DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar
but Still Faces Challenges (02-AUG-07, GAO-07-1029R).
The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to achieve information
superiority over adversaries and share information seamlessly
among disparate weapons systems. Two programs envisioned as a
part of this effort are Transformational Satellite Communications
System (TSAT) and Space Radar. TSAT is designed to provide rapid
worldwide secure communications with air and space
systems--including Space Radar--through radio frequency and laser
communications links. Space Radar is expected to provide global
all-weather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
particularly in denied areas, for military, national
intelligence, and civil users. Both TSAT and Space Radar will
require major software development efforts and employ a
significant number of experienced staff. TSAT and Space Radar
development efforts are expected to be among the most costly
space systems ever developed by DOD. In 2004, TSAT was estimated
to have a total life cycle cost of about $16 billion, of which
$2.0 billion will have been spent at the end of fiscal year 2007.
Space Radar is estimated to have a total life cycle cost from $20
billion to $25 billion, and the program has spent about
approximately $464.5 million. TSAT expects to begin product
development in fiscal year 2008, and launch the first satellite
in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. Space Radar expects to
begin product development in fiscal year 2009 and launch the
first satellite in third quarter of fiscal year 2016. The systems
are also expected to be among the most complex ever developed,
largely because of the challenges associated with integrating
critical technologies within the satellites and networking the
satellites to other platforms. Congress requested that GAO assess
DOD's progress in adopting best practice as both of these
programs proceed toward product development. We presented our
findings on TSAT and Space Radar in briefings to Congressional
staffs in March 2007. This letter summarizes our findings,
conclusions, and recommendations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-1029R
ACCNO: A73852
TITLE: DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar
but Still Faces Challenges
DATE: 08/02/2007
SUBJECT: Aerospace research
Communication satellites
Communication systems
Defense procurement
Planning programming budgeting
Procurement planning
Program evaluation
Radar equipment
Research programs
Strategic planning
Technology
Research and development
Cost estimates
DOD Space Radar Program
DOD Transformational Satellite
Communications System Program
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GAO-07-1029R
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Washington, DC 20548
August 2, 2007
The Honorable Bill Nelson
Chairman
The Honorable Jeff Sessions
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ellen Tauscher
Chairwoman
The Honorable Terry Everett
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
House of Representatives
Subject: DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but Still
Faces Challenges
The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to achieve information
superiority over adversaries and share information seamlessly among
disparate weapons systems. Two programs envisioned as a part of this
effort are Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and
Space Radar. TSAT is designed to provide rapid worldwide secure
communications with air and space systems--including Space Radar--through
radio frequency and laser communications links. Space Radar is expected to
provide global all-weather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
particularly in denied areas, for military, national intelligence, and
civil users. Both TSAT and Space Radar will require major software
development efforts and employ a significant number of experienced staff.
TSAT and Space Radar development efforts are expected to be among the most
costly space systems ever developed by DOD. In 2004, TSAT was estimated to
have a total life cycle cost of about $16 billion, of which $2.0 billion
will have been spent at the end of fiscal year 2007. Space Radar is
estimated to have a total life cycle cost from $20 billion to $25 billion,
and the program has spent about approximately $464.5 million. TSAT expects
to begin product development in fiscal year 2008, and launch the first
satellite in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. Space Radar expects to
begin product development in fiscal year 2009 and launch the first
satellite in third quarter of fiscal year 2016. The systems are also
expected to be among the most complex ever developed, largely because of
the challenges associated with integrating critical technologies within
the satellites and networking the satellites to other platforms.
You requested that we assess DOD's progress in adopting best practice as
both of these programs proceed toward product development. We presented
our findings on TSAT and Space Radar in briefings to your staffs in March
2007. This letter summarizes our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. Copies of the briefings are enclosed.
Results in Brief
DOD is making efforts to instill best practices on TSAT and Space Radar.
These practices, as GAO has identified over the past decade, are to
separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path
toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program
start, and use quantifiable data to make decisions to move to next phases.
Collectively, these practices ensure a high level of knowledge is achieved
at key junctures in development and that a program does not go forward
unless a strong business case on which the program was originally
justified continues to hold true.
However, sustaining these efforts could prove challenging. Specifically:
o Successful organizations we have studied ensure that
technologies are mature, that is, proven to work as intended
before program start. In the past DOD has chosen to extend
technology invention into the acquisition process, and as a
result, programs have experienced technical problems that require
large amounts of time and money to fix. By contrast, best practice
organizations mature technologies to the point of being tested in
a relevant or operational environment before committing to an
acquisition program.
TSAT and Space Radar have made progress in the maturation of
technologies, but challenges remain. In a June 2007 update, DOD
determined that six of the seven critical technologies for TSAT
are at a technology readiness level (TRL) 6 (meaning the
technology has been tested in a relevant environment), and the
program expects to have the remaining technology at a TRL 6 prior
to the preliminary design phase. Space Radar expects to have
almost all critical technologies mature to a TRL 6 by program
start in June 2009. However, the program currently has five
critical technologies assessed to be TRL 3 to TRL 4. This
signifies that DOD will need to gain significant knowledge on
these technologies to gain sufficient insight into costs and
schedule to be well positioned for success by program start. In
addition, the program office acknowledges that some of the seven
technology risks it has rated as high, including risks related to
spectrum, software, and integration with space radar users, will
not be fully mitigated prior to program start.
o Successful organizations defer more ambitious technology efforts
to corporate research departments (equivalent to the science and
technology [S&T] organization in DOD) until they are ready to be
added to future increments. Our best practice work has shown that
a technology development environment is more forgiving and less
costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment.
Events such as test failures, new discoveries, and time spent
attaining knowledge are considered normal in this environment.
Both programs have deferred more ambitious technology development
efforts to the science and technology environment. TSAT, for
example, deferred the inclusion of the wide-field of view
multi-access communication technology to reduce risk on the
program, and is currently contributing about $16.7 million for
"off-line" maturation of this technology until opportunities arise
for including it as part of future increments. In addition, it
also eliminated multi-access laser communications^1 capabilities
from consideration for future increments at this time due to the
immaturity level of the technology. Space Radar has deferred
lithium-ion batteries, more efficient solar cells, and onboard
processing for its first increment, and like TSAT, is contributing
toward their development by S&T organizations. At this time, Space
Radar has not defined details of an increment beyond the first
one.
o Successful organizations extensively research and define
requirements before program start to ensure that they are
achievable, given available resources, and that they do not define
requirements after starting programs. In successful programs,
negotiations and trade-offs occur before product development is
started to ensure that a match exists between customer
expectations and developer resources.
Both programs have also strived to employ best practices to help
identify and determine achievability of requirements. In 2006, the
TSAT program was restructured into an incremental approach to
control risk and increase confidence in the program schedule,
putting agreements in place between development partners that
organize capabilities into blocks based on technological maturity.
For example, TSAT has reached agreements with groups representing
the needs of users and warfighters that addresses which
requirements will be included in the first and second blocks of
the program. Space Radar has also developed an approach to obtain
agreement and collaboration among users on program requirements.
In an effort to facilitate communication and reach agreement over
requirements between program partners within DOD and the
Intelligence Community (IC), Space Radar has proactively
introduced a variety of working groups that provide the program
with a consolidated senior group of participants to validate,
coordinate and integrate Space Radar requirements and concepts of
operations throughout project development. Nevertheless, the Space
Radar development effort has not yet had to fully define program
requirements, including key performance parameters. Until all
requirements are defined, vetted, and validated, the program
office could still face challenges in closing potential gaps
between requirements and resources.
o Successful organizations ensure other resources--primarily
funding, time, and people -- can also be matched to requirements
before program start. Funding: Both programs face long-term
challenges for funding. As DOD seeks to fund Space Radar and TSAT,
it will be (1) undertaking other new, costly efforts, including
the Global Positioning System III, the Space Based Surveillance
System, and the Alternative Infrared Satellite System; (2)
addressing cost overruns associated with legacy programs; and (3)
facing increased pressures to ramp up investments in assets
designed to protect space systems. In total, these efforts will
increase DOD's investment for all major space acquisitions from
$6.31 billion to $9.22 billion, or about 46 percent over the next
3 years. More may be needed if technical, software, and other
problems on current programs worsen. At the same time, investment
needs for other weapon systems are also on the rise, while
long-term budget forecasts indicate that considerably fewer
dollars will be available for discretionary spending in coming
years rather than more. Funding for Space Radar is further
complicated by the lack of long-term funding agreements beyond
fiscal year 2013, adding uncertainty to DOD's and the intelligence
community's ability to afford expensive programs such as Space
Radar. To its credit, Space Radar has worked to establish a key
funding agreement between DOD and the intelligence community that
addresses short-term cost sharing responsibilities. In prior
reports, we have stated that as long as too many programs compete
for too few dollars in DOD, programs will be incentivized to
produce optimistic estimates and suppress bad news. They will view
success as securing the next installment of funds versus
delivering capability within cost and schedule goals. We have
recommended that DOD guide its decisions to start space and other
weapons acquisition programs with an overall investment strategy
that would identify priorities for funding so that space systems
that are expected to play a critical role in transformation, such
as Space Radar and TSAT, could be priorities along with other
legacy and transformational systems. To date, this has not been
done for space or for DOD's broader weapons portfolio.
^1 Multi-access laser communications technology is to provide simultaneous
communications for a number of optical users at very high data rates.
Schedule: Schedules for both programs may also be optimistic. The
TSAT program may have underestimated the time for design,
integration, and production activities. For example, TSAT embarked
on a major software development effort in January 2006 that would
build the overall network architecture and provide network
management capabilities for TSAT and Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellites, but DOD's Program Analysis & Evaluation
office has expressed concern about the overall complexity of the
program and the ability of the contractors to write enough
software code in one year as is necessary for the program to
proceed effectively. In addition, the Space Radar schedule is
shorter between program start and initial launch capability than
what DOD has achieved for other complex satellite systems. The
Space Radar acquisition timeframe from program start to initial
launch capability is 86 months, which our analysis shows is
shorter than what DOD has achieved or estimated for other complex
satellite systems.
Workforce: TSAT also faces further challenges in meeting workforce
personnel requirements to manage and oversee the program in the
future, such as the impact from future Air Force workforce
reductions of 40,000 active duty personnel--positions that the Air
Force may not be able to fill with civilians due to budgetary
constraints.
Conclusion
Continued efforts by the programs to instill best practices on TSAT and
Space Radar are good steps toward addressing acquisition problems,
representing significant shifts in thinking about how space systems should
be developed. While these steps can help better position these programs
for success, they will not work without adhering to commitments to delay
milestone decisions or make trade-offs if there are still gaps between
requirements and resources. DOD space program and senior officials
recognize this and have expressed a commitment to delay program milestones
in order to provide the time needed to match resources to requirements, if
necessary. However, DOD has not addressed funding pressures that have
encouraged premature program starts and too much optimism for past
satellite development efforts.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that TSAT and Space Radar do not succumb to funding pressures
within DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of the Air Force to identify potential gaps between requirements
and resources before approving the start of product development and, if
necessary, adjust requirements and resources to increase the likelihood of
achieving program cost, schedule, and performance goals.
We provided a draft of this letter to DOD for review and comment. DOD
concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which
were incorporated where appropriate. DOD's letter is reprinted as Appendix
I.
Scope and Methodology
To assess DOD's progress in adopting best practices as both of these
programs proceed toward product development, we obtained and analyzed
pertinent documents from the program offices at the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, California. We
reviewed budget documents, risk management plans, and risk handling plans
as well as requirements documentation for both TSAT and Space Radar. We
also reviewed acquisition strategies, program office and prime contractor
schedules, and technology development plans for both programs.
To accomplish our work, we conducted interviews with cognizant and
responsible program officials at Space and Missile Systems Center in El
Segundo, California, and with Department of Defense officials in
Arlington, Virginia. We also met with Air Force Space Command officials at
Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, as well as the Space Radar Integrated
Program Office in Chantilly, Virginia. We also visited contractor
facilities in California, Colorado, and Maryland.
We conducted our work from July 2006 to March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
- - - - -
We will send copies of the letter to Department of Defense and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [7]chaplainc@gao.gov
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Principal
contributors to this report were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Josie
Sigl; Ann Hobson; Arturo Holguin; Jeff Barron; Rich Horiuchi; Maria
Durant; Jackie Wade; Tony Beckham; and Hai Tran.
Cristina Chaplain
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Enclosure II: Space Radar Briefing Slides
Enclosure III: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)
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