Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit	 
Capability Remain Unclear (28-JUN-07, GAO-07-1044T).		 
                                                                 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues
to invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S.  
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)	 
program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected  
foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States at over	 
300 air, sea, and land ports of entry (POEs). The program uses	 
biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and photographs) to  
screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is
the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. GAO's 
testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit	 
capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit	 
efforts. In developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior  
reports on US-VISIT as well as ongoing work for the committee.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1044T					        
    ACCNO:   A71616						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit 
Capability Remain Unclear					 
     DATE:   06/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Biometrics 					 
	     Border security					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Documentation					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Immigration					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Technology 					 
	     Visas						 
	     Data collection					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DHS Visitor and Immigrant Status			 
	     Indicator Technology Program			 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-1044T

   

     * [1]TESTIMONY.pdf

          * [2]Background
          * [3]US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs
          * [4]Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT

               * [5]Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well
               * [6]Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution

          * [7]Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit
          * [8]Contact and Acknowledgements

     * [9]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf

          * [10]Order by Mail or Phone

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimonybefore the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 1 p.m. EDT
Thursday, June 28, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY:

Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director
Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-07-1044T

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Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee,

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee's hearing
focusing on the exit side of the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). As you know, US-VISIT is a
multibillion dollar program of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
that is to, among other things, enhance the security of our citizens and
visitors and ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system. To
achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to record certain travelers'^1 entry and
exit to and from the United States at over 300 ports of entry (POEs),
verify their identity, and determine their compliance with the terms of
their admission and stay.

Since fiscal year 2002, we have produced eight reports that have
identified fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in defining
and justifying the program's future direction and delivering program
capabilities and benefits on time and within cost.^2 Our testimony today
draws on the above cited reports as well as our ongoing work for the House
Committee on Homeland Security on the definition and completion of
US-VISIT's strategic solution. All the work on which this testimony is
based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

In summary, DHS has invested about $1.3 billion over 4 years and delivered
basically one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry
capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs, but
comparable exit capabilities are not. Moreover, the prospects for this
changing are essentially as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago,
despite the fact that the department's funding plans have provided about
one-quarter of a billion dollars to exit-related efforts. During this
time, we have continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS was managing
US-VISIT in general, and the program's exit capability in particular, and
have made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the
program delivered clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities
and benefits on time and within budget. Today, as DHS embarks on yet
another attempt to deliver long-overdue exit capabilities, these
recommendations still apply. Unless the department implements them, it
runs the serious risk of repeating the mistakes it made on prior exit
efforts and producing similar results. Accordingly, we urge the department
to approach its latest attempt at deploying mission critical exit
capabilities in the kind of rigorous and disciplined fashion that we have
recommended. If it does not, the prospects for having an operational exit
capability will be diminished, which in turn will limit the department's
ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and
immigration enforcement missions.

^1 US-VISIT applies to foreign travelers that enter the United States
under a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a visa
waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. The
Visa Waiver Program enables foreign nationals of certain countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for stays of 90 days
or less without obtaining a visa.

^2 See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003);  GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT
Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land
Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006); and GAO,
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007).

Background

US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the security of
U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure
the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of
our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is to collect, maintain, and
share information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the
United States; detect fraudulent travel documents, verify traveler
identity, and determine traveler admissibility through the use of
biometrics; facilitate information sharing and coordination within the
immigration and border management community; and identify foreign
nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their
admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their
immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law
enforcement officials. The scope of the program includes the pre-entry,
entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national
travelers who enter and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and
land POEs.

The US-VISIT program office is responsible for managing the acquisition,
deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT systems in support of
such DHS agencies as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As of March 31, 2007, the program director
reports to the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs
Directorate.

In 2003, DHS planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in 4 increments:
Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (land entry and
exit), Increment 3 (land entry and exit), and Increment 4, which was to
define, design, build, and implement a more strategic program capability.
Since then the scope of the first three increments has changed. The
current scope is Increment 1 (air and sea entry), Increment 2 (air, sea,
and land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry). Increment 4 is still
intended to define, design, build, and implement a more strategic program
capability, which program officials stated will consist of a series of
incremental releases or mission capability enhancements that will support
business outcomes. In Increments 1 through 3, the program has built
interfaces among existing ("legacy") systems, enhanced the capabilities of
these systems, and deployed these capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs.
These first three increments have been largely pursued through existing
system contracts and task orders. Increment 4 strategic system
enhancements are being pursued through a systems integration contract
awarded to Accenture and its partners in May 2004.

Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated for
US-VISIT. According to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2007,^3 DHS may not obligate $200 million of the $362.494 million
appropriated for US-VISIT in fiscal year 2007 until DHS provides the
Senate and House Committees with a plan for expenditure that meets several
criteria. The department has requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008
for the program. As of January 31, 2007, program officials stated that
about $1.3 billion has been obligated for US-VISIT activities.

^3 Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1357-58 (Oct. 4, 2006).

US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs

A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at most
POEs. On January 5, 2004, the program office deployed and began operating
most aspects of its planned biometric entry capability at 115 airports and
14 seaports for certain foreign nationals, including those from visa
waiver countries.^4 As of December 2006, the program office also deployed
and began operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection
areas of 154 of 170 land POEs. According to program officials, 14 of the
remaining 16 POEs have no operational need to deploy US-VISIT because
visitors subject to US-VISIT are, by regulation, not authorized to enter
into the United States at these locations. The other two POEs do not have
the necessary transmission lines to operate US-VISIT, and thus they
process visitors manually.

According to DHS, these entry capabilities have produced results. For
example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric hits in
primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having adverse actions,
such as denial of entry, taken against them. Further, about 14,000 leads
were referred to ICE's immigration enforcement unit, resulting in 315
arrests.^5 Another potential consequence is the deterrent effect of having
an operational entry capability. Although deterrence is difficult to
demonstrate, officials have cited it as a byproduct of having a publicized
capability at the border to screen entry on the basis of identity
verification and matching against watch lists of known and suspected
terrorists.

Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is Not
Operational

Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and resources
towards establishing an operational exit capability at air, sea, and land
POEs. For example, between 2003 and 2006, DHS reports allocating about
$250 million^6 for exit-related efforts. Notwithstanding this considerable
investment of time and resources, DHS still does not have an operational
exit capability. Our prior reports have raised a number of concerns about
DHS's management of US-VISIT's exit efforts.

^4 On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry procedures to
include individuals from visa waiver countries applying for admission.

^5 We did not verify this information.

As we and others have reported,^7 the absence of a biometric exit
capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are
available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit capability,
DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying
and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of
admission--a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, ICE's efforts to ensure the
integrity of the immigration system could be degraded if it continues to
spend its limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who
have already left the country.

Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well

Between January 2004 and May 2007, the program office conducted various
exit pilots at one air and one sea POE without fully deploying a biometric
exit capability. Throughout this period, we have reported on the
limitations in how these pilot activities were planned, defined, and
justified. For example, we reported in September 2003,^8 prior to the
pilots being deployed, that DHS had not economically justified the initial
US-VISIT increment (which was to include an exit capability at air and sea
POEs) on the basis of benefits, costs, and risks. As a result, we
recommended that DHS determine whether proposed incremental capabilities
would produce value commensurate with program costs and risks. We later
reported in May 2004^9 that DHS had not deployed a biometric exit
capability to the 80 air and 14 sea POEs as part of Increment 1 deployment
in December 2003, as it had originally intended. Instead, as we mention
above, the pilot exit capability was deployed to only one air and one sea
POE on January 5, 2004.

^6 As reported in the fiscal year 2005, revised 2006, and 2007 expenditure
plans. The fiscal year 2007 plan reported that of this amount, $53.1
million is still available as prior year carryover.

^7 GAO-07-248 and Department of Homeland Security, Inspector General,
Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance Enforcement
Unit, (September 2005).

^8 GAO-03-1083.

In February 2005, we reported^10 that the program office had not
adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air and sea POEs
because the pilot's evaluation scope and time line were compressed, and
thus would not provide the program office with sufficient information to
adequately assess the pilots and permit the selection of the best exit
solution for deployment. Accordingly, we recommended that the program
office reassess its plans for deploying an exit capability to ensure that
the scope of the pilot provided an adequate evaluation of alternatives.

A year later in February 2006, we reported^11 that the program office had
extended the pilot from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports and two seaports) and
the time frame by an additional 7 months. Notwithstanding the expanded
scope and time frame, the exit pilots were not sufficiently evaluated. In
particular, on average only about 24 percent of those travelers subject to
US-VISIT actually complied with the exit processing steps. The evaluation
report attributed this, in part, to the fact that compliance during the
pilot was voluntary, and that to achieve the desired compliance rate, the
exit solution would need an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing
persons to reenter the United States if they do not comply with the exit
process. Despite this limitation, as of February 2006, program officials
had not conducted any formal evaluation of enforcement mechanisms or their
possible effect on compliance or cost, and according to the then Acting
Program Director, no such evaluation would be done. Nonetheless, DHS
continued to operate the exit pilots.

^9 GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status
Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.:
May 11, 2004).

^10 GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain
on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program,
GAO-05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005).

^11 GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key
Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).

In February 2006, we also reported that while DHS had analyzed the cost,
benefits, and risks for its air and sea exit capability, the analyses did
not demonstrate that the program was producing or would produce mission
value commensurate with expected costs and benefits, and the costs upon
which the analyses were based were not reliable. A year later, we
reported^12 that DHS had not adequately defined and justified its past
investment in its air and sea exit pilots and its land exit demonstration
projects, and still did not have either an operational exit capability or
a viable exit solution to deploy. We further noted that exit-related
program documentation did not adequately define what work was to be done
or what these efforts would accomplish, did not describe measurable
outcomes from the pilot or demonstration efforts, and did not indicate the
related cost, schedule, and capability commitments that would be met. We
recommended that planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots and
demonstration projects until such investments were economically justified
and until each investment had a well-defined evaluation plan. In its
comments on our report, DHS agreed with our recommendation.

Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution

In January 2004, DHS committed to delivering a biometric exit capability
by December 2005; however, we reported^13 that program officials concluded
in January 2005 that a biometric land exit capability could not be
implemented without having a major impact on land POE facilities.
According to these officials, the only proven technology available to
biometrically verify individuals upon exit at land POEs would necessitate
mirroring the entry processes,  which the program reported was "an
infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not limited to,
the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure requirements, and
potential trade and commerce impacts."^14

^12 GAO-07-278.

^13 GAO-07-248.

In light of these constraints, the program office tested radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology^15 as a means of recording visitors as
they exit at land POEs. However, this technology was not biometrics-based.
Moreover, testing and analysis at five land POEs at the northern and
southern borders identified numerous performance and reliability problems,
such as the failure of RFID readers to detect a majority of travelers'
tags during testing.

According to program officials, no technology or device currently exists
to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would not have a
major impact on land POE facilities. They added that technological
advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to
biometrically verify persons exiting the country without major changes to
facility infrastructure and without requiring those exiting to stop and/or
exit their vehicles.

In November 2006, during the course of our work on, among other things,
the justification for ongoing land exit demonstration projects, DHS
terminated these projects. In our view, the decision was warranted because
DHS had not adequately defined and justified its investment in its pilots
and demonstration projects. As noted earlier, we recommended in February
2007, that planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots and
demonstration projects until such investments are economically justified
and until each investment has a well-defined evaluation plan. DHS agreed
with our recommendation.

^14 US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Va.: Jan. 31, 2005).

^15 RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and gather
information contained on a tag--in this case, a unique identifying number
embedded in a tag on a visitor's arrival/departure form--which an
electronic reader at the POE is to detect.

Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit Capabilities Risks
Repeating Past Mistakes

According to relevant federal guidance,^16 the decision to invest in a
system or system component should be based on a clear definition of what
capabilities, involving what stakeholders, will be delivered according to
what schedule and at what cost. Moreover, such investment decisions should
be based on reasonable assurance that a proposed program will produce
mission value commensurate with expected costs and risks. As noted
earlier, DHS funding plans have collectively allocated about $250 million
to a number of exit efforts through 2006, but without having adequately
defined or economically justified them. Now, in 2007, it risks repeating
these same mistakes as it embarks on yet another attempt to implement a
means by which to biometrically track certain foreign nationals exiting
the United States, first at airports, and then at seaports, with land exit
capabilities being deferred to an unspecified future time.

Based on the department's latest available documentation, it intends to
spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20
million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit
capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the
analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these
funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term deployment plans
for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that
a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible.

More specifically, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan states
that DHS will begin the process of planning and designing an air and sea
exit solution during fiscal year 2007, focusing initially on air exit and
then emulating these technology and operational experiences in completing
the sea exit solution. According to this plan, air exit efforts will begin
during the third quarter of fiscal year 2007, which ends in 2 days.
However, US-VISIT program officials told us as recently as three weeks ago
that this deadline will not be met.

^16 See, for example, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and
Execution of the Budget (June 2006).

Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will be
done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire, deliver,
deploy, and operate this capability, including plans describing expected
system capabilities, defining measurable outcomes (benefits and results),
identifying key stakeholder (e.g., airlines) roles/responsibilities and
buy-in, and coordinating and aligning with related programs. Further,
there is no analysis available comparing the life cycle costs of the air
exit solution to its expected benefits and risks. The only additional
information available to date is what the department characterized as a
high-level schedule for air exit that we obtained on June 11, 2007. This
schedule shows that business requirements and a concept of operations are
to be completed by September 3, 2007; a cost-benefit analysis is to be
completed by October 1, 2007; testing is to be completed by October 1,
2008; and the exit solution is to be fully deployed in 2 years (June
2009). However, the schedule does not include the underlying details
supporting the timelines for such areas of activity as system design,
system development, and system testing. According to program officials,
more detailed schedules exist but were not provided to us because the
schedules had not yet been approved by DHS.

Further, while the expenditure plan states that DHS plans to integrate the
air exit solution with the commercial airlines' existing check-in
processes and to integrate US-VISIT's efforts with CBP's pre-departure
Advance Passenger Information System and the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA's) Secure Flight,^17 the program office did not
provide any documentation that describes what has been done with regard to
these plans or what is planned relative to engaging with and obtaining
buy-in from the airlines. Nevertheless, DHS plans to issue a proposed
regulation requiring airlines to participate in this effort by December
17, 2007.

^17 The Advanced Passenger Information System captures arrival and
departure manifest information provided by air and sea carriers. Secure
Flight is a program being developed by TSA for domestic flights to
prescreen passengers or match passenger information against terrorist
watch lists to identify individuals who should undergo additional security
scrutiny.

With regard to land exit, the future is even more unclear. According to
the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, the department has concluded that a
biometric land exit capability is not practical in the short term because
of the costly expansion of existing exit capacity, including physical
infrastructure, land acquisition, and staffing. As a result, DHS states an
intention to begin matching entry and exit records using biographic
information in instances where no current collection exists today, such as
in the case of individuals who do not submit their Form I-94 upon
departure. According to DHS, it has also initiated discussions with its
Canadian counterparts about the potential for them to collect biographical
exit data at entry into Canada. Such a solution could include data sharing
between the two countries and would require significant discussions on
specific data elements and the means of collection and sharing, including
technical, policy, and legal issues associated with this approach.
However, DHS has yet to provide us with any documentation that specifies
what data elements would be collected or what technical, policy, and legal
issues would need to be addressed. Further, according to DHS, it has not
yet determined a time frame or any cost estimates for the initiation of
such a non-biometric land exit solution.

   

In closing, we would like to emphasize the mission importance of a cost
effective, biometrically enabled exit capability, and that delivering such
a capability requires effective planning and justification, and rigorous
and disciplined system acquisition management. To date, these activities
have not occurred for DHS's exit efforts. If this does not change, there
is no reason to expect that DHS's newly launched efforts to deliver an air
and sea exit solution will produce results different from its past
efforts--namely, no operational exit solution despite many years and
hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the
continued absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS's ability to
effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration
enforcement mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its latest
attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and
disciplined fashion that we have previously recommended.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.

Contact and Acknowledgements

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact
Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or [email protected], or Richard M. Stana
at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Other major contributors include
Deborah Davis, Kory Godfrey, Daniel Gordon, David Hinchman, Kaelin Kuhn,
John Mortin, and Amos Tevelow.

(310649)

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[17]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Randy Hite at (202) 512-3439 or
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Highlights of [18]GAO-07-1044T , a report to Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives

June 28, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit Capability Remain Unclear

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to
invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect,
maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter
and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry
(POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and
photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a
visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document.

GAO's testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit
capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit efforts. In
developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT as
well as ongoing work for the committee.

[19]What GAO Recommends

In light of the department's longstanding challenges in delivering an
operational exit capability and the uncertainty surrounding its future
exit efforts, GAO urges the department to approach its latest attempt at
deploying mission critical exit capabilities with the kind of rigor and
discipline that GAO has previously recommended.

After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered
essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry
capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but
comparable exit capabilities are not. To the department's credit,
operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, including
more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry,
taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the other half of
US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its
funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars since
2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, GAO has continued to cite
weaknesses in how DHS is managing US-VISIT in general, and the exit side
of US-VISIT in particular, and has made numerous recommendations aimed at
better ensuring that the program delivers clearly defined and adequately
justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.

The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are
as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department's latest
available documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is
approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit
efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3
million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in
fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities.
However, it has not produced either plans or analyses that adequately
define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has
only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for biometric
exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term
biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond this high-level
schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what will
be done by what entities and at what cost.

In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit
intentions, it is unlikely that the department's latest efforts to deliver
near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different
from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit
capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department
goes without exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and
efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement
missions will suffer. Among other things, this means that DHS cannot
ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing
those people who have overstayed their original period of admission, which
is a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs
enforcement entities will continue to spend limited resources on
investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country.

References

Visible links
  11. http://www.gao.gov/
  12. http://www.gao.gov/
  13. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  14. mailto:[email protected]
  15. mailto:[email protected]
  16. mailto:[email protected]
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T
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