Yucca Mountain: DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program,  
but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High	 
Quality Is Unclear (02-AUG-07, GAO-07-1010).			 
                                                                 
Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To	 
permanently store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has 
been working to submit a license application to the Nuclear	 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a nuclear waste repository at	 
Yucca Mountain about 100 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Although  
the project has been beset with delays, in part because of	 
persistent problems with its quality assurance program, DOE	 
stated in July 2006 that it will submit a license application	 
with NRC by June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-quality	 
application needs to be complete, technically adequate, 	 
transparent by clearly justifying underlying assumptions, and	 
traceable back to original source materials. GAO examined (1)	 
DOE's development of its schedule for submitting a license	 
application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2)	 
NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to submit a high-quality	 
application, and (3) DOE's progress in addressing quality	 
assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's	 
March 2006 report. GAO reviewed DOE's management plan for	 
creating the license application, reviewed correspondence and	 
attended prelicensing meetings between DOE and NRC, and 	 
interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site representatives for the 
Yucca Mountain project. In commenting on a draft of the report,  
both DOE and NRC agreed with the report.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1010					        
    ACCNO:   A73847						        
  TITLE:     Yucca Mountain: DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance   
Program, but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be	 
High Quality Is Unclear 					 
     DATE:   08/02/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Independent regulatory commissions 		 
	     Licenses						 
	     Nuclear waste disposal				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Quality assurance					 
	     Radioactive waste disposal 			 
	     Performance measures				 
	     DOE Yucca Mountain Project (NV)			 

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GAO-07-1010

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]DOE's Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by Jun
     * [4]NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High-Qua
     * [5]DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance

          * [6]DOE Has Replaced or Improved Two Previously Ineffective Mana
          * [7]DOE Has Addressed Other Management Challenges

     * [8]Concluding Observations
     * [9]Agency Comments
     * [10]Scope and Methodology

          * [11]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Honorable Jon C. Porter, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

August 2007

YUCCA MOUNTAIN

DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its
Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear

GAO-07-1010

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 6
DOE's Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by June 30, 2008,
Was Developed in Consultation with Yucca Mountain Project Managers 12
NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High-Quality License
Application That Will Facilitate Completion of a Timely Review 14
DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance
Recommendations and Resolving Challenges We Identified 17
Concluding Observations 21
Agency Comments 22
Scope and Methodology 22
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Energy 25
Appendix II Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 28

Tables

Table 1: Major Milestones in DOE's Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository
Schedule 12
Table 2: Key Technical Issues Identified by NRC and DOE 16

Figure

Figure 1: NRC's License Application Review Process 10

Abbreviations

BSC Bechtel/SAIC Company, LLC DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental
Protection Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCRWM Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management USGS U.S. Geological Survey

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

August 2, 2007

The Honorable Jon C. Porter
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Porter:

Nuclear power reactors generate nearly 20 percent of the nation's
electricity, but they create waste that can remain highly radioactive for
hundreds of thousands of years and requires proper disposal to protect
public health and the environment. More than 50,000 metric tons of this
radioactive waste is stored temporarily at 72 sites around the
country--primarily at commercial nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 established the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management (OCRWM) within the Department of Energy (DOE) and directed
OCRWM to construct an underground geological repository to permanently
dispose of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste. The act also
set 1998 as the target date for DOE to start accepting this waste and
required the owners of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
wastes to enter into contracts with DOE for the disposal of these
materials and to pay for the repository's construction and operations. In
2002, the Congress approved the President's recommendation of the Yucca
Mountain site in Nevada for the repository. However, construction has not
yet begun. DOE currently estimates that 2017 is the earliest date that the
repository could open. Since DOE was unable to begin the acceptance of
waste in 1998 as required by the statute and contracts, the government has
incurred a liability that DOE now estimates to be approximately $7
billion. Each year of delay in the operation of the repository beyond 2017
could increase the government's liability by up to $500 million.

Before construction of the repository can begin, DOE must submit a license
application to obtain a construction authorization from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).1 The act directs NRC to issue or deny
construction authorization within 3 years after receiving DOE's license
application, unless NRC extends this period by not more than 1 year and
reports the reasons for doing so to the Secretary of Energy and the
Congress. To ensure that its license application review is completed
within the allotted 3- to 4-year time frame, NRC expects the application
to be high quality--that is, to contain the information necessary and
sufficient to support the technical positions it presents. Specifically,
NRC has stated that a high-quality license application would be complete,
technically adequate, transparent--clearly justifying and explaining any
underlying assumptions and conclusions--and traceable back to original
source materials.

1Under 10 C.F.R. Part 63.121, NRC also requires, among other things, that
(1) the geologic repository operations be located in and on lands that are
either owned by DOE or are permanently withdrawn and reserved for its use
and (2) DOE obtain necessary water rights for the project.

As part of the licensing process, DOE must demonstrate that its repository
will meet NRC's regulations, which implement the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) standard for protecting public health and the environment
from harmful exposure to the radioactive waste. In preparation to file a
license application, DOE has been conducting numerous scientific and
technical studies at the Yucca Mountain site that will serve as supporting
documentation to demonstrate that it can meet these standards. DOE has
also developed computer models to measure the probability that various
combinations of natural and engineered features of the repository could
safely contain waste for the long term, taking into account possible water
infiltration, waste package corrosion, earthquakes, volcanic action, or
other scenarios.

NRC requires a license applicant to support its technical analysis by
implementing a quality assurance program that ensures that the scientific,
engineering, procurement, recordkeeping, and other work at the project is
performed under controlled conditions and can be verified by others. DOE
project teams are responsible for carrying out various functions or
aspects of the work and creating their own policies and procedures to
implement the quality assurance requirements. DOE has established a
quality assurance program that, for example, contains general requirements
for calibrating equipment before conducting scientific tests, such as
stipulating when and how the equipment should be calibrated and how to
document the results.

In March 2006, we reported that DOE had experienced persistent problems
with its quality assurance program for the Yucca Mountain project.2 We
concluded that the project's management tools were ineffective for
monitoring performance and detecting new quality assurance problems. We
recommended that DOE take action to strengthen the project's management
tools to better identify problems and track progress in addressing them.
Our report also identified three substantial management challenges facing
the project. First, in March 2005, DOE announced the discovery of e-mail
messages implying that some U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) employees
responsible for analyzing water infiltration in Yucca Mountain may have
falsified scientific data and had shown disdain for quality assurance
program requirements. Subsequently, in January 2007, we reported that DOE
had spent about $20.5 million to survey e-mail messages to determine the
extent and nature of the problem, rework the USGS analysis, and conduct
quality assurance and e-mail training.3 Second, DOE needs to ensure that
specific engineering designs reflected high-level plans and regulatory
requirements. For example, design changes to a spent fuel handling
building led to the description of different design requirements regarding
the need for a water-based, fire-suppression system. The activation of
such a system could facilitate a nuclear reaction, if there were also an
inadvertent release of spent nuclear fuel inside the building. The
requirement for the system, therefore, was eliminated, but not all
building design documents reflected the change. Third, DOE has experienced
substantial turnover in key project management positions. NRC has stressed
the importance of a continuity of qualified managers rather than a series
of acting managers, but 9 of 17 key management positions at DOE turned
over between 2001 and 2006.

2GAO, Yucca Mountain: Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste
Repository Needs Increased Management Attention, [12]GAO-06-313
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).

3GAO, Yucca Mountain Project: Information on Estimated Costs to Respond to
Employee E-mails That Raised Questions about Quality Assurance,
[13]GAO-07-297R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

Quality assurance problems are not new at the project and over time have
contributed to delays in filing a license application. In 2001, DOE
determined that, in part because of ongoing efforts to resolve quality
assurance problems, it would be unable to submit a license application to
NRC by December 2002, the target date scheduled when the Congress approved
the Yucca Mountain site. DOE was also unable to meet a December 2004 goal
for submitting a license application. Past initiatives to address these
problems and prepare for the submission of a license application have
included changes to improve the project's organizational culture and
ability to quickly detect and resolve problems. Subsequently, in October
2005, DOE implemented its "New Path Forward" by making major changes to
the project's design, organization, and management. For example, to
improve accountability at the project, it reorganized project staff to
create a single manager in charge of the project's major tasks in science,
engineering, and licensing. DOE also designated Sandia National
Laboratories as the project's lead laboratory to integrate the scientific
work that Bechtel/SAIC Company, LLC (BSC), the project's lead contractor,
had previously overseen.

Shortly after his Senate confirmation in May 2006, OCRWM's director
announced a new schedule to submit DOE's license application for the
repository to NRC by June 30, 2008. The director has also fundamentally
changed DOE's management of the Yucca Mountain project--DOE now directly
manages the project, rather than limiting its role to overseeing BSC's
implementation of its management and operating contract. OCRWM's director
and deputy director now hold monthly program review meetings with DOE and
contractor project managers and routinely participate in quality assurance
management meetings with a focus on identifying and correcting problems.
OCRWM's director has also identified specific performance measures for
each project employee to improve the organizational culture.

In light of persistent quality assurance problems and other delays that
the Yucca Mountain project has experienced, we examined (1) DOE's
development of its schedule for filing a license application by June 30,
2008, and the stakeholders with whom it consulted; (2) NRC's assessment of
DOE's readiness to file a license application that is high quality and
enables NRC to complete its evaluation within 3 to 4 years; and (3) DOE's
progress in implementing the recommendations and resolving the additional
challenges identified in our March 2006 report and the extent to which
these challenges were considered in setting the license application
schedule.

To examine DOE's development of its license application schedule, we
reviewed Yucca Mountain project documents, including DOE's license
application management plan and progress reports, and interviewed senior
OCRWM managers. To obtain NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to file a
high-quality license application, we attended prelicensing meetings and
other interactions between NRC and DOE and reviewed NRC correspondence and
statements regarding DOE's planned license application submission. We also
interviewed NRC officials regarding these interactions and their views of
the planned license application. Finally, to determine DOE's progress in
implementing the recommendations in our March 2006 report and resolving
the additional challenges we identified, we reviewed prior GAO reports,
corrective action reports, and related Yucca Mountain project documents;
interviewed senior OCRWM managers in DOE headquarters and the Yucca
Mountain project office in Las Vegas, Nevada; and interviewed NRC
officials. We conducted our work from February 2007 through July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief

The decision to submit a license application to NRC by June 30, 2008, was
made by OCRWM's director in consultation with DOE and contractor project
managers; the director did not consult with nonfederal stakeholders,
including the state of Nevada and the nuclear power industry. DOE
officials told us they did not consult with external stakeholders because
there was no legal requirement or compelling management reason for them to
do so. They noted that the NRC review process includes public hearings on
the application, which will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to
comment on the substance of the application. OCRWM's director told us that
he announced the decision to expedite the license application process
shortly after taking office to jump-start what he viewed as a stalled
project. The director believes the June 30, 2008, schedule is achievable
because DOE has already completed a substantial amount of work, including
the completion of a draft license application in 2005 that DOE ultimately
determined was not ready to submit to NRC. To develop the internal
schedule to meet the June 2008 date, project managers created a management
plan to (1) assess the statutory and regulatory requirements for the
license application; (2) identify any gaps and inadequacies in previous
efforts to draft a license application; (3) rework the problem areas; and
(4) create a management process to review, revise, and then seek DOE
management's approval for filing the license application.

NRC officials expect that DOE will file a license application by June 30,
2008, but the officials would not speculate on its quality or whether it
will enable NRC to complete its evaluation within the 3- to 4-year time
frame cited by the act because of NRC's long-standing practice to maintain
an objective and neutral position toward proposed license applications
until they are filed with NRC. NRC has expressed concern about the lack of
a rigorous quality assurance program and the reliability of USGS's
scientific work, which DOE had certified before it discovered the USGS
e-mails indicating quality assurance problems. However, NRC recognizes
that DOE has taken steps to address these problems. To better ensure that
DOE understands its expectations, NRC has held periodic prelicensing
management and technical meetings with DOE officials that are open to
external stakeholders. NRC officials stated that DOE will need to file a
high-quality application to enable NRC to complete its review within the
3- to 4-year time frame.

DOE has made progress in implementing the quality assurance
recommendations in our March 2006 report and resolving the challenges we
identified, but it is unclear whether its actions will prevent similar
problems from recurring. Specifically, DOE has eliminated the one-page
summary of performance indicators--the primary management tool DOE program
managers had used to monitor project performance--that we determined was
ineffective. In its place, OCRWM's director has instituted more frequent
and rigorous project management meetings and is introducing a new trending
report that synthesizes information from the project's corrective action
program. In addition, in response to the USGS e-mail issue, Sandia
National Laboratories developed a new water infiltration model to replace
USGS's technical analysis to ensure that the license application's
scientific analysis is accurate and supportable, and DOE reviewed e-mail
and other documents to determine the root cause and extent of the problem.
Regarding the rigor of the engineering design process, DOE has implemented
new systems to ensure that specific engineering designs reflect high-level
plans and regulatory requirements. Regarding management continuity, DOE
has worked to fill and retain personnel in key management positions, such
as the director of quality assurance. However, DOE continues to lose key
project managers, most recently with the departure of OCRWM's deputy
director. In addition, OCRWM's director is a political appointee whose
term is expected to end in January 2009 when a new administration takes
office, and the management style and priorities of future directors may be
different. Furthermore, DOE project officials anticipate that changing the
project's culture and history of recurring quality assurance problems will
take a long time.

Background

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, establishes a
comprehensive policy and program for the safe, permanent disposal of
commercial spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive wastes in one
or more geologic repositories. The act charges DOE with (1) establishing
criteria for recommending sites for repositories; (2) "characterizing"
(investigating) the Yucca Mountain site to determine its suitability for a
repository;4 (3) if the site is found suitable, recommending it to the
President, who would submit a recommendation to the Congress if he agreed
that the site was qualified; and (4) seeking permission from NRC to
construct and operate a repository at the approved site. Under the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, users of nuclear-power-generated electricity pay $0.001
per kilowatt-hour into a Nuclear Waste Fund, which may be used only to pay
for the siting, licensing, and construction of a nuclear waste repository.
In fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that the fund had $19.4 billion.5 DOE
also reported that it had spent about $11.7 billion (in fiscal year 2006
dollars) from project inception in fiscal years 1983 through 2005 and
estimated that an additional $10.9 billion (in fiscal year 2006 dollars)
would be incurred from fiscal years 2006 to 2017 to build the repository.

4The 1987 amendments to the act directed that DOE investigate only the
Yucca Mountain site.

5The Nuclear Waste Fund provided $8.3 billion and funding for defense
waste provided $3 billion. Both commercial spent nuclear fuel and
high-level defense waste are planned for disposal at Yucca Mountain.

Since the early 1980s, DOE has studied the Yucca Mountain site to
determine whether it is suitable for a high-level radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel repository. For example, DOE completed numerous
scientific studies of water flow and the potential for rock movement near
the mountain, including the likelihood that volcanoes and earthquakes will
adversely affect the repository's performance. To allow scientists and
engineers greater access to the rock being studied, DOE excavated two
tunnels for studying the deep underground environment: (1) a 5-mile main
tunnel that loops through the mountain, with several research areas or
alcoves connected to it, and (2) a 1.7-mile tunnel that crosses the
mountain, allowing scientists to study properties of the rock and the
behavior of water near the potential repository area. Since July 2002,
when the Congress approved the President's recommendation of the Yucca
Mountain site for the development of a repository, DOE has focused on
preparing its license application.

In October 2005, DOE announced a series of changes in the management of
the project and in the design of the repository to simplify the project
and improve its safety and operation. Previously, DOE's design required
radioactive waste to be handled at least four separate times by
transporting the waste to the Yucca Mountain site, removing the waste from
its shipping container, sealing it in a special disposal container, and
moving it into the underground repository. The new repository design
relies on uniform canisters that would be filled and sealed before being
shipped, reducing the need for direct handling of most of the waste prior
to being placed in the repository. As a result, DOE will not have to
construct several extremely large buildings costing millions of dollars
for handling radioactive waste. In light of these changes, DOE has been
working on revising the designs for the repository's surface facilities,
developing the technical specifications for the canisters that will hold
the waste, and revising its draft license application.

In accordance with NRC regulations, before filing its license application,
DOE must first make all documentary material that is potentially relevant
to the licensing process electronically available via NRC's Internet-based
document management system. This system, known as the Licensing Support
Network, provides electronic access to millions of documents related to
the repository project. DOE is required to initially certify to NRC that
it has made its documentary material available no later than 6 months in
advance of submitting the license application. NRC, Nevada, and other
parties in the licensing process must also certify their documentary
material was made available following DOE's initial certification. This
information will then be available to the public and all the parties
participating in the licensing process. OCRWM currently expects to certify
its material in the Licensing Support Network by December 21, 2007. In
addition, OCRWM expects to complete the necessary designs and have the
draft license application ready for DOE management's review by February
29, 2008.

NRC is charged with regulating the construction, operation, and
decommissioning phases of the project and is responsible for ensuring that
DOE satisfies public health, safety, and environmental regulatory
requirements. Once DOE files the license application, NRC will begin a
four-stage process to process the application and decide whether to (1)
authorize construction of the repository, (2) authorize construction with
conditions, or (3) deny the application. As shown in figure 1, this
process includes the following steps:

           o Acceptance review. NRC plans to take up to 180 days to examine
           the application for completeness to determine whether the license
           application has all of the information and components NRC
           requires. If NRC determines that any part of the application is
           incomplete, it may either reject the application or require that
           DOE furnish the necessary documentation. NRC will docket the
           application once it deems the application complete, indicating its
           readiness for a detailed technical review.

           o Technical review. The detailed technical review, scheduled for
           18 to 24 months, will evaluate the soundness of the scientific
           data, computer modeling, analyses, and preliminary facility
           design. The review will focus on evaluating DOE's conclusions
           about the ability of the repository designs to limit exposure to
           radioactivity, both during the construction and operation phase of
           the repository (known as preclosure) and during the phase after
           the repository has been filled, closed, and sealed (known as
           postclosure.) If NRC discovers problems with the technical
           information used to support the application, it may conduct
           activities to determine the extent and effect of the problem. As
           part of this review, NRC staff will prepare a safety evaluation
           report that details staff findings and conclusions on the license
           application.

           o Public hearings. NRC will also convene an independent panel of
           judges--called the Atomic Safety Licensing Board--to conduct a
           series of public hearings to address contested issues raised by
           affected parties and review in detail the related information and
           evidence regarding the license application. Upon completion, the
           board will make a formal ruling (called the initial decision)
           resolving matters put into controversy. This initial decision can
           then be appealed to the NRC commissioners for further review.

           o NRC commission review. In the likely event of an appeal, the NRC
           commissioners will review the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's
           initial decision. In addition, outside of the adjudicatory
           proceeding, they will complete a supervisory examination of those
           issues contested in the proceeding to consider whether any
           significant basis exists for doubting that the facility will be
           constructed or operated with adequate protection of the public
           health and safety. The commissioners will also review any issues
           about which NRC staff must make appropriate findings prior to the
           authorization of construction, even if they were not contested in
           the proceeding.

           Figure 1: NRC's License Application Review Process

           However, until DOE submits a license application, NRC's role has
           involved providing regulatory guidance; observing and gathering
           information on DOE activities related to repository design,
           performance assessment, and environmental studies; and verifying
           site characterization activities. These prelicensing activities
           are intended to identify and resolve potential licensing issues
           early to help ensure that years of scientific work are not
           found to be inadequate for licensing purposes. DOE and NRC have
           interacted since 1983 on the repository. In 1998, they entered
           into a prelicensing interaction agreement that provides for
           technical and management meetings, data and document reviews, and
           the prompt exchange of information between NRC's on-site
           representatives and DOE project personnel. Consistent with this
           prelicensing interaction agreement and NRC's regulations, NRC
           staff observe and review activities at the site and other
           scientific work as they are performed to allow early
           identification of potential licensing issues for timely resolution
           at the staff level.

           EPA also has a role in the licensing process--setting radiation
           exposure standards for the public outside the Yucca Mountain site.
           In 2001, EPA set standards for protecting the public from
           inadvertent releases of radioactive materials from wastes stored
           at Yucca Mountain, which are required by law to be consistent with
           recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. In July 2004,
           the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
           ruled that EPA's standards were not consistent with the National
           Academy of Sciences' recommendations.6 In response, EPA proposed a
           revised rule in August 2005.7 The director of EPA's Office of Air
           and Radiation Safety told us that EPA plans to finalize its rule
           this year. In addition, NRC must develop exposure limits that are
           compatible with EPA's rule. NRC published a proposed rule which it
           states is compatible with EPA's rule,8 received public comments in
           2005, but has not yet finalized the rule. If EPA's rule does not
           change significantly in response to public comments, NRC's rule
           would not require major revisions either and could be finalized
           within months. However, if EPA's final rule has major changes, it
           could require major changes to NRC's rule, which could take more
           than a year to redraft, seek and incorporate public comments, and
           finalize, according to NRC officials.
			  
6Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir 2004). Prior to
establishing the original standards, EPA requested recommendations from
the National Academy of Sciences that resulted in the National Research
Council's report, Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards
(Washington, D.C.: 1995).

770 Fed. Reg. 49014 (Aug. 22, 2005).

870 Fed. Reg. 53313 (Sept. 8, 2005).

           DOE's Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by June 30,
			  2008, Was Developed in Consultation with Yucca Mountain Project
			  Managers

           In July 2006, DOE announced its intent to file a license
           application to NRC no later than June 30, 2008. OCRWM's director
           set the June 30, 2008, goal to jump-start what he viewed as a
           stalled project. OCRWM's director told us that he consulted with
           DOE and contractor project managers to get a reasonable estimate
           of an achievable date for submitting the license application and
           asked OCRWM managers to develop a plan and schedule for meeting
           the June 30, 2008, goal. OCRWM's director believes this schedule
           is achievable, noting that DOE had already performed a significant
           amount of work toward developing a license application.
           Specifically, DOE completed a draft license application in
           September 2005, but opted not to file it with NRC to allow more
           time to address the USGS e-mail issue, revise the repository's
           design to simplify the project and improve its safety and
           operation, and consider revising its technical documents in
           response to the possibility that EPA would revise the radiation
           standards for the proposed repository. Table 1 shows the project's
           major milestones.

           Table 1: Major Milestones in DOE's Proposed Yucca Mountain
           Repository Schedule

Milestone                                               Date               
Complete repository designs for use in the license      November 30, 2007  
application                                                                
Certify the License Support Network                     December 21, 2007  
Submit draft application to OCRWM's director for DOE    February 29, 2008  
management review                                                          
Issue supplement to the environmental impact statement  May 30, 2008       
File the license application with NRC                   June 30, 2008      
License application docketed by NRCa                    September 30, 2008 
Start Nevada rail construction                          October 5, 2009    
Receive construction authorization from NRC             September 30, 2011 
Update the license application to receive a license     March 29, 2013     
from NRC to receive and possess nuclear wasteb                             
Complete construction for initial operations            March 30, 2016     
Complete start-up testing                               December 31, 2016  
Begin receipt of radioactive waste canisters            March 31, 2017     

           Source: DOE.

           aAssumes a 90-day docketing review by NRC.

           bDOE would need to receive a license to receive and possess before
           it can begin to receive waste.

           DOE did not consult with external stakeholders in developing this
           schedule because there was no legal or regulatory requirement or
           compelling management reason to do so, according to senior OCRWM
           officials. However, these officials noted that the NRC review
           process includes extensive public hearings on the application,
           which will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on
           and challenge the substance of the application. In addition,
           regarding other aspects of the program, senior OCRWM officials
           noted that they have often consulted with external stakeholders,
           including city and county governments near the proposed repository
           site, NRC, USGS, and nuclear power companies. OCRWM has also
           consulted with Nevada, the U.S. Department of the Navy, and other
           DOE offices. For example, in developing its standards for the
           canisters that will be used to store, transport, and place the
           waste in the repository, DOE consulted with the Navy and the
           nuclear power plant operators that generate the nuclear waste and
           will use the proposed canisters. In addition, DOE has worked with
           the local city and county governments near the repository to
           develop the plans for transporting the waste to the proposed
           repository.

           OCRWM's director has made the submission of the license
           application by June 30, 2008, the project's top strategic
           objective and management priority. Accordingly, each OCWRM office
           has created business plans detailing how its work will support
           this objective. Furthermore, DOE has developed a license
           application management plan that incorporates the lessons learned
           from previous license application preparation efforts and works to
           ensure that the license application meets all DOE and NRC
           statutory, regulatory, and quality requirements. The plan
           establishes a process whereby teams assess the statutory and
           regulatory requirements for the license application, identify any
           gaps and inadequacies in the existing drafts of the license
           application, and draft or revise these sections. Since the license
           application is expected to be thousands of pages long, the plan
           divides the license application into 71 subsections, each with a
           team assigned specific roles and responsibilities, such as for
           drafting a particular subsection or approving a particular stage
           of the draft. Finally, the plan also creates new project
           management controls to provide oversight of this process and
           manage risks. For example, the plan details how issues that may
           pose risks to the schedule or quality of the license application
           should be noted, analyzed, and resolved, and how the remaining
           issues should be elevated to successively higher levels of
           management.
			  
			  NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High-Quality
			  License Application That Will Facilitate Completion of a Timely Review

           NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license
           application by June 30, 2008, but will not speculate about its
           quality due to a long-standing practice to maintain an objective
           and neutral position toward proposed license applications until
           they are filed with NRC. According to NRC officials, NRC's ability
           to review an application in a timely manner is contingent on the
           application being high quality, which NRC officials define as
           being complete and accurate, including traceable and transparent
           data that adequately support the technical positions presented in
           the license application. NRC has expressed concern about the lack
           of a rigorous quality assurance program and the reliability of
           USGS scientific work that DOE had certified before the USGS
           e-mails were discovered.9 Based on its prelicensing review, NRC
           recognizes that DOE is addressing problems with its quality
           assurance program and, by developing a new water infiltration
           model, is restoring confidence in the reliability of its
           scientific work.

           When the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 gave NRC responsibility
           for licensing the nuclear waste repository, NRC staff began
           engaging in prelicensing activities aimed at gathering information
           from DOE and providing guidance so that DOE would be prepared to
           meet NRC's statutory and regulatory requirements and NRC would be
           prepared to review the license application. NRC issued high-level
           waste disposal regulations containing criteria for approving the
           application and publicly available internal guidance detailing the
           steps and activities NRC will perform to review the application.
           NRC also established a site office at OCRWM's Las Vegas, Nevada,
           offices to act as NRC's point of contact and to facilitate prompt
           information exchanges. NRC officials noted that they have also
           been working for several years to communicate NRC's expectations
           for a high-quality license application.

           Although NRC has no formal oversight role in the Yucca Mountain
           project until DOE files a license application, NRC staff observe
           DOE audits of its quality assurance activities to identify
           potential issues and problems that may affect licensing. The NRC
           staff then report their findings in quarterly reports that
           summarize their work and detail any problems or issues they
           identify. For example, after observing a DOE quality assurance
           audit at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in August
           2005, NRC staff expressed concern that humidity gauges used in
           scientific experiments at the project were not properly
           calibrated--an apparent violation of quality assurance
           requirements. Due in part to concerns that quality assurance
           requirements had not been followed, BSC issued a February 7, 2006,
           stop-work order affecting this scientific work. In June 2007,
           OCRWM project managers told us that because quality assurance
           rules were not followed, DOE could not use this scientific work to
           support the license application.
			  
9NRC expressed concerns in 1984 that some project staff viewed quality
assurance requirements as unnecessary and burdensome, and, in 1986, DOE
issued a stop-work order based on its determination that USGS staff did
not appreciate the importance of quality assurance and that USGS work
would not meet NRC's expectations.

           To facilitate prelicensing interactions, NRC and DOE developed a
           formal process in 1998 for identifying and documenting technical
           issues and information needs. As shown in table 2, issues were
           grouped into nine key technical issues focused mainly on
           postclosure performance of the geologic repository. Within this
           framework, NRC and DOE defined 293 agreements in a series of
           technical exchange meetings. An agreement is considered closed
           when NRC staff determines that DOE has provided the requested
           information. Agreements are formally closed in public
           correspondence or at public technical exchanges. As of June 2007,
           DOE has responded to all 293 of the agreements. NRC considers 260
           of these to be closed. NRC considers 8 of the remaining 33
           agreements to be potentially affected by the USGS e-mail issue
           that emerged in 2005. Their resolution will be addressed after NRC
           examines the new water infiltration analysis. NRC considers that
           the remaining 25 have been addressed but still need additional
           information. DOE has indicated that it does not plan any further
           responses on these agreements, and that the information will be
           provided in the June 2008 license application.

Table 2: Key Technical Issues Identified by NRC and DOE

Key technical issue            Short description                           
Container Life and Source Term Prediction of the waste package container   
                                  lifetime, including estimates of the amount 
                                  of radioactivity that may escape from       
                                  deteriorated waste packages                 
Evolution of the Near-Field    Changes in the waste package environment    
Geochemical Environment        over long periods                           
Igneous Activity               The likelihood and consequences of volcanic 
                                  activity                                    
Repository Design and          Evaluation of how heat from the waste may   
Thermal-Mechanical Effects     affect the mechanical properties of the     
                                  geologic repository design                  
Radionuclide Transport         Identification of key geochemical processes 
                                  that may control radionuclide transport at  
                                  Yucca Mountain                              
Structural Deformation and     Evaluation of earthquake and fault activity 
Seismicity                                                                 
Thermal Effects on Flow        Understanding of the effects of heat        
                                  generated by the waste on moisture flow     
                                  around the repository                       
Total System Performance       Development of the capability to conduct    
Assessment and Integration     and review total system performance         
                                  assessments                                 
Unsaturated and Saturated Flow Characterization of groundwater flow near   
under Isothermal Conditions    the repository                              

Source: NRC.

NRC determined that adding agreements to the original 293 was not an
efficient means to continue issue resolution during prelicensing, given
DOE's stated intent to submit its license application, first in 2004, and
now in 2008. NRC is now using public correspondence, as well as public
technical exchanges and management meetings, to communicate outstanding
and emerging technical issues. For example, NRC's September 2006
correspondence provided input on DOE's proposed approach for estimating
seismic events during the postclosure period and requested further
interactions on the topic. Also, since May 2006, NRC and DOE have
conducted a series of technical exchanges to discuss such topics as DOE's
total system performance assessment model, the seismic design of
buildings, and other DOE design changes. Other interactions are planned to
ensure that NRC has sufficient information to conduct its prelicensing
responsibilities.

DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance Recommendations and
Resolving Challenges We Identified

DOE is implementing the recommendations and addressing the challenges
identified in our March 2006 report, but it is unclear whether the
department's actions will prevent similar problems from recurring.
Specifically, in response to our recommendations that DOE improve its
management tools, DOE has eliminated the one-page summary (or panel) of
performance indicators and has revised its trend evaluation reports. DOE
is supplementing these changes with more rigorous senior management
meetings that track program performance to better ensure that new problems
are identified and resolved. DOE has also begun addressing additional
management challenges by independently reworking USGS's water infiltration
analysis, fixing problems with a design and engineering process known as
requirements management, and reducing the high-turnover rate and large
number of acting managers in key project management positions.

DOE Has Replaced or Improved Two Previously Ineffective Management Tools

Our March 2006 report found that two of the project's management
tools--the panel of performance indicators and the trend evaluation
reports--were ineffective in helping DOE management to monitor progress
toward meeting performance goals, detecting new quality assurance
problems, and directing management attention where needed. In response,
DOE has stopped using its panel of performance indicators and replaced
them with monthly program review meetings--chaired by OCRWM's director and
attended by top-level OCRWM, BSC, Sandia, and USGS managers--that review
the progress of four main OCRWM projects: (1) the drafting of the license
application; (2) the effort to select and load documents and records into
NRC's Licensing Support Network; (3) work supplementing DOE's
environmental impact statement to reflect the October 2005 changes in
repository design, which shift from direct handling of waste to the use of
canisters; and (4) the development of a system to transport waste from
where it is generated, mainly nuclear power plants, to the repository. In
addition, DOE has developed the following four new, high-level performance
indicators that it evaluates and discusses at its monthly program review
meetings:

           o safety, including injuries and lost workdays due to accidents at
           the project;

           o quality, including efforts to improve OCRWM's corrective action
           program, which works to detect and resolve problems at the project
           and the performance of the quality assurance program;

           o cost, including actual versus budgeted costs, staffing levels,
           and efforts to recruit new employees; and
           o culture, including the project's safety conscious work
           environment program, which works to ensure that employees are
           encouraged to raise safety concerns to their managers or to NRC
           without fear of retaliation and that employees' concerns are
           resolved in a timely and appropriate manner according to their
           importance.

           Although DOE plans to develop additional performance indicators,
           these four simplified indicators have replaced about 250
           performance indicators on the previous performance indicator
           panel. According to a cognizant DOE official, the previous
           performance indicator panel was ineffective, in part, because it
           focused on what could be measured, as opposed to what should be
           measured, resulting in DOE focusing its efforts on developing the
           performance indicator panel instead of determining how to use this
           information as a management tool. The monthly program review and
           the new performance indicators are designed to be more useful to
           OCRWM management by being simpler and more focused on the key
           mission activities.

           DOE has also revised its trend evaluation reports to create new
           organizational structures and procedures that detail the processes
           and steps for detecting and analyzing trends and preparing trend
           evaluation reports for senior management review. DOE has appointed
           a trend program manager and implemented a work group to oversee
           these processes. Furthermore, as we recommended, the new trend
           program has an increased focus on the significance of the
           monitored condition by synthesizing trends projectwide instead of
           separating OCRWM's and BSC's trend evaluation reports.

           To improve the utility of trend evaluation reports as a management
           tool, the procedures now identify the following three types of
           trends and criteria for evaluating them:

           o Adverse trends are (1) repeated problems that involve similar
           tasks or have similar causes and are determined by management to
           be significant or critical to the success of the project; (2)
           repeated problems that are less significant but collectively
           indicate a failure of the quality assurance program, may be
           precursors to a more significant problem, or pose a safety
           problem; and (3) patterns of problems that management determines
           warrant further analysis and actions to prevent their recurrence.

           o Emerging trends are problems that do not meet the criteria for
           an adverse trend, but require actions to ensure that they do not
           evolve into an adverse trend.
           o Monitored trends are fluctuations in the conditions being
           monitored that OCRWM management determines do not warrant action,
           but each fluctuation needs close monitoring to ensure that it does
           not evolve into an emerging or adverse trend.

           DOE has also implemented changes to its corrective action
           program--the program that provides the data that are analyzed in
           the trend evaluation program. The corrective action program is the
           broader system for recognizing problems and tracking their
           resolution. It is one of the key elements of the project's quality
           assurance framework and has been an area of interest to NRC in its
           prelicensing activities. The corrective action program consists of
           a computer system that project employees can use to enter
           information about a problem they have identified and create a
           record, known as a condition report, and a set of procedures for
           evaluating the condition reports and ensuring these problems are
           resolved.

           Regarding our broader conclusions that the OCRWM quality assurance
           program needed more management attention, in spring 2006, DOE
           requested a team of external quality assurance experts to review
           the performance of the quality assurance program. The experts
           concluded that 8 of the 10 topics they studied--including the
           corrective action program--had not been effectively implemented.
           Specifically, the team found that the corrective action program
           did not ensure that problems were either quickly or effectively
           resolved. Furthermore, a follow-up internal DOE study, called a
           root cause analysis report, concluded that the corrective action
           program was ineffective primarily because senior management had
           failed to recognize the significance of repeated internal and
           external reviews and did not aggressively act to correct
           identified problems and ensure program effectiveness.

           In response, DOE has revised the corrective action program in an
           effort to change organizational behaviors and provide increased
           management attention. For example, DOE has restructured the
           condition screening team, which previously had poor internal
           communication and adversarial relationships among its members,
           according to a senior project manager. Similarly, a December 2006
           external review of the quality assurance program found that OCRWM
           staff had focused its efforts on trying to downgrade the
           significance of condition reports to deflect individual and
           departmental responsibility, rather than ensuring that the
           underlying causes and problems were addressed. In response, DOE
           (1) reorganized the condition screening team to reduce the size of
           the team but include more senior managers; (2) identified roles,
           responsibilities, and management expectations for the team,
           including expectations for collaborating and communicating; and
           (3) formalized processes and criteria for screening and reviewing
           condition reports. The condition screening team now assigns one of
           four significance levels to each new condition report and assigns
           a manager who is responsible for investigating the problem.

           In addition, DOE has restructured the management review committee,
           which oversees the corrective action program and the condition
           screening team. The management review committee is charged with,
           among other things, reviewing the actions of the condition
           screening team, particularly regarding the condition reports
           identified as having the highest two levels of significance. The
           management review committee also reviews draft root cause analysis
           reports, and any condition reports that could affect the license
           application. Whereas these functions were previously performed by
           BSC, the management review committee is now sponsored by OCRWM's
           deputy director and includes senior DOE, BSC, and Sandia managers.
           DOE has also created written policies to clarify the roles,
           responsibilities, and expectations of the management review
           committee. The goal of these changes is to refocus management
           attention--with OCRWM's deputy director serving as a champion for
           the corrective action program--and ensure that problems are
           resolved in a timely and efficient manner.
			  
			  DOE Has Addressed Other Management Challenges

           DOE has addressed to varying degrees three other management
           challenges identified in our March 2006 report: (1) restoring
           confidence in USGS's scientific documents; (2) problems with a
           design and engineering process known as requirements management;
           and (3) managing a changing and complex program, particularly
           given the high turnover in key management positions. Specifically:

           o USGS e-mail issue. DOE has taken three actions to address
           concerns about the reliability of USGS's scientific work after a
           series of e-mails implied that some USGS employees had falsified
           scientific and quality assurance documents and disdained DOE's
           quality assurance processes. Specifically, DOE (1) evaluated
           USGS's scientific work; (2) directed Sandia to independently
           develop a new water infiltration model to compare with USGS's
           model and reconstruct USGS's technical documents; and (3)
           completed a root cause analysis, including a physical review of
           more than 50,000 e-mails and keyword searches of nearly 1 million
           other e-mails sampled from more than 14 million e-mails. DOE's
           evaluation of USGS's scientific work concluded that there was no
           evidence that the USGS employees falsified or modified
           information. DOE's root cause analysis team concluded that there
           was no apparent widespread or pervasive pattern across OCRWM of a
           negative attitude toward quality assurance or willful
           noncompliance with quality assurance requirements. However, the
           analysis found that OCRWM's senior management had failed to hold
           USGS personnel accountable for the quality of the scientific work,
           fully implement quality assurance requirements, and effectively
           implement the corrective action program. These internal studies
           and reports and Sandia's independent development of a new water
           infiltration model are intended to restore public confidence in
           the water infiltration modeling work in the license application.

           o Problems with design control and the requirements management
           process. DOE has revised its design control and requirements
           management processes to address the problems that our March 2006
           report identified. In addition, to gauge the effectiveness of
           these changes, DOE conducted an internal study called a readiness
           review, in which it determined that the changes in the processes
           were sufficient and that BSC was prepared to resume design and
           engineering work. Subsequently, in January 2007, DOE's independent
           assessment of BSC and the requirements management process
           concluded that the processes and controls were adequate and
           provided a general basic direction for the design control process.
           DOE has also contracted with Longenecker and Associates to review
           the project's engineering processes with the final report due in
           the summer of 2007.

           o Management turnover. DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel
           in key management positions that had been vacant for extended
           periods of time, most notably the director of quality assurance
           and the OCRWM project director. In addition, as part of an effort
           to change the organizational culture, OCRWM's director has created
           a team to evaluate how to improve succession planning and identify
           gaps in the skills or staffing levels in OCRWM. However, DOE
           continues to lose key project managers, most recently with the
           departure of OCRWM's deputy director. Furthermore, additional
           turnover is possible after the 2008 presidential election, when
           the incoming administration is likely to replace OCRWM's director.
           Historically, new directors have tended to have different
           management priorities and have implemented changes to the
           organizational structure and policies. To address this concern,
           OCRWM's director suggested legislatively changing the director
           position by making it a long-term appointment to reflect the
           long-term nature of the Yucca Mountain project.
			  
			  Concluding Observations

           The OCRWM director's schedule for filing a repository license
           application with NRC by June 30, 2008, will require a concerted
           effort by project personnel. However, given the waste repository's
           history since its inception in 1983, including two prior failed
           efforts to file a license application, it is unclear whether DOE's
           license application will be of sufficient quality to enable NRC to
           conduct a timely review of the supporting models and data that
           meet the statutory time frames. DOE has taken several important
           actions to change the organizational culture of the Yucca Mountain
           project since the issuance of our March 2006 report. These actions
           appear to be invigorating, for example, the quality assurance
           program by focusing management attention on improving quality by
           resolving problems. However, for a variety of reasons, it has yet
           to be seen whether DOE's actions will prevent the kinds of
           problems our March 2006 report identified from recurring or other
           challenges from developing. First, some of DOE's efforts, such as
           its efforts to reduce staff turnover, are in preliminary or
           planning stages and have not been fully implemented. Therefore,
           their effectiveness cannot yet be determined. Second, improving
           the quality assurance program will also require changes in the
           organizational behaviors of OCRWM's staff and contractors. OCRWM's
           director told us that these types of cultural changes can be
           particularly difficult and take a long time to implement.
           Consequently, it may be years before OCRWM fully realizes the
           benefits of these efforts. Finally, as we have previously
           reported, DOE has a long history of quality assurance problems and
           has experienced repeated difficulties in resolving these problems.
			  
			  Agency Comments

           We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their
           review and comment. In their written responses, both DOE and NRC
           agreed with our report. (See apps. I and II.) In addition, both
           DOE and NRC provided comments to improve the draft report's
           technical accuracy, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
			  
			  Scope and Methodology

           To examine the development of DOE's license application schedule,
           we reviewed DOE documents related to the announcement and creation
           of the license application. We also reviewed the DOE management
           plan for creating the license application and other internal
           reports on the progress in drafting the application. We
           interviewed OCRWM's director and other OCRWM senior management
           officials in DOE headquarters and its Las Vegas project office
           about the process for creating the schedule, including
           consultations with stakeholders. In addition, we observed meetings
           covering topics related to the license application schedule
           between DOE and NRC, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and
           Materials, and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. These
           meetings were held in Rockville, Maryland; Las Vegas, Nevada; and
           Arlington, Virginia.

           To obtain NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to file a
           high-quality license application, we obtained NRC documents--such
           as the status of key technical issues and briefing slides on NRC's
           technical exchanges with DOE. We also attended NRC staff briefings
           for the Commission's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and
           Materials, including a briefing on NRC's prelicensing activities;
           reviewed meeting transcripts; and observed a NRC-DOE quarterly
           meeting and recorded NRC's comments. In addition, we interviewed
           NRC's project manager who is responsible for reviewing the
           postclosure portion of a license application, NRC's on-site
           representative at the Las Vegas office, and other NRC regional
           officials. Furthermore, we interviewed the director of EPA's
           Office of Air and Radiation Safety regarding the status of EPA's
           rulemaking to set radiation exposure standards for the public
           outside the Yucca Mountain site.

           To determine DOE's progress in implementing the recommendations
           and resolving the additional challenges identified in our March
           2006 report, we reviewed prior GAO reports that assessed DOE's
           quality assurance process and relevant DOE corrective action
           reports, root cause analyses, and other internal reviews that
           analyzed DOE's efforts to improve its management tools and its
           corrective action program in general. We also reviewed related NRC
           documents, such as some observation audit reports. We observed NRC
           and DOE management meetings and technical exchanges in Rockville,
           Maryland, and Las Vegas, Nevada, that covered related issues. We
           also interviewed OCRWM's director in DOE headquarters and senior
           managers at the Yucca Mountain project office in Las Vegas about
           their efforts to address our recommendations. Regarding the
           quality assurance challenges noted in our prior report, we
           reviewed a January 2007 GAO report discussing the USGS issue and
           reviewed DOE documents detailing their actions to restore
           confidence in the scientific documents. We reviewed internal DOE
           documents regarding requirements management and interviewed the
           program's chief engineer in charge of resolving this issue.
           Finally, regarding staff turnover in key management positions, we
           reviewed OCRWM's strategic objectives, business plan, and project
           documents and interviewed OCRWM's director and other senior
           project managers about their efforts to improve succession
           planning.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report, we plan no further distribution of it
           until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will
           send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
           committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Chairman of the Nuclear
           Regulatory Commission, the director of the Office of Management
           and Budget, and other interested parties. We will also make copies
           available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
           available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           [14]http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
           report were Richard Cheston, Casey Brown, Omari Norman, Alison
           O'Neill, and Daniel Semick.

           Sincerely yours,

           Mark E. Gaffigan
			  Acting Director, Natural Resources and
           Environment
			  
			  Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy
			  
			  Appendix II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
			  
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[21]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1010 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan, (202) 512-3841,
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Highlights of [22]GAO-07-1010 , a report to the Honorable Jon C. Porter,
House of Representatives

August 2007

YUCCA MOUNTAIN

DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its
Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear

Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To permanently
store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been working to
submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain about 100 miles from Las
Vegas, Nevada. Although the project has been beset with delays, in part
because of persistent problems with its quality assurance program, DOE
stated in July 2006 that it will submit a license application with NRC by
June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-quality application needs to be
complete, technically adequate, transparent by clearly justifying
underlying assumptions, and traceable back to original source materials.

GAO examined (1) DOE's development of its schedule for submitting a
license application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2) NRC's
assessment of DOE's readiness to submit a high-quality application, and
(3) DOE's progress in addressing quality assurance recommendations and
challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. GAO reviewed DOE's
management plan for creating the license application, reviewed
correspondence and attended prelicensing meetings between DOE and NRC, and
interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site representatives for the Yucca
Mountain project. In commenting on a draft of the report, both DOE and NRC
agreed with the report.

The director of DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management set
the June 30, 2008, date for filing the license application with NRC in
consultation with the DOE and contractor managers for the Yucca Mountain
project. DOE officials told us that external stakeholders were not
consulted because there was neither a legal requirement nor a compelling
management reason to do so. According to the director, the June 2008
schedule is achievable because DOE has already completed a large amount of
work, including the completion of a draft license application in 2005 that
DOE decided not to submit to NRC.

NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license
application by June 30, 2008, but until NRC receives the application,
officials will not speculate about whether it will be high quality. NRC
has not seen a draft of the license application, and NRC's long-standing
practice is to maintain an objective and neutral position toward a future
application until it is filed. To help ensure that DOE understands its
expectations, NRC has, among other things, held periodic prelicensing
management and technical meetings with DOE.

DOE has made progress in resolving the quality assurance recommendations
and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. For example, DOE has
replaced the one-page summary of performance indicators that GAO had
determined was ineffective with more frequent and rigorous project
management meetings. DOE has addressed the management challenges GAO
identified to varying degrees. For example, regarding management
continuity, DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel in key management
positions, such as the director of quality assurance. However, for various
reasons--including the long history of recurring problems and likely
project leadership changes in January 2009 when the current administration
leaves office--it is unclear whether DOE's actions will prevent these
problems from recurring.

Major Milestones in the Yucca Mountain Project

References

Visible links
  12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-313
  13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-297R
  14. http://www.gao.gov/
  15. http://www.gao.gov/
  16. http://www.gao.gov/
  17. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  18. mailto:[email protected]
  19. mailto:[email protected]
  20. mailto:[email protected]
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1010
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1010
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