Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges	 
(11-JUL-07, GAO-07-1099T).					 
                                                                 
Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used  
by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map  
and monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as 
hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two	 
current acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National		 
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System	 
(NPOESS) program--which is to replace two existing polar-orbiting
environmental satellite systems--and the planned $7 billion	 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R)	 
program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due
to reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was
asked to summarize its past work on the progress and challenges  
facing these key environmental satellite acquisitions.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1099T					        
    ACCNO:   A72429						        
  TITLE:     Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and       
Challenges							 
     DATE:   07/11/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Climate						 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Earth resources satellites 			 
	     Geosynchronous satellites				 
	     Procurement					 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Satellites 					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Weather forecasting				 
	     National Polar-Orbiting Operational		 
	     Environmental Satellite System			 
                                                                 
	     NOAA Geostationary Operational			 
	     Environmental Satellite				 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-1099T

   

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                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

      Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, July 11, 2007                            
                                    ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE ACQUISITIONS                              
                                    Progress and Challenges                   
                                    Statement of Dave A. Powner, Director     
                                    Information Technology Management Issues  

GAO-07-1099T

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE ACQUISITIONS

Progress and Challenges

  What GAO Found

Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, technically
complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate
monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion
over the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch
planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced
escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These
factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby
decreasing the program's complexity by reducing the number of sensors and
satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying
the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016 (see table
below). Since that time, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective
management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and
significant risks remain.

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, GAO
reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R
system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these
vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of
GOES-R cost-- which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led
the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program's scope from four to
two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program
officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may
further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming months.
GAO also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned
from past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound
cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently
has work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.

Summary of Changes to NPOESS Program
Key area             Program before            Program after restructuring 
                        restructuring                                         
Life cycle range     1995-2020                 1995-2026                   
Estimated life cycle $8.4 billion              $12.5 billion               
cost                                                                       
                 First satellite by November 2009 First satellite by January  
                                                  2013                        
Launch schedule       Second satellite by June Second satellite by January 
                         2011                     2016                        
Number of satellites  6 (in addition to NPP)   4 (in addition to NPP)      
                                                  2 (early morning and        
                                                  afternoon; will             
                    3 (early morning, midmorning, rely on European satellites 
                                                  for                         
Number of orbits    and afternoon)             midmorning orbit data)      
Number and                                     9 instruments (7 sensors    
                                                  and 2                       
complement of       13 instruments (10 sensors subsystems); 4 of the       
                       and                        sensors are to              
instruments         3 subsystems)              provide fewer capabilities  
Number of data                                                             
records       55                               39 (6 are to be degraded    
                                                  products)                   

United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
our work on two major operational environmental satellite programs: the
$12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) program and the planned $7 billion Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) program.

Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are
used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and
monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment.
NPOESS--a tri-agency program managed by the Department of Commerce's
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of
Defense/US Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)--is expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment
monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting
environmental satellite systems. The GOES-R series, managed by NOAA with
assistance from NASA, is to replace the current series of satellites which
will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately
2012. This new series is expected to mark the first major technological
advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994. The NPOESS and GOES-R programs
are considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the
continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe
weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through
the years 2026 and 2028 respectively.

At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous work on
operational environmental satellite programs, including NPOESS and the
GOES-R program.^1 In preparing this testimony, we
relied on the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports contain
detailed overviews of our scope and methodology. All of the work on which
this testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

^1GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is
Under Way, but [3]Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,GAO-07-498
(Washington, D.C. April 27, 2007); Polar-orbiting OperationalEnvironmental
Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way,but [4]Challenges and Risks
Remain,GAO-07-910T (Washington, D.C. June 7, 2007); Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating
Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, [5]GAO-06-993 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from
Other Satellite Programs, [6]GAO-06-1129T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29,
2006).

  Results in Brief

NOAA is involved in two major satellite acquisition programs, NPOESS and
GOES-R, and both are costly, technically complex, and critically important
to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally
estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program,
with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few
years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the
program thereby decreasing the program's complexity by reducing the number
of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion,
and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016,
respectively. Since that time, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective
management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and
significant risks remain. Specifically, key acquisition documents that
were originally due in September 2006 are still not completed, the program
office is not yet fully staffed, and the early July turnover of the
program executive officer increases the program's risk. Additionally,
technical risks remain in the development of key system sensors and the
ground-based data processing system. In April 2007, we made
recommendations to complete key acquisition documents, increase staffing
at the program office, and delay reassignment of the program executive.
Implementation of these recommendations should reduce risk on this
critical acquisition.

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, we
reported that NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the
overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to
one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However,
analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4
billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program's scope
from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical
sensors. Program officials now report that they are reevaluating that
decision and may further revise the scope and requirements of the program
in coming months. We also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement
lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remained to be done
to ensure sound cost estimates and adequate system engineering
capabilities. We made recommendations to the program to improve its
capabilities for managing this program and agency officials agreed with
these recommendations and initiated efforts to implement them. We
currently have work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.

  Background

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational
environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
(NESDIS) is responsible for managing the existing civilian geostationary
and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called the
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites and the Polar
Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), respectively. The Air Force
is responsible for operating a second polar-orbiting environmental
satellite system-- the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).

Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data that are
processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather
products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical
weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting
weather 3 or more days in advance--including forecasting the path and
intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to
predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and
emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar
satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such
as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are
used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate monitoring.
Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar satellite configuration
consisting of two POES and two DMSP satellites.

            Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a
relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These satellites are uniquely
positioned to provide timely environmental data to meteorologists and
their audiences on the earth's atmosphere, its surface, cloud cover, and
the space environment. They also observe the development of hazardous
weather, such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their
movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and
life. Furthermore, the satellites' ability to provide broad, continuously
updated coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is
important to NOAA's weather forecasting operations.

                 Figure 2: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage

Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost
Overruns, and Schedule Delays

Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and risky
undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical problems,
cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have reported on a
historical pattern of repeated missteps in the procurement of major
satellite systems, including NPOESS, the GOES I-M series, the Air Force's
Space Based Infrared System High Program (SBIRS-High), and the Air Force's
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System (AEHF).^2 Table 1 lists
key problems experienced with these programs. While each of the programs
faced multiple problems, all of them experienced insufficient maturity of
technologies, overly aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract
management, and inadequate system engineering capabilities for overseeing
contractors.

Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems
Problem                                    NPOESS GOES I-M SBIRS-High AEHF 
Insufficient technical readiness prior to                                  
critical decision points                                                   
Inadequate preliminary studies prior to                                    
the decision to award a development        X      X        X               
contract                                                                   
Insufficient technical maturity prior to   X      X        X          X    
the decision to move to production                                         
Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates                                    
Optimistic assumptions including:                                          
       o savings from heritage systems        X      X        X               
       o readiness of technology maturity     X      X        X          X    
       o constant and available industrial                    X               
         base                                                                 
       o no weight growth                     X               X          X    
       o no requirements growth                                          X    
       o savings from lot buys versus                         X               
         single-unit purchase                                                 
       o overly aggressive schedule           X      X        X          X    
Poor program and contractor management                                     
Quality and subcontractor issues           X      X        X          X    
Inadequate systems engineering             X      X        X          X    
capabilities                                                               
Inadequate earned value management         X               X          X    
capabilities                                                               

Problem                                    NPOESS GOES I-M SBIRS-High AEHF 
Insufficient management reserve                 X                     X    
Ineffective contract award fee structure        X X        X               
Poor senior executive level oversight                                      
Infrequent meetings                             X                          
Inability to make timely decisions              X                          
Other                                                                      
Unstable funding stream                         X          X          X    
Unstable requirements                                      X          X    

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data.

^2 [7]GAO-07-498; [8]GAO-06-993; GAO , Defense Acquisitions: SpaceSystem
Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing Them, [9]GAO-06-776R (Washington,
D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold,
[10]GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases,
and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions,
[11]GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-orbiting
Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule
Changes, [12]GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense
Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of
Cost and Schedule Overruns [13],GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31,
2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on
Satellite and Related Acquisitions, [14]GAO-03-825R (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs
[15],GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites:
Action Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite
Program, [16]GAO/NSIAD-91-252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense
Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report
on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (May 2003).

  NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two
satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying
both civilian and military requirements. ^3 The converged program, NPOESS,
is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the
continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate
monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and
NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities:
NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the converged
system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition;
and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the development and
incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. NOAA and DOD
share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology
projects and studies. The NPOESS program office is overseen by an
Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of NOAA and
NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

^3Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994).

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to cost
about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its inception
in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide satellite development,
satellite launch and operation, and groundbased satellite data processing.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract was
awarded in August 2002, the estimated cost was $7 billion. Acquisition
plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites over the
life of the program, as well as the integration of 13
instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems (see
table 2).

Table 2: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical sensors are
                                    in bold)

                             Instrument Description

Advanced technology microwave Measures microwave energy released and
scattered by the atmosphere and is to be sounder (ATMS) used with infrared
sounding data from NPOESS's cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily
global atmospheric temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Retrieves  specific measurements of clouds  and
aerosols (liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the  atmosphere,
such as sea spray, smog, and smoke).

Conical-scanned microwave Collects microwave images and data needed to
measure rain rate, ocean surface wind imager/sounder (CMIS) speed and
direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture, as well as
temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels.

Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS)  Collects measurements of the  earth's
radiation to determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture,
and pressure in the atmosphere.

Data collection system Collects  environmental data from platforms  around
the world and delivers them to users worldwide.

Earth radiation  budget sensor  Measures  solar short-wave  radiation  and
long-wave radiation released by the earth  back into space on a  worldwide
scale to enhance long-term climate studies.

Ozone mapper/profiler suite  (OMPS) Collects  data needed  to measure  the
amount and distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere.

Radar altimeter Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface height,
significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to provide
critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction models.

Search and rescue satellite aided  tracking Detects and locates  aviators,
mariners, and land-based users in distress. system

Space environmental sensor  suite Collects data  to identify, reduce,  and
predict the effects of space  weather on technological systems,  including
satellites and radio links.

 Survivability sensor Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other
                       instruments in case of an attack.

  Total solar irradiance sensor Monitors and captures total and spectral solar
                                irradiance data.

Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite  Collects images and  radiometric
data  used  to  provide  information   on  the  earth's  clouds,   (VIIRS)
atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces.

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data.

In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory
Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several

Page 8 GAO-07-1099T

years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk
associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity
of climate data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites.

NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems
over Several Years

Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost
increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be
made about the program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we
reported that changes in the NPOESS funding stream led the
program to develop a new program cost and schedule baseline. ^4
After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the
program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7
billion to $8.1 billion, delaying key milestones, including the launch
of the first satellite, and extending the life of the program until
2020.^5

In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to
experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting
in schedule delays and anticipated cost increases. This was due in
part, to problems at multiple levels of management--including
subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive leadership.
Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer
executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a
decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program--
what would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved
deciding among options involving increased costs, delayed
schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued
oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making were more
critical than ever, and we urged the committee to make a decision
quickly so that the program could proceed.

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost
growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to
certify the program to Congress.^6 This placed
any decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office
implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to continue work
on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding.

^4 GAO;  Polar-Orbiting  Environmental  Satellites:  Project  Risks  Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, [17]GAO-03-987T
(Washington, D.C., July 15, 2003)

^5 [18]GAO-04-1054

^6GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellites: Cost  Increases
Trigger Review  and Place  Program's  Direction on  Hold,  [19]GAO-06-573T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).

Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major
defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase thresholds.^7
The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a major
defense acquisition is expected to overrun its project baseline by 15
percent or more and to certify the program to Congress when it is expected
to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or more.^8 In late November 2005,
NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify
the program. Certifying the program entailed providing a determination
that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2) there are no
alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military
capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost are
reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is adequate
to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams--made up of
DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each of the four elements of the
certification process.

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion
through 2026.^9 This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over
the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the
first two satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. The new program also
entailed establishing a stronger
program management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be
produced and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of instruments
on the satellites from 13 to 9--consisting of 7 environmental sensors and
2 subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early
morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for
midmorning orbit data.^10 Table 3 summarizes the major program changes
made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.

^710 U.S.C S 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.

^810 U.S.C. S 2433 (e)(2).

^9DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program would
cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes satellite
development, production, and launch, but not operations and support costs
after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for operations
and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle cost to $12.5
billion.

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy
Key area             decision                   Program after the          
                                                   Nunn-McCurdy decision      
Life cycle range     1995-2020                  1995-2026                  
Estimated life cycle $8.4 billion               $12.5 billion              
cost                                                                       
Launch schedule      NPP by October 2006        NPP by January 2010        
                        First NPOESS by November   First NPOESS by January    
                        2009                       2013                       
                        Second NPOESS by June 2011 Second NPOESS by January   
                                                   2016                       
Management structure System Program Director    System Program Director is 
                        reports to a tri-          responsible for day-to-day 
                        agency steering committee  program management and     
                        and the tri-agency         reports to the Program     
                        Executive Committee        Executive Officer          
                        Independent program        Program Executive Officer  
                        reviews noted              oversees program and       
                        insufficient system        reports to the tri-agency  
                        engineering and cost       Executive Committee        
                   analysis staff                                             
Number of          6 (in addition to NPP)       4 (in addition to NPP)     
satellites                                                                 
                                 3 (early morning, 2 (early morning and       
Number of orbits     midmorning, and afternoon) afternoon; will rely on    
                                                   European                   
                                                   satellites for midmorning  
                                                   orbit data)                
                         13 instruments (10        9 instruments (7 sensors   
Number and complement sensors and 3 subsystems) and 2 subsystems); 4 of    
                                                   the                        
of instruments                                  sensors are to provide     
                                                   fewer capabilities         
Number of EDRs        55                        39 (6 are to be degraded   
                                                   products)                  

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for the
delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by January
2010,^11 launching the first NPOESS
satellite (called C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS
satellite (called C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated
from prior plans to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up
the final POES satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.

^10 The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites
dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are planned to be
launched sequentially over 14 years.

^11 According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to launch
it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of a climate data
continuity gap.

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the final
POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need to rely on
the existing constellation of environmental satellites until NPP data
becomes available--almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not intended to
be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move it to a different orbit so
that its data would be available in the event of a premature failure of
the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not provide all of the
operational capability planned for the NPOESS spacecraft. If the health of
the existing constellation of satellites diminishes--or if NPP data is not
available, timely, and reliable-- then there could be a gap in
environmental satellite data.

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and reduced
the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13 original sensors,
5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less capable sensors, 1
was modified to provide less functionality, and 4 were cancelled. Table 4
shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including the 4 identified as
critical sensors.

     Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold)

                                   Status of

instrument

after the Nunn-

McCurdy Instrument decision Change description

ATMS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS
                                  satellites.

Aerosol polarimetry sensor  Cancelled Sensor was  cancelled, but could  be
reintegrated on future  NPOESS satellites should  another party choose  to
fund it.^a

CMIS Replaced CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office is to
procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on the
second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites.

CrIS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS
                                  satellites.

Data collection system Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
                                  satellites.

Status of              
instrument             
after the Nunn-        
McCurdy                
Instrument             decision  Change description                        
Earth radiation budget           Sensor was cancelled, and is to be        
sensor                 Replaced  replaced on the first NPOESS satellite    
                                    (and no                                   
                                    others) by an existing sensor with fewer  
                                    capabilities called the Clouds and the    
                                    Earth's Radiant Energy System.            
                                    One part of the sensor, called OMPS       
OMPS                   Modified  (nadir), is to be included on NPP and on  
                                    the                                       
                                    first and third NPOESS satellites; the    
                                    remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was   
                                    cancelled on the NPOESS satellites, but   
                                    will be included on NPP a                 
Radar altimeter        Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be        
                                    reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites  
                                    should another party choose to fund it.a  
Search and rescue      Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four   
satellite                        NPOESS satellites.                        
aided tracking system                                                      
Space environmental              Sensor is to be replaced by a less        
sensor                 Replaced  capable, less expensive, legacy sensor    
                                    called the                                
suite                            Space Environment Monitor on the first    
                                    and third NPOESS satellites.              
Survivability sensor   Cancelled Subsystem contract was cancelled, but     
                                    could be reintegrated on future NPOESS    
                                    satellites should another party choose to 
                                    fund it.a                                 
Total solar irradiance Cancelled Sensor contract was cancelled, but could  
sensor                           be reintegrated on future NPOESS          
                                    satellites should another party choose to 
                                    fund it.a                                 
VIIRS                  Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on    
                                    all four NPOESS satellites.               

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.

aAlthough direct program funding for these instruments was eliminated, the
instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites should other
parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision requires the
program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft for these
instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate them.

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the
resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental data
records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the
agencies placed the highest priority on continuing current operational
weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected
environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised
NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing global
climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of
EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The
39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface temperature,
precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were
removed include cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface height,
net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict
the electric fields in the space environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a
reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple
products depicting energy in the space environment.

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain
To Be Completed

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of
the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring
the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks remain to be done.
Restructuring a major acquisition program like NPOESS is a process that
involves identifying time-critical and highpriority work and keeping this
work moving forward, while reassessing development priorities,
interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and costs. It also involves
revising important acquisition documents including the memorandum of
agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, the
acquisition strategy, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation
master plan, the integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen
by when, and the acquisition program baseline. Specifically, the
Nunn-McCurdy certification decision required the Secretaries of Defense
and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of
agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that the program office,
Program Executive Officer, and the Executive Committee revise and approve
key acquisition documents including the acquisition strategy and system
engineering plan by September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the
restructuring. Once these are completed, the program office can proceed to
negotiate with its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining
what will be delivered, by when, and at what cost.

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007
and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office and
contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the remainder
of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated master schedule
details the steps leading up to launching NPP by September 2009, launching
the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013, and launching the second
NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term steps include completing and
testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with
the NPP spacecraft and completing integration testing; completing the data
processing system and integrating it with the command, control, and
communications segment; and performing advanced acceptance testing of the
overall system of systems for NPP.

However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be
completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key
acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test and
evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, it has not yet
obtained the approval of the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the
Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of agreement among the three
agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the NPOESS Executive
Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As of June 2007, these
approvals are over 9 months past due. Agency officials noted that the
September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was not
realistic given the complexity of coordinating documents among three
different agencies.

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency agreement
and will allow the program office to move forward in completing other
activities related to restructuring the program. These other activities
include completing an integrated baseline review with the contractor to
reach agreement on the schedule and work activities, and finalizing
changes to the NPOESS development and production contract. Program costs
are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract
changes--an event that the Program Director expects to occur in July 2007.
Completion of these activities will allow the program office to lock down
a new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until key acquisition
documents are finalized and approved, the program faces increased risk
that it will not be able to complete important restructuring activities in
time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in
place. This places the NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and
future cost increases.

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems
Remain

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was endorsed
during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated Program
Office still faces staffing problems.
 	
Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about
management problems at all levels of the NPOESS program, including
subcontractor and contractor management, program office management, and
executive-level management.^12 Two independent review teams also noted a
shortage of skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system
engineers. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in
establishing an effective management structure--including establishing a
new organizational framework with increased oversight by program
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. However,
DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in the summer of
2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program lacks a
staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans
for filling those gaps. As a result, the program office has experienced
delays in getting core management activities under way and lacks the staff
it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.

NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective Management
Structure and
Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive Turnover Will Increase
Program Risks

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an
effective management structure and increasing the frequency and
intensity of its oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and
others have raised concerns about management problems at all
levels of management on the NPOESS program, including
subcontractor and contractor management, program office
management, and executive-level management. In response to
recommendations made by two different independent review teams,
the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and early
2006 for revising its management structure.

^12 [20]GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS
ProgramWell Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/2006
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams reviewed
the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team
investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and a
DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader NPOESS
program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on their
findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively.

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a Program
Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program Director, to
streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the program. This
Program Executive Officer reports directly to the Executive Committee.
Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and the Program Director
proposed a revised organizational framework that realigned division
managers within the Integrated Program Office responsible for overseeing
key elements of the acquisition and increased staffing in key areas. In
June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved this new
management structure and the Integrated Program Office implemented it.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the relationships among the Integrated
Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee,
as well as key divisions within the program office.

             Figure 3: Overview of New NPOESS Management Structure

Operating under this new management structure, the program office
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and mitigation
activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value management
techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to these program
office activities, the Program Executive Officer implemented monthly
program reviews and increased the frequency of contacts with the Executive
Committee. The Program Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in
monthly letters, apprising committee members of the program's status,
progress, risks, and earned value, and the Executive Committee now meets
on a quarterly basis--whereas in the recent past, we reported that the
Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.^13

Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We recently
reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due in part to
frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested that
addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials' tenure
with the development or delivery of a product.^14 In March 2007, NPOESS
program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign the recently
appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer 2007 as part of this
executive's natural career progression. As of June 2007, the Program
Executive Officer has held this position for 19 months. Given that the
program is currently still being restructured, and that there are
significant challenges in being able to meet critical deadlines to ensure
satellite data continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to an already
risky program.

NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide Staffing
Process

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a
staffing process that identifies programwide staffing requirements
and plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human capital
management calls for establishing a process or plan for determining
staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to
fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially
important for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent
review teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems.
Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the number of system
engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor and
contractor engineering activities and in the number of budget and cost
analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value reports. To
rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification decision directed the
Program Director to take immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the
program office with the approval of the Program Executive Officer.

^13 [21]GAO-06-249T

^14GAO, Space  Acquisitions: Improvements  Needed in  Space Acquisitions  and
Keys to Achieving Them, [22]GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the
program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a budget
officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief, and a
contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual division
managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire staff for
key positions. However, the program office lacks a programwide process for
identifying and filling all needed positions. As a result, division
managers often wait months for critical positions to be filled. For
example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program estimated that it needed to
hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of these
positions had been filled. As of April 2007, program officials estimated
that they still needed to fill 5 budget analyst positions, 5 systems
engineering positions, and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of
the vacancies--4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems engineering
positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions-- are to be
provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions is in
some stage of being filled--that is, recruitment packages are being
developed or reviewed, vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are
being interviewed, selected, and approved.

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the right
personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not even begin
to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program officials noted
that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual layers of
complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because each agency
has its own hiring and performance management rules. In November 2006, the
program office brought in an administrative officer who took the lead in
pulling together the division managers' individual assessments of needed
staff and has been working with the division managers to refine this list.
This new administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to
assess their needs and to hire needed staff, and to develop a process by
which evolving needs are identified and positions are filled. However,
there is as yet no date set for establishing this basic programwide
staffing process. As a result of the lack of a programwide staffing
process, there has been an extended delay in determining what staff is
needed and in bringing those staff on board; this has resulted in delays
in performing core activities, such as establishing the program office's
cost estimate and bringing in needed contracting expertise. Additionally,
until a programwide staffing process is in place, the program office risks
not having the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.

In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA
implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS program
office reported that several critical positions were filled in April and
May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated NOAA's accelerated hiring
model and, as of June 2007, about 10 key positions remained to be filled.

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks Remain

Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment and ground systems
segment--are under development; however, significant problems have
occurred and risks remain. The program office is aware of these risks and
is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the
program's overall cost and schedule. Given the tight time frames for
completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and
developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing
systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office,
the Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to
provide close oversight of milestones and risks.

Space Segment--Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major Risks

The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors
are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS-- because they are
to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating work on
another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important because
this new sensor-- replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor--will need to be
developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past
year, the program made progress on each of the sensors and the spacecraft.
However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced major problems. The
status of each of the components of the space segment is described in
table 5.

 Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of April 2007

Space segment component Risk level Status

VIIRS High VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In
December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS's
engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.^a
While these problems were being studied, the program office approved the
delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible for
integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program officials
determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but one of the
problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to system level
integration with a goal of resolving the final problem before a technical
readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is scheduled to be delivered
to NPP by July 2008.

CrIS High Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the
flight unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural failure
during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure review board
established by the contractors and the NPOESS program office identified
causes for failure and has planned an approach to completing flight unit
development and delivery for NPP. The review board has also initiated
inspections of all sensor modules and subsystems for damage. The program
office expects to restart acceptance testing in July 2007, and the CrIS
flight unit is expected to be delivered to NPP by February 2008.

OMPS Moderate As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one
element of the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the
program. In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS
(limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved in
early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP by May
2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit delivery will
be so late in the integration testing process that there could be an
insufficient schedule margin should a problem arise.

ATMS Low The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor
and delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the flight
unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other sensors in
order to complete integration testing.

Space segment                                                              
component          Risk level   Status                                     
Microwave imager/ Not yet rated A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is   
sounder                         being planned to replace the cancelled     
                                   CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for 
                                   the launch on the second NPOESS satellite. 
                                   In October 2006, the program office issued 
                                   a request for information seeking industry 
                                   ideas for the design of the new sensor.    
                                   The program office anticipates awarding a  
                                   contract to develop the sensor by October  
                                   2008.                                      
Spacecraft        Low           The development of the spacecrafts for NPP 
                                   and NPOESS are on track. The NPP           
                                   spacecraft was completed in June 2005.     
                                   Integration testing will be conducted once 
                                   the NPP sensors are delivered.             
                                   Early issues with the NPOESS spacecraft    
                                   (including issues with antennas and a data 
                                   storage unit) have been resolved; however, 
                                   risks remain that could delay the          
                                   completion of the spacecraft. A key risk   
                                   involves delays in the delivery of the     
                                   solar array, which may arrive too late to  
                                   be included in some key testing. Other     
                                   risks associated with the electrical power 
                                   subsystem are taking longer than           
                                   anticipated to resolve.                    

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

a The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue in which
band registration shifts with different temperatures; (2) cross-talk,
which involves information from sensor cells leaking into other cells; and
(3) line-spread function issues, in which the instrument's focus changes
with changes in temperature.

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is of
particular importance because these components are to be demonstrated on
the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in September 2009. Any
delay in the NPP launch date could affect the overall NPOESS program,
because the success of the program depends on the lessons learned in data
processing and system integration from the NPP satellite. Additionally,
continued sensor problems could lead to higher final program costs.

Ground Segment--Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains

Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface
data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive
satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and
communications system--is under way and on track. However,
important work pertaining to developing the algorithms that
translate satellite data into weather products within the integrated
data processing segment remains to be completed. Table 6 describes
each of the components of the ground segment and identifies the
status of each.

         Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components, as of April 2007

Ground segment component/description Risk level Status

Interface Data Processing Moderate IDPS is being developed in a series of
builds. Currently, IDPS build 1.4 has been System (IDPS): delivered for
testing and recently passed two key data transfer tests. Contractors are A
ground-based system that is currently working to develop IDPS build 1.5,
which is expected to be the build that will be to process the sensors'
data used with NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency,
algorithm so that they are usable by the performance, and calibration and
validation planning. data processing centers and Latency--IDPS must
process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP the broader
community of requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing
the latency of the system's environmental data users. data handling from
93 minutes to 73 minutes and is working to reduce it by 8 minutes IDPS
will be deployed at the more by resolving data management issues,
increasing the number of processors, and four weather data processing
increasing algorithm efficiency. centers. Algorithm performance--IDPS
algorithms are the mathematical functions coded into the
system software that transform raw data into data products, including
sensor data
records and environmental data records. IDPS build 1.4 contains
provisional algorithms,
which are being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing.
Because
some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those sensors in order
to refine the
algorithms has also been delayed and may not be completed in time for the
delivery of
IDPS build 1.5 in early 2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to
improve the
algorithms in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP
launch.

Calibration/validation--Calibration/validation is the process for tweaking
algorithms to
provide more accurate observations. The contractor has documented a
detailed schedule
for calibration and validation during IDPS development and is developing a
postlaunch
task list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and
uncertainty
continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A program
official noted that, while
teams can do a lot of preparation work, including building the
infrastructure to allow
sensor testing and having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors,
and available
data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch.

Ground stations for receiving Low NOAA is working with domestic and
foreign authorities to gain approval to operate satellite data: ground
stations to receive satellite data. According to agency officials, the
full 15 unmanned ground stations complement of ground stations will not be
in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the around the world (called
ground stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the
program office has SafetyNet(TM)) are to receive reached agreement with 4
of 15 ground station sites. satellite data and send these to the four data
processing centers.

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.

Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS system is
of particular importance because this system will be needed to process NPP
data.

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to
ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical
weather and environmental observations, in our April 2007 report,^15 we
made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to the
Administrator of NASA to ensure that the responsible executives within
their respective organizations approve key acquisition documents,
including the memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, the system
engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition
strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. We also
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to delay
reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer until all
sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory Program; these
deliveries are currently scheduled to occur by July 2008. We also made two
additional recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and
implement a written process for identifying and addressing human capital
needs and for streamlining how the program handles the three different
agencies' administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for
immediately filling needed positions.

In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to
finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed
extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. DOD
subsequently extended the due dates to September and October 2007 and
March 2008 in the case of the test and evaluation master plan. Because the
NPOESS program office intends to complete contract negotiations in July
2007, we remain concerned that any further delays in approving the
documents could delay contract negotiations and thus increase the risk to
the program.

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation to
develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing
human capital needs and to streamline how the program handles the three
different agencies' administrative procedures. The department also agreed
with our recommendation to plan to immediately fill open positions at the
skill sets needed for the program and has implemented an accelerated
hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA positions in the NPOESS
program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made NPOESS hiring a high
priority and has documented a strategy-- including milestones--to ensure
that all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007.

NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that NOAA identified the

^15 [23]GAO-07-498

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program Director
responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain in place
for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the Program
Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air Force and
NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made before the
departure of the current Program Executive Officer to provide an overlap
period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. However,
over the last few years, we and others (including an independent review
team and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective
executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program's cost and
schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program
Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule,
and technical challenges will place the program at further risk.

In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director remain
in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position
does not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program Executive
Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced in providing
oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing NPOESS and
coordinating with Executive Committee members as well as the Defense
acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer
position is planned to rotate between agencies, the memorandum of
agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft and should be
flexible enough to allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain
until critical risks have been addressed.

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the
selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the
current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer is
expected to depart in early July 2007, and as of early July 2007, a
successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex
acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and advanced
technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and
develop the sound professional working relationships that the new Program
Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain
convinced that given NPOESS current challenges, reassigning the current
Program Executive Officer at this time is not appropriate.

  GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites
at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years
(see table 7). To date, NOAA has procured three series of GOES satellites
and is planning to acquire a fourth series, called GOES-R.

              Table 7: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES

                 Series name Procurement duration^a Satellites

                 Original GOES^b 1970-1987 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

                      GOES I-M 1985-2001 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

                         GOES-N 1998-2011 13, O, P, Q^c

                         GOES-R 2007-2020 R, S, T, U^d

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

^aDuration includes time from contract award to final satellite launch.

^bThe procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate contracts
for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2 and -3, (3)
GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and GOES-7.

^cNOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite.

^dNOAA recently decided to drop satellites T and U from this series, but is
now reconsidering that decision.

Original GOES Satellites

In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program
based on experimental geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While
these satellites operated effectively for many years, they had technical
limitations. For example, this series of satellites was "spinstabilized,"
meaning that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a
stable position with respect to the earth. As a result, the satellite
viewed the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had to collect data
very slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each time its field-of-view
swung past the earth. A complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours to
collect.

GOES I-M Series

In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation
of GOES, called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements
developed by NOAA's National Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among
others. GOES I-M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 through GOES-12, and
was a significant improvement in technology from the original GOES
satellites. For example, GOES I-M was "body-stabilized," meaning that the
satellite held a fixed position in orbit relative to the earth, thereby
allowing for continuous meteorological observations. Instead of
maintaining stability by spinning, the satellite would preserve its fixed
position by continuously making small adjustments in the rotation of
internal momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate for
drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M satellites
would be able to collect significantly better quality data more quickly
than the older series of satellites.

GOES-N Series

In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow
GOES I-M, called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies
for the instruments and added system upgrades, including an improved power
subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the
GOES-N satellites were designed to operate longer than its predecessors.
This series originally consisted of four satellites, GOES-N through
GOES-Q. However, the option for the GOES-Q satellite was cancelled based
on NOAA's assessment that it would not need the final satellite to
continue weather coverage. In particular, the agency found that the GOES
satellites already in operation were lasting longer than expected and that
the first satellite in the next series could be available to back up the
last of the GOES-N satellites. As noted earlier, the first GOES-N series
satellite--GOES-13--was launched in May 2006. The GOES-O and GOES-P
satellites are currently in production and are expected to be launched in
July 2008 and July 2011, respectively.

Planned GOES-R Series

NOAA is currently planning to procure the next
series of GOES satellites, called the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for
the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of prior GOES series, both
in terms of system and instrument improvements. The system improvements
are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements and to provide
more rapid information updates. Table 8 highlights key system-related
improvements that GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary
satellite program.

Table 8: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements
Key feature                                GOES-N (current)      GOES-R    
Total products                            41                  ~152         
Downlink rate of raw data collected by    2.6 Mbps              132 Mbps   
instruments (from satellite to ground stations)                            
Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from      2.1 Mbps       17-24 Mbps 
satellite to users)                                                        
Raw data storage (the length of time that raw  0 days           30 days    
data will be stored at ground stations)                                    

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the clarity
and precision of the observed environmental data. Originally, NOAA planned
to acquire 5 different instruments. The program office considered two of
the instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite--to be the most critical because they would provide
data for key weather products. Table 9 summarizes the originally planned
instruments and their expected capabilities.

          Table 9: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006

                         Planned instrument Description

Advanced Baseline Imager  Expected to  provide variable  area imagery  and
radiometric information  of the  earth's  surface, atmosphere,  and  cloud
cover. Key features include

     o monitoring and tracking severe weather,
     o providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and
     o providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage
       simultaneously.

    Planned instrument Description

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite  Expected to  provide information  about
the earth's  surface to  aid  in the  prediction  of weather  and  climate
monitoring. Key features include

     o providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support
       forecasts and climate monitoring,
     o monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality,
       coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms, and
     o providing higher resolution and faster coverage.

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite Expected to provide information on space
weather to aid in the  prediction of particle precipitation, which  causes
disturbance and disruption of radio communications and navigation systems.
Key features include

     o measuring magnetic fields and charged particles,
     o providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons
       and protons, and
     o enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation,
       telecom services, astronauts, and airlines.

Solar Imaging Suite Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic
range of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as
well as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features
include

     o providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor
       solar storms and
     o providing improved imager capability.

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Expected to continuously monitor  lightning
activity over the United States and  provide a more complete dataset  than
previously possible. Key features include

     o detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and
     o providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on
       polar satellites.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency
decided to cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite, but expected to explore options to ensure the
continuity of data provided by the current GOES series. Additionally, NOAA
reduced the number of satellites in the GOES-R series from four to two
satellites.

The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System
Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R
system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled
to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the time of our
most recent review in September 2006,^16 NOAA had
issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system
to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors
in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to reduce the risks
associated with developing new instruments, NOAA issued contracts for the
early development of two instruments and for the preliminary designs of
three other instruments.

^16 [24]GAO-06-993 .

However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the
program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--led the agency to
consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. In
September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the agency had made a
decision to reduce the scope and complexity of the GOES-R program by
reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 2 and canceling a technically
complex instrument--called the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. As of
July 2007, agency officials reported that they are considering further
changes to the scope of the program, which are likely to affect the
overall program cost. We have work under way to evaluate these changes.

Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, but more remains to be done. As outlined previously, key lessons
from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and
schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the
system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient
management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate
senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA established
plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates,
performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident
government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior
executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully address
these lessons. Specifically, at the time of our review, NOAA had not yet
developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and
government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA had not yet determined how it
will ensure that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved
in time for an upcoming decision milestone, nor had it determined the
appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee
the program using earned value management.^17 Until it completes these
activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will
repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls
that have plagued past procurements.

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition
Risk

To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R procurement, in
our September 2006 report,^18 we made recommendations to the Secretary of
Commerce to direct its NOAA Program Management Council to establish a
process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and
independent life cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are
finalized; to establish a team of system engineering experts to perform a
comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager instrument to
determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument
before moving the instrument into production; and to seek assistance in
determining the appropriate levels of resources needed at the program
office to adequately track and oversee the contractor's earned value
management data. In written comments at that time, the Department of
Commerce agreed with our recommendations and provided information on its
plans to implement our recommendations.

In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to developing
weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for events such as
hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in environmental and climate
monitoring. Over the last several years, the NPOESS program experienced
cost, schedule, and technical problems, but has now been restructured and
is making progress. Still, technical and programmatic risks remain. The
GOES-R program has incorporated lessons from other satellite acquisitions,
but still faces challenges in establishing the management capabilities it
needs and in determining the scope of the program. We have work under way
to evaluate the progress and risks of both NPOESS and GOES-R in order to
assist with congressional oversight of these critical programs.

^17Earned value  management is  a  method that  compares  the value  of  work
accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected in  that
period.

^18 [25]GAO-06-993.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or members of the committee may have at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at [26][email protected]. Other
key contributors to this testimony include Carol Cha, Kathleen S. Lovett,
and Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director).

(310853)

References

Visible links
3. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-498
4. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-910T
5. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993
6. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1129T
7. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-498
8. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993
9. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-776R
  10. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-573T
  11. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-249T
  12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1054
  13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-48
  14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-825R
  15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-476
  16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSAID-91-252
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-987T
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1054
  19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-573T
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-249T
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-249T
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-626T
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-498
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993
  26. mailto:[email protected]
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