to the
Iraqi people; moreover, these shortages are greater at the
provincial level of government, according to State and USAID
officials. We have also reported that the poor security situation
and high levels of violence have contributed to the continued and
accelerating "brain drain" of professional Iraqis that would be
needed to manage the new regional administrations.4
3The lack of clarity about power sharing between federal and regional
governments is highlighted by problems over power generation. As of the
summer of 2007, a number of provinces have been ignoring the federal
government's shared authority over power generation and distribution by
failing to provide their required allocations of power to Baghdad,
contributing to national blackouts. In August 2007, these provincial
authorities were threatening to disconnect their local power generating
sources from the national electricity grid.
4GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, [69]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9.
2007); GAO, forthcoming Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry
Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [70]GAO-07-903 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2007).
Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent
High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial
council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many
Sunnis boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi'a and Kurd
provincial councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations.
To redress the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial
councils, Iraq needs to hold new provincial elections, but must
first establish an electoral commission, write provincial election
laws, define provincial powers so voters know the stakes, and set
a date for elections.
Status
Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented
legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC), it has not enacted and implemented legislation
establishing a provincial elections law, provincial council
authorities, or a date for provincial elections.
o Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented
legislation to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in
establishing the commission. According to the U.S. government, the
Council of Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January
23, 2007, and subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners,
as required under the law, in a process the UN deemed in
compliance with international standards. However, a provision in
the IHEC law requires the COR to nominate and the Board of
Commissioners to appoint the directors of the Governorate
Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve of these positions are
vacant, but, according to State, the process of appointing the
directors is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC to
establish and update a voter registry in collaboration with the
Governorate and Regional Electoral Offices. However, before they
can complete an update of the voter registry (which was last
updated in mid-2005), an election law must be enacted that defines
the residency and voter eligibility requirements. Finally, the
IHEC still needs a budget to fund its activities.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
o Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial
elections. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime
Minster's office is drafting legislation governing provincial
elections, including setting a date for elections to occur.
However, according to the Embassy, some key political parties are
hesitant to hold provincial elections due to concerns that they
will lose representation, potentially to more extreme parties.
Additionally, several parties are demanding that any election law
ensure that eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be
allowed to vote.
o Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities
and structures of local governments, has not been enacted and
implemented. According to the U.S. government, the draft
legislation has been approved and submitted to the Council of
Representatives, where it has had two of the three required
readings. However, the U.S. government reported in July 2007 that
changes were being considered, particularly related to the powers
of the governor and the authority of the federal government at the
local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with the draft,
including that it cedes most power to the provinces. The United
Nations pointed out that the draft fails to clarify the role of
the governorate and that the draft law does not deal adequately
with the effective delivery of public goods and services in the
governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8, 2007, the
relevant COR committee presented a report outlining suggested
changes to the law, some of which the Embassy supported.
o The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial
elections. The Iraq Study Group emphasized the need for provincial
elections at the earliest possible date. The Embassy is urging the
Iraqi government to take the legislative and administrative action
necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. According to the
U.S. Embassy, it is intensively engaged with the Iraqi government
and the COR at all levels to expedite legislation or amendments to
existing legislation that will allow provincial elections to take
place and secure funding for elections.
In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark
should be partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission
has been established and the benchmark calls only for its
establishment. However, the benchmark requires more than the
establishment of the IHEC, and Iraq has not enacted and
implemented a provincial elections law, provincial council
authorities, or a date for provincial elections, as required by
the benchmark.
Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation
Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and
others who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool
to promote reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In
addition, the Iraqi government and coalition forces hold thousands
of detainees, some of whom could be eligible for an amnesty
program when conditions are right.
Status
The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty,
according to U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful
program are not present. As figure 2 in the cover letter shows,
many steps remain in the legislative process, including drafting
the legislation and obtaining approval in the Iraqi cabinet and
Council of Representatives. However, the government of Iraq is not
pressing for the development of amnesty legislation.
Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation
Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister's
national reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has
been made. The plan called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not
involved in crimes against humanity or terrorist acts. At that
time, the Iraqi government announced that it would release 2,500
detainees; 2,500 prisoners were subsequently released. According
to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-scale releases have been
made since 2006, and there has been little discussion of amnesty
since then. However, the Prime Minister's office and Iraq's
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee sponsored
a workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended that
amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national
reconciliation and that the government's military has to be
superior to armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United
Nations takes the position that in considering the categories of
perpetrators to be included or excluded in amnesty, international
law does not allow amnesty to be granted to those who committed
genocide, crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. In addition, Iraqi government
officials have recommended that an amnesty program consider all
detained individuals held by Iraq and by coalition forces. There
are currently thousands of detainees, including over 24,000 held
by coalition forces. According to multinational force officials,
there could be considerably more detainees in the future as the
Baghdad security plan progresses. The Coalition's Task Force 134
is building and expanding prison facilities to accommodate
additional detainees.
Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong
militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces
are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the
Constitution of Iraq.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are
responsible for sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and
have heavily infiltrated the Iraqi army and national police.
Efforts to dissolve or bring militias under control have been
ongoing since 2004. In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis in a
nationwide poll agreed that militias should be dissolved.
Status
The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming
militias. CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces
and militias within Iraq, except for those allowed under the
Order.2 Multiple steps are needed to enact and implement further
legislation to disarm militias. More importantly, according to
U.S. officials, conditions are not right for a traditional
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR);
accordingly, there is currently no momentum in the government of
Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias pose a severe challenge to
stability and reconciliation in Iraq.
Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made i
Demobilizing Them
Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash
al-Mahdi (the militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often
operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to
detain and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. A June
2007 Defense Department report further notes that many Jayash
al-Mahdi fighters have left Baghdad as a result of expanded
coalition and Iraqi presence. They now engage in ethnic and
sectarian violence in northern and central Iraq and have increased
conflict with the Badr Organization in southern Iraq leading to a
significant increase in attacks against the coalition in Basrah.
The June 2007 report also states that Shi'a militia infiltration
of the Ministry of Interior is a problem. Militia influence
impacts every component of the Ministry, particularly in Baghdad
and other key cities.
1For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing
of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the
relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as
"partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in
instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have
been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the
requirements of "met" or "partially met."
2Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and
Oversight Issues ( [71]GAO-04-902R, Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been
made to disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias
numbering an estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition
and reintegration process in 2004. The Coalition Provisional
Authority estimated that 90 percent of these fighters would
complete the transition and reintegration process by January 2005.
However, according to the administration's July 15, 2007 report,
no armed group has committed to disarm. Moreover, according to
U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR commission has not
developed a plan for DDR and has not received funding for its
work.
Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist
A May 2007 UN assessment on DDR for Iraq states that minimum
requirements for a successful DDR program in Iraq include a secure
environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an
overarching political agreement, sustainable funding, and
appropriate reintegration opportunities. GAO's reports and
analysis show that these conditions do not exist in Iraq. For
example:
o As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, the overall level of
attacks against Iraqi civilians, coalition personnel, and Iraqi
security forces has risen since 2003, creating a poor security
environment. Classified and unclassified GAO reports provide
further information on security in Iraq..3
o In June 2006, the prime minister sought to include insurgent
groups as part of his reconciliation plan. However, according to
administration and DOD reports, efforts at reconciliation have
stalled. In addition, Iraqi officials reject terrorist groups,
such as al Qaeda in Iraq, and a report done for the U.S. Embassy
comments that some groups cannot be reconciled. Also, the support
of external actors is an important element of disarmament and
demobilization, but according to U.S. reports, some external
groups are not helpful. For example, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard provides deadly arms and funding to Iraq's militias and
contributes to the ongoing instability.
3GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces, [72]GAO-07-612T ) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007); GAO,
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight, ( [73]GAO-07-308SP ) Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007; GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and
Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, ( [74]GAO-06-217C
) Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.
The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007
budget and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from
the Iraq Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government
of Iraq for this purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for
DDR and has not made progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is
uncertain whether such funding is needed at this time.
Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees
Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1
Issue
The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security
plan2 in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad and
surrounding areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi
security forces implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but
these operations failed to reduce violence for a variety of
reasons. Unlike the earlier operations, the current Baghdad
Security Plan encompasses political, economic, and security
activities that the Iraqi government needed to coordinate at the
national level.
Status
In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive
Steering Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees
to coordinate political, economic and military activities and make
decisions in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a
Department of State official, the executive committee's major
objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the
Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's
population as part of the Baghdad Security Plan. Each of the
subcommittees addresses one of six issues related to the plan's
implementation: economics, services, political, communication,
popular mobilization, and security. The executive committee and
subcommittees meet on a weekly basis.
The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi
Prime Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level
Iraqi ministry officials chair the various subcommittees. For
example, a deputy prime minister chairs the economic subcommittee
and the services subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant
Iraqi ministries serve on each subcommittee. Two senior U.S.
officials are observers to the executive committee and attend its
weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or U.S. embassy official is also
assigned to each subcommittee. This official provides advice on
the subcommittees' agendas and other support when called upon.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the committees were established in
support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if at least half of the committees were established in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if less
than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan.
2The current Baghdad security plan is also known as Operation Fardh
al-Qanoon.
According to a Department of State official, the executive
committee and subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi
government provided sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in
implementing the Baghdad Security Plan. For example, when the
Iraqi Army provided brigades that were not at full strength, the
executive committee and security subcommittee identified forces
from other parts of the country to move to Baghdad. The committees
also found ways to house and feed the Iraqi troops supporting the
security plan. In addition, the communication subcommittee has
helped publicize the security plan's goals and the other
subcommittees' efforts to get resources to Baghdad districts that
have been cleared of insurgents.
We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or
subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the
implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the
administration's July 2007 report to Congress stated that the
effectiveness of each committee varied.
Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades
Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
Issue
During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces
refused to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of
the previous Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the
President said that the Iraqi government had agreed to resolve
this problem under the current plan and had committed three
additional Iraqi brigades to support the new plan.
Status
Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army
battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support
the Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the
administration stated that the Iraqi government had difficulty
deploying three additional army brigades to Baghdad at sufficient
strength. In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that
current present for duty rates for deployed units is 75 percent of
authorized strength. However, the July 2007 administration report
stated that the government has deployed battalions from multiple
Iraqi Army divisions to provide the required three
brigade-equivalent forces to support the Baghdad security plan.
After the initial deployment of the required brigades, the Iraqi
government began the rotation plan. 19 units have currently
deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan. Several of these
units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every 90 days
in accordance with the plan. In addition, all of the Iraqi units
had pre-deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The
administration's July 2007 report states that progress toward this
benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been
satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad.
However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance
of the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been
varied. Some units had performed exceptionally well, proven
themselves and raised their readiness ratings. Others had marked
time and slowly regressed over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19
Iraqi units that had supported operations in Baghdad, 5 units had
performed well while the remaining had proven to be problematic
for several reasons: lack of personnel, lack of individual
fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct their assigned
missions. We obtained classified information that indicates other
problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified briefing
report provides more information on this benchmark.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq had provided
three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of battalions,
to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some of the units
were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations; and as "not
met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to support
Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each unit's
transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on their
reliability. Consequently, our determination of "partially met" was based
largely on classified information. (see classified appendix).
Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority
Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this
plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in
consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention,
to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni
insurgents and Shi'ite militias.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the
Baghdad security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in
part, because Iraqi political and sectarian interference prevented
forces from taking action against militias. According to the
administration's initial assessment, Iraq's Prime Minister stated
that political or sectarian interference in the affairs of the
Iraqi security forces will not be tolerated, and actions have been
taken to address political intervention.
Status
In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of
Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi
commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security
plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in
consultation with U.S. commanders without political intervention.
The report noted that political intervention in the conduct of
some security operations continues even though new rules of
engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have come into
effect and commanders have been given the authority to attack
insurgents and militias.
According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and
political interference in the conduct of military operations
continues. Tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong
within many Iraqi military units, hindering efforts to take
actions against militias. These loyalties are often the basis for
relationships between key officers in units and higher-level
authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command. For
example, sectarian militias control many local police.
Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed
loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi'a militias making it
difficult to target Shi'a extremist networks. Further, according
to DOD, evidence exists of target lists emanating from the Office
of the Commander in Chief that bypassed operational commanders and
directed lower-level intelligence officers and commanders to make
arrests, primarily of Sunnis. In addition, sectarian bias in the
appointment of senior military and police commanders continues,
giving rise to suspicions that political considerations may drive
Iraqi commanders' decisions about which operations to undertake or
support.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not face
political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and
operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi
commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making
tactical and operational decisions.
In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the
brigade commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion
commanders have been replaced for failure to command or enforce
non-sectarian operations.
Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the
Law
Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights
report, the Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights
violations in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added
to the increasing violence against the civilian population during
2006. In support of the Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime
Minister pledged to provide even-handed enforcement of the law.
Status
According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured
that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom2 reported that Iraq's
Shi'a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in
sectarian-based human rights violations, as well as tolerating
abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions
in the governing coalition. According to the commission, the Iraqi
government through its security forces has committed arbitrary
arrest, prolonged detention without due process, targeted
executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In committing
these abuses, the security forces target Sunnis on the basis of
their religious identity, as well as terrorists and insurgents.
Furthermore, the commission reported that the Iraqi government
tolerates and fails to control religiously motivated attacks and
other abuses carried out by Shi'a militias, specifically Jayash
al-Mahdi and Badr Organization. These militias have targeted
Sunnis on the basis of their religious identity and have committed
such abuses as abductions, beatings, targeted killings,
intimidation, forced resettlement, murder, rape, and torture.
According to the commission's report, relationships between these
militias and leading Shi'a factions within Iraq's ministries and
governing coalition indicate that the Jayash al-Mahdi and Badr
Organization are parastate actors operating with impunity or even
with governmental complicity.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces provided
even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "not met"
if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the
law.
2U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington D.C.: May
2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom was created
by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor
violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or
belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to
give independent policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of
State, and Congress.
In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the
Iraqi government and security forces continue to engage in
sectarian-based abuses. State's March 2007 human rights report3
cited widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent
involvement in extrajudicial killings throughout the country.
These incidents included Shi'a militia members wearing police
uniforms and driving police cars in carrying out killings and
kidnapping in the southern city of Basra. In addition, death
squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis
and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs,
largely with impunity.
The administration's July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi
government and many Iraqi security force units are still applying
the law on a sectarian basis when left on their own. The report
attributed any progress made by the security forces in enforcing
the law more even-handedly to the presence of coalition units and
embedded training teams, rather than to the Iraqi government.
3U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007).
Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens
Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki
said ``the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for
any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political
affiliation."
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met1
Issue
As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the
Baghdad security plan, previous plans to secure Baghdad have
failed, in part, because political and sectarian interference and
rules of engagement in place for those plans prevented Iraqi and
coalition forces from entering neighborhoods that are safe havens
to those fueling the sectarian violence. On January 6, 2007, the
Iraqi Prime Minister stated, "The Baghdad security plan will not
offer a safe shelter for outlaws regardless of their ethnic and
political affiliations, and we will punish anyone who hesitates to
implement orders because of his ethnic and political background."
Status
Although the Iraqi government has allowed MNF-I to conduct
operations in all areas of Baghdad, temporary safe havens still
exist due to strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration
of security forces. According to State, terrorist safe havens are
defined as ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a
country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a
threat to U.S. national security interests are able to organize,
plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in
relative security because of inadequate governance capacity,
political will, or both.
U.S. commanders report overall satisfaction with their ability to
target any and all extremist groups. In commenting on our draft
report, DOD stated that coalition forces and Iraqi security forces
conducted over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr
City from January to August 2007. According to DOD, the surge has
resulted in significant reductions in safe havens for al Qaeda in
Iraq inside Baghdad and in al Anbar and Diyala provinces. In
previous Baghdad operations, the Iraqi government prevented Iraqi
and coalition forces from going into Sadr City. Although MNF-I
conducts operations in Sadr City, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces
maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border of Sadr
City, with none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In addition
to Joint Security Stations, MNF-I established about 30 coalition
outposts throughout Baghdad, including one on the border of Sadr
City.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did not
allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as "partially
met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet some existed;
and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi government had no
stated policy on safe havens.
Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad
However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security
forces and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain
the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition forces.
Thus temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which supports a rating
of partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes some of the conditions
that allow safe havens to exist. For example, the Shi'a militia continues
to function as the de facto government in Sadr City. Further, militia
influence impacts every component of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior,
particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities, according to the DOD
report.
Our classified briefing report provides more information on the existence
of safe havens.
Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control
Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia
control of local security.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
During 2006, according to State and UN reports,2 insurgents, death squads,
militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians,
largely on a sectarian basis. In addition, the number of internally
displaced persons in Iraq sharply increased following the February 2006
bombing of the Samarra mosque, primarily as a result of sectarian
intimidation and violence that forced many people from their homes. By the
end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become
divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were increasingly controlled by
armed groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these areas.3
In January 2007, the President announced that the United States would
increase force levels in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign
to reduce sectarian violence and bring security to Baghdad.
Status
While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia
control over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a serious
problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq.
According to the administration's July 2007 report to Congress, MNF-I data
showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since
the start of the Baghdad security plan. MNF-I counts sectarian incidents
and murders in determining trends in sectarian violence.4 The
administration's July 2007 report concluded that the Iraqi government,
with substantial coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress
toward reducing sectarian violence. The report acknowledged that precise
measurements vary, and it was too early to determine if the decrease would
be sustainable.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was
eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there
was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence
was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated.
2U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights
Report (Sept. 1-Oct. 31, 2006); UNAMI, Human Rights Report (Nov. 1-Dec.
31, 2006).
3According to State's human rights report, an overall campaign aimed at
forcibly displacing citizens was the main reason for the increasing
polarization of areas within and outside Baghdad during 2006. State noted
numerous reports that indicated a Shi'a militia, the Jayash al-Mahdi, was
responsible for a growing number of raids and killings of Sunni citizens
in Baghdad and other parts of the country during the year.
GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been reduced
because measuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator's
intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks targeting civilians
and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as
additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 5, the average
number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the
last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is
largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than
civilians.
4DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: June
2007).
Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)
While overall attacks declined in July compared with June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major
religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections.5 For
2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September.
The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq6 (NIE) also reports
that the level of overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on and
casualties among civilians, remains high. Further, the NIE states that
Iraq's security will continue to improve modestly, but that levels of
insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high over the next 6 to 12
months. Similarly, recent March and June 2007 United Nations reports state
that attacks against civilians persist and the continuing systematic,
widespread attacks against the civilian population in Iraq are tantamount
to crimes against humanity and violate the laws of war.
5Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 4
years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5,
2005; and September 24, 2006.
6National Intelligence Council, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some
Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive, Update to NIE,
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead (Washington,
D.C.: August 2007).
The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced
from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found
that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February
2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi
citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to 50,000 people
will continue to be displaced each month even if the security plan
succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently, the number of
displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000 to 100,000 each
month, according to the Red Crescent.
The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues,
imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. As
the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently reported,
most of Iraq's internally displaced persons are moving from mixed areas7
to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely because of direct threats or
forcible displacement from their homes due to their religious and
sectarian identities. Where population displacements have led to
significant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have diminished to some extent
because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal
enclaves.
Our classified report provides further information on trends associated
with violence in Iraq.
7According to a UN report, sectarian violence was most pronounced in areas
with diverse ethnic and religious groups or where such groups were located
in close proximity to each other, such as in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, and
Mosul. Anbar province, where attack levels have decreased significantly
over the past several months, is a predominantly Sunni Arab province.
Militia control over local security forces - the second part of the
benchmark--has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports have
stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over
local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For example,
in July 2007, the administration reported that militia presence is still
strong and will likely remain so until the security situation begins to
stabilize. The report stated that the Iraqi government has made
unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local
security, which continues to negatively affect the public perception of
the authority and fairness of the Iraqi government. In addition, DOD's
June 2007 report to Congress called militia influence of local police a
significant problem and added that some security forces remain prone to
intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs. Further, the
Department of State's human rights report characterized Iraqi police
effectiveness as seriously compromised by militias and sectarianism, with
rampant corruption and a culture of impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the
United Nations reported cases of possible collusion between armed militia
and Iraqi security forces in raids and security operations, as well as the
failure of these security forces to intervene and prevent kidnapping and
murder and other crimes.
Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations
Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods
across Baghdad.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1
Issue
Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and
Iraqi forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of insurgents.
The current Baghdad security plan and the related increase of U.S. and
Iraqi forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents, militias, and
organized criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a security presence
in those areas; and provide for follow-on assistance efforts. As part of
this effort, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are establishing Joint
Security Stations across Baghdad to improve population protection by
providing a continuous presence in Baghdad's neighborhoods.
Status
As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition
assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security Stations
in Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security Stations that
had achieved initial or full operational capability.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint
Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were
established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of
the planned Joint Security Stations were established.
Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007
Note: Figure 6 shows the 28 joint security stations that were located in
Baghdad's security districts as of August 9, 2007. Three additional joint
security stations are located in Baghdad but are outside of the security
districts, and another joint security station has been transferred to
Iraqi control.
Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the
administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to
improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in
Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater oversight of Iraqi security
forces by U.S. military personnel.
Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently
Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently.
GAO Assessment: Not met1
Issue
In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi
military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and
police. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in an
effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security
responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government, and ultimately withdraw
U.S. troops from Iraq. The coalition began embedding transition teams with
Iraqi security forces in 2005 to help develop their ability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. These teams use the Operational Readiness
Assessment process to evaluate the readiness of Iraqi security force units
to conduct operations with or without coalition support.2
Status
While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly
leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units
operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 2007.3
According to the administration's July 2007 report, an Iraqi unit can be
considered independent if it has achieved an Operational Readiness
Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.4
Manning shortages as well as logistics and sustainment shortfalls have
contributed to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable of
operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and militia
influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces. In June
2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target of most
enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for the
majority of casualties, contributing to the decline in the readiness of
some Iraqi units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi security forces.
Annual attrition is estimated to be between 15 and 18 percent for the
Iraqi army and between 20 and 22 percent for the police. In addition,
according to a June 2007 report from DOD to Congress, only about 65
percent of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time
due to a liberal leave policy and absences without leave. To increase the
number of soldiers on hand for operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I
decided that they will increase manning to 120 percent of authorization
levels.5
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq increased
the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating
independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of
Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable
of operating independently.
2The Operational Readiness Assessment was previously known as the
Transitional Readiness Assessment process.
3As of May 2007, the Iraqi army had established over 100 battalions.
4In 2006, MNF-I changed the definition of a level 1 unit. Previously, in
guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use in evaluating
Iraqi security forces, a level 1 unit was said to be fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations. In 2006, MNF-I
removed the words "fully" and "independent" from the definition. DOD
officials could not provide a rationale for the change.
Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police
units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics
support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi forces' limited
capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume missions from
MNF-I and requires continued development in some key areas through the end
of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December 2008 goal for the Iraqi
government to provide day-to-day items such as food, water, and
electricity to the Ministry of Defense's National Depot. In addition, the
Ministry of Interior aims to become self sufficient in procuring and
managing repair parts by the end of 2008.
MNF-I and the Iraqi government continue to struggle with sectarian and
militia influences while trying to develop the Iraqi security forces.
Because of the sectarian leaning of some national police units, MNF-I is
providing continuing oversight of Iraqi security forces. In addition,
militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of the Interior,
especially in Baghdad and other key cities, according to DOD. This
influence, along with corruption and illegal activity, constrains progress
in the development of Ministry of Interior forces.
5The administration's July 2007 interim assessment stated that the number
of units assessed at level 1 had decreased, in part, due to a 20-percent
increase in unit authorization levels.
Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights
Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature are protected.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met1
Issue
Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba'athist
regime. Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to
ensure broad representation and fairness in the new Iraq.
Status
The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council of
Representatives' by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of minorities
throughout Iraq remain unprotected.
Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected
The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws include
provisions to ensure the full participation of minority political parties
within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These provisions include:
o Article 39 of Iraq's Constitution, which guarantees the freedom
to form and join associations and political parties and also
prohibits forcing any person to join in any party, society, or
political entity or to continue membership in it.
o Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which
guarantees the freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of
all members of the Council of Representatives. This guarantee is
made regardless of a representative's party or political
affiliation in a way that does not contradict the provisions of
the Constitution, including the freedom of objective opposition,
constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation between the
Council of Representatives and other constitutional institutions.
1We considered this benchmark as "met" if the Iraqi government had laws or
regulations ensuring the rights of minority parties in the legislature and
minority parties received these rights; considered this benchmark as
"partially met" if the Iraqi government had such laws but did not protect
these rights; and considered this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi
government had no law or regulation protecting minority party rights.
According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights
in the legislature are protected and they are not physically
intimidated. The legislators also said that they have the right to
speak before Parliament, and to offer legislation even though they
are often not consulted on legislative issues. According to the
U.S. government, the electoral system--provincial proportional
representation--that was used to elect the current Council was
chosen in 2005 to balance a number of factors, including the
ability of women and small minority parties to gain
representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December
2005 includes members from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen,
Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities.
Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected
Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the
legislature, widespread violence across Iraq has seriously
compromised the government's ability to protect human rights.
According to the United Nations, attacks against religious and
ethnic minorities continued unabated in most areas of Iraq,
prompting these communities to seek ways to leave the country.2
The conflicts reportedly bear the mark of sectarian polarization
and "cleansing" in neighborhoods formerly comprised of different
religions.3 According to a non-governmental organization, all of
Iraq's minority communities have suffered violations that include
destruction and defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of
congregations gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming,
and murder of religious and civic leaders and individuals
including children; and forced conversion to Islam using tactics
such as death threats, rape, and forced marriage.4
In comments on this benchmark, State wrote that GAO should not
refer to the general human rights problems of Iraqi minorities
because to do so goes beyond the scope of the benchmark and State
addresses these problems in other reports. We disagree. We
assessed this benchmark as met based on our interpretation of the
benchmark and our criteria. However, we believe it is important to
provide some context of minority rights in Iraq. Iraqi legislators
we interviewed insisted that the situation in their communities
has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, their
freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability
to engage fully in Iraq political life.
2UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, Jan. 1- Mar. 31,
2007.
3Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? (Washington D.C.: Mar. 23,
2007).
4Preti Taneja, Minority Rights Group International, Assimilation, Exodus,
Eradication: Iraq's Minority Communities Since 2003 (United Kingdom:
February 2007).
Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi
Revenues
Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services
on an equitable basis.
GAO Assessment: Partially met1
Issue
The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's
inability to fully spend its own resources to rebuild its
infrastructure and deliver essential services as a critical
economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds
are a necessary source of financing for Iraq's rebuilding effort,
particularly since the United States has obligated most of the $40
billion it provided to Iraq for reconstruction since 2003.
However, the government of Iraq has had difficulty spending its
resources on capital projects. In 2006, the government spent only
22 percent of its non-provincial capital projects and
reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the critical oil sector,
which provides over 90 percent of Iraq's revenues, the government
spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil
reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq
committed to spending $10 billion on capital projects and
reconstruction.
Status
The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for
capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget
in February 2007, including capital funds for the provinces based
on their populations. However, available data from the government
of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show that,
while spending has increased compared with spending in 2006, a
large portion of Iraq's $10 billion capital projects and
reconstruction budget in fiscal year 2007 will likely go unspent.2
Iraq's Financial Management Law generally requires budgeted funds
to be spent by the end of the fiscal year. The Ministry of Oil and
the provinces (excluding the Kurdistan region) were allocated
almost half of the government's 2007 capital projects and
reconstruction budget; however, they are unlikely to spend a large
share of their budgets in 2007, according to U.S. and coalition
officials. We are conducting a review of U.S. efforts to help Iraq
spend its budget and will issue a separate report at a later date.
1We would have considered this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been
allocated and either the funds had been spent or there was a high
likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We
would have considered this benchmark as "partially met" if funds were
allocated but it was not clear that the funds would be spent by the end of
the fiscal year. We would have considered the benchmark as "not met" if
the funds had not yet been allocated or if funds were allocated but
clearly not spent.
2Iraq's fiscal year begins on January 1st.
Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are Unlikely
to Spend a Large Share of their 2007 Capital Projects and
Reconstruction Budgets
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraqi government
ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the $6.25
billion allocated to their capital projects and reconstruction
budgets through July 15th, just over half-way through the fiscal
year.3 This level of spending already exceeds the $1.4 billion
spent in 2006. However, Iraqi ministries have less than 6 months
left in the year to spend the remaining 76 percent of their
budgets. In its July 2007 report, the administration cited
satisfactory progress with this benchmark because the Ministry of
Finance was releasing funds to ministries and provinces. The U.S.
Embassy reported that the Ministry of Finance released 25 percent
and 10 percent of 2007 capital project and reconstruction budget
funds to ministries and provinces, respectively, in the first 5
months of the year. However, funding releases are not expenditures
and may not be a reliable indicator of future spending by
ministries and provinces. The administration's report noted that
capacity constraints and security problems may affect Iraq's
ability to accelerate its spending and procurement activities.
Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share
of Their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets
The Ministry of Oil's capital project and reconstruction budget
for 2007 is $2.4 billion, almost a quarter of the government's
total. The ministry has already surpassed last year's spending
total; however, U.S. officials stated that the ministry is not
likely to spend a large share of its capital projects and
reconstruction budget due to a variety of challenges, including a
difficult security environment and burdensome and complex
procurement rules. According to U.S. officials, the ministry has
undertaken reform efforts to eliminate bottlenecks in the budget
execution process. The U.S. Embassy reported that the Ministry of
Oil had spent $500 million through July 15, 2007, or 21 percent of
its budget for the year. However, the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction reported statements by U.S. officials that
the ministry may not have spent all of these funds, but instead
shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing
Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the
Oil Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget.4
3The expenditure data presented by the U.S. Embassy are preliminary data
provided by the Ministry of Finance and do not include figures for the
Kurdistan region or the other provinces. In its official May 2007 monthly
report, the Ministry of Finance did not report any expenditures for
capital projects and reconstruction. In the absence of official data, the
information presented by the U.S. Embassy provides an indication of Iraq's
ability to spend its capital projects and reconstruction budget in the
first half of the year.
In addition, the government provided over $2 billion, or over 20
percent of the 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget, to
the provinces (not including the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region)
based on their populations.5 These funds are in addition to $2
billion 2006 provincial funds for capital projects, most of which
had not been transferred to the provinces until November and
December of 2006.6 U.S. and foreign officials stated that the
provinces have little experience planning and executing
infrastructure projects and are likely to spend little of their
2007 capital projects and reconstruction budgets. According to
information collected and reported by Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, the provinces had committed 44 percent of their 2007
allocation to contracts for capital projects, as of July 15,
2007.7 However, it is not clear whether the value of committed
contracts is a reliable indicator of actual spending. Given the
capacity and security challenges currently facing Iraq, many
committed contracts may not be executed and, therefore, would not
result in actual expenditures.8 The Government of Iraq is
undertaking a number of initiatives, including budget execution
training sessions, to help provincial officials spend their
capital budgets, according to U.S. officials.
4Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report and
Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, July 30,
2007).
5The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation of $1.56 billion, or
16 percent of the total 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget.
U.S. officials believe the Kurdistan region is able to execute its budget
successfully because of its years of experience as a semi-autonomous
region.
6The $2 billion in 2006 capital project and reconstruction funds for the
provinces did not include the Kurdistan region, which received a separate
allocation. The government of Iraq permitted the provinces to carry over
$1.3 billion in unspent 2006 funds. Unspent 2007 capital funds for the
provinces may not be carried over, according to U.S. officials.
7This percentage differs from preliminary Ministry of Finance data
provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicating that the
provinces "spent and committed" 18 percent of their 2007 allocations for
capital projects and reconstruction, as of July 15, 2007.
8The term "commitment" in Iraq is similar to an obligation under the U.S.
budget process, although the government of Iraq's official expenditure
data, as reported by the Ministry of Finance, does not include commitments
or obligations.
Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations
Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or
making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security
Forces.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met1
Issue
According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers
may be discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian
manner if Iraq's political authorities undermine or make false
accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Status
Iraq's political authorities continue to undermine and make false
accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S.
government officials, little has changed since the U.S.
Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment. Each
month the U.S. government receives reports alleging wrongdoing by
ISF members considered by MNF-I to be non-sectarian in their
approach to security. The U.S. assessment further stated that in
most cases the U.S. government was unable to determine the
validity of these allegations but believed them to be untrue. The
assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the
independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi
government does not adequately address the accusations. According
to MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of
military officers, but the cases did not provide justification or
specific charges against the officers. Further information is
classified.
The U.S. government further reported that anecdotal evidence
suggests that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing
allegations even-handedly. According to U.S. government reporting,
the de-Ba'athification Commission fabricated charges to cleanse
Sunni officers from military units, and the Office of Commander in
Chief has issued questionable judicial warrants as a more recent
technique to target Sunni commanders. In addition, the ISF's
formal command structure is compromised by influential sectarian
leaders linked to the security ministries. These actions have
reportedly led to the arrest and detention of several military
officials. According to U.S. officials, this tactic is primarily
used against Sunni Ministry of Defense officials and does not
occur at the predominantly Shi'a Ministry of Interior. The U.S.
government also reported that some Sunni politicians have made
unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials. Moreover, Iraqi
government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some members of
the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have
publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they
continue to ignore sectarian activities, according to the U.S.
government.
1We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel.
Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks
Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks
aIraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in
September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October
16, 2006.
bIn December 2006, MNF-I and the government of Iraq agreed to establish
joint security stations.
Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
aAccording to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for
these benchmarks.
Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 20071 (the Act) requires GAO to
submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of
whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in
the Act and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. This report
(1) provides an assessment of whether or not the Iraqi government has met
18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, and (2) provides
information on the status of the achievement of each benchmark. These
benchmarks address 8 legislative, 9 security and 1 economic-related
action.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus,
Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the
government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, including a visit from July
22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.2 We provided drafts
of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which
we incorporated as appropriate. Although we analyzed classified data, this
report only contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We
conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Legislative Benchmarks
To determine if the Iraqi government is completing actions related to
review of the Iraqi Constitution; enacting and implementing legislation on
de-Ba'athification, the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources,
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, the independent high electoral
commission, provincial elections, provincial council authorities, amnesty,
and militia disarmament; and ensuring that the rights of minority
political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we took a number
of actions. Specifically, we interviewed and reviewed documentation from
the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for
Peace, IFES3, the Independent High Electoral Commission, non-governmental
organizations, and the Departments of Defense and State in Washington,
D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included the
administration's July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi
Constitution, draft laws related to each of the benchmarks, the
International Compact with Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and UN
analyses of the laws addressed by the benchmarks.
1Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.
2For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [75]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [76]http://www.gao.gov for a
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.
For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we relied
on prior GAO reporting4 and updated information where appropriate. We
interviewed and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, UN, U.S.
Institute for Peace, and State Department in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad,
Iraq. We compared central government draft oil laws with the Iraqi
Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional Government Oil and Gas law.
Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration's report on
progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of
Representatives Bylaws. We interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, Iraq,
including the leader of the Iraqi Minority Council. We also reviewed human
rights reports from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and
the U.S. government to determine whether the rights of minorities
throughout Iraq are protected.
Security Benchmarks
To determine if the Iraqi government is (1) establishing supporting
political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; (2) providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations; (3) providing Iraqi commanders
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad Security Plan without
political intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are
providing even-handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6)
reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control
of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security stations;
(8) increasing the number of security units capable of operating
independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi
Security Forces, we took a number of actions.
3IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election
Systems.
4GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's
Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, [77]GAO-07-1107T
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007) and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated
Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors,
[78]GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007).
Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other
documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting committees.
We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and reports showing the
Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and analyzed the U.S.
Department of Defense Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) formerly
known as Transitional Readiness Assessments, for these units. In addition,
we reviewed classified and unclassified assessments of the authorities
granted to unit commanders, the level of sectarian influence and levels of
militia infiltration of army and police units, and reports of incidents
where Iraqi officials interfered with the chain of command.
To understand the range of methodological issues associated with measuring
levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information related to
broader trends in population security, we interviewed officials from the
U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense in Washington, D.C.,
and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; the United
Nations; and the International Organization for Migration in Washington,
D.C., Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We also met with these officials
to discuss the other benchmarks.
Economic Benchmark
To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is allocating and
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects,
including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, we
interviewed U.S. government officials and contractors, and obtained and
analyzed supporting documents. We interviewed officials in Washington D.C.
and Baghdad with the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
U.S. Agency for International Development; the Embassy Iraq Transition
Assistance Office; and consultants to the Ministry of Finance. To assess
progress in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues we reviewed official
Iraqi Ministry of Finance capital budget and expenditure data for fiscal
years 2006 and 2007 provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and
unofficial Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation data on
capital expenditures reported by Multinational Force-Iraq.
We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget execution
by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S. Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations to the
provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital funding
allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and expenditure
data with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising the Ministry of
Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and State, the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World Bank, IMF, public
accountants and Iraqi government budget implementation documents. We found
that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of showing
trends in budget expenditures.
Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 2.
See comment 1.
See comment 6.
See comment 5.
See comment 4.
See comment 3.
See comment 11.
See comment 10.
See comment 9.
See comment 8.
See comment 7.
See comment 13.
See comment 12.
See comment 18.
See comment 17.
See comment 16.
See comment 15.
See comment 14
See comment 19.
See comment 21.
See comment 20.
The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated
August 30, 2007.
GAO Comments
1. We agree with State that legislation on the Iraq High Electoral
Commission has been enacted and implemented. However, our
assessment of "not met" on the electoral benchmark is based on the
Iraqi government not enacting and implementing three of four
components of this benchmark--legislation on provincial
authorities, provincial elections, and an election date.
2. We have highlighted the different standards of assessment
between our report and the administration's reports. We also
specify our assessment criteria in the cover letter and each
appendix to make our judgments fully transparent.
3. We have included information about the recent communique in the
cover letter and appendices as appropriate.
4. We have included information about the Kurdish Regional
Government's new law and the U.S. position on it in the appendix
on hydrocarbon legislation.
5. Our report acknowledges the progress that the Iraqi government
has made in allocating and spending $10 billion of fiscal year
2007 funds on capital projects and reconstruction. While these
funds have been allocated, our report also notes that a large
portion of these funds will likely go unspent. Consequently, we
rated this benchmark as "partially met."
6. We disagree with State's comment. We assessed this benchmark as
"met." However, Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the
situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work
in the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the
legislature, and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political
life. Thus we included additional relevant information about
minority human rights in Iraq.
7. See comment 6.
8. See comment 6.
9. We revised our text.
10. Under our criteria, we considered the benchmark as "not met"
because the Constitutional Review Committee was still continuing
work on devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi
legislature had not voted on the package, and a referendum had not
been held.
11. We added information to our already existing reference to the
Kurdish National Assembly legislation.
12. We revised this sentence.
13. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met.
14. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
15. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
16. Our paragraph provides context for the committees' work and
the text makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we
retained our original language.
17. See comment 6.
18. See comment 6.
19. See comment 5.
20. We revised the text.
21. See comment 6.
Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See States response in appendix XXII.
See comment 2.
See comment 1.
See comment 7.
See comment 6
See comment 5
See comment 4.
See comment 3
The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter dated August 30, 2007.
GAO Comments
1. We have revised the text.
2. We have revised the text.
3. We have modified the sentence by adding not "always."
4. We have replaced this chart.
5. We have qualified the sentence by adding "parts of ."
6. We disagree with DOD's comment. The Iraq benchmark calls for
increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating
independently. A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness,
particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence.
DOD's June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has
constrained the development of MOI forces.
7. DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are
in the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we
report. We are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it
is from a published DOD source and we do not have further
documentation on the new figure.
Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
GAO Contacts
Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgements
Steve Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton,
Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet
Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.
In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M
Burke-Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern,
Debra Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel
Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer,
Mary Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis,
Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.
(320511)
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Highlights of [86]GAO-07-1195 , a report to Congressional Committees
September 2007
SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007,
on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained
in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The
benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government
in June 2006.
In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and
September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward
meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met.
To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed
officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also
made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since
May 2003.
[87]What GAO Recommends
In future reports to Congress on the benchmarks, we recommend that the
Secretaries of State and Defense: (1) specify clearly what step in the
Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached; (2) identify trends
in sectarian violence together with broader measures of population
security; and (3) better identify the operational readiness of Iraqi
security forces.
State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our
assessment of certain benchmarks.
The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with
the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of
the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of
August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not
meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. (See next page). Overall, key legislation
has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the
Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These
results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces.
The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected.
The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and
implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in
October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other
legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee
has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution.
Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification,
oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia
disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in
achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what
step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached.
Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local
security, eliminated political intervention in military operations,
ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable
of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no
false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian
violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is
difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of
population security show differing trends.
Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of
allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data
indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been
spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in
Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the
military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of
the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress
would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this
report.
References
Visible links
66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
67. http://www.gao.gov/
68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1107T
69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-903
71. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-902R
72. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-612T
73. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
74. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-217C
75. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
76. http://www.gao.gov/
77. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1107T
78. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677
79. http://www.gao.gov/
80. http://www.gao.gov/
81. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
82. mailto:[email protected]
83. mailto:[email protected]
84. mailto:[email protected]
85. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195
86. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195
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