Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing
Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support (30-NOV-06,
GAO-07-115).
Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways
to better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts
evolved, the Marine Corps identified requirements for naval
surface fire support and the Navy began developing two systems to
meet these needs--the Extended Range Munition for existing
classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class destroyer. GAO was
asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have
been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended
Range Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems.
GAO also analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the
requirements and whether gaps remain. To address these objectives
GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and programs and held
discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine Corps as well
as other interested organizations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-115
ACCNO: A63767
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing
Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support
DATE: 11/30/2006
SUBJECT: Cost overruns
Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Military forces
Military systems analysis
Munitions
Naval warfare
Operational testing
Program evaluation
Requirements definition
Schedule slippages
Systems design
DD(X) Destroyer
DD-21 Destroyer
Navy Extended Range Guided Munition
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GAO-07-115
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Add
* [4]Validated Requirements for Naval Surface Fire Support Are De
* [5]Requirements for Volume of Fire Remain Unclear
* [6]Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and
* [7]The Extended Range Munition Has Experienced Cost Overruns an
* [8]Affordability Concerns in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Progra
* [9]Navy Has Begun Development of Some Candidate Systems for Fut
* [10]Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabi
* [11]Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Si
* [12]Risks Remain in the Navy's Approach for Addressing Future Ne
* [13]Requirements for Volume of Fires Need Further Definition
* [14]Current Navy Practices for Managing Resources and
Requiremen
* [15]Management of Command and Control Issues is Unresolved
* [16]Conclusions
* [17]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [18]Agency Comments and Our Review
* [19]GAO Contact
* [20]Staff Acknowledgments
* [21]GAO's Mission
* [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [23]Order by Mail or Phone
* [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [25]Congressional Relations
* [26]Public Affairs
Report to the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
November 2006
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire
Support
GAO-07-115
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 5
Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Address
Quantitative Measures for Volume of Fire 7
Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and Schedule
Growth and Will Deliver Less Capability Than Originally Planned 12
Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabilities 24
Conclusions 28
Recommendations for Executive Action 29
Agency Comments and Our Review 30
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 32
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 34
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 38
Tables
Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements 8
Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 10
Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range Munition 14
Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class Destroyer 19
Figures
Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration 5
Figure 2: Extended Range Munition 13
Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range Munition Program
16
Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface Fire
Support 18
Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided Missile
Destroyer 21
Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program
23
Abbreviations
CEP Circular error probable
CG(X) Experimental guided-missile cruiser
DD Destroyer
DDG Guided missile destroyer
DD(X) Experimental destroyer
ERM Extended Range Munition
RDT&E Research, development, test, and evaluation
SC Surface combatant
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
November 30, 2006 November 30, 2006
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett Chairman The Honorable Gene Taylor
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Projection Forces Committee on
Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman The Honorable Gene Taylor Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Projection Forces Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has shifted its focus away from
warfare on the open ocean and toward operations in coastal waters. In
support of this new focus, the Marine Corps has developed new concepts for
landing forces ashore in a hostile environment from ships at sea. These
maneuvers--referred to as expeditionary operations--increase the Marine
Corps's reliance on sea-based fire support. According to the Navy and
Marine Corps, ship-based guns and missiles, or naval surface fire support,
are essential for advancing landing forces to their objectives and
protecting them from enemy attack. Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy
has shifted its focus away from warfare on the open ocean and toward
operations in coastal waters. In support of this new focus, the Marine
Corps has developed new concepts for landing forces ashore in a hostile
environment from ships at sea. These maneuvers--referred to as
expeditionary operations--increase the Marine Corps's reliance on
sea-based fire support. According to the Navy and Marine Corps, ship-based
guns and missiles, or naval surface fire support, are essential for
advancing landing forces to their objectives and protecting them from
enemy attack.
From 1992 to the present, the Marine Corps has been working to set
requirements for naval surface fire support that reflect evolving
operating concepts. The Navy has been developing systems to meet these
requirements including the Extended Range Munition, a precision-guided
munition with increased range fired from an improved gun on an existing
class of ships, and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, an entirely new
surface ship designed with advanced capabilities specifically for naval
surface fire support. When these systems began development, they were
expected to begin to be fielded by 2001 and 2008, respectively. Current
plans call for fielding to begin in 2011 and 2014. In response to your
request, this report addresses (1) whether well-defined requirements for
naval surface fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's
progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition, the
Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. We also analyzed whether
the Navy's systems currently under development fulfill the established
requirements, and the actions being taken to address any remaining gaps.
From 1992 to the present, the Marine Corps has been working to set
requirements for naval surface fire support that reflect evolving
operating concepts. The Navy has been developing systems to meet these
requirements including the Extended Range Munition, a precision-guided
munition with increased range fired from an improved gun on an existing
class of ships, and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, an entirely new
surface ship designed with advanced capabilities specifically for naval
surface fire support. When these systems began development, they were
expected to begin to be fielded by 2001 and 2008, respectively. Current
plans call for fielding to begin in 2011 and 2014. In response to your
request, this report addresses (1) whether well-defined requirements for
naval surface fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's
progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition, the
Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. We also analyzed whether
the Navy's systems currently under development fulfill the established
requirements, and the actions being taken to address any remaining gaps.
To determine whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire
support have been established, we analyzed documentation on the stated
needs and operational concepts for ship-based fire support including
doctrinal publications and capabilities documents. To supplement our To
determine whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire support
have been established, we analyzed documentation on the stated needs and
operational concepts for ship-based fire support including doctrinal
publications and capabilities documents. To supplement our analysis, we
held discussions with a number of Marine Corps and Navy offices including
those responsible for creating requirements, such as the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command and the Chief of Naval Operations's Surface
Warfare Division. To assess the Navy's progress in developing and fielding
systems to meet these requirements, we held discussions and reviewed
documents at the program offices responsible for acquiring the Extended
Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and other weapon systems. We
also drew from our prior work on these systems. In analyzing whether the
systems selected meet requirements for naval surface fire support, we
reviewed reports and documentation produced by or in cooperation with the
Navy and Marine Corps, such as the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary
Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, as well as the
capabilities development documents for the systems themselves. To
supplement this information and address the actions taken to close
remaining gaps, we met with officials from joint and service organizations
in the requirements community. For more information on the methodology
used in this report see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from
February 2006 to November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
In December 2005, an agreement was reached that defined requirements for
naval surface fire support in such areas as range and accuracy, but did
not include quantifiable measures for volume of fire. The Marine Corps
derived these requirements over a decade as its thinking on expeditionary
operations evolved. From 1996 to 2002, the Marine Corps communicated
requirements derived from these concepts to the Navy in a series of
letters. These letters included descriptions of desired capabilities like
volume of fire, which the Marine Corps defines as the delivery of a large
quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress
or destroy a target, as well as specific requirements for range and
accuracy. These capabilities and requirements formed the basis of the
needs identified in the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations
in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document approved in December 2005
through the joint requirements process. While this document identifies a
need for volume of fire as defined by the Marine Corps, a set of specific
requirements like those for range or accuracy do not yet exist.
Requirements for volume of fire are complicated by the variance in effects
desired from mission to mission, although this is a challenge in other
warfare areas as well. In addition, there is not yet a clear understanding
of how the capabilities offered by precision munitions can be utilized for
volume fires in a cost effective manner.
Developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class
destroyer has required more funding and time than anticipated and may not
offer the capabilities originally promised, while the development of
follow-on systems has just begun. The cost to develop the Extended Range
Munition is expected to exceed the original estimate by over 550 percent
and fielding of an initial capability has been delayed by nearly 11 years,
largely due to the failure to recognize and plan for technical challenges.
While the program's current approach seeks to improve reliability of key
components, the viability of the program remains in question until
realistic plans for testing, producing, and fielding the munition are
approved and the munition's design is demonstrated through testing.
Oversight of the program was recently changed from the Navy to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, who has
not yet held a comprehensive review of the program. Cost challenges,
stemming primarily from unrealistic expectations, have led the Navy over
time to reduce ship capabilities and procurement quantities from the
Zumwalt class destroyer program. Specifically, the Navy has reduced each
ship's land-attack munitions by 50 percent and decreased ship quantities
from 32 to 7. These reductions have further increased the Navy's reliance
on the less capable Extended Range Munition for naval surface fire
support. The Navy continues to develop Zumwalt class technologies and
design and plans to begin construction of the first two ships in fiscal
year 2008. To provide capabilities for naval surface fire support beyond
the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy has
begun development of prototypes for the electromagnetic railgun and
multipurpose loitering missile. Further progress on these systems is
dependent on continued analysis of the capabilities required,
identification of system requirements, and advances in technology.
Despite the new capabilities promised by the Extended Range Munition and
Zumwalt class destroyer, needs for naval surface fire support exceed
projected capabilities. Recently, the Joint Fires initial capabilities
document assessed future fire support needs for operations in the
littorals1 and identified capability gaps in command and control, engaging
moving targets in poor weather, engaging targets when collateral damage is
a concern, and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. While
the identification of gaps by such a study is not unusual, it is important
that the gaps be properly analyzed so that informed decisions can be made
on whether to accept the gaps or how best to close them. Three issues
exist that could inhibit the analysis of gaps identified in capabilities
for naval surface fire support. The uncertainty inherent in the Marine
Corps's current requirements for volume of fire is one such issue. Any
decision to allocate limited resources to fill this gap would benefit from
clarification of these requirements. In addition, the Navy's Expeditionary
Warfare Division, charged with establishing capabilities and requirements
for naval surface fire support, has not had a formal role in managing
requirements and allocating resources for the Extended Range Munition and
Zumwalt class destroyer, increasing the risk that naval surface fire
support capabilities may not align with the requirements and operating
concepts of expeditionary warfare. Also, while the Navy is analyzing gaps
for engaging targets, it has not identified a lead organization for
analyzing gaps in command and control.
1 The littoral includes an area extending from a transition point in the
open ocean, to more constrictive and shallower waters, to the shore, and
onward to those inland areas that can be attacked, supported, and defended
from the sea.
We are making four recommendations to assist the Navy and Marine Corps in
clarifying requirements and developing systems for naval surface fire
support. Specifically we are recommending that (1) the Navy and Marine
Corps define requirements and operational concepts for volume of fire to
clarify the effects desired and inform the selection and acquisition of
fire support programs; (2) the Chief of Naval Operations's Expeditionary
Warfare Division, as the division in charge of expeditionary warfare
requirements and liaison with the Marine Corps, be given a formal role in
developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources
for systems that provide naval surface fire support; (3) the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, as
decision authority for the Extended Range Munition, conduct a
comprehensive review of the program to validate plans for future
development and acquisition; and (4) the gap in command and control of
joint fires for littoral operations be assigned to the appropriate
organization and coordinated with the Navy's work on engagement gaps.
In comments to a draft of this report, the Department of Defense concurred
with our recommendations to clarify requirements and concepts for volume
of fire and conduct a review of the Extended Range Munition program. The
department partially concurred with our recommendation to give
Expeditionary Warfare a formal role in developing and managing systems for
naval surface fire support, stating that a review of existing roles and
regulations would be conducted and changes made if necessary. The
department also partially concurred with our recommendation to assign an
organization to address the gap in command and control of joint fires in
the littorals, stating that means to address this gap would be
investigated later, after initial analysis of engagement gaps is
completed. We are concerned that deferring command and control to a later
analysis continues a history of inattention to this area.
Background
The Marine Corps has been developing new concepts for expeditionary
operations that are characterized by an increase in mobility, flexibility,
and depth of operations. To successfully conduct these operations, the
Marine Corps relies on a "fires triad" composed of land-based artillery
and mortars, attack planes and helicopters, and sea-based surface ships to
destroy or suppress enemy forces. Figure 1 shows the fires triad concept.
Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration
The systems within the fires triad are considered complementary. For
example, while surface ships provide the majority of supporting fires for
ground forces during the early phases of expeditionary operations,
land-based artillery and mortars assume a greater role in later phases as
more of these assets are placed ashore. Some legs of the triad offer
capabilities others cannot. The guns of artillery and surface ships are
more capable of providing volume of fire--large amounts of sustained fire
to suppress or destroy a target--while aircraft are used for long-range
precision strikes or attacks on moving targets. Regardless of each
system's capabilities or contributions, all components of the triad are
considered necessary for success.
The sea-based portion of the triad is referred to as naval surface fire
support and is traditionally provided by the guns and missiles onboard
Navy surface ships. For decades the Navy had provided this capability with
the 16-inch guns of the Iowa class battleships that were eventually taken
out of service due to the high cost of their operations and maintenance.
With the decommissioning of the last Iowa class battleship in 1992, the
Navy was left with only the short-range (13 nautical miles2) 5-inch guns
on destroyers and cruisers to provide naval surface fire support.
According to the Navy, new and improved coastal defense systems deployed
by potential adversaries required that Navy ships protect themselves by
coming no closer than 25 nautical miles to shore, rendering the existing
5-inch guns ineffective for fire support. In May 1992, the Navy approved a
mission need statement for naval surface fire support that recognized this
gap in capabilities and called for new or improved systems that could
provide increased range, lethality, and accuracy. Since that time, the
Navy and Marine Corps have conducted a number of studies to identify
possible solutions for this gap and to clarify the needs and requirements
associated with naval surface fire support.
In 1994, the Navy developed a plan to improve naval surface fire support
by upgrading existing 5-inch guns on Arleigh Burke class destroyers and
Ticonderoga class cruisers and developing a new 5-inch guided munition for
near-term capabilities, and considered options for long-term capabilities
as it developed concepts for a new surface combatant ship. Eventually,
these concepts evolved into the Extended Range Munition and the Zumwalt
class destroyer programs. The establishment of basic requirements by the
Marine Corps supported efforts to develop these systems. Marine Corps
analysis concluded that since ground-based artillery would be unavailable
during the initial stages of an expeditionary operation, naval surface
fire support must provide, at a minimum, the same range, accuracy, and
lethality as current artillery systems. In 1995, the Navy began to
incorporate this analysis into its plans for acquiring new weapons systems
by approving an initial range requirement of 41 to 63 nautical miles,
assuming a 25 nautical mile stand-off range. As Marine Corps thinking on
expeditionary operations evolved over the next decade, more requirements
would be added.
2 A nautical mile is equal to about 1.85 kilometers.
Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Address Quantitative
Measures for Volume of Fire
For over 10 years the Marine Corps worked with the Navy to develop
requirements for naval surface fire support that align with the concept of
expeditionary operations. It was not until December 2005 that, as a result
of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached. This
agreement provides the basis for meeting the fire support needs of the
warfighter through a variety of solutions by attempting to define the
effects required. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the lack of
a clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine Corps,
volume fires are necessary to execute expeditionary operations, but
quantifiable volume fires requirements have not been established due to
the variance in effects desired from mission to mission and the planned
use of precision munitions. Clearer requirements would inform the
acquisition of planned systems and aid in determining capabilities of any
future systems.
Validated Requirements for Naval Surface Fire Support Are Derived from Marine
Corps Concepts for Expeditionary Operations
Although the Marine Corps further defined its needs for naval surface fire
support over the last 10 years, it only recently reached agreement with
the Navy on a new set of requirements through the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System, a joint process for establishing
requirements. This process resulted in the Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document,
which incorporated and validated the Marine Corps's requirements for naval
surface fire support. These requirements are based on the concept of
expeditionary operations that the service has been developing since 1992.
Table 1 describes the documents and events central to creation of this
concept.
Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements
Year Events
1992 o Gap in fire support left by decommissioning of battleships.
o Publication of ...from the Sea shifts the emphasis of Marine
Corps and Navy operations from confronting the Soviet threat at
sea to the use of expeditionary forces in the littorals.
1994 o Navy completes first analysis of how to fill gap in naval
surface fire support.
o Publication of Forward...from the Sea further refines Navy
concept of expeditionary operations in the littorals.
1995 o Navy and Marine Corps agree to an initial range requirement of
41 to 63 nautical miles.
1996 o Operational Maneuver from the Sea presents Marine Corps concepts
on expeditionary warfare including the reliance on sea-basing.
o First Marine Corps letter derives naval surface fire support
requirements from concepts presented in Operational Maneuver from
the Sea.
1997 o Publication of Ship to Objective Maneuver establishes the
concept of multiple, independent maneuver forces attacking their
targets directly instead of pausing to establish a foothold and
attacking as a combined force.
1999 o Second Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support
requirements expands discussion of Marine Corps's needs.
2000 o Navy releases guidance on how ship design can support Marine
Corps's requirements.
2001 o Marine Corps publishes Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare a capstone
document that encapsulates and revalidates previous concepts and
doctrine on expeditionary warfare.
2002 o Third Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support
requirements presents requirements across near-, mid-, and
far-terms for evolutionary acquisition.
2003 o The Marine Corps drafts a memorandum of agreement on
requirements, but Navy does not agree to memorandum.
2005 o Agreement reached on requirements for naval surface fire
support.
Sources: Navy and Marine Corps (data); GAO (presentation).
According to the concept created by the Marine Corps, the fundamental
aspect that defines expeditionary operations--sea-based forces operating
with increased depth and mobility in multiple dispersed units--establishes
certain requirements for naval surface fire support. Since land-based
artillery is restricted by the need for a large presence ashore, and
air-based fire support can be restricted by weather conditions, the
importance of sea-based naval surface fire support increases. The depth of
operations envisioned requires ship-based guns and other systems with
considerable range, while the speed and mobility envisioned demand rapid
response times. Fire support for expeditionary forces also requires
accuracy and precision, to increase the probability that targets are
destroyed or disabled and reduce the possibility of marines being killed
when calling for munitions to land close to their own positions.
Sustainability and lethality are needed as well to compensate for the
firepower removed from Marine units to preserve their speed and agility.
According to the Marine Corps, volume of fire, defined as large quantities
of munitions delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or destroy
a target, is also necessary to immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable
maneuver. These requirements surpass the abilities of the Navy's existing
13 nautical mile range 5-inch guns, necessitating the development and
fielding of new weapons systems or the acceptance of risks in executing
expeditionary operations.
The Marine Corps quantified many of the requirements for naval surface
fire support to better communicate them to the Navy and aid in the
development of new systems. While an initial range requirement was
established in 1995, the Marine Corps identified a number of additional
requirements for naval surface fire support that clarify the needs for
expeditionary operations. These requirements were identified in a series
of three letters from 1996 to 2002, with the last letter describing
requirements in terms of desired near-, mid-, and far-term capabilities.
The Marine Corps also provided rationale for its needs by providing an
explanation of each of the requirements. Table 2 lists the requirements as
described in the last of these letters. The Marine Corps sought to use
these letters to establish a more formal agreement on the needs for naval
surface fire support, and even drafted a memorandum of agreement in 2003.
While the Navy did not sign this memorandum, many of the requirements
presented in the letters were used in the development of systems and
technologies to provide fire support. Agreement was reached when the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, which oversees requirements development
for all four services, approved the Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document in
December 2005. This document incorporated and validated Marine Corps
requirements for naval surface fire support.
Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements
Near-Term Mid-Term Far-Term
(2004-2005) (2006-2009) (2010-2019)
System Thresholda 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes
response
Objective Limits of Limits of Limits of
technology technology technology
Range: naval Threshold 41 nm 63 nm 97 nm
guns
Objective 63 nm 97 nm Limits of
technology
Range: other Threshold 200 nm 200 nm 262 nm
systems
Objective 222 nm 222 nm Limits of
technology
Accuracy and Threshold 50 m CEPb 50 m CEP 50 m CEP
precision
Objective 20 m CEP 20 m CEP 20 m CEP
Target Threshold 50 nm 63 nm 97 nm
acquisition
Objective 63 nm 97 nm Limits of
technology
Ordnance o Destroy or suppress point, area, and moving targets
effects including personnel and material, and destroy hardened
targets
o Provide smoke, illumination, and incendiary effects
Volume of fire o Volume fires are equally important to precision
o Needed for mass fires, suppression, combined arms
effects, and close fire support
o Sufficient quantities are maintained to sustain
desired effects over time
Sustainment o All systems sustainable via under way replenishment
Source: Marine Corps.
Note: As defined by Marine Corps March 2002 "Hanlon Letter" and approved
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in December 2005.
aThreshold refers to minimally acceptable performance and objective refers
to desired performance.
bCircular error probable.
Requirements for Volume of Fire Remain Unclear
While some of the Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire support
have been quantified, validated, and applied to Navy systems in
development, the requirement for volume of fire remains less defined. The
Marine Corps has consistently maintained the need for these fires and has
described their use under the concept of expeditionary operations. The
Marine Corps defines volume of fire as large quantities of munitions
delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target.
This definition establishes two types of volume fires: suppression, which
requires a large quantity of munitions delivered on a target or group of
targets in an area over a period of time, and destruction, where a large
quantity of munitions are delivered simultaneously with as much accuracy
as possible. Marine Corps officials have also identified an increasing
need for multiple simultaneous suppression or destruction missions to
support dispersed units. While the Marine Corps's letters on naval surface
fire support provide definitions of these missions, the requirements
provided do not offer quantitative measures of effectiveness or success
for all the key elements of volume of fire. The firing rate of weapon
systems and their ability to deliver multiple rounds simultaneously are
highlighted as important, but other factors--such as the amount of time or
munitions typically required for suppression, or the number of
simultaneous engagements to be supported--remain undefined.
Marine Corps and Navy officials have stated that the advent of precision
munitions for naval surface fire support further complicates requirements
and definitions for volume of fire. Currently, volume fires are provided
by ground-based artillery and mortars firing large amounts of inexpensive,
unguided munitions. Due to the perceived benefits of precision in
air-delivered weapons and the need to deliver naval surface fire support
from greater distances due to shore-based threats, the Navy has been
developing guided munitions for fire support. These munitions have the
potential to deliver far greater precision and lethality than unguided
munitions, but the high cost of procurement--up to $54,500 per round for
the Extended Range Munition against $1,633 for the current 5-inch
projectile3--could preclude the Navy from deploying them in the large
quantities posited for volume fires. Marine Corps officials have stated
that the concept of providing volume of fire with precision munitions is
currently being analyzed and that changes to the way volume fires are
employed could be possible. For instance, as the lethality and precision
of munitions increase, it may be possible to change the way targets are
selected and use fewer rounds to achieve volume effects. Officials state,
however, that there are still scenarios in which large sustained
quantities of munitions are necessary.
The ambiguity surrounding volume of fire, especially when such missions
are executed with precision weapons, has a direct impact on the
procurement of munitions for naval surface fire support. The Navy uses an
estimating process, known as the non-nuclear ordnance requirements
process, to assist in determining the number of munitions needed to
support the warfighter. According to Navy officials, to accurately
estimate the number of rounds needed for volume fires the model
requires--but does not have--a definition of the effects desired from
volume fires. In addition, the process does not currently account for the
new capabilities offered by the precision weapons under development for
naval fires. Without the Marine Corps's definition of these effects, the
model will produce inaccurate or unrealistic estimates of the number of
rounds needed. Navy officials identified other shortcomings in both the
information provided by the Navy and Marine Corps and in the assumptions
used to model naval surface fire support procurement quantities. For
instance, the model does not provide enough fidelity in the distance to
targets or properly account for the number of precision rounds carried in
each ship. The Marine Corps, through the Expeditionary Warfare Division in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, is working with the Navy to
refine the data provided to the non-nuclear ordnance requirements process
as well as the assumptions made within the process itself.
3 The $1,633 represents the fiscal year 2008 price of the Navy's unguided
5-inch high explosive projectile and its propelling charge.
The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects the
ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps's needs.
The Marine Corps has stated that the effects desired from volume of fire
varies from mission to mission and therefore is difficult to quantify.
However, the variance in desired effects from scenario to scenario is a
challenge in other warfare areas as well. In the absence of requirements
that define at least minimum capabilities for common scenarios, such as
the duration and quantity of fire needed to suppress a target, it may be
difficult to develop cost effective systems that meet Marine Corps needs.
Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and Schedule Growth and
Will Deliver Less Capability Than Originally Planned
The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have required
additional funding and time for development and will not be fielded in the
quantities initially planned. Development of the Extended Range Munition
has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and programmatic
challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent from initial
estimates. The Navy continues to face challenges related to the
affordability and viability of its plan ahead that must be overcome in
order to field the munition. Optimistic estimates and consequent cost
increases in the Zumwalt class destroyer program have resulted in
reductions to both ship quantities and munition capacities per ship, both
of which will seriously impact capabilities available to support future
expeditionary operations. Candidate technologies to provide future naval
surface fire support capabilities are currently in development as science
and technology programs, and have not yet completed the requirements
documentation and other steps necessary to enter the acquisition process.
Figure 2: Extended Range Munition
The Extended Range Munition Has Experienced Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays
and Continues to Face Risk
The Extended Range Munition is a precision guided munition fired from a
modified 5-inch gun and is designed to provide accurate fire support for
ground forces to an objective range of 63 nautical miles. In order to fire
the munition, elements of the existing 5-inch gun design including the gun
barrel, magazine, ammunition handling, and gun initialization systems were
modified. In addition to changes in the gun, the Navy has also developed a
naval fires control system, which will be used to receive, process, and
execute warfighter fire mission requests for the gun system. The Navy is
installing the modified 5-inch guns, each with a magazine capacity of 232
Extended Range Munition rounds, and fires control systems onboard 32
Arleigh Burke class destroyers (DDG 81 through DDG 112), but has abandoned
plans to equip 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers with all the capabilities
needed to fire the new munitions. Table 3 summarizes major events that
have occurred in the Extended Range Munition program.
Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range Munition
Year Events
1996 o Operational requirements for an extended range munition are
approved that reflect Marine Corps range and accuracy needs.
o Program begins with system design and demonstration as opposed
to concept and technology development.
o Navy contracts with Texas Instruments in Dallas, Texas, for
development and testing of a 5-inch precision munition.
1997 o Raytheon acquires Texas Instruments.
1999 o Raytheon relocates development of the program to Tucson,
Arizona, resulting in workforce disruption and delays.
o Design of components changes as contractor learns effects of
fluctuating pressures subjected to the munition when fired.
2001 o Planned initial operating capability not achieved; currently
planned for 2011.
2002 o Navy alters requirements triggering a change from submunition to
unitary warhead.
o Redesign continues.
2003 o Critical design review completed based on design of
developmental test rounds--design of production ready munition
remains incomplete.
o Land-Based Flight Test 1 fails due to guidance and tail fin
issues.
o Gun environment instability continues until gun pressures are
stabilized in 2004.
2004 o Navy partially halts work on the program due to budget,
schedule, and performance issues.
o Navy awards second, separate demonstration contract for an
alternate munition and discusses a competition for future
contracts.
o Navy partially restarts the program for work in specific areas.
2005 o Engineering Flight Test A succeeds in demonstrating launch and
guided flight of the munition.
o Engineering Flight Test B fails due to an issue with the
guidance system.
o Land-Based Flight Test 2 fails due to canard and rocket motor
issues.
o Land-Based Flight Test 3 fails due to a manufacturing issue.
o Land-Based Flight Tests 4 and 6 fail due to canard issues.
o Land-Based Flight Test 5 succeeds in demonstrating launch and
guided flight of the munition.
o Proposed munition quantities increase with Marine Corps
involvement.
2006 o Navy ceases funding for alternate munition due to test
failures--effort continues through funding added by Congress.
o Program costs trigger a change in acquisition category resulting
in a shift in oversight to Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Sources: Contractor and Navy (data); GAO (presentation).
Despite the progress on the gun and fire control systems, development of
the munition has been more challenging than initially anticipated. When
the program began in 1996, the Navy planned to use several components from
the previously developed 5-inch semi-active laser guided projectile and
assumed that few changes to these components were necessary. Navy
officials then approved an accelerated schedule that began directly with
development and demonstration of the system design.4 In the late 1990's,
the program began to experience technical problems with the explosive used
to propel the munition from the gun, resulting in damage to munition
components. These problems resulted in the need to redesign certain
components. Additional design changes occurred in 2002 when warhead
requirements were altered by the Navy. Although work on the program was
partially halted from February to May 2004 due to poor testing performance
and cost and schedule growth, the contractor continued to redesign
components in several areas, such as the rocket motor, tail fins, and
guidance system, in order to improve performance. After redesign of
individual munition components, testing of the munition resumed. Beginning
in February 2005, the contractor sought to demonstrate the munition's
reliability through a series of seven land-based flight tests. Five of
these tests failed due to component issues; two of these failures have
been traced to a lack of quality controls with suppliers.
The Navy's decision to accelerate the program's schedule by entering
directly into system design and demonstration increased cost and schedule
risk in the munition's development. Our work on best practices has shown
that a critical first step in developing systems is to fully demonstrate
technologies before system development begins, thereby reducing program
risk and creating confidence that technologies will work as expected.5 The
Navy chose to accept this technical and design risk by allowing the
Extended Range Munition to enter system design directly. Since a
knowledge-based process was not effectively utilized early in the program,
the Navy could not provide an accurate estimate for the resources needed
for development.
Challenges to date have resulted in schedule delays and significant cost
growth. Figure 3 shows the total estimated cost and schedule growth in the
program since 1996.
4 The Defense Department's framework for managing acquisition programs,
presented in DOD Instruction 5000.2, establishes 5 program phases: concept
refinement, technology demonstration, system development and
demonstration, production and deployment, and operations and support. A
program may be authorized to enter into the acquisition system at any
point consistent with phase specific entrance criteria and statutory
requirements.
5 For more information see GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon Systems Outcomes,
GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, DC: July 30, 1999).
Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range Munition Program
The Navy originally estimated that development of the munition would
require $86 million. Currently, the Navy projects that development will
require a total of $475 million.6 Increases in production costs are due in
part to a decision to increase procurement of the munition from 8,500
rounds to 15,000 rounds. In August 2006, oversight of the program was
elevated by requiring that major programmatic decisions, such as approval
of the Navy's estimate for resources needed for completion and the
strategy for development and testing, be approved by the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics rather than the Navy.
While this restructuring has elevated oversight, a comprehensive review of
the program by the Undersecretary has not been performed.
As a result of challenges in developing the munition, the Navy sought
possible alternatives to the Extended Range Munition and awarded a second,
separate demonstration contract in May 2004 for the Ballistic Trajectory
Extended Range Munition. The munition's rocket motor caused test failures
and led the Navy to conclude that any further efforts to develop the
munition for competition would not be worthwhile. According to a Navy
official, the Navy concluded that the Extended Range Munition was a more
viable option for fielding a tactical round by fiscal year 2011 and is no
longer requesting funding for the Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range
Munition. Instead, the Navy has chosen to modify the current contract and
continue development of the Extended Range Munition. Navy officials state
a competition could still occur in 2011 for production of the Extended
Range Munition.
6 All amounts shown as base year 1996 dollars.
While the Navy intends to begin fielding the Extended Range Munition in
2011, major risks remain. The program faces technical challenges in
demonstrating the munition's guidance components as well as successfully
completing component testing and ensuring reliability of the munition.
Even though the program had two successful land-based tests in 2005, the
Navy has yet to repeat such demonstrations and does not plan to begin
shipboard testing until 2010. The Navy currently plans to conduct 40
land-based guided flight tests prior to the shipboard event. According to
program officials, the Navy continues to evaluate plans and identify
resources required for completing development of the munition. Program
officials are considering alternative plans for testing the munition's
reliability through additional component and land-based flight tests.
Until these plans are completed and approved through a comprehensive
review by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, uncertainty remains on whether the Navy's revised strategy
follows a knowledge-based approach and aligns the program's available
resources with the Navy's goal to begin fielding in 2011.
Affordability Concerns in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program Have Led to
Reductions in Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities and Procurement Quantities
The Zumwalt class destroyer will deliver far fewer quantities of ships and
munitions for naval surface fire support than envisioned 10 years ago. The
primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy's concept for
the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary performance at an
unrealistically low cost. In 2001, the Department of Defense recognized
that additional time and money were required to develop and field the
destroyer and concluded that a new approach was necessary. Through a
series of decisions, the Navy restructured the program by adding time for
technology development, trading naval surface fire support capability for
lower costs, and reducing the planned number of ships. At the same time,
other ship capabilities were maintained or even expanded, leading to
increased cost and additional technical risk. The capability trades and
quantity reductions in the Zumwalt class destroyer program increase the
Navy's dependence on the less capable Extended Range Munition (ERM) to
provide naval surface fire support, as shown in figure 4.7
Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface Fire
Support
The Zumwalt class destroyer program represents the Navy's solution for
addressing a mission need identified in 1994 for a 21st century surface
combatant capable of, among other things, projecting sustained naval
surface fire support for amphibious and other ground forces. The program
was derived from a concept for a tailored capability ship identified as
the Maritime Fire Support Ship. This concept featured significant naval
fires capabilities--including two advanced 155 millimeter gun systems
capable of firing a land attack munition up to 100 nautical miles--as well
as robust surface and subsurface warfare capabilities, reduced signatures,
and reduced crewing compared to that of current ship classes. The Navy
used the characteristics of the Maritime Fire Support Ship to serve as a
basis for developing requirements for the DD 21 land attack destroyer.
These requirements were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in 1997 and featured robust capabilities related to naval surface
fire support including threshold quantities of 2 advanced gun systems,
1200 munitions capable of long range land attack, and 128 missile launch
cells. When sized to these capabilities, DD 21 was expected to displace
over 17,000 long tons. Requirements also included ambitious targets for
reduced manning and a low radar cross section. DD 21 plans, along with
other Zumwalt class program events, are shown in table 4.
7 The Department of Defense notes that the Zumwalt class destroyer's
planned capacity for land attack munitions--and its ability to replenish
munitions while underway--offered sufficient capability to meet current
programmatic and operational requirements for naval surface fire support.
While the ship may meet requirements as they are currently stated,
decreases to munition capacity on the order of 50 percent--especially when
coupled with ship quantity reductions from 32 to 7--lessen the
contribution of the Zumwalt class destroyer in performing naval surface
fire support and result in a greater reliance on other fire support
systems.
Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class Destroyer
Year Event
1994 o Navy identifies need for a new 21st century surface combatant
(SC 21) to provide naval surface fire support.
1997 o Analysis for SC 21 found that using a family of ships--as
opposed to one ship--built on a common hull offered advantages.
o Navy approves minimum requirements for DD 21 including 2
advanced gun systems, 1200 land attack munitions, and 128 missile
cells.
o Plans for DD 21 include 32 ships with an average unit cost not
to exceed $921 million (FY96$) and an initial operational
capability of fiscal year 2008 (Acquisition Program Baseline -
January 1998).
1999 o DD 21 program costs increase to account for development of
software and key systems including the volume search radar,
advanced gun system, and integrated power system.
o DD 21 program plans revised to include 32 ships with an average
unit cost not to exceed $956 million (FY96$) (Acquisition Program
Baseline - March 1999).
2001 o DD 21 program restructured to emphasize technology development
and affordability.
o Program renamed DD(X) and designated within a family of future
surface combatants including a future cruiser and littoral combat
ship.
2002 o Marine Corps releases a memorandum with a requirement for each
DD(X) to be equipped with 2 advanced gun systems and 900 to 1200
land attack munitions.
o Navy completes its review of requirements for future surface
combatants and recommends a force structure of 16 DD(X) each with
2 advanced gun systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile
cells.
o Navy recognizes the need for an additional $7.6 billion to
complete DD(X) technology development, testing, and evaluation
efforts.
2003 o Chief of Naval Operations directs that DD(X) capabilities
include 2 advanced gun systems, 600 land attack munitions, and a
minimum of 80 missile cells.
o Navy modifies DD(X) radar design, increasing air defense
capability while adding development risk.
2004 o DD(X) program restructured to include a quantity of 8 ships, an
average unit cost not to exceed $2.6 billion (FY96$), and an
initial operational capability of fiscal year 2013 (Acquisition
Program Baseline--April 2004).
o DD(X) operational requirements approved which reflect minimum
naval surface fire support capabilities outlined by the Chief of
Naval Operations in June 2003 and incorporate the Marine Corps
requirements for range, accuracy, and system response time.
2005 o Navy approves a DD(X) system design, which includes 2 advanced
gun systems with 300 rounds each, a convertible storeroom capable
of holding an additional 320 land attack munitions, and 80 missile
cells.
o Navy approves new plans for the DD(X) program including a
procurement quantity of 10 ships, an average unit cost not to
exceed $3.1 billion (FY96$), and an initial operational capability
of fiscal year 2014 (Acquisition Program Baseline--November 2005).
o Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics authorizes detail design and construction of 8 ships.
o Navy pursues further cost reductions and eliminates the 320
round capable convertible storeroom, saving approximately $19
million in procurement costs per ship.
2006 o Navy outlines its 30 year shipbuilding plan in a report to
Congress, which identifies plans to construct 7 DD(X) destroyers.
o DD(X) program renamed DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer.
o Congress authorizes split funding of two lead ships but states
that procurement costs for the two ships should not rise above
$6.528 billion.
Sources: Navy (data); GAO (presentation).
In 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed concerns that
the program's cost estimate was unrealistic and that the program was not
adequately funded.8 Although originally envisioned as a tailored
capability ship, DD 21 requirements outlined a multimission ship featuring
several revolutionary technologies. These concerns prompted the Navy to
restructure the program and revisit its planned family of ships concept.
As a result, the Navy revised its family of ships approach to include a
future destroyer named DD(X), a future cruiser known as CG(X), and a new
littoral combat ship. This approach sought to take advantage of
commonality among the three programs in an effort to mitigate risk in
technology development.9 Figure 5 shows the different technologies
introduced through the DD 21 and DD(X) programs.
8 Since 2001, the Navy has taken some actions to improve the realism of
cost estimates, although we have also reported on additional measures the
Navy could take. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with
the Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2006) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management
Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs,
GAO-05-183 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005).
Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided Missile
Destroyer
The DD 21 and DD(X) programs introduced several revolutionary
technologies, many of which remain in development.
The Navy's Surface Combatant Spiral Development Review in 2002 recommended
a multimission DD(X) configured with 2 advanced gun systems, 900 land
attack munitions, and 96 missile launch cells as the most cost-effective
basis for developing DD(X) requirements. These capability reductions were
expected to decrease the ship's cost by reducing the destroyer's weight
from nearly 17,000 long tons expected for DD 21 to approximately 15,700
long tons. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that the
size of DD(X) be reduced to 14,000 long tons while retaining multimission
capability. To achieve these goals, the Navy reduced planned DD(X) land
attack munitions to 600 and decreased minimum requirements for missile
launch cells to 80 per ship. In an effort to address Marine Corps concerns
regarding the reduced naval surface fire support capabilities offered by
DD(X) as compared to DD 21, the Navy modified the DD(X) design to include
a convertible storeroom capable of holding an additional 320 land attack
munitions. The Chief of Naval Operations also directed the Navy to revisit
its plan for developing a volume search radar for the DD(X) design.
According to Navy officials, undertaking development of a less
technologically mature, but potentially more powerful volume search radar
for DD(X) was worthwhile because it would help preserve a competitive
industrial base in advance of CG(X) development. The change would also add
air defense capability to DD(X), giving the ship capability that exceeds
performance requirements. Achieving these benefits, however, would require
the Navy to delay testing for the volume search radar and commit nearly
$20 million in additional research, development, test, and evaluation
funding for the DD(X) program to manage the significant technical risk
associated with developing the more challenging technology. One month
following the Chief of Naval Operations's directive, the Navy modified the
ship's radar development contract to accommodate the higher risk volume
search radar approach.
9 For more information on Zumwalt class destroyer technology development,
see GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R (Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2005) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the
DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2004).
In 2004, the Department of Defense approved new program goals and
operational requirements for the DD(X) program that reflected a plan to
procure fewer ships, projecting less naval surface fire support capability
than DD 21. Figure 6 shows how program costs and quantities have changed
over time.
Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program
Continuing cost pressures in the program led the Navy to reevaluate DD(X)
capabilities, technologies, and design as part of a comprehensive cost
reduction effort. As part of this effort, the Navy eliminated the DD(X)
convertible storeroom from the ship's design. Although yielding
approximately $19 million in procurement savings per ship, this decision
reduced the ship's naval surface fire support capability by almost 35
percent. Other DD(X) capabilities and technologies including the ship's
dual band radar (volume search radar and multifunction radar), integrated
computing environment, and reduced signature features were not
significantly affected during this process. According to Navy officials,
contractor estimates have identified $265 million in procurement savings
achieved for each Zumwalt class destroyer.
In 2006, the Navy changed the name of the DD(X) program to DDG 1000
Zumwalt class destroyer and reduced planned ship quantities to 7. Although
this decision reflected the practical realities of recognizing more
realistic costs, these reductions nevertheless increase the Navy's
reliance on successful outcomes in the Extended Range Munition program in
order to complete future naval surface fire support missions. This
reliance is further compounded by Navy decisions that have reduced the
number of land attack munitions each Zumwalt class ship is capable of
carrying. However, because the Extended Range Munition offers less range
and capability than the DD(X) long-range land attack munition, the Navy
may be forced to accept additional risk in certain fire support missions.
Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range Munition on 32
Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be supplemented with 7 Zumwalt
class ships carrying long-range land-attack munitions.
Navy Has Begun Development of Some Candidate Systems for Future Naval Surface
Fire Support Capabilities
The Navy has begun science and technology efforts for the electromagnetic
railgun and multipurpose loitering missile, but has not approved
development or fielding of these systems as formal acquisition programs.
The Office of Naval Research is leading efforts to develop and test a
prototype of the electromagnetic railgun and estimates that the system
will require approximately $216 million to complete its initial
demonstration phase in support of fielding around 2025. The
electromagnetic railgun is one of four key naval prototype efforts within
the Office of Naval Research, which together represent 50 percent of the
agency's fiscal year 2007 proposed investment in leap-ahead innovations.
Naval Sea Systems Command is managing preliminary tests and the
development effort of the Affordable Weapon System, which is one candidate
for the multipurpose loitering missile concept. The project has received
approximately $155 million to date in support of these efforts. While
neither the electromagnetic railgun nor the multipurpose loitering missile
have been formally chosen as programs for acquisition, these systems
provide the Navy and Marine Corps with potential options for future naval
surface fire support capabilities. Further analysis by the Navy and the
Department of Defense will determine whether these technologies are
feasible and if these systems are needed.
Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabilities
Based on the 2005 Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support
of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, the Extended Range Munition
and Zumwalt class destroyer will not provide the full range of
capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. Analysis performed for
the initial capabilities document studied the capabilities of systems
across the services to provide fire support in the littorals and
identified 4 capability gaps--command and control of joint fires, engaging
moving targets, minimized collateral damage, and achieving volume fires
effects. While the Navy has initiated efforts to address remaining naval
surface fire support needs, it faces challenges in further defining
requirements for volume of fire, shaping acquisition outcomes to meet the
needs of the expeditionary warfighter, and managing command and control
issues related to fire support.
Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Significant Naval
Surface Fire Support Capability, but Cannot Meet All the Needs of Future
Warfighters
In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and
validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the
Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the fire
support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the gaps
that exist in meeting these needs. Needs were defined by collecting
guidance, tasks, conditions, and standards for fire support from each of
the services, including those presented by the Marine Corps's letters on
naval surface fire support. Gaps in capability were identified by
analyzing the ability of current and planned systems throughout the fires
triad, including the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer,
to fulfill the defined needs. As could be expected from any analysis of
current versus desired capabilities, the initial capabilities document
identified a number of gaps. The document lists the gaps in order of
priority as 1) the ability to transmit and receive targeting information
to enable command and control of fire support, 2) engaging moving targets
in poor weather, 3) providing fire support when collateral damage or
casualties in friendly forces is a concern, and 4) providing volume fires
to achieve suppression of enemy targets.
While the initial capabilities document approaches fire support needs and
capabilities from a joint perspective--meaning that the need for fire
support and the systems providing it can come from the Navy, Marine Corps,
Army, or Air Force--it does address naval surface fire support systems
specifically. The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer were
treated as planned systems within the analysis, as they are expected to
become available within the 2005 to 2015 time period considered in the
study. The analysis conducted for the initial capabilities document
revealed that if these systems are implemented as currently planned they
will provide the warfighter with improved capabilities to engage certain
targets, especially in restricted conditions such as poor weather.
However, they do not provide enough additional capability to close any of
the four gaps. Future systems for naval surface fire support, such as the
electromagnetic rail gun and the multipurpose loitering missile, were not
considered as they will not be available until after 2015.
The analysis performed for the initial capabilities document discussed a
number of weaknesses in current and planned naval surface fire support
systems. For instance, the analysis determined that Navy ships cannot take
full advantage of targeting information communicated from other systems
affecting their ability to provide accurate fire support, especially when
collateral damage is a concern. Munitions currently in use or development
also lack the ability to hit moving targets, as they have neither the
sensors to detect moving targets nor the ability to update the location of
targets while in flight. The need for volume fires is not fully met by the
Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer either, and multiple,
simultaneous calls for volume fire provide a challenge as well. Officials
state that this gap in volume of fire persists despite the low number of
calls for suppression anticipated by the analysis--5 targets or 0.3
percent of the total fires called for in the scenarios analyzed--due to
the reductions made in munitions available for naval surface fire support
and uncertainty about the effects expected.
Risks Remain in the Navy's Approach for Addressing Future Needs in Naval Surface
Fire Support
Requirements for Volume of Fires Need Further Definition
The Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals
Initial Capabilities Document provides greater definition for volume of
fire than articulated in earlier Marine Corps's correspondence on naval
surface fire support, presenting new measures of effectiveness for
suppression. The document establishes a minimum capability needed to fill
the gap in volume fires for suppression that includes measures of
effectiveness for probability of damage against targets and a number of
targets to suppress as well as capabilities like range and rate of fire.
However, these desired minimum capabilities still lack a measure for the
duration of fire, or how long targets need to be suppressed or fired upon
to cause the stated amount of damage, and the amount of munitions needed
to cause these effects. Instead of providing measures for these
capabilities, the document reiterates previous analyses by stating that
more specific volume requirements are dependant on the situation. Initial
capabilities documents, like the Joint Fires document, do not generally
establish requirements but only suggest capabilities. A set of
requirements that quantitatively captures all the capabilities potentially
needed is a necessary precursor for the Department of Defense to determine
whether and how to address any resultant capability gap regarding volume
fires.
Current Navy Practices for Managing Resources and Requirements Increase Risk
That Warfighter Needs Will Go Unaddressed
Navy processes for defining requirements and allocating resources for
naval surface fire support systems may result in acquisition outcomes that
do not align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter. The
Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with developing
capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire support. However,
this division has not had a formal oversight role in the Extended Range
Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer programs. Instead, the Navy has
assigned management of requirements and resources for these programs to
its Surface Warfare division, which is charged with developing
capabilities and requirements for destroyers and other surface ships.10
This approach places the Navy at risk for making investment decisions in
its naval surface fire support programs without fully understanding the
potential impacts on operating concepts for expeditionary warfare.
For example, quantity requirements in the Extended Range Munition program
were initially established by the Navy's Surface Warfare Division.
However, a 2005 report from the Department of Defense's Office of the
Inspector General identified the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division as
responsible for both analyzing warfighting requirements for the Extended
Range Munition and validating planned procurement quantities in the
program. On the basis of the Inspector General's report the planned
quantities of the Extended Range Munition increased by over 75 percent in
order to meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. In
another example, resources and requirements for the Navy's multimission
Zumwalt class destroyer are principally managed by the Navy's Surface
Warfare Division. Cost challenges within the program have required the
Navy to reduce planned capabilities on the ship as well as procurement
quantities, which has significantly reduced the Zumwalt class's ability
and availability to provide naval surface fire support. This process of
cost and capability trades has been managed by the Navy's Surface Warfare
Division, not by the customer--represented by the Navy's Expeditionary
Warfare Division--who depends on the delivered capabilities. As a result,
current naval surface fire support capabilities of the Zumwalt class
destroyer may not be aligned with the priorities of the expeditionary
warfighter.
10 In contrast, the Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with
determining requirements and resources for amphibious and mine warfare
ships, but the Navy instruction defines a formal role for the Surface
Warfare Division in determinations for these ships as well.
Management of Command and Control Issues is Unresolved
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has designated the Navy as the
lead component to analyze the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface
Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three engagement
gaps presented in the initial capabilities document. However, no
organization has been chosen to analyze the first gap in capability, which
identified issues in fire support command and control. Any attempt to
close this gap could have consequences for systems developed to engage
targets, as they rely on the command and control architecture for target
assignment and information.
Conclusions
Since the retirement of the battleships in 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps
have worked to develop capabilities for naval surface fire support. The
Navy and Marine Corps chose to pursue an approach in which the Extended
Range Munition would provide near-term capabilities and the Zumwalt class
destroyer would provide capabilities over the medium term. However, this
investment strategy was defined by low levels of technical knowledge and
poor estimates of the financial resources that would be needed to acquire
this capability. As a result, the acquisition of systems for naval surface
fire support has been plagued by technical and budgetary challenges that
have delayed the fielding of any significant capability.
The recent joint analysis of fire support for forces operating in the
littorals has been an important and constructive process in generating
agreement and improving the knowledge base required to reconcile needs and
assets. Yet, more work needs to be done to reconcile these differences, as
evidenced by the gaps identified in the joint analysis. The presence of
gaps in capabilities should be expected from any analysis of current
resources, and it does not necessarily follow that all gaps must be closed
with more resources. However, if gaps are to remain in place, this result
should be the product of deliberate analysis and decision making that
takes into account the views of the warfighter. At this point, there are
several issues whose resolution will enable the kind of analysis needed to
fully reconcile naval surface fire support needs with fire support assets.
First, although the Marine Corps has quantified many of its requirements
for naval surface fire support in a way that allows the Navy to guide
development of its systems, volume of fire remains ill-defined. While the
Marine Corps maintains the importance of volume fires, the failure to even
roughly quantify needs within thresholds and objectives leads to the
absence of this capability in the systems the Navy develops as well as
difficulty in planning munition procurement. By working with the Navy and
other services to better define the effects required and to create
operational concepts for a system or combination of systems that could
achieve volume effects, the Marine Corps may be able to better provide
this capability to warfighters in future conflicts.
Second, although the Navy and Marine Corps have reached an understanding
on naval surface fire support requirements as a whole, translation of this
understanding to the capabilities and quantities of individual systems
must yet be reached. Over the past 10 years, the decisions made on
individual systems such as the Extended Range Munition and the Zumwalt
class destroyer have reduced the capabilities the Navy plans to make
available to provide fire support for the Marine Corps's operations. These
decisions were reached without providing a formal role for the Navy's
Expeditionary Warfare Division in deciding the requirements and resources
allocated to platforms that provide naval surface fire support, increasing
risk that acquisition outcomes will not align with the priorities of the
expeditionary warfighter.
Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended
Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a
position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition to
provide fire support than originally planned. This program still faces
significant development risks, a fact recognized by the decision of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to
elevate oversight of the program.
Finally, while the Navy's Surface Warfare Division has begun the analysis
of gaps related to engaging targets, no office has been selected to
analyze the gap in command and control of fire support in the littorals.
To ensure that current and future systems provide a fire support function
within the larger command and control network, it is important that this
gap be analyzed in conjunction with the other identified capability gaps
in joint fire support.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Department's efforts to address naval surface fire support
needs, we are making the following four recommendations:
o To determine the desired effects for volume of fire, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy and Marine
Corps to define quantitative requirements and operational concepts
on use of volume fires, especially when using precision weapons
for suppression or simultaneous strikes. This analysis should be
used to 1) inform and update the non-nuclear ordnance requirements
process used to determine procurement objectives for these
munitions and 2) clarify the capability gap for volume fires as
identified in the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in
Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals.
o In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire
support are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts
of the forces they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations's
Expeditionary Warfare Division, as the division charged with
establishing capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire
support and liaison to the Marine Corps, a formal role in
developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing
resources for Navy systems responsible for providing naval surface
fire support.
o In light of the changes to the schedule, budget requirements,
and design of the Extended Range Munition program, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, as the program's
milestone decision authority, conduct a comprehensive review of
the program to validate progress and acquisition plans that will
incorporate results from current and planned program studies and
direct changes as necessary.
o Given the importance of command and control in coordinating fire
support, especially in the complex environment imposed by joint
operations in the littorals, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Navy to designate the appropriate organization
for managing an analysis of alternatives related to this gap and
ensure that the results of this analysis are coordinated with
solutions for identified engagement gaps.
Agency Comments and Our Review
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
recommendation to define quantitative requirements and operational
concepts on the use of volume fires as well as the recommendation to
conduct a comprehensive review of the Extended Range Munition program.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to provide a formal role
to the Expeditionary Warfare Division in decisions regarding naval surface
fire support, stating that the department will review the existing role of
the Director, Expeditionary Warfare and relevant Navy directives and make
adjustments if necessary. It also stated that the role of Expeditionary
Warfare was recently formalized for the munitions requirements and
procurement process, but that the guns and launchers which fire these
munitions are the responsibility of the Surface Warfare Division. In
conducting its review, we believe the department should be mindful that
naval surface fire support capability is not limited to munitions but also
includes guns, ships, and other systems.
DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to address the
command and control gap identified by the Initial Capabilities Document
for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals,
but indicated that full analysis of this gap will be deferred and not
coordinated with the initial analysis of engagement gaps. This is
surprising given that the initial capabilities document identified
correcting weaknesses in command and control as the highest priority in
its analysis. We are concerned that deferring command and control to a
later analysis continues a history of inattention to this area.
DOD's written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. The
department also provided technical comments which were incorporated into
the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the
Navy; and interested congressional committees. We will also provide copies
to others on request. We will also make copies available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected] .
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO Staff who made
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Paul L. Francis
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire support
have been established, we reviewed current and historical Navy, Marine
Corps, and joint force documents that identify requirements related to
naval surface fire support and that explain operational concepts for
expeditionary warfare. We analyzed and compared these documents to
determine 1) when the joint services reached formal agreement on naval
surface fire support requirements, 2) how these requirements align with
the Marine Corps's key operating concepts for expeditionary warfare, and
3) the degree to which these requirements include clear, quantitative
measures of performance. To supplement this analysis, we further discussed
these issues with Navy, Marine Corps, and joint force officials
responsible for establishing naval surface fire support requirements. We
also interviewed Navy program officials responsible for developing and
procuring the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer to
understand how naval surface fire support requirements have been
incorporated into these programs.
To assess the Navy's progress in developing and fielding the Extended
Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for naval
surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation including
performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions, acquisition
strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and testing plans and
results. We also drew from our prior work related to best practices and
development and cost challenges in the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt
class destroyer programs. In addition, we reviewed Department of Defense
reports related to these and other programs for naval surface fire
support. To supplement our analysis, we interviewed Navy and Office of the
Secretary of Defense officials responsible for managing resources and
requirements in naval surface fire support programs. We also discussed
program challenges and risks with the acquisition managers, contractors,
and testing community associated with each system.
To determine whether current Navy systems in development will fulfill
naval surface fire support requirements, we comparatively analyzed the
joint services' most recent requirements document related to naval surface
fire support--the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support
of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals--with the validated
performance requirements for the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class
destroyer. To identify actions taken to address situations where naval
surface fire support requirements may not fully align with the
capabilities planned for these systems, we interviewed officials from the
Navy, Marine Corps, joint services, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the
Navy's Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the Marine
Corps's Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and Operations
offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems; and
the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer program offices.
We also met with officials from the Department of Defense's Office of the
Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,
Joint Forces Command, the Naval Surface Warfare Center--Dahlgren Division,
the Office of Naval Research, Affordable Weapon System project office, the
Defense Contract Management Agency, Raytheon Missile Systems, BAE Systems,
and Alliant Techsystems.
We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841
Staff Acknowledgments
Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant
Director; J. Kristopher Keener; Christopher R. Durbin; Ryan Consaul; and
Lily Chin.
(120520)
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-115 .
To view the full product, including the scope
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Highlights of [36]GAO-07-115 , a report to Subcommittee on Projection
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
November 2006
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire
Support
Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to better
protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the Marine
Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and the Navy
began developing two systems to meet these needs--the Extended Range
Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class
destroyer.
GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have
been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended Range
Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also
analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and whether
gaps remain.
To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and
programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine
Corps as well as other interested organizations.
[37]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense clarify requirements for
volume of fire, clarify Navy and Marine Corps roles in managing resources,
comprehensively review the Extended Range Munition program, and assign
responsibility for assessing the gap in command and control. DOD concurred
with the first and third recommendations, and partially concurred with the
others.
In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began
to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities
needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are
still lacking for volume of fire--the delivery of a large quantity of
munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a
target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of
fire, it is difficult to assess whether additional investment is necessary
or the form it should take.
The Navy's Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost
more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver
fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical
challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original
cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed
delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition's path for
development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and
munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while
a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies
that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land
attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The
primary reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the
Navy's original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically
low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in
the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008.
The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command
and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather;
engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets
that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of
the joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and
Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios,
they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The
Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the
three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to
analyze the gap in command and control, which is essential for target
assignment and information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in
programs to fill remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary
warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary
warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing
requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems
that provide naval surface fire support.
References
Visible links
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-115
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