Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence, Clear	 
Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments  
in Collective Protection (19-JAN-07, GAO-07-113).		 
                                                                 
For the military to operate in environments contaminated by	 
chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a 
protected environment for group activities. GAO previously	 
reported persistent problems in providing collective protection  
for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report,	 
GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and
biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided	 
collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major  
expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for	 
managing installation protection policies and prioritizing	 
critical installations for funding. In conducting this review,	 
GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence 
of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat  
areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-113 					        
    ACCNO:   A64984						        
  TITLE:     Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence,   
Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide	 
Investments in Collective Protection				 
     DATE:   01/19/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Biological agents					 
	     Biological warfare 				 
	     Biological weapons 				 
	     Chemical agents					 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Chemical weapons					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal intelligence agencies			 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military intelligence				 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military policies					 
	     Protective equipment				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-07-113

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key A

          * [4]Current Assessed Threat of Missile Attack Stems Mainly from
          * [5]Terrorist Threat to U.S. Installations Also Is Expected to I
          * [6]Significant Uncertainties Exist regarding Key Aspects of the

     * [7]Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Cons

          * [8]Most Critical Fixed Facilities in High Threat Areas Do Not H
          * [9]Guidance on the Use of Collective Protection Was Often Uncle
          * [10]Inconsistent Guidance and Limited Resources Affected Some Ma

               * [11]Infantry Units Operating in Similar Environments Have
                 Differ
               * [12]About One-Half of Navy Ships Are Not Meeting
                 Requirements
               * [13]Inconsistent Guidance and Shortages of Collective
                 Protection

     * [14]Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Polic

          * [15]Overall Installation Protection Activities Are Fragmented an
          * [16]Priorities for Allocation of Installation Protection Resourc

     * [17]Conclusions
     * [18]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [19]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [20]GAO Contact
     * [21]Acknowledgments
     * [22]GAO's Mission
     * [23]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [24]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [25]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [26]Congressional Relations
     * [27]Public Affairs

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Relations, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

January 2007

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to
Guide Investments in Collective Protection

GAO-07-113

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of
Chemical and Biological Threat 8
Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Consistently
Addressed 13
Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies Undermines
Decision Making on Critical Priorities 23
Conclusions 31
Recommendations for Executive Action 32
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense 39
Appendix III DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry 42
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 44
Appendix V Comments from the Director of National Intelligence 47
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48
Related GAO Products 49

Tables

Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection Equipment 15
Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary Warfighting
Assets 18
Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection 20

Figures

Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher 10
Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter 21
Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support 22
Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple DOD
Organizations 25

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
JPEO Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 19, 2007

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security and
International Relations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Shays:

The U.S. security environment has changed markedly in recent years. Once
focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union, with its nuclear
arsenal and massive conventional forces, the Department of Defense (DOD)
and intelligence community now face a more diverse threat. The new
security environment includes not only hostile nation states, but also
terrorist organizations around the world who may possess asymmetric
capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. Many of these weapons can be difficult
to detect, since much of the technology, equipment, and materials needed
to develop them also have legitimate commercial applications. DOD has
repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of the use of chemical and
biological weapons against U.S. forces both at home and abroad, and
recently reported that it is continuing to increase funding for defenses
against such weapons.1 Understanding the nature of the chemical and
biological threat from adversaries, and the dangers this threat poses to
U.S. forces, is fundamental to DOD's ability to make risk management
decisions regarding where and how to focus investments in defending U.S.
forces.

In the event of chemical or biological weapons use, DOD policy emphasizes
avoidance of contaminated areas. When avoidance is not possible, DOD
normally provides protective suits for military personnel required to
operate in contaminated environments. However, while DOD has made
improvements, these suits limit mobility and are difficult to wear for
long periods. For this reason, collective protection areas, which are
specially constructed environments such as portable tent systems or rooms
with equipment designed to provide a pressurized and filtered environment
for groups of personnel, may be needed at some fixed facilities and
expeditionary warfighting assets, including ground, naval, and air assets.
Such collective protection equipment enables individuals to remove their
individual protective gear and still perform essential activities, such as
operational command and control, medical, and certain logistics functions;
or simply rest. In prior reports on chemical and biological defense, we
have reported persistent problems regarding the provision and
effectiveness of collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat
areas overseas. DOD states that American interests abroad will be the most
likely targets in the coming decade. The department operates numerous
overseas facilities that are critical to U.S. ability to project, support,
and sustain military forces and operations worldwide during war time.

1Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006).

DOD's approach to risk management requires commanders to combine
assessments of the threats to facilities, their vulnerabilities, and
critical assets into an overall assessment of risk, which is then used to
allocate resources to correct vulnerabilities. DOD introduced its risk
management approach in 2001. However, we recently reported that it was
facing difficulties in its implementation.2 For example, we found that
DOD's organizational culture resists department-level approaches to
priority setting and investment decisions. In addition, DOD also faced
challenges in integrating its management framework and reform initiatives
into a coherent, unified management approach. DOD is currently examining a
series of management reforms to help unify and improve operations.

You asked that we review the effectiveness of DOD's program to provide
collective protection for U.S. forces. In this report, we examine (1)
current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2)
the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection against
vulnerabilities at critical fixed facilities overseas and major
warfighting expeditionary assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing
overall installation protection policies and prioritizing critical
installations for funding. This report is an unclassified version of our
December 2006 classified report.

To examine the current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological
threats to DOD facilities, we reviewed briefings and other intelligence
products, and we interviewed officials from a variety of national and DOD
intelligence organizations. These organizations included the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and each of the four regional combatant commands with
critical overseas facilities in their areas of operations. For the
purposes of our review, we defined high threat areas to be those within
missile range of three nation states with some chemical and biological
warfare capabilities or those at high risk of terrorist attack. To
determine the levels of collective protection provided to critical
facilities, in the absence of a DOD critical installation priority listing
across the services, we worked with a number of DOD offices to develop the
criteria needed to determine which sites were considered critical. The
criterion called for DOD to identify those sites that must remain
operational during a chemical or biological event, such as command and
control nodes, rest and relief areas, emergency medical locations, and
intelligence sites in order for DOD to complete its mission; and where
there would be no capability to transfer the function or capability to an
alternate location. The Joint Staff then assisted us in requesting
information from the responsible combatant commands regarding which
installations and facilities overseas were considered critical from their
warfighting perspectives using our criteria, and the amount and type of
collective protection equipment available at each site. We also worked
with military service and department-level offices to obtain detailed
listings of the type and amount of equipment provided in major
expeditionary assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and aircraft.
To examine DOD's framework for managing overall installation protection
activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we
reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and reports by GAO and DOD. We
also conducted interviews with responsible officials at the department and
military services levels, as well as at the U.S. Central, European,
Pacific, and Southern Commands. We assessed the reliability of data used
in this report and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We conducted our review from September 2005 through August 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in appendix
I.

2GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, [28]GAO-06-13 ,
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).

Results in Brief

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to
provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant
uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat.
These problems challenge the ability of the intelligence community to
develop assessments--such as the national intelligence estimate on
chemical warfare, which has not been updated since 2002--to help guide DOD
and other governmental risk assessments and investment decisions.
Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD
installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or
biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other
means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. Although
several nations are assessed to have chemical and biological warfare
capability, the threat is currently assessed with varying levels of
confidence to stem primarily from a handful of countries. Three countries
are assessed to have the capability to develop at least some chemical and
biological agents and possess the missiles to deliver them. DOD expects
this threat to increase in coming years as these countries continue to
improve their missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from
al Qaeda, and while presently limited regarding chemical and biological
weapons, this threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to
try to acquire chemical and biological agents. Despite these threat
assessments, the intelligence community has recognized significant
uncertainties in the quality and depth of intelligence about those
threats. Such uncertainty raises questions about the actual level of
damage that might be sustained during an attack and the actual threat
posed by our adversaries, and is thus critical information for officials
making risk management decisions on investments to protect U.S. forces,
and those approving funding for such investments. However, while the
National Intelligence Council, under the leadership of the Director of
National Intelligence, has been able to work together and issue a new 2006
national intelligence estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties
in the biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been
able to issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical
warfare threat since 2002. We are recommending that the Director of
National Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his
ability to update the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and
take the necessary steps to bring the report to issuance.

Collective protection vulnerabilities at both critical overseas facilities
and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets are not widely or
consistently addressed with operational capabilities. For example, nearly
80 percent (97 of 125) of overseas sites identified as critical by
combatant commanders, based on criteria we provided them, did not have
collective protection equipment available. Moreover, while collective
protection equipment was limited across all four regional combatant
commands, it also was not consistently fielded in high threat areas. About
two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did not receive
collective protection. In addition to the uncertainties in assessing key
aspects of the chemical and biological threat, the reasons for the limited
and inconsistent fielding of collective protection at critical overseas
fixed facilities appear to be rooted in the often unclear and inconsistent
guidance on its use. While DOD guidance encourages the use of collective
protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to guide overarching
strategic decisions on its use. In addition, guidance provided by the
individual services--except for the Air Force-is often vague and
inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for
collective protection should be left to local commanders' discretion or
prescribed by the services, (2) when the various types of collective
protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be
protected. Similarly, we also found collective protection shortages and
inconsistent guidance affected some major expeditionary warfighting
assets, such as infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units. For
example, despite the Army and Marine Corps infantry often operating in
similar environments, the Army called for its ground units to have
collective protection while the Marine Corps did not. In addition, while
Navy guidance has for many years required ships, such as aircraft
carriers, destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships, to have collective
protection, about 47 percent of these ships had the required equipment.
Small medical units and large hospital systems designed to be set up in
rear areas also exhibited shortages and inconsistent requirements. The
intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all combine
to make it difficult for commanders to make clear risk management
assessments of the need for collective protection and of the risks of not
providing it. Given the intelligence uncertainties discussed above and the
challenges commanders face in making decisions regarding the need for
collective protection, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense
direct the development of clear and consistent criteria to guide
overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective protection at DOD
facilities. We are also recommending that the department and military
services review their current policies and, where appropriate, develop
consistent guidance on when such equipment is required for naval, ground,
and air forces, and that the services establish consistent criteria on
requirements for collective protection at military service medical units.

DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related
installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, making it
difficult for the department to ensure that collective protection
resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. More specifically,
opportunities to target funds to improve preparedness and protect critical
military personnel, facilities, and capabilities from attacks using
weapons of mass destruction may be lost. As we have previously reported, a
large number of DOD organizations are engaged in efforts to improve
installation preparedness, but no single entity has been given the
authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of
installation preparedness. In past reports, we and others have recommended
the department designate a single integrating authority for installation
preparedness, which the department agreed to do, but has not yet
implemented. As a result, this lack of an integrated approach and clear
lines of authority and responsibilities exacerbates an already complex
challenge of balancing warfighting needs associated with the collective
protection program with other competing needs. For example, the department
has not formally established a methodology to identify facilities and
infrastructure that are critical to protect, and therefore has not
identified facilities that should receive priority for collective
protection or other installation protection improvements.  Without an
integrated approach, along with clear lines of authority, responsibility
and accountability, collective protection resources may continue to be
applied inconsistently, and facilities of a lower priority may be afforded
protective measures that are needed for more critical facilities. At the
close of our review in August 2006, DOD announced that it was beginning a
major new reorganization of its policy directorate to respond to the
changing security threat and to better support the warfighting commands in
this environment. We believe the reorganization provides DOD with an
excellent opportunity to realign responsibilities in an effort to correct
its long-standing problems in this area. To address these challenges, we
believe the Secretary of Defense--as part of the new reorganization--needs
to appoint a single authority with responsibility for coordinating and
integrating worldwide installation preparedness policies and operating
concepts, as previously recommended. We further recommend that this
authority also oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on a criterion
for identifying critical facilities and infrastructure and to develop a
system for prioritizing critical facilities for funding protection
improvements.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD and the Director of
National Intelligence both generally agreed with all of our
recommendations. Their written comments and our evaluation of them are on
page 33 of this report.

Background

DOD's program to provide collective protection is managed by the Joint
Project Manager for Collective Protection under the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO).3 The JPEO has
overall responsibility for research, development, acquisition, fielding,
and other aspects of support for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear defense equipment, as well as medical countermeasures and
installation protection in support of the National Military Strategy.4 As
one of eight project managers in the JPEO, the mission of the Joint
Program Manager for Collective Protection is to develop, procure, and
field collective protection equipment that protects U.S. forces from
chemical, biological, and radiological contamination.

Between fiscal years 2002 to 2005 DOD's procurement budget for the overall
chemical and biological defense program totaled about $2.4 billion,
including about $218 million for collective protection. During fiscal year
2006, the procurement budget for collective protection totaled about $31.4
million. Most of these funds, about $16.2 million, were budgeted for the
procurement of expeditionary medical shelters; another $10.4 million was
budgeted for installation of collective protection equipment on certain
classes of Navy ships; and another $5 million was budgeted to provide
collective protection for field hospitals. The Joint Program Manager for
Collective Protection has no program to fund the integration of collective
protection systems into buildings. Funds for this type of collective
protection often come from military service construction or operations and
maintenance program funds. Although the Guardian Installation Protection
Program under the JPEO was originally designed to provide some funding for
collective protection and other installation protection improvements, this
program was primarily focused on domestic installations and its funding
has been substantially reduced.

In making decisions regarding whether to seek funding for collective
protection under DOD's risk management approach, commanders first conduct
threat assessments to identify and evaluate potential threats to their
facilities and forces, such as terrorist attacks, using intelligence
assessments of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past
activities. The intelligence community continuously assesses the chemical
and biological warfare threats to U.S. interests around the world, and the
individual agencies issue finished intelligence products with those
assessments. Under the leadership of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council coordinates and
issues periodic national intelligence assessments reflecting the overall
intelligence community's assessments and judgments on the current and
future threat from chemical and biological warfare and other threats.

3The Joint Program Executive Office is under the overall leadership of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs.

4The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed DOD
to centralize the overall coordination and integration of the chemical and
biological warfare defense program and the chemical and biological medical
defense program. Pub. L. No. 103-160 S 1701.

Following the threat assessments, commanders also use vulnerability and
criticality assessments as additional inputs to the decision-making
process for making investments. Vulnerability assessments are conducted to
identify weaknesses that may be exploited by the identified threats and to
suggest options that address those weaknesses. For example, a
vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in security systems,
computer networks, or unprotected water supplies. Criticality assessments
are conducted to evaluate and prioritize important assets and functions
for funding in terms of factors such as mission and significance as a
target, helping to reduce the potential for expending resources on lower
priority assets.

Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of Chemical
and Biological Threat

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to
provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant
uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat.
These problems have challenged the community's development of
assessments--such as the National Intelligence Estimate on chemical
warfare, which has not been updated since 2002--to help guide DOD and
other government agencies' risk assessments and investment decisions.
Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD
installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or
biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other
means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. The missile
threat is currently assessed with varying levels of confidence to stem
primarily from a handful of countries, and DOD expects this threat to
increase in coming years as these countries continue to improve their
missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from al Qaeda, and
while presently limited regarding chemical and biological weapons, this
threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to try to
acquire chemical and biological agents. Despite these assessments, the
intelligence community has recently recognized significant uncertainties
in the quality and depth of intelligence about those threats. Such
uncertainty raises questions about the operational impact that might be
sustained during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries,
and is thus critical information for officials making risk management
decisions on investments to protect U.S. forces. However, while the
intelligence community has been able to work together and issue a new 2006
National Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties
in the biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been
able to issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical
warfare threat since 2002.

Current Assessed Threat of Missile Attack Stems Mainly from Three Countries and
Is Expected to Increase

The possibility of attack from nation states using missiles--or, in some
cases, artillery or Special Forces--to spread chemical or biological
agents is viewed as posing a significant threat to U.S. overseas
installations. DOD intelligence assessments indicate that the current
threat stems mainly from a handful of countries and DOD expects this
threat to increase. Intelligence estimates assess that several other
countries also have chemical and biological warfare capability and the
missiles to deliver agents. However, these countries are not assessed as
major threats since our relationships with them are not as adversarial as
with the primary threat countries. The intelligence community assesses
that the primary threat countries have the capability to produce at least
some types of chemical or biological agents, although there is
considerable uncertainty regarding many important aspects of these
countries' chemical and biological warfare programs. They are also
assessed to possess the missiles to deliver them, even though in most
cases it is unclear whether they have actually produced, weaponized, or
stockpiled any agent. Reports also indicate that the missile inventories
of these countries are composed primarily of SCUDs or their variants, with
ranges of 300 kilometers to 700 kilometers. Figure 1 shows a SCUD B
missile with launcher.

Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher

In addition, the three primary threat countries are assessed not only to
be actively pursuing technological improvements to these SCUDs and other
ballistic missiles to increase accuracy, range, and survivability but also
pursuing the development of new missile systems. For example, intelligence
reports indicate that one country is trying to extend the range and
accuracy of some of its existing ballistic missiles and is also developing
a solid propellant medium range missile with a range of at least 2,000
kilometers. Similarly, intelligence reports indicate that another of the
primary threat countries continues to pursue an intercontinental ballistic
missile and continues to develop extended range SCUDs and variants for its
medium range missiles that will likely enhance its warfighting
capabilities and complicate U.S. missile defense systems.

Terrorist Threat to U.S. Installations Also Is Expected to Increase

Intelligence officials believe that terrorists, primarily al Qaeda,
continue to try to acquire chemical and biological agents and therefore
pose a threat to overseas DOD installations. While the actual status of al
Qaeda's acquisition and development of chemical and biological agents is
unclear and its access to effective delivery methods presently is limited,
some intelligence agencies expect this threat to increase. For example,
some intelligence reporting projects that over the next decade terrorists
are likely to conduct a chemical attack against United States' interests
either at home or overseas. Future delivery methods could include such
devices as balloons, crop sprayers, mortars, or unmanned aerial vehicles.
During our review, 22 countries overseas were assessed as being at high
risk of some type of terrorist attack.

Significant Uncertainties Exist regarding Key Aspects of the Terrorist and
Missile Threat

DOD expects both adversarial nation states and terrorists to increase
their chemical and biological warfare capabilities. However, as
acknowledged by intelligence agencies and officials, and highlighted by
the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in its report to the President,5 the
intelligence community has struggled to handle the changing security
environment. These struggles include significant uncertainty regarding
important aspects of the chemical and biological threat and how to
communicate assessments of those threats. These problems can undermine the
ability of the intelligence community to develop assessments--such as the
National Intelligence Estimate on chemical warfare, produced under the
leadership of the Director of National Intelligence. The Estimate has not
been updated since 2002 and would help guide DOD and other government
agencies' risk assessments and investment decisions.

5Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).

As discussed in the Commission's report, many of the intelligence
community's assessments on secretive nations like Iran and North Korea
rely largely on inherently ambiguous indicators, such as capabilities
assessments, indirect reports of intentions, deductions based on denial
and deception efforts associated with suspect weapons of mass destruction
sites, and ambiguous or limited pieces of "confirmatory" evidence. As a
result, significant uncertainty arises regarding important aspects of
states' actual ability to employ chemical and biological warfare agents in
ways needed to cause large-scale casualties. However, as noted in the
Commission's report, in past years the intelligence community may not have
clearly communicated that uncertainty and dissenting opinions about
assessments based on that information, to decision makers in an attempt to
provide a "consensus" assessment. According to intelligence officials, in
the wake of the intelligence failures in Iraq, the community is attempting
to develop reforms such as providing better assessments that more candidly
recognize the uncertainties in the intelligence, and dissenting views
regarding the meaning of such information; as well as reforms in areas
such as the terms and definitions used to describe the severity of the
threat. According to these officials, notwithstanding the attempts at
reforms, there are continuing difficulties in gaining agreement on such
issues which can delay issuance of assessment information. For example, we
were able to obtain the recent 2006 national intelligence estimate on the
biological warfare threat. However, we were not able to obtain a recent
national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare threat because it
remains in development. The chemical warfare estimate was last updated in
2002.

With respect to specific chemical and biological warfare capabilities of
individual nation states, we found significant uncertainties regarding the
ability of the primary threat countries to use sophisticated dissemination
techniques to effectively disperse chemical and biological agents and
cause large scale casualties. Most ballistic missiles currently in their
arsenals, such as the SCUD and its variants, are relatively inaccurate,
and this inaccuracy increases with the range to the target. Accordingly,
techniques such as "air bursting" or "submunition" warhead loads may be
used to compensate for this inaccuracy. Air bursting, which is literally
the bursting of a warhead filled with chemical or biological agents in the
air, can dramatically increase the area of contamination compared to the
use of warheads bursting on the ground. Similarly, submunitions--which are
small bomblets inside a warhead--also improve agent dissemination by
covering an area more evenly than bulk filled munitions. Submunitions also
provide the opportunity to deliver agents such as sarin that are not
robust enough to survive release subsequent to a ground detonation or
supersonic airburst.

There is also significant uncertainty regarding terrorists' ability to
acquire and disseminate chemical and biological agents. Unclassified
intelligence information states that al Qaeda is interested in acquiring
or producing chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas and Sarin, but it
is unclear if it has actually acquired any chemical or biological agents.
However, as we reported in 1999,6 there are many technical challenges that
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda would have to overcome in order to cause
mass casualties using sophisticated chemical and biological warfare
agents. For example, while terrorists do not need specialized knowledge or
dissemination methods to use simple toxic industrial chemicals such as
chlorine, they would need a relatively high degree of expertise to
successfully cause mass casualties with sophisticated agents, such as VX
and anthrax. As such, some intelligence reporting concludes that given our
limited access to the al Qaeda organization and its heightened sense of
operational security, the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to
confirm that it has that capability until it is actually used.

Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Consistently Addressed

Combined with the uncertainty of the threat as previously discussed,
commanders face the difficulty of identifying their vulnerability to that
threat and how best to protect against it. In judging the vulnerability of
his or her command to that threat, the commander determines whether to
have collective protection, and if so, what type of protection is most
appropriate and what functions need to be protected. At the critical
facilities identified by the combatant commanders, we found that
collective protection equipment was not widely or consistently available.
The reasons for the limited and inconsistent fielding of collective
protection appear to be rooted in unclear and inconsistent guidance on the
use of collective protection. For example, while DOD guidance encourages
the use of collective protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria
to guide strategic decisions on its use. Moreover, guidance provided by
the individual military services--excepting the Air Force--is often vague,
inconsistent, or both with respect to key issues. Such issues include
whether local commanders make the decision to provide or not provide the
protection or the services prescribe those decisions, as is done in the
Air Force; what type of collective protection is most appropriate; and
what functions need to be protected. Similarly, we also found collective
protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some
major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval
vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and
inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to
make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective
protection and the risks of not providing it.

6GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, [29]GAO/NSIAD-99-163
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999).

Most Critical Fixed Facilities in High Threat Areas Do Not Have Collective
Protection

Officials from the four regional combatant commands responsible for
overseas operations identified 125 critical sites in 19 countries as
critical to their operations, 97 of which did not have collective
protection. Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat
areas did not receive collective protection. In addition, the department
did not have an overall DOD-wide list of sites formally identified as
critical despite long-standing requirements to identify and prioritize
such sites. As a result, in conjunction with several DOD offices, we
developed a definition of the term critical and requested that the four
regional combatant commanders identify sites meeting that definition.

The 125 sites identified as critical by the combatant commanders are
located on 64 large installations and other facilities and included many
command and control centers; many intelligence, communications, logistics,
and medical facilities; and a number of air bases. These facilities were
spread across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific and were
largely concentrated in four countries. As shown in table 1, 28 of these
sites (22 percent) had collective protection equipment available to allow
personnel to continue operations in case of attack. The limited amount of
collective protection we found is consistent with the findings of our
earlier reports dating back to at least the late 1990s. For example in
1997, we reported that few defense facilities in Southwest Asia and South
Korea had collective protection.

Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection Equipment

                                  Critical sites in countries   
                                 with high terrorist threat or  
                                 within range of missiles from  
                 Critical sites    primary threat countries     
Total number with collective                                 Sites without 
of critical       protection           Sites with collective    collective 
sites              equipment                      protection    protection 
125                 28 (22%)                              24            47 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also not
consistently fielded in high threat areas. As shown in table 1, 24 of the
28 sites with collective protection equipment were located in areas
assessed to be at high risk of attack by terrorists or within range of
missile attack by the primary threat countries. However, the 24 sites with
collective protection totaled about one-third of the total of 71 critical
fixed facilities in high threat areas. For example, 12 of the sites with
collective protection were located in one country, which is assessed to
have a moderate threat of attack from terrorists, but is within range of
attack from a nearby hostile nation. The Army identified 4 of its sites in
this country as critical to its mission, but only 2 of the sites had
collective protection. Additionally, a 2004 DOD security assessment
identified 1 of those 2 sites as having major shortcomings in collective
protection equipment, which raised questions about the command post's
viability as a warfighting command center. The Air Force provided all 10
of the critical sites on its air bases in this country with collective
protection, but critical air bases in another nearby country did not have
collective protection despite also being in range of missile attack by the
hostile neighbor. Air Force officials told us they view the threat in this
country as moderate.

Similarly, the Navy provided collective protection to its five critical
sites in one country in the Middle East, which is assessed as being at
high threat of terrorist attack and within range of missile attack from a
nearby hostile country. However, none of the four critical sites on a key
air base in another nearby country were provided with collective
protection, despite also being assessed at high threat of terrorist attack
and being within range of missile attack from the same hostile country.
According to Air Force officials, while there is no collective protection
currently at the base, they plan to provide such equipment in the future.

Guidance on the Use of Collective Protection Was Often Unclear and Inconsistent

While it is difficult to precisely specify the ultimate reasons for the
limited and inconsistent fielding of collective protection, the quality of
guidance on the use of the equipment appears to have been a contributing
factor since it was often unclear and inconsistent. DOD does not provide
clear overarching strategic guidance on many key issues that would help
commanders make decisions on the use of collective protection. Military
services and installation commanders are generally expected to address key
issues that include what level of threat justifies the investment in
collective protection. DOD guidance generally encourages the use of
collective protection and provides information on, among other things, the
nature of the chemical and biological threat to installations and forces,
the types of equipment available, and the pros and cons of using each, but
it does not prescribe criteria to guide the use of collective protection.
For example, in determining what level of threat justifies the investment
in collective protection, the commander assesses vulnerability from both
terrorist attack and missile attack. However, as discussed earlier,
intelligence on these threats does not make clear whether terrorists, such
as al Qaeda, possess the capability to produce mass casualties through the
use of chemical or biological weapons. A number of officials told us that
they believed the provision of collective protection equipment should be
targeted only at installations at high risk of missile attack, given
limited DOD resources and the likelihood that terrorist attacks alone lack
the capability to produce large-scale damage. However, the guidance does
not establish criteria differentiating between the two types of attacks,
which would help guide decision making.

In addition to DOD's lack of guidance, military service guidance on the
use of collective protection, excepting the Air Force, is often vague,
inconsistent, or both. For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps do not require collective protection to be provided at their
critical fixed facilities or other fixed facilities. Rather, these
services rely on the discretion of their local installation commanders to
determine whether to have the protection, what type of collective
protection should be provided, and which functions should be protected. In
contrast, Air Force policy requires that in the absence of guidance from
higher commands, Air Force commanders should plan to provide collective
protection for 30 percent of the personnel on their bases in areas judged
by the intelligence community to be at high risk of attack from terrorists
or other non state actors or attack from missiles launched by adversarial
nations. Consistent with the Air Force requirement for collective
protection, it had the most critical sites with the equipment. Of the 50
critical sites the Air Force operated, 16 had collective protection.
Meanwhile, the Army operated 51 critical sites and provided 7 sites with
collective protection, while the Navy operated 23 critical sites and
provided 5 with collective protection.

Once the decision to provide collective protection equipment is made, the
services--again excepting the Air Force--lack specific guidance to
determine what type of protection is most appropriate and what functions
need to be protected. The critical facilities identified in our review
used both integrated systems--with overpressure and filtration systems
built in to existing buildings--as well as simple portable tent systems.
Eighteen of the 28 sites had the overpressure and filtration systems
integrated into the construction of the buildings, while 10 sites had
portable systems such as tents with liners and filtration systems, which
could be erected inside the buildings or set up at locations around the
installations. While both can provide protection for groups of various
sizes, costs vary significantly depending upon factors such as square
footage to be protected and other construction elements. According to
officials, the portable tent systems may cost as little as $18,000
depending on the configuration. However, a recent installation of an
integrated system at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland cost about $1.8
million. In addition, local commands must divert existing operations and
maintenance funds to pay for the replacement filters and other costs to
sustain the integrated collective protection systems over time. According
to officials, this creates a significant disincentive to the initial
procurement of integrated collective protection equipment.

Finally, we also found little clear guidance regarding which functions
should be protected. Commanders generally do not have guidance to help
them determine whether to provide protection for command and control
functions, medical treatment facilities, areas for rest and relief, and
other base functions, or to cover only parts of these functions. Only the
Air Force provided clear guidance on this issue. As discussed above, Air
Force regulations state that commanders should plan to provide collective
protection for at least 30 percent of base personnel. These regulations
also describe requirements for coverage of specific functions, including
command and control, medical facilities, and dormitories and dining
facilities, and the level of protection required for each. During our
discussions at the combatant commands we noted that the other services
often had different views on the costs and benefits of the Air Force
requirement.

The intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all
contribute to the difficulty commanders face in making clear risk
management assessments of the need for collective protection or of the
risk of not providing it. In the absence of clear guidance to aid such
decisions, the potential for inconsistent and inefficient allocation of
DOD resources increases.

Inconsistent Guidance and Limited Resources Affected Some Major Expeditionary
Warfighting Assets

Similar to the inconsistent availability of collective protection for
critical overseas fixed facilities, collective protection equipment
shortages and inconsistent requirements also affected some major
expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval vessels,
and medical units (see table 2).

Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary Warfighting
Assets

                                 Percentage of Required/ 
                                                         
Asset                         Authorized              
Light infantry units          70%                     
                                                         
Army                          Not required            
                                                         
Marine Corps                                          
Navy ships                    47%                     
Air Force aircraft            Not required            
Medical units                 18%                     
                                                         
Small Army units              Not required            
                                                         
Small Marine Corps units      61%                     
                                                         
Army hospital systems         21%                     
                                                         
Navy hospital systems         96%                     
                                                         
Air Force hospital systems    Not required            
                                                         
Marine Corps hospital systems                         

Source: DOD.

While differing missions and other factors may explain inconsistencies in
the use of collective protection, no clear guidance was evident in many
cases to explain why forces operating in similar environments were not
provided the same level of protection against chemical or biological
attack.

  Infantry Units Operating in Similar Environments Have Different Guidance for
  Collective Protection

Despite operating in similar environments in areas such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps infantry units had different
requirements for collective protection. For example, according to Army
officials, the Army requires its light infantry units at the battalion
level to provide collective protection equipment (M20/M20A1 Simplified
Collective Protection Equipment Shelters), but the unit commander must
make the decision to actually request this equipment. Army officials told
us that as of August 2006, commanders had requested and received 2,506 of
the total Army authorization of 3,558 (70 percent). However, they could
not provide details on the units requesting the shelters because their
systems do not track non major end items.

In contrast, Marine Corps officials stated that they had no requirement
for collective protection and no systems on hand. According to these
officials, the current systems that are available are too large and bulky
to be carried with their fast-moving infantry units. They preferred to
depend on avoidance and decontamination techniques to mitigate any
potential chemical or biological threat. However, Marine Corps officials
also acknowledged their potential vulnerability and the need for
collective protection in documents dating back to at least 2002.7 Despite
the acknowledged need for the systems, concerns were subsequently raised
that analyses of the workload requirements for setup, installation, and
maintenance requirements, as well as formal techniques and tactics on
their use, would be needed before any collective protection systems could
be fielded. According to Marine Corps officials, these requirements had
not been completed at the time of our review.

  About One-Half of Navy Ships Are Not Meeting Requirements

Navy guidance has for many years required ships, such as aircraft
carriers, destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships to have prescribed
levels of collective protection equipment.8 However, as shown in table 3,
about 47 percent of naval vessels required to have collective protection
have such protection actually installed. According to Navy officials, many
of these ships were built prior to the requirement for collective
protection, and funds to retrofit these ships have been limited.

7U.S. Marine Corps memorandum, Statement of Need for the Interim
Collective Protection System, November 5, 2002.

8OPNAV Instruction 9070.1, Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the
U.S. Navy, Enclosures (2) and (3) (Sept. 23, 1988).

Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection

                                        Total number of  Number of ships with 
Ship class                                     ships collective protection 
Aircraft Carriers                                 12                     0 
Amphibious Warfare Ships                          36                    21 
Cruisers                                          23                     0 
Destroyers                                        45                    45 
Fast Combat Support Ships (Military                                        
Sealift Command)                                   4                     4 
Frigates                                          29                     0 
Totals                                           149              70 (47%) 

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center.

Navy guidance requiring collective protection also appears outdated,
inconsistent, or both in some areas. For example, according to Navy
officials, funding limitations have required them to focus existing
resources on those ships operating closer in to shore in "littoral"
waters, since these ships are more likely to be exposed to chemical or
biological agents than ships operating further out in deeper "blue water."
However, the Navy guidance continues to require that aircraft carriers,
which generally operate in deep water far from shore, have collective
protection installed. Navy officials told us that they believed that the
requirement was originally based on the threat of Cold War Soviet naval
tactics, and that the guidance had not yet been updated to reflect the
current threat environment. We also found inconsistencies in the guidance
regarding supply ships, such as station ships (required) and shuttle ships
(not required), operating in littoral waters.

  Inconsistent Guidance and Shortages of Collective Protection Found at Medical
  Units

We also found inconsistencies and shortages of collective protection at
medical units, such as small units that travel with their parent infantry
units and large hospital systems designed to be set up in rear areas.
These problems create military limitations and increase risks to U.S.
forces and capabilities.

For example, Army infantry units contain medical support groups, such as
battalion aid stations, that deploy with the parent unit into battlefield
areas. Army guidance requires these medical units to have a certain number
of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters consisting basically of
tents with protective linings and overpressure systems attached to the
backs of transport vehicles (see fig. 2). In contrast, the Marine Corps
had not established any requirements for its medical units to have these
systems. According to Marine Corps officials, avoidance and
decontamination strategies are their preferred method for handling
chemical or biological events while operating on the battlefield. In
addition, according to DOD officials, the Marine Corps often moves in
small air and sea transports with little room for collective protection
equipment, consistent with its traditional strategic mission. As a result,
Marine Corps units may use Army medical support in the areas where they
are deployed. However, the increasing use of joint operations, where both
operate in the same geographic area at the same time, may be blurring
traditional missions.

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter

While the Army requires its medical support units to have collective
protection systems, Army figures indicate that only 191 of the 1,035
required systems (18 percent) were on hand as of the end of fiscal year
2005. This situation is similar to that found in our 2002 review of Army
medical units in South Korea, when we found that only about 20 percent of
the required systems were scheduled to be purchased. The JPEO, which
procures these systems for the military services, has plans to procure
additional systems through fiscal year 2014. However, the planned funding
for these systems is lagging behind requirements, and the office will not
be able to procure all the needed systems by 2014. Officials told us that
only about 60 percent of the funding needed has been budgeted, and they
need an additional $323 million to fulfill all requirements.

Collective protection for larger expeditionary hospital operations is
provided by large portable tent systems with liners and pressurized
interiors, which may be combined to provide 200 to 300 beds or more. The
Army, Navy, and Air Force all have versions of these mobile hospitals (see
fig. 3). However, while the Air Force generally met its goal, shortages
and other serious problems continue to affect Army and Navy medical
facility collective protection.

Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support

According to Army officials, the Army acquisition goal was to have 23 of
these systems on hand, but it was only able to obtain 14 because of
funding limitations. Similarly, Navy officials told us that they only had
enough tent liners to protect about 460 beds of the approximately 2,220
total bed spaces currently required. Moreover, the collective protection
liners used to make the hospital tent systems resistant to chemical and
biological attack were not located with the tents, which were
prepositioned at various sites around the world. The liners were located
at a site in Virginia and would need to be moved to the same locations as
the hospital tent systems in order to provide a collective protection
capability. According to Navy officials, the Navy is aware of this
shortfall and is in the process of redesigning the requirements to provide
collective protection for its mobile fleet hospital tent systems. We
reported similar shortfalls in collective protection equipment at Army,
Navy, and Air Force portable hospital systems in South Korea in our 2002
report.

Our current review found that the Air Force generally met its goal for the
transportable hospital systems. According to data provided by the Air
Force, as of May 31, 2006, it had 156 of 162 (96 percent) required systems
on hand. Marine Corps officials told us that the Corps does not establish
such large transportable hospital operations and it has no systems in
stock, instead relying on the Navy to provide for Marine needs in this
area.

Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies Undermines
Decision Making on Critical Priorities

Our prior work and that of several DOD offices has highlighted DOD's
fragmented framework for managing the strategic use of collective
protection and other installation protection activities. This, combined
with the lack of agreed upon installation priorities guided by the robust
application of risk management principles, makes it difficult for the
department to ensure that funding resources are allocated efficiently and
effectively. More specifically, opportunities to target funds to improve
preparedness and protect critical military personnel, facilities, and
capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost.
Responsibilities for installation protection activities are spread over a
variety of DOD organizations and programs. These programs are designed to
address protection from threats ranging from terrorist attacks to
industrial accidents; however, with their different operating definitions
and evolving concepts, gaps and inefficiencies in collective protection
program coverage are created. In a 2004 report, we recommended that DOD
designate a single authority with responsibility for unifying and
coordinating installation protection policies. However, despite DOD's
agreement with that recommendation it has not yet implemented it. These
problems also prevent DOD from reaching agreement regarding departmentwide
standards to identify which facilities and infrastructure are critical and
compile an overall list of critical facilities prioritized for receiving
funds for protection improvements.

Overall Installation Protection Activities Are Fragmented and Disjointed

DOD policies and resulting management activities that direct the strategic
use of collective protection and other installation protection activities
are fragmented and disjointed. Responsibilities for key installation
protection activities such as (1) policy and oversight, (2) installation
threat and vulnerability assessments and risk management decisions on
appropriate protections, and (3) funding programs for installation
protection improvements are spread across a variety of programs and DOD
organizations, as shown in figure 4. No single DOD organization has
responsibility for developing unified policy and coordinating these
activities.

Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple DOD
Organizations

The variety of DOD organizations bring their own approaches to policy and
programs for installation protection, and these different approaches can
result in unresolved conflict and inefficient application of resources.
For example, responsibilities for installation protection (including
collective protection) reside primarily with installation commanders,
regional combatant commanders, the military services, and the Joint Staff.
At the same time, responsibilities for policy and oversight of
installation protection activities, such as the antiterrorism program, are
spread among the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, and others. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
developed worldwide antiterrorism policies and standards. However,
Homeland Defense is responsible for providing policy and oversight of
domestic antiterrorism activities.

Responsibilities for making installation threat and vulnerability
assessments and risk management decisions on collective protection or
other needed improvements are also spread across multiple organizations
and levels. For example, local installation commanders have basic
responsibility for these activities, but the military services, combatant
commanders, and others with responsibilities for missions taking place at
the installations are also involved. At the same time, organizations such
as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint Staff are involved in
providing over 20 different types of formal assessments of installation
vulnerabilities. For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency conducts
Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which examine the
vulnerability of large installations with 300 or more personnel to a
terrorist attack and the potential for mass casualties and large-scale
loss of life. The agency as well as others may also conduct "full spectrum
vulnerability assessments." As the name implies, these assessments examine
an installation's vulnerability to a wide range of threats that could
interrupt its ability to fulfill its mission, including attacks using
chemical or biological agents, attacks against information networks, and
attacks against supporting non-DOD infrastructure.

Similarly, funding for installation protection improvements also involves
a variety of organizations. For example, the combatant commanders have no
programs of their own to fund improvements at overseas facilities
important to their warfighting needs. According to combatant command
officials, much of the funding for improvements at the overseas
installations comes from the construction or operations and maintenance
programs of the military services that operate them. The JPEO Guardian
Installation Protection program provided another potential source of
funding, but the program has faced a number of problems. The Guardian
program was initiated in 2004 to provide improvements to protect critical
facilities from attacks ranging from terrorists to nation states using
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The program was
initially provided approximately $1.2 billion in funding for improvements
at 185 domestic and 15 overseas sites from fiscal years 2004 through 2009.
However, DOD recently cut funding for the program by about $760 million.
According to officials, because of the cuts, they stopped funding for
collective protection and other such improvements while the role of the
program and its list of projects were being reviewed by DOD. Antiterrorism
programs also provide some potential funding. Oversight of resources used
for overall antiterrorism activities is conducted by the Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, while
oversight of resources used for domestic antiterrorism activities is
conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.

We and several DOD offices have reported on problems associated with the
fragmented installation protection program structure. For example in
August 2004,9 we reported that the large number of organizations engaged
in efforts to improve installation preparedness, and the lack of
centralized authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate
departmentwide installation preparedness efforts were hindering overall
preparedness efforts and DOD's ability to ensure that its resources were
applied efficiently and effectively. Officials at the department, Joint
Staff, service, and installation levels told us that the lack of a single
focal point to integrate departmentwide installation preparedness efforts
among the many involved organizations adversely affected their ability to
resolve disagreements and develop needed overarching guidance, concepts of
operations, and chemical and biological defense standards. Because of the
absence of departmentwide standards, military services and installations
faced problems in prioritizing requirements for funding and personnel
resources, since such standards provided the basis for calculating
requirements. We recommended that DOD designate a single authority with
the responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation
preparedness improvement efforts at the department, service, and
installation levels.

9GAO, Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation
Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and
Comprehensive Planning, [30]GAO-04-855 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2004).

In May 2006, the DOD Inspector General reported that the problems with the
fragmented and disjointed program structure were continuing.10 According
to the report, responsibilities for installation protection activities
continued to be spread across multiple programs and organizations, with no
single DOD organization responsible for unifying and coordinating these
activities. Problems such as inadequate program structure, inadequately
coordinated program concepts, and a lack of generally accepted terminology
describing concepts and doctrine resulted in confusion and disagreement in
attempts to establish policy and assign responsibilities, inefficient
application of resources, and the lack of a strategic vision balancing all
areas of program responsibility. For example, the report found that the
lack of clear lines of authority and responsibilities for installation
protection activities between the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense was causing confusion and inefficiency. In
this regard, coincident with the establishment of the Homeland Defense
office in 2003, the Secretary of Defense called for development of a
chartering DOD Directive within 45 days to formalize the responsibilities
of the new Assistant Secretary and clarify the relationship between
Homeland Defense and other offices, such as Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict. However, according to officials in Homeland Defense,
the chartering directive was never formalized because of problems in
coordinating with the many DOD offices involved, the continuing evolution
of their responsibilities, and the focusing of resources on developing the
June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

In June 2006, DOD's Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Programs and the Joint Requirements Office also
issued a study on installation protection confirming many of the problems
identified earlier by us and the DOD Inspector General.11 This study was
called for as a result of the funding cuts in the Guardian Installation
Protection Program. The study pointed out that problems with the alignment
of antiterrorism, chemical and biological defense, critical infrastructure
protection, and other programs create difficulty in providing military
installations with capabilities for all-hazard planning, preparedness,
response, and recovery. The study also noted that DOD organizations were
not developing guidance to sufficiently resolve problems related to
inadequate policy, standards, and doctrine in these areas. Moreover, it
also reported that despite agreement with our 2004 recommendation calling
for designation of a single authority responsible for coordinating and
integrating overall installation protection efforts, DOD still had not
done so. This study made a series of recommendations designed to integrate
and unify installation protection and emergency preparedness programs and
concepts. This study also developed a plan to improve installation
protection at DOD facilities, recommending that some $560 million be
provided for installation protection improvements over 4 years, with
priority given to overseas facilities. However, the amount of funding
approved by DOD was sufficient only for the lowest levels of improvements
and did not include funding for collective protection and chemical and
biological detection improvements.

10Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General: Evaluation of
Defense Installation Vulnerability Assessments, Report No. IE-2005-001
(Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2006).

11Department of Defense, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
High-Yield Explosive Installation Protection Study Report (Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2006).

At the close of our review in August 2006, DOD announced a new
reorganization that will affect some of the organizations involved in
installation protection activities. The need for reorganization was
identified in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as
necessary to respond to the changing security threat by reshaping DOD
offices to better support the warfighting combatant commands and respond
to the new threat environment. According to DOD officials, the specific
policy and organizational changes that will result from the reorganization
will develop over the coming months.

Priorities for Allocation of Installation Protection Resources Were Not
Identified

Program fragmentation can also prevent DOD from reaching agreement in
prioritizing facilities for protection funding. A long-standing series of
directives and instructions, as well as DOD's June 2005 "Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support," have recognized the importance of
prioritizing installations in light of constrained resources and called on
DOD to identify critical infrastructure and to prioritize these assets for
funding improvements.12 Accordingly, early in our review, we requested a
list of critical overseas facilities from the Directors for Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, as well as from other offices
throughout DOD and the military services. However, DOD was unable to
provide us with such a list.

12See Department of Defense Directive 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance
Program (Jan. 20, 1998) (canceled by DODD 3020.40); Department of Defense
Instruction 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency
Response Guidelines, paragraph E3.1.8 (Dec. 4, 2002); and Department of
Defense Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program,
sections 4 and 5 (Aug. 19, 2005).

According to DOD officials, there are a variety of listings of critical
facilities and other infrastructure. However, each is compiled from the
limited perspective of the military service or other DOD organization
responsible for the asset, and not from an overall DOD strategic
perspective. According to these officials, gaining agreement on DOD-wide
priorities is difficult because of the fragmented organizational
structure, as well as policy and program changes following September 11,
2001. According to the May 2006 DOD Inspector General report, a lack of
stable funding and centralized prioritization and oversight for critical
infrastructure improvements has created problems throughout the combatant
commands. According to the report, determining which assets were critical
depended on mission requirements that varied with the level of command.
Thus, an effort to protect an asset critical to a combatant commander from
his or her warfighting perspective could receive a low priority from an
installation commander who may be focused on a different, non-warfighting
perspective. Similarly, DOD's June 2006 study of installation protection
was directed to create a prioritized list of installations to receive
funding for protective measures, but was unable to do so. According to the
report, it could not develop the list because of the short time frame
allowed for completion of the study and the controversial nature of
installation prioritization.

In recognition of this problem, we sent a letter to the Secretary of
Defense in November 2005 requesting clarification of the situation and DOD
actions to correct the problem (see app. II). DOD's response (see app.
III) acknowledged the importance of prioritizing its critical assets and
stated that it published DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program, in August 2005. This directive called for the
development of policy and program guidance for DOD-wide critical
infrastructure, including criteria and methodology to identify and
prioritize these assets. At the time of our review, this effort was being
conducted through the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense. In
addition, this office was also directed to conduct an assessment of all of
the activities that contribute to the department's ability to achieve
mission assurance to identify program gaps and other problems that could
interfere with mission assurance. According to program officials, the
framework for prioritizing DOD's critical infrastructure was expected to
be published in August 2006 but has not yet been formally adopted. It is
unclear when the assessment of program gaps will be completed. It is also
unclear to what extent the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense will
address aspects of critical infrastructure protection related to overseas
facilities identified as critical to warfighting missions.

Conclusions

As we and others have observed for several years, notwithstanding the
emergence of adversaries that can use chemical and biological weapons, the
fielding of collective protection equipment at both critical overseas
fixed facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets remains
limited and inconsistent. Assessing the need and priority for such
equipment is difficult because of the significant uncertainties in the
intelligence about the nature of the chemical and biological threat. While
the intelligence community recognizes the need to assess and communicate
these uncertainties about the chemical warfare threat, this information
has not been available to the agencies that need it. Specifically, the
intelligence community, under the leadership of the Director of National
Intelligence, has not been able to complete an up-to-date National
Intelligence Estimate on chemical warfare in part due to changing
assessment and communication policies, as well as issues surrounding the
basis or evidence for the assessments. In our view, an updated chemical
warfare National Intelligence Estimate is needed to provide a critical
input and basis for decisions on investments in chemical warfare defenses,
including collective protection.

Uncertainty about the threat can lead to resources being invested in
assets where they may not be needed. Conversely, not providing collective
protection where it may be needed can place military personnel and
operations at increased risk. In addition, allowing the current fragmented
and disjointed framework for managing installation protection policies to
continue without agreed-upon priorities for funding or clear requirements
and service guidance on the appropriate use of collective protection,
further increases the likelihood that limited DOD resources will be used
inefficiently and ineffectively. DOD's ongoing reorganization provides a
good opportunity to review the policy and programmatic gaps and
inconsistencies, gain the agreement of the competing organizations needed
to integrate the policies and operating concepts, and correct the
long-standing need for an overarching authority in this area.

Recommendations for Executive Action

In light of the need for the most current intelligence estimates to help
guide the government's--including DOD's--risk assessments and investment
decisions, we are recommending that the Director of National Intelligence
identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update the
chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the necessary
steps to bring the report to issuance.

To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and
collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place
military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the
efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense--as part of the ongoing
reorganization--take the following four actions to ensure better
coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance on
key operating concepts. To ensure better coordination and integration of
the overall installation protection activities, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Defense

           o designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility
           to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness
           policies and operating concepts and
           o assign this single authority with the responsibility to oversee
           efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on criteria for identifying
           critical facilities and to develop a system for prioritizing
           critical facilities and infrastructure for funding protection
           improvements.

To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and
biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense

           o direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear
           and consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions
           on the use of collective protection at DOD facilities, including
           issues such as whether decisions on the need for collective
           protection should be prescribed or left to commanders' discretion,
           the use of integrated overpressure and filtration systems versus
           portable structures, and what mission functions must be protected,
           and
           o direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their
           current policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent
           requirements on when collective protection is required for medical
           units, and naval, ground, and air forces.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a classified version of our draft report, DOD and
the Director of National Intelligence both generally agreed with all five
of our recommendations. Their unclassified comments on the classified
version are reprinted in appendices IV and V. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Regarding our first recommendation that the Director of National
Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to
update the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the
necessary steps to bring the report to issuance; the Director's office
stated that the National Intelligence Council began the process of
developing that estimate several months ago, and expects the update to be
published in early 2007. In this regard, DOD also called for the Director
of National Intelligence to prepare an integrated, worldwide chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threat
assessment. DOD stated that current assessments are fragmented and not
consistent across geographic areas. We agree that better coordinated and
integrated threat assessments, consistent across geographic regions could
help improve DOD's decisions regarding investments in the security needs
of U.S. forces worldwide. We encourage DOD to make this recommendation
directly to the Director of National Intelligence.

DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility
to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies
and operating concepts. DOD acknowledged that as currently practiced,
installation preparedness is not a formal program within the department.
DOD also noted that while it agreed with our recommendation, it believed
that the combatant commanders should be responsible for their respective
areas of responsibility and determine collective protection requirements
based on operational needs. We agree that the combatant commanders should
have flexibility to recognize special operational needs in the fielding of
collective protection in their areas of responsibility. However, as our
report clearly points out such determinations should take place within an
agreed-upon, coordinated, and integrated framework of DOD-wide
installation preparedness policies and operating concepts.

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, that the
integrating authority discussed in our second recommendation also be given
responsibility to oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on criteria
for identifying critical facilities and for developing an overall
prioritized list of critical facilities and infrastructure for funding
protection improvements. The department agreed with our recommendation to
assign oversight responsibility to a single integrating authority;
however, it suggested that rather than develop an overall prioritized
list, DOD should develop a "system" to prioritize the critical facilities
for funding protective improvements. DOD stated that this "system" to
prioritize facilities does not have to be a list "from 1 to n", but
instead may be tiers or bands of assets based on the strategic impact if
that asset was lost or degraded, using the all hazards approach to
vulnerability assessments. We agree that the identification of prioritized
tiers or types/bands of assets could satisfy DOD's needs in this area, if
done appropriately. However, we believe the danger with this approach is
the identification of tiers or types of assets so broad as to invite
continued disagreement and gridlock, leaving the situation essentially
unchanged. Nonetheless, to provide the department with flexibility to
implement this key action as a system, we adjusted our recommendation to
reflect DOD's suggestion.

DOD concurred without comment with our fourth and fifth recommendations
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and Military Services
to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic
decisions on the use of collective protection; and that those offices
review their current policies and develop consistent requirements on the
use of collective protection at medical units, and naval, ground, and air
forces.

As we agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send
copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
National Intelligence, and to interested congressional committees. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Davi M. D'Agostino
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the current assessments of chemical and biological threats to
Department of Defense facilities located overseas, we interviewed
intelligence officials from a variety of national and DOD intelligence
organizations, and reviewed briefings and other intelligence products
generated by these organizations. Specifically, we met with officials from
the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National
Ground Intelligence Center and DOD intelligence officials from each of the
four regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities located
in their area of operations. During our meetings, we obtained detailed
briefings and other intelligence products, which described the nature and
likelihood of a chemical or biological attack on U.S. troops and
installations, as well as other documents that described the capabilities
of terrorist organizations and adversarial nation states. Although we
could not independently verify the reliability of the information, we
obtained explanations of the basis for the assessments from intelligence
analysts and other officials. We also requested access to and briefings on
the most recent national intelligence estimates for both chemical and
biological threats from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. Although the office provided us with the latest intelligence
estimate on biological warfare, we were unable to obtain the latest
national intelligence estimate on chemical warfare. At the close of our
review in August 2006, the estimate remained in draft status and we were
unable to schedule a briefing with officials to discuss its contents.

To determine the levels of collective protection provided to critical
overseas facilities we worked with several DOD offices, first to develop
criterion needed to determine which DOD sites were considered critical,
and second, to identify the type and amount of any collective protection
equipment at each site. During the time of our review DOD had not
developed an overall agreed-upon methodology and listing of facilities
considered to be critical. As a result, we were required to develop our
own criterion for the purposes of this review. To develop this criterion
we reviewed existing DOD regulations and discussed potential options with
officials from a variety of DOD offices, including the Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program, the Joint Staff Office for Antiterrorism and
Homeland Defense, the Joint Requirements Office, the Joint Program Manager
for Collective Protection, and the Guardian Installation Protection
Program office. The criterion called for DOD to identify those sites that
must remain operational to complete its mission during a chemical or
biological event, such as command and control nodes, rest and relief
areas, emergency medical locations, and intelligence sites, and where
there would be no capability to transfer the function or capability to an
alternate location. The Joint Staff then assisted us by forwarding our
criterion to the regional combatant commanders for the U.S. Central,
European, Pacific, and Southern Commands, and requesting that they
identify their critical facilities and the type and amount of any
collective protection equipment currently located at those sites. Our
method of quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual
buildings identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when
identified separately by DOD officials. Following receipt of the responses
from the combatant commands, we verified the accuracy of those lists with
officials from each command.

To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major
expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels,
and aircraft, we reviewed DOD's Annual Report on Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials from each
service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to obtain detailed
listings of the type and amount of collective protection equipment
currently fielded by each service component. Once we obtained these
listings, we verified the information with officials from each service and
the Joint Program Executive Office. Based on these efforts and our
discussions with department and military service officials, we believe
that the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this report.

To examine DOD's framework for managing overall installation protection
activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we
reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD reports
and interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices responsible for
program management and oversight. Specifically, we met with officials from
the following offices:

           o Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
           Defense, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
           o Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
           Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
           o Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
           and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
           o Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
           Defense
           o Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological
           and Nuclear Defense
           o Joint Staff, Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense
           o Office of the Inspector General

                        o Regional combatant commands (Central Command,
                        European Command, Pacific Command, and Southern
                        Command)
                        o Military service components (Army, Navy, Air Force,
                        and Marine Corps)
                        o Defense Threat Reduction Agency
                        o U.S. Army Chemical School

We conducted our review from September 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense

Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Portions of this correspondence have been deleted for security reasons.

Appendix V: Comments from the Director of National Intelligence

Portions of this correspondence have been deleted for security reasons.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood,

Assistant Director (retired); Robert Repasky, Assistant Director; Lorelei
St. James, Assistant Director; Shawn Arbogast; Angela Bourciquot; Grace
Coleman; Jason Jackson; John Nelson; Rebecca Shea; Karen Thornton; and
Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-Based
Approach for Making Resource Decisions. [34]GAO-06-13 . Washington, D.C.:
November 15, 2005.

Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can
Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning.
[35]GAO-04-855 . Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2004.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks. [36]GAO/NSIAD-99-163 . Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 1999.

(350914)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-113 .

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
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512-5431 or [email protected].

Highlights of [44]GAO-07-113 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

January 2007

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to
Guide Investments in Collective Protection

For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and
biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed
collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for
group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing
collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In
this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical
and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided
collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major
expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing
installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations
for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify
critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in
overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile
attack.

[45]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) update the
chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate and that DOD take actions
to provide clearer, more consistent policies that guide the funding and
placement of collective protection and other installation preparedness
activities. In comments on a draft of this report, the DNI and DOD
generally agreed with of all of our recommendations.

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical
and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and
biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using
missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release
chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The
intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more
candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and
amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and
biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these
uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our
adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments.
However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National
Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the
uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an
update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving
assessment and communication policies.

Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical
overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets
(e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and
inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical
by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have
collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the
critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems
such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective
protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but
does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its
use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and
inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for
the equipment should be left to local commanders' discretion, (2) when the
various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and (3) what
functions need to be protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty
determining the need for collective protection.

DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related
installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which
affects DOD's ability to ensure that collective protection resources are
allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have
highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating
concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations involved.
These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which
critical facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and
make it difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs
and ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO
and others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate
and coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD
agreed. However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done
so.

References

Visible links
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-13
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-163
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-13
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-163
  44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-113
*** End of document. ***