    Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage
    Diversity Visa Program (21-SEP-07, GAO-07-1174).

    Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to aliens from
    countries with low rates of immigration to the United States.
    Diversity visa applicants must apply online, be selected by
    lottery, be interviewed, and be determined to be eligible before
    obtaining a diversity visa. GAO was asked to review (1) the
    extent to which the Diversity Visa Program (DV program) is
    diversifying the U.S. immigrant pool, (2) areas of the DV program
    that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are security
    implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) what
    steps the Department of State (State) has taken to address the
    vulnerabilities. We reviewed laws, regulations, and other
    documentation, and interviewed numerous State officials both at
    headquarters and in the field.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1174
        ACCNO:   A76569
      TITLE:     Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability
    to Manage Diversity Visa Program
         DATE:   09/21/2007
      SUBJECT:   Border security
    	     Data collection
    	     Data integrity
    	     Databases
    	     DV-1 Visas
    	     Fraud
    	     Homeland security
    	     Identification cards
    	     Immigrants
    	     Immigration
    	     Immigration and naturalization law
    	     Immigration information systems
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Risk management
    	     Visas
    	     Diversity Visa Program

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    GAO-07-1174

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    Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
    Representatives:

    United States Government Accountability Office:

    GAO:

    September 2007:

    Border Security:

    Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage Diversity Visa
    Program:

    Border Security:

    GAO-07-1174:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-07-1174, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
    Homeland Security, House of Representatives.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to aliens from
    countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. Diversity
    visa applicants must apply online, be selected by lottery, be
    interviewed, and be determined to be eligible before obtaining a
    diversity visa. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which the
    Diversity Visa Program (DV program) is diversifying the U.S. immigrant
    pool, (2) areas of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, (3)
    whether there are security implications associated with these
    vulnerabilities, and (4) what steps the Department of State (State) has
    taken to address the vulnerabilities. We reviewed laws, regulations,
    and other documentation, and interviewed numerous State officials both
    at headquarters and in the field.

    What GAO Found:

    The DV program is contributing to the diversity of U.S. immigrants;
    since 1995, more than 500,000 aliens from countries with low rates of
    immigration to the United States have become legal permanent residents
    through the program. Little is known about diversity immigrants once
    they enter the United States, such as whether they contribute to
    further diversity by petitioning for family members to immigrate.

    The DV program is vulnerable to fraud committed by and against DV
    applicants, but State has not compiled comprehensive data on detected
    and suspected fraudulent activity. At 5 of the 11 posts we reviewed,
    consular officers reported that the majority of DV applicants, lacking
    access to a computer or internet savvy, use �visa agents� to enter the
    lottery. Some agents take advantage of DV applicants; visa agents in
    Bangladesh have intercepted applicants� program documents and charged
    ransoms of up to $20,000 or coerced applicants into sham DV marriages.
    Consular officers at 6 posts reported that widespread use of fake
    documents, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, and
    passports, presented challenges when verifying the identities of
    applicants and dependents.

    Difficulty in verifying identities has security implications because
    State�s security checks rely heavily on name-based databases. In 2003,
    State�s Inspector General raised concerns that aliens from countries
    designated as state sponsors of terrorism can apply for diversity
    visas. Nearly 9,800 persons from these countries have obtained
    permanent residency in the United States through the program. We found
    no documented evidence that DV immigrants from these, or other,
    countries posed a terrorist or other threat. However, experts familiar
    with immigration fraud believe that some individuals, including
    terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain
    in the United States. This places a premium on mitigating fraud risks.

    Despite taking steps to strengthen the DV program, State does not have
    a strategy to address the pervasive fraud reported by some posts. State
    believes that some legislative changes could mitigate fraud risks, but
    it has not made formal proposals for change and has not compiled
    comprehensive data on program outcomes and fraud trends which would
    help decision makers consider whether legislative changes are needed.

    Figure: Top 10 Countries of Origin for DV Immigrants, Fiscal Years 1995-
    2006:

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: Map Resources (map).

    [End of figure]

    What GAO Recommends:

    We recommend that State compile better data on known fraud in the DV
    program and use these data to develop a strategy to address fraud
    risks, including proposals for legislative changes, if deemed
    necessary. State did not agree with our recommendations and said that
    it has a robust fraud screening program for DV applicants. However, our
    report shows that there are significant fraud risks in the DV program
    and that State could do more to mitigate the risk, especially at posts
    that are reporting significant challenges with DV fraud.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    GAO-07-1174.
    For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
    fordj@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    The DV Program Is Contributing to a Diverse U.S. Immigrant Population,
    but Little Is Known about DV Immigrants Once They Enter the United
    States:

    The DV Program Is Vulnerable to Fraudulent Activity Committed by and
    Against Applicants, but State Has Not Compiled Comprehensive Data on
    Detected or Suspected Fraudulent Activity:

    Difficulties in Verifying the Identity of Some DV Applicants May Have
    Security Implications:

    State Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the DV Program, but Does Not Have a
    Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Reported by Consular Officers at
    Some Posts:

    Conclusions:

    Recommendations:

    Agency Comments:

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:

    GAO Comments:

    Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    Tables:

    Table 1: Top 10 Countries of Origin for Diversity Visa Immigrants,
    Fiscal Years 1995-2006:

    Table 2: Diversity Visa Recipients from Countries Designated as State
    Sponsors of Terrorism, Fiscal Years 2000-2006:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: Percentage of Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status
    by Class of Entry, Fiscal Year 2006:

    Figure 2: Process for Obtaining a Diversity Visa:

    Figure 3: Percentage of Diversity Visas Compared to Family-and
    Employment-Based Visas by Geographic Region, Fiscal Year 2006:

    Abbreviations:

    DV: Diversity Visa:
    FPP: Office of Fraud Prevention Programs:
    IG: Inspector General:
    INA: Immigration and Nationality Act:
    KCC: Kentucky Consular Center:

    United States Government Accountability Office:

    Washington, DC 20548:

    September 21, 2007:

    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
    Chairman:
    Committee on Homeland Security:
    House of Representatives:

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    Congress established the Diversity Visa Program (DV program) through
    the Immigration Act of 1990.[Footnote 1] The program provides up to
    55,000[Footnote 2] immigrant visas[Footnote 3] each fiscal year to
    aliens from countries with low rates of immigration[Footnote 4] to the
    United States. Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to
    individuals from countries other than the countries that send large
    numbers of immigrants to the United States. Aliens from 179 countries
    are eligible to participate in the 2007 DV program. A diversity visa
    holder may travel to the United States and apply for entry as a legal
    permanent resident.[Footnote 5] Legal permanent resident status allows
    individuals to live and work legally in the United States, travel in
    and out of the country, petition for certain family members to join
    them, and eventually apply for U.S. citizenship. Unlike most immigrant
    visa categories, DV applicants do not need a family member or employer
    in the United States to petition on their behalf. Instead, aliens enter
    what is commonly referred to as the "visa lottery"; individuals
    selected in this lottery are eligible to apply for a diversity visa.
    The Department of State (State) administers the DV program, including
    an online entry and lottery selection process at its Kentucky Consular
    Center (KCC) and visa adjudication interviews at its consular posts
    abroad.[Footnote 6]

    This report is part of a two-pronged approach to address your interest
    in the immigrant visa process, the potential vulnerabilities in the
    process--including security risk--and options for mitigating these
    risks. In the course of our research, we decided to focus on the
    diversity visa category of immigrant visas for two reasons. First, in
    2003, State's Office of the Inspector General (IG) pointed to pervasive
    fraud in DV applications that posts must deal with, as well as the risk
    inherent in allowing aliens from countries designated as state sponsors
    of terrorism[Footnote 7] to apply for and obtain a DV. Second, we spoke
    with several experts both within and outside of government who raised
    concerns about fraudulent activity in the DV program. Another GAO study
    currently underway--the second to address your request--will focus on
    the security screening and adjudication process for nonimmigrants
    already in the United States who are applying for legal permanent
    resident status.

    This report examines (1) the extent to which the DV program is
    diversifying the U.S. immigrant visa pool, (2) areas of the DV program
    that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are security
    implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) what steps
    State has taken to address the vulnerabilities in the DV program. To
    conduct our review, we reviewed laws, regulations, and other
    documentation related to the DV program; and we interviewed officials
    at State headquarters and at the KCC, where the online entry and
    selection processes for the diversity visa lottery are administered. We
    selected 11 DV-issuing posts to review because they encompassed a range
    of experiences in DV processing: (1) posts that had reported
    considerable DV fraud activity, (2) posts representing various DV
    workload volumes, (3) posts located in different geographic regions,
    and (4) posts that process applicants from countries designated as
    state sponsors of terrorism. We conducted field work at 4 of these
    posts: Accra, Ghana; Lagos, Nigeria; Warsaw, Poland, which processes DV
    applicants from Ukraine; and Ankara, Turkey, which processes DV
    applicants from Iran. At these 4 posts, we reviewed consular operations
    and interviewed State officials regarding the challenges they faced
    with the DV program. We interviewed consular officers at an additional
    7 posts via teleconference. We conducted our review from November 2006
    to August 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope
    and methodology.

    Results in Brief:

    Data show that the DV program is contributing to the diversification of
    the U.S. immigrant pool. As a result of the program, more than 500,000
    aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the United
    States have obtained legal permanent resident status. Immigrants from
    Africa and Europe have received the most diversity visas. For example,
    in fiscal year 2006, 40 percent of diversity immigrants were from
    Africa and 34 percent were from Europe, while 19 percent of diversity
    immigrants were from Asia, 4 percent from South America, and 1 percent
    from North America. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have consistently
    ranked among the top diversity-visa-sending countries since fiscal year
    1995. Little is known about diversity immigrants once they enter the
    United States, such as whether they remain in the United States,
    petition for other family members to immigrate, and become U.S.
    citizens. There have been very limited attempts by State and the
    Department of Homeland Security to evaluate the effectiveness of the
    program and its impact.

    Several elements of the DV program are vulnerable to fraudulent
    activity committed by and against DV applicants, but State has not
    compiled comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraudulent
    activity. The extent to which these vulnerabilities are exploited
    varies by country, depending on the applicant pool and local
    circumstances. Some of the posts we reviewed indicated that fraudulent
    activity was a major concern, while others did not report serious
    problems. In countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal,
    Nigeria, and Ukraine, consular officers reported that the majority of
    DV applicants, lacking access to a computer or internet savvy, seek
    assistance from "visa agents" or "visa consultants" to enter the
    lottery. While some visa agents perform a legitimate service, others
    take advantage of DV applicants by such means as disseminating
    misleading information on the program, intercepting official
    correspondence from the KCC to the lottery winners, and charging
    exorbitant fees for each step in the DV process. For example, consular
    officers at the U.S. embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh said that some
    unscrupulous visa agents use their own address on DV entries forms so
    that KCC's notification letters are delivered to them instead of to the
    person selected in the lottery. The agents have then, in some cases,
    held these letters for up to $20,000 in ransom, or offered to reduce
    this fee if the legitimate DV winner agreed to marry a person of the
    agent's choosing--who had also paid a fee to the agent--and to add this
    new spouse to the visa application. Consular officers working in the
    U.S. embassies in Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw[Footnote 8] and
    in the U.S. consulate in Lagos said they encountered many of these
    fraudulent DV marriages, termed "pop-ups" since the relationships were
    entered into after the DV applicants had been selected in the lottery.
    Cables from the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to State
    headquarters reported that fraudulent DV couples go to great lengths to
    prove their relationship is legitimate, including backdated marriage
    certificates and staged wedding photographs, and some even incur
    pregnancies for the sake of the visa. Consular officers at six of the
    posts reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and
    Warsaw--reported that the availability of fake documents, or genuine
    documents with false information, such as birth certificates, marriage
    certificates, and passports, presented significant challenges when
    verifying DV applicants' identities and the relationship between the
    principal DV applicants and their spouse and dependents. Despite much
    anecdotal information on DV program fraud and abuse, State has not
    compiled comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraud across all
    DV-issuing posts.

    Although none of the officials at State headquarters in Washington or
    the consular officers at the 11 posts we reviewed considered the DV
    program to be specifically targeted by terrorists, a few said that
    difficulties in verifying visa applicants' identity could have security
    implications. Consular officers' difficulties in verifying the identity
    of some DV applicants, particularly in countries where applicants can
    purchase legitimate identity documents containing fraudulent
    information, could reduce the effectiveness of security screening for
    DV applicants. While consular officers screen all visa applicants for
    security-related concerns, a DV applicant with no previous record in
    U.S. government agency databases or an applicant who is using a false
    identity may not be detected as a potential security concern. A 2002
    cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka stated that the ease with which
    individuals can obtain genuine identity documents in any assumed
    identity, including passports, creates an "open door" for terrorists
    wishing to enter the United States with legal status. The cable also
    stated that name check requirements for visa applicants are useless in
    detecting someone with a newly invented identity, as may be the case
    with many of the post's DV applicants. In 2003, State's IG raised
    concerns that aliens from designated state sponsors of terrorism are
    eligible for the DV program. Since 2000, nearly 9,800 aliens from state
    sponsors of terrorism have received diversity visas. The IG stated that
    the DV program contained significant risks to national security from
    hostile intelligence officers, criminals, and terrorists attempting to
    use the program for entry into the United States as permanent residents
    and recommended that State's Bureau of Consular Affairs propose
    legislation to bar aliens from state sponsors of terrorism. Consular
    Affairs agreed with the recommendation in principle but did not
    implement it, expressing concern over the effect of permanently
    disbarring aliens who may be fleeing oppressive regimes of states that
    sponsor terrorism. The IG later agreed to close the recommendation
    although it had not been implemented. We found no documented evidence
    of DV immigrants from state sponsors of terrorism committing any
    terrorist acts. However, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 9]
    the Department of Homeland Security, terrorism experts, and federal law
    enforcement officials familiar with immigration fraud believe that some
    individuals, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent
    means to enter or remain in the United States.

    State has taken steps to strengthen the DV program, but it does not
    have a strategy to address the pervasive fraud being reported by
    consular officers at some posts. Since 2003, KCC has employed facial
    recognition software to detect multiple entries, implemented an
    electronic application process, and hired a full-time fraud prevention
    manager. KCC employees flag DV cases with fraud indicators before they
    are sent to posts; consular officers can use this information when
    adjudicating DV cases. Posts also conduct fraud investigations on some
    DV cases. These efforts address some of the vulnerabilities within
    State's control, but not all. For instance, DV applicants who are
    selected in the DV lottery receive a notification letter in a large
    white envelope that lists KCC as the return address, which consular
    officers say is highly conspicuous for postal workers or other third
    parties who may intercept the letter and extort money from applicants
    in exchange for it. At the same time, State contends that it is
    restrained from addressing other vulnerabilities by insufficient
    resources and the legislative requirements of the program. For
    instance, the consular chief in Lagos said the consular section did not
    have the resources to conduct all the fraud investigations it would
    like to, and the post's assistant regional security officer for
    investigations position had been vacant since September 2006. Moreover,
    while State believes that some legislative changes could mitigate fraud
    in the DV program, it has not made any formal proposals to this effect.
    Further, it has not compiled data on DV program outcomes and on
    detected and suspected fraud activity in the program, which would help
    decision makers consider whether legislative changes are needed.

    We are recommending that State compile more comprehensive data on the
    DV program, including information on detected or suspected DV fraud and
    data on the amount of fraud prevention resources being spent on DV
    investigations. We also recommend that State use these data to
    formulate a strategy to combat fraud in the DV program. This strategy
    should include proposals for legislative change, if deemed necessary to
    mitigate fraud risks; consideration of appropriate fraud prevention
    resources; and some operational improvements to strengthen the program.

    We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
    Homeland Security for their comments. The Department of Homeland
    Security did not comment on the report. In its written comments, State
    said it was disappointed with the report's findings and did not agree
    with the recommendations. It said that our report did not give the
    department enough credit for steps it has taken to combat fraud in the
    DV program and that our report identified management failures that do
    not exist. While State's comments acknowledge that the DV program faces
    fraud challenges, State also said that there are limits to what the
    department can do. In our report, we give credit to State for making
    several improvements to its fraud screening for DV applicants, such as
    implementing an electronic application process, facial recognition
    software, and flagging DV cases with fraud indicators before they are
    sent to posts. Moreover, our report does not discuss "management
    failures" by State. Our report shows that the DV program has
    significant risks for fraud and that State can mitigate some of these
    risks by more systematically documenting the extent of known fraud in
    the program. Therefore, we continue to recommend that State make
    operational improvements to the program and to propose legislative
    changes, if necessary, to improve its ability to combat fraud.

    Background:

    In 2006, the United States granted permanent admission--or legal
    permanent resident status--to approximately 1.3 million
    aliens.[Footnote 10] Aliens granted legal permanent resident status are
    formally classified as immigrants, and receive a permanent resident
    card commonly referred to as a green card. The Immigration and
    Nationality Act (INA), as amended in 1990, is the primary body of law
    governing immigration and visa operations. According to the act,
    immediate relatives of U.S. citizens[Footnote 11] are granted legal
    permanent resident status without numerical limitation;[Footnote 12] in
    2006, this category represented nearly half of all aliens granted this
    status (see fig. 1). Other legal permanent residents are admitted in
    numerically limited categories, with preference given to aliens who
    have close family relationships to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent
    resident, or who have needed job skills.

    Figure 1: Percentage of Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status
    by Class of Entry, Fiscal Year 2006:

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration
    Statistics; GAO.

    [End of figure]

    The 1990 amendment to the act also established the DV program, which
    authorizes up to 55,000 immigrant visas annually to aliens from
    countries with low rates of immigration to the United States.[Footnote
    13] The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration
    Statistics annually determines regional and country limits for DV
    allocations and notifies State which countries can participate in the
    DV program each fiscal year. All countries are eligible for the DV
    program except those that contributed more than 50,000 family-or
    employment-based immigrants to the U.S. immigrant population over the 5
    preceding years, and each eligible country is limited to 7 percent, or
    3,850, of the total diversity visa limit.[Footnote 14] Sixteen
    countries are ineligible for the 2007 DV program: Canada, China
    (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti,
    India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South
    Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent
    territories, and Vietnam.

    As with all other immigrant visas, DV holders who attain legal
    permanent resident status may petition for certain family members to
    join them in the United States, travel in and out of the country, and
    eventually apply for U.S. citizenship. However, unlike family and
    employment immigrant visa categories, DV applicants do not need a
    petition from a family member or employer in the United States to
    apply. Instead, aliens enter what is commonly referred to as the "visa
    lottery" online during a period of time of at least 30 days as
    established by the State Department each fiscal year. The process for
    obtaining a DV involves several steps, and is administered primarily by
    the State Department (see fig. 2). State's KCC manages the early stages
    of the process, including the DV lottery and case preparation, and
    State's consular officers adjudicate the majority of DV cases at
    overseas posts.[Footnote 15]

    Figure 2: Process for Obtaining a Diversity Visa:

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO analysis of State data; Nova Developments (clip art).

    [A] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant
    or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident
    status through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

    [End of figure]

    The online entry form requires basic personal information as well as a
    digital photograph.[Footnote 16] Aliens may prepare and submit their
    own entries or someone else may prepare and submit the entry for them.
    All family members (spouse and unmarried children under age 21) must be
    listed on the principal entrant's form; these dependents are also
    eligible to apply for a diversity visa if the principal entrant is
    selected in the lottery. Aliens who will obtain diversity visas in
    fiscal year 2008 ("DV-2008") submitted their online entry forms between
    October 4 and December 3, 2006. The KCC received 5.5 million qualified
    entries for the DV-2008 program. KCC screens all entries, and may
    disqualify aliens who entered the lottery more than once. Acceptable
    entries are run through a computer-generated random drawing
    administered by KCC. KCC notifies those entrants selected in the
    lottery by mail;[Footnote 17] the notification letters are sent to the
    mailing address provided on the entry, regardless of who prepared it.
    These letters provide visa application instructions. Aliens whose
    entries were selected in the DV-2008 lottery received notification
    letters from KCC by July 2007. KCC continues to process applications by
    collecting and preparing the selected applicant's key documents until
    the applicant is considered documentarily qualified and is scheduled
    for a visa interview at a consular post abroad.[Footnote 18] For DV-
    2008 applicants, visa adjudication interviews must take place before
    September 30, 2008, because applicants only remain eligible through the
    end of the specific fiscal year for which they were selected; after
    this time, the DV-2008 program will be complete and no more DVs from
    that lottery pool can be issued.

    Although KCC prepares each applicant's case, only consular officers at
    a U.S. embassy or consulate can make the adjudicatory decision whether
    to issue a diversity visa[Footnote 19]. At the DV adjudication
    interview, consular officers must determine that there is a basis for
    immigration (in this case, a winning diversity lottery entry) and that
    the applicant meets the two basic eligibility requirements: applicants
    must (1) be from an eligible DV country,[Footnote 20] and (2)
    demonstrate that they either hold the equivalent of a U.S. high school
    education[Footnote 21] or possess 2 years of work experience in an
    occupation requiring 2 years of training or experience within the 5-
    year period immediately prior to the application.[Footnote 22] Consular
    officers must also verify the relationship between principal DV
    applicants and their dependents. As with all visa applicants, DV
    applicants are subject to all grounds of visa ineligibility such as
    certain adverse medical conditions, criminal behavior, security and
    terrorist concerns, and other factors. Aliens who are granted a DV have
    6 months from the date of issuance to proceed to U.S. ports of entry to
    apply for admission into the United States.

    The DV Program Is Contributing to a Diverse U.S. Immigrant Population,
    but Little Is Known about DV Immigrants Once They Enter the United
    States:

    Data show that the DV program is contributing to the diversification of
    the U.S. immigrant pool. As a result of the program, more than half a
    million aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the
    United States have obtained legal permanent resident status. In fiscal
    year 2006, 40 percent of diversity immigrants were from Africa and 34
    percent were from Europe, while 19 percent of diversity immigrants were
    from Asia, 4 percent from South America, and 1 percent from North
    America. In general, more aliens from the Africa and Europe regions
    immigrate to the United States on a diversity visa than on a family-or
    employment-based immigrant visa, in contrast to immigrants from other
    regions. Since fiscal year 1995, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have
    sent the most diversity immigrants to the United States. While these
    data demonstrate that the DV program has contributed to the
    diversification of the U.S. immigrant pool, little is known about DV
    immigrants after they enter the United States, such as whether they
    remain in the United States and if they petition for family members to
    join them.

    Aliens from Africa and Europe Receive Majority of Diversity Visas:

    Aliens from Africa and Europe receive a greater percentage of
    numerically controlled visas in the diversity visa category than
    immigrants from other regions (see fig. 3).[Footnote 23]

    Figure 3: Percentage of Diversity Visas Compared to Family-and
    Employment-Based Visas by Geographic Region, Fiscal Year 2006:

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration
    Statistics; GAO.

    [End of figure]

    Current U.S. immigration policy favors individuals with family or
    employment ties in the United States, and the DV program seeks to
    provide an opportunity for immigration to aliens from countries that do
    not have high levels of immigration. More than half a million aliens
    from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States have
    obtained legal permanent resident status since the inception of the
    program; these are individuals who may not otherwise have had the
    opportunity to immigrate via family or employment ties. In 2006,
    immigrants from Africa received 40 percent of all diversity visas,
    compared with 3 percent of the family-based and employment-based
    immigrant visas combined. Similarly, immigrants from Europe received 34
    percent of diversity visas issued in 2006, in contrast to 8 percent of
    family-based and employment-based visas combined. Immigrants from North
    America, South America, and Asia received the majority of family-based
    and employment-based visas, and received a smaller percentage of
    diversity visas.

    Since 1996, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine have consistently ranked
    among the top diversity visa sending countries (see table 1). Some
    countries, such as Peru, Poland, and Russia, are ineligible for the DV-
    2008 program due to their recent high immigration volume.[Footnote 24]
    In such cases, State refers to countries as having "graduated" from the
    program.

    Table 1: Top 10 Countries of Origin for Diversity Visa Immigrants,
    Fiscal Years 1995-2006:

    1;
    Country of birth[A]: Ethiopia;
    1995: 2,656;
    1996: 3,240;
    1997: 2,880;
    1998: 2,090;
    1999: 2,190;
    2000: 1,777;
    2001: 2,194;
    2002: 3,994;
    2003: 3,381;
    2004: 4,517;
    2005: 3,427;
    2006: 3,357;
    Total: 35,703.

    2;
    Country of birth[A]: Nigeria;
    1995: 2,408;
    1996: 4,359;
    1997: 2,605;
    1998: 3,185;
    1999: 3,112;
    2000: 2,821;
    2001: 2,684;
    2002: 2,279;
    2003: 3,119;
    2004: 2,959;

    2005: 2,379;
    2006: 2,942;
    Total: 34,852.

    3;
    Country of birth[A]: Ukraine;
    1995: 1,068;
    1996: 2,328;
    1997: 1,660;
    1998: 2,095;
    1999: 3,091;
    2000: 3,969;
    2001: 2,748;
    2002: 3,028;
    2003: 3,033;
    2004: 2,975;
    2005: 2,745;
    2006: 3,282;
    Total: 32,022.

    4;
    Country of birth[A]: Albania;
    1995: 597;
    1996: 2,400;
    1997: 3,474;
    1998: 3,403;
    1999: 3,114;
    2000: 3,909;
    2001: 3,295;
    2002: 2,566;
    2003: 1,915;
    2004: 2,075;
    2005: 2,438;
    2006: 1,500;
    Total: 30,686.

    5;
    Country of birth[A]: Bulgaria;
    1995: 1,000;
    1996: 985;
    1997: 1,843;
    1998: 2,924;
    1999: 3,390;
    2000: 3,657;
    2001: 2,611;
    2002: 1,808;
    2003: 2,486;
    2004: 2,342;
    2005: 2,854;
    2006: 1,631;
    Total: 27,531.

    6;
    Country of birth[A]: Poland[B];
    1995: 4,915;
    1996: 3,444;
    1997: 3,418;
    1998: 391;
    1999: 36;
    2000: 24;
    2001: 22;
    2002: 2,486;
    2003: 2,568;
    2004: 2,850;
    2005: 3,259;
    2006: 2,100;
    Total: 25,513.

    7;
    Country of birth[A]: Bangladesh;
    1995: 1,920;
    1996: 3,753;
    1997: 3,080;
    1998: 2,835;
    1999: 1,697;
    2000: 1,719;
    2001: 1,508;
    2002: 1,104;
    2003: 745;
    2004: 1,756;
    2005: 1,753;
    2006: 3,093;
    Total: 24,963.

    8;
    Country of birth[A]: Romania;
    1995: 1,992;
    1996: 2,321;
    1997: 2,378;
    1998: 2,620;
    1999: 2,862;
    2000: 2,867;
    2001: 1,953;
    2002: 981;
    2003: 1,202;
    2004: 1,145;
    2005: 1,585;
    2006: 1,207;
    Total: 23,113.

    9;
    Country of birth[A]: Egypt;
    1995: 2,230;
    1996: 2,219;
    1997: 1,652;
    1998: 1,786;
    1999: 1,536;
    2000: 1,506;
    2001: 1,123;
    2002: 1,161;
    2003: 923;
    2004: 1,643;
    2005: 2,478;
    2006: 3,727;
    Total: 21,984.

    10;
    Country of birth[A]: Ghana;
    1995: 1,338;
    1996: 3,933;
    1997: 2,350;
    1998: 2,156;
    1999: 1,734;
    2000: 1,737;
    2001: 1,120;
    2002: 1,217;
    2003: 1,577;
    2004: 1,152;
    2005: 1,049;
    2006: 1,129;
    Total: 20,492.

    Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration
    Statistics.

    [A] Although State's rules of cross-chargeability allow DV applicants
    to claim a country other than their country of birth as their native
    country, the numbers in this table count DV immigrants by country of
    birth, as reported by DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics.

    [B] Poland's eligibility for the DV program has fluctuated. As noted
    previously, State's rules of cross-chargeability would allow a spouse
    or child of a DV applicant who was born in Poland to claim the country
    of the principal DV applicant as their native country. Some DVs were
    issued to aliens whose country of birth is Poland but who claimed
    another country as their native country in years when Poland was
    ineligible for the program.

    [End of table]

    Little Is Known About Diversity Immigrants Once They Enter the United
    States:

    Although the DV program has helped some countries to increase
    immigration to the point where the country has graduated from the
    program, very little is known about DV immigrants after they arrive in
    the United States. For example, neither State nor the Department of
    Homeland Security has done a specific study on DV immigrants after they
    enter the United States, such as whether they remain in the United
    States and if they petition for family members to join them. Therefore,
    it is difficult to determine to what extent the DV program contributed
    to a country's graduating from the program or whether the country
    graduated from the program because of other factors.

    Similarly, it is unclear whether DV program requirements provide
    sufficient grounds for DV immigrants to lead successful lives in the
    United States. In 2003, the State Department compiled a report that
    described certain demographics of DV recipients in that year. The study
    illustrated characteristics of DV recipients' gender, age, level of
    education, work experience, and marriage status, and reported that the
    "typical" DV recipient was a male professional, aged 26-30, holding a
    university degree. The study also pointed to certain demographics that
    varied across regions; for instance, more DV recipients from the Europe
    region were married than those from the Africa region. While the 2003
    study provided useful information regarding DV recipients, we asked
    Department of Homeland Security and State officials whether a similar
    study had been done on DV recipients once they became legal permanent
    residents in the United States, and they did not know of any such
    study.

    The DV Program Is Vulnerable to Fraudulent Activity Committed by and
    Against Applicants, but State Has Not Compiled Comprehensive Data on
    Detected or Suspected Fraudulent Activity:

    Some DV applicants commit fraud in an effort to obtain a diversity visa
    or are themselves the victims of fraud perpetrated by an unscrupulous
    "visa industry.[Footnote 25]" The extent of fraudulent activity varies
    by post and is influenced by the applicant pool and local country
    conditions. In our review of 11 DV-issuing posts, consular officers at
    5 posts--Accra, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Dhaka, and Warsaw[Footnote 26]--
    reported that fraudulent activity was a major challenge in adjudicating
    visas for DV applicants. These 5 posts all ranked in the top 10
    countries with the most DV entrants worldwide in 2006. Consular
    officers at the other 6 posts reported some challenges with the program
    but not as pervasive as the posts listed above. The problems of fraud
    and abuse as reported by consular officers in Accra, Addis Ababa,
    Lagos, Dhaka, and Warsaw are often rooted in the fact that a majority
    of the DV applicants at those posts sought assistance from the visa
    industry to enter the lottery. In so doing, they are sometimes extorted
    for large sums of money or coerced into sham marriages by unscrupulous
    entities in this industry. In addition, consular officers at these 5
    posts said that fraud activity made it challenging to verify
    applicants' identity and eligibility, and that detecting fraudulent DV
    marriages also presented a challenge. Despite much anecdotal
    information on DV program fraud and abuse, the State Department has not
    compiled data on detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing
    posts.

    Many Applicants Do Not Receive Accurate Information and Do Not Apply
    Independently for the DV Lottery:

    Consular officers at 6 of the 11 posts we reviewed reported that many
    of the applicants they see at DV adjudication interviews entered the DV
    program with high expectations but little understanding of the
    program's rules. State publishes detailed information on the DV program
    at [hyperlink, http://www.travel.state.gov], and many embassies and
    consulates that process diversity visas also post DV program details on
    their individual web sites, frequently in the host country's language.
    In addition, 8 of the 11 posts we reviewed conduct public outreach
    through press conferences, TV and radio information sessions, or flyers
    to educate potential applicants about the program. State's official 17-
    page instruction packet lists detailed information on the program and
    informs applicants that it is free to enter the lottery, and that the
    U.S. government does not employ any outside consultants or private
    services to operate the DV program.

    However, consular officers and public diplomacy officers at six posts
    reported that many applicants do not learn about the DV program details
    from State, but rather from other sources, such as from family and
    friends in their local community or from the visa industry--self-styled
    "visa consultants" and "visa agents" who have no official connection to
    the U.S. government. Consular officers remarked that the visa industry
    is very active in countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal,
    Nigeria, and Ukraine. Consular officers at the U.S. embassy in
    Kathmandu reported that visa consultancy is a "booming" business in
    Nepal. An October 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Kiev to State
    headquarters reported that visa consultancy businesses in western
    Ukraine (a poor, rural region that provides the majority of Ukrainian
    DV applicants) constantly advertise in local newspapers and on
    billboards; two such businesses had office buildings decorated with
    large American flags. An August 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in
    Accra to State headquarters noted that visa consultants targeted
    university students as potential clients and set up information tables
    on university campuses to enroll students into the DV lottery. Consular
    officers in Accra and Lagos said that visa consultants advertised with
    banners around town, and officers in Kathmandu suspected that it was
    visa consultants who ripped down banners that the U.S. embassy put up
    in major cities in Nepal, announcing how to get free information on the
    DV program. Not only do visa consultants charge for information that
    State provides for free, but many consular officers said that they also
    give out inaccurate or misleading information. The former consular
    chief in Katmandu, who spoke with us in May 2007, weeks after finishing
    his posting, said that his post's biggest challenge was counteracting
    the incorrect information the visa industry put out.

    Consular officers in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, and
    Ukraine estimated that the majority of the DV applicants at their posts
    sought assistance from this visa industry to enter the DV lottery. They
    cited the lack of personal computers and internet savvy as among the
    reasons for this. For example, according to the U.S. embassy in Dhaka,
    Bangladesh has one of the lowest internet access and usage rates in the
    world, yet it has provided the highest number of principal entrants,
    not including dependents, into the DV lottery in 2006, 2007, and
    2008[Footnote 27]; a December 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka
    attributed Bangladesh's large number of entrants solely to the visa
    industry. Some visa consultants offer legitimate help, such as
    preparing and submitting DV entry forms, but several consular officers
    said many also encourage unqualified applicants to enter the DV
    lottery, submit multiple or incorrect entries, and take advantage of
    their clients in a multitude of ways. A May 2006 cable from the U.S.
    embassy in Addis Ababa noted that it is the applicants' responsibility
    to ensure accuracy of their lottery entry, but, in Ethiopia, many
    applicants have little control over their entry when it is being
    handled by visa agents, and no alternative way to enter other than
    through the visa industry.

    Consular officers at several posts said that they encountered
    unqualified and misinformed applicants. Some applicants did not
    understand that "winning" the lottery did not guarantee them a visa,
    but rather provided them with an opportunity to apply for one. One
    consular officer in Accra noted that some applicants were confused by
    KCC's notification letter since the first word of the letter says
    "congratulations." A February 2007 cable from Kathmandu noted that DV
    applicants thought the visa interview was a mere formality. A consular
    officer in Lagos said that some applicants think they just need to stop
    by the embassy to pick up their visa. Other officers reported that some
    applicants believe that, in addition to a visa, they will get a free
    house and car in the United States. Consular officers reported that
    these misconceptions are problematic since unqualified applicants will
    proceed with their applications despite the considerable expense
    associated with it (the total cost, per person, for DV adjudication is
    $755, whether or not the adjudication results in visa issuance[Footnote
    28]. Officers processing DVs in low income countries such as
    Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria[Footnote 29] said that applicants raised
    the fee through a variety of ways, including taking out loans, selling
    property, and collecting money from networks of extended family and
    friends.

    Some Applicants Who Seek Assistance from the Visa Industry Are
    Defrauded:

    While seeking assistance from visa agents or consultants, some
    applicants are cheated and abused by unscrupulous entities[Footnote 30]
    within this visa industry. Consular officers at six posts we reviewed-
    -Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw--provided
    examples of such abuse. As mentioned above, some visa consultants
    encourage people to enter the DV program regardless of their
    eligibility, and charge fees for each step of the process. Consular
    officers in Addis Ababa, Kathmandu, and Warsaw said that visa agents
    often filled out applicants' DV entry forms incorrectly--failing to
    list all family members or listing incorrect biographic data--which
    disqualified otherwise eligible applicants when they came to their visa
    interview. Consular officers in Dhaka said that many of their DV
    applicants could not read Western script; if given the chance to review
    their entry form, they could not tell whether visa consultants had
    filled in their biographic information correctly. Consular officers at
    these six posts estimated that visa consultants' fees ranged from
    nominal amounts for assistance in entering the lottery to exorbitant
    sums if an applicant is selected in the lottery.

    Consular officers in Accra, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw cited issues with
    KCC's notification letters that contributed to such abuse. They said
    that visa agents frequently list their own address on the lottery entry
    so that the notification letter comes directly to them, giving them
    control over the application. With the winning notification letter in
    hand, the agents can then demand thousands of dollars from the
    applicant in exchange for the letter; an August 2006 cable from the
    U.S. embassy in Accra cited an example where agents charged $2,500 for
    such an exchange, while consular officers in Dhaka suspected that the
    fee could range between $10,000 and $20,000. In our observation of DV
    adjudication interviews in Warsaw, consular officers pointed out
    several applicants whose applications did not list their own personal
    address, but rather the same P.O. box in Ukraine, which the officers
    attributed to a visa facilitator. An October 2006 cable from Warsaw
    noted that hundreds of Ukrainian DV applications were linked to the
    same P.O. box. Moreover, consular officers in Bangladesh and Nepal said
    that some letters, which conspicuously bear a U.S. postmark and KCC's
    return address, were intercepted by postal employees or stolen out of
    the mail, resulting in the letter being held for ransom. Also, some
    visa agents enter individuals into the DV lottery without their
    knowledge. For example, consular officers in Ukraine told us they
    suspected that visa agents bribe local officials for biographic data to
    enter potentially qualified applicants without their knowledge, and
    then attempt to extort money in exchange for the notification letter if
    one of the applicants is selected in the lottery. A March 2007 cable
    from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka noted that, in Bangladesh, visa agents
    posted fake job advertisements to collect biographic data and enter
    individuals without their knowledge. If one of these individuals won
    the lottery, the visa agent would either extort money in exchange for
    the notification letter or threaten to steal the individual's identity.
    A consular officer in Dhaka said that the diversity visa is referred to
    as the "Visa of Tears" by some Bangladeshis because of the suffering
    associated with it.

    Fraud Activity Makes It Challenging to Verify DV Applicants' Identity
    and Eligibility at Some Posts:

    Once applicants proceed to an embassy or consulate for their visa
    adjudication interview, consular officers must be able to confirm that
    the person at the visa interview is the same person listed on the DV
    winning entry, and therefore the legitimate applicant for the visa.
    However, in 6 of the 11 posts we reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka,
    Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw--consular officers said that unreliable
    local documents made verifying DV applicants' identity a challenge.
    Officers in Accra, Dhaka, and Lagos said that applicants' identity
    documents could not be trusted because legitimate, authentic documents
    could be purchased with fraudulent information on them. In addition,
    the posts in Kathmandu and Warsaw sent cables to State headquarters to
    report that DV applicants could purchase authentic identity documents
    with false information from corrupt government officials. Consular
    officers in Accra, Dhaka, and Lagos noted that many applicants did not
    have birth certificates prior to their DV application and only procured
    them for the purpose of their DV application. These officers believed
    that some may have obtained birth certificates with fraudulent
    information. Moreover, 5 posts reported that visa consultants offer
    fraudulent documents as part of their services. A cable from Accra
    noted that Ghanaian police raided a travel agency suspected of fraud
    and found blank forms for passports, birth certificates, and other
    civil documents, as well as receipts for "DV consultations" ranging
    from $300 to $7,000. According to a Warsaw cable, Ukrainian DV
    applicants said that corrupt government officials in Ukraine were
    collaborating with visa facilitators to provide fraudulent documents.
    In Dhaka, consular officers suspected that visa facilitators use the
    availability of fake documents to substitute imposters in DV cases
    under their control if they cannot receive sufficient payment from the
    real applicant.

    In addition to verifying that an applicant is a native of an eligible
    DV country, consular officers must determine whether the applicant
    meets the education or work experience requirement for the diversity
    visa. However, in five of the posts we reviewed, consular officers
    reported that some applicants tried to claim education or work
    experience they did not possess. For example, consular officers in
    Dhaka said that DV applicants presented handwritten education documents
    that could be easily forged or altered, and reported that school
    officials were willing to issue authentic documents with false
    information. At several posts, consular officers referred questionable
    documents to the consular section's fraud prevention unit for further
    review; for example, the fraud prevention unit in Accra verified
    education documents with school authorities in Ghana. The fraud
    prevention unit in Lagos found that most of the documents were
    authentic, but suspected that legitimate education credentials masked a
    deeper problem of widespread cheating in school-leaving examinations.
    In cases where applicants applied for the DV with their work
    experience, officers reported several cases of applicants' using fake
    credentials and job letters. Moreover, the officers reported that some
    were coached by visa consultants on how to fake knowledge of work
    experience they did not possess.

    Fraudulent DV Marriages Present a Challenge at Several Posts:

    The DV program rules require applicants to list all family
    members[Footnote 31] on their original entry form. Due to the extended
    time between the lottery entry and the visa interview at post, some
    applicants marry and have children after their initial DV entry, and
    these new beneficiaries are added to the principal DV winner's
    application. At some posts, verifying the legitimacy of these new
    relationships did not pose a problem. However, at 5 of the 11 posts we
    reviewed--Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw--consular
    officers reported that verifying these relationships, referred to as
    "pop-ups," was a major fraud challenge[Footnote 32]. Consular officers
    in Accra and Addis Ababa said that relationship fraud was their biggest
    fraud challenge in DV processing. In Addis Ababa, for example, marrying
    a DV lottery winner in an attempt to obtain an immigrant visa has
    become so common that the term "DV marriage" has entered the local
    lexicon. Officers in Accra estimated that up to 50 percent of DV
    adjudications there involve a "pop-up" spouse; officers in Addis Ababa
    said that the percentage of sham DV marriages at their post could be as
    high as 90 percent and a cable from the post stated that DV-related
    marriage fraud was "rampant." Officers speculated that some applicants
    entered into a DV marriage to help a friend or another family member,
    even a sibling, obtain an immigrant visa. According to officers in
    Addis Ababa, Accra, and Lagos, applicants engaging in sham marriages
    rely on backdated marriage certificates, fake supporting documentation,
    and staged wedding pictures to try to prove their marriage is
    legitimate. An officer in Accra said that the prevalence of customary
    marriages in Ghana, in which there is no official documentation of the
    union, complicates matters since even legitimate couples may only
    acquire a marriage certificate after winning the DV lottery. The custom
    of arranged marriage in Nepal and Bangladesh makes it challenging for
    officers to sort out legitimate arranged marriages from those arranged
    solely for immigration purposes.

    Consular officers and cables from Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw cited
    the involvement of the visa industry in organizing fake DV marriages.
    The officers in Addis Ababa believed that arranging DV marriages was
    the greatest money maker for visa agents. If an applicant cannot pay a
    visa agent's exorbitant fees, a lesser fee can be arranged if the
    applicant marries a person who has also paid a fee to the agent. The
    visa agents provide the new couples with fake documentation to
    establish the marriage and coach them on how to answer questions about
    the relationship in the visa interview. Officers in Warsaw obtained a
    "cheat sheet" from some Ukrainian applicants detailing how to prepare
    for the consular officer's questions. Moreover, the fraud prevention
    unit at the U.S. embassy in Ukraine learned of a visa consultancy in
    western Ukraine that offered, for approximately $14,500, to set up a
    fake marriage between a client and a DV winner. The arrangement was
    based on fake documents and months of preparation before the visa
    interview. If the couple's visa application was denied, most of the
    money would be returned to the client.

    Considerable Anecdotal Evidence Exists, but State Lacks Comprehensive
    Data on DV Fraud:

    State has considerable anecdotal evidence on fraudulent activity
    committed by and against DV applicants, but has not compiled
    comprehensive data on detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing
    posts. For example, posts such as Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, and Warsaw
    have summarized DV fraud trends in cables, consular packages, and other
    reports sent to State headquarters, but the information is largely
    qualitative and it is difficult to gauge what percentage of DV
    applicants are implicated in fraud. Although the KCC collects data on
    the number of cases with potential fraud indicators, it is only when
    cases are adjudicated at consular posts that the fraud can be
    investigated more fully and determined to be factual and material to
    the case. While some consular officers we spoke with had estimates of
    such things as the number of cases with suspected "pop-up" spouses and
    the percentage of applicants who had been assisted by visa agents, none
    said they had developed comprehensive data on detected or suspected DV
    fraud at their post. Officials from Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud
    Prevention Programs (FPP) said that they could not gauge the extent of
    DV fraud overall and that they did not analyze DV fraud in isolation,
    as their fraud prevention initiatives were aimed at combating all types
    of visa fraud, regardless of category. However, they said they had
    recently implemented fraud tracking software to collect more data from
    posts, such as when an officer suspected that fraudulent documents were
    used or when officers referred a DV case to the post's fraud prevention
    unit. An FPP official shared some preliminary results from the first
    three quarters of fiscal year 2007: 31 DV-issuing posts had referred
    1081 DV cases to the posts' fraud prevention units. Eight of these
    posts had each referred more than 60 cases to their fraud prevention
    unit; Dhaka had referred 121 cases and Warsaw had referred 173. The
    official said that FPP was still working out some glitches with the
    fraud tracking program, but was hopeful that the data collected could
    clarify where DV fraud was most prevalent.

    Difficulties in Verifying the Identity of Some DV Applicants May Have
    Security Implications:

    Although none of the officials at State headquarters or the consular
    officers at the 11 posts we interviewed considered the DV program to be
    specifically targeted by terrorists, a few said that the challenge of
    verifying DV applicants' identity could have security implications. The
    State IG has also raised concerns that natives of state sponsors of
    terrorism are eligible to participate in the DV program.

    Prevalence of Identity Fraud at Some Posts Could Reduce Effectiveness
    of Security Screening:

    Consular officers' difficulties in verifying the identity of some DV
    applicants, particularly in countries where applicants can purchase
    legitimate identity documents containing fraudulent information, could
    reduce the effectiveness of security screening for DV applicants.
    Consular officers screen all visa applicants for security-related
    concerns. Each applicant's name is checked against State's Consular
    Lookout and Support System, which contains records provided by numerous
    agencies and includes information on persons with visa refusals,
    immigration violations, and terrorism concerns. Consular officers also
    collect applicants' fingerprints at the visa interview and run them
    through U.S. databases of criminals and terrorists. In some cases--for
    instance, if the applicant's name generates a hit in the Consular
    Lookout and Support System, or if the applicant's nationality,
    background, or intentions in the United States warrant further
    information--the consular officer is required to request a security
    advisory opinion for the applicant, which is sent back to Washington
    where multiple agencies collect and review additional information on
    the applicant. Despite these security checks, a DV applicant with no
    previous record in U.S. government agency databases or an applicant who
    is using a false identity may not be detected as a potential security
    concern. Criminals or terrorists with no record in U.S. government
    agency databases could potentially contact an unscrupulous visa agent
    and arrange to be added to a DV applicant's case as a "pop-up" spouse.
    A 2002 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka stated that the ease with
    which individuals can obtain genuine identity documents in any assumed
    identity, including passports, creates an "open door" for terrorists
    wishing to enter the United States with legal status. The cable noted
    that 99 percent of DV applicants' identity documents were issued after
    the applicant had been selected in the lottery and that, despite
    officers' diligent compliance with name check requirements, these
    checks were useless in detecting someone with a newly invented
    identity. Similarly, a consular officer in Kathmandu said that official
    documents could be purchased or fabricated in Nepal, and this officer
    was concerned that a terrorist from another country would obtain a
    Nepalese passport with a false identity. He noted the importance of
    locally engaged staff working in the consular section who could help
    with detecting imposters, such as by recognizing that the applicant
    spoke Nepali with a foreign accent.

    Consular officers at some posts said that determining whether DV
    applicants have a criminal background, which may make them ineligible
    to receive a visa, was challenging in countries where the police
    certificates were unreliable.[Footnote 33] Consular officers in Accra,
    Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw considered the police certificates
    "worthless" because they had never seen one with derogatory information
    on an applicant. Officers in Lagos suspected that inadequate record
    keeping and the ease of bribing police officers were to blame.

    Aliens from Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism
    Eligible for DV Program:

    Aliens from state sponsors of terrorism are eligible to apply for and
    receive a diversity visa, and since fiscal year 2000, nearly 9,800
    aliens from state sponsors of terrorism have received diversity visas
    (see table 2).

    Table 2: Diversity Visa Recipients from Countries Designated as State
    Sponsors of Terrorism, Fiscal Years 2000-2006:

    Country of birth: Cuba;
    2000: 712;
    2001: 429;
    2002: 425;
    2003: 214;
    2004: 298;
    2005: 371;
    2006: 314;
    Total: 2,763.

    Country of birth: Iran;
    2000: 355;
    2001: 333;
    2002: 695;
    2003: 478;
    2004: 349;
    2005: 407;
    2006: 547;
    Total: 3,164.

    Country of birth: North Korea;
    2000: -;
    2001: -;
    2002: -;
    2003: -;
    2004: -;
    2005: -;
    2006: -;
    Total: -.

    Country of birth: Sudan;
    2000: 1,033;
    2001: 719;
    2002: 629;
    2003: 420;
    2004: 351;
    2005: 248;
    2006: 303;
    Total: 3,703.

    Country of birth: Syria;
    2000: 38;
    2001: 34;
    2002: 27;
    2003: 20;
    2004: -;
    2005: 19;
    2006: 24;
    Total: 162.

    Country of birth: Total;
    2000: 2,138;
    2001: 1,515;
    2002: 1,776;
    2003: 1,132;
    2004: 998;
    2005: 1,045;
    2006: 1,188;
    Total: 9,792.

    Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration
    Statistics; GAO.

    [End of table]

    In a 2003 report on the DV program, the State IG noted that, while
    aliens from state sponsors of terrorism can only be issued nonimmigrant
    visas in limited circumstances, no parallel restriction exists for
    diversity visas. Because of this, and because of the program's
    vulnerability to fraud, the State IG said the DV program contained
    significant risks to national security from hostile intelligence
    officers, criminals, and terrorists attempting to use the program for
    entry into the United States as permanent residents. The State IG
    recommended that the Bureau of Consular Affairs propose changes to the
    INA to bar aliens from state sponsors of terrorism from the DV
    application process. Consular Affairs agreed with the recommendation in
    principle but did not implement it, expressing concern over the effect
    of permanently disbarring aliens who may be fleeing oppressive regimes
    of states that sponsor terrorism. The IG later agreed to close the
    recommendation although it had not been implemented.

    As we have previously reported,[Footnote 34] the Department of Homeland
    Security, terrorism experts, and federal law enforcement officials
    familiar with immigration fraud believe that some individuals,
    including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter
    or remain in the United States. We found no documented evidence of DV
    immigrants from state sponsors of terrorism committing terrorist acts.
    However, two of the four consular officers adjudicating diversity visas
    at the U.S. embassy in Ankara, Turkey,[Footnote 35] where some DV
    applicants from Iran are adjudicated, said that it was somewhat
    difficult to verify Iranian identity documents. Although they said that
    the vast majority of Iranian applicants are subject to security
    advisory opinions, the regional security officer in Ankara considered
    it possible for Iranian intelligence officers to pose as DV applicants
    and not be detected by the post's security screening if their identity
    was not already known to U.S. intelligence. Although this is an
    inherent risk with applicants from all countries, the regional security
    officer noted that it was difficult to mitigate this risk for Iranian
    applicants since the United States does not have a diplomatic presence
    in Iran.

    State Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the DV Program, but Does Not Have a
    Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Reported by Consular Officers at
    Some Posts:

    State has taken steps to address some weaknesses in the DV program, but
    it does not have a strategy to address pervasive fraud being reported
    by consular officers at some posts. Since 2003, KCC has improved its
    detection of multiple DV entries and of potential fraud indicators.
    Consular officers at the 11 posts we reviewed described a variety of
    fraud prevention measures aimed at combating DV fraud, but some of the
    posts are limited by resource constraints. These efforts address some
    of the program's vulnerabilities, but State does not have a strategy to
    address the pervasive DV fraud being reported by posts such as Accra,
    Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw. State consular officials believe
    that some legislative changes could make it easier for State to
    mitigate fraud in the DV program--such as raising the education
    eligibility requirement--but State has not made any formal proposals to
    this effect.

    KCC Has Improved Its Detection of Multiple Lottery Entries and
    Potential Fraud Indicators:

    KCC has made several improvements to its processing of the DV lottery
    entries to detect multiple entries and to screen cases for possible
    fraud indicators before they are sent to consular posts for
    adjudication. KCC piloted facial recognition software in 2001 and, in
    2003, moved to an electronic application process, known as e-DV. Both
    facial recognition and e-DV improve KCC's ability to detect multiple
    entries and to detect possible fraud indicators. Prior to this, the DV
    lottery was paper-based, which made it difficult for KCC employees to
    catch multiple entries. Now, all e-DV entries go through electronic and
    manual procedures to screen out ineligible entries. The entries are
    screened electronically for exact duplicate digital photographs or
    biographic information; exact duplicates are disqualified. Next, all
    principal applicant entries selected in the lottery are checked with
    facial recognition software against galleries (by region and by gender)
    drawn from the entire e-DV database to further eliminate duplicate
    entries based on photo matches. Possible matches are returned to KCC's
    facial recognition technicians, who then make a determination on
    whether or not a valid match exists. KCC reported that it detected
    7,622 multiple entries in 2005, 7,166 in 2006, and 3,969 in 2007. KCC's
    fraud prevention manager attributed the decreasing number to the
    success of facial recognition software, suggesting that applicants and
    visa industry consultants were not submitting as many multiple entries
    because they had learned that KCC would detect and disqualify them.

    If KCC's facial recognition technicians detect multiple entries before
    the entrant has been notified of being selected in the lottery, KCC
    will disqualify the entry and not notify the entrant of the
    disqualification. In the past, KCC disqualified the entrant and sent a
    disqualification letter to the entrant regardless of whether the
    entrant had already been sent a notification letter. Consular Affairs'
    legal department requested KCC to cease disqualification of entrants
    who had already been notified as this could be perceived as an
    adjudicatory decision by KCC.[Footnote 36] KCC now forwards the
    information on the facial recognition match to the post so the consular
    officer can make the decision.

    In addition to facial recognition software, KCC employees search for
    other fraud indicators as they collect additional documents from
    individuals selected in the lottery and prepare to send their cases to
    posts for adjudication. For example, they note, through "fraud flags,"
    if applicants (1) added a spouse or children to their case after being
    selected in the lottery, (2) if there were substantial changes to
    biographic details, or (3) if the applicant appeared in a different
    entry with different family members. In their scan of applicants
    selected in the 2005 DV program, KCC employees found 804 "pop-up"
    spouses or children; applicants from Ghana, Nigeria, and Ukraine had
    more "pop-ups" than any other country. KCC's fraud flags are noted in
    both the electronic and hard copy files that are sent to posts, and
    several of the consular officers at the posts we reviewed said that the
    fraud flags were useful for their adjudication of DV cases. With the
    advent of e-DV it also became possible to provide an electronic
    comparison of the applicant's lottery entry photograph to the
    photograph submitted with the visa application so that consular
    officers can review and compare these photographs. This process has
    assisted numerous posts in identification of imposters. Finally, in
    2004, KCC hired a full-time fraud prevention manager, who oversees
    fraud prevention programs for both the DV program and petition-based
    nonimmigrant visa programs, which are also processed at the KCC. In
    commenting on this report, State mentioned some additional tools it
    uses to prevent DV fraud, such as fraud conferences and fraud
    prevention management training which include DV patterns and issues.

    Posts Combat DV Fraud with Various Fraud Prevention Measures, but Some
    Face Resource Constraints:

    All of the 11 DV-processing posts we reviewed use various resources to
    combat DV-related fraud, both to warn DV applicants about visa industry
    scams and to detect fraudulent activity by DV applicants. Consular
    officers in Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lagos, and Warsaw said that
    they conduct extensive public diplomacy campaigns to educate DV
    applicants about the program and to warn them about unscrupulous visa
    consultants. For example, the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa distributed
    100,000 color flyers throughout Ethiopia, printed in six local
    languages, and ran many advertisements in local newspapers to exhort DV
    applicants not to be fooled by the visa industry and warn that fake
    marriages will not go undetected by consular officers. Similarly,
    consular officers in Accra and Lagos have conducted numerous interviews
    and press conferences to educate applicants about the DV program and to
    warn them against scams. The post in Kathmandu reported it undertakes
    extensive outreach to ensure that potential DV applicants have
    information on the program, and is planning even more aggressive public
    outreach for the future. Moreover, officers at several posts described
    efforts they took to warn applicants not to proceed with the visa
    interview unless they were qualified. For example, the consular
    sections in Accra, Ankara, and Kathmandu post signs next to the
    cashier's window, reminding applicants of the DV eligibility
    requirements and that the $755 fee is not refundable. Consular officers
    in Dhaka brief DV applicants in the waiting room every morning to
    remind them of the requirements, the consequences of committing fraud,
    and that the fee is nonrefundable. However, consular officers
    consistently said that some DV applicants still hold misconceptions;
    the officers suspect that they do not trust information they receive
    from the U.S. government, preferring to trust members of their own
    community as sources of information.

    In addition to public diplomacy efforts, DV posts also use a variety of
    antifraud tools to combat fraud after the applicant has come to the
    post for visa adjudication. Consular officers review the applicant's
    documents, along with any fraud notes from KCC, and scrutinize the
    applicant during the visa interview. The consular chief in Dhaka said
    the post's best antifraud tool is good interviewing skills. In Accra,
    Addis Ababa, and Warsaw, officers conduct split interviews for couples
    suspected of marriage fraud. Questionable cases are referred to the
    post's fraud prevention unit for further review.[Footnote 37] These
    units investigate the facts of the case, such as by calling school
    boards to see if the education certificate is legitimate, or conducting
    field investigations to see if an applicant's marriage is legitimate.
    Some posts also receive assistance from their regional security office,
    and some receive limited cooperation from local law enforcement. A
    consular officer in Accra said that the embassy made three DV fraud
    ring busts along with the help of local police, and in Lagos, the
    consulate reported that its fraud prevention unit was working with the
    Nigerian authorities to prosecute several DV applicants who had
    admitted to marriage fraud.

    Several officers said that DV fraud investigations were resource-
    intense, and others said that they were restricted by limited
    resources. A May 2006 cable from the post in Addis Ababa to State
    headquarters stated that consular officers and fraud investigators had
    spent thousands of hours trying to sift out real marriages from the
    many fraudulent ones, and thousands of dollars each year verifying
    marriage certificates and conducting field investigations. Consular
    officers in Accra said that the post stopped doing field investigations
    on suspected DV sham marriages because they were so resource-intense
    and not productive; for example, in many cases, when investigators from
    the embassy went to neighborhoods to check on marriages, they found
    neighbors complicit and willing to back up the couple's story. In
    Lagos, the consular chief said that the section did not have the
    resources to carry out all the fraud investigations it would like to,
    although the post had reclassified the fraud prevention manager's
    position so that it would next be filled by a midlevel officer, instead
    of an entry-level officer, which is currently the case. An official in
    the post's regional security office said the office was so short on
    resources that it did not have the time or budget to help the consular
    section, and while Lagos had an assistant regional security officer for
    investigations position, the slot has been vacant since September 2006.
    Accra does not have an assistant regional security officer for
    investigations position.

    The U.S. embassy in Kiev has an assistant regional security officer for
    investigations, and the fraud prevention unit at the embassy works with
    the consular section at the embassy in Warsaw on Ukrainian DV fraud.
    Officers from the unit reported success with DV field investigations
    conducted in the past year; 16 of 19 investigations confirmed evidence
    of fraud. However, those same officials told us they were concerned
    that they would get less cooperation from local officials in Ukraine in
    future investigations. The immigrant visa section chief in Warsaw said
    that increased funding for field investigations would be the best way
    to improve DV processing. The U.S. embassy in Dhaka also has a busy
    fraud prevention unit and an assistant regional security officer for
    investigations whom consular officers said was very helpful with DV
    fraud investigations. In a March 2007 cable to State headquarters and
    the KCC, the post said that its fraud prevention efforts would be
    greatly enhanced if it had more information on visa facilitator
    patterns; the post wanted lists of duplicate entries that might provide
    more information to track visa facilitators.

    State Lacks a Strategy to Address Pervasive Fraud Activity Reported by
    Some Posts:

    Despite the efforts made both by KCC and individual DV-processing
    posts, State does not have a strategy to address the serious DV fraud
    being reported by posts such as Accra, Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and
    Warsaw. Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs (FPP) has
    suggested some ways to address the problems caused by unscrupulous visa
    agents, but it has not fully developed these initiatives. For example,
    in order to prevent applicants' notification letters from being stolen,
    officials from FPP said that they were considering alternate ways of
    notifying DV applicants in countries such as Ukraine and Bangladesh,
    but that a strategy had yet to be implemented. Some consular officers
    we interviewed suggested that the KCC should send the notification
    letter in an unmarked envelope or that KCC send the notification letter
    directly to post and require applicants to come to the embassy or
    consulate to pick it up.

    Many consular officers we interviewed suggested that DV applicants
    should not be allowed to add dependents, or "pop-ups," to their
    applications after being selected in the lottery. Consular Affairs
    officials said that such a change would require the INA to be amended.
    At least 15 consular officers we spoke with at posts such as Accra,
    Addis Ababa, Dhaka, Lagos, and Warsaw advocated for this change. A May
    2006 cable from Addis Ababa predicted that this would prevent fraud,
    more tightly regulate the DV program, and save hundreds of hours of
    interview time. Although such a policy would inconvenience some
    legitimate applicants, consular officers said that the principal DV
    winner in those cases could petition later for dependents, after
    entering the United States. While the KCC has collected data on DV
    cases with possible "pop-ups," State has not compiled data on how much
    time and money posts spend on investigating them and what percentage
    are proven to be fraudulent. Without these data, State cannot inform
    policy makers whether amending the INA to this effect would be helpful
    in combating fraud, and, on balance, how many legitimate couples and
    families it would inconvenience.

    Similarly, the fraud prevention manager at KCC and some consular
    officers we spoke with suggested that the DV education requirement be
    raised to require a university degree of applicants. They said that
    this would help them combat fraud since it would be easier for consular
    officers to verify university degrees and less easy for applicants to
    fraudulently claim they had attained this level of education. State
    amended the DV entry form this year, providing KCC with data on the
    education level of entrants applying for diversity visas that will be
    issued in fiscal year 2008. KCC's preliminary analysis of 30,011
    entrants selected in the lottery shows that about 35 percent of
    entrants claimed to have a high school diploma and another 39 percent
    claimed some university education or higher.

    The involvement of the visa industry is perhaps the most problematic
    issue for State, and an area in which it most lacks control. However,
    despite the cables coming from posts where the visa industry
    involvement is problematic--such as Accra, Addis Ababa, and Dhaka--
    State has not attempted to quantify the problem, gauge the extent of
    its involvement across all posts, or recognize to what extent the
    electronic DV (e-DV) entry format has facilitated the visa industry's
    abuse. Posts such as Dhaka and Warsaw have sent cables to State
    headquarters reporting that e-DV has facilitated unscrupulous visa
    agents' scams. In December 2006, the U.S. embassy in Dhaka reported
    that, although e-DV had reduced some traditional types of DV fraud, it
    had facilitated a new type of widespread extortion and identity theft
    fraud since e-DV effectively had given control of the program to visa
    facilitators who had internet access and English language skills,
    unlike many potential applicants in Bangladesh. A June 2006 cable from
    Warsaw reported that e-DV opened a new avenue for fraud that was
    previously inhibited by the personal signature requirement on the paper
    version of the lottery; e-DV allowed visa agents to use "phished"
    biographic data to enter individuals without their knowledge and then
    coerce them into sham marriages. Although consular officers said the DV
    applicants who entered the lottery with the assistance of a visa
    facilitator are frequently too intimidated or threatened to admit that
    they did so, State has not attempted to quantify the effect of visa
    industry involvement. U.S. tax forms, for example, require paid
    preparers to sign their names and list their addresses, giving a degree
    of accountability to the preparer. FPP officials said they were
    considering ways to partner with nongovernmental entities to help DV
    applicants with the lottery process so they could avoid an unscrupulous
    visa industry, although this plan also has yet to be implemented.

    Conclusions:

    Since its inception, the DV program has facilitated thousands of
    individuals from countries currently underrepresented in the U.S.
    immigrant pool to immigrate to the United States. However, consular
    officers at 5 of the 11 posts we reviewed reported that fraud in the DV
    program is a major challenge, and these 5 posts all rank in the top 10
    countries with the most DV recipients. While fraud is an issue across
    all immigrant visa categories, there are specific aspects of the DV
    program--the ability for applicants to add a "pop-up" spouse after
    being selected in the lottery and the ability to enter individuals
    without their knowledge--that make it particularly vulnerable to
    manipulation from an unscrupulous visa industry in some countries.
    State needs to do more to address this issue, such as by strengthening
    the application and notification steps of the process. For example,
    State could move forward with FPP's proposals to partner with
    nongovernmental entities in countries where applicants need assistance
    to enter the lottery. In addition, it could require that third parties
    put their own name and address on the DV entry form to provide a degree
    of accountability, or consider "certifying" visa agents deemed to be
    legitimate. It could also take steps to make the notification process
    less vulnerable to interception by third parties, such as by sending
    the letter in a less conspicuous envelope, or sending the letter to
    posts and requiring the applicant to pick it up. State also should
    consider whether proposing legislative changes would help it address
    fraud in the program. As has been suggested by consular officers,
    barring "pop-up" spouses may remove some incentives to fraudulent
    activity and remove power from the visa industry, and raising the
    education bar might make it easier for officers to verify applicants'
    eligibility and to detect fraud. State officials have discussed the
    potential need for legislative changes, but have not moved forward to
    formally propose such changes. Further, State has not developed data on
    DV program outcomes, detected or suspected fraud across all DV-issuing
    posts, and the amount of resources being spent on investigating DV
    fraud. All of this information would help decision makers consider
    whether legislative changes are needed.

    Recommendations:

    To strengthen its management of the DV program, we recommend that
    State:

    * Compile more comprehensive data on the DV program, including
    information on (1) detected or suspected fraud, including data on "pop-
    up" spouses, third party involvement, and identity and document fraud;
    and (2) the amount of fraud prevention resources being spent on DV
    investigations,

    * Use these data to formulate a strategy to combat fraud in the DV
    program. This strategy should include: (1) proposals for legislative
    changes, if deemed necessary to mitigate fraud risks; (2) consideration
    of appropriate fraud prevention resources at each DV-issuing post; and
    (3) operational improvements to strengthen the program, including
    making the notification process less vulnerable to interception by
    third parties and exploring the feasibility of certifying some visa
    agents or partnering with nongovernmental entities to assist applicants
    with entering the lottery.

    Agency Comments:

    We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
    Homeland Security for their comments. The Department of Homeland
    Security did not comment on the report. In its written comments, State
    said it was disappointed with the report's findings and did not agree
    with the recommendations. It said that our report did not give the
    department enough credit for steps it has taken to combat fraud in the
    DV program and that our report identified management failures that do
    not exist. While State's comments acknowledge that the DV program faces
    fraud challenges, State also said that there are limits to what the
    department can do. In our report, we give credit to State for making
    several improvements to its fraud screening for DV applicants, such as
    implementing an electronic application process, facial recognition
    software, and flagging DV cases with fraud indicators before they are
    sent to posts. Moreover, our report does not discuss "management
    failures" by State. Our report shows that the DV program has
    significant risks for fraud and that State can mitigate some of these
    risks by more systematically documenting the extent of known fraud in
    the program. Therefore, we continue to recommend that State make
    operational improvements to the program and to propose legislative
    changes, if necessary, to improve its ability to combat fraud.

    We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
    Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the
    Secretary of Homeland Security. We also will make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you
    or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
    at (202) 512- 4128. Key contributors to this report were John Brummet,
    Kate Brentzel, Christina Connelly, Joseph Carney, and Grace Lui.

    Sincerely yours,

    Signed by:

    Jess T. Ford Director:
    International Affairs and Trade:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

    We examined the immigrant visa process in terms of its administration
    across government agencies, the potential vulnerabilities in the
    process--including security risks--and options for mitigating these
    risks. In the course of our initial research, we decided to focus on
    the diversity visa (DV) category of immigrant visas for two reasons.
    First, in 2003, the Department of State's (State) Office of the
    Inspector General (IG) pointed to pervasive fraud at many DV-issuing
    posts, as well as the risk inherent in allowing aliens from state
    sponsors of terrorism[Footnote 38] to apply for and obtain a DV.
    Second, we spoke with several experts both within and outside of
    government who raised concerns about fraudulent activity in the DV
    program. Another GAO study currently underway--the second to address
    your request--will focus on the security screening process for
    nonimmigrants already in the United States who are applying for legal
    permanent resident status. This report examines (1) the extent to which
    the DV program is diversifying the U.S. immigrant visa pool, (2) areas
    of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are
    security implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4)
    what steps State has taken to address the vulnerabilities in the DV
    program.

    To assess the extent to which the DV program is diversifying the U.S.
    immigrant pool, we examined key documents regarding the purpose and
    goals of the DV program. For example, we reviewed the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, as amended; examined State's Foreign Affairs Manual,
    and attended consular training courses on the immigrant visa process at
    State's Foreign Service Institute. We also collected and analyzed State
    and Department of Homeland Security data on DV trends and demographics
    that illustrate the volume of DV applicants and recipients across
    countries and regions, and compared these data to visa issuance trends
    in other immigrant visa categories. To assess the reliability of these
    data, we asked relevant State and Department of Homeland Security
    officials a series of questions that covered data classification;
    custody and maintenance of the data, including updates; quality control
    procedures; and accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined
    that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
    report. We also interviewed officials at State and Department of
    Homeland Security on the agencies' efforts to study and track DV
    recipients.

    To assess the areas of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud,
    whether there are security implications associated with these
    vulnerabilities, and the steps State has taken to address these
    vulnerabilities, we reviewed key documents related to DV fraud and
    abuse. For example, we examined bulletins on consular fraud issues
    produced by Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs and
    presentations by the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) on fraud prevention
    efforts such as facial recognition technologies. We also reviewed
    documents from the posts we visited including standard operating
    procedures, quarterly fraud reports, and internal cables. In addition,
    we reviewed State data on results of fraud prevention efforts such as
    facial recognition technology. In January 2007, we visited the KCC in
    Williamsburg, Kentucky, where we observed DV operations and interviewed
    key officials in the DV process. We held many follow-up discussions
    with KCC's fraud prevention manager after our visit.

    Between April and May 2007, we did fieldwork at the U.S. embassies in
    Accra, Ghana; Ankara, Turkey; Warsaw, Poland;[Footnote 39] and the U.S.
    consulate in Lagos, Nigeria. Between May and June 2007, we also
    conducted telephone interviews with consular staff in an additional 7
    posts: the U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Cairo, Egypt;
    Dhaka, Bangladesh; Kathmandu, Nepal; Lima, Peru; and the U.S.
    consulates in Casablanca, Morocco; and Frankfurt, Germany. We selected
    these 11 posts because they encompassed a range of experiences in DV
    processing: (1) posts that had reported considerable DV fraud activity,
    (2) posts representing various DV workload volumes; (3) posts located
    in different geographic regions, and (4) posts that process applicants
    from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. The selected
    posts are not intended to be representative of all DV-issuing posts.
    During our field work in Ghana, Nigeria, Turkey, and Poland, we
    observed DV operations and interviewed consular officials about visa
    adjudication policies, procedures, and resources; challenges to
    administering the DV program; and efforts to prevent and investigate
    cases of fraud and abuse. In our teleconferences with consular staff in
    Addis Ababa, Cairo, Casablanca, Dhaka, Frankfurt, Kathmandu, and Lima,
    we conducted interviews using a standard set of questions regarding the
    posts' challenges with DV processing, fraud prevention, and suggestions
    for improving the DV program. We developed the interview questions
    based on our review of the documentation and data listed above. The
    responses to our interviews are not intended to be representative of
    all DV-issuing posts.

    In the Washington, D.C. area, we interviewed officials from State's
    Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, as well as
    officials from the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
    U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. We also interviewed officials and
    observed DV adjudication interviews at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Services district offices in Baltimore, Maryland, and Fairfax,
    Virginia, and spoke with officials by phone at U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services district offices in Tampa, Florida; Houston,
    Texas; and Los Angeles, California. We requested meetings with
    headquarters officials at the Central Intelligence Agency to discuss
    the agency's role in screening DV applicants from countries designated
    as state sponsors of terrorism, but they declined to meet with us.

    We conducted our work from October 2006 through August 2007 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:

    United States:
    Department of State:
    Assistant Secretary for Resource Management:
    and Chief Financial Officer:
    Washington, D.C. 20520:

    Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
    Managing Director:
    International Affairs and Trade:
    Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, N.W.:
    Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:

    September 10, 2007:

    Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

    We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Border
    Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage Diversity
    Visa Program," GAO Job Code 320458.

    The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
    incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

    If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact June
    Kunsman, Managing Director, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at (202) 663-
    1153.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:
    Sid Kaplan (Acting):

    cc: GAO � Kate Brentzel:
    CA � Maura Harty:
    State/OIG � Mark Duda:

    Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:

    Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage
    Diversity Visa Program:

    (GAO-07-1174, GAO Code 320458):

    We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
    Accountability Office draft report entitled, "Border Security: Fraud
    Risks Complicate State's Ability to Manage the Diversity Visa (DV)
    Program." We are disappointed with the report's findings and do not
    agree with the recommendations. The Department of State has
    administered this Congressionally-mandated program with diligence and
    creativity and believes the report does not reflect this.

    This report fails to accurately credit the Department of State with
    identifying and combating fraud in this Congressionally-mandated
    program and, by examining the program in isolation, mistakenly
    identifies management failures that do not exist. In fact the
    Department of State has designed and implemented robust and
    sophisticated fraud screening programs in the DV program, starting with
    implementing an electronic application process and including state-of-
    the-art facial recognition screening fingerprints and data mining
    techniques.

    Visas for the United States are, in some countries, the most valuable
    commodity on the market. Many of those same cultures operate on the
    premise that any government benefit requires the intervention or
    assistance of someone with special connections and the payment of fees.
    Over a decade and a half of publicity to the contrary has failed to
    convince a substantial number of applicants. Success in extorting money
    from applicants and winners in those same societies bred more scams.

    It is a sad reality that all visa categories encounter sham marriages,
    suspect identities, fraudulent documents, use of agents and unlikely
    stories. Consular officers around the world work hard to identify and
    combat that fraud and thus ensure as secure an immigration process as
    possible for the United States. GAO is able to report on these fraud
    trends because consular officers, working primarily with Diplomatic
    Security and DHS colleagues, have been successful in reporting it and
    combating it. The very nature of the Congressionally-mandated DV
    program, a lottery system which requires no relative or employer
    sponsorship and therefore serves as a vehicle for huge populations
    without existing U.S. connections, makes it particularly susceptible to
    human gullibility and in some cases desperation.

    There are those who clearly see a "business" opportunity in preying on
    prospective applicants. In effect, for many, the DV program represents,
    in some societies, the last hope for those desperate to leave, leading
    to the exploitation of the very individuals it aims to benefit.

    It is worth noting that all of the vulnerabilities to fraud described
    in the GAO's report were discovered (and relayed to GAO) by vigilant
    consular personnel who engage in constant efforts to counter and
    discourage visa fraud. For the DV program in particular, extensive
    screening takes place before cases are sent abroad for interview.
    Careful pre-processing coupled with skillful interviewing unravels the
    fraud. Applicants who do not meet the basic requirements to apply, who
    submit fraudulent documents, and who assume the identities of winners
    in efforts to qualify pay large fees only to be refused in the end.
    Consequently, that process consumes resources unproductively.

    Systematic Fraud Analysis:

    We do not agree that there is no systemic analysis of DV fraud. In
    fact, as GAO was informed, broader, systemic fraud analysis and
    reporting is routinely provided to posts worldwide and includes
    information developed from diversity visa case experiences and post
    feedback. Over the lifetime of this program, the Bureau of Consular
    Affairs used post feedback to introduce screening, interviewing and
    training 'improvements promptly as trends and technology became
    available. The Fraud Prevention Programs office expanded in response to
    the need for systematic study and analysis of fraud and malfeasance
    concerns of consular officers and managers. These fraud detection
    tools, in particular for DV, include:

    * Screening for and disqualifying duplications;

    * Inclusion of photographs to discourage false identities;

    * Facial recognition screening and disqualifying of multiple
    applications before winner notification;

    * Improved minimum photo standards for participation;

    * Electronic application to improve accuracy, search capacity,
    duplicate elimination and preprocessing;

    * Fraud conferences and fraud prevention management training including
    DV patterns and issues;

    * Requiring photographs for derivative family members to deter fraud; �
    Development of fraud tracking software to enhance analysis and begin to
    provide metrics;

    * Development of additional on-line processing and verification tools
    to reduce opportunities for visa brokers or middlemen to control
    winning applications;

    * Incorporation of fingerprint checks to detect criminals and
    impostors.

    Most of the impressive array of fraud-prevention strategies,
    techniques, and technologies that consular officers employ are useful
    against multiple kinds of fraud. This applies to interviewing skills,
    use of biometrics, advanced database searches, field investigations,
    and other measures. We believe that it is generally more important to
    develop and deploy what we have learned effectively against fraud as a
    recurring phenomenon, rather than attempt to develop separate fraud-
    prevention strategies for each of the dozens of visa categories that we
    adjudicate.

    State Sponsors of Terrorism Eligibility:

    We do not see the DV program as uniquely vulnerable and every DV
    "winner" who pursues his or her case is vetted in a manner identified
    to all immigrant visa applicants. That process includes two types of
    biometric checks and name checks. The long lead time involved in an
    application, the layers of screening, the low probability of selection
    all complicate exploitation.

    Use of Approved Agents:

    It is not within the scope of our authority to develop, train and
    oversee approved agents to assist DV aspirants with their applications.
    Nor does it seem to us a good use of resources. The program is designed
    and intended to permit an applicant to manage independently, and given
    the minimum high school degree requirement, this should not serve as a
    barrier to applying. With wide availability of translations of the
    application process and forms, even the language barrier can be easily
    bridged on line.

    Winner packages:

    Security-related access restrictions and competing priorities from
    higher priority immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicant pools argue
    against handing out winner packets at posts abroad or registering
    applicants for the lottery at our posts. Such an approach could end up
    inviting unqualified or unselected applicants to appear at posts
    seeking assistance. Currently, we are developing more on-line tools to
    notify winning applicants of the next steps and documents required, as
    well as providing them access to verify their winner's status and
    interview date. The DV process is transparent and easily accessible.
    Even post engages in robust public outreach efforts to ensure that host
    country prospective applicants have readily available � and free �
    information on the program. There is a limit to the appropriate
    involvement of the USG in preventing applicants from engaging the
    services of unscrupulous local brokers in their home countries.

    Analysis of DV Adjustment and Subsequent Family Petitioning:

    Researching the outcome of DV immigration exceeds the scope of the
    authority of the Department of State. Once applicants are admitted to
    the United States, authority passes to DHS's Bureau of U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services. Any such study of this issue would be more
    appropriate for that agency. While the outcomes might influence
    decisions of Congress concerning the future of the DV program, they
    would have no apparent bearing on the visa decisions that State must
    make on a case-by-case basis.

    Specific recommended language changes:

    Page 4 - "pervasive fraud at DV-issuing posts" would be more accurately
    worded "pervasive fraud in DV applications that posts must deal with."

    Page 11 � The first paragraph is confusing and moving the first
    sentence to the end would resolve that.

    Page 13 � Rather than "no more DVs can be Issued" should more
    accurately read "no more DVs from that lottery pool can be issued."

    Page 13, para 8 � "State Department has not compiled data." In fact a
    good deal of data on issuances and refusals, disqualifications and
    instances of fraud are available. We think it would be more appropriate
    to note that while extensive data have been compiled, the fraud
    tracking system that was deployed in late 2006 and currently undergoing
    additional refinement should provide metrics for more in- depth
    analysis of fraud specific to visas by category.

    GAO Comments:

    1. We agree that consular officers are working hard to identify and
    combat DV fraud. Our report repeatedly mentions that consular officers
    gave us information on suspected and detected fraud.

    2. We agree that State has taken numerous steps to detect and combat DV
    fraud. Based on State's comments, we have added to the report some
    additional material on the steps that State has taken. However, we
    believe that State could do more. For example, State has not compiled
    data from all DV-issuing posts on the outcomes of investigations on
    "pop-up" spouse cases, or data on how many cases have suspected third
    party involvement, or data on the amount of resources--time and money-
    -being spent on DV investigations. We believe that such an analysis
    would help State target its resources to posts with the greatest fraud
    challenges and also better inform Congress about risks in the program.

    3. We agree with State that many fraud-prevention strategies are useful
    to consular officers against multiple kinds of fraud, and that separate
    fraud-prevention strategies need not be developed for each visa
    category. However, we think that the nature of the DV program presents
    some unique fraud challenges that would benefit from additional
    measures. As State noted in its comments, the DV program is a lottery
    system which, unlike other immigrant visa programs, requires no
    relative or employer sponsorship and therefore serves as an immigration
    vehicle for huge populations without existing U.S. connections. This is
    why we recommend that State develop a specific strategy to combat fraud
    in the program.

    4. We maintain that the difficulty in establishing some DV applicants'
    identity contributes to the vulnerability of allowing individuals from
    state sponsors of terrorism to be eligible for the program. State's
    Inspector General expressed similar concerns in its 2003 report on the
    DV program.

    5. In recommending that State make operational improvements to the DV
    program, we are not advocating for any one specific approach. Instead,
    we recommend that State explore options for alternative ways of
    handling the application and notification processes that have led to
    substantial fraud challenges in some countries.

    6. We understand that there are limits to what State can do to protect
    DV applicants from being victimized by an unscrupulous visa industry.
    However, we believe that the U.S. government must bear some
    responsibility for a program that causes, albeit unintentionally,
    exploitation and abuse of individuals. In addition to its public
    outreach efforts, State needs to consider ways to modify DV program
    operations to deter unscrupulous visa agents.

    7. We have revised this recommendation in response to State's comments.
    However, since State is primarily responsible for administering the DV
    program, we believe that State could benefit from information on DV
    immigrants once they have entered the United States. For example,
    information on whom DV immigrants petition for may illuminate fraud
    patterns and trends. State could take the initiative on discussions
    within the executive branch on designing such a study, and collect data
    from the Department of Homeland Security as needed.

    8. We have modified the text on page 2.

    9. We have modified the text on page 10.

    10. We mention State's fraud tracking system in this report and we
    believe that it will provide useful metrics for the analysis of DV-
    related fraud when fully operational. However, it is not clear whether
    this tracking system will provide State with comprehensive data from
    all DV-issuing posts on the outcomes of investigations on "pop-up"
    spouse cases, or data on how many cases have suspected third party
    involvement, or data on the amount of resources--time and money--being
    spent on DV investigations. We believe that this additional data, which
    we recommend collecting, would help State target its resources to posts
    with the greatest fraud challenges, and that it would better inform
    Congress about risks in the program.

    [End of section]

    Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Jess Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov:

    Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the person named above, John Brummet, Kate Brentzel,
    Christina Connelly, Joseph Carney, and Grace Lui made major
    contributions to this report.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, � 131, 104 Stat.
    4978, 4997-99 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. � 1153 (c)).

    [2] The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA)
    passed by Congress in November 1997 stipulated that up to 5,000 of the
    55,000 annually allocated diversity visas be made available for use
    under the NACARA program. The reduction of the limit of available
    diversity visas to 50,000 began with the DV program's fiscal year 2000,
    or DV-2000, and is likely to remain in effect through the DV-2008
    program.

    [3] The United States also grants visas to people who are seeking to
    enter the United States temporarily. In this report, we use the term
    "visa" to refer to immigrant visas only.

    [4] Aliens from countries that have sent more than 50,000 immigrants in
    the family-or employment-based categories in the previous 5 years are
    not eligible for the current fiscal year's lottery. The list of
    ineligible countries can change every year as immigration patterns
    shift; on average, approximately 15 countries have been ineligible each
    year since DV-2000. The following 16 countries are ineligible for the
    2007 DV program: Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican
    Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan,
    Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom (except
    Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and Vietnam.

    [5] Holding an immigrant visa is but one of the requirements an alien
    must satisfy to become a legal permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. � 1201.

    [6] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant
    or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident
    status through the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services. See 8 U.S.C. � 1255. In fiscal years 2000
    through 2005, about 5 percent of DV immigrants adjusted status.

    [7] Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly
    provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated
    pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
    as codified at 50 App. U.S.C. � 2405 (j), section 40 of the Arms Export
    Control Act as codified at 22 U.S.C. � 2780(d), and section 620A of the
    Foreign Assistance Act as codified at 22 U.S.C. � 2371. Taken together,
    the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under
    these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a
    ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual
    use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
    Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates
    other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in
    certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are five countries
    designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and
    Syria.

    [8] As Poland "graduated" from the program after DV-2006, Polish
    natives are not currently eligible to apply for diversity visas. The
    U.S. embassy in Warsaw adjudicates DVs for natives of Belarus, Latvia,
    Lithuania, and Ukraine.

    [9] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions
    Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-
    259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006).

    [10] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services counts both "arrivals"
    and "adjustments-of-status" in this number. In 2006, roughly 65 percent
    of immigrants were adjustments and 35 percent were arrivals.
    "Adjustments" refer to cases in which the alien is already present in
    the United States, and "arrivals" refer to cases in which the alien
    requests permanent admission while outside the United States. In the
    latter cases, the alien must apply for and obtain a U.S. immigrant visa
    at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad before arriving at U.S. ports of
    entry. A visa indicates that the alien's application has been reviewed
    and determined eligible by a U.S. consular officer, and allows the
    bearer to apply for admission to the United States at a U.S. port of
    entry.

    [11] Immediate relatives include spouses, parents of citizens ages 21
    and older, and unmarried children of citizens under 21. See, 8 U.S.C. �
    1151 (b)(2)(A)(i).

    [12] 8 U.S.C. � 1151.

    [13] Pub. L. No. 101-649, � 131.

    [14] U.S.C. � 1153(c).

    [15] Applicants already residing in the United States on a nonimmigrant
    or other status may be eligible to adjust to legal permanent resident
    status through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See 8 U.S.C.
    � 1255. In the last 5 years, the percentage of DV applicants who
    adjusted status has been about 5 percent.

    [16] 22 C.F.R. � 42.33.

    [17] KCC does not notify those entrants who were not selected in the
    lottery.

    [18] Those qualified to adjust status in the United States are
    processed at domestic U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
    offices.

    [19] See 8 U.S.C. �� 1104(A), 1201(a). See also, 8 C.F.R. � 245.2.
    Adjustment-of-status cases are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services adjudication officers in the United States.

    [20] Aliens applying for the DV must either be a native of (born in) a
    country that qualifies for the DV, regardless of the alien's current
    country of residence or nationality, or be entitled to claim another
    country as their native country. The rules of "cross chargeability"
    within the DV program--designed to prevent the separation of family
    members--allow individuals to claim their native country as one other
    than their country of birth for reasons including: (1) an alien born in
    a nonqualifying country in which neither parent was born nor resident
    at the time of the child's birth may claim the birthplace of either
    parent, if that country qualifies for the DV; and (2) an alien born in
    a nonqualifying country may claim their spouse's native country if it
    qualifies for the DV, provided that the spouse is included on the DV
    application, is issued a visa, and enters the United States
    simultaneously with the applicant. See 22 C.F.R. � 42.12 for
    chargeability exceptions generally and State's Foreign Affairs Manual
    Volume 9, section 42.12 notes for chargeability exceptions as applied
    to the DV program.

    [21] The State Department's interpretation of the term "high school
    education or its equivalent" means successful completion of either (1)
    a 12-year course of elementary and secondary study in the United
    States; or (2) a formal course of elementary and secondary education
    comparable to completion of 12 years of elementary or secondary
    education in the United States. According to State's Foreign Affairs
    Manual, the education should be sufficient to allow a student to apply
    for college admission without further education.

    [22] The Department of Labor's O*Net [hyperlink,
    http://wwww.online.onetcenter.org] establishes eligible occupations.

    [23] While immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted without
    limit, other immigrant visa categories, such as employment, family, and
    diversity visas, are numerically controlled. 8 U.S.C. � 1151.

    [24] Poland's eligibility for the program has fluctuated as its
    immigration pattern to the United States has changed.

    [25] For the purposes of this report, "visa industry" is defined as the
    individuals and businesses involved in a variety of tasks related to
    the DV process, such as preparing and submitting DV entries,
    translating documents, and even making travel arrangements for
    applicants' visa interviews. We use the terms visa "agents,"
    "consultants," and "facilitators" interchangeably, as these and other
    terms were used by consular officers when referring to the visa
    industry.

    [26] As Poland "graduated" from the DV program after DV-2006, Polish
    natives are not currently eligible to apply for diversity visas. The
    U.S. embassy in Warsaw adjudicates DVs for natives of Belarus, Latvia,
    Lithuania, and Ukraine. In this report, references to Warsaw are
    specifically about the post's challenges with processing Ukrainian
    applicants.

    [27] More than 1.7 million Bangladeshis entered the DV-2008 lottery.
    Entrants from Nigeria and Ukraine rank next, with approximately 685,000
    and 620,000 entrants, respectively.

    [28] The $755 DV adjudication fee is comprised of the following: a $335
    immigrant visa application processing fee, a $375 DV surcharge fee, and
    a $45 immigrant visa security surcharge. While State headquarters
    advises posts to charge the full $755 before a DV adjudication
    interview, we found that some posts had implemented their own fee
    collection policies. For example, the post in Lagos charged DV
    applicants $375 before the interview and the remaining $380 only if the
    adjudication resulted in a visa issuance. Officers there claimed the
    policy was fair considering the financial burden DV fees imposed on
    applicants.

    [29] In 2005, the World Bank reported that the gross national income,
    per capita, was $470 in Bangladesh, $450 in Ghana, and $560 in Nigeria.

    [30] Consular officers in Bangladesh and Ukraine suspected that these
    unscrupulous elements are connected to organized crime.

    [31] The principal DV winner's spouse and unmarried children under age
    21 are eligible to receive a diversity visa.

    [32] Marriage fraud is not limited to diversity visas. Many consular
    officers said they suspected that many of the K visas (for fianc�es)
    that they adjudicated were fraudulent.

    [33] DV applicants are required to bring police certificates with them
    to their visa adjudication interview, except in certain countries, such
    as Iran, where the certificates are considered unavailable. 22 C.F.R. �
    42.65.

    [34] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions
    Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-
    259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006).

    [35] As there is no U.S. embassy in Iran, visa services are available
    for Iranian applicants at the U.S. embassies in Abu Dhabi, Ankara, and
    Vienna, as well as the U.S. consulates in Dubai, Naples, and Frankfurt.

    [36] Only consular officers at a U.S. embassy or consulate can make the
    adjudicatory decision whether to issue a diversity visa. See 8 U.S.C.
    �� 1104(A), 1201(a). See also, 8 C.F.R. � 245.2.

    [37] Not all cases with fraud indicators are referred to the consular
    section's fraud prevention unit. In some cases, the applicant is not
    eligible for the visa for other reasons and the visa is refused; the
    fraud is therefore not material and the case will not be referred to
    the section's fraud prevention unit.

    [38] Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly
    provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated
    pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act,
    section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the
    Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of
    sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include
    restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and
    sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and
    miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under the
    above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that
    penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state
    sponsors. Currently there are five countries designated under these
    authorities: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

    [39] We also spoke with officials at the U.S. embassy in Kiev by
    digital video conference while we were in Poland, as the U.S. embassy
    in Kiev coordinates with the U.S. embassy Warsaw on fraud
    investigations for DV applicants from Ukraine.

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