NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International
Space Station (24-JUL-07, GAO-07-1121T).
This testimony discusses the challenges faced by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the International
Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the midst
of one of the most challenging periods in its history. As part of
its Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously
developing a range of new technologies and highly complex systems
to support future exploration efforts, completing assembly of the
space station, and retiring the space shuttle. This is NASA's
biggest transition effort since landing humans on the moon more
than 3 decades ago and then initiating the Space Shuttle Program
a few years later. Taken together, these efforts create
significant challenges in terms of managing investments, launch
and other facilities, workforce, international partners, and
suppliers. Clearly, any delays or problems in completing and
sustaining the space station itself, may well have reverberating
effects on NASA's ability to ramp up efforts to develop
technologies needed for future exploration or to support other
important missions. GAO has undertaken a body of work related to
NASA's transition efforts that include NASA's industrial supplier
base, its workforce challenges, development of new crew and cargo
spacecraft, and NASA's assembly and sustainment activities
related to the ISS. This statement focuses on the preliminary
results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO work completed
to date. Specifically, it will address the following challenges:
(1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS; (2)
maintenance of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the
shuttle; and (3) filling the gap between the shuttle and new
NASA-developed vehicles to service the ISS. NASA's ability to
overcome these challenges will be critical to ensuring the
availability of the International Space Station as a viable
research entity into the future. While these results and findings
are preliminary, many have been echoed in other studies and
identified by NASA itself. Our work is being conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-1121T
ACCNO: A73212
TITLE: NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the
International Space Station
DATE: 07/24/2007
SUBJECT: Commercial off the shelf
Foreign governments
International cooperation
Program evaluation
Schedule slippages
Space exploration
Staff utilization
Strategic planning
Technology
Delivery schedules
Space operations
International Space Station
Space Shuttle
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GAO-07-1121T
* [1]Background
* [2]Aggressive Launch Schedule for Space Shuttle
* [3]Shuttle Workforce Challenges
* [4]Filling the Gap between the Shuttle and New NASA-Developed V
* [5]NASA Dependence on Commercial Development
* [6]NASA Dependence on International Partners
* [7]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
* [8]GAO's Mission
* [9]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [10]Order by Mail or Phone
* [11]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [12]Congressional Relations
* [13]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
NASA
Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
GAO-07-1121T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges faced by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the International
Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the midst of one of
the most challenging periods in its history. As part of its Vision for
Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously developing a range of new
technologies and highly complex systems to support future exploration
efforts, completing assembly of the space station, and retiring the space
shuttle. This is NASA's biggest transition effort since landing humans on
the moon more than 3 decades ago and then initiating the Space Shuttle
Program a few years later. Taken together, these efforts create
significant challenges in terms of managing investments, launch and other
facilities, workforce, international partners, and suppliers. Clearly, any
delays or problems in completing and sustaining the space station itself,
may well have reverberating effects on NASA's ability to ramp up efforts
to develop technologies needed for future exploration or to support other
important missions.
GAO has undertaken a body of work related to NASA's transition efforts
that include NASA's industrial supplier base, its workforce challenges,
development of new crew and cargo spacecraft, and NASA's assembly and
sustainment activities related to the ISS. My statement today focuses on
the preliminary results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO work
completed to date. Specifically, I will address the following challenges:
(1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS; (2)
maintenance of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the shuttle;
and (3) filling the gap between the shuttle and new NASA-developed
vehicles to service the ISS. NASA's ability to overcome these challenges
will be critical to ensuring the availability of the International Space
Station as a viable research entity into the future. While some of these
results and findings are preliminary, many have been echoed in other
studies and identified by NASA itself. Our work is being conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background
NASA plans to finish assembling the ISS in fiscal year 2010 and operate
the station until 2016. The station is scheduled to support 6-person crew
capability as early as 2009. The shuttle was to be the primary means for
ISS re-supply and crew rotation. NASA's international partners were
planning to augment the shuttle's capabilities with their cargo and crew
spacecraft. Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, the President set a
new "vision" for NASA that called for the shuttle's retirement in 2010
upon completing ISS assembly. As part of the Vision, NASA is developing
new crew and cargo vehicles, with the crew vehicle currently scheduled to
be available in the 2015 timeframe. One of the vehicles--the Crew
Exploration Vehicle--will carry and support only crews traveling to low
earth orbit and beyond and will also be capable of ferrying astronauts to
and from the ISS. However, since these systems are not scheduled to become
operational until 2015, NASA plans to rely on international partners and
commercial providers to make up the 5-year gap in ISS logistics and crew
rotation resulting from the shuttle retirement.
Aggressive Launch Schedule for Space Shuttle
As we have begun our review of ISS assembly, several issues related to
NASA's space shuttle manifest have come to our attention. First, the
shuttle planning manifest dated January 2007 projects that NASA will
launch 16 missions before retirement of the shuttle in 2010--one of those
has already been launched. Of the 15 remaining missions, one will service
the Hubble Telescope and 2 are designated as contingency missions.
Assuming the contingency flights are included, on average, NASA will need
to launch one shuttle every 2.7 months--an aggressive schedule when
compared to recent launch timeframes. In the past, with three shuttles,
NASA launched a shuttle every 3.7 months on average after the Challenger
accident in 1986. Since the Columbia accident in 2003, NASA has averaged
10.8 months between launches.1 For the remainder of calendar year 2007,
NASA has three launches planned, which will total four missions for the
year. Due to vehicle traffic constraints, the minimum required time
between shuttle launches to ISS is 35 calendar days, so while the manifest
is aggressive, it is achievable.
Additionally, the current shuttle manifest leaves little room for
unexpected delays caused by weather damage or launch debris, which have
proven to impact the shuttle launch schedule significantly. For example,
in 2007, hail damage to the external fuel tank caused an unexpected three
month delay in a shuttle launch. While there are limits to the planning
NASA can do for such events, the tight schedule constraints leave little
room for significant delays as a result of such occurrences.
As evidence of the increasing pressure NASA is experiencing with regard to
the shuttle manifest, the ISS program office is planning for certain cargo
elements to be launched on the two final shuttle flights even though NASA,
as an agency, still considers these flights contingency missions. NASA is
also being forced to consider the possibility of canceling delivery of
some portions of the ISS. Specifically, NASA determined that if the
schedule slips, the Cupola observatory and the Node 3 connector built for
hardware, oxygen and waste storage may be slipped to contingency flights.
If that occurs and those flights do not launch, those elements may not be
assembled on ISS as originally planned.
1These values represent the time between the launch date of the flight
that resulted in loss of the shuttle and the launch date of the next
subsequent flight.
Finally, NASA officials explained that since only the shuttle is large
enough to deliver certain large Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) to the
ISS, they must be launched prior to retirement of the shuttle. These ORUs
are replacement segments for those segments operating on the ISS that fail
or reach the end of their life. The officials noted that NASA originally
planned to use the shuttle to launch and retrieve certain large ORUs that
are critical for ISS operations. After being brought back to Earth, the
plan was to repair and refurbish the ORUs and return them to service on
the ISS. However, with the shuttle no longer available to transport those
ORUs after 2010, NASA changed its strategy for providing them to ISS from
a refurbishment approach to a "launch and burn" approach. They suggested
that under the new strategy, NASA would build enough ORUs to cover the ISS
planned mission life and use them up over time. Large ORUs that originally
were to be launched and returned on the shuttle would have to be
pre-positioned on the ISS before the shuttle retires.
There is still much to be worked out with NASA's change in strategy for
positioning ORUs to cover the space station's planned mission life. For
example, the program office is still assessing the implications of
restarting production lines to produce additional spares. This involves
examining whether the right equipment, materials, expertise, and data is
still available--an endeavor that the ISS program office acknowledged
would be challenging. We will continue to monitor changes to the shuttle
manifest as they occur.
Shuttle Workforce Challenges
The space shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately 2,000
civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel. NASA must maintain a
workforce with necessary critical skills to manage the shuttle program
through its completion. In response to GAO recommendations, NASA has
undertaken several initiatives to attempt to address its potential
workforce drain.
In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited progress toward developing
a detailed strategy for sustaining a critically skilled shuttle workforce
to support space shuttle operations. We reported that significant delays
in implementing a strategy to sustain the shuttle workforce would likely
lead to larger problems, such as funding and failure to meet NASA program
schedules. Accordingly, we concluded that timely action to address
workforce issues is critical given their potential impact on NASA-wide
goals such as closing the gap in human spaceflight. At the time we
performed our work several factors hampered the ability of the Space
Shuttle Program to develop a detailed long-term strategy for sustaining
the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe space shuttle
operations through retirement. For example, the program's focus was on
returning the shuttle to flight, and other efforts such as determining
workforce requirements were delayed. In our report, we recommended that
NASA begin identifying the Space Shuttle Program's future workforce needs
based upon various future scenarios. Scenario planning could better enable
NASA to develop strategies for meeting future needs. NASA concurred with
our recommendation. The agency acknowledged that shuttle workforce
management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge as it
progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle and as such has acted to
respond to our recommendation.
For example, since we made our recommendation, NASA developed an agency
wide strategic human capital plan and developed workforce analysis tools
to assist it in identifying critical skills needs. NASA also developed a
human capital plan specifically for sustaining the shuttle workforce
through the retirement and, then transitioning the workforce. According to
agency officials, currently NASA is mapping the available skills of the
Space Shuttle workforce with the skills it will need for future work so
that it can better plan and implement workforce reassignments. NASA's
senior leaders recognize the need for an effective workforce strategy in
order to sustain the shuttle workforce through the shuttle's retirement,
which coincides with the completion of the ISS. Clear, strong executive
leadership will be needed to ensure that the risks associated with the
transition of the shuttle workforce are minimized.
Filling the Gap between the Shuttle and New NASA-Developed Vehicles to Service
the International Space Station
NASA has several options for filling the gap between the shuttle, which
will retire in 2010 and new NASA-developed vehicles that are not expected
to come on-line until 2015. The first relies on new vehicles developed
within the U.S. commercial space sector. The second relies on vehicles
developed by international partners--both new and legacy systems. There
are considerable challenges with all options NASA is examining.
NASA Dependence on Commercial Development
NASA is working with the commercial space sector to develop and produce
transport vehicles that can take equipment and ultimately crew to and from
the space station during the gap between the space shuttle and the crew
launch vehicle. Rather than buy these vehicles outright, NASA plans to
help fund their development and purchase transportation services or
perhaps even the vehicles themselves when they are needed. This program is
known as Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS). Currently,
NASA has seven COTS agreements--all are in the initial phases of raising
private funds for the development. NASA funding has been provided to two
companies, Rocketplane Kistler (RpK) and Space Exploration Technologies
(SpaceX). NASA has signed five more Space Act Agreements which facilitates
sharing technological information, but these agreements are unfunded by
NASA.
There are two phases to the COTS program, the first phase entails
technical development and demonstration and the second phase may include
the competitive procurement of orbital transportation services for ISS
logistical support. NASA officials noted that both RpK and SpaceX met
their first milestone to demonstrate financial progress by obtaining
private funding. However, RpK missed its second milestone in May 31, 2007
and had to renegotiate its Space Act Agreement milestone with NASA.
The International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force (IISTF)2
reported in February 2007 that the design, development, and certification
of the new COTS capability for ISS re-supply was just beginning. IISTF
stated that, "if similar to other new program development activities, it
most likely will take much longer than expected and will cost more than
anticipated." Our work has generally found space and other complex system
development efforts--including NASA-sponsored efforts--often encounter
schedule delays and technical problems when they are seeking to obtain
significant advances in technologies, move forward amid changing
requirements or with other unknowns, and/or are managed without adequate
oversight, In our opinion, risks may be high in these partnerships, given
that the suppliers do not have long-standing relationships with NASA or
other government agencies and the development of the COTS vehicles
represent totally new endeavors for most of these companies. As such, it
will be exceedingly important for NASA to establish sound program
management and oversight controls over these endeavors, establish clear
and consistent guidance, limit requirements changes, and ensure it has
adequate visibility into the progress being made by the COTS suppliers.
Our review will examine the extent to which these measures are being
taken. As you know, GAO has identified contract management as a high risk
area for NASA. Actions designed to enhance program management and
oversight are being implemented, but it may take years to complete them.
This may make it even more difficult for NASA to successfully manage and
oversee its relationship with the COTS suppliers. If NASA relies on these
development efforts without adequate oversight, the programs could fall
short of cost and schedule estimates, result in downgraded performance,
and ultimately impact overall sustainment of the ISS.
2As required by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No., 109-155 S801, the International
Space Station Independent Safety Task Force was charged with assessing the
vulnerabilities of the International Space Station.
NASA Dependence on International Partners
NASA has suggested that some supply activities during the gap can be
conducted by vehicles under development or currently in operation by
international partners--specifically, Europe, Japan and Russia--but these
vehicles have constraints. Our ongoing review will assess these
constraints in greater detail.
To begin with, new vehicles being developed by the European and Japanese
space agencies are very complex. Currently, the first test flight for the
European vehicle is likely to happen in January 2008. The Japanese vehicle
will not have its first operational flight until 2009. According to NASA
officials, both the European and Japanese vehicle developments experienced
technical hurdles and budgetary constraints, but both partners are
committed to fulfilling their roles as partners in the ISS program. They
do have confidence that the European vehicle will be available for ISS
operations before retirement of the shuttle, but they are not as confident
about the Japanese vehicle being ready by that time. NASA reliance on
these vehicles to augment re-supply activities after 2010 assumes that
further delays in their development will not occur. NASA's expectation is
that these vehicles will be developed in parallel with commercial
developments. The agency's preference is to use commercially developed
vehicles, rather than rely on the vehicles developed by the international
partners to cover the capability gap after retirement of the shuttle
fleet.
NASA also plans to continue working with Russia to provide crew and cargo
support to the ISS, but this has been facilitated through an exemption to
the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act. Russian vehicles
that were already operational were used to rotate crew and supply ISS
during the period after the Columbia accident and a Russian Soyuz vehicle
remains docked to the ISS continuously. The Iran, North Korea and Syria
Nonproliferation Act exemption expires at the end of 2011, at which time
any exchanges will be subject to the restrictions of the Act. However, if
commercial development does not produce a usable vehicle by that date, the
only vehicle that can support crew transportation is the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft. According to NASA officials, the agency is planning to request
a waiver to gain further exemption beyond 2011 if this situation occurs.
Additionally, there are challenges related to sharing knowledge with
international partners due to restrictions by the International Traffic in
Arms Regulation (ITAR). This was highlighted by the International Space
Station Independent Safety Task Force, and NASA has been working to
address the concerns laid out in that study. Over the years, GAO has
identified weaknesses in the efficiency and effectiveness of government
programs designed to protect critical technologies while advancing U.S.
interests. While each program has its own set of challenges, we found that
these weaknesses are largely attributable to poor coordination within
complex interagency processes, inefficiencies in program operations, and a
lack of systematic evaluations for assessing program effectiveness and
identifying corrective actions. However, in reviewing in the Joint Strike
Fighter, another complex international system development effort, we also
identified actions that could be taken early in programs to prevent delays
and other problems related to ITAR. Our review going forward will assess
the degree to which challenges in this area remain.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or the other members may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For further questions about this statement, please contact Cristina T.
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement include James L. Morrison, Brendan S. Culley, Masha P.
Pastuhov-Purdie, Keo Vongvanith and Alyssa B. Weir.
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