Special Operations Forces: Management Actions Are Needed to	 
Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S. Special  
Operations Command (05-SEP-07, GAO-07-1030).			 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on special operations 
forces to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and
to perform other tasks such as training foreign military forces. 
To meet the demand for these forces, DOD established a Marine	 
Corps service component under the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority  
of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) 
the Marine Corps special operations command has identified its	 
force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has developed 
a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its	 
special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined	 
whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its forces  
for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine	 
Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DOD plans for this new command.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1030					        
    ACCNO:   A75699						        
  TITLE:     Special Operations Forces: Management Actions Are Needed 
to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S.	 
Special Operations Command					 
     DATE:   09/05/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Human capital					 
	     Marine Corps personnel				 
	     Marine Corps training				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military training					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Special forces					 
	     Special operations 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Military interoperability				 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-07-1030

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Tasks and Missions of Special Operations Forces
          * [4]Prior Actions Taken to Integrate Marine Corps Forces into US
          * [5]Organization of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Comma
          * [6]Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command

     * [7]Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Spe

          * [8]Steps Taken to Establish Marine Corps Special Operations Com
          * [9]Limitations in Strategic Planning Process Led to Force Struc

     * [10]Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps

          * [11]While Some Personnel Requirements Have Been Identified, Mari
          * [12]Marine Corps Has Developed an Interim Policy to Manage Perso

     * [13]USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether

          * [14]Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Implemented Prog
          * [15]USSOCOM Has Not Formally Validated That Marine Corps Trainin

     * [16]Conclusions
     * [17]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [18]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [19]GAO Contact
     * [20]Acknowledgments
     * [21]GAO's Mission
     * [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [23]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [25]Congressional Relations
     * [26]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2007

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces
into the U.S. Special Operations Command

GAO-07-1030

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 8
Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Force Structure Needed to Perform Its Missions Has Not
Been Fully Identified 14
Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps Has Not
Developed a Strategic Human Capital Approach to Manage the Critical Skills
And Competencies Required of Personnel in Its Special Operations Command
20
USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether Marine Corps
Special Operations Forces Training Programs Prepare Units for Missions 26
Conclusions 32
Recommendations for Executive Action 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables

Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces' Core Tasks 9
Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command 12
Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013 14

Figures

Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps Forces
into USSOCOM 11
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for Special
Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component
13

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
GAO Government Accountability Office
SEAL Sea, Air, Land
USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

September 5, 2007

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

In 1987, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a primary mission to provide trained and
combat-ready special operations forces to the department's geographic
combatant commanders.^1 These forces differ from conventional forces in
that they are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
operations in hostile or politically sensitive environments and they
employ military capabilities that are not present in conventional military
forces. Subsequent to its activation, USSOCOM assumed operational control
of existing units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.^2 However, the
Marine Corps did not assign any of its forces to USSOCOM, citing a need to
retain the flexibility needed to perform its missions. Instead, the Marine
Corps created a program to deploy forces to the geographic combatant
commands that were trained to perform some special operations missions.

^1The department's five geographic commands--U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command--are responsible for U.S. military operations within
their areas. DOD plans to establish a U.S. Africa Command with a full
operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2008.

^2Examples of existing special operations forces that were placed under
USSOCOM's control include Army Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air, Land
(SEAL) units.

With the onset of the war on terrorism, DOD has greatly expanded the role
of USSOCOM. As part of its strategy for this war, the department has
relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in the
ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, special operations
forces have performed other types of military tasks, such as training and
advising foreign military forces in a number of countries around the
world, in order to build the capabilities of partner nations to combat
terrorists more effectively within their own borders. To meet these
commitments, special operations forces have experienced a substantial
increase in deployments. For example, we reported in July 2006 that from
fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average weekly number of
special operations forces personnel who deployed to the department's
geographic combatant commands increased by 64 percent.^3 DOD recognizes
that it needs additional special operations forces to defeat terrorist
networks and has sought to increase the number of these forces. One
department initiative to increase the number of special operations forces
has been to integrate Marine Corps forces into USSOCOM. In 2005, the
Secretary of Defense requested that the Marine Corps and USSOCOM develop
plans to establish a Marine Corps service component to integrate Marine
Corps forces within the special operations community. In October 2005, the
Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps special
operations command (Command) as a service component to USSOCOM.

The Marine Corps activated its special operations command in February
2006, and in August 2006 began deploying special operations forces units
to conduct missions for the geographic combatant commanders. On the basis
of initial department guidance, the Marine Corps special operations
command will be comprised of approximately 2,600 Marines and Navy
personnel to train foreign military forces and conduct other special
operations missions. According to current plans, the Command will be fully
operationally capable by the end of fiscal year 2008.^4 At DOD's request,
the Congress has provided the Marine Corps and USSOCOM with regular and
supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 totaling $509.5
million (excluding military personnel costs) to establish the Marine Corps
special operations command.^5 In addition, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM
have projected funding needs for the Command totaling $907.8 million for
fiscal years 2008 through 2013.

^3GAO, Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be
Addressed to Meet Expanded Role, [27]GAO-06-812 (Washington D.C.: July 31,
2006).

^4The Marine Corps special operations command defines fully operationally
capable as the organization, training, and equipping of 6 special
operations companies and 16 foreign military training teams.

While USSOCOM is responsible for monitoring the status of its personnel,
it does not have authority over personnel management issues such as
recruiting, retention, or the assignment of servicemembers in special
operations forces units. Instead, personnel management is the
responsibility of each military service, and each service handles those
responsibilities differently. For example, the Marine Corps is assigning
personnel to its special operations command from a variety of career
fields,^6 such as reconnaissance and intelligence, and plans to rotate
these personnel between special operations forces units and conventional
force units. This policy is in contrast to the management of some special
operations forces personnel in the other military services. The Army, for
example, has established separate career fields for Special Forces and
Civil Affairs soldiers and in fiscal year 2007, the Navy established a
separate career field for SEALs. Once assigned to the Command, personnel
will be provided with additional training for the skills that are required
to perform special operations missions. In general, the Marine Corps will
retain the responsibility for providing training for basic Marine Corps
skills to personnel who are assigned to its special operations forces
units. USSOCOM, through its Marine Corps service component command, is
responsible for providing training for special operations-unique skills to
Marine Corps personnel in these units.

We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objective was to evaluate
DOD's efforts to establish a Marine Corps special operations command.
Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special
operations command has identified the force structure needed to perform
its mission, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital
approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of
personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has
determined whether Marine Corps special operations forces training
programs are preparing these forces for assigned missions.

^5Military personnel costs for all servicemembers, including special
operations forces personnel, are included in the services' budgets.

^6The military services delineate their force structure through career
fields, or occupational specialties, which represent the jobs that are
necessary to meet their specific missions.

To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations command
has identified the force structure needed to perform its mission, we
identified and reviewed reports related to the department's efforts to
increase the size of special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps
forces into USSOCOM. We analyzed available internal DOD documentation such
as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified DOD's plans and time
frames for establishing the Marine Corps special operations command. We
discussed DOD's decision-making processes for developing force structure
plans for the new Command with officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense; the Joint Staff; Headquarters, Marine Corps; USSOCOM; and the
geographic combatant commands. We also reviewed documents and interviewed
officials with the Marine Corps special operations command to determine
the force structure challenges the Command has identified and the plans
that are being developed to revise its force structure. To assess the
extent to which the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital
approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of
personnel in its special operations forces units, we analyzed relevant
Marine Corps policies for assigning personnel to conventional force units
and to special operations forces units. We conducted interviews with
officials from Headquarters, Marine Corps, who are responsible for
managing personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special operations
command. To better understand the unique personnel needs of the Marine
Corps special operations command, we interviewed officials from the
Command to discuss the specialized skills and training that are required
by personnel who are assigned to special operations forces units to
perform the Command's assigned missions. To assess the extent to which
USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps special operations forces
training programs are preparing these forces for assigned missions, we
examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine related to the responsibilities of
the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for training special operations forces
personnel. We reviewed available documents that detail training programs
for Marine Corps special operations forces. We collected and analyzed
documents related to USSOCOM's evaluations of Marine Corps special
operations forces training, and we discussed the efforts that have been
taken by the Marine Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to assess
the effectiveness of these training programs. Our assessment of data
reliability concluded that the data used to support this review were
sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. We conducted our review
from August 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology is contained in appendix I.

Results in Brief

Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command, the Command has not yet fully identified the force
structure needed to perform its assigned missions. The Marine Corps has
taken several steps to establish its special operations command, such as
activating the Command's headquarters, establishing Marine Corps special
operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct special
operations missions. DOD developed initial force structure requirements
for the Command by basing the composition and number of special operations
units on existing units within the Marine Corps that had performed similar
missions in the past, but did not use critical practices of effective
strategic planning when developing these requirements. We have previously
reported on several practices that are critical to effective strategic
planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to support
organizational missions and the involvement of stakeholders in
decision-making processes to help ensure efforts and resources are
targeted to the highest priorities.^7 However, DOD did not fully
incorporate these critical practices during its planning for the Marine
Corps special operations command. For example, the Command's activities
and resources were not fully aligned with the organization's mission.
Neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps
conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number of
personnel needed to meet the Command's mission requirements, and the
number of personnel authorized for the Command was not directly tied to
specific mission requirements. In addition, we found that some key
stakeholders were not involved in the establishment of the Marine Corps
special operations command. For example, the special operations components
within the department's geographic combatant commands--which are
responsible for commanding special operations forces around the
world--were not involved in the process to establish the Marine Corps
special operations command or in the decisions to target the service's
resources to their highest priorities and mission requirements. As a
result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has
identified several challenges related to its planned force structure. For
example, officials identified shortfalls in the number of personnel
available to conduct support functions for Marine Corps special operations
forces units. Additionally, the Command has determined that the number and
composition of its special operations forces units are not aligned with
the Command's mission requirements and, at the time we issued our report,
the Marine Corps special operations command was developing several
proposals to significantly revise its force structure to better meet its
mission needs. These revisions would adjust the number and size of the
Command's warfighter units to better meet mission requirements. Although
the Command had not completed several analyses of the personnel and
funding requirements that are tied to these proposed force structure
changes, it has set milestones for completing its work. Until the analyses
are completed, however, the Command will be unable to determine whether
the approved plans for its personnel and funding should be adjusted in
order for the Command to perform all of its assigned missions.

^7GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [28]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).

Although some preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its
special operations command because the Command has not yet conducted a
comprehensive analysis to identify the critical skills and competencies
required of personnel in its special operations forces units. Our prior
work has shown that the analysis of critical skill and competency gaps
between current and future workforce needs is an important step in
strategic human capital planning.^8 The Marine Corps special operations
command has begun to identify some of the critical skills that are needed
to perform special operations missions. For example, as part of the effort
to identify these critical skills, it is developing a training course that
will provide baseline training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them
for positions in warfighter units. The Command plans to provide these
personnel with training on advanced survival skills and foreign languages.
However, the Command has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to fully
identify and document the advanced skills and additional training that are
necessary to support its full range of assigned missions. Moreover, the
Command has not yet fully determined which positions should be filled by
specially trained personnel who are strategically managed to meet the
Command's missions. Such analyses are critical to the Marine Corps'
efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management
of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit
of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to
assign some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour
lengths to account for the additional training and skills. According to
officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps special
operations command, the interim policy is designed, in part, to retain
some personnel at the Marine Corps special operations command long enough
to complete specialized training and conduct at least two deployments.
However, the interim policy is inconsistent with the Marine Corps special
operations command's goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel
within the special operations community. According to officials from the
Command, permanent assignments for personnel in special operations forces
units are necessary to develop and sustain the critical skills required to
support the Command's full range of assigned missions. Officials with
Headquarters, Marine Corps, told us the service plans to review the
interim policy and work with the Marine Corps special operations command
to develop a management strategy that better meets the Command's personnel
needs. However, until the Command completes a comprehensive analysis to
identify and document the critical skills and training needed by its
future workforce to perform the Command's full range of assigned special
operations missions, the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for
developing or evaluating alternative strategic human capital approaches
for the management of personnel assigned to its special operations forces
units.

^8GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans
Needed, [29]GAO-04-753 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004).

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Marine
Corps special operations command's training programs are preparing its
forces for their missions because it has not established common training
standards for many special operations skills and it has not formally
evaluated whether these programs will prepare units to be fully
interoperable with other special operations forces. The Marine Corps
special operations command has taken several actions to implement training
programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel to a unique
set of special operations forces standards. For example, the Command has
provided training to its forces that has been adapted from the training
programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations
missions prior to the activation of the Command. In addition, Command
officials told us that training programs for missions that conventional
units are not assigned have been determined by consulting with, and
selectively incorporating, the service-specific training that USSOCOM's
other service components provide to their special operations forces.
Although USSOCOM is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of all
training programs and for ensuring the interoperability of all of DOD's
special operations forces, it does not have a sound basis to determine
whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing units for their
missions for two reasons. First, common training standards have not yet
been established for many special operations skills. USSOCOM has
established common training standards for some skills, and is working on
an incremental basis to develop common standards for additional skills
because of the recognition that current service-specific training may not
optimize opportunities for commonality, jointness, or efficiency. Second,
while USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to evaluate the training
provided to Marine Corps special operations forces, it has not formally
validated that the training programs developed by the Marine Corps special
operations command meet special operations forces standards and prepare
forces to be fully interoperable with the department's other special
operations forces. Without common training standards for special
operations skills or a formal evaluation of the training and standards
used to prepare Marine Corps forces for deployments, USSOCOM cannot
demonstrate the needed assurances to the geographic combatant commanders
that these forces are being trained to special operations forces standards
and that these forces are fully interoperable with DOD's other special
operations forces, thereby potentially impacting the success of future
joint operations.

To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for
the management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special
operations command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained in a manner that is fully interoperable with DOD's
other special operations forces, we are making recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense to (1) direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
conduct an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of
personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units, establish
milestones for conducting this analysis, and use the results of this
analysis to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management
of these personnel; and (2) direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a
framework for evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training
programs to ensure the programs are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps
special operations forces to be fully interoperable with the department's
other special operations forces. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and noted that actions
consistent with the recommendations are underway.

Background

In 1986, the President signed a joint resolution of Congress that directed
the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for
special operations forces.^9 In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense
established USSOCOM with the mission to provide trained and combat-ready
special operations forces to DOD's geographic combatant commands. Since
2003, DOD has further expanded the role of USSOCOM to include greater
responsibility for planning and leading the department's efforts in the
war on terrorism. In addition to training, organizing, equipping, and
deploying combat-ready special operations forces to the geographic
combatant commands, USSOCOM has the mission to lead, plan, synchronize,
and, as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks.

^9Pub. L. No. 99-500, S 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. S
167).

Tasks and Missions of Special Operations Forces

DOD doctrine describes the characteristics of special operations forces,
and provides joint force commanders with the guidance and information
necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for
special operations forces.^10 According to doctrine, special operations
forces perform two types of activities: special operations forces perform
tasks that no other forces in DOD conduct, and they perform tasks that
other DOD forces conduct but do so according to a unique set of conditions
and standards. In particular, special operations forces are specifically
organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish nine core tasks, which
represent the collective capabilities of all special operations forces
rather than those of any one unit. Table 1 defines these core tasks.

Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces' Core Tasks

Core task                       Description                                
Direct action                   Short duration strikes and other           
                                   small-scale offensive actions conducted in 
                                   hostile, denied, or politically sensitive  
                                   environments to seize, destroy, capture,   
                                   exploit, recover, or damage designated     
                                   targets.                                   
Special reconnaissance          Reconnaissance and surveillance actions    
                                   conducted in hostile, denied, or           
                                   politically sensitive environments to      
                                   collect or verify information of strategic 
                                   or operational significance, employing     
                                   military capabilities not normally found   
                                   in conventional forces.                    
Foreign internal defense        Participation by civilian and military     
                                   agencies of a government in any of the     
                                   action programs taken by another           
                                   government or other designated             
                                   organization, to free and protect its      
                                   society from subversion, lawlessness, and  
                                   insurgency.                                
Unconventional warfare          A broad spectrum of military and           
                                   paramilitary operations, normally of long  
                                   duration, predominately conducted through, 
                                   with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces 
                                   that are organized, trained, equipped,     
                                   supported, and directed in varying degrees 
                                   by an external source.                     
Counterterrorism                Offensive measures taken to prevent,       
                                   deter, and respond to terrorism.           
Counterproliferation of weapons Actions taken to locate, seize, destroy,   
of mass destruction             render safe, capture, or recover weapons   
                                   of mass destruction.                       
Civil affairs operations        Operations that establish, maintain,       
                                   influence, or exploit relations among      
                                   military forces, government and            
                                   nongovernmental civilian organizations and 
                                   authorities, and the civilian populace in  
                                   friendly, neutral, or hostile areas of     
                                   operations in order to facilitate military 
                                   operations and consolidate and achieve     
                                   U.S. national objectives.                  
Psychological operations        Planned operations to convey selected      
                                   information and indicators to foreign      
                                   audiences to influence their emotions,     
                                   motives, objective reasoning, and          
                                   ultimately the behavior of foreign         
                                   governments, organizations, groups, and    
                                   individuals.                               
Information operations          Actions taken to affect adversary          
                                   information and information systems while  
                                   defending one's own information and        
                                   information systems.                       

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

^10Department of Defense, Joint Pub. 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations (Dec. 17, 2003).

Prior Actions Taken to Integrate Marine Corps Forces into USSOCOM

Since 1987, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have taken several steps to
expand the relationship between the two organizations. For example,
beginning in 1993, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM established a working
group to discuss efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and
interoperability. These efforts received a renewed emphasis with the onset
of the war on terrorism. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense requested the
military services to increase their support to USSOCOM. In 2003, the
Marine Corps established a specially trained and equipped unit as a
concept to demonstrate the Marine Corps' ability to conduct special
operations missions under the operational control of USSOCOM. This unit
deployed to Iraq in April 2004 to perform selected special operations
missions. The Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine
Corps service component to USSOCOM in October 2005. In February 2006, the
Marine Corps activated its special operations command. Since August 2006,
the Marine Corps special operations command has deployed its forces to
perform special operations missions to support the geographic combatant
commanders' requirements. Figure 1 provides a timeline.

Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps Forces
into USSOCOM

Organization of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is the Marine Corps
service component to USSOCOM. The Command is headquartered on Marine Corps
Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine Corps special operations
command has five major subordinate units. These units include two Marine
Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special Operations Advisor
Group,^11 the Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine
Special Operations School. Table 2 provides a description of each unit.

^11Prior to May 2007, the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group was
named the Foreign Military Training Unit.

Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command

Unit                     Description                                       
Marine Special           Provides special operations companies to perform  
Operations Battalion     direct action, special reconnaissance, and        
                            foreign internal defense operations; companies    
                            can deploy aboard a Marine Expeditionary Unit or  
                            independently.                                    
Marine Special           Provides tailored, combat skills training and     
Operations Advisor Group advisor support for identified foreign forces to  
                            enhance the capability of partner nation forces.  
Marine Special           Provides tailorable and scalable support          
Operations Support Group capabilities for worldwide special operations     
                            missions, including intelligence and              
                            communications support, combined arms, military   
                            working dog support, and combat service support.  
Marine Special           Conducts assessment and selection of Marines      
Operations School        assigned to Marine Corps Forces Special           
                            Operations Command, develops and standardizes     
                            doctrine and tactics, and trains and certifies    
                            units for worldwide deployments.                  

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

By fiscal year 2011, the Command will be authorized 2,516 personnel--2,483
military personnel and 33 civilians. With the exception of one Marine
Corps reserve position, all of the authorized military personnel will be
drawn from the military services' active components. The Marine Corps
special operations component will be the smallest service component under
USSOCOM. The other military services' special operations components
include the following.

           o The Army component is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
           Army special operations forces include Special Forces, Rangers,
           Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological
           Operations units.
           o The Navy component is the Naval Special Warfare Command. Naval
           Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle
           Teams, and Special Boat Teams.
           o The Air Force component is the Air Force Special Operations
           Command. Air Force special operations forces include fixed and
           rotary wing aviation squadrons, a combat aviation advisory
           squadron, special tactics squadrons, and an unmanned aerial
           vehicle squadron.

           Figure 2 shows the number of military personnel positions in
           fiscal year 2007 authorized for DOD's special operations forces in
           the active component and reserve component. The authorizations
           include positions in special operations forces warfighter units,
           support units, and headquarters units such as USSOCOM and its
           service component commands.

           Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for
           Special Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and
           Reserve Component
			  
			  Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command

           Since fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have
           requested baseline and supplemental funding for the Marine Corps
           special operations command. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps
           and USSOCOM received $109.3 million in supplemental funds to
           establish the Marine Corps special operations command. In fiscal
           year 2007, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM received an additional
           $368.2 million in baseline funds for the Command, and $32 million
           in supplemental funding. As shown in table 3, the Marine Corps and
           USSOCOM have projected military construction, operation and
           maintenance, and procurement funding for the Command for fiscal
           years 2008 through 2013.

Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013

Dollars         in                                                         
millions                                                                   
                      Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal 
Appropriation        year   year   year   year   year   year   year   year 
account              2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013 
Military               $0 $228.6 $123.4  $10.1     $0     $0     $0     $0 
Construction                                                               
Operation and           0   65.6  100.4  110.6   74.5   69.9   72.3   75.8 
Maintenance                                                                
Procurement             0   74.0   56.1   57.6   70.6   77.4    2.2    6.9 
Supplemental        109.3   32.0                                           
Total              $109.3 $400.2 $279.9 $178.3 $145.1 $147.3  $74.5  $82.7 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data as of February 13, 2007.

Note: Amounts include Marine Corps and USSOCOM funding for the Marine
Corps special operations command.

Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Special Operations
Command, Force Structure Needed to Perform Its Missions Has Not Been Fully
Identified

Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command, the Command has not fully identified the force
structure needed to enable it to perform its assigned missions. The Marine
Corps has taken several steps to establish its special operations command,
such as activating the Command's headquarters, establishing Marine Corps
special operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct
special operations missions; however, DOD did not use critical practices
of effective strategic planning when developing the initial force
structure plans for the Command. As a result of limitations in the
strategic planning process, the Marine Corps special operations command
has identified several force structure challenges that will likely affect
the Command's ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and
is working to revise its force structure to address these challenges.

Steps Taken to Establish Marine Corps Special Operations Command, but Initial
Force Structure Plans Were Not Developed Using Critical Practices of Effective
Strategic Planning

The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish the Marine Corps
special operations command. For example, the Marine Corps has activated
the headquarters of its special operations command, established some of
its special operations forces units--including 4 special operations
companies and 12 foreign military training teams to date--and deployed
these units to conduct special operations missions. However, the initial
force structure plans for the Command were not developed using critical
practices of effective strategic planning. According to officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the Marine Corps, the
Secretary of Defense directed that the Marine Corps establish a special
operations command to meet the growing demand for special operations
forces in the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense, with input from
the Marine Corps, determined that 2,516 personnel was an appropriate size
for the Command based on the assumptions that the Command was to be
staffed within the existing Marine Corps end-strength, and the
establishment of the Command could not significantly affect the Marine
Corps budget. Marine Corps planners then based the composition and number
of Marine Corps special operations forces units on existing units within
the service that had trained to perform similar missions in the past. For
example, Marine Corps officials told us that the force structure plans for
its special operations companies were modeled after a Maritime Special
Purpose Force, which had previously trained to conduct some special
operations missions for conventional Marine Corps units.^12 Additionally,
Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure plan to
establish nine special operations companies was based on the need to
accommodate the deployment schedule of its Marine Expeditionary Units. The
initial force structure plan also included the transfer of the Foreign
Military Training Unit from the conventional force to its special
operations command. Using this existing force structure, the Marine Corps
planned to establish 24 foreign military training teams under its special
operations command.

DOD did not fully incorporate critical practices of effective strategic
planning when it developed these initial force structure plans for the
Marine Corps special operations command. We have previously reported that
strategic planning is important to ensure that an organization's
activities support its strategic goals. Effective planning principles,
such as those embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993^13 and used by leading organizations, require federal agencies to set
strategic goals and develop strategic plans to accomplish those goals. Our
prior work has identified several critical practices for effective
strategic planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to
meet organizational missions and stakeholder involvement. Our prior work
has shown that leading organizations recognize that an organization's
activities, core processes, and resources must be aligned to support its
mission and help it achieve its goals. Organizations should assess the
extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their
mission and desired outcomes. In addition, successful organizations base
their strategic planning, to a large extent, on the interests and
expectations of their stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement is important
to help agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at
the highest priorities. Just as important, involving stakeholders in
strategic planning efforts can help create a basic understanding among the
stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies, the
limited resources available to them, and how those demands and resources
require careful and continuous balancing.^14

^12The Maritime Special Purpose Force was part of the Marine Corps' Marine
Expeditionary Unit--Special Operations Capable Program. This program
provided a forward deployed, sea-based Marine Air-Ground Task Force
capable of executing designated maritime special operations, among other
tasks. The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and trained using
Marine Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special operations-capable
force that could be tailored to execute maritime special operations
missions.

^13Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

However, in our review of the planning process that preceded the
establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command, we found the
Command's activities and resources were not fully aligned with the
organization's mission. For example, although the alignment of activities
and resources to meet organizational missions, a critical practice of
effective strategic planning, should include an analysis of the number of
personnel required for an organization to accomplish its missions, Marine
Corps officials stated that the size of the Marine Corps special
operations command (2,516 personnel) was not determined through an
analysis of the Command's assigned missions. Specifically, neither the
Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a
comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel
needed to meet the Marine Corps special operations command's mission
requirements that directly tied the number of personnel authorized for the
Command with its assigned missions. USSOCOM did not provide official
mission guidance to the Marine Corps until October 2006, almost 1 year
after the Command's personnel authorizations had been determined. In the
absence of specific guidance, Marine Corps planners did not conduct a
comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel
needed to meet the Marine Corps special operations command's full range of
mission requirements. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable
data on the number of employees required to meet an agency's needs are
critical because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency's ability
to perform its missions efficiently and effectively.^15

14 [30]GAO/GGD-96-118 .

The alignment of activities and resources should also include an analysis
of the number and composition of Marine Corps special operations forces
units. However, the Marine Corps did not determine the number and
composition of its special operations forces units based on specific
guidance from USSOCOM. Although the Marine Corps special operations
command was established as the Marine Corps service component under
USSOCOM, USSOCOM did not provide guidance to Marine Corps planners on the
full range of missions assigned to the Command, or on the number of
special operations forces that the Marine Corps needed to provide. Both
USSOCOM and Marine Corps officials reported that USSOCOM provided only
informal guidance to Marine Corps planners on the core tasks that would be
assigned to Marine Corps special operations forces units. According to
Marine Corps officials involved in the planning for the Marine Corps
special operations command, the informal guidance did not prioritize the
core tasks to focus Marine Corps planning efforts, and the guidance did
not identify the required capacity for specific capabilities within the
Command.

The official guidance that USSOCOM provided to the Marine Corps special
operations command in October 2006 contained a complete list of missions
the Command would be expected to perform. However, the guidance did not
prioritize these missions to focus the Command's planning efforts.
Additionally, the guidance did not establish milestones and benchmarks
that the Command could use to determine when, and to what level of
proficiency, Marine Corps special operations forces units should be able
to perform all of their assigned missions. In the absence of specific
guidance, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure plan
to establish nine special operations companies was not based on a USSOCOM
requirement for the number of these companies. Moreover, while the
decision to transfer the foreign military training teams to the Marine
Corps special operations command met the Command's mission to provide
USSOCOM with a foreign internal defense capability, the decision on the
number of teams needed by the Command to meet USSOCOM's mission
requirements was left to the Marine Corps. Marine Corps officials also
told us that in the absence of clear guidance on the required capacity for
support personnel within the Command, Marine Corps planners prioritized
the assignment of personnel in warfighter positions in special operations
forces units over positions in support units. Specifically, because
planners were basing the Command's force structure decisions on the
personnel limit established by DOD, the Marine Corps exchanged positions
related to support functions within the Command for positions in its
warfighter units. Support functions such as vehicle maintenance, motor
transportation, intelligence operations, communication support, and
engineering support provide important and necessary support to Marine
Corps special operations forces units, as well as other special operations
forces units in USSOCOM's other service components.

^15GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [31]GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

Furthermore, we found a lack of involvement by some key stakeholders in
the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command. For
example, the special operations components with the department's
geographic combatant commands--which are responsible for commanding
special operations forces around the world--were not involved in the
process to establish the Marine Corps special operations command or in the
decisions to target the service's resources to their highest priorities
and mission requirements. Officials with the U.S. Pacific Command's
special operations command who are responsible for functions such as
operations and planning told us they provided little input into the
planning process to help determine how Marine Corps special operations
forces units should be organized and what capabilities were needed in
these units to meet the mission requirements of the geographic combatant
commands. Similarly, officials from the U.S. Central Command's special
operations command who were responsible for operations and planning in
that command told us they were not included in the planning process that
preceded the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command.
In particular, officials told us they were not involved in the decisions
regarding the types of missions that Marine Corps special operations
forces units would need to perform, although as we noted in our July 2006
report on special operations forces deployment trends, 85 percent of all
fiscal year 2005 special operations forces deployments were to the U.S.
Central Command's area of responsibility.^16

16 [32]GAO-06-812 .

Limitations in Strategic Planning Process Led to Force Structure Challenges,
although Plans Are Being Revised to Address These Challenges

The Marine Corps special operations command has identified several force
structure challenges that stem from limitations in DOD's strategic
planning process that will likely affect its ability to perform its full
range of responsibilities, and the Command is revising its force structure
plans to address these challenges. For example, the Command has determined
that the number and composition of its special operations forces units are
not aligned with the Command's mission requirements. In particular, the
Command has identified shortages in positions such as authorized
intelligence personnel, which will affect the Command's ability to
simultaneously provide intelligence support to Marine Corps special
operations forces and USSOCOM. Moreover, according to Marine Corps special
operations command officials, the limited number of personnel available to
perform support functions will prevent the Command from effectively
performing all of its mission requirements. To illustrate this point,
Marine Corps special operations command officials told us that the initial
force structure plans for the Command call for less than one support
person available for every person assigned to a warfighter position.
According to Command officials, this ratio is less than what would be
expected for a command of similar size and assigned missions. Officials
said an expected ratio for a command such as theirs would be at least two
support personnel to one warfighter, and therefore their goal is to adjust
the force structure to meet this ratio.

In addition, Marine Corps special operations command officials reported
that the number of positions authorized for support personnel will also
affect the Command's ability to meet its responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip Marine Corps special operations forces. Officials stated
the number of personnel assigned to its command elements, such as the
headquarters and the staffs of the subordinate units, is insufficient to
effectively accomplish these responsibilities. Current force structure
plans authorize approximately 780 military personnel and 33 civilian
personnel for the Command's headquarters and the staffs of its major
subordinate units.

At the time of our work, the Marine Corps special operations command was
developing several proposals to significantly revise its force structure
to address the challenges stemming from the limitations in the planning
process and to better align the Command to meet USSOCOM's mission
guidance. These revisions would adjust the number and size of the
Command's warfighter units to better meet mission requirements.
Additionally, if approved, some of the positions made available through
the revisions could be used to remedy shortfalls in personnel who perform
support functions such as personnel management, training, logistics,
intelligence, and budget-related activities. Command officials told us
these proposals would likely mitigate many of the challenges that have
resulted from the lack of a comprehensive strategic planning process, but
they acknowledged that many of the decisions that are needed to implement
the force structure changes will be made by Headquarters, Marine Corps. In
order to move forward with its proposals, the Command is working to
complete several analyses of the personnel and funding requirements that
are tied to these proposed force structure changes. It has set milestones
for when these analyses should be completed in order to determine whether
any additional funding or personnel would be required. However, the
Command expects to be able to implement these proposals within the funding
levels already identified and planned for future fiscal years. Until the
analyses are completed, the Command will be unable to determine whether
the approved plans for its personnel and funding should be adjusted in
order for the Command to perform all of its assigned missions.

Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps Has Not Developed a
Strategic Human Capital Approach to Manage the Critical Skills And Competencies
Required of Personnel in Its Special Operations Command

Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills
and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command.
While the Marine Corps special operations command has identified some
skills that are needed to perform special operations missions, it has not
conducted a comprehensive analysis of the critical skills and incremental
training required of personnel in its special operations forces units.
Such analyses are critical to the Marine Corps' efforts to develop a
strategic human capital approach for the management of personnel in its
special operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses,
the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some personnel
to special operations forces units for extended tour lengths to account
for the additional training and skills needed by these personnel. However,
this interim policy is inconsistent with the Marine Corps special
operations command's goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel
within the special operations community.

While Some Personnel Requirements Have Been Identified, Marine Corps Special
Operations Command Has Not Fully Identified the Critical Skills and Competencies
Required of Its Personnel

While the Marine Corps special operations command has identified some
critical skills and competencies that are needed to perform special
operations missions, it has not fully identified these requirements
because it has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all
the critical skills and additional training required of personnel in its
units. We have previously reported that strategic human capital planning
is essential to federal agencies' efforts to transform their organizations
to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Generally, strategic human
capital planning addresses two needs: (1) aligning an agency's human
capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic
goals, and (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing,
motivating, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. Our prior
work has shown that the analysis of critical skill and competency gaps
between current and future workforce needs is an important step in
strategic human capital planning.^17 We have also reported that it is
essential that long-term strategies include implementation goals and
timelines to demonstrate that progress is being made.

As part of the effort to identify these critical skills, the Marine
Special Operations School is developing a training course that will
provide baseline training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them for
positions in warfighter units. For example, the Command plans to provide
these personnel with training on advanced survival skills and foreign
language in order to prepare them to perform special operations missions.
However, the Marine Corps special operations command has not fully
identified and documented the critical skills and training that are
required for personnel to effectively perform special operations missions,
and that build on the skills that are developed in conventional Marine
Corps units. Officials told us the Command had not yet identified the full
range of training that will be provided in this course in order to
establish a minimum level of special operations skills for the Command's
warfighters. Additionally, the Marine Corps special operations command has
not fully identified the advanced skills and training necessary to support
some of the Command's more complex special operations missions, such as
counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare.
While the Marine Corps special operations command has established a time
frame for when it wants to conduct the training course under development,
it has not set milestones for when it will complete its analysis of the
critical skills and competencies required of its personnel.

^17 [33]GAO-04-753 .

Moreover, the Marine Corps special operations command has not yet fully
determined which positions should be filled by specially trained personnel
who are strategically managed to meet the Command's missions. Officials
told us there is broad agreement within the Command that personnel
assigned to operational positions in its warfighter units require
specialized training in critical skills needed to perform special
operations missions, and should therefore be strategically managed to meet
the Command's mission requirements. These personnel include enlisted
reconnaissance and communications Marines assigned to the Marine Special
Operations Battalions and infantry Marines assigned to the Marine Special
Operations Advisor Group, as well as some officers assigned to these
units. At the time of our review, however, we found that the Command had
not yet determined which additional positions should also be filled by
personnel who are strategically managed. In particular, we were told by
officials from the Command's headquarters that a determination has not yet
been made as to whether personnel who deploy with warfighter units to
provide critical combat support, such as intelligence personnel, require
specialized skills and training that are incremental to the training
provided in conventional force units. For example, officials have not yet
decided whether intelligence personnel should attend the initial training
course that is under development. However, the Marine Special Operations
School plans to provide these personnel with specialized intelligence
training to enable them to support certain sensitive special operations
missions in support of deploying units. Officials acknowledge that until
the Command determines the extent to which support personnel require
specialized skills and training to perform their missions, the Command
cannot fully identify which positions should be filled by personnel who
are strategically managed.

Marine Corps Has Developed an Interim Policy to Manage Personnel in Its Special
Operations Command, but It Lacks Consensus on a Strategic Human Capital Approach

To address the personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations
command, Headquarters, Marine Corps, has established an interim policy
that provides for extended assignments of some personnel in special
operations forces units; however, the absence of a comprehensive analysis
of the critical skills and training required of personnel in special
operations forces units has contributed to a lack of consensus within the
Marine Corps on a strategic human capital approach to manage these
personnel. The extended assignments apply to Marines who are beyond their
first term of enlistment, which is typically 3 to 5 years, and who are
assigned to one of the Marine Corps special operations command's
warfighter, training, or intelligence units. The policy directs that these
personnel will be assigned to the Command for 48 months, in part, to
account for the additional training provided to personnel in these units.
According to officials at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps
special operations command, the 48-month assignment policy is designed to
retain designated personnel within special operations forces units long
enough to complete at least two deployments. All other Marines will be
assigned to the Command for approximately 36 months, which is a typical
tour length for Marines in conventional force units.

The interim policy also addresses a concern that personnel assigned to
special operations forces units will have opportunities for career
progression. In general, Marines are managed according to established
career progression models for their respective career fields. These career
progression models identify the experiences, skills, and professional
military education necessary for personnel to be competitive for promotion
to the next grade. For example, as personnel are promoted to a higher
grade, they are typically placed in positions with increased
responsibilities that are consistent with their career progression models
in order to remain competitive for further promotion. The Marine Corps has
not established a separate career field for special operations forces
personnel; instead, the Marine Corps is assigning personnel from a variety
of career fields, such as reconnaissance, to its special operations forces
units. However, the current structure of the Marine Corps special
operations command cannot support long-term assignments of personnel
within the Command, in some cases, due to limited opportunities for
progression into positions with increased responsibilities. For example,
our analysis of the Marine Corps special operations command's force
structure shows that the Command is authorized 76 percent fewer
reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-7 as compared to
the number of reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-6.
The Marine Corps has established targets for the promotion of
reconnaissance personnel to the grade of E-7 after they have spent
approximately 5 years in the grade of E-6. As a result, many
reconnaissance personnel who are promoted to E-7 while assigned to a
special operations forces unit will need to be reassigned to the
conventional force in order to move into an E-7 position and remain
competitive for further promotion.

The interim policy is also consistent with the approved plan to increase
the authorized end-strength of the Marine Corps. In January 2007, the
President approved plans to increase the active duty end-strength of the
Marine Corps from 179,000 in fiscal year 2006 to 202,000 by fiscal year
2011. This plan includes growth in the number and size of conventional
force units and is intended to reduce the stress on frequently deployed
units, such as intelligence units, by achieving a 1 to 2 deployment to
home station ratio for these units. Marine Corps officials associated with
units that will be affected by these increases, such as reconnaissance and
intelligence units, told us that the rotation of personnel from Marine
Corps special operations units back into the conventional force is
important to help ensure that conventional force units are staffed with
experienced and mature personnel. For example, our analysis of Marine
Corps data shows that by fiscal year 2009, the Marine Corps will increase
the servicewide requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human
intelligence personnel by 50 percent above fiscal year 2006 levels.
Although the Marine Corps is adjusting its accession, training, and
retention strategies to meet the increased requirement for enlisted
counterintelligence/human intelligence personnel, officials stated the
rotation of these experienced personnel from the Marine Corps special
operations command back into the conventional force can help meet the
increased personnel needs of conventional intelligence units, while also
ensuring that conventional force units have an understanding of special
operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additionally, officials
told us the rotation of personnel from special operations forces units to
conventional force units supports the Marine Corps' process for
prioritizing the assignment of personnel to units that are preparing for
deployments to Iraq and other war on terrorism requirements.

Notwithstanding the intended outcome of the interim policy, Marine Corps
special operations command officials told us that the policy might impact
the Command's ability to prepare its forces to conduct the full range of
its assigned missions and that the policy is inconsistent with the
Command's stated goal for the permanent assignment of personnel in its
special operations forces units. In congressional testimony, the Commander
of the Marine Corps special operations command specified his goal to
develop a personnel management strategy that would retain some personnel
within the special operations community for the duration of their careers.
Officials from the Command told us that a substantial investment of time
and resources is required to train personnel in special operations forces
units on the critical skills needed to perform special operations
missions. For example, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel
will receive in-depth training to develop foreign language proficiency and
cultural awareness, which is consistent with DOD's requirement to increase
the capacity of special operations forces to perform more demanding and
specialized tasks during long-duration, indirect, and clandestine
operations in politically sensitive environments.^18 However, these
officials believe that the Command's ability to develop and sustain these
skills over time will be hampered if its special operations forces units
experience high personnel turnover. In addition, according to USSOCOM
doctrine, personnel must be assigned to a special operations forces unit
for at least 4 years in order to be fully trained in some advanced special
operations skills. Consequently, officials from the Command have
determined that limited duration assignments would challenge the Command's
ability to develop the capability to conduct more complex special
operations core tasks, and to retain fully trained personnel long enough
to use their skills during deployments. The Marine Corps special
operations command has determined that to achieve its goal of permanent
personnel assignments within the special operations community, it requires
a separate career field for its warfighter personnel. According to
officials from the Command, a separate career field would allow the Marine
Corps to manage these personnel based on a career progression model that
reflects the experiences, skills, and professional military education that
are relevant to special operations missions. Moreover, according to
officials from the Command, the establishment of a special operations
forces career field would allow the Marine Corps to develop and sustain a
population of trained and qualified personnel, while providing the Command
and USSOCOM with a more appropriate return on the investment in training
personnel to perform special operations missions.

^18Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February
2006).

The Command's goal for the permanent assignment of some special operations
forces personnel is also consistent with USSOCOM's current and projected
needs for special operations forces personnel. USSOCOM has identified the
retention of experienced personnel who possess specialized skills and
training as a key component in its strategy to support the war on
terrorism. In its vision of how special operations forces will meet
long-term national strategic and military objectives,^19 USSOCOM has
identified the need for a comprehensive special operations forces career
management system to facilitate the progression of these personnel through
increasing levels of responsibility within the special operations
community. In addition, senior USSOCOM officials have expressed support
for an assignment policy that allows Marine Corps personnel to remain
within the special operations community for the duration of their careers.

^19U.S. Special Operations Command, Capstone Concept for Special
Operations (2006).

Headquarters, Marine Corps, plans to review its interim policy for
assigning personnel to its special operations command annually to
determine whether it meets the mission requirements of the Command.
Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently directed
Headquarters, Marine Corps, to study the assignment policies for personnel
in certain Army special operations forces units who rotate between
conventional Army units and special operations forces units. According to
a Headquarters, Marine Corps, official, one purpose of this study is to
evaluate whether a similar management strategy may be applied to personnel
in Marine Corps special operations forces units. Notwithstanding these
efforts, officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps
special operations command acknowledge that the analysis of the critical
skills and training required of personnel in the Command's special
operations forces units is a necessary step in the development of a
strategic human capital approach to the management of these personnel.
Until the Marine Corps special operations command completes a
comprehensive analysis to identify and document the critical skills and
additional training needed by its future workforce to perform the
Command's full range of assigned special operations missions, the Marine
Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative
strategic human capital approaches for the management of personnel
assigned to its special operations forces units.

USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether Marine Corps Special
Operations Forces Training Programs Prepare Units for Missions

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether Marine Corps
special operations forces training programs are preparing units for their
missions because it has not established common training standards for many
special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these
programs will prepare units to be fully interoperable with DOD's other
special operations forces. The Marine Corps special operations command has
provided training for its forces that is based on training that was
provided to conventional units that were assigned some special operations
missions prior to the activation of the Command, and by selectively
incorporating the training that USSOCOM's other service components provide
to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not formally validated that the
training used to prepare Marine Corps special operations forces meets
special operations standards and is effective in training Marine Corps
special operations forces to be fully interoperable with the department's
other special operations forces.

Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Implemented Programs to Train
Personnel to Perform Special Operations Missions

The Marine Corps special operations command has taken several actions to
implement programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel to
perform special operations missions. For example, the Command operates the
Marine Special Operations School, which has recently finalized plans for a
training pipeline to initially screen all of the Marines and Sailors
identified for assignment to the Command to determine their suitability
for such assignments. Once the initial screening is completed, personnel
who volunteer for assignments in one of the Command's warfighter
units--such as the Marine Special Operations Battalions and the Marine
Special Operations Advisor Group--will undergo an additional assessment
that measures mental and physical qualifications. As indicated by the
Command's plans, personnel who successfully complete this assessment will
be provided with additional baseline special operations training prior to
being assigned to one of the Command's warfighter units.^20

The Marine Special Operations School also provides training to personnel
in special operations companies. This training consists of both classroom
instruction and the practical application of specialized skills. For
example, the school has provided training to personnel in skills such as
precision shooting, close quarters battle, and special reconnaissance
techniques. In addition, the school's instructors conduct exercises to
train the special operations companies on the unit's tactics, techniques,
and procedures, as well as predeployment training events, to certify the
companies are capable of performing the primary special operations
missions assigned to these units.^21

The Command's Marine Special Operations Advisor Group has also developed a
comprehensive training program designed to build the individual and
collective skills required to perform the unit's mission to provide
military training and advisor support to foreign forces. The program
includes individual training for skills such as light infantry tactics and
cultural and language training, as well as training for advanced skills in
functional areas such as communications, intelligence, and medical
training. The training program culminates with a capstone training event
that evaluates the proficiency of personnel in mission-essential skills.
The training event is used as a means of certifying that these units are
trained to perform their assigned missions.

^20As discussed previously in this report, the Marine Corps special
operations command has not fully determined what baseline training will be
provided to special operations forces personnel or which personnel will be
required to receive this training.

^21In addition to the training exercise to certify these units are capable
of performing special operations missions, the special operations
companies also conduct an extensive training program with a Marine
Expeditionary Unit prior to deployment.

In addition, Marine Corps special operations companies and Marine Special
Operations Advisor Group teams conduct unit training to prepare for the
missions that will be performed during deployments. According to officials
with these units, this training is tailored to prepare personnel for the
specific tasks that will likely be performed during the deployment. For
example, officials stated that unit training may include enhanced language
and cultural awareness training for specific countries and training in
environmental terrains where these units will be deployed.

Marine Corps special operations forces have used conventional Marine Corps
training standards to prepare personnel and units to conduct some special
operations missions. Officials with the Marine Corps special operations
command and its subordinate units told us that its special operations
forces units have trained personnel in some skills based on the training
programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations
missions prior to the activation of the Command. For example, according to
Marine Corps policy, the service formerly deployed specially organized,
trained, and equipped forces as part of the Marine Expeditionary Units
that were capable of conducting some special operations missions, such as
direct action operations.^22 Officials with the Marine Corps special
operations command and the Marine Corps Special Operations Battalions told
us that the special operations companies have been provided with training
for skills such as urban sniper, specialized demolitions, and dynamic
assault that is based largely on the training and standards for these
skills that were established for conventional Marine Corps forces.

For other skills, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel have
reviewed and incorporated the training plans that USSOCOM's Army, Navy,
and Air Force service components use to prepare their special operations
forces. Marine Corps special operations command officials told us that
conventional Marine Corps units are not typically trained in many of the
advanced skills required to perform some special operations missions, such
as counterterrorism and unconventional warfare. To develop programs to
train personnel on the skills required to perform these and other special
operations missions, Marine Corps special operations forces have
incorporated the training and standards from the training publications of
the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare
Command, and the Air Force Special Operations Command. However, according
to a senior USSOCOM official, Marine Corps special operations forces have
had the discretion to select the standards to use when training forces to
perform special operations skills.

^22The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and trained using
Marine Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special operations-capable
force that could be tailored to execute a maritime special operations
mission.

During our review, we met with servicemembers who had recently completed
deployments with Marine Corps special operations forces units as well as
with servicemembers who were preparing for planned deployments. In
general, these servicemembers told us that they believed they were
adequately trained and prepared to perform their assigned missions. Team
leaders with the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group, for example,
stated that they received sufficient guidance to properly plan and execute
special operations missions during deployments to train and advise foreign
military forces. However, at the time of our work, the Marine Corps
special operations companies that participated in the first deployments of
these units had not yet completed their deployments. As a result, we were
unable to discuss whether the training that was provided was adequate to
fully meet their mission requirements.

USSOCOM Has Not Formally Validated That Marine Corps Training Meets Special
Operations Forces Standards and Prepares Forces to Be Fully Interoperable with
Other Forces

USSOCOM has not formally validated that the training used to prepare
Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards and prepares forces
to be fully interoperable with the department's other special operations
forces. The Marine Corps special operations command has made progress in
developing and implementing training programs for Marine Corps special
operations forces. However, the Command has not used common training
standards for special operations skills because USSOCOM has not developed
common training standards for many skills, although work to establish
common standards is ongoing. USSOCOM officials stated the headquarters and
the service components are working to develop common training standards,
where appropriate, because USSOCOM recognizes that the service-specific
training conducted for advanced special operations skills may not optimize
opportunities for commonality, jointness, or efficiency. In addition,
USSOCOM officials told us that common training standards would further
promote departmentwide interoperability goals, address potential safety
concerns, and provide greater assurances to future joint force commanders
that special operations forces are trained to similar standards.

Our prior work has shown that the lack of commonality in training
standards for joint operations creates potentially hazardous conditions on
the battlefield. For example, we reported in 2003 that the military
services and the special operations community did not use common standards
to train personnel to control air support of ground forces. In particular,
we found that the standards for these personnel in special operations
units differed among the Army, Navy, and Air Force because personnel were
required to meet their service-specific training requirements, which led
to hesitation by commanders in Afghanistan to employ some special
operations forces personnel to direct air support of ground forces.^23 In
2005, USSOCOM established minimum standards for training, qualifying,
evaluating, and certifying special operations forces personnel who control
air support of ground forces.

USSOCOM formalized a process in 2006 to establish and validate common
training standards for special operations skills. As part of this process,
USSOCOM established a working group comprised of representatives from
USSOCOM and each service component to determine the baseline tasks that
define the training standard and the service component training
requirements for special operations skills. According to a USSOCOM
official, the working group first identified the common training
requirements and standards for the skills of military free fall and combat
dive. In addition, USSOCOM and its service components are working
incrementally to identify common training standards for other special
operations skills, such as the training required for personnel assigned to
combined joint special operations task forces.^24 However, officials with
USSOCOM and the Marine Corps special operations command told us the
process to establish common training standards for applicable special
operations skills will likely take a considerable amount of time to
complete due to the number of advanced special operations skills and the
challenge of building consensus among the service components on what
constitutes a common training standard.

^23GAO, Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper
Air Support of Ground Forces, [34]GAO-03-505 (May 2, 2003).

^24Combined joint special operations task forces are composed of special
operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S.
military department. They are formed to carry out a specific special
operation or to prosecute special operations in support of a theater
campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task
force may have conventional units assigned or attached to support the
conduct of specific missions.

Furthermore, USSOCOM has not formally validated whether the training used
to prepare Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards and
prepares forces to be fully interoperable with the department's other
special operations forces. USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to
evaluate the training provided to Marine Corps special operations forces.
In November 2006, for example, USSOCOM representatives attended a training
exercise on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton for a Marine special
operations company that was preparing for an upcoming deployment. In
addition, USSOCOM representatives observed training exercises in February
2007 for Marine Special Operations Advisor Group teams that were preparing
to deploy. A USSOCOM official told us that the purpose of these
evaluations was to observe some of the planned training tasks and focus on
areas where USSOCOM could assist the Marine Corps special operations
command in future training exercises. However, USSOCOM has not formally
assessed the training programs used by the Marine Corps special operations
command to prepare its forces for deployments, despite the fact that
USSOCOM is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of all training
programs and ensuring the interoperability of all of DOD's special
operations forces. Our review of the reports prepared for USSOCOM
leadership and provided to Marine Corps personnel showed that they did not
contain a formal evaluation of the training content and they did not
provide an assessment of the standards used during the training to
determine whether the training was in accordance with special operations
forces standards.

Officials with the Marine Corps special operations command and its
subordinate units told us that USSOCOM has not been extensively involved
in the development of Marine Corps special operations forces training
programs and the performance standards used to train Marine Corps special
operations forces. In addition, USSOCOM officials told us that a formal
assessment of Marine Corps training programs has not occurred, and will
likely not occur, because the management of the Marine Corps special
operations command's training programs is, like the other service
components, a responsibility delegated to the Marine Corps component
commander. These officials told us the service component commander has the
primary responsibility for establishing training programs and certifying
that special operations forces are capable of performing special
operations missions prior to deployments. In addition, a USSOCOM official
stated that any training-related issues affecting the readiness of special
operations forces are identified in readiness reports and are discussed
during monthly meetings between senior USSOCOM leadership and the service
component commanders. However, without common training standards for
special operations skills or a formal validation of the training used to
prepare Marine Corps special operations forces for planned deployments in
the near term, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances to the
geographic combatant commanders that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained to special operations forces standards and that these
forces meet departmentwide interoperability goals for special operations
forces, thereby potentially affecting the success of future joint
operations.

Conclusions

Since activating a Marine Corps component to USSOCOM, the Marine Corps has
made considerable progress integrating into the special operations force
structure, and several Marine Corps units have successfully completed
deployments to train foreign military forces--a key focus area in DOD's
strategy for the war on terrorism. The Marine Corps has also taken an
initial step to meet the unique personnel needs of its special operations
command. However, it does not have complete information on all of the
critical skills and additional training required of its personnel in
special operations forces units. This information would enable the Marine
Corps to assess the effectiveness of its human capital planning to date
and build consensus on the development of alternative approaches for the
management of its personnel assigned to special operations forces units.
Until the Marine Corps develops a strategic human capital approach that is
based on an analysis of the critical skills and training required of
personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units, it may be
unable to align its personnel with the Marine Corps special operations
command's actual workforce requirements, which could jeopardize the
long-term success of this new Command.

The Marine Corps special operations command faces an additional challenge
in training its forces to special operations forces standards and meeting
DOD interoperability goals because USSOCOM has not yet established common
training standards for many advanced skills. In the absence of common
training standards, the Marine Corps special operations command is
training its newly established special operations forces units in some
skills that were not previously trained in conventional Marine Corps
units. Unless USSOCOM validates that the training currently being used to
prepare Marine Corps special operations forces is effective and meets
DOD's interoperability goals, it will be unable to ensure that Marine
Corps special operations forces are interoperable with other special
operations forces in the department, thereby potentially affecting the
success of future joint operations.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for
the management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special
operations command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained to be fully interoperable with DOD's other special
operations forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions.

           o Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the
           Commander, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, to
           conduct an analysis of the critical skills and competencies
           required of personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces
           units and establish milestones for conducting this analysis. This
           analysis should be used to assess the effectiveness of current
           assignment policies and to develop a strategic human capital
           approach for the management of these personnel.
           o Direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for
           evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training
           programs, including their content and standards, to ensure the
           programs are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully
           interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the
recommendations are underway. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the
report as appropriate.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Commandant
of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command, to establish milestones for conducting an analysis of
the critical skills and competencies required in Marine Corps special
operations forces units and, once completed, use this analysis to assess
the effectiveness of current assignment policies and develop a strategic
human capital approach for the management of these personnel. DOD stated
that the Marine Corps special operations command is currently conducting a
detailed analysis of the critical skills and competencies required to
conduct the missions assigned to the Command. The department further noted
that the Command will also fully develop mission-essential task lists, and
individual and collective training standards in order to clearly state the
requirements for training and personnel. DOD also stated that USSOCOM is
providing assistance so that these processes are integrated with USSOCOM's
development of the Joint Training System, which is mandated by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We believe these are important
steps if fully implemented. We note, however, DOD's response does not
address the issue of milestones and gives no indication when the ongoing
analysis will be completed. We believe milestones are important because
they serve as a means of holding people accountable. Furthermore, DOD did
not address the need for the Marine Corps to use the analysis being
conducted by the Command to assess the effectiveness of the current
assignment policy. Without such an assessment, neither the Marine Corps
nor DOD will have needed assurances that the current Marine Corps policy
for assigning personnel to its special operations command is providing DOD
with an appropriate return on the investment the department is making to
train Marine Corps special operations forces personnel. Moreover, without
a strategic human capital approach that is based on the comprehensive
analysis of the critical skills and training required of its special
operations forces personnel, the Marine Corps may be unable to effectively
align its personnel with the Marine Corps special operations command's
workforce requirements.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Commander,
USSOCOM, to establish a framework for evaluating Marine Corps special
operations forces training programs to ensure the programs are sufficient
to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable with DOD's other
special operations forces. DOD stated that USSOCOM is currently
implementing the Joint Training System that is mandated by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01D. According to DOD, the
Joint Training System will provide the framework for USSOCOM to evaluate
component training programs to ensure special operations forces
operational capabilities are achieved. DOD also stated that Headquarters,
USSOCOM, established the Training Standards and Requirements Integrated
Process Team to complement the Joint Training System, which is focusing on
standardizing training for individual skills across USSOCOM, and ensuring
increased efficiency and interoperability. DOD stated that USSOCOM
delegates many authorities to its service component commanders, including
training their service-provided forces. DOD further stated that the Marine
Corps special operations command has established the Marine Corps Special
Operations School, which is tasked with evaluating all unit training
programs to assess their combat capability and interoperability with
special operations forces. While we agree that implementing the Joint
Training System and standardizing training through the integrated process
team will help ensure the interoperability of Marine Corps special
operations forces, according to USSOCOM officials, these efforts will
likely take several years to complete. We continue to believe that in the
near term, USSOCOM needs to evaluate the Marine Corps special operations
forces training programs that are currently being conducted. While the
Marine Corps has trained its conventional forces in skills related to the
special operations forces' core tasks of direct action and special
reconnaissance, it has not traditionally trained its forces in other
special operations forces core tasks, such as unconventional warfare. For
this reason, it is incumbent on USSOCOM to validate the ongoing training
to ensure these new Marine Corps special operations forces units are
adequately prepared to perform all of their assigned missions and are
interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces.

We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the
Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[35]www.gao.gov . If you or your staffs have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or [36][email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to
this report are listed in appendix III.

Sharon L. Pickup, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations command
(Command) has identified the force structure needed to perform its
mission, we identified and reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) reports
related to the department's efforts to increase the size of special
operations forces by integrating Marine Corps forces into the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). These documents included the 2002 Special
Operations Forces Realignment Study, the 2006 Operational Availability
Study, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the 2006 Unified
Command Plan. We analyzed available internal DOD documentation such as
briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified DOD's plans and time
frames for establishing the Marine Corps special operations command. We
discussed with officials at DOD organizations the processes that DOD
utilized to determine and implement the plans for the new Command. These
organizations include, but are not limited to, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict; the Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment Directorate; Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations;
Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Marine Corps Manpower and
Reserve Affairs. We also interviewed officials with USSOCOM and the
special operations components of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific
Command to determine the role of these commands in the decision-making
processes. We reviewed prior GAO reports and the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993^1 that discuss key elements of effective strategic
planning. We interviewed officials from the Marine Corps special
operations command to determine the status of the Command's efforts to
activate Marine Corps special operations forces units and discussed the
challenges the Command has identified that may affect the Command's
ability to meet its full range of responsibilities. We analyzed documents
that describe the Marine Corps special operations command's proposals to
readjust its force structure to overcome its identified challenges. We
discussed the status of these proposals with officials from the Marine
Corps special operations command and Headquarters, Marine Corps. However,
at the time of our review, the Marine Corps special operations command had
not finalized decisions on proposed changes to its force structure and
concepts of employment for its special operations forces units. As a
result, we were unable to assess the extent to which any proposed changes
to the Command's force structure would mitigate identified challenges and
specified personnel shortfalls.

^1Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps has determined a strategic
human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies
required of personnel in its special operations command, we examined
relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning personnel to conventional
force units and the service's interim policy for assigning personnel to
special operations forces units. We interviewed officials from the Marine
Corps special operations command and Headquarters, Marine Corps, to
discuss the service's career progression models for personnel assigned to
Marine Corps special operations forces units. We also reviewed DOD plans
to increase the active duty end-strength of the Marine Corps, and
interviewed officials from Headquarters, Marine Corps, to discuss the
service's strategy to meet the personnel needs of its special operations
forces units and its conventional force units. We analyzed the Marine
Corps special operations command's planned force structure and interviewed
officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps special
operations command to determine the challenges the Marine Corps may face
in developing a long-term plan to assign personnel to its special
operations forces units. To better understand the unique personnel needs
of the Marine Corps special operations command, we interviewed officials
from the Command to discuss the specialized skills and training that are
required by personnel who are assigned to special operations forces units
to perform the Command's assigned missions. We reviewed available
documentation on the current and proposed training plans that identify the
critical skills and training that will be provided to Marine Corps special
operations forces personnel, and we interviewed officials with the Command
to discuss the status of their efforts to fully identify all special
operations critical skills and training requirements. We reviewed
congressional testimony by the Commander of the Marine Corps special
operations command^2 and relevant Command planning documents to identify
the Marine Corps special operations command's goal for a human capital
plan that supports its assigned missions. We examined USSOCOM annual
reports and strategic planning documents relevant to the Marine Corps
special operations command, and interviewed USSOCOM officials to discuss
the management of special operations forces personnel. We also reviewed
our past reports that discuss effective strategies for workforce planning.

^2Statement of Major General Dennis Hejlik, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Special Operations Command, before the Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, January 31, 2007.

To assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps
special operations training programs are preparing these forces for
assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine related to
the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for training special
operations forces personnel. We analyzed Marine Corps special operations
command and USSOCOM training guidance for special operations forces. We
examined USSOCOM documents related to the processes in place to establish
common training standards for advanced special operations skills, and
interviewed officials to discuss the status of USSOCOM's efforts to
establish common training standards for special operations skills. We
examined available documents that detail training programs for Marine
Corps special operations forces. We interviewed officials from the Marine
Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to discuss the processes used
to identify and select training standards for special operations skills.
We collected and analyzed documents related to USSOCOM's evaluations of
Marine Corps special operations forces training, and we discussed the
efforts that have been taken by the Marine Corps special operations
command and USSOCOM to assess the effectiveness of these training
programs. We conducted our work from August 2006 through July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Using
our assessment of data reliability, we concluded that the data used to
support this review were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives.
We interviewed the source of these data to determine how data accuracy was
ensured, and we discussed their data collection methods, standard
operating procedures, and other internal control measures.

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following
locations:

           o Office of the Secretary of Defense

                        o Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
                        Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

           o Joint Staff

                        o Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
                        Directorate, J8

           o U.S. Marine Corps

                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Combat Development
                        Command)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Installations and
                        Logistics Department)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Intelligence
                        Department)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Manpower and
                        Reserve Affairs)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Plans, Policies,
                        and Operations)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Programs and
                        Resources)
                        o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Training and
                        Education Command)

           o Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia
           o Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii

           o I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California
           o II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
           o III Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan

           o Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

                        o Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
                        Headquarters
                        o 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion
                        o 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion
                        o Marine Special Operations Advisor Group
                        o Marine Special Operations Support Group
                        o Marine Special Operations School

           o U.S. Special Operations Command

                        o U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Command
                        Support
                        o U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special
                        Operations
                        o U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special
                        Operations Knowledge and Futures

           o Theater Special Operations Commands
			  
                        o Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command
                        o Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

           Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact

           Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or [37][email protected]
			  
			  Acknowledgments

           In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant
           Director; Renee Brown; Jason Jackson; David Malkin; Karen
           Thornton; and Matthew Ullengren also made key contributions to
           this report.
			  
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(350908)

[44]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1030 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
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Highlights of [45]GAO-07-1030 , a report to congressional committees

September 2007

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces
into the U.S. Special Operations Command

The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on special operations forces to
conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform other
tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the demand for
these forces, DOD established a Marine Corps service component under the
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps
forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the
extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special operations command has
identified its force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its
special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine
Corps training programs are preparing its forces for assigned missions.
GAO performed its work with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DOD
plans for this new command.

[46]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Marine Corps conduct an analysis of the critical
skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations
command and that USSOCOM establish a basis to ensure they are trained to
be fully interoperable with DOD's special operations forces. In commenting
on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with GAO's
recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the recommendations
are underway.

Whilethe Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command (Command), the Command has not yet fully identified the
force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD developed
initial force structure plans to establish the Command; however, it did
not use critical practices of strategic planning, such as the alignment of
activities and resources and the involvement of stakeholders in
decision-making processes when developing these plans. As a result of
limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has identified
several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command's
ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to
revise its force structure.

Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills
and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command.
While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform special
operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to
determine all of the critical skills and incremental training required of
personnel in its special operations forces units. These analyses are
critical to the Marine Corps' efforts to develop a strategic human capital
approach for the management of personnel in its special operations forces
units. Without the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has
developed an interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations
forces units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional
training and skills; however, the policy is inconsistent with the
Command's goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the
special operations community. Until the Command completes an analysis to
identify and document the critical skills and competencies needed by its
future workforce to perform its full range of special operations missions,
the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating
alternative strategic human capital approaches for managing personnel
assigned to its special operations forces units.

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Command's
training programs are preparing units for their missions because it has
not established common training standards for many special operations
skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these programs prepare
units to be fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The
Command is providing training to its forces that is based on training
programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations
missions prior to the Command's activation and incorporates the training
that USSOCOM's other service components provide to their forces. However,
USSOCOM has not validated that the training for Marine Corps forces
prepares them to be fully interoperable with DOD's other special
operations forces. Without an evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the
needed assurances that Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with
its other forces, which may jeopardize the success of future joint
missions.

References

Visible links
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-812
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-753
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-373SP
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-812
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-753
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-505
  35. http://www.gao.gov/
  36. mailto:[email protected]
  37. mailto:[email protected]
  38. http://www.gao.gov/
  39. http://www.gao.gov/
  40. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  41. mailto:[email protected]
  42. mailto:[email protected]
  43. mailto:[email protected]
  44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1030
  45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1030
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