Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage
Diversity Visa Program (21-SEP-07, GAO-07-1174).		 
                                                                 
Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to aliens from
countries with low rates of immigration to the United States.	 
Diversity visa applicants must apply online, be selected by	 
lottery, be interviewed, and be determined to be eligible before 
obtaining a diversity visa. GAO was asked to review (1) the	 
extent to which the Diversity Visa Program (DV program) is	 
diversifying the U.S. immigrant pool, (2) areas of the DV program
that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are security	 
implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) what 
steps the Department of State (State) has taken to address the	 
vulnerabilities. We reviewed laws, regulations, and other	 
documentation, and interviewed numerous State officials both at  
headquarters and in the field.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1174					        
    ACCNO:   A76569						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability  
to Manage Diversity Visa Program				 
     DATE:   09/21/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Border security					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Databases						 
	     DV-1 Visas 					 
	     Fraud						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Identification cards				 
	     Immigrants 					 
	     Immigration					 
	     Immigration and naturalization law 		 
	     Immigration information systems			 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Visas						 
	     Diversity Visa Program				 

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GAO-07-1174

   

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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2007: 

Border Security: 

Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage Diversity Visa 
Program: 

Border Security: 

GAO-07-1174: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1174, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to aliens from 
countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. Diversity 
visa applicants must apply online, be selected by lottery, be 
interviewed, and be determined to be eligible before obtaining a 
diversity visa. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which the 
Diversity Visa Program (DV program) is diversifying the U.S. immigrant 
pool, (2) areas of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) 
whether there are security implications associated with these 
vulnerabilities, and (4) what steps the Department of State (State) has 
taken to address the vulnerabilities. We reviewed laws, regulations, 
and other documentation, and interviewed numerous State officials both 
at headquarters and in the field. 

What GAO Found: 

The DV program is contributing to the diversity of U.S. immigrants; 
since 1995, more than 500,000 aliens from countries with low rates of 
immigration to the United States have become legal permanent residents 
through the program. Little is known about diversity immigrants once 
they enter the United States, such as whether they contribute to 
further diversity by petitioning for family members to immigrate. 

The DV program is vulnerable to fraud committed by and against DV 
applicants, but State has not compiled comprehensive data on detected 
and suspected fraudulent activity. At 5 of the 11 posts we reviewed, 
consular officers reported that the majority of DV applicants, lacking 
access to a computer or internet savvy, use ï¿½visa agentsï¿½ to enter the 
lottery. Some agents take advantage of DV applicants; visa agents in 
Bangladesh have intercepted applicantsï¿½ program documents and charged 
ransoms of up to $20,000 or coerced applicants into sham DV marriages. 
Consular officers at 6 posts reported that widespread use of fake 
documents, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, and 
passports, presented challenges when verifying the identities of 
applicants and dependents. 

Difficulty in verifying identities has security implications because 
Stateï¿½s security checks rely heavily on name-based databases. In 2003, 
Stateï¿½s Inspector General raised concerns that aliens from countries 
designated as state sponsors of terrorism can apply for diversity 
visas. Nearly 9,800 persons from these countries have obtained 
permanent residency in the United States through the program. We found 
no documented evidence that DV immigrants from these, or other, 
countries posed a terrorist or other threat. However, experts familiar 
with immigration fraud believe that some individuals, including 
terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain 
in the United States. This places a premium on mitigating fraud risks. 

Despite taking steps to strengthen the DV program, State does not have 
a strategy to address the pervasive fraud reported by some posts. State 
believes that some legislative changes could mitigate fraud risks, but 
it has not made formal proposals for change and has not compiled 
comprehensive data on program outcomes and fraud trends which would 
help decision makers consider whether legislative changes are needed. 

Figure: Top 10 Countries of Origin for DV Immigrants, Fiscal Years 1995-
2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

We recommend that State compile better data on known fraud in the DV 
program and use these data to develop a strategy to address fraud 
risks, including proposals for legislative changes, if deemed 
necessary. State did not agree with our recommendations and said that 
it has a robust fraud screening program for DV applicants. However, our 
report shows that there are significant fraud risks in the DV program 
and that State could do more to mitigate the risk, especially at posts 
that are reporting significant challenges with DV fraud. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
GAO-07-1174.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The DV Program Is Contributing to a Diverse U.S. Immigrant Population, 
but Little Is Known about DV Immigrants Once They Enter the United 
States: 

The DV Program Is Vulnerable to Fraudulent Activity Committed by and 
Against Applicants, but State Has Not Compiled Comprehensive Data on 
Detected or Suspected Fraudulent Activity: 

Difficulties in Verifying the Identity of Some DV Applicants May Have 
Security Implications: 

State Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the DV Program, but Does Not Have a 
Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Reported by Consular Officers at 
Some Posts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Top 10 Countries of Origin for Diversity Visa Immigrants, 
Fiscal Years 1995-2006: 

Table 2: Diversity Visa Recipients from Countries Designated as State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, Fiscal Years 2000-2006: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Percentage of Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status 
by Class of Entry, Fiscal Year 2006: 

Figure 2: Process for Obtaining a Diversity Visa: 

Figure 3: Percentage of Diversity Visas Compared to Family-and 
Employment-Based Visas by Geographic Region, Fiscal Year 2006: 

Abbreviations: 

DV: Diversity Visa: 
FPP: Office of Fraud Prevention Programs: 
IG: Inspector General: 
INA: Immigration and Nationality Act: 
KCC: Kentucky Consular Center: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 21, 2007: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Congress established the Diversity Visa Program (DV program) through 
the Immigration Act of 1990.[Footnote 1] The program provides up to 
55,000[Footnote 2] immigrant visas[Footnote 3] each fiscal year to 
aliens from countries with low rates of immigration[Footnote 4] to the 
United States. Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to 
individuals from countries other than the countries that send large 
numbers of immigrants to the United States. Aliens from 179 countries 
are eligible to participate in the 2007 DV program. A diversity visa 
holder may travel to the United States and apply for entry as a legal 
permanent resident.[Footnote 5] Legal permanent resident status allows 
individuals to live and work legally in the United States, travel in 
and out of the country, petition for certain family members to join 
them, and eventually apply for U.S. citizenship. Unlike most immigrant 
visa categories, DV applicants do not need a family member or employer 
in the United States to petition on their behalf. Instead, aliens enter 
what is commonly referred to as the "visa lottery"; individuals 
selected in this lottery are eligible to apply for a diversity visa. 
The Department of State (State) administers the DV program, including 
an online entry and lottery selection process at its Kentucky Consular 
Center (KCC) and visa adjudication interviews at its consular posts 
abroad.[Footnote 6] 

This report is part of a two-pronged approach to address your interest 
in the immigrant visa process, the potential vulnerabilities in the 
process--including security risk--and options for mitigating these 
risks. In the course of our research, we decided to focus on the 
diversity visa category of immigrant visas for two reasons. First, in 
2003, State's Office of the Inspector General (IG) pointed to pervasive 
fraud in DV applications that posts must deal with, as well as the risk 
inherent in allowing aliens from countries designated as state sponsors 
of terrorism[Footnote 7] to apply for and obtain a DV. Second, we spoke 
with several experts both within and outside of government who raised 
concerns about fraudulent activity in the DV program. Another GAO study 
currently underway--the second to address your request--will focus on 
the security screening and adjudication process for nonimmigrants 
already in the United States who are applying for legal permanent 
resident status. 

This report examines (1) the extent to which the DV program is 
diversifying the U.S. immigrant visa pool, (2) areas of the DV program 
that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are security 
implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) what steps 
State has taken to address the vulnerabilities in the DV program. To 
conduct our review, we reviewed laws, regulations, and other 
documentation related to the DV program; and we interviewed officials 
at State headquarters and at the KCC, where the online entry and 
selection processes for the diversity visa lottery are administered. We 
selected 11 DV-issuing posts to review because they encompassed a range 
of experiences in DV processing: (1) posts that had reported 
considerable DV fraud activity, (2) posts representing various DV 
workload volumes, (3) posts located in different geographic regions, 
and (4) posts that process applicants from countries designated as 
state sponsors of terrorism. We conducted field work at 4 of these 
posts: Accra, Ghana; Lagos, Nigeria; Warsaw, Poland, which processes DV 
applicants from Ukraine; and Ankara, Turkey, which processes DV 
applicants from Iran. At these 4 posts, we reviewed consular operations 
and interviewed State officials regarding the challenges they faced 
with the DV program. We interviewed consular officers at an additional 
7 posts via teleconference. We conducted our review from November 2006 
to August 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope 
and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Data show that the DV program is contributing to the diversification of 
the U.S. immigrant pool. As a result of the program, more than 500,000 
aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the United 
States have obtained legal permanent resident status. Immigrants from 
Africa and Europe have received the most diversity visas. For example, 
in fiscal year 2006, 40 percent of diversity immigrants were from 
Africa and 34 percent were from Europe, while 19 percent of diversity 
immigrants were from Asia, 4 percent from South America, and 1 percent 
from North America. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have consistently 
ranked among the top diversity-visa-sending countries since fiscal year 
1995. Little is known about diversity immigrants once they enter the 
United States, such as whether they remain in the United States, 
petition for other family members to immigrate, and become U.S. 
citizens. There have been very limited attempts by State and the 
Department of Homeland Security to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
program and its impact. 

Several elements of the DV program are vulnerable to fraudulent 
activity committed by and against DV applicants, but State has not 
compiled comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraudulent 
activity. The extent to which these vulnerabilities are exploited 
varies by country, depending on the applicant pool and local 
circumstances. Some of the posts we reviewed indicated that fraudulent 
activity was a major concern, while others did not report serious 
problems. In countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, 
Nigeria, and Ukraine, consular officers reported that the majority of 
DV applicants, lacking access to a computer or internet savvy, seek 
assistance from "visa agents" or "visa consultants" to enter the 
lottery. While some visa agents perform a legitimate service, others 
take advantage of DV applicants by such means as disseminating 
misleading information on the program, intercepting official 
correspondence from the KCC to the lottery winners, and charging 
exorbitant fees for each step in the DV process. For example, consular 
officers at the U.S. embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh said that some 
unscrupulous visa agents use their own address on DV entries forms so 
that KCC's notification letters are delivered to them instead of to the 
person selected in the lottery. The agents have then, in some cases, 
held these letters for up to $20,000 in ransom, or offered to reduce 
this fee if the legitimate DV winner agreed to marry a person of the 
agent's choosing--who had also paid a fee to the agent--and to add this 
new spouse to the visa application. Consular officers working in the 
U.S. embassies in Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw[Footnote 8] and 
in the U.S. consulate in Lagos said they encountered many of these 
fraudulent DV marriages, termed "pop-ups" since the relationships were 
entered into after the DV applicants had been selected in the lottery. 
Cables from the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to State 
headquarters reported that fraudulent DV couples go to great lengths to 
prove their relationship is legitimate, including backdated marriage 
certificates and staged wedding photographs, and some even incur 
pregnancies for the sake of the visa. Consular officers at six of the 
posts reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and 
Warsaw--reported that the availability of fake documents, or genuine 
documents with false information, such as birth certificates, marriage 
certificates, and passports, presented significant challenges when 
verifying DV applicants' identities and the relationship between the 
principal DV applicants and their spouse and dependents. Despite much 
anecdotal information on DV program fraud and abuse, State has not 
compiled comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraud across all 
DV-issuing posts. 

Although none of the officials at State headquarters in Washington or 
the consular officers at the 11 posts we reviewed considered the DV 
program to be specifically targeted by terrorists, a few said that 
difficulties in verifying visa applicants' identity could have security 
implications. Consular officers' difficulties in verifying the identity 
of some DV applicants, particularly in countries where applicants can 
purchase legitimate identity documents containing fraudulent 
information, could reduce the effectiveness of security screening for 
DV applicants. While consular officers screen all visa applicants for 
security-related concerns, a DV applicant with no previous record in 
U.S. government agency databases or an applicant who is using a false 
identity may not be detected as a potential security concern. A 2002 
cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka stated that the ease with which 
individuals can obtain genuine identity documents in any assumed 
identity, including passports, creates an "open door" for terrorists 
wishing to enter the United States with legal status. The cable also 
stated that name check requirements for visa applicants are useless in 
detecting someone with a newly invented identity, as may be the case 
with many of the post's DV applicants. In 2003, State's IG raised 
concerns that aliens from designated state sponsors of terrorism are 
eligible for the DV program. Since 2000, nearly 9,800 aliens from state 
sponsors of terrorism have received diversity visas. The IG stated that 
the DV program contained significant risks to national security from 
hostile intelligence officers, criminals, and terrorists attempting to 
use the program for entry into the United States as permanent residents 
and recommended that State's Bureau of Consular Affairs propose 
legislation to bar aliens from state sponsors of terrorism. Consular 
Affairs agreed with the recommendation in principle but did not 
implement it, expressing concern over the effect of permanently 
disbarring aliens who may be fleeing oppressive regimes of states that 
sponsor terrorism. The IG later agreed to close the recommendation 
although it had not been implemented. We found no documented evidence 
of DV immigrants from state sponsors of terrorism committing any 
terrorist acts. However, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 9] 
the Department of Homeland Security, terrorism experts, and federal law 
enforcement officials familiar with immigration fraud believe that some 
individuals, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent 
means to enter or remain in the United States. 

State has taken steps to strengthen the DV program, but it does not 
have a strategy to address the pervasive fraud being reported by 
consular officers at some posts. Since 2003, KCC has employed facial 
recognition software to detect multiple entries, implemented an 
electronic application process, and hired a full-time fraud prevention 
manager. KCC employees flag DV cases with fraud indicators before they 
are sent to posts; consular officers can use this information when 
adjudicating DV cases. Posts also conduct fraud investigations on some 
DV cases. These efforts address some of the vulnerabilities within 
State's control, but not all. For instance, DV applicants who are 
selected in the DV lottery receive a notification letter in a large 
white envelope that lists KCC as the return address, which consular 
officers say is highly conspicuous for postal workers or other third 
parties who may intercept the letter and extort money from applicants 
in exchange for it. At the same time, State contends that it is 
restrained from addressing other vulnerabilities by insufficient 
resources and the legislative requirements of the program. For 
instance, the consular chief in Lagos said the consular section did not 
have the resources to conduct all the fraud investigations it would 
like to, and the post's assistant regional security officer for 
investigations position had been vacant since September 2006. Moreover, 
while State believes that some legislative changes could mitigate fraud 
in the DV program, it has not made any formal proposals to this effect. 
Further, it has not compiled data on DV program outcomes and on 
detected and suspected fraud activity in the program, which would help 
decision makers consider whether legislative changes are needed. 

We are recommending that State compile more comprehensive data on the 
DV program, including information on detected or suspected DV fraud and 
data on the amount of fraud prevention resources being spent on DV 
investigations. We also recommend that State use these data to 
formulate a strategy to combat fraud in the DV program. This strategy 
should include proposals for legislative change, if deemed necessary to 
mitigate fraud risks; consideration of appropriate fraud prevention 
resources; and some operational improvements to strengthen the program. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Homeland Security for their comments. The Department of Homeland 
Security did not comment on the report. In its written comments, State 
said it was disappointed with the report's findings and did not agree 
with the recommendations. It said that our report did not give the 
department enough credit for steps it has taken to combat fraud in the 
DV program and that our report identified management failures that do 
not exist. While State's comments acknowledge that the DV program faces 
fraud challenges, State also said that there are limits to what the 
department can do. In our report, we give credit to State for making 
several improvements to its fraud screening for DV applicants, such as 
implementing an electronic application process, facial recognition 
software, and flagging DV cases with fraud indicators before they are 
sent to posts. Moreover, our report does not discuss "management 
failures" by State. Our report shows that the DV program has 
significant risks for fraud and that State can mitigate some of these 
risks by more systematically documenting the extent of known fraud in 
the program. Therefore, we continue to recommend that State make 
operational improvements to the program and to propose legislative 
changes, if necessary, to improve its ability to combat fraud. 

Background: 

In 2006, the United States granted permanent admission--or legal 
permanent resident status--to approximately 1.3 million 
aliens.[Footnote 10] Aliens granted legal permanent resident status are 
formally classified as immigrants, and receive a permanent resident 
card commonly referred to as a green card. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), as amended in 1990, is the primary body of law 
governing immigration and visa operations. According to the act, 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens[Footnote 11] are granted legal 
permanent resident status without numerical limitation;[Footnote 12] in 
2006, this category represented nearly half of all aliens granted this 
status (see fig. 1). Other legal permanent residents are admitted in 
numerically limited categories, with preference given to aliens who 
have close family relationships to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent 
resident, or who have needed job skills. 

Figure 1: Percentage of Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status 
by Class of Entry, Fiscal Year 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration 
Statistics; GAO. 

[End of figure] 

The 1990 amendment to the act also established the DV program, which 
authorizes up to 55,000 immigrant visas annually to aliens from 
countries with low rates of immigration to the United States.[Footnote 
13] The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration 
Statistics annually determines regional and country limits for DV 
allocations and notifies State which countries can participate in the 
DV program each fiscal year. All countries are eligible for the DV 
program except those that contributed more than 50,000 family-or 
employment-based immigrants to the U.S. immigrant population over the 5 
preceding years, and each eligible country is limited to 7 percent, or 
3,850, of the total diversity visa limit.[Footnote 14] Sixteen 
countries are ineligible for the 2007 DV program: Canada, China 
(mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, 
India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South 
Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent 
territories, and Vietnam. 

As with all other immigrant visas, DV holders who attain legal 
permanent resident status may petition for certain family members to 
join them in the United States, travel in and out of the country, and 
eventually apply for U.S. citizenship. However, unlike family and 
employment immigrant visa categories, DV applicants do not need a 
petition from a family member or employer in the United States to 
apply. Instead, aliens enter what is commonly referred to as the "visa 
lottery" online during a period of time of at least 30 days as 
established by the State Department each fiscal year. The process for 
obtaining a DV involves several steps, and is administered primarily by 
the State Department (see fig. 2). State's KCC manages the early stages 
of the process, including the DV lottery and case preparation, and 
State's consular officers adjudicate the majority of DV cases at 
overseas posts.[Footnote 15] 

Figure 2: Process for Obtaining a Diversity Visa: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State data; Nova Developments (clip art). 

[A] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant 
or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident 
status through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 

[End of figure] 

The online entry form requires basic personal information as well as a 
digital photograph.[Footnote 16] Aliens may prepare and submit their 
own entries or someone else may prepare and submit the entry for them. 
All family members (spouse and unmarried children under age 21) must be 
listed on the principal entrant's form; these dependents are also 
eligible to apply for a diversity visa if the principal entrant is 
selected in the lottery. Aliens who will obtain diversity visas in 
fiscal year 2008 ("DV-2008") submitted their online entry forms between 
October 4 and December 3, 2006. The KCC received 5.5 million qualified 
entries for the DV-2008 program. KCC screens all entries, and may 
disqualify aliens who entered the lottery more than once. Acceptable 
entries are run through a computer-generated random drawing 
administered by KCC. KCC notifies those entrants selected in the 
lottery by mail;[Footnote 17] the notification letters are sent to the 
mailing address provided on the entry, regardless of who prepared it. 
These letters provide visa application instructions. Aliens whose 
entries were selected in the DV-2008 lottery received notification 
letters from KCC by July 2007. KCC continues to process applications by 
collecting and preparing the selected applicant's key documents until 
the applicant is considered documentarily qualified and is scheduled 
for a visa interview at a consular post abroad.[Footnote 18] For DV- 
2008 applicants, visa adjudication interviews must take place before 
September 30, 2008, because applicants only remain eligible through the 
end of the specific fiscal year for which they were selected; after 
this time, the DV-2008 program will be complete and no more DVs from 
that lottery pool can be issued. 

Although KCC prepares each applicant's case, only consular officers at 
a U.S. embassy or consulate can make the adjudicatory decision whether 
to issue a diversity visa[Footnote 19]. At the DV adjudication 
interview, consular officers must determine that there is a basis for 
immigration (in this case, a winning diversity lottery entry) and that 
the applicant meets the two basic eligibility requirements: applicants 
must (1) be from an eligible DV country,[Footnote 20] and (2) 
demonstrate that they either hold the equivalent of a U.S. high school 
education[Footnote 21] or possess 2 years of work experience in an 
occupation requiring 2 years of training or experience within the 5- 
year period immediately prior to the application.[Footnote 22] Consular 
officers must also verify the relationship between principal DV 
applicants and their dependents. As with all visa applicants, DV 
applicants are subject to all grounds of visa ineligibility such as 
certain adverse medical conditions, criminal behavior, security and 
terrorist concerns, and other factors. Aliens who are granted a DV have 
6 months from the date of issuance to proceed to U.S. ports of entry to 
apply for admission into the United States. 

The DV Program Is Contributing to a Diverse U.S. Immigrant Population, 
but Little Is Known about DV Immigrants Once They Enter the United 
States: 

Data show that the DV program is contributing to the diversification of 
the U.S. immigrant pool. As a result of the program, more than half a 
million aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the 
United States have obtained legal permanent resident status. In fiscal 
year 2006, 40 percent of diversity immigrants were from Africa and 34 
percent were from Europe, while 19 percent of diversity immigrants were 
from Asia, 4 percent from South America, and 1 percent from North 
America. In general, more aliens from the Africa and Europe regions 
immigrate to the United States on a diversity visa than on a family-or 
employment-based immigrant visa, in contrast to immigrants from other 
regions. Since fiscal year 1995, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have 
sent the most diversity immigrants to the United States. While these 
data demonstrate that the DV program has contributed to the 
diversification of the U.S. immigrant pool, little is known about DV 
immigrants after they enter the United States, such as whether they 
remain in the United States and if they petition for family members to 
join them. 

Aliens from Africa and Europe Receive Majority of Diversity Visas: 

Aliens from Africa and Europe receive a greater percentage of 
numerically controlled visas in the diversity visa category than 
immigrants from other regions (see fig. 3).[Footnote 23] 

Figure 3: Percentage of Diversity Visas Compared to Family-and 
Employment-Based Visas by Geographic Region, Fiscal Year 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration 
Statistics; GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Current U.S. immigration policy favors individuals with family or 
employment ties in the United States, and the DV program seeks to 
provide an opportunity for immigration to aliens from countries that do 
not have high levels of immigration. More than half a million aliens 
from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States have 
obtained legal permanent resident status since the inception of the 
program; these are individuals who may not otherwise have had the 
opportunity to immigrate via family or employment ties. In 2006, 
immigrants from Africa received 40 percent of all diversity visas, 
compared with 3 percent of the family-based and employment-based 
immigrant visas combined. Similarly, immigrants from Europe received 34 
percent of diversity visas issued in 2006, in contrast to 8 percent of 
family-based and employment-based visas combined. Immigrants from North 
America, South America, and Asia received the majority of family-based 
and employment-based visas, and received a smaller percentage of 
diversity visas. 

Since 1996, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have consistently ranked 
among the top diversity visa sending countries (see table 1). Some 
countries, such as Peru, Poland, and Russia, are ineligible for the DV- 
2008 program due to their recent high immigration volume.[Footnote 24] 
In such cases, State refers to countries as having "graduated" from the 
program. 

Table 1: Top 10 Countries of Origin for Diversity Visa Immigrants, 
Fiscal Years 1995-2006: 

1; 
Country of birth[A]: Ethiopia; 
1995: 2,656; 
1996: 3,240; 
1997: 2,880; 
1998: 2,090; 
1999: 2,190; 
2000: 1,777; 
2001: 2,194; 
2002: 3,994; 
2003: 3,381; 
2004: 4,517; 
2005: 3,427; 
2006: 3,357; 
Total: 35,703. 

2; 
Country of birth[A]: Nigeria; 
1995: 2,408; 
1996: 4,359; 
1997: 2,605; 
1998: 3,185; 
1999: 3,112; 
2000: 2,821; 
2001: 2,684; 
2002: 2,279; 
2003: 3,119; 
2004: 2,959; 

2005: 2,379; 
2006: 2,942; 
Total: 34,852. 

3; 
Country of birth[A]: Ukraine; 
1995: 1,068; 
1996: 2,328; 
1997: 1,660; 
1998: 2,095; 
1999: 3,091; 
2000: 3,969; 
2001: 2,748; 
2002: 3,028; 
2003: 3,033; 
2004: 2,975; 
2005: 2,745; 
2006: 3,282; 
Total: 32,022. 

4; 
Country of birth[A]: Albania; 
1995: 597; 
1996: 2,400; 
1997: 3,474; 
1998: 3,403; 
1999: 3,114; 
2000: 3,909; 
2001: 3,295; 
2002: 2,566; 
2003: 1,915; 
2004: 2,075; 
2005: 2,438; 
2006: 1,500; 
Total: 30,686. 

5; 
Country of birth[A]: Bulgaria; 
1995: 1,000; 
1996: 985; 
1997: 1,843; 
1998: 2,924; 
1999: 3,390; 
2000: 3,657; 
2001: 2,611; 
2002: 1,808; 
2003: 2,486; 
2004: 2,342; 
2005: 2,854; 
2006: 1,631; 
Total: 27,531. 

6; 
Country of birth[A]: Poland[B]; 
1995: 4,915; 
1996: 3,444; 
1997: 3,418; 
1998: 391; 
1999: 36; 
2000: 24; 
2001: 22; 
2002: 2,486; 
2003: 2,568; 
2004: 2,850; 
2005: 3,259; 
2006: 2,100; 
Total: 25,513. 

7; 
Country of birth[A]: Bangladesh; 
1995: 1,920; 
1996: 3,753; 
1997: 3,080; 
1998: 2,835; 
1999: 1,697; 
2000: 1,719; 
2001: 1,508; 
2002: 1,104; 
2003: 745; 
2004: 1,756; 
2005: 1,753; 
2006: 3,093; 
Total: 24,963. 

8; 
Country of birth[A]: Romania; 
1995: 1,992; 
1996: 2,321; 
1997: 2,378; 
1998: 2,620; 
1999: 2,862; 
2000: 2,867; 
2001: 1,953; 
2002: 981; 
2003: 1,202; 
2004: 1,145; 
2005: 1,585; 
2006: 1,207; 
Total: 23,113. 

9; 
Country of birth[A]: Egypt; 
1995: 2,230; 
1996: 2,219; 
1997: 1,652; 
1998: 1,786; 
1999: 1,536; 
2000: 1,506; 
2001: 1,123; 
2002: 1,161; 
2003: 923; 
2004: 1,643; 
2005: 2,478; 
2006: 3,727; 
Total: 21,984. 

10; 
Country of birth[A]: Ghana; 
1995: 1,338; 
1996: 3,933; 
1997: 2,350; 
1998: 2,156; 
1999: 1,734; 
2000: 1,737; 
2001: 1,120; 
2002: 1,217; 
2003: 1,577; 
2004: 1,152; 
2005: 1,049; 
2006: 1,129; 
Total: 20,492. 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration 
Statistics. 

[A] Although State's rules of cross-chargeability allow DV applicants 
to claim a country other than their country of birth as their native 
country, the numbers in this table count DV immigrants by country of 
birth, as reported by DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics. 

[B] Poland's eligibility for the DV program has fluctuated. As noted 
previously, State's rules of cross-chargeability would allow a spouse 
or child of a DV applicant who was born in Poland to claim the country 
of the principal DV applicant as their native country. Some DVs were 
issued to aliens whose country of birth is Poland but who claimed 
another country as their native country in years when Poland was 
ineligible for the program. 

[End of table] 

Little Is Known About Diversity Immigrants Once They Enter the United 
States: 

Although the DV program has helped some countries to increase 
immigration to the point where the country has graduated from the 
program, very little is known about DV immigrants after they arrive in 
the United States. For example, neither State nor the Department of 
Homeland Security has done a specific study on DV immigrants after they 
enter the United States, such as whether they remain in the United 
States and if they petition for family members to join them. Therefore, 
it is difficult to determine to what extent the DV program contributed 
to a country's graduating from the program or whether the country 
graduated from the program because of other factors. 

Similarly, it is unclear whether DV program requirements provide 
sufficient grounds for DV immigrants to lead successful lives in the 
United States. In 2003, the State Department compiled a report that 
described certain demographics of DV recipients in that year. The study 
illustrated characteristics of DV recipients' gender, age, level of 
education, work experience, and marriage status, and reported that the 
"typical" DV recipient was a male professional, aged 26-30, holding a 
university degree. The study also pointed to certain demographics that 
varied across regions; for instance, more DV recipients from the Europe 
region were married than those from the Africa region. While the 2003 
study provided useful information regarding DV recipients, we asked 
Department of Homeland Security and State officials whether a similar 
study had been done on DV recipients once they became legal permanent 
residents in the United States, and they did not know of any such 
study. 

The DV Program Is Vulnerable to Fraudulent Activity Committed by and 
Against Applicants, but State Has Not Compiled Comprehensive Data on 
Detected or Suspected Fraudulent Activity: 

Some DV applicants commit fraud in an effort to obtain a diversity visa 
or are themselves the victims of fraud perpetrated by an unscrupulous 
"visa industry.[Footnote 25]" The extent of fraudulent activity varies 
by post and is influenced by the applicant pool and local country 
conditions. In our review of 11 DV-issuing posts, consular officers at 
5 posts--Accra, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Dhaka, and Warsaw[Footnote 26]-- 
reported that fraudulent activity was a major challenge in adjudicating 
visas for DV applicants. These 5 posts all ranked in the top 10 
countries with the most DV entrants worldwide in 2006. Consular 
officers at the other 6 posts reported some challenges with the program 
but not as pervasive as the posts listed above. The problems of fraud 
and abuse as reported by consular officers in Accra, Addis Ababa, 
Lagos, Dhaka, and Warsaw are often rooted in the fact that a majority 
of the DV applicants at those posts sought assistance from the visa 
industry to enter the lottery. In so doing, they are sometimes extorted 
for large sums of money or coerced into sham marriages by unscrupulous 
entities in this industry. In addition, consular officers at these 5 
posts said that fraud activity made it challenging to verify 
applicants' identity and eligibility, and that detecting fraudulent DV 
marriages also presented a challenge. Despite much anecdotal 
information on DV program fraud and abuse, the State Department has not 
compiled data on detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing 
posts. 

Many Applicants Do Not Receive Accurate Information and Do Not Apply 
Independently for the DV Lottery: 

Consular officers at 6 of the 11 posts we reviewed reported that many 
of the applicants they see at DV adjudication interviews entered the DV 
program with high expectations but little understanding of the 
program's rules. State publishes detailed information on the DV program 
at [hyperlink, http://www.travel.state.gov], and many embassies and 
consulates that process diversity visas also post DV program details on 
their individual web sites, frequently in the host country's language. 
In addition, 8 of the 11 posts we reviewed conduct public outreach 
through press conferences, TV and radio information sessions, or flyers 
to educate potential applicants about the program. State's official 17-
page instruction packet lists detailed information on the program and 
informs applicants that it is free to enter the lottery, and that the 
U.S. government does not employ any outside consultants or private 
services to operate the DV program. 

However, consular officers and public diplomacy officers at six posts 
reported that many applicants do not learn about the DV program details 
from State, but rather from other sources, such as from family and 
friends in their local community or from the visa industry--self-styled 
"visa consultants" and "visa agents" who have no official connection to 
the U.S. government. Consular officers remarked that the visa industry 
is very active in countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, 
Nigeria, and Ukraine. Consular officers at the U.S. embassy in 
Kathmandu reported that visa consultancy is a "booming" business in 
Nepal. An October 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Kiev to State 
headquarters reported that visa consultancy businesses in western 
Ukraine (a poor, rural region that provides the majority of Ukrainian 
DV applicants) constantly advertise in local newspapers and on 
billboards; two such businesses had office buildings decorated with 
large American flags. An August 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in 
Accra to State headquarters noted that visa consultants targeted 
university students as potential clients and set up information tables 
on university campuses to enroll students into the DV lottery. Consular 
officers in Accra and Lagos said that visa consultants advertised with 
banners around town, and officers in Kathmandu suspected that it was 
visa consultants who ripped down banners that the U.S. embassy put up 
in major cities in Nepal, announcing how to get free information on the 
DV program. Not only do visa consultants charge for information that 
State provides for free, but many consular officers said that they also 
give out inaccurate or misleading information. The former consular 
chief in Katmandu, who spoke with us in May 2007, weeks after finishing 
his posting, said that his post's biggest challenge was counteracting 
the incorrect information the visa industry put out. 

Consular officers in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, and 
Ukraine estimated that the majority of the DV applicants at their posts 
sought assistance from this visa industry to enter the DV lottery. They 
cited the lack of personal computers and internet savvy as among the 
reasons for this. For example, according to the U.S. embassy in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh has one of the lowest internet access and usage rates in the 
world, yet it has provided the highest number of principal entrants, 
not including dependents, into the DV lottery in 2006, 2007, and 
2008[Footnote 27]; a December 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka 
attributed Bangladesh's large number of entrants solely to the visa 
industry. Some visa consultants offer legitimate help, such as 
preparing and submitting DV entry forms, but several consular officers 
said many also encourage unqualified applicants to enter the DV 
lottery, submit multiple or incorrect entries, and take advantage of 
their clients in a multitude of ways. A May 2006 cable from the U.S. 
embassy in Addis Ababa noted that it is the applicants' responsibility 
to ensure accuracy of their lottery entry, but, in Ethiopia, many 
applicants have little control over their entry when it is being 
handled by visa agents, and no alternative way to enter other than 
through the visa industry. 

Consular officers at several posts said that they encountered 
unqualified and misinformed applicants. Some applicants did not 
understand that "winning" the lottery did not guarantee them a visa, 
but rather provided them with an opportunity to apply for one. One 
consular officer in Accra noted that some applicants were confused by 
KCC's notification letter since the first word of the letter says 
"congratulations." A February 2007 cable from Kathmandu noted that DV 
applicants thought the visa interview was a mere formality. A consular 
officer in Lagos said that some applicants think they just need to stop 
by the embassy to pick up their visa. Other officers reported that some 
applicants believe that, in addition to a visa, they will get a free 
house and car in the United States. Consular officers reported that 
these misconceptions are problematic since unqualified applicants will 
proceed with their applications despite the considerable expense 
associated with it (the total cost, per person, for DV adjudication is 
$755, whether or not the adjudication results in visa issuance[Footnote 
28]. Officers processing DVs in low income countries such as 
Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria[Footnote 29] said that applicants raised 
the fee through a variety of ways, including taking out loans, selling 
property, and collecting money from networks of extended family and 
friends. 

Some Applicants Who Seek Assistance from the Visa Industry Are 
Defrauded: 

While seeking assistance from visa agents or consultants, some 
applicants are cheated and abused by unscrupulous entities[Footnote 30] 
within this visa industry. Consular officers at six posts we reviewed-
-Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw--provided 
examples of such abuse. As mentioned above, some visa consultants 
encourage people to enter the DV program regardless of their 
eligibility, and charge fees for each step of the process. Consular 
officers in Addis Ababa, Kathmandu, and Warsaw said that visa agents 
often filled out applicants' DV entry forms incorrectly--failing to 
list all family members or listing incorrect biographic data--which 
disqualified otherwise eligible applicants when they came to their visa 
interview. Consular officers in Dhaka said that many of their DV 
applicants could not read Western script; if given the chance to review 
their entry form, they could not tell whether visa consultants had 
filled in their biographic information correctly. Consular officers at 
these six posts estimated that visa consultants' fees ranged from 
nominal amounts for assistance in entering the lottery to exorbitant 
sums if an applicant is selected in the lottery. 

Consular officers in Accra, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw cited issues with 
KCC's notification letters that contributed to such abuse. They said 
that visa agents frequently list their own address on the lottery entry 
so that the notification letter comes directly to them, giving them 
control over the application. With the winning notification letter in 
hand, the agents can then demand thousands of dollars from the 
applicant in exchange for the letter; an August 2006 cable from the 
U.S. embassy in Accra cited an example where agents charged $2,500 for 
such an exchange, while consular officers in Dhaka suspected that the 
fee could range between $10,000 and $20,000. In our observation of DV 
adjudication interviews in Warsaw, consular officers pointed out 
several applicants whose applications did not list their own personal 
address, but rather the same P.O. box in Ukraine, which the officers 
attributed to a visa facilitator. An October 2006 cable from Warsaw 
noted that hundreds of Ukrainian DV applications were linked to the 
same P.O. box. Moreover, consular officers in Bangladesh and Nepal said 
that some letters, which conspicuously bear a U.S. postmark and KCC's 
return address, were intercepted by postal employees or stolen out of 
the mail, resulting in the letter being held for ransom. Also, some 
visa agents enter individuals into the DV lottery without their 
knowledge. For example, consular officers in Ukraine told us they 
suspected that visa agents bribe local officials for biographic data to 
enter potentially qualified applicants without their knowledge, and 
then attempt to extort money in exchange for the notification letter if 
one of the applicants is selected in the lottery. A March 2007 cable 
from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka noted that, in Bangladesh, visa agents 
posted fake job advertisements to collect biographic data and enter 
individuals without their knowledge. If one of these individuals won 
the lottery, the visa agent would either extort money in exchange for 
the notification letter or threaten to steal the individual's identity. 
A consular officer in Dhaka said that the diversity visa is referred to 
as the "Visa of Tears" by some Bangladeshis because of the suffering 
associated with it. 

Fraud Activity Makes It Challenging to Verify DV Applicants' Identity 
and Eligibility at Some Posts: 

Once applicants proceed to an embassy or consulate for their visa 
adjudication interview, consular officers must be able to confirm that 
the person at the visa interview is the same person listed on the DV 
winning entry, and therefore the legitimate applicant for the visa. 
However, in 6 of the 11 posts we reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, 
Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw--consular officers said that unreliable 
local documents made verifying DV applicants' identity a challenge. 
Officers in Accra, Dhaka, and Lagos said that applicants' identity 
documents could not be trusted because legitimate, authentic documents 
could be purchased with fraudulent information on them. In addition, 
the posts in Kathmandu and Warsaw sent cables to State headquarters to 
report that DV applicants could purchase authentic identity documents 
with false information from corrupt government officials. Consular 
officers in Accra, Dhaka, and Lagos noted that many applicants did not 
have birth certificates prior to their DV application and only procured 
them for the purpose of their DV application. These officers believed 
that some may have obtained birth certificates with fraudulent 
information. Moreover, 5 posts reported that visa consultants offer 
fraudulent documents as part of their services. A cable from Accra 
noted that Ghanaian police raided a travel agency suspected of fraud 
and found blank forms for passports, birth certificates, and other 
civil documents, as well as receipts for "DV consultations" ranging 
from $300 to $7,000. According to a Warsaw cable, Ukrainian DV 
applicants said that corrupt government officials in Ukraine were 
collaborating with visa facilitators to provide fraudulent documents. 
In Dhaka, consular officers suspected that visa facilitators use the 
availability of fake documents to substitute imposters in DV cases 
under their control if they cannot receive sufficient payment from the 
real applicant. 

In addition to verifying that an applicant is a native of an eligible 
DV country, consular officers must determine whether the applicant 
meets the education or work experience requirement for the diversity 
visa. However, in five of the posts we reviewed, consular officers 
reported that some applicants tried to claim education or work 
experience they did not possess. For example, consular officers in 
Dhaka said that DV applicants presented handwritten education documents 
that could be easily forged or altered, and reported that school 
officials were willing to issue authentic documents with false 
information. At several posts, consular officers referred questionable 
documents to the consular section's fraud prevention unit for further 
review; for example, the fraud prevention unit in Accra verified 
education documents with school authorities in Ghana. The fraud 
prevention unit in Lagos found that most of the documents were 
authentic, but suspected that legitimate education credentials masked a 
deeper problem of widespread cheating in school-leaving examinations. 
In cases where applicants applied for the DV with their work 
experience, officers reported several cases of applicants' using fake 
credentials and job letters. Moreover, the officers reported that some 
were coached by visa consultants on how to fake knowledge of work 
experience they did not possess. 

Fraudulent DV Marriages Present a Challenge at Several Posts: 

The DV program rules require applicants to list all family 
members[Footnote 31] on their original entry form. Due to the extended 
time between the lottery entry and the visa interview at post, some 
applicants marry and have children after their initial DV entry, and 
these new beneficiaries are added to the principal DV winner's 
application. At some posts, verifying the legitimacy of these new 
relationships did not pose a problem. However, at 5 of the 11 posts we 
reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw--consular 
officers reported that verifying these relationships, referred to as 
"pop-ups," was a major fraud challenge[Footnote 32]. Consular officers 
in Accra and Addis Ababa said that relationship fraud was their biggest 
fraud challenge in DV processing. In Addis Ababa, for example, marrying 
a DV lottery winner in an attempt to obtain an immigrant visa has 
become so common that the term "DV marriage" has entered the local 
lexicon. Officers in Accra estimated that up to 50 percent of DV 
adjudications there involve a "pop-up" spouse; officers in Addis Ababa 
said that the percentage of sham DV marriages at their post could be as 
high as 90 percent and a cable from the post stated that DV-related 
marriage fraud was "rampant." Officers speculated that some applicants 
entered into a DV marriage to help a friend or another family member, 
even a sibling, obtain an immigrant visa. According to officers in 
Addis Ababa, Accra, and Lagos, applicants engaging in sham marriages 
rely on backdated marriage certificates, fake supporting documentation, 
and staged wedding pictures to try to prove their marriage is 
legitimate. An officer in Accra said that the prevalence of customary 
marriages in Ghana, in which there is no official documentation of the 
union, complicates matters since even legitimate couples may only 
acquire a marriage certificate after winning the DV lottery. The custom 
of arranged marriage in Nepal and Bangladesh makes it challenging for 
officers to sort out legitimate arranged marriages from those arranged 
solely for immigration purposes. 

Consular officers and cables from Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw cited 
the involvement of the visa industry in organizing fake DV marriages. 
The officers in Addis Ababa believed that arranging DV marriages was 
the greatest money maker for visa agents. If an applicant cannot pay a 
visa agent's exorbitant fees, a lesser fee can be arranged if the 
applicant marries a person who has also paid a fee to the agent. The 
visa agents provide the new couples with fake documentation to 
establish the marriage and coach them on how to answer questions about 
the relationship in the visa interview. Officers in Warsaw obtained a 
"cheat sheet" from some Ukrainian applicants detailing how to prepare 
for the consular officer's questions. Moreover, the fraud prevention 
unit at the U.S. embassy in Ukraine learned of a visa consultancy in 
western Ukraine that offered, for approximately $14,500, to set up a 
fake marriage between a client and a DV winner. The arrangement was 
based on fake documents and months of preparation before the visa 
interview. If the couple's visa application was denied, most of the 
money would be returned to the client. 

Considerable Anecdotal Evidence Exists, but State Lacks Comprehensive 
Data on DV Fraud: 

State has considerable anecdotal evidence on fraudulent activity 
committed by and against DV applicants, but has not compiled 
comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing 
posts. For example, posts such as Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw 
have summarized DV fraud trends in cables, consular packages, and other 
reports sent to State headquarters, but the information is largely 
qualitative and it is difficult to gauge what percentage of DV 
applicants are implicated in fraud. Although the KCC collects data on 
the number of cases with potential fraud indicators, it is only when 
cases are adjudicated at consular posts that the fraud can be 
investigated more fully and determined to be factual and material to 
the case. While some consular officers we spoke with had estimates of 
such things as the number of cases with suspected "pop-up" spouses and 
the percentage of applicants who had been assisted by visa agents, none 
said they had developed comprehensive data on detected or suspected DV 
fraud at their post. Officials from Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud 
Prevention Programs (FPP) said that they could not gauge the extent of 
DV fraud overall and that they did not analyze DV fraud in isolation, 
as their fraud prevention initiatives were aimed at combating all types 
of visa fraud, regardless of category. However, they said they had 
recently implemented fraud tracking software to collect more data from 
posts, such as when an officer suspected that fraudulent documents were 
used or when officers referred a DV case to the post's fraud prevention 
unit. An FPP official shared some preliminary results from the first 
three quarters of fiscal year 2007: 31 DV-issuing posts had referred 
1081 DV cases to the posts' fraud prevention units. Eight of these 
posts had each referred more than 60 cases to their fraud prevention 
unit; Dhaka had referred 121 cases and Warsaw had referred 173. The 
official said that FPP was still working out some glitches with the 
fraud tracking program, but was hopeful that the data collected could 
clarify where DV fraud was most prevalent. 

Difficulties in Verifying the Identity of Some DV Applicants May Have 
Security Implications: 

Although none of the officials at State headquarters or the consular 
officers at the 11 posts we interviewed considered the DV program to be 
specifically targeted by terrorists, a few said that the challenge of 
verifying DV applicants' identity could have security implications. The 
State IG has also raised concerns that natives of state sponsors of 
terrorism are eligible to participate in the DV program. 

Prevalence of Identity Fraud at Some Posts Could Reduce Effectiveness 
of Security Screening: 

Consular officers' difficulties in verifying the identity of some DV 
applicants, particularly in countries where applicants can purchase 
legitimate identity documents containing fraudulent information, could 
reduce the effectiveness of security screening for DV applicants. 
Consular officers screen all visa applicants for security-related 
concerns. Each applicant's name is checked against State's Consular 
Lookout and Support System, which contains records provided by numerous 
agencies and includes information on persons with visa refusals, 
immigration violations, and terrorism concerns. Consular officers also 
collect applicants' fingerprints at the visa interview and run them 
through U.S. databases of criminals and terrorists. In some cases--for 
instance, if the applicant's name generates a hit in the Consular 
Lookout and Support System, or if the applicant's nationality, 
background, or intentions in the United States warrant further 
information--the consular officer is required to request a security 
advisory opinion for the applicant, which is sent back to Washington 
where multiple agencies collect and review additional information on 
the applicant. Despite these security checks, a DV applicant with no 
previous record in U.S. government agency databases or an applicant who 
is using a false identity may not be detected as a potential security 
concern. Criminals or terrorists with no record in U.S. government 
agency databases could potentially contact an unscrupulous visa agent 
and arrange to be added to a DV applicant's case as a "pop-up" spouse. 
A 2002 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka stated that the ease with 
which individuals can obtain genuine identity documents in any assumed 
identity, including passports, creates an "open door" for terrorists 
wishing to enter the United States with legal status. The cable noted 
that 99 percent of DV applicants' identity documents were issued after 
the applicant had been selected in the lottery and that, despite 
officers' diligent compliance with name check requirements, these 
checks were useless in detecting someone with a newly invented 
identity. Similarly, a consular officer in Kathmandu said that official 
documents could be purchased or fabricated in Nepal, and this officer 
was concerned that a terrorist from another country would obtain a 
Nepalese passport with a false identity. He noted the importance of 
locally engaged staff working in the consular section who could help 
with detecting imposters, such as by recognizing that the applicant 
spoke Nepali with a foreign accent. 

Consular officers at some posts said that determining whether DV 
applicants have a criminal background, which may make them ineligible 
to receive a visa, was challenging in countries where the police 
certificates were unreliable.[Footnote 33] Consular officers in Accra, 
Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw considered the police certificates 
"worthless" because they had never seen one with derogatory information 
on an applicant. Officers in Lagos suspected that inadequate record 
keeping and the ease of bribing police officers were to blame. 

Aliens from Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism 
Eligible for DV Program: 

Aliens from state sponsors of terrorism are eligible to apply for and 
receive a diversity visa, and since fiscal year 2000, nearly 9,800 
aliens from state sponsors of terrorism have received diversity visas 
(see table 2). 

Table 2: Diversity Visa Recipients from Countries Designated as State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, Fiscal Years 2000-2006: 

Country of birth: Cuba; 
2000: 712; 
2001: 429; 
2002: 425; 
2003: 214; 
2004: 298; 
2005: 371; 
2006: 314; 
Total: 2,763. 

Country of birth: Iran; 
2000: 355; 
2001: 333; 
2002: 695; 
2003: 478; 
2004: 349; 
2005: 407; 
2006: 547; 
Total: 3,164. 

Country of birth: North Korea; 
2000: -; 
2001: -; 
2002: -; 
2003: -; 
2004: -; 
2005: -; 
2006: -; 
Total: -. 

Country of birth: Sudan; 
2000: 1,033; 
2001: 719; 
2002: 629; 
2003: 420; 
2004: 351; 
2005: 248; 
2006: 303; 
Total: 3,703. 

Country of birth: Syria; 
2000: 38; 
2001: 34; 
2002: 27; 
2003: 20; 
2004: -; 
2005: 19; 
2006: 24; 
Total: 162. 

Country of birth: Total; 
2000: 2,138; 
2001: 1,515; 
2002: 1,776; 
2003: 1,132; 
2004: 998; 
2005: 1,045; 
2006: 1,188; 
Total: 9,792. 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration 
Statistics; GAO. 

[End of table] 

In a 2003 report on the DV program, the State IG noted that, while 
aliens from state sponsors of terrorism can only be issued nonimmigrant 
visas in limited circumstances, no parallel restriction exists for 
diversity visas. Because of this, and because of the program's 
vulnerability to fraud, the State IG said the DV program contained 
significant risks to national security from hostile intelligence 
officers, criminals, and terrorists attempting to use the program for 
entry into the United States as permanent residents. The State IG 
recommended that the Bureau of Consular Affairs propose changes to the 
INA to bar aliens from state sponsors of terrorism from the DV 
application process. Consular Affairs agreed with the recommendation in 
principle but did not implement it, expressing concern over the effect 
of permanently disbarring aliens who may be fleeing oppressive regimes 
of states that sponsor terrorism. The IG later agreed to close the 
recommendation although it had not been implemented. 

As we have previously reported,[Footnote 34] the Department of Homeland 
Security, terrorism experts, and federal law enforcement officials 
familiar with immigration fraud believe that some individuals, 
including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter 
or remain in the United States. We found no documented evidence of DV 
immigrants from state sponsors of terrorism committing terrorist acts. 
However, two of the four consular officers adjudicating diversity visas 
at the U.S. embassy in Ankara, Turkey,[Footnote 35] where some DV 
applicants from Iran are adjudicated, said that it was somewhat 
difficult to verify Iranian identity documents. Although they said that 
the vast majority of Iranian applicants are subject to security 
advisory opinions, the regional security officer in Ankara considered 
it possible for Iranian intelligence officers to pose as DV applicants 
and not be detected by the post's security screening if their identity 
was not already known to U.S. intelligence. Although this is an 
inherent risk with applicants from all countries, the regional security 
officer noted that it was difficult to mitigate this risk for Iranian 
applicants since the United States does not have a diplomatic presence 
in Iran. 

State Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the DV Program, but Does Not Have a 
Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Reported by Consular Officers at 
Some Posts: 

State has taken steps to address some weaknesses in the DV program, but 
it does not have a strategy to address pervasive fraud being reported 
by consular officers at some posts. Since 2003, KCC has improved its 
detection of multiple DV entries and of potential fraud indicators. 
Consular officers at the 11 posts we reviewed described a variety of 
fraud prevention measures aimed at combating DV fraud, but some of the 
posts are limited by resource constraints. These efforts address some 
of the program's vulnerabilities, but State does not have a strategy to 
address the pervasive DV fraud being reported by posts such as Accra, 
Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw. State consular officials believe 
that some legislative changes could make it easier for State to 
mitigate fraud in the DV program--such as raising the education 
eligibility requirement--but State has not made any formal proposals to 
this effect. 

KCC Has Improved Its Detection of Multiple Lottery Entries and 
Potential Fraud Indicators: 

KCC has made several improvements to its processing of the DV lottery 
entries to detect multiple entries and to screen cases for possible 
fraud indicators before they are sent to consular posts for 
adjudication. KCC piloted facial recognition software in 2001 and, in 
2003, moved to an electronic application process, known as e-DV. Both 
facial recognition and e-DV improve KCC's ability to detect multiple 
entries and to detect possible fraud indicators. Prior to this, the DV 
lottery was paper-based, which made it difficult for KCC employees to 
catch multiple entries. Now, all e-DV entries go through electronic and 
manual procedures to screen out ineligible entries. The entries are 
screened electronically for exact duplicate digital photographs or 
biographic information; exact duplicates are disqualified. Next, all 
principal applicant entries selected in the lottery are checked with 
facial recognition software against galleries (by region and by gender) 
drawn from the entire e-DV database to further eliminate duplicate 
entries based on photo matches. Possible matches are returned to KCC's 
facial recognition technicians, who then make a determination on 
whether or not a valid match exists. KCC reported that it detected 
7,622 multiple entries in 2005, 7,166 in 2006, and 3,969 in 2007. KCC's 
fraud prevention manager attributed the decreasing number to the 
success of facial recognition software, suggesting that applicants and 
visa industry consultants were not submitting as many multiple entries 
because they had learned that KCC would detect and disqualify them. 

If KCC's facial recognition technicians detect multiple entries before 
the entrant has been notified of being selected in the lottery, KCC 
will disqualify the entry and not notify the entrant of the 
disqualification. In the past, KCC disqualified the entrant and sent a 
disqualification letter to the entrant regardless of whether the 
entrant had already been sent a notification letter. Consular Affairs' 
legal department requested KCC to cease disqualification of entrants 
who had already been notified as this could be perceived as an 
adjudicatory decision by KCC.[Footnote 36] KCC now forwards the 
information on the facial recognition match to the post so the consular 
officer can make the decision. 

In addition to facial recognition software, KCC employees search for 
other fraud indicators as they collect additional documents from 
individuals selected in the lottery and prepare to send their cases to 
posts for adjudication. For example, they note, through "fraud flags," 
if applicants (1) added a spouse or children to their case after being 
selected in the lottery, (2) if there were substantial changes to 
biographic details, or (3) if the applicant appeared in a different 
entry with different family members. In their scan of applicants 
selected in the 2005 DV program, KCC employees found 804 "pop-up" 
spouses or children; applicants from Ghana, Nigeria, and Ukraine had 
more "pop-ups" than any other country. KCC's fraud flags are noted in 
both the electronic and hard copy files that are sent to posts, and 
several of the consular officers at the posts we reviewed said that the 
fraud flags were useful for their adjudication of DV cases. With the 
advent of e-DV it also became possible to provide an electronic 
comparison of the applicant's lottery entry photograph to the 
photograph submitted with the visa application so that consular 
officers can review and compare these photographs. This process has 
assisted numerous posts in identification of imposters. Finally, in 
2004, KCC hired a full-time fraud prevention manager, who oversees 
fraud prevention programs for both the DV program and petition-based 
nonimmigrant visa programs, which are also processed at the KCC. In 
commenting on this report, State mentioned some additional tools it 
uses to prevent DV fraud, such as fraud conferences and fraud 
prevention management training which include DV patterns and issues. 

Posts Combat DV Fraud with Various Fraud Prevention Measures, but Some 
Face Resource Constraints: 

All of the 11 DV-processing posts we reviewed use various resources to 
combat DV-related fraud, both to warn DV applicants about visa industry 
scams and to detect fraudulent activity by DV applicants. Consular 
officers in Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw said that 
they conduct extensive public diplomacy campaigns to educate DV 
applicants about the program and to warn them about unscrupulous visa 
consultants. For example, the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa distributed 
100,000 color flyers throughout Ethiopia, printed in six local 
languages, and ran many advertisements in local newspapers to exhort DV 
applicants not to be fooled by the visa industry and warn that fake 
marriages will not go undetected by consular officers. Similarly, 
consular officers in Accra and Lagos have conducted numerous interviews 
and press conferences to educate applicants about the DV program and to 
warn them against scams. The post in Kathmandu reported it undertakes 
extensive outreach to ensure that potential DV applicants have 
information on the program, and is planning even more aggressive public 
outreach for the future. Moreover, officers at several posts described 
efforts they took to warn applicants not to proceed with the visa 
interview unless they were qualified. For example, the consular 
sections in Accra, Ankara, and Kathmandu post signs next to the 
cashier's window, reminding applicants of the DV eligibility 
requirements and that the $755 fee is not refundable. Consular officers 
in Dhaka brief DV applicants in the waiting room every morning to 
remind them of the requirements, the consequences of committing fraud, 
and that the fee is nonrefundable. However, consular officers 
consistently said that some DV applicants still hold misconceptions; 
the officers suspect that they do not trust information they receive 
from the U.S. government, preferring to trust members of their own 
community as sources of information. 

In addition to public diplomacy efforts, DV posts also use a variety of 
antifraud tools to combat fraud after the applicant has come to the 
post for visa adjudication. Consular officers review the applicant's 
documents, along with any fraud notes from KCC, and scrutinize the 
applicant during the visa interview. The consular chief in Dhaka said 
the post's best antifraud tool is good interviewing skills. In Accra, 
Addis Ababa, and Warsaw, officers conduct split interviews for couples 
suspected of marriage fraud. Questionable cases are referred to the 
post's fraud prevention unit for further review.[Footnote 37] These 
units investigate the facts of the case, such as by calling school 
boards to see if the education certificate is legitimate, or conducting 
field investigations to see if an applicant's marriage is legitimate. 
Some posts also receive assistance from their regional security office, 
and some receive limited cooperation from local law enforcement. A 
consular officer in Accra said that the embassy made three DV fraud 
ring busts along with the help of local police, and in Lagos, the 
consulate reported that its fraud prevention unit was working with the 
Nigerian authorities to prosecute several DV applicants who had 
admitted to marriage fraud. 

Several officers said that DV fraud investigations were resource- 
intense, and others said that they were restricted by limited 
resources. A May 2006 cable from the post in Addis Ababa to State 
headquarters stated that consular officers and fraud investigators had 
spent thousands of hours trying to sift out real marriages from the 
many fraudulent ones, and thousands of dollars each year verifying 
marriage certificates and conducting field investigations. Consular 
officers in Accra said that the post stopped doing field investigations 
on suspected DV sham marriages because they were so resource-intense 
and not productive; for example, in many cases, when investigators from 
the embassy went to neighborhoods to check on marriages, they found 
neighbors complicit and willing to back up the couple's story. In 
Lagos, the consular chief said that the section did not have the 
resources to carry out all the fraud investigations it would like to, 
although the post had reclassified the fraud prevention manager's 
position so that it would next be filled by a midlevel officer, instead 
of an entry-level officer, which is currently the case. An official in 
the post's regional security office said the office was so short on 
resources that it did not have the time or budget to help the consular 
section, and while Lagos had an assistant regional security officer for 
investigations position, the slot has been vacant since September 2006. 
Accra does not have an assistant regional security officer for 
investigations position. 

The U.S. embassy in Kiev has an assistant regional security officer for 
investigations, and the fraud prevention unit at the embassy works with 
the consular section at the embassy in Warsaw on Ukrainian DV fraud. 
Officers from the unit reported success with DV field investigations 
conducted in the past year; 16 of 19 investigations confirmed evidence 
of fraud. However, those same officials told us they were concerned 
that they would get less cooperation from local officials in Ukraine in 
future investigations. The immigrant visa section chief in Warsaw said 
that increased funding for field investigations would be the best way 
to improve DV processing. The U.S. embassy in Dhaka also has a busy 
fraud prevention unit and an assistant regional security officer for 
investigations whom consular officers said was very helpful with DV 
fraud investigations. In a March 2007 cable to State headquarters and 
the KCC, the post said that its fraud prevention efforts would be 
greatly enhanced if it had more information on visa facilitator 
patterns; the post wanted lists of duplicate entries that might provide 
more information to track visa facilitators. 

State Lacks a Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Activity Reported by 
Some Posts: 

Despite the efforts made both by KCC and individual DV-processing 
posts, State does not have a strategy to address the serious DV fraud 
being reported by posts such as Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and 
Warsaw. Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs (FPP) has 
suggested some ways to address the problems caused by unscrupulous visa 
agents, but it has not fully developed these initiatives. For example, 
in order to prevent applicants' notification letters from being stolen, 
officials from FPP said that they were considering alternate ways of 
notifying DV applicants in countries such as Ukraine and Bangladesh, 
but that a strategy had yet to be implemented. Some consular officers 
we interviewed suggested that the KCC should send the notification 
letter in an unmarked envelope or that KCC send the notification letter 
directly to post and require applicants to come to the embassy or 
consulate to pick it up. 

Many consular officers we interviewed suggested that DV applicants 
should not be allowed to add dependents, or "pop-ups," to their 
applications after being selected in the lottery. Consular Affairs 
officials said that such a change would require the INA to be amended. 
At least 15 consular officers we spoke with at posts such as Accra, 
Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw advocated for this change. A May 
2006 cable from Addis Ababa predicted that this would prevent fraud, 
more tightly regulate the DV program, and save hundreds of hours of 
interview time. Although such a policy would inconvenience some 
legitimate applicants, consular officers said that the principal DV 
winner in those cases could petition later for dependents, after 
entering the United States. While the KCC has collected data on DV 
cases with possible "pop-ups," State has not compiled data on how much 
time and money posts spend on investigating them and what percentage 
are proven to be fraudulent. Without these data, State cannot inform 
policy makers whether amending the INA to this effect would be helpful 
in combating fraud, and, on balance, how many legitimate couples and 
families it would inconvenience. 

Similarly, the fraud prevention manager at KCC and some consular 
officers we spoke with suggested that the DV education requirement be 
raised to require a university degree of applicants. They said that 
this would help them combat fraud since it would be easier for consular 
officers to verify university degrees and less easy for applicants to 
fraudulently claim they had attained this level of education. State 
amended the DV entry form this year, providing KCC with data on the 
education level of entrants applying for diversity visas that will be 
issued in fiscal year 2008. KCC's preliminary analysis of 30,011 
entrants selected in the lottery shows that about 35 percent of 
entrants claimed to have a high school diploma and another 39 percent 
claimed some university education or higher. 

The involvement of the visa industry is perhaps the most problematic 
issue for State, and an area in which it most lacks control. However, 
despite the cables coming from posts where the visa industry 
involvement is problematic--such as Accra, Addis Ababa, and Dhaka-- 
State has not attempted to quantify the problem, gauge the extent of 
its involvement across all posts, or recognize to what extent the 
electronic DV (e-DV) entry format has facilitated the visa industry's 
abuse. Posts such as Dhaka and Warsaw have sent cables to State 
headquarters reporting that e-DV has facilitated unscrupulous visa 
agents' scams. In December 2006, the U.S. embassy in Dhaka reported 
that, although e-DV had reduced some traditional types of DV fraud, it 
had facilitated a new type of widespread extortion and identity theft 
fraud since e-DV effectively had given control of the program to visa 
facilitators who had internet access and English language skills, 
unlike many potential applicants in Bangladesh. A June 2006 cable from 
Warsaw reported that e-DV opened a new avenue for fraud that was 
previously inhibited by the personal signature requirement on the paper 
version of the lottery; e-DV allowed visa agents to use "phished" 
biographic data to enter individuals without their knowledge and then 
coerce them into sham marriages. Although consular officers said the DV 
applicants who entered the lottery with the assistance of a visa 
facilitator are frequently too intimidated or threatened to admit that 
they did so, State has not attempted to quantify the effect of visa 
industry involvement. U.S. tax forms, for example, require paid 
preparers to sign their names and list their addresses, giving a degree 
of accountability to the preparer. FPP officials said they were 
considering ways to partner with nongovernmental entities to help DV 
applicants with the lottery process so they could avoid an unscrupulous 
visa industry, although this plan also has yet to be implemented. 

Conclusions: 

Since its inception, the DV program has facilitated thousands of 
individuals from countries currently underrepresented in the U.S. 
immigrant pool to immigrate to the United States. However, consular 
officers at 5 of the 11 posts we reviewed reported that fraud in the DV 
program is a major challenge, and these 5 posts all rank in the top 10 
countries with the most DV recipients. While fraud is an issue across 
all immigrant visa categories, there are specific aspects of the DV 
program--the ability for applicants to add a "pop-up" spouse after 
being selected in the lottery and the ability to enter individuals 
without their knowledge--that make it particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation from an unscrupulous visa industry in some countries. 
State needs to do more to address this issue, such as by strengthening 
the application and notification steps of the process. For example, 
State could move forward with FPP's proposals to partner with 
nongovernmental entities in countries where applicants need assistance 
to enter the lottery. In addition, it could require that third parties 
put their own name and address on the DV entry form to provide a degree 
of accountability, or consider "certifying" visa agents deemed to be 
legitimate. It could also take steps to make the notification process 
less vulnerable to interception by third parties, such as by sending 
the letter in a less conspicuous envelope, or sending the letter to 
posts and requiring the applicant to pick it up. State also should 
consider whether proposing legislative changes would help it address 
fraud in the program. As has been suggested by consular officers, 
barring "pop-up" spouses may remove some incentives to fraudulent 
activity and remove power from the visa industry, and raising the 
education bar might make it easier for officers to verify applicants' 
eligibility and to detect fraud. State officials have discussed the 
potential need for legislative changes, but have not moved forward to 
formally propose such changes. Further, State has not developed data on 
DV program outcomes, detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing 
posts, and the amount of resources being spent on investigating DV 
fraud. All of this information would help decision makers consider 
whether legislative changes are needed. 

Recommendations: 

To strengthen its management of the DV program, we recommend that 
State: 

* Compile more comprehensive data on the DV program, including 
information on (1) detected or suspected fraud, including data on "pop- 
up" spouses, third party involvement, and identity and document fraud; 
and (2) the amount of fraud prevention resources being spent on DV 
investigations, 

* Use these data to formulate a strategy to combat fraud in the DV 
program. This strategy should include: (1) proposals for legislative 
changes, if deemed necessary to mitigate fraud risks; (2) consideration 
of appropriate fraud prevention resources at each DV-issuing post; and 
(3) operational improvements to strengthen the program, including 
making the notification process less vulnerable to interception by 
third parties and exploring the feasibility of certifying some visa 
agents or partnering with nongovernmental entities to assist applicants 
with entering the lottery. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Homeland Security for their comments. The Department of Homeland 
Security did not comment on the report. In its written comments, State 
said it was disappointed with the report's findings and did not agree 
with the recommendations. It said that our report did not give the 
department enough credit for steps it has taken to combat fraud in the 
DV program and that our report identified management failures that do 
not exist. While State's comments acknowledge that the DV program faces 
fraud challenges, State also said that there are limits to what the 
department can do. In our report, we give credit to State for making 
several improvements to its fraud screening for DV applicants, such as 
implementing an electronic application process, facial recognition 
software, and flagging DV cases with fraud indicators before they are 
sent to posts. Moreover, our report does not discuss "management 
failures" by State. Our report shows that the DV program has 
significant risks for fraud and that State can mitigate some of these 
risks by more systematically documenting the extent of known fraud in 
the program. Therefore, we continue to recommend that State make 
operational improvements to the program and to propose legislative 
changes, if necessary, to improve its ability to combat fraud. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of 
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. We also will make copies available to 
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you 
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 
at (202) 512- 4128. Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, 
Kate Brentzel, Christina Connelly, Joseph Carney, and Grace Lui. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We examined the immigrant visa process in terms of its administration 
across government agencies, the potential vulnerabilities in the 
process--including security risks--and options for mitigating these 
risks. In the course of our initial research, we decided to focus on 
the diversity visa (DV) category of immigrant visas for two reasons. 
First, in 2003, the Department of State's (State) Office of the 
Inspector General (IG) pointed to pervasive fraud at many DV-issuing 
posts, as well as the risk inherent in allowing aliens from state 
sponsors of terrorism[Footnote 38] to apply for and obtain a DV. 
Second, we spoke with several experts both within and outside of 
government who raised concerns about fraudulent activity in the DV 
program. Another GAO study currently underway--the second to address 
your request--will focus on the security screening process for 
nonimmigrants already in the United States who are applying for legal 
permanent resident status. This report examines (1) the extent to which 
the DV program is diversifying the U.S. immigrant visa pool, (2) areas 
of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are 
security implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) 
what steps State has taken to address the vulnerabilities in the DV 
program. 

To assess the extent to which the DV program is diversifying the U.S. 
immigrant pool, we examined key documents regarding the purpose and 
goals of the DV program. For example, we reviewed the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as amended; examined State's Foreign Affairs Manual, 
and attended consular training courses on the immigrant visa process at 
State's Foreign Service Institute. We also collected and analyzed State 
and Department of Homeland Security data on DV trends and demographics 
that illustrate the volume of DV applicants and recipients across 
countries and regions, and compared these data to visa issuance trends 
in other immigrant visa categories. To assess the reliability of these 
data, we asked relevant State and Department of Homeland Security 
officials a series of questions that covered data classification; 
custody and maintenance of the data, including updates; quality control 
procedures; and accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined 
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. We also interviewed officials at State and Department of 
Homeland Security on the agencies' efforts to study and track DV 
recipients. 

To assess the areas of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, 
whether there are security implications associated with these 
vulnerabilities, and the steps State has taken to address these 
vulnerabilities, we reviewed key documents related to DV fraud and 
abuse. For example, we examined bulletins on consular fraud issues 
produced by Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs and 
presentations by the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) on fraud prevention 
efforts such as facial recognition technologies. We also reviewed 
documents from the posts we visited including standard operating 
procedures, quarterly fraud reports, and internal cables. In addition, 
we reviewed State data on results of fraud prevention efforts such as 
facial recognition technology. In January 2007, we visited the KCC in 
Williamsburg, Kentucky, where we observed DV operations and interviewed 
key officials in the DV process. We held many follow-up discussions 
with KCC's fraud prevention manager after our visit. 

Between April and May 2007, we did fieldwork at the U.S. embassies in 
Accra, Ghana; Ankara, Turkey; Warsaw, Poland;[Footnote 39] and the U.S. 
consulate in Lagos, Nigeria. Between May and June 2007, we also 
conducted telephone interviews with consular staff in an additional 7 
posts: the U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Cairo, Egypt; 
Dhaka, Bangladesh; Kathmandu, Nepal; Lima, Peru; and the U.S. 
consulates in Casablanca, Morocco; and Frankfurt, Germany. We selected 
these 11 posts because they encompassed a range of experiences in DV 
processing: (1) posts that had reported considerable DV fraud activity, 
(2) posts representing various DV workload volumes; (3) posts located 
in different geographic regions, and (4) posts that process applicants 
from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. The selected 
posts are not intended to be representative of all DV-issuing posts. 
During our field work in Ghana, Nigeria, Turkey, and Poland, we 
observed DV operations and interviewed consular officials about visa 
adjudication policies, procedures, and resources; challenges to 
administering the DV program; and efforts to prevent and investigate 
cases of fraud and abuse. In our teleconferences with consular staff in 
Addis Ababa, Cairo, Casablanca, Dhaka, Frankfurt, Kathmandu, and Lima, 
we conducted interviews using a standard set of questions regarding the 
posts' challenges with DV processing, fraud prevention, and suggestions 
for improving the DV program. We developed the interview questions 
based on our review of the documentation and data listed above. The 
responses to our interviews are not intended to be representative of 
all DV-issuing posts. 

In the Washington, D.C. area, we interviewed officials from State's 
Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, as well as 
officials from the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. We also interviewed officials and 
observed DV adjudication interviews at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services district offices in Baltimore, Maryland, and Fairfax, 
Virginia, and spoke with officials by phone at U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services district offices in Tampa, Florida; Houston, 
Texas; and Los Angeles, California. We requested meetings with 
headquarters officials at the Central Intelligence Agency to discuss 
the agency's role in screening DV applicants from countries designated 
as state sponsors of terrorism, but they declined to meet with us. 

We conducted our work from October 2006 through August 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States: 
Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management: 
and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

September 10, 2007: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Border 
Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage Diversity 
Visa Program," GAO Job Code 320458. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact June 
Kunsman, Managing Director, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at (202) 663-
1153.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 
Sid Kaplan (Acting): 

cc: GAO ï¿½ Kate Brentzel: 
CA ï¿½ Maura Harty: 
State/OIG ï¿½ Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage 
Diversity Visa Program: 

(GAO-07-1174, GAO Code 320458): 

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office draft report entitled, "Border Security: Fraud 
Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage the Diversity Visa (DV) 
Program." We are disappointed with the report's findings and do not 
agree with the recommendations. The Department of State has 
administered this Congressionally-mandated program with diligence and 
creativity and believes the report does not reflect this. 

This report fails to accurately credit the Department of State with 
identifying and combating fraud in this Congressionally-mandated 
program and, by examining the program in isolation, mistakenly 
identifies management failures that do not exist. In fact the 
Department of State has designed and implemented robust and 
sophisticated fraud screening programs in the DV program, starting with 
implementing an electronic application process and including state-of-
the-art facial recognition screening fingerprints and data mining 
techniques. 

Visas for the United States are, in some countries, the most valuable 
commodity on the market. Many of those same cultures operate on the 
premise that any government benefit requires the intervention or 
assistance of someone with special connections and the payment of fees. 
Over a decade and a half of publicity to the contrary has failed to 
convince a substantial number of applicants. Success in extorting money 
from applicants and winners in those same societies bred more scams. 

It is a sad reality that all visa categories encounter sham marriages, 
suspect identities, fraudulent documents, use of agents and unlikely 
stories. Consular officers around the world work hard to identify and 
combat that fraud and thus ensure as secure an immigration process as 
possible for the United States. GAO is able to report on these fraud 
trends because consular officers, working primarily with Diplomatic 
Security and DHS colleagues, have been successful in reporting it and 
combating it. The very nature of the Congressionally-mandated DV 
program, a lottery system which requires no relative or employer 
sponsorship and therefore serves as a vehicle for huge populations 
without existing U.S. connections, makes it particularly susceptible to 
human gullibility and in some cases desperation. 

There are those who clearly see a "business" opportunity in preying on 
prospective applicants. In effect, for many, the DV program represents, 
in some societies, the last hope for those desperate to leave, leading 
to the exploitation of the very individuals it aims to benefit. 

It is worth noting that all of the vulnerabilities to fraud described 
in the GAO's report were discovered (and relayed to GAO) by vigilant 
consular personnel who engage in constant efforts to counter and 
discourage visa fraud. For the DV program in particular, extensive 
screening takes place before cases are sent abroad for interview. 
Careful pre-processing coupled with skillful interviewing unravels the 
fraud. Applicants who do not meet the basic requirements to apply, who 
submit fraudulent documents, and who assume the identities of winners 
in efforts to qualify pay large fees only to be refused in the end. 
Consequently, that process consumes resources unproductively. 

Systematic Fraud Analysis: 

We do not agree that there is no systemic analysis of DV fraud. In 
fact, as GAO was informed, broader, systemic fraud analysis and 
reporting is routinely provided to posts worldwide and includes 
information developed from diversity visa case experiences and post 
feedback. Over the lifetime of this program, the Bureau of Consular 
Affairs used post feedback to introduce screening, interviewing and 
training 'improvements promptly as trends and technology became 
available. The Fraud Prevention Programs office expanded in response to 
the need for systematic study and analysis of fraud and malfeasance 
concerns of consular officers and managers. These fraud detection 
tools, in particular for DV, include: 

* Screening for and disqualifying duplications; 

* Inclusion of photographs to discourage false identities; 

* Facial recognition screening and disqualifying of multiple 
applications before winner notification; 

* Improved minimum photo standards for participation; 

* Electronic application to improve accuracy, search capacity, 
duplicate elimination and preprocessing; 

* Fraud conferences and fraud prevention management training including 
DV patterns and issues;

* Requiring photographs for derivative family members to deter fraud; ï¿½ 
Development of fraud tracking software to enhance analysis and begin to 
provide metrics;

* Development of additional on-line processing and verification tools 
to reduce opportunities for visa brokers or middlemen to control 
winning applications;

* Incorporation of fingerprint checks to detect criminals and 
impostors. 

Most of the impressive array of fraud-prevention strategies, 
techniques, and technologies that consular officers employ are useful 
against multiple kinds of fraud. This applies to interviewing skills, 
use of biometrics, advanced database searches, field investigations, 
and other measures. We believe that it is generally more important to 
develop and deploy what we have learned effectively against fraud as a 
recurring phenomenon, rather than attempt to develop separate fraud- 
prevention strategies for each of the dozens of visa categories that we 
adjudicate. 

State Sponsors of Terrorism Eligibility: 

We do not see the DV program as uniquely vulnerable and every DV 
"winner" who pursues his or her case is vetted in a manner identified 
to all immigrant visa applicants. That process includes two types of 
biometric checks and name checks. The long lead time involved in an 
application, the layers of screening, the low probability of selection 
all complicate exploitation. 

Use of Approved Agents: 

It is not within the scope of our authority to develop, train and 
oversee approved agents to assist DV aspirants with their applications. 
Nor does it seem to us a good use of resources. The program is designed 
and intended to permit an applicant to manage independently, and given 
the minimum high school degree requirement, this should not serve as a 
barrier to applying. With wide availability of translations of the 
application process and forms, even the language barrier can be easily 
bridged on line. 

Winner packages: 

Security-related access restrictions and competing priorities from 
higher priority immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicant pools argue 
against handing out winner packets at posts abroad or registering 
applicants for the lottery at our posts. Such an approach could end up 
inviting unqualified or unselected applicants to appear at posts 
seeking assistance. Currently, we are developing more on-line tools to 
notify winning applicants of the next steps and documents required, as 
well as providing them access to verify their winner's status and 
interview date. The DV process is transparent and easily accessible. 
Even post engages in robust public outreach efforts to ensure that host 
country prospective applicants have readily available ï¿½ and free ï¿½ 
information on the program. There is a limit to the appropriate 
involvement of the USG in preventing applicants from engaging the 
services of unscrupulous local brokers in their home countries. 

Analysis of DV Adjustment and Subsequent Family Petitioning: 

Researching the outcome of DV immigration exceeds the scope of the 
authority of the Department of State. Once applicants are admitted to 
the United States, authority passes to DHS's Bureau of U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services. Any such study of this issue would be more 
appropriate for that agency. While the outcomes might influence 
decisions of Congress concerning the future of the DV program, they 
would have no apparent bearing on the visa decisions that State must 
make on a case-by-case basis. 

Specific recommended language changes: 

Page 4 - "pervasive fraud at DV-issuing posts" would be more accurately 
worded "pervasive fraud in DV applications that posts must deal with." 

Page 11 ï¿½ The first paragraph is confusing and moving the first 
sentence to the end would resolve that. 

Page 13 ï¿½ Rather than "no more DVs can be Issued" should more 
accurately read "no more DVs from that lottery pool can be issued." 

Page 13, para 8 ï¿½ "State Department has not compiled data." In fact a 
good deal of data on issuances and refusals, disqualifications and 
instances of fraud are available. We think it would be more appropriate 
to note that while extensive data have been compiled, the fraud 
tracking system that was deployed in late 2006 and currently undergoing 
additional refinement should provide metrics for more in- depth 
analysis of fraud specific to visas by category.

GAO Comments: 

1. We agree that consular officers are working hard to identify and 
combat DV fraud. Our report repeatedly mentions that consular officers 
gave us information on suspected and detected fraud. 

2. We agree that State has taken numerous steps to detect and combat DV 
fraud. Based on State's comments, we have added to the report some 
additional material on the steps that State has taken. However, we 
believe that State could do more. For example, State has not compiled 
data from all DV-issuing posts on the outcomes of investigations on 
"pop-up" spouse cases, or data on how many cases have suspected third 
party involvement, or data on the amount of resources--time and money-
-being spent on DV investigations. We believe that such an analysis 
would help State target its resources to posts with the greatest fraud 
challenges and also better inform Congress about risks in the program. 

3. We agree with State that many fraud-prevention strategies are useful 
to consular officers against multiple kinds of fraud, and that separate 
fraud-prevention strategies need not be developed for each visa 
category. However, we think that the nature of the DV program presents 
some unique fraud challenges that would benefit from additional 
measures. As State noted in its comments, the DV program is a lottery 
system which, unlike other immigrant visa programs, requires no 
relative or employer sponsorship and therefore serves as an immigration 
vehicle for huge populations without existing U.S. connections. This is 
why we recommend that State develop a specific strategy to combat fraud 
in the program. 

4. We maintain that the difficulty in establishing some DV applicants' 
identity contributes to the vulnerability of allowing individuals from 
state sponsors of terrorism to be eligible for the program. State's 
Inspector General expressed similar concerns in its 2003 report on the 
DV program. 

5. In recommending that State make operational improvements to the DV 
program, we are not advocating for any one specific approach. Instead, 
we recommend that State explore options for alternative ways of 
handling the application and notification processes that have led to 
substantial fraud challenges in some countries. 

6. We understand that there are limits to what State can do to protect 
DV applicants from being victimized by an unscrupulous visa industry. 
However, we believe that the U.S. government must bear some 
responsibility for a program that causes, albeit unintentionally, 
exploitation and abuse of individuals. In addition to its public 
outreach efforts, State needs to consider ways to modify DV program 
operations to deter unscrupulous visa agents. 

7. We have revised this recommendation in response to State's comments. 
However, since State is primarily responsible for administering the DV 
program, we believe that State could benefit from information on DV 
immigrants once they have entered the United States. For example, 
information on whom DV immigrants petition for may illuminate fraud 
patterns and trends. State could take the initiative on discussions 
within the executive branch on designing such a study, and collect data 
from the Department of Homeland Security as needed. 

8. We have modified the text on page 2. 

9. We have modified the text on page 10. 

10. We mention State's fraud tracking system in this report and we 
believe that it will provide useful metrics for the analysis of DV- 
related fraud when fully operational. However, it is not clear whether 
this tracking system will provide State with comprehensive data from 
all DV-issuing posts on the outcomes of investigations on "pop-up" 
spouse cases, or data on how many cases have suspected third party 
involvement, or data on the amount of resources--time and money--being 
spent on DV investigations. We believe that this additional data, which 
we recommend collecting, would help State target its resources to posts 
with the greatest fraud challenges, and that it would better inform 
Congress about risks in the program. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jess Ford, (202) 512-4268 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, John Brummet, Kate Brentzel, 
Christina Connelly, Joseph Carney, and Grace Lui made major 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, ï¿½ 131, 104 Stat. 
4978, 4997-99 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1153 (c)). 

[2] The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) 
passed by Congress in November 1997 stipulated that up to 5,000 of the 
55,000 annually allocated diversity visas be made available for use 
under the NACARA program. The reduction of the limit of available 
diversity visas to 50,000 began with the DV program's fiscal year 2000, 
or DV-2000, and is likely to remain in effect through the DV-2008 
program. 

[3] The United States also grants visas to people who are seeking to 
enter the United States temporarily. In this report, we use the term 
"visa" to refer to immigrant visas only. 

[4] Aliens from countries that have sent more than 50,000 immigrants in 
the family-or employment-based categories in the previous 5 years are 
not eligible for the current fiscal year's lottery. The list of 
ineligible countries can change every year as immigration patterns 
shift; on average, approximately 15 countries have been ineligible each 
year since DV-2000. The following 16 countries are ineligible for the 
2007 DV program: Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom (except 
Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and Vietnam. 

[5] Holding an immigrant visa is but one of the requirements an alien 
must satisfy to become a legal permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1201. 

[6] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant 
or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident 
status through the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services. See 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1255. In fiscal years 2000 
through 2005, about 5 percent of DV immigrants adjusted status. 

[7] Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated 
pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
as codified at 50 App. U.S.C. ï¿½ 2405 (j), section 40 of the Arms Export 
Control Act as codified at 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2780(d), and section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act as codified at 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2371. Taken together, 
the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under 
these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a 
ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual 
use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 
Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates 
other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in 
certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are five countries 
designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and 
Syria. 

[8] As Poland "graduated" from the program after DV-2006, Polish 
natives are not currently eligible to apply for diversity visas. The 
U.S. embassy in Warsaw adjudicates DVs for natives of Belarus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine. 

[9] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions 
Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-
259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006). 

[10] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services counts both "arrivals" 
and "adjustments-of-status" in this number. In 2006, roughly 65 percent 
of immigrants were adjustments and 35 percent were arrivals. 
"Adjustments" refer to cases in which the alien is already present in 
the United States, and "arrivals" refer to cases in which the alien 
requests permanent admission while outside the United States. In the 
latter cases, the alien must apply for and obtain a U.S. immigrant visa 
at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad before arriving at U.S. ports of 
entry. A visa indicates that the alien's application has been reviewed 
and determined eligible by a U.S. consular officer, and allows the 
bearer to apply for admission to the United States at a U.S. port of 
entry. 

[11] Immediate relatives include spouses, parents of citizens ages 21 
and older, and unmarried children of citizens under 21. See, 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 
1151 (b)(2)(A)(i).

[12] 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1151. 

[13] Pub. L. No. 101-649, ï¿½ 131. 

[14] U.S.C. ï¿½ 1153(c). 

[15] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant 
or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident 
status through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See 8 U.S.C. 
ï¿½ 1255. In the last 5 years, the percentage of DV applicants who 
adjusted status has been about 5 percent. 

[16] 22 C.F.R. ï¿½ 42.33. 

[17] KCC does not notify those entrants who were not selected in the 
lottery. 

[18] Those qualified to adjust status in the United States are 
processed at domestic U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
offices. 

[19] See 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 1104(A), 1201(a). See also, 8 C.F.R. ï¿½ 245.2. 
Adjustment-of-status cases are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services adjudication officers in the United States. 

[20] Aliens applying for the DV must either be a native of (born in) a 
country that qualifies for the DV, regardless of the alien's current 
country of residence or nationality, or be entitled to claim another 
country as their native country. The rules of "cross chargeability" 
within the DV program--designed to prevent the separation of family 
members--allow individuals to claim their native country as one other 
than their country of birth for reasons including: (1) an alien born in 
a nonqualifying country in which neither parent was born nor resident 
at the time of the child's birth may claim the birthplace of either 
parent, if that country qualifies for the DV; and (2) an alien born in 
a nonqualifying country may claim their spouse's native country if it 
qualifies for the DV, provided that the spouse is included on the DV 
application, is issued a visa, and enters the United States 
simultaneously with the applicant. See 22 C.F.R. ï¿½ 42.12 for 
chargeability exceptions generally and State's Foreign Affairs Manual 
Volume 9, section 42.12 notes for chargeability exceptions as applied 
to the DV program. 

[21] The State Department's interpretation of the term "high school 
education or its equivalent" means successful completion of either (1) 
a 12-year course of elementary and secondary study in the United 
States; or (2) a formal course of elementary and secondary education 
comparable to completion of 12 years of elementary or secondary 
education in the United States. According to State's Foreign Affairs 
Manual, the education should be sufficient to allow a student to apply 
for college admission without further education. 

[22] The Department of Labor's O*Net [hyperlink, 
http://wwww.online.onetcenter.org] establishes eligible occupations. 

[23] While immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted without 
limit, other immigrant visa categories, such as employment, family, and 
diversity visas, are numerically controlled. 8 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1151. 

[24] Poland's eligibility for the program has fluctuated as its 
immigration pattern to the United States has changed. 

[25] For the purposes of this report, "visa industry" is defined as the 
individuals and businesses involved in a variety of tasks related to 
the DV process, such as preparing and submitting DV entries, 
translating documents, and even making travel arrangements for 
applicants' visa interviews. We use the terms visa "agents," 
"consultants," and "facilitators" interchangeably, as these and other 
terms were used by consular officers when referring to the visa 
industry. 

[26] As Poland "graduated" from the DV program after DV-2006, Polish 
natives are not currently eligible to apply for diversity visas. The 
U.S. embassy in Warsaw adjudicates DVs for natives of Belarus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine. In this report, references to Warsaw are 
specifically about the post's challenges with processing Ukrainian 
applicants. 

[27] More than 1.7 million Bangladeshis entered the DV-2008 lottery. 
Entrants from Nigeria and Ukraine rank next, with approximately 685,000 
and 620,000 entrants, respectively. 

[28] The $755 DV adjudication fee is comprised of the following: a $335 
immigrant visa application processing fee, a $375 DV surcharge fee, and 
a $45 immigrant visa security surcharge. While State headquarters 
advises posts to charge the full $755 before a DV adjudication 
interview, we found that some posts had implemented their own fee 
collection policies. For example, the post in Lagos charged DV 
applicants $375 before the interview and the remaining $380 only if the 
adjudication resulted in a visa issuance. Officers there claimed the 
policy was fair considering the financial burden DV fees imposed on 
applicants. 

[29] In 2005, the World Bank reported that the gross national income, 
per capita, was $470 in Bangladesh, $450 in Ghana, and $560 in Nigeria. 

[30] Consular officers in Bangladesh and Ukraine suspected that these 
unscrupulous elements are connected to organized crime. 

[31] The principal DV winner's spouse and unmarried children under age 
21 are eligible to receive a diversity visa. 

[32] Marriage fraud is not limited to diversity visas. Many consular 
officers said they suspected that many of the K visas (for fiancï¿½es) 
that they adjudicated were fraudulent. 

[33] DV applicants are required to bring police certificates with them 
to their visa adjudication interview, except in certain countries, such 
as Iran, where the certificates are considered unavailable. 22 C.F.R. ï¿½ 
42.65. 

[34] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions 
Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-
259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006). 

[35] As there is no U.S. embassy in Iran, visa services are available 
for Iranian applicants at the U.S. embassies in Abu Dhabi, Ankara, and 
Vienna, as well as the U.S. consulates in Dubai, Naples, and Frankfurt. 

[36] Only consular officers at a U.S. embassy or consulate can make the 
adjudicatory decision whether to issue a diversity visa. See 8 U.S.C. 
ï¿½ï¿½ 1104(A), 1201(a). See also, 8 C.F.R. ï¿½ 245.2. 

[37] Not all cases with fraud indicators are referred to the consular 
section's fraud prevention unit. In some cases, the applicant is not 
eligible for the visa for other reasons and the visa is refused; the 
fraud is therefore not material and the case will not be referred to 
the section's fraud prevention unit. 

[38] Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated 
pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 
section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of 
sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include 
restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and 
sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and 
miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under the 
above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that 
penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state 
sponsors. Currently there are five countries designated under these 
authorities: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 

[39] We also spoke with officials at the U.S. embassy in Kiev by 
digital video conference while we were in Poland, as the U.S. embassy 
in Kiev coordinates with the U.S. embassy Warsaw on fraud 
investigations for DV applicants from Ukraine. 

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