State Department: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls	 
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps (01-AUG-07, 	 
GAO-07-1154T).							 
                                                                 
GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital	 
issues that have hampered the Department of State's (State)	 
ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and 	 
objectives, particularly at posts central to the war on terror.  
In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative	 
(DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State	 
employees. This testimony addresses State's progress in (1)	 
addressing staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI	 
and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of Foreign	 
Service officers and other staff. To accomplish these objectives,
GAO analyzed staffing and language data and met with State	 
officials.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1154T					        
    ACCNO:   A73767						        
  TITLE:     State Department: Staffing and Foreign Language	      
Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps		 
     DATE:   08/01/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Civil service jobs 				 
	     Diplomats						 
	     Employee incentives				 
	     Employee training					 
	     Employees						 
	     Foreign languages					 
	     International relations				 
	     Labor shortages					 
	     Performance appraisal				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Staff utilization					 
	     Hardship duty pay					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Dept. of State Diplomatic Readiness		 
	     Initiative 					 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-1154T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background

          * [3]State's Foreign Language Requirements

     * [4]State Has Made Progress in Addressing Staffing Shortfalls bu

          * [5]Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured
          * [6]Staffing Gaps for Key Mid-level Positions Persist; Positions

               * [7]Many Mid-level Positions Are Staffed by Junior Officers

          * [8]State Is More Willing to Use Directed Assignments

     * [9]State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language C

          * [10]State Continues to Have Shortages of Staff Proficient in For

               * [11]Some Question the Adequacy of Their Positions' Language
                 Prof
               * [12]State's Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder
                 Efforts t
               * [13]Lack of Foreign Language Capability May Adversely Affect
                 Sta

     * [14]Conclusions
     * [15]Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
     * [16]Appendix I: Related GAO Products

          * [17]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, August 1, 2007

STATE DEPARTMENT

Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to
Address Gaps

Statement of Jess Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-07-1154T

August 1, 2007

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on Department of State
(State) human capital issues. In recent years, State has undertaken
several broad initiatives to ensure it has enough qualified staff in the
right places to carry out its mission. These efforts have included State's
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), designed to hire a reserve of
Foreign Service officers (FSO) and civil service employees, support
training opportunities for staff, enhance State's ability to respond to
crises and emerging priorities, and fill critical skill gaps. In addition,
State is currently implementing its Transformational Diplomacy Initiative,
which involves, among other things, repositioning overseas staff from
locations such as Europe to emergent critical areas, including Asia and
the Middle East, and expanding language training efforts.

Today, I will discuss State's progress in (1) addressing staffing
shortfalls since the implementation of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of Foreign Service
officers and other staff.

GAO has reported on a number of human capital issues that have hampered
State's ability to carry out the President's foreign policy priorities and
objectives. My statement today is based primarily on our August 2006
report on State human capital issues.^1 Over the course of our work on
this report, we examined documentation on State's recruitment efforts;
analyzed staffing, vacancy, and assignment data; reviewed the language
proficiency data for specific posts, specialties, and grades; and compared
the language proficiency of staff in language-designated positions with
the requirements for the positions. We met with officials at State's
Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, and six regional bureaus, and also conducted fieldwork in Abuja
and Lagos, Nigeria; Sana'a, Yemen; and Beijing, China--posts of strategic
importance to the United States that have recently posed various human
capital challenges to State. Furthermore, we recently met with the State
Department to follow up on its human capital initiatives. We performed
this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

^1GAO: State Department: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, [18]GAO-06-894 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 2006).

Summary

State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since
implementing the DRI in 2002; however, the initiative did not fully meet
its goals, and staffing shortfalls remain a problem. Without ensuring that
the right people with the right skills are in the right places, these gaps
will continue to compromise State's ability to carry out its foreign
policy objectives and execute critical mission functions. From 2002
through 2004, the DRI enabled State to hire more than 1,000 employees
above attrition to respond to emerging crises and allow staff time for
critical job training. However, according to State officials, much of this
increase was absorbed by the demand for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan;
and thus, the desired crises and training reserve was not achieved. In
addition, State has placed an increased focus on foreign language training
in certain critical areas, which means that staff who would otherwise be
working are instead attending language training. According to State
officials, outside of the department's consular program and worldwide
security upgrade program, State has not received any additional authorized
positions since 2004, and officials also told us that they now estimate
State needs more than 1,000 new positions to support foreign language
training needs and respond to crises and emerging priorities. In an effort
to address staffing shortfalls at historically hard to fill hardship
posts,^2 many of which are of significant strategic importance to the
United States, State has implemented various incentives, including
offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at these posts
and allowing employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. More recently,
State made service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion to the
senior Foreign Service. And, since we issued our report, State has
increased its service requirements of staff at hardship posts and has also
recently taken additional measures to ensure all Iraq positions are
filled. However, State has not evaluated the effectiveness of its hardship
incentives, and continues to have difficulty attracting qualified
mid-level applicants--or bidders--for some hardship posts. According to
State officials, mid-level positions at many posts continue to be staffed
by junior officers who lack experience and have minimal guidance. For
example, at the time of our last review, the mid-level consular manager
positions in Shenyang and Chengdu, China--two locations with high
incidences of visa fraud--were held by first tour junior officers. State
has not traditionally assigned its limited number of employees to
particular posts based on risk and priorities; rather, it has generally
assigned staff to posts for which they have expressed an interest. We
recommended that State consider using its authority to direct staff to
accept assignments, as necessary, to ensure that critical gaps are filled.
After our report was issued, State's Director General publicly indicated
he would direct assignments when needed. While State has not yet used
directed assignments, State officials told us that the department's
increased willingness to do so has helped convince some qualified staff to
accept critical reassignments.

^2State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives--an additional 5 to 35
percent of base salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of the
conditions--to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these posts
and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter.

State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities,
but significant language gaps remain. State has significantly increased
the number of worldwide positions requiring language proficiency and has
enhanced efforts to recruit individuals proficient in certain languages.
However, State continues to have difficulties filling language designated
positions with language proficient staff. Gaps in language proficiency can
compromise State's ability to execute critical duties, including reaching
out to foreign audiences central to the war on terror. In April 2007, we
testified that inadequate language skills hampered public diplomacy
officers' ability to cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S.
foreign policy. Moreover, officials at one high visa fraud post stated
that consular officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully
understanding everything the applicants tell them during the visa
interview. State officials told us that some language gaps have worsened
in recent years due to State's relocation of some staff positions to
critical posts that require so-called "superhard" language skills, such as
Arabic or Chinese, that staff do not have. We reported that almost 30
percent of the staff filling language designated positions worldwide as of
October 2005 did not meet the language proficiency requirements. The
percentage was much higher at certain critical posts--for example, 59
percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Moreover, some
officers we met with who did meet the proficiency requirements questioned
whether the requirements are adequate. For example, embassy officials in
Yemen and China stated that the speaking and reading proficiency levels
designated for their positions were not high enough and that staff in
these positions were not sufficiently fluent to effectively perform their
jobs. Additionally, several factors--including the short length of some
tours and the limitations on consecutive tours at the same post--may
hinder officers' ability to enhance and maintain their language skills
over time, as well as State's ability to take advantage of those skills
and the investment it makes in training. We also reported a perception
among some officers that State's current promotion system discourages
officers from specializing in any particular region, making the officers
reluctant to apply to posts where they could better utilize their language
skills. Since our report was issued, State officials informed us that the
department has recently implemented a new initiative that would provide
additional language incentive pay for staff if they chose to be reassigned
to a posting that would utilize their existing Arabic language skills.^3
In addition, in response to our recommendations that State take action to
enhance the language proficiency of its staff, State officials told us
that the department has placed an increased focus on language training in
critical areas and that it is exploring the possibility of longer tours of
duty in limited cases.

Background

To address staffing shortfalls, in 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, a $197 million effort designed to hire 1,158^4 new
foreign and civil service employees over a 3-year period, support training
opportunities for staff, enhance State's ability to respond to crises and
emerging priorities, improve State's hiring processes to recruit personnel
from more diverse experiences and cultural backgrounds, and fill critical
skill gaps. As of June 2007, State had about 20,000 American employees,
including Foreign Service officers (FSO). About 67 percent of Foreign
Service employees serve overseas; of that number, about 68 percent are
assigned to hardship posts. A hardship pay differential is established
only for those locations that involve extraordinarily difficult living
conditions, excessive physical hardship, or notably unhealthful conditions
affecting the majority of employees officially stationed or detailed
there. Living costs are not considered in differential determinations.^5

It is more difficult to attract qualified bidders for some hardship posts
than for others. In response to severe staffing shortages at such posts,
State established the Service Need Differential (SND) program in 2001.
Under this program, an employee who accepts a 3-year assignment at a post
designated for SND is eligible to receive an additional hardship
differential--over and above existing hardship differentials--equal to 15
percent of the employee's base salary.^6 State's geographic bureaus
initially identified the posts designated to offer SND in 2001 and may add
or remove posts once per year.

^3Furthermore, additional language pay incentives are being piloted for
employees taking advantage of reassignment who have the proficiency in
Arabic required of their position.

^4State received funding for 1,069 employees.

^5State pays an additional 15 to 35 percent of salary for danger pay. The
danger pay allowance is designed to provide additional compensation above
basic compensation to all U.S. government civilian employees, including
chiefs of mission, for service in foreign areas having conditions--such as
civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or war--that threaten physical
harm or imminent danger to employees. These conditions do not include acts
characterized chiefly as economic crime.

State's Foreign Language Requirements

As of June 2007, State had 3,467 positions--approximately 45 percent of
all Foreign Service positions overseas--designated as requiring some level
of foreign language proficiency. These positions span about 68 languages.
State places the required languages into three categories based on the
amount of time it takes to learn them.

           o Category I languages are world languages, such as Spanish and
           French that relate closely to English. Fifty-five percent of the
           language-designated positions require proficiency in a world
           language.
           o Category II languages, such as Albanian or Urdu, are languages
           with significant linguistic or cultural differences from English.
           State refers to such languages as "hard" languages. Twenty-nine
           percent of the language-designated positions require proficiency
           in a hard language.
           o Category III, the "superhard" languages, include Arabic and
           Chinese, and are exceptionally difficult for native English
           speakers to learn. Sixteen percent of the language-designated
           positions require proficiency in a superhard language.

           State's primary approach to meeting its language requirements is
           through language training, primarily through classes provided at
           its training arm, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). In
           addition, overseas posts offer part-time language training through
           post language programs funded by the regional bureaus and their
           posts. Although State's main emphasis is on enhancing staffs
           foreign language capability through training, it has special
           mechanisms to recruit personnel with foreign language skills. For
           example, applicants who pass the oral assessment can raise their
           ranking by passing a language test in any foreign language used by
           State. Additional credit is given to candidates who pass a test in
           languages that State has deemed as critical needs languages.^7
           Officers hired under this initiative must serve in a post that
           requires the language for which they were recruited for their
           first or second tour.
			  
^6Chiefs of mission, principal officers, and deputy chiefs of mission are
not eligible to receive SND regardless of the length of their tours.
Entry-level employees on 2-year tours directed by the Office of Career
Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) are also ineligible for SND.

           State Has Made Progress in Addressing Staffing Shortfalls but Critical
			  Gaps Remain at Hardship Posts

           Since the implementation of the DRI in 2002, State has increased
           its number of permanent positions and available staff worldwide
           for both the foreign and civil service, but these increases were
           offset somewhat by urgent staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan
           and other factors. State hired most of its new staff through the
           Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, bringing in more than 1,000 new
           employees above attrition, thus achieving its numerical hiring
           goals. These employees were hired primarily to allow staff time
           for critical job training, to staff overseas posts, and to be
           available to respond to new emerging priorities. However,
           according to State's Human Resources officials, the initiative's
           goals became quickly outdated as new pressures resulted from
           staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, bureaus
           have had to give up a total of about 300 positions for Iraq. In
           addition, State has placed an increased focus on foreign language
           training in certain critical areas, which means that staff who
           would otherwise be working are instead attending language
           training. Outside of the department's consular program and
           worldwide security upgrade program, State has not received any
           additional authorized positions since 2004. State officials told
           us that they now estimate they need more than 1,000 new positions
           to support foreign language training needs and to respond to
           crises and emerging priorities.^8
			  
			  Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured

           Beginning in 2001, in an effort to address the growing number of
           mid-level vacancies at hardship posts, State created a series of
           incentives--including extra pay and negotiated tour lengths--to
           attract mid-level employees to hardship posts around the world.
           For example, the SND Program offers employees an extra 15 percent
           pay for an additional year of service at the most
           difficult-to-staff posts. While State has information on the
           number of officers actually enrolled in the program, it was not
           able to provide data on the number of eligible officers who were
           not. State's Director General and officials from its Human
           Resources Bureau said that State has not completed any formal
           evaluations of the incentives; instead, officials from Human
           Resources meet informally to discuss how well the incentives are
           working. Without formal evaluations, State has not been able to
           systematically measure whether the extra hardship pay incentive
           has had a significant impact on staffing at hardship posts. Senior
           officials with whom we spoke in Washington, D.C., and FSOs at
           hardship posts had mixed views on whether the SND program has been
           effective. In addition, while it may be too early to assess the
           effectiveness of more recently implemented initiatives, such as
           negotiated tour lengths, former and current ambassadors stated
           that this initiative may not benefit posts. In particular, they
           noted that although negotiating a shorter tour length might
           initially attract bidders to hardship posts, such frequent
           rotations diminish a post's ability to carry out the United
           States' foreign policy goals. Noting the prevalence of 1-year
           tours in the Muslim world,^9 a senior official at State said that
           officers with shorter tours tend to produce less effective work
           than those with longer ones.
			  
^7State has deemed the following as critical needs languages: Arabic;
Chinese; Korean; Russian; Turkic languages (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
Turkish, Turkmen, and Uzbek); Indic languages (Urdu, Hindi, Nepali,
Bengali, Punjabi); and Iranian languages (Farsi/Persian, Tajiki, Pashto).

^8It was beyond the scope of this engagement to assess this estimate.

           In addition to incentives, State has implemented a new career
           development program--the Generalist Career Development
           Program--that stipulates service at a hardship post as a
           requirement for consideration to promotion to the senior Foreign
           Service. Officials from Human Resources stated that it was too
           early to tell whether this new requirement for promotion to the
           senior Foreign Service will be effective in attracting mid-level
           officers to hardship posts. Other new requirements include
           expanded Fair Share^10 rules that require designated FSOs to bid
           on a minimum of three posts with a 15 percent or higher
           differential pay incentive in two geographic areas. Further, since
           we issued our report in 2006, State has shortened the Washington
           consecutive service limit from 6 years to 5 years, which means
           that more officers will be spending more time in the field to help
           fill staffing gaps.
			  
^9According to State, the Muslim world is comprised of 58 countries and
territories with significant Muslim populations, many of which are members
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. These countries have a
combined population of 1.5 billion people and are located in Africa, Asia,
and Europe.

^10According to State, an employee is considered Fair Share if he or she
has not served at least (1) 20 months at a post with a combined hardship
and danger pay differential of 15 percent or greater or (2) 10 months at a
post with a 1-year standard tour of duty during the 8 years prior to the
employee's upcoming transfer eligibility date. Previously, serving 18
months of service at a post receiving any hardship differential, even 5
percent, during the previous 8 years prior to an employee's upcoming
transfer exempted staff from consideration as a Fair Share bidder.

           State also has created a special assignments cycle for Iraq to
           ensure that these priority positions are filled to 100 percent as
           close as possible. In addition, State has negotiated new Iraq
           staffing incentives, such as allowing 6 months of Iraq service,
           compared to longer service elsewhere, to fulfill the requirements
           of the Fair Share rules. State has also recently revised the Iraq
           Service Recognition Package by (1) increasing language incentive
           pay for Arabic speakers; (2) allowing, in certain cases, staff who
           leave their current post of assignment to serve in Iraq to extend
           service at that post for up to 1 year after returning; and (3)
           enabling family members to remain at the current post of
           assignment throughout the duration of the Iraq assignment.

           In 2006 we recommended that to enhance staffing levels and skills
           at hardship posts, the Secretary of State systematically evaluate
           the effectiveness of State's incentive programs for hardship post
           assignments, establishing specific indicators of progress and
           adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis. State
           officials told us that the department has not conducted any such
           evaluation to date because the large number of factors that staff
           consider when bidding on assignments makes it problematic to
           isolate the effects of individual incentives; however, State does
           plan to add some questions on the impact of incentives to its
           biannual employee quality-of-life survey.
			  
			  Staffing Gaps for Key Mid-level Positions Persist; Positions Filled
			  by Junior Officers in Stretch Positions

           As of our most recent report, State had a combined deficit of 154
           officers,^11 with the largest staffing deficits continuing to
           affect mid-level positions across all career tracks. State
           officials have said it would take several years for DRI hiring to
           begin addressing the mid-level staffing shortages because the
           earliest DRI hires are just now being promoted to mid-level. On
           average, it takes approximately 4.3 years for a junior officer to
           receive a promotion to mid-level. State expects to eliminate
           mid-level deficits by 2010.
			  
^11The total deficit decreases to 82 when junior grade level 05 and 06
positions are included. We did not include them in this calculation
because we were told that these grades were training positions that are
not counted against the deficit

           Although bidding for hardship posts with the smallest pay
           differentials increased slightly in recent years, it remained
           about the same for posts with the highest differentials, such as
           those with 20 and 25 percent. Overall, posts in Africa, the Middle
           East, and South Asia continue to receive the lowest number of
           bids, averaging about 4 or 5 bids per position, while posts in
           Europe and the Western Hemisphere receive the highest bids,
           averaging 15 and 17, respectively. For example, we reported in
           2006 that posts in Bujumbura, Burundi; Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria;
           Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Calcutta, India received, on average,
           between zero and two bids per mid-level officer position and, in
           the 2005 assignments cycle, 104 mid-level positions had no bidders
           at all, including 67 positions in Africa and the Middle East. In
           addition, consular positions in the posts with the highest
           hardship differential (25 percent) continued to receive some of
           the lowest number of bids in 2005--on average, only 2.5 bids per
           position compared with 18 for nonhardship posts. Low numbers of
           bids at hardship posts have resulted in positions remaining vacant
           for long periods of time.

           In 2006 we reported that consular and public diplomacy positions
           were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in
           these two tracks at the mid-level. Although State has seen an
           increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several
           embassy officials stated that they do not have the capacity to
           effectively utilize increased funds. Moreover, these staffing gaps
           also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers
           receive because many officers are sent to fill a position quickly
           and never benefit from full training, ultimately limiting the
           success of their public diplomacy outreach efforts. Further, due
           to staffing shortages in consular sections around the world, there
           are fewer staff to implement the new interview requirements and
           screening procedures for visas, contributing to extensive wait
           times for applicant visa interviews at consular posts overseas.
           For example, State's data shows that between September 2006 and
           February 2007, 53 consular posts reported maximum wait times of 30
           or more days in at least 1 month, signaling a significant resource
           problem for State.
			  
			    Many Mid-level Positions Are Staffed by Junior Officers

           In order to fill vacancies, primarily at hardship posts, State
           sometimes allows staff to bid for a position at either a higher
           grade than their current grade level (called an "upstretch") or a
           lower grade (a "downstretch"). Often, upstretch assignments are
           offered as a reward and career-enhancing opportunity for staff who
           have demonstrated outstanding performance, and many officers
           successfully fulfill the duties requested of the higher grade
           level.^12 In an effort to compensate for mid-level gaps in Iraq,
           State will consider entry-level employees with extraordinary
           skills for mid-level positions there if they have a high-level
           Arabic language ability, prior military experience, or proven
           performance in crisis management. However, a 2004 report by
           State's Inspector General^13 found that in many African posts, for
           example, there were significant deficiencies in the ability,
           training, and experience of FSOs serving in upstretch assignments.
           At hardship posts we visited in early 2006, we found experience
           gaps and other staffing shortfalls. In particular, we found that
           the consulate in Lagos was staffed by a mix of officers, including
           numerous junior officers in stretch positions. Moreover, many
           officers in stretch positions at hardship posts continue to lack
           the managerial experience or supervisory guidance needed to
           effectively perform their job duties. In addition, junior officers
           in stretch assignments at the various posts we visited stated
           that, without mid-level officers to guide them, they many times
           can only turn to senior management, including the ambassador, for
           assistance. According to a 2004 State Inspector General report,
           senior staff, including ambassadors, spend more time on
           operational matters and less time on overall planning, policy, and
           coordination than should be the case.^14 Many junior officers also
           stated that although they were filling stretch positions at the
           mid-level, they were not allowed to receive management training
           from State due to their lower grade status. One officer told us
           she requested management training to help her manage staff in
           accordance with her role as acting chief of a key section of the
           embassy but was denied the opportunity because she was not a
           tenured mid-level officer.

           Senior management at posts we visited shared some of these
           concerns. A former Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria stated that
           it is extremely difficult for junior officers to work in stretch
           assignments when there are few mid-level officers to guide them.
           Ambassadors at these posts also stated that, although many junior
           officers entering the Foreign Service are highly qualified, they
           do not have sufficient training to handle some of the high stress
           situations they encounter and often end up making mistakes. For
           example, according to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria--the third
           largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees--the embassy
           had only three senior officers at the time of our visit, and
           public affairs were handled entirely by first tour junior
           officers. Also, according to U.S. officials in Beijing, the
           mid-level consular manager positions in Shenyang and Chengdu,
           China--two locations with high incidences of visa fraud--were held
           by first tour junior officers at the time of our visit. Moreover,
           security officers at one hardship post told us that without
           mid-level staff, they sometimes lack the resources to adequately
           perform basic duties, such as accompanying the ambassador on
           diplomatic travel. Former ambassadors with whom we spoke expressed
           serious concerns about State's diplomatic readiness and conveyed
           their belief that a post's ability to carry out critical duties is
           significantly compromised when the proper staffing levels, and
           particularly well-trained officers, are not in place.
			  
^12According to State the rationale for stretch assignments (upstretches
and downstretches) is both system- and employee-driven. Upstretches can be
career enhancing or accommodate family needs or staffing gaps.
Downstretches may happen to accommodate family needs or be the end result
after an employee is promoted when in an at-grade position.

^13Strengthening Leadership and Staffing at African Hardship Posts, U.S.
Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Memorandum Report
ISP-I-04-54, July 2004.

^14ISP-I-04-54.

           State Is More Willing to Use Directed Assignments

           Despite chronic staffing shortages at hardship posts, especially
           at the mid-level, State has rarely directed FSOs to serve in
           locations for which they have not bid on a position--including
           hardship posts or locations of strategic importance to the United
           States--due to concerns about lowering morale or productivity.
           According to State officials, State's Global Repositioning
           Initiative, announced in January 2006, has reallocated a
           significant number of positions, primarily from Washington and
           Europe to critical posts in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle
           East. However, given that there is no guarantee that these
           positions will be filled because bidding will continue to be on a
           voluntary basis under the initiative, we recommended that State
           consider using its authority to direct staff to accept
           assignments, as necessary, to fill these critical mid-level gaps.
           After our report was issued, State's Director General publicly
           indicated he would direct assignments when needed. While State has
           not yet used directed assignments, State officials told us that
           the department's increased willingness to do so has helped
           convince some qualified staff to accept critical reassignments.
			  
			  State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language
			  Capabilities, but Significant Language Gaps Remain

           State has made several efforts to improve its foreign language
           capabilities, including creating additional language-designated
           positions and enhancing recruiting efforts. Since 2001, State
           officials told us they have significantly increased the number of
           worldwide positions requiring language proficiency. These
           positions span about 69 languages. State has also enhanced its
           efforts to recruit and hire FSOs with language skills. For
           example, State's Office of Recruitment has targeted its recruiting
           outreach efforts to universities with strong language programs and
           conferences of language professionals, as well as associations and
           professional organizations (such as the Arab American Institute)
           that have members already fluent in critical needs languages. In
           addition, State offers bonus points on the Foreign Service exam to
           candidates who demonstrate proficiency in critical needs
           languages. State then requires these officers to serve in
           positions that will employ their language skills during their
           first or second assignment. State has also implemented career
           development criteria, effective January 1, 2005, that require,
           among other things, foreign language proficiency as a prerequisite
           for consideration for promotion. In addition to these
           requirements, State has developed financial incentives for
           officers with certain proficiency levels in critical languages.
           Moreover, State has enhanced its overseas language programs
           through various initiatives, including expanding its use of
           overseas language schools and post language programs, increasing
           the number of weeks of training offered in certain critical
           languages, and providing language immersion courses for officers
           transitioning to new posts.
			  
			  State Continues to Have Shortages of Staff Proficient in Foreign
			  Languages

           State assesses language proficiency based on a scale established
           by the federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six
           levels--0 to 5--with 5 being the most proficient. Proficiency
           requirements for language-designated positions at State tend to
           congregate at levels 2 and 3 of the scale. In our 2006 report, we
           compared the language proficiency of staff in all
           language-designated positions with the positions' requirements and
           our analysis showed that about 29 percent of all worldwide
           language-designated positions were filled by individuals who did
           not meet the position's proficiency requirements.^15 Language
           deficiencies exist worldwide but were among the greatest in the
           Middle East, where 37 percent of all language-designated positions
           were filled by staff without the language skills required of their
           positions. The skills gap was even greater at some critical
           posts--for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt, and 60 percent in
           Sana'a, Yemen. In recent discussions with State officials, they
           told us these gaps have worsened since we reported on this issue
           in 2006, primarily because, according to the officials, State has
           increased the number of worldwide positions requiring language
           proficiency by over 100 percent since 2001. State has relocated
           some staff positions to critical posts that require so-called
           "superhard" language skills, such as Arabic or Chinese, that many
           staff do not have.
			  
^15The percentages are for officers and specialists who met both the
speaking and writing requirement for their positions.

           To further illustrate how skill gaps differ among languages of
           varying levels of difficulty, we analyzed data on superhard, hard,
           and world-language designated positions. Our analysis showed the
           greatest deficiencies in positions requiring superhard languages,
           such as Arabic. Almost 40 percent of superhard language-designated
           positions worldwide (465 positions) were filled by individuals who
           did not meet the language requirements of their position; this
           figure was 30 and 25 percent for hard and world
           language-designated positions, respectively. Further, the highest
           percentage--almost 40 percent--of superhard positions filled by
           officers that did not meet the speaking and reading language
           requirements were among positions requiring Arabic, Chinese, and
           Japanese.

           Further analysis of Arabic and Chinese, two languages spoken in
           regions of strategic interest to the United States, showed that
           the percentage of staff that did not meet language requirements
           for their positions varied by career tracks. For example, 100
           percent of the staff filling positions in the management career
           track requiring Arabic and 88 percent of the staff filling
           positions in the management career track requiring Chinese did not
           meet the language requirements of their positions. In addition, 72
           and 75 percent of Foreign Service specialist (staff who perform
           security, technical, and other support functions) positions
           requiring Chinese and Arabic, respectively, were filled by staff
           who did not meet the language requirement. Six of the specialists
           we met with in Beijing said they did not receive sufficient
           language training before arriving at post. State officials have
           acknowledged that Foreign Service specialists have not received
           the required amount of training, and FSI officials attributed this
           situation to time constraints. Most specialists only have enough
           time to participate in FSI's Familiarization and Short-term
           Training (FAST) language courses designed for beginners with 2
           months or less time to devote to training. State's Director
           General, in a cable issued in January 2006, stated that State has
           been shortsighted in not providing training to specialists,
           especially office management specialists, and that required
           training would be available for specialists in the future.

           To enhance the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, we
           recommended in our August 2006 report that State systematically
           evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the language
           proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing specific
           indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its
           efforts accordingly. State officials told us the department has
           placed an increased emphasis on language training and that it has
           developed targets for eliminating proficiency gaps for individual
           languages, with a particular focus on critical needs languages
           such as Arabic and Chinese.
			  
			    Some Question the Adequacy of Their Positions' Language Proficiency
             Requirements

           Some officers whom we met with and who had attained the
           proficiency requirements for their assignments stated that they
           were not sufficiently fluent to perform their jobs effectively.
           For example, consular officers we met with in China who tested at
           a speaking level of 2 and reading level of 0, the required
           proficiency level for 50 language-designated, junior officer
           consular positions at posts requiring Chinese proficiency, said
           they could ask appropriate questions during consular interviews,
           but could not always understand the answers. They pointed out that
           Spanish or French language-designated consular positions require a
           level 3 speaking and reading language proficiency. Moreover, a
           survey of junior officers currently serving in China revealed that
           most officers not interested in serving in China again cited
           language issues as the primary reason. According to the Deputy
           Chief of Mission in Sana'a, the level 3 Arabic speaking and
           reading proficiency requirements for senior officers do not
           provide staff with the proficiency needed to participate in
           debates about U.S. foreign policy. He described an instance when
           he was asked to appear as an embassy spokesperson on an Arabic
           language media program. The program, which involved a debate
           format and addressed U.S. politics, was conducted entirely in
           Arabic. The official said that given his 4+proficiency in Arabic,
           he was the only official at the embassy capable of engaging in
           such a debate. Officials from the Foreign Service Institute
           explained that language-designated position requirements are set
           at a level officers can realistically achieve in the limited
           amount of time available to obtain training.
			  
			    State's Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder Efforts to
				 Improve Its Foreign Language Capability

           Several FSOs we met with said they believe State's current
           assignment and promotion system may hinder officers' abilities to
           enhance and maintain their language skills over time and State's
           ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it
           makes in training. For example, State's requirements for tenure
           stipulate that junior officers work in a variety of regions and
           jobs to prepare them for careers as generalists, while State's
           assignment regulations do not allow junior officers and
           specialists to serve consecutive tours at the same post. As a
           result, junior officers are often assigned to second tours that do
           not utilize the language skills they acquired for their first
           tour. There is also a perception among some officers that spending
           too much time in one region can lead to being labeled as too
           narrowly specialized, which could hinder the officers' careers.
           However, a senior State official asserted that the belief that
           regional specialization hurts an officer's career is untrue and,
           further, that State's new career development plan supports
           regional specialization.

           In addition, the short length of some tours, such as 1-year
           unaccompanied assignments, may not give an officer sufficient time
           to master a language. According to State's Inspector General, as
           long as unaccompanied assignments are restricted to 1 year,
           officers have little incentive to seek extensive language
           training.^16 In an effort to make better use of the State's
           training investment, the FSI has encouraged officers and
           specialists to take FSI courses to refine their language skills
           and achieve greater facility when dealing with the local
           community. But officers in both Yemen and China stated that
           State's assignment system does not allow for sufficient time
           between assignments to use FSI's continued language training.
           Compounding this problem, officers stated that their language
           skills often diminish when a new assignment takes them to a region
           requiring different language skills.

           We recommended that State consider an assignment system that
           allows for longer tours, consecutive assignments in certain
           countries, and more regional specialization in certain areas to
           hone officers' skills in certain superhard languages and better
           leverage the investment State makes in language training. State
           has informed us that it has recently implemented a new initiative
           that would provide additional language pay incentives for staff if
           they chose to take a reassignment to use existing Arabic language
           skills. In addition, State's new Arabic Opportunities Initiative,
           announced in June 2007, allows select tenured employees to curtail
           current assignments to take Arabic language training beginning in
           September 2007. State has only partially implemented our
           recommendation that it consider an assignment system that allows
           for longer tours and consecutive assignments in certain countries.
           State officials told us that the department is currently exploring
           the possibility of extending tours of duty of some 1-year posts
           and allowing family members to accompany employees there.
			  
^16Employees assigned to 1-year unaccompanied posts may extend their
tours.

             Lack of Foreign Language Capability May Adversely Affect State's
				 Operations

           State's foreign language gaps may hinder posts' operations.
           According to the Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and
           Cultural Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, deficits
           in foreign language education negatively affect our national
           security, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence gathering
           efforts, and cultural understanding by preventing effective
           communication in foreign media environments, impeding
           counter-terrorism efforts, and limiting our capacity to work with
           people and governments in post conflict zones. We found examples
           of this negative impact involving a variety of officers and
           specialists serving in language-designated positions without the
           required foreign language skills.

           o Consular officers: Officials at one high visa fraud post that we
           visited stated that, due to language skill deficiencies, consular
           officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding
           everything the applicants tell them during visa interviews.
           o Economic and political officers: An economic officer in a
           country with a superhard language had been conducting several
           important negotiations in English with foreign government
           officials over a number of months with few results. When the
           officials began discussing the same issue in the host country
           language, the whole tenor of the negotiations changed. According
           to the officer, one foreign government official who did not
           understand English, and was therefore silent throughout the
           initial meetings, had actually been the most valuable source of
           information yet could only convey that information when the
           meeting was conducted in his own language. In Beirut, State's
           Inspector General reported that most of the political and economic
           officers did not receive the Arabic language training needed to
           work professionally in Lebanon, limiting opportunities to expand
           their contacts to the less sophisticated urban areas and into the
           countryside.

           o Public diplomacy officers: Officers at many posts cannot
           communicate effectively with foreign audiences in local languages,
           hampering their ability to cultivate personal relationships and
           explain U.S. foreign policy. In April 2007,^17 we testified that
           many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot
           communicate with local audiences as well as their positions
           require.
			  
^17GAO: U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved,
but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges, [36]GAO-07-795T
(Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007).
			  
           o Management Officers: According to one ambassador we met with, a
           senior level embassy official, who did not have sufficient
           speaking and reading language skills for his position met with a
           prime minister but was unable to participate fully in the
           top-secret discussion without an outside translator present.
           However, because the prime minister would not speak freely with
           the translator present, the meeting was not productive.

           o Foreign Service specialists: A regional security officer stated
           that lack of foreign language capability may hinder intelligence
           gathering because local informants are reluctant to speak through
           locally hired interpreters.
			  
			  Conclusions

           Despite progress, critical gaps in staffing at hardship posts and
           shortages of staff with foreign language proficiency in critical
           languages continue to impact State's diplomatic readiness. State
           has recently undertaken more aggressive efforts to ensure that all
           positions in Iraq are filled and, through other actions and
           incentives, has made efforts to fill staffing gaps, particularly
           at hardship posts. State has also increased its focus on language
           training and instituted other measures to enhance its overall
           language proficiency, particularly in critical languages such as
           Arabic. But staffing and language gaps remain. Moreover, State has
           not fully implemented our recommendation that it consider an
           assignment system that allows for longer tours and consecutive
           assignments in certain countries to hone critical language skills
           and better leverage the investment State makes in language
           training. Because State does not currently have a sufficient level
           and mix of staffing and language resources to immediately fill all
           of its gaps in these areas, choices must be made about priorities,
           given the risk and strategic interests in particular regions and
           countries. Without ensuring that the right people with the right
           skills are in the right places, these gaps will continue to
           compromise State's ability to carry out its foreign policy
           objectives and execute critical mission functions, including
           reaching out to foreign audiences in regions of critical
           importance to the war on terror.

           Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be
           happy to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee
           may have.
			  
			  Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

           For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford,
           (202) 512-4128 or [19][email protected] . Individuals making key
           contributions to this statement include Michael Courts, Assistant
           Director; Joe Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Laverne Tharpes; and
           Melissa Pickworth.
			  
			  Appendix I: Related GAO Products

           U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved,
           but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges.
           [20]GAO-07-795T . Washington, D.C.: April, 26, 2007.

           Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls
           Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. [21]GAO-06-894 .
           Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2006.

           Overseas Staffing: Rightsizing Approaches Slowly Taking Hold but
           More Action Needed to Coordinate and Carry Out Efforts.
           [22]GAO-06-737 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.

           U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain
           Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges.
           [23]GAO-06-707T . Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.

           U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
           Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
           Challenges. [24]GAO-06-535 . Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.

           Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
           Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. [25]GAO-05-859 .
           Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.

           State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport
           Fraud Detection Efforts. [26]GAO-05-477 . Washington, D.C.: May
           20, 2005.

           State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas
           Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages.
           [27]GAO-04-139 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.

           Foreign Affairs: Effective Stewardship of Resources Essential to
           Efficient Operations at State Department, USAID. [28]GAO-03-1009T
           . Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2003.

           State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment
           System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts.
           [29]GAO-02-626 . Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002.
			  
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(320518)

[37]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1154T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [38]GAO-07-1154T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate

August 1, 2007

STATE DEPARTMENT

Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to
Address Gaps

GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that
have hampered the Department of State's (State) ability to carry out U.S.
foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to
the war on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative (DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State
employees. This testimony addresses State's progress in (1) addressing
staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps
in the language proficiency of Foreign Service officers and other staff.
To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data
and met with State officials.

[39]What GAO Recommends

We made a number of recommendations in our August 2006 report to the
Secretary of State to address staffing gaps and foreign language
shortfalls. State generally agreed with our recommendations and has made
some progress in implementing them.

State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since
implementing the DRI in 2002; however, the initiative did not fully meet
its goals, and staffing shortfalls remain a problem. From 2002 to 2004,
the DRI enabled State to hire more than 1,000 employees above attrition to
respond to emerging crises and allow staff time for critical job training.
However, according to State officials, much of this increase was absorbed
by the demand for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the desired
crises and training reserve was not achieved. State officials told us that
they now estimate they need more than 1,000 new positions to support
foreign language training needs and respond to crises and emerging
priorities. In an effort to address staffing shortfalls, particularly at
critical hardship posts, State has implemented various incentives,
including offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at
these posts and allowing employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty.
State has also taken steps to ensure all Iraq positions are staffed. While
State has not yet used its authority to direct staff to accept
assignments, it has in several cases identified qualified staff and
convinced them to accept reassignments. However, despite these and other
efforts, mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by inexperienced
junior officers with minimal guidance. An experience gap at critical posts
can severely compromise the department's diplomatic readiness and its
ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical
post-level duties.

State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities,
but significant language gaps remain. State has increased the number of
worldwide positions requiring language proficiency since 2001 and has
enhanced efforts to recruit individuals proficient in certain languages.
However, State continues to have difficulties filling some positions with
language proficient staff. State officials told us these gaps have
worsened in recent years. In response to our recommendations to enhance
the language proficiency of State's staff, officials told us that the
department has placed an increased focus on language training in critical
areas. State has recently implemented a new initiative that would provide
additional pay incentives for staff if they chose to be reassigned to use
existing Arabic language skills. Continuing gaps in language proficiency
can adversely affect State's diplomatic readiness and ability to execute
critical duties. For example, officials at one high visa fraud post we
visited stated that consular officers sometimes adjudicate visas without
fully understanding everything the applicants tell them during the visa
interview. Moreover, we were told that officers at some posts cannot
communicate effectively with foreign audiences, hampering their ability to
cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S. foreign policy.

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References

Visible links
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-894
  19. mailto:[email protected]
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-894
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-737
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-707T
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-535
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-859
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-477
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-139
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1009T
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-626
  30. http://www.gao.gov/
  31. http://www.gao.gov/
  32. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  33. mailto:[email protected]
  34. mailto:[email protected]
  35. mailto:[email protected]
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1154T
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1154T
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