Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing
Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting
Substantial Personnel Growth (13-SEP-07, GAO-07-1007).						 
                                                                 
The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50
percent in some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because
of the effect of implementing base realignment and closure
(BRAC), overseas force rebasing, and force modularity actions.
This growth creates the need for additional support
infrastructure at these bases and in nearby communities.
Military construction costs of over $17 billion are expected for
new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure costs
as well. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative. It addresses (1) the challenges and associated risks
the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at
its gaining installations and (2) how communities are planning
and funding for infrastructure to support incoming personnel and
their families. GAO analyzed personnel restationing numbers,
discussed planning efforts with Army and community officials,
and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and nearby
communities.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1007						        
    ACCNO:   A76208						        
  TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks
for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army
Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth
							 
     DATE:   09/13/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Army bases
             Army personnel
             Base realignments
             Construction costs
             Cost analysis
             DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program
             Defense economic analysis
             Military bases
             Military facilities
             Military facility construction
             Schedule slippages
             Strategic planning

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GAO-07-1007



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Report to Congressional Addressees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2007: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support 
for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

GAO-07-1007: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1007, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50 percent in 
some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because of the effect of 
implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC), overseas force 
rebasing, and force modularity actions. This growth creates the need 
for additional support infrastructure at these bases and in nearby 
communities. Military construction costs of over $17 billion are 
expected for new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure 
costs as well. 

GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller Generalï¿½s authority to 
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. It addresses (1) the 
challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely 
infrastructure support at its gaining installations and (2) how 
communities are planning and funding for infrastructure to support 
incoming personnel and their families. GAO analyzed personnel 
restationing numbers, discussed planning efforts with Army and 
community officials, and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and 
nearby communities. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army has developed plans to accommodate the growth of about 154,000 
personnel at its domestic bases, but it faces several complex 
implementation challenges that risk late provision of needed 
infrastructure to adequately support incoming personnel. First, Army 
plans continue to evolve, and Army headquarters and each of the nine 
gaining bases we visited were relying on different numbers of personnel 
movements and were not fully aware of the causes for the variances. For 
example, Fort Benning officials expected more than 6,000 additional 
soldiers and military students than Army headquarters planned. Because 
consistency in the relocation numbers is important for properly 
determining not only base infrastructure support needs but those of 
nearby communities as well, inconsistent numbers could lead to an 
improperly sized facilitiesï¿½ infrastructure. Second, the Army faces 
challenges in synchronizing personnel movements with planned newly 
constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. Any significant delays 
in implementing planned actions could place the Army at risk of not 
meeting BRAC statutory deadlines. Third, competing priorities could 
lead the Army to redirect resources planned for needed infrastructure 
improvements and operations to such priorities as current operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, as has happened in the past. However, such 
redirection of resources could undermine the Armyï¿½s ability to complete 
infrastructure improvements in time to support personnel movements and 
to meet planned timelines. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
primary construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented 
volume of construction, implement a new construction strategy designed 
to save construction costs and time, and complete infrastructure 
improvements within available resources and planned timelines. The Army 
recognizes these challenges and is refining its implementation plans to 
overcome these challenges. 

While communities surrounding growth bases GAO visited have generally 
proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been hindered in 
fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements and associated 
costs by the evolving nature of the Armyï¿½s plans and different 
interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army officials at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 school-age 
children, DODï¿½s November 2006 figures project only about 600. At the 
time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Communities 
surrounding growth bases have their own unique infrastructure 
improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based 
on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) 
the communityï¿½s current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the 
communityï¿½s own capacity to finance additional infrastructure 
requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to 
finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and 
state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of 
GAOï¿½s review even though the evolving nature of the Armyï¿½s planning 
prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they 
knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To better facilitate infrastructure planning, GAO recommends that DOD 
determine the causes for the variances in restationing numbers and 
ensure that agreement is reached within the Army on these numbers. DOD 
partially concurred with both recommendations. 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 
512-4523 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Army Has Developed Plans but Faces Complex Implementation 
Challenges: 

Communities Have Efforts Under Way to Address Anticipated Army Growth, 
but Planning and Funding Challenges Remain: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 2,000 
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011Because of BRAC, Overseas 
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as 
of March 2007): 

Table 2: Planned Facilities Construction Costs for the 18 Army Domestic 
Installations Expecting Net Gains in Personnel of at Least 2,000 
Because of BRAC, Overseas Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous 
Restationing Actions for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011: 

Table 3: Comparison of Army Headquarters and Installation Expected 
Personnel Restationing Numbers at Selected Installations for Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2011 (as of March 2007): 

Table 4: Comparison of Army Headquarters and Training and Doctrine 
Command Proposed and Approved Personnel Reduction Numbers for the 
Army's Centers of Excellence: 

Table 5: OEA Army Growth-Related Grant Awards for Fiscal Years 2006 and 
2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Locations of 18 Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at 
Least 2,000 Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011Because of 
BRAC, Overseas Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous 
Restationing Actions: 

Figure 2: Panoramic View of Relocatable Buildings at Fort Bliss, Texas: 

Figure 3: Closer View of Relocatable Buildings at Fort Bliss, Texas: 

Abbreviations: 

ASIP: Army Stationing Installation Plan: 
BRAC: base realignment and closure: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
OEA: Office of Economic Adjustment: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 13, 2007: 

Congressional Addressees: 

The Army is implementing extensive worldwide transformation initiatives 
to enhance U.S. national security while conducting operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. These initiatives are expected to 
lead to significantly increased military and civilian populations on 
certain domestic installations by 2011. Because of the combined effect 
of implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC); overseas force 
redeployments back to the United States under the Global Defense 
Posture Realignment, known as overseas rebasing; and a major Army force 
reorganization, known as force modularity, the Army expects to relocate 
over 150,000 personnel and increase 18 base populations by about 
136,000.[Footnote 1] Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that 
military construction costs will exceed $17 billion through fiscal year 
2011 at these 18 bases, and surrounding communities will likely incur 
costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other 
infrastructure improvements. These figures do not include personnel 
increases and added infrastructure costs as a result of Army actions to 
increase its active end strength authorization by 65,000 soldiers. 
Furthermore, family members and non-mission-related defense 
contractors, whose numbers are not included in the relocation figures 
cited above, will also relocate to areas surrounding these bases, thus 
fueling increased civilian infrastructure needs. Compounding the 
challenges of moving so many personnel is the statutory requirement to 
complete BRAC closures and realignments by September 15, 2011.[Footnote 
2] The Army expects to continue modularity-related moves beyond 2011. 
Senior Army officials consider appropriate infrastructure support as 
integral to maintaining operational readiness and quality of life for 
soldiers, DOD civilians, and their families. 

This report is one in a series that addresses emerging issues 
associated with the implementation of the BRAC 2005 round, overseas 
rebasing, and force modularity initiatives. Because of the broad 
implications these initiatives have on the infrastructure support at 
the Army's domestic installations and surrounding communities and 
widespread congressional interest in this subject, we prepared this 
report under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct 
evaluations on his own initiative.[Footnote 3] We are reporting the 
results to you in order to facilitate your oversight of the Army's 
efforts to address infrastructure needs as a result of the expected 
growth. Our objectives were to (1) identify the challenges and risks 
the Army faces in providing adequate infrastructure when needed at its 
major gaining bases and (2) describe surrounding communities' plans and 
funding for needed infrastructure to support incoming personnel and 
their families. 

To achieve our objectives, we analyzed data on the expected number and 
timing of military and civilian personnel arrivals and departures at 
gaining installations and military construction plans and funding to 
support these moves. We also discussed implementation, funding, and 
personnel movement plans with officials from various Army 
organizations, including the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management, the Installation Management Command and its 
four regional offices, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans, and the Army Corps of Engineers. We also 
discussed implementation challenges with installation officials at nine 
domestic bases expecting significant personnel growth and with local 
leaders in communities surrounding these bases. To address the 
surrounding communities' plans for needed schools, housing, 
transportation, and other infrastructure, we reviewed documents on 
community growth impacts and actions to address these impacts and data 
on financial grants provided by DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment 
(OEA) to communities surrounding the growth bases. We also met with 
community leaders and discussed their plans to meet DOD-prompted needs 
and with OEA officials to identify their interagency community impact 
assistance efforts with other federal agencies, such as the Departments 
of Transportation and Education. 

We conducted our work from March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Business plans 
intended to direct the implementation of the BRAC recommendations 
affecting the gaining bases were in draft at the time of our review. In 
addition, other information the Army provided us was preliminary and 
subject to change. Nonetheless, Army officials told us that the 
information constituted their current plans at the time of our review 
and should be considered an approximation of projected personnel 
movement and funding. Similarly, because surrounding communities' plans 
depend on the Army's plans, community planning information is also 
considered preliminary and subject to change. Although we found some 
discrepancies in the Army's information, we concluded that, overall, it 
was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. A more 
detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 
appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The Army has developed plans to accommodate growth of about 154,000 
personnel at its domestic bases as a result of BRAC 2005, overseas 
rebasing, and force modularity actions, but it faces several complex 
challenges to the implementation of those plans and risks late 
provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support arriving 
personnel. First, some of the Army plans continue to evolve, 
particularly because the numbers continually change. Moreover, Army 
headquarters and the gaining bases we visited were relying on different 
numbers of personnel movements based on their understanding of the 
plans at the time of our review. For example, Fort Benning officials 
expected more than 6,000 additional soldiers and military students and 
trainees than Army headquarters planned to relocate there at the time 
of our review; however, officials could not fully determine the reasons 
for these discrepancies. Because consistency in the relocation numbers 
is important for properly determining not only base infrastructure 
support needs but also those of nearby communities, inconsistent 
numbers could lead to improperly sized facilities or overbuilding. 
Second, the Army faces certain complexities in synchronizing personnel 
movements with newly constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. 
Any significant delays in implementing planned actions could place the 
Army at risk of not meeting the statutory deadline for completing BRAC 
actions. Third, competing priorities could lead the Army to redirect 
resources planned for needed infrastructure improvements and operations 
to such priorities as current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 
has happened in the past. However, such redirection of resources could 
undermine the Army's ability to complete infrastructure improvements in 
time to support personnel movements by the statutory or planned 
deadlines in 2011. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary 
construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented volume of 
construction, implement a new construction strategy expected to save 
construction costs and time, and effectively manage construction to 
complete infrastructure improvements within available resources and 
planned timelines, with special attention paid to the statutory 
September 15, 2011, deadline for completing BRAC closures and 
realignments. The Army recognizes these challenges and is refining its 
infrastructure implementation and funding plans to overcome these 
challenges. 

While communities surrounding growth installations we visited have 
generally proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been 
hindered from fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements 
and associated costs by the evolving nature of the Army's plans and 
different interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army 
officials at Fort Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 
school-age children, DOD's November 2006 figures project only about 
600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. 
Communities surrounding growth bases have unique infrastructure 
improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based 
on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) 
the community's current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the 
community's own capacity to finance additional infrastructure 
requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to 
finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and 
state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of 
our review even though the evolving nature of the Army's planning 
prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they 
knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements. 

To better facilitate infrastructure planning, we are making 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of 
the Army to (1) determine why there are differences between 
headquarters and gaining bases with respect to the number of arriving 
and departing personnel and (2) ensure that Army headquarters and 
gaining bases are collaborating to agree on Army personnel movement 
plans so that base commanders and surrounding communities can 
effectively plan for expected growth. This collaboration to reach 
agreement should continue as expected personnel movement actions are 
revised over time. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 
both of our recommendations. It concurred with the findings of each 
recommendation but said that the Army had determined the cause of data 
differences and had already taken corrective actions. While the Army 
has taken some steps to produce compatible data between the 
headquarters and installation level, these corrective actions have not 
been fully effective. Following receipt of DOD's comments on our draft 
report in late August 2007, we contacted several of the bases we 
visited during our review and found that there were still some 
significant, long-standing problems with the variances in the data 
being used by the installations and headquarters. While the data 
differences have improved at some locations, other locations had data 
differences that exceeded 1,000 personnel and officials said that they 
had serious concerns with the headquarters data. Because disconnects 
still exist, we believe that our recommendations remain valid. 

Background: 

BRAC, overseas rebasing, and Army modularity are all expected to 
generate significant personnel movements among numerous bases within 
the United States and from certain overseas locations back to the 
United States. Four primary organizations--the Army's Office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, OEA, and the President's Economic Adjustment Committee--are 
responsible for planning, managing construction, and assisting local 
communities affected by these moves. 

Three Major Initiatives Are to Generate Significant Personnel 
Movements: 

First, DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is 
implementing its fifth round, known as BRAC 2005, which was authorized 
by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002.[Footnote 4] The BRAC Commission recommendations were accepted by 
the President and Congress and became effective on November 9, 2005. In 
accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD must complete closures 
and realignments by September 15, 2011. BRAC 2005's key goals were to 
(1) transform DOD by more closely aligning its infrastructure with 
defense strategy, (2) enhance joint operations, and (3) reduce excess 
infrastructure and produce savings. Traditionally, DOD relied on BRAC 
primarily to reduce excess property and save money since property that 
has been disposed of is no longer maintained by DOD. Conversely, due in 
part to the addition of the transformation and joint operations goals 
to BRAC 2005, this round led to more than twice the number of actions 
in all previous rounds combined, 837 distinct actions in all. These 
BRAC actions incorporate many of the more than 50,000 Army personnel 
expected to return from overseas locations to the United States as part 
of DOD's overseas rebasing initiative discussed below. 

Second, in August 2004, the President announced plans for sweeping 
changes to the number and locations of DOD's overseas-based facilities. 
Known as the Global Defense Posture Realignment, DOD plans to realign 
its overseas basing structure over a 6-to 8-year period from the legacy 
Cold War posture to one that would more effectively support current 
allies and strategies and address emerging threats. Under the overseas 
rebasing effort, the 50,000 Army personnel plus another 20,000 other 
defense personnel and about 100,000 family members are to relocate from 
overseas locations--primarily in Europe and Korea--to bases in the 
United States. Although some of these personnel have already relocated, 
many were still overseas at the time of our review. Army plans call for 
overseas relocations to the United States to be completed prior to 
September 15, 2011. 

Third, similar to BRAC and overseas rebasing actions, implementation of 
Army force modularity will add to the personnel growth at some bases. 
The Army's modular transformation has been referred to as the largest 
Army reorganization in 50 years and affects the active Army, Army 
National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. The foundation for the modular 
force is the creation of brigade combat teams that while somewhat 
smaller than existing brigades, are expected to be more agile and 
deployable and better able to meet combatant commander requirements. 
Successful implementation of this initiative requires the movement of 
personnel across various units, new facilities and equipment, a 
different mix of skills and occupational specialties, and significant 
changes in doctrine and training. The Army began the modularity 
initiative in 2004 and expects to finish most associated 
reorganizations by 2011, but expects that some reorganizations will 
occur after 2011. 

As a result of the three initiatives and certain other restationing 
moves, the Army expects a net gain of about 154,000 personnel at its 
domestic gaining bases from fiscal years 2006 through fiscal year 2011. 
These gains include active and reserve soldiers, military students and 
trainees, civilians, and mission contractors but do not include family 
members and non-mission-related contractors.[Footnote 5] Our analysis 
of March 2007 Army data on personnel restationing actions indicates 
that 18 domestic installations, as shown in table 1, are likely to 
experience a net gain of at least 2,000 military and civilian personnel 
for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 because of BRAC 2005, overseas 
rebasing, modularity, and other miscellaneous restationing actions. 
Personnel gains at individual locations are projected to range from 7 
percent to 111 percent. 

Table 1: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 2,000 
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011Because of BRAC, Overseas 
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as 
of March 2007): 

Installation: Fort Belvoir, VA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 21,437; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 45,332; 
Estimated net gain in population: 23,895; 
Percentage of population increase: 111. 

Installation: Fort Bliss, TX; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 20,130; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 38,063; 
Estimated net gain in population: 17,933; 
Percentage of population increase: 89. 

Installation: Fort Bragg, NC; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 57,352; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 69,136; 
Estimated net gain in population: 11,784; 
Percentage of population increase: 21. 

Installation: Fort Lewis, WA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 36,147; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 47,110; 
Estimated net gain in population: 10,963; 
Percentage of population increase: 30. 

Installation: Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 24,819; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 34,980; 
Estimated net gain in population: 10,161; 
Percentage of population increase: 41. 

Installation: Fort Benning, GA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 40,592; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 50,487; 
Estimated net gain in population: 9,895; 
Percentage of population increase: 24. 

Installation: Fort Riley, KS; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 15,188; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 24,608; 
Estimated net gain in population: 9,420; 
Percentage of population increase: 62. 

Installation: Fort Lee, VA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 13,495; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 20,645; 
Estimated net gain in population: 7,150; 
Percentage of population increase: 53. 

Installation: Fort Meade, MD; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 35,504; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 41,915; 
Estimated net gain in population: 6,411; 
Percentage of population increase: 18. 

Installation: Fort Carson, CO; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 24,066; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 29,756; 
Estimated net gain in population: 5,690; 
Percentage of population increase: 24. 

Installation: Fort Sill, OK; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 26,499; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 31,136; 
Estimated net gain in population: 4,637; 
Percentage of population increase: 17. 

Installation: Schofield Barracks, HI; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 20,907; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 24,393; 
Estimated net gain in population: 3,486; 
Percentage of population increase: 17. 

Installation: Redstone Arsenal, AL; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 26,210; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 29,268; 
Estimated net gain in population: 3,058; 
Percentage of population increase: 12. 

Installation: Fort Shafter, HI; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 11,004; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 13,892; 
Estimated net gain in population: 2,888; 
Percentage of population increase: 26. 

Installation: Fort Dix, NJ; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 7,279; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 9,777; 
Estimated net gain in population: 2,498; 
Percentage of population increase: 34. 

Installation: National Training Center and Fort Irwin, CA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 12,652; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 14,920; 
Estimated net gain in population: 2,268; 
Percentage of population increase: 18. 

Installation: Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield, GA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 28,322; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 30,400; 
Estimated net gain in population: 2,078; 
Percentage of population increase: 7. 

Installation: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 17,623; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 19,694; 
Estimated net gain in population: 2,071; 
Percentage of population increase: 12. 

Installation: Total; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 439,226; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 575,512; 
Estimated net gain in population: 136,286; 
Percentage of population increase: 31. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army headquarters-level data. 

Notes: Personnel growth consists of Army military (active and reserve), 
military students and trainees and civilians, non-Army military and 
civilians, and mission contractors. Figures do not include family 
members and non-mission-related contractors and expected increases that 
may occur as a result of plans to increase the Army's active end 
strength authorization by 65,000 personnel. 

[End of table] 

As also shown in table 1, while the overall net gain in personnel at 
these installations averages 31 percent, Forts Belvoir, Bliss, Lee, and 
Riley are expected to experience a 53 percent or more growth rate. The 
expected personnel net gains at these 18 installations account for 
nearly 90 percent of the total expected personnel net gains across all 
Army domestic installations through 2011. Figure 1 shows the locations 
of the 18 installations. 

Figure 1: Locations of 18 Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at 
Least 2,000 Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011Because of 
BRAC, Overseas Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous 
Restationing Actions: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

accommodating the expected large increase of personnel at these 18 Army 
locations over the next several years requires the expenditure of 
significant military construction funds for required facilities. 
Although the Army also will have procurement, operations and 
maintenance, and other associated cost increases at these bases because 
of the personnel increases, the scope of this report focuses on 
military construction funding. Our analysis of DOD data, as shown in 
table 2, indicates that DOD is planning to spend over $17 billion to 
construct facilities at these locations through the fiscal year 2011 
time frame. 

Table 2: Planned Facilities Construction Costs for the 18 Army Domestic 
Installations Expecting Net Gains in Personnel of at Least 2,000 
Because of BRAC, Overseas Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous 
Restationing Actions for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011: 

Dollars in millions. 

Army BRAC[A]; 
FY2006: $506; 
FY2007: $1,962; 
FY2008: $2,007; 
FY2009: $1,615; 
FY2010: $1,126; 
FY2011: $0; 
Total dollars: $7,215; 
Percentage of total dollars: 42. 

Non-Army BRAC[B]; 
FY2006: 46; 
FY2007: 295; 
FY2008: 1,678; 
FY2009: 1,843; 
FY2010: 698; 
FY2011: 38; 
Total dollars: $4,598; 
Percentage of total dollars: 27. 

Army modularity[C]; 
FY2006: 31; 
FY2007: 169; 
FY2008: 247; 
FY2009: 361; 
FY2010: 468; 
FY2011: 725; 
Total dollars: $1,999; 
Percentage of total dollars: 12. 

Subtotal of the three initiatives; 
FY2006: $583; 
FY2007: $2,426; 
FY2008: $3,932; 
FY2009: $3,819; 
FY2010: $2,292; 
FY2011: $763; 
Total dollars: $13,812; 
Percentage of total dollars: 81. 

Other Army military construction[D]; 
FY2006: 580; 
FY2007: 496; 
FY2008: 414; 
FY2009: 355; 
FY2010: 223; 
FY2011: 1,137; 
Total dollars: $3,205; 
Percentage of total dollars: 19. 

Total; 
FY2006: $1,163; 
FY2007: $2,922; 
FY2008: $4,346; 
FY2009: $4,174; 
FY2010: $2,515; 
FY2011: $1,900; 
Total dollars: $17,017; 
Percentage of total dollars: 100. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army, Air Force, Navy, and defensewide agencies 
and activities budget data. 

Note: Figures may not add precisely because of rounding. 

[A] Includes overseas basing relocations included in BRAC 2005 actions. 

[B] Includes planned expenditures by the departments of the Navy and 
Air Force as well as defense agencies and activities. 

[C] Modularity funds presented are for permanent facilities only. 
Modularity funds were also expended in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and 
plans exist to fund additional infrastructure in fiscal years 2012 and 
2013. 

[D] These amounts are military construction projects not part of BRAC 
or modularity that are planned by the Army during the years indicated. 
Amounts do not include any funds that may be necessary as a result of 
Army plans to increase the active force authorization by 65,000 
personnel. 

[End of table] 

Also shown in table 2, the overwhelming majority, over 80 percent, of 
the planned construction expenditures at these Army installations are 
attributable to BRAC, overseas rebasing, and modularity actions. 
Moreover, as shown in the table, other military services or defense 
agencies and activities are planning to expend about $4.6 billion for 
constructing BRAC facilities they expect to use at these Army 
installations. For example, several defense agencies are expecting to 
spend more than $2.6 billion in facility construction at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, while the Air Force plans to spend in excess of $600 million 
for facilities to house medical training personnel and students at Fort 
Sam Houston, Texas. 

Four Organizations Are Primarily Responsible for Managing These 
Personnel Moves and Assisting Communities: 

The following four organizations are to manage personnel moves 
associated with BRAC, overseas rebasing, or Army modularity and to 
assist local communities affected by the movements: 

* The Army's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 
Management provides policy guidance and program management on all 
matters relating to the management and funding of Army installations 
worldwide and to ensure the availability of installation services and 
facilities. To accomplish its mission, the office coordinates with 
other key Army headquarters organizations, including the Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Army Budget 
Office, to respond to operational requirements and resource 
availability in providing for installation infrastructure. To assist in 
this role, the Installation Management Command provides needed 
installation services and facilities, including construction, family 
care, food management, environmental programs, well-being, logistics, 
public works, and installation funding to support readiness and mission 
execution. 

* The Army Corps of Engineers is the Army's construction agent and is 
charged with contracting for infrastructure construction for the Army. 
The Corps also manages the construction process, including supervision 
and inspection as facilities construction progresses. It also functions 
as the construction agent for selected Air Force construction projects 
and fulfills a role as an agent for a civil works construction program 
involving flood control, water supply, hydroelectric power generation, 
navigation, recreation, wetlands regulation, and resource protection. 

* OEA is a field activity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
that assists states and communities by providing technical and 
financial assistance in planning and carrying out adjustment strategies 
in response to defense actions. Much of that assistance in the past had 
been directed toward communities that lost military and civilian 
personnel because of the closure or major realignment of a base. 
Conversely, because the 2005 BRAC round, overseas rebasing, and Army 
modularity have created significant growth at many bases, OEA has 
assisted affected communities with growth planning. 

* The President's Economic Adjustment Committee was established under 
Executive Order 12788 and comprises 22 federal agencies that are to 
facilitate the organization, planning, and execution of community-based 
defense adjustment strategies. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Environment) chairs the committee, and the 
Secretaries of Labor and Commerce serve as Vice Chairmen. The Committee 
Chair has testified that the committee will likely conduct team visits 
to better understand local community adjustment challenges and to more 
capably address potential needs for federal assistance. 

The Army Has Developed Plans but Faces Complex Implementation 
Challenges: 

The Army has developed plans to accommodate growth of about 154,000 
personnel at its domestic bases as a result of BRAC 2005, overseas 
rebasing, and force modularity actions, but it faces several complex 
challenges to the implementation of those plans and risks late 
provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support arriving 
personnel. First, Army plans are still evolving, and officials at the 
gaining bases we visited did not agree with Army headquarters on 
personnel movements at their bases. Second, the synchronization of 
personnel movements across installations with the planned 
infrastructure construction is difficult because any unforeseen delays 
or disruptions in providing for necessary facilities can adversely 
affect synchronization plans. Third, competing resource demands could 
lead to redirection of resources that would have been used for 
infrastructure improvements to other priorities, as has happened in the 
past. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers may be at risk of not 
finishing all needed infrastructure projects within new cost and 
timeline goals because of the unprecedented volume of required 
construction. 

Expected Personnel Movement Numbers Differ between Army Headquarters 
and Some Gaining Bases: 

Expected personnel movement numbers differ between Army headquarters 
and the bases where these people will move, thus affecting whether 
adequate infrastructure will be in place when personnel arrive. As of 
March 2007, the nine gaining bases we visited were expecting different 
numbers of personnel arrivals and departures than those generated by 
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Table 
3 provides examples of these variances at six of these bases, five of 
which are planning for more personnel movement than Army headquarters' 
plans while one base expects slightly less.[Footnote 6] While the other 
three bases we visited had personnel movement numbers that also 
differed from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans' 
numbers, the data were not as easily comparable as those presented in 
table 3. 

Table 3: Comparison of Army Headquarters and Installation Expected 
Personnel Restationing Numbers at Selected Installations for Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2011 (as of March 2007): 

Installation: Fort Benning, GA; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 1,127; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 3,846; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 2,719. 

Installation: Fort Benning, GA;
Personnel category: Student; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 5,347; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 8,757; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 3,410. 

Installation: Fort Bliss, TX; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 19,468; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 20,979; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 1,511. 

Installation: Fort Carson, CO; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 5,394; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 5,209; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: (185). 

Installation: Fort Lee, VA; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 1,065; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 1,717; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 652. 

Installation: Fort Lee, VA; 
Personnel category: Student; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 4,444; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 6,494; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 2,050. 

Installation: Fort Riley, KS; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 7,907; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 8,490; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 583. 

Installation: Fort Sill, OK; 
Personnel category: Military; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 2,235; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 2,761; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 526. 

Installation: Fort Sill, OK; 
Personnel category: Student; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Headquarters: 1,754; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Installation: 4,357; 
Expected personnel restationing numbers: Difference: 2,603. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Only certain personnel categories are displayed in the table. 

[End of table] 

The examples in table 3 are not necessarily representative of all Army 
growth locations and all categories of arriving personnel, but they 
nonetheless could lead to unnecessary infrastructure improvements on 
some bases and inadequate improvements on others. Army headquarters 
officials explained that they program military construction funds based 
on their numbers while base-level officials and surrounding communities 
rely more on the base-level numbers for planning purposes. While we 
recognize that the numbers of personnel moving to Army growth 
installations will fluctuate, officials could fully explain the reasons 
for discrepancies as large as those shown in table 3, and inconsistent 
numbers can lead to under-or overbuilding by the base and the 
surrounding communities. 

Expected personnel movements also can vary based on doctrinal changes 
that consequently lead to changes in operational unit sizes and 
organizational structures. For example, BRAC 2005 recommended the 
creation of certain Army training centers of excellence that 
consequently require consolidation of some training staff and 
facilities in certain locations.One such planned center of excellence-
-the Army Maneuver Center at Fort Benning, Georgia--is to be created 
through the consolidation of the Armor School and Center (currently 
located at Fort Knox, Kentucky) with the Infantry School and Center at 
Fort Benning. This consolidation is expected to lead to personnel 
movements from Fort Knox to Fort Benning. However, because the 
organizational framework for the centers of excellence had not been 
fully defined at the time of our review and was therefore still 
evolving, Army's headquarters and Training and Doctrine Command 
officials still had not reached agreement on the number of people to be 
assigned to each center. Thus, gaining base officials, such as those at 
Fort Benning, could not fully plan for incoming personnel movements 
based on the center's personnel numbers and associated personnel 
reductions until the final personnel numbers were approved. Table 4 
shows the wide disparity in the proposed personnel reduction numbers 
and those ultimately approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army 
in March 2007. 

Table 4: Comparison of Army Headquarters and Training and Doctrine 
Command Proposed and Approved Personnel Reduction Numbers for the 
Army's Centers of Excellence: 

Training center of excellence: Maneuver - Fort Benning, GA; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Headquarters- proposed: 1,661; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Training and Doctrine Command-proposed and 
approved[A]: 635; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Difference: 1,026. 

Training center of excellence: Net Fires - Fort Sill, OK; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Headquarters- proposed: 293; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Training and Doctrine Command-proposed and 
approved[A]: 300; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Difference: (7). 

Training center of excellence: Combat Service Support - Fort Lee, VA; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Headquarters-proposed: 666; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Training and Doctrine Command-proposed and 
approved[A]: 220; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Difference: 446. 

Training center of excellence: Remaining centers; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Headquarters-proposed: 286; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Training and Doctrine Command- proposed 
and approved[A]: 324; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Difference: (38). 

Total; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Headquarters-proposed: 2,906; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Training and Doctrine Command-proposed and 
approved[A]: 1,479; 
Personnel reduction numbers: Difference: 1,427. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

[A] The Vice Chief of Staff for the Army approved the numbers in March 
2007. 

[End of table] 

Military planners and base operations and community officials require 
accurate personnel arrival information to ensure that they can 
effectively plan for and fund infrastructure improvements to provide 
adequate facilities for the new arrivals. To the extent that personnel 
numbers are inaccurate, the Army and the surrounding community could 
either plan for too much or too little space to meet infrastructure 
requirements. 

Army Faces Challenges in Synchronizing Personnel Restationing Plans 
with Planned Construction of Facilities: 

Synchronizing personnel movements with the completion of infrastructure 
needed to accommodate newly arriving personnel at gaining bases 
presents difficult challenges that must be overcome to ensure that 
facilities are ready when relocated personnel arrive. These challenges 
include developing plans to account for (1) the complexities inherent 
in coordinating the expected large number of individual movements 
prompted by BRAC, overseas rebasing, and modularity and (2) the need to 
manage interdependent BRAC actions affecting individual bases. 
Moreover, delays in constructing needed infrastructure, for reasons 
such as environmental assessments on gaining bases, can force delays in 
carrying out the personnel movements. Given the compressed time frames 
for completing construction of facilities and subsequently relocating 
personnel, any significant delays of BRAC actions could place the Army 
at risk of not completing personnel moves at some locations and not 
meeting the September 15, 2011, statutory deadline. 

The Army faces a key challenge stemming from the sheer number of 
synchronized actions that must take place to successfully complete 
certain personnel movements. In congressional testimony, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) stated that the 
Army has to complete more than 1,300 discrete actions to successfully 
implement BRAC recommendations. For example, 14 separate BRAC 
recommendations involving 59 separate DOD organizations impact Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia, which is expected to gain nearly 24,000 personnel by 
September 15, 2011. Among the personnel moving to Fort Belvoir will be 
about 15,000 expected to arrive as late as August 2011 as the result of 
the closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., 
to staff a newly constructed hospital, the collocation of various 
defense agencies and activities from leased space off base, and several 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency moves. These moves all depend 
on the completion of new construction at Fort Belvoir, much of which is 
expected to be completed only shortly before or at the same time as the 
relocations. For example, current plans call for construction to be 
complete in September 2011 for the collocation of about 9,000 personnel 
from various defense agencies and activities at the base. However, at 
the time of our review, the Army had not made a final decision whether 
to obtain General Services Administration land it owns near rail and 
transit stations in Springfield, Virginia, where the Army would move 
these personnel. If this process delays these moves, it could 
jeopardize meeting the statutory deadline. 

The Army also has to overcome the challenge to planned synchronization 
from the interdependence of various BRAC recommendations. For example, 
the BRAC recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, includes 
the planned relocation of some personnel into renovated facilities at 
the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. However, the designated 
receiving facilities at Aberdeen cannot be renovated until the military 
organization currently occupying those facilities--the Ordnance Center 
and School--relocates. The school, however, cannot relocate--an action 
associated with another BRAC recommendation--until new space is 
provided at Fort Lee, Virginia. According to Army officials, the 
Ordnance Center and School is expected to move to Fort Lee in July 
2009, and some personnel from Fort Monmouth are expected to move into 
the renovated space at Aberdeen in June 2011. Any delay could 
jeopardize these moves and meeting the September 15, 2011, deadline. 

Another key synchronization challenge is the need to complete required 
environmental assessments, conduct any needed environmental cleanup, 
and undertake endangered species protection before construction 
commences. For example, construction of the new Maneuver Center of 
Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, could be delayed because the 
installation is required to account for endangered species protection 
actions in its construction plans. While the Army initially expected to 
complete the relevant environmental impact statement by the end of 
fiscal year 2007, it has revised its expected completion date by about 
3 months. Base officials said that this delay will not affect current 
construction schedules. However, if any further delays materialize, 
both needed construction and arrival of Armor School and Center 
personnel from Fort Knox could be delayed. Army officials also told us 
that other regulatory environmental requirements must be complied with, 
including certain studies, consultations, and permitting, before 
various construction projects can commence and any delays could 
undermine the synchronization schedule of construction and personnel 
movements that must be completed before the deadline. 

Synchronization difficulties have already arisen in the Army's BRAC 
2005 plans, and the Army consequently delayed scheduled personnel 
movements in at least the following three instances because facilities 
were not expected to be ready at the gaining bases when needed: 

* Fort Benning, Georgia: Officials delayed the start-up of the Maneuver 
Center of Excellence by a year or more from their initial plans for it 
to begin operations in fiscal year 2009. 

* Fort Bliss, Texas: The 1ST Armored Division's planned move from 
Germany was moved from fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010 to fiscal 
years 2010 and 2011. Similarly, a 1ST Armored Division brigade 
relocation has been rescheduled from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 
2008. 

* Fort Sill, Oklahoma: The Net Fires Center of Excellence is to begin 
operations in fiscal years 2009 instead of fiscal year 2008 as 
originally planned. 

To the extent that delays occur as implementation proceeds, the Army 
faces an increased risk that it may not complete all closures and 
realignments by the statutory deadline. 

The Army is now emphasizing the need to have adequate permanent 
facilities in place when personnel arrive because utilizing temporary 
facilities, often referred to as relocatables, adds to the facilities' 
cost in the long term as permanent facilities are to eventually replace 
the relocatables. Army officials have told us that because of 
congressional concerns regarding the possible use of temporary 
facilities to meet requirements for 2005 BRAC round and overseas 
rebasing actions, they do not plan to use relocatable facilities for 
these moves, even though they would serve as an interim measure for 
providing needed infrastructure.[Footnote 7] Nonetheless, in the recent 
past the Army has relied on temporary facilities to accommodate troops 
for operational reasons when no permanent facilities were available, as 
evidenced by the Army's modularity initiative and facilities 
construction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army data indicate that more than 
7 million square feet of relocatables have been used to accommodate 
modular force conversions at a cost of nearly $1 billion since 2004 at 
domestic bases. Figures 2 and 3 show relocatables in place at Fort 
Bliss to accommodate the arrival of the 1ST Cavalry Division in 2006. 

Figure 2: Panoramic View of Relocatable Buildings at Fort Bliss, Texas: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Closer View of Relocatable Buildings at Fort Bliss, Texas: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

Competing Priorities Could Lead to Redirection of Funding from 
Infrastructure to Other Priorities: 

Competing priorities could lead to the redirection of funds planned for 
infrastructure construction or improvement to other priorities and 
consequently lead to delays in preparing facilities for newly arriving 
personnel at gaining bases. In September 2006, the Chief of Staff of 
the Army negotiated directly with the Office of Management and Budget 
for an increase in the Army's total fiscal year 2008 budget rather than 
the usual practice of providing its budget request to the Secretary of 
Defense. The Army Chief of Staff took this step because he perceived a 
shortfall of nearly $25 billion in the Army's fiscal year 2008 budget. 
However, as a result of the negotiations, the Army received $7 billion 
more than that originally supported by the Secretary of Defense, but 
still $18 billion less than the amount the Chief of Staff believed was 
required to fund all priorities. 

The Army projects the cost of BRAC implementation to be about $17.6 
billion of which military construction is projected to account for 
about $13.1 billion.[Footnote 8] The Army plans to fund the $17.6 
billion from a variety of sources. First, to help finance portions of 
the Army's BRAC 2005 implementation costs, DOD will provide BRAC 
funding of almost $7 billion. Second, DOD also will provide funding for 
overseas rebasing, which will supply the Army with about $2.6 billion 
to fund these redeployment actions to the United States. Together, 
these amounts will provide the Army about $9.5 billion. Thus, the Army 
will need about another $8.1 billion to finance BRAC 2005 
implementation of about $17.6 billion. To address the shortfall, at the 
time of our review, the Army planned to rely heavily on funding 
programmed for certain projects outside the BRAC accountthe Military 
Construction Army Accountthrough 2011 and to move these targeted 
projects further into the future. 

While the Army has identified sources for the funds to implement BRAC 
2005, competing priorities could prompt future redirection of funds 
away from BRAC or other construction. Operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; support for new weapons systems, including the Future 
Combat System; costs to implement modularity; plans to increase the 
Army's active force structure by 65,000 personnel; and other 
initiatives all will compete for funds with BRAC 2005 and other 
infrastructure construction priorities. Moreover, cost growth in any of 
these priorities could increase the pressure to redirect funds. For 
example, in March 2007, we reported that the Army's projected cost for 
the Future Combat System had increased by almost 80 percent from $91.4 
billion to $163.7 billion. We also reported that the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's independent estimates of the acquisition cost of 
the system were higher and ranged from $203 billion to $234 
billion.[Footnote 9] 

As we have previously reported, concerns have remained regarding the 
adequacy of funding allocated to maintain DOD infrastructure and 
support other installation operating needs. Furthermore, underfunding, 
including the deterioration of facilities and its negative effects on 
the quality of life for those living and working at affected 
installations and on their ability to accomplish their mission 
activities, further affects military operations.[Footnote 10] This has 
been particularly prevalent in the Army and in 2004 was exacerbated 
because varying amounts were redirected from facilities accounts to 
help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. At the end of fiscal year 
2004, Army installations received additional funds to help offset these 
shortfalls, but the timing made it difficult for the installations to 
execute these funds. Our visits to various gaining bases revealed that 
the adequacy of operations and maintenance funds to operate bases 
continues to be an issue. The Army has had to take steps in each of the 
last 3 years, affecting facilities accounts, to help fund the war. We 
are continuing to conduct work in this area and have recently initiated 
a review looking at the sustainment and operation of DOD facilities. 

Because of expected budgetary pressures and competing priorities, and 
to limit short-term construction costs, the Army plans to delay 
construction of certain quality of life facilities at some gaining 
installations. Quality of life facilities include child development and 
youth centers, physical fitness centers, chapels, on-post shopping and 
convenience areas, and athletic fields. BRAC recommendations do not 
require specific construction projects, and thus the Army has chosen to 
defer some quality of life facilities beyond 2011. Specifically, at the 
nine Army growth installations we visited, the BRAC requirement for 
quality of life facilities has an estimated value of about $739 
million. However, if only certain quality of life facilities are 
included, then the requirement drops to about $472 million.[Footnote 
11] Nonetheless, the Army planned to fund only about $76 million using 
BRAC funds and about another $122 million using military construction 
funds through 2011. As a consequence, for example, at Fort Carson, 
Colorado, officials requested that two child care centers be 
constructed before most incoming personnel arrived in 2009. However, 
the Army has budgeted funding for the two centers in 2011. Moreover, 
the Army has not budgeted for any quality of life projects at Forts 
Belvoir and Lee, Virginia, through 2011 despite installation 
requirements for these facilities. 

Installation officials we spoke with were confident that their bases 
could accommodate the new personnel even without all required quality 
of life facilities and believed that the surrounding communities would 
be able to accommodate some base personnel's child care and other 
quality of life needs. Meanwhile, military family advocates believe 
that not funding quality of life facilities could jeopardize military 
readiness by distracting deployed soldiers who may be concerned that 
their families are not being taken care of. 

Army Corps of Engineers Is at Risk of Not Meeting Construction Costs 
and Timing Goals: 

To meet the expected large volume and costs of facilities construction 
associated with BRAC and the concurrent implementation of overseas 
rebasing and modularity, most of which must be completed by the end of 
fiscal year 2011, the Army Corps of Engineers has developed a strategy, 
known as military construction transformation, intended to reduce (1) 
construction costs by 15 percent and (2) construction time by 30 
percent. Through its transformation strategy, the Corps intends to 
change how it executes construction projects by: 

* standardizing facility designs and processes, 

* expanding the use of manufactured building solutions,[Footnote 12] 

* executing military construction as a continuous building program and 
not just a collection of individual projects, and: 

* emphasizing commercial rather than government building standards and 
base master planning. 

The Army approved the strategy on February 1, 2006, and the established 
eight centers to simplify the contracting and construction processes 
for certain types of facilities as a step in its goal to reduce 
construction costs and time. By 2008, the Corps expects that each 
center will establish baseline requirements for common facilities to 
reduce construction costs and time frames on the theory that 
contractors can build to the same design faster and cheaper once they 
have experience with the design. The Fort Worth, Texas, district is to 
standardize enlisted barracks' construction; the Savannah, Georgia, 
district is to standardize brigade operations complexes; and the 
Louisville, Kentucky, district is to standardize operational readiness 
training complexes. A further cost-saving element of the strategy is to 
reduce the cost of support facilities, such as utility connections, 
paved parking and walkways, storm drains, information technology 
connections, and antiterrorism and force protection measures. According 
to officials, these costs usually range from 25 to 30 percent of the 
construction cost when government construction standards are used. 

In addition to common designs, the strategy encourages contractors to 
use manufactured buildings with flexibility to use any of five 
construction types rather than requiring only noncombustible, concrete 
and steel type I or II construction.[Footnote 13] Corps officials said 
that this approach provides not only greater flexibility in the design 
and construction of military projects but also flexibility to respond 
to fluctuating material prices. They also noted that using materials 
other than concrete and steel makes it easier to renovate, reuse, and 
reconfigure a facility when appropriate. These officials believe that 
the changes would not significantly reduce the useful life of 
facilities. 

Recognizing that its construction strategy constitutes a critical 
operational change, the Army Corps of Engineers is testing its new 
approach on projects at five locations. A Corps official told us that 
11 projects awarded at the pilot locations during fiscal year 2006 all 
were bid under the price set by the Corps thus achieving up to a 17 
percent savings. Further, these projects were all awarded without scope 
reductions. Corps officials also told us that the contractors for these 
projects are expected to complete them in from 440 to 540 days as 
compared with the normal completion time of about 720 days. In 
addition, we were told that the Corps hopes to have completed the pilot 
testing and developed regional contracts for the standardized facility 
types so that they can be used in the fiscal year 2008 military 
construction program. According to Corps officials, these contracts 
will help streamline the construction process because a task order can 
be issued against an already existing contract when needed. Despite the 
early positive results, however, Corps officials acknowledge that their 
strategy has not been tested in high-demand conditions, such as those 
that will occur because of the much larger construction budgets and 
extensive construction plans during fiscal years 2008 through 2010. 

With respect to implementing this transformational construction 
strategy, building materials cost and labor wage rates that exceed 
rates used in the construction budget process could lead to 
unexpectedly costly building projects. In recent years, the actual rate 
of construction inflation has exceeded the federal government's 
inflation rate, which the Corps is required to use in budgeting for its 
construction projects. While this variance, which was as high as 6.1 
percentage points in fiscal year 2004, has diminished over time, the 
actual rate of construction inflation continues to exceed the Corps' 
budgeted rate. Because the Corps uses government inflation rates to 
develop its cost estimates and budget for construction in any given 
year, any variance in actual inflation from those rates has an impact 
on the cost of construction projects.[Footnote 14] Army Corps of 
Engineers officials told us that to the extent that the actual rate of 
inflation continues to exceed the budgeted rate as implementation 
proceeds and construction material costs are higher than anticipated, 
they would either have to redirect funding from other sources to 
provide for construction projects or resort to a reduction in the scope 
of some construction projects. We note, however, that this trend may 
not necessarily continue into the future, depending on the economics 
surrounding the construction industry. 

Finally, the Corps is expected to manage an unprecedented volume of 
construction through 2011, with some regions expecting to far exceed 
their normal construction capacity. For example, the Fort Worth, Texas, 
district is to manage about $2.5 billion in construction work at Fort 
Bliss. Corps officials said that this amount would place them at their 
maximum capacity of about $400 million in construction work annually 
managed by that district, and they must also manage $2 billion in 
construction in the San Antonio, Texas, area. Similarly, at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, the Corps' military construction budget will increase 
from about $50 million per year to more than $300 million annually over 
the next 3 years. These costs do not include the costs of the Corps' 
civil works program, which would include construction programs such as 
recovering from the impacts of Hurricane Katrina. Corps headquarters 
officials have said that they will bring in assistance from other Corps 
districts, hire outside help if specific districts are unable to meet 
the demand without such help, or both thus potentially adding 
additional cost to the projects. 

Communities Have Efforts Under Way to Address Anticipated Army Growth, 
but Planning and Funding Challenges Remain: 

Communities surrounding growing Army installations have acted to 
address school, housing, transportation, and other infrastructure 
needs, but each community's actions are unique because demands vary by 
location. These communities are in the process of identifying and 
obtaining funding sources to finance these additional infrastructure 
requirements, and they have several ways to finance these needs, 
including seeking federal assistance. Nonetheless, given the evolving 
nature of the Army's growth projections, these communities have 
generally been hindered in their ability to identify all of the costs 
for implementing infrastructure expansion. DOD's OEA is assisting 
communities with their growth planning efforts, but OEA does not 
provide funding for facilities' construction projects. 

Communities Have Generally Been Proactive in Planning and Implementing 
Actions for Growth: 

Communities we visited have been planning for a significant anticipated 
increase in DOD personnel and family members from BRAC, overseas 
rebasing, and modularity implementation. These communities' schools, 
housing, transportation, and other infrastructure needs depend on the 
number of new personnel to be assigned to their local bases. However, 
the Army's plans for relocating its personnel and families were 
evolving at the time of our review. Consequently, communities cannot 
fully determine their requirements because of changing Army plans, 
although some communities had begun planning anyway. Some went further 
and undertook new construction even before the Army had decided which 
bases would grow and by how much. For example, some communities in the 
Forts Benning, Bliss, and Riley areas expanded medical facilities in 
anticipation of DOD and community growth unrelated to DOD. Similarly, 
through a pre-BRAC 2005 partnership between Fort Bliss and the City of 
El Paso, an inland desalination plant is under construction on the 
installation that is to be operated by the City of El Paso. Community 
officials also told us that they are increasing the capacity and 
accreditation of child care facilities to help accommodate relocating 
families' needs. 

At the time of our review, base commanders' representatives and 
affected communities' officials at locations we visited were regularly 
collaborating to manage community growth. In addition to housing, 
schools, and transportation needs, community officials were planning 
new water and sewage systems projects to accommodate growth. For 
example, the community bordering Fort Sill has identified $14.7 million 
in water and sewer projects and is seeking state and federal financial 
assistance to finance the projects. State-level or regional task forces 
have also been formed in some states to assist communities surrounding 
bases in managing the growth. Communities surrounding Army 
installations in Georgia, Texas, Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia have 
organized such task forces to help identify and address off-base 
infrastructure needs from a regional viewpoint. Members of these 
planning groups include elected or appointed representatives from the 
state, local, and county levels and representatives from local 
businesses, school districts, and the private sector. 

Local officials in some of the communities we visited also said that 
the arrival of defense personnel and family members is expected to 
occur later than initially projected, thus giving them more time to 
plan for and complete new construction. At the same time, some 
communities' officials were concerned that Army plans could change and 
that their nearby bases might not grow as much as first thought, but 
they would not find out until after new construction had been started 
or completed. 

Communities Have Developed Plans and Taken Other Actions to Improve 
Schools, Housing, and Transportation: 

The communities we visited have been actively planning and have 
initiated a number of actions to accommodate the anticipated increased 
need for schools, housing, and transportation. Some communities have 
taken steps to address school needs by funding school construction 
requirements, while others are seeking federal assistance. To help 
accommodate increased housing demands, communities have constructed or 
developed plans for constructing additional housing units. Some 
communities already have transportation projects under way or planned, 
while other communities have identified needed projects but lack the 
funding to make these road expansions and are seeking state and federal 
assistance. 

Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Anticipated Increase in 
Student Enrollments: 

Some school systems in communities surrounding gaining Army 
installations plan to expand their facilities to accommodate the 
anticipated increase in school enrollments, although such planning is 
hampered by evolving Army base growth plans. While the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense estimates that Army actions will lead to the 
transfer of about 50,000 school children into school districts 
surrounding gaining installations, fluctuating Army numbers hamper 
communities' planning. 

For example, Fort Benning officials projected that student enrollment 
would increase by about 10,000 through fiscal year 2011 as compared to 
a November 2006 DOD report that estimates 600. A number of reasons 
accounted for the variances, including differences in the scope (e.g., 
defense personnel versus defense and nondefense personnel) of the 
projected arrivals and assumptions underlying the projections for 
family dependents related to those arriving personnel. At the time of 
our review, these disparities remained unresolved. There are a number 
of installations, in addition to Fort Benning, for which base 
projections differ from those generated by the Army. Forts Benning and 
Riley officials told us that they have been in direct contact with the 
units that will be moving to the bases and consequently believe that 
their own estimates more accurately reflect impending growth than those 
by Army headquarters. As a result, Forts Benning and Riley officials 
are relying on their own estimates and communicating them to local 
officials for use in their school construction planning. 

Financing school construction is a key challenge confronting officials 
in communities surrounding growth bases, and these officials have 
adopted a variety of strategies. For example, Forts Bliss and Riley 
area school systems have passed bonds to expand their schools' 
capacity. The community surrounding Fort Bliss approved bonds totaling 
over $600 million for school construction intended to serve an 
increased student population of about 14,900. In addition, one 
community surrounding Fort Riley passed a $33 million school bond to 
finance a new 1,100-student middle school, a new 400-student elementary 
school, and the expansion of existing elementary schools. Another 
school system near Fort Riley decided to keep a school open that was to 
close. In addition to bonds, some school systems are seeking federal 
assistance. For example, local officials in the community adjacent to 
Fort Benning estimate that they need about $321 million to support 
incoming students and are seeking federal assistance. Moreover, the 
school systems near Forts Benning, Bliss, Carson, Lee, Riley, and Sill 
have formed the Seven Rivers National Coalition and were subsequently 
joined by the school systems near the Aberdeen Proving Ground; Forts 
Bragg, Knox, Leonard Wood, and Meade; and the Redstone Arsenal. The 
coalition has petitioned for construction funding from DOD, the 
Department of Education, and Congress and believes that it needs about 
$2 billion to support incoming students. However, DOD's position has 
been to provide planning assistance through OEA to communities affected 
in prior BRAC rounds but not construction financing. Similarly, the 
Department of Education indicated that no funding is available. 

In addition to construction funds, school districts will also need 
additional operating funds to run the new schools. Congress provided $7 
million in fiscal year 2006 to help operate school systems affected by 
DOD transfers, and DOD distributed the money to 26 school systems in 14 
states. School systems having a 20 percent enrollment of military or 
DOD civilian dependent children[Footnote 15] are eligible for this 
assistance if this population has increased or decreased by 5 percent, 
or by 250 students, and the increase or decrease is the result of DOD 
transfers. For fiscal year 2007, Congress provided $8 million. 

Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Increased Housing 
Demands: 

To accommodate the anticipated demand for housing in communities 
surrounding gaining bases, residential developers and community 
planners are planning and constructing new housing. For example, 
officials from the communities surrounding Fort Riley, a multicounty 
area with fewer than 150,000 people, project that they will need from 
8,000 to 9,000 additional housing units to accommodate the increase in 
personnel and family members relocating to the area. These off-base 
housing units are in addition to the 400 new on-base homes being added 
to the existing base inventory of 3,114. Developers in the communities 
surrounding Fort Riley had also already started construction or had 
construction plans for about 6,000 new units. 

Also, the Department of Agriculture's housing loan program dedicated 
$25 million in fiscal year 2006 for loan assistance to personnel 
relocating to the Fort Riley area. Under this program, approved lenders 
provide qualifying low-and middle-income rural residents with home 
financing options, including no-down-payment loans to create 
homeownership opportunities. In December 2005, the department opened an 
office at Fort Riley to assist these potential homebuyers with off-post 
housing needs. The department also plans to establish a similar 
partnership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and to provide similar 
assistance to potential homebuyers relocating there. 

In contrast to the rural environment at Fort Riley, Fort Bliss is near 
El Paso, Texas, with a metropolitan population of about 750,000. El 
Paso community officials told us that they are not as concerned about 
housing because they believe that their market is large enough to 
absorb the influx of new personnel. At the same time, according to an 
Army official, a recently completed draft housing market analysis for 
Fort Bliss identified an additional on-base housing requirement of 
about 3,370 to be paid for using housing privatization funding if this 
requirement is approved and funding is provided. 

Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Increased Traffic and 
Insufficient Road Capacity: 

Restationing of defense personnel at some gaining bases is likely to 
prompt new transportation infrastructure construction in communities 
surrounding the bases. Some state and local governments had already 
begun planning for or started construction projects at the time of our 
review. For instance, according to community officials, projects 
already started or planned to be started are expected to cost (1) $60 
million in the Fort Riley area, (2) $45 million in the Fort Carson 
area, and (3) $150 million in the Fort Bliss area. Also, Fort Sill 
community representatives said that they have identified road expansion 
projects totaling approximately $25 million, and because of limited 
local funding, they are seeking state and federal financing assistance. 
At the same time, community officials at Forts Lee and Sam Houston told 
us that their respective state departments of transportation are 
examining plans for road expansion projects near these installations. 

Transportation needs and funding will also be a concern in large 
metropolitan areas surrounding gaining installations because of both 
rapid growth being experienced apart from DOD-prompted growth and the 
influx of personnel onto gaining bases. For example, at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, personnel increases are expected to exceed 20,000 and this 
anticipated growth will further burden an already congested northern 
Virginia transportation system. A working group that includes 
representatives from the Army, the Virginia Department of 
Transportation, Fairfax County, and the Federal Highway Administration 
has been established to review the transportation impacts of the Fort 
Belvoir realignment. A preliminary list of transportation projects 
around Fort Belvoir totaling about $663 million has been identified as 
necessary to help accommodate the expected increase in traffic. 
Although representatives from the local, state, and federal governments 
recognize that transportation system improvements are needed, no 
funding sources or commitments had been identified at the time of our 
review for projects totaling approximately $458 million of the total of 
$663 million. To help facilitate some of these specific road 
construction projects surrounding Fort Belvoir, the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 included a 
provision allowing the Army to enter into a special agreement with the 
State of Virginia for certain land conveyance and road construction 
around Fort Belvoir. The Defense Access Road Program is a potential 
source for helping to pay for public highway improvements.[Footnote 16] 
Recent developments could affect proposed transportation projects and 
the timing of the move to Fort Belvoir because, at the time of our 
review, the Army was making a decision whether to obtain land owned by 
the General Services Administration near rail and transit stations in 
the Springfield, Virginia, area where it would move approximately 9,000 
personnel. 

The Office of Economic Adjustment Is Assisting Communities: 

In prior BRAC rounds, OEA, part of the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), has provided 
technical and financial planning assistance but not construction funds 
to communities through its grants. According to an OEA official, in the 
prior four BRAC rounds, OEA assisted over 100 communities. In our 
January 2005 report on the status of the prior BRAC rounds, we reported 
that OEA, the Department of Labor, the Economic Development 
Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration provided nearly $2 billion in assistance 
through fiscal year 2004 to communities and individuals for base reuse 
planning, airport planning, job training, infrastructure improvements, 
and community economic development, and these agencies are slated to 
perform similar roles for the 2005 BRAC round.[Footnote 17] 

DOD sponsored a BRAC conference in May 2006 attended by state, local, 
and federal agencies and BRAC-affected communities to discuss BRAC 
impacts, including growth. The conference provided an opportunity for 
communities to discuss issues with officials from OEA and other federal 
entities that are part of the President's Economic Adjustment 
Committee, which helps communities plan for and prepare for growth. In 
assisting communities with their growth plans, during fiscal year 2006, 
OEA awarded growth-related grants[Footnote 18] totaling approximately 
$3.2 million to seven communities surrounding Army installations, and 
as of April 30, 2007, has awarded 11 fiscal year 2007 Army growth- 
related grants totaling approximately $8.8 million to 10 communities 
surrounding Army installations and to the State of Kansas. Table 5 
provides a listing of these OEA Army growth-related grants by fiscal 
year and amount. 

Table 5: OEA Army Growth-Related Grant Awards for Fiscal Years 2006 and 
2007: 

Growth location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 
FY 2006 grant award: $287,438; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): $1,414,650. 

Growth location: Fort Belvoir, VA; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 1,542,568. 

Growth location: Fort Benning, GA; 
FY 2006 grant award: 486,542; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 0. 

Growth location: Fort Bliss, TX; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 936,500. 

Growth location: Fort Bragg, NC; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 1,049,387. 

Growth location: Fort Carson, CO; 
FY 2006 grant award: 517,830; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 0. 

Growth location: Fort Drum, NY; 
FY 2006 grant award: 737,579; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 0. 

Growth location: Fort Knox, KY; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 565,867. 

Growth location: Fort Lee, VA; 
FY 2006 grant award: 289,379; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 13,950. 

Growth location: Fort Meade, MD; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 1,447,630. 

Growth location: Fort Riley, KS; 
FY 2006 grant award: 763,700; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 36,000. 

Growth location: Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 931,709. 

Growth location: Fort Sill, OK; 
FY 2006 grant award: 109,580; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 635,026. 

Growth location: State of Kansas; 
FY 2006 grant award: 0; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): 180,054. 

Growth location: Total; 
FY 2006 grant award: $3,192,048; 
FY 2007 grant award (as of April 30, 2007): $8,753,341. 

Source: Office of Economic Adjustment, DOD. 

[End of table] 

We are continuing to examine the combined effect of BRAC, overseas 
rebasing, and Army modularity on communities surrounding military 
installations as a result of language in the House Committee on 
Appropriations report accompanying the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act 2007. We expect to provide the results of that work 
in the spring of 2008. 

Conclusions: 

Continuing Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on 
terror and evolving BRAC 2005, overseas rebasing, and force modularity 
plans have resulted in fluctuating and uncertain personnel restationing 
plans. Knowing how many Army personnel and dependents will move to a 
given base and their arrival dates is fundamental to the base's and 
surrounding community's abilities to plan for and provide adequate on- 
and off-base schools, housing, transportation, and other 
infrastructure. However, as of March 2007, several of the Army's 
largest gaining bases and Army headquarters-level offices had yet to 
agree as to the number of arriving and departing personnel because 
officials were unaware of the specific causes of the variances in their 
estimates. For their part, communities surrounding gaining bases 
generally relied on their local base officials for personnel arrival 
and departure numbers, which in effect, can be translated into the 
communities' off-base infrastructure requirements. However, without 
knowing whether the local base or Army headquarters-level officials' 
plans have accurate information about growth plans, these communities 
are not well positioned to plan for and provide adequate schools, 
housing, transportation, and other infrastructure. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To better facilitate infrastructure planning, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) determine 
why there are differences between headquarters and gaining bases with 
respect to the number of arriving and departing personnel and (2) 
ensure that Army headquarters and base officials are collaborating to 
agree on Army personnel movement plans so that base commanders and 
surrounding communities can effectively plan for expected growth. This 
collaboration to reach agreement should continue as expected personnel 
movement actions are revised over time. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 
both of our recommendations. With regard to the first recommendation, 
DOD concurred with our findings but said that the Army had determined 
the cause of differences between the headquarters and gaining bases' 
numbers of arriving and departing personnel. As a result, the Army said 
that in January 2007 it had taken corrective action by establishing the 
Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) as the single, unified source 
of installation planning population data to be used Army-wide. However, 
the information in our report was based on March 2007 ASIP data, which 
continued to show that all of the nine installations we visited were 
using different numbers than headquarters was using. 

With regard to the second recommendation, DOD also concurred with our 
findings but said that the Army had already taken corrective action 
without the need of direction from the Secretary of Defense. The Army 
stated that in May 2007 it issued guidance that allowed installations 
to plan for anticipated unit moves that may not be reflected in the 
ASIP and to discuss these plans with local communities as long as they 
are appropriately qualified as predecisional and subject to change. 
Army officials also stated that in June 2007, they would ensure that 
installations forward all population issues, stationing issues, or both 
to Department of the Army headquarters for resolution. Following 
receipt of DOD's comments on our draft report in late August 2007, we 
contacted several of the bases we visited during our review and found 
that there were still some significant, long-standing problems with the 
variances in the data being used by the installations and headquarters. 
In some cases the magnitude of the differences has been reduced, but 
there are still several cases in which the differences exceed 1,000 
personnel. For example, we were told that Fort Bliss still expects more 
than 1,000 military personnel than are currently projected by 
headquarters. To the Army's credit, most of the officials we spoke with 
at the installation level said the data were improving, with one 
location reporting that its data were very close to that of the 
headquarters. However, officials at six of the seven installations we 
contacted still said that they had serious concerns with the 
headquarters data. 

Because disconnects still exist, we believe that our recommendations 
remain valid and that the Secretary of Defense should act upon both of 
our recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or at [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Addressees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in 
providing for timely infrastructure support at its major gaining bases 
because of the combined effects of implementing the 2005 round of base 
realignment and closures (BRAC), overseas rebasing, and Army force 
modularity actions, we analyzed infrastructure-related planning 
documentation and discussed planning and related funding efforts with 
officials from various Army headquarters-level offices, four regional 
Installation Management Command offices, and nine installations. We 
visited Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Riley, 
Kansas; Fort Meade, Maryland; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Bliss and Fort 
Sam Houston, Texas; and Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee, Virginia, because 
preliminary data indicated large influxes of military and civilian 
personnel through fiscal year 2011 at these nine installations. 

Because Army implementation plans were evolving as we conducted our 
work, we periodically updated the information we collected as the Army 
refined its plans. In examining the plans and identifying challenges 
that could place the Army at risk of not providing the necessary 
infrastructure to accommodate incoming personnel in a timely manner, we 
focused our efforts on key elements of the planning process, including 
planned personnel restationing actions and synchronization of multiple 
actions affecting particular installations, infrastructure requirements 
to include quality of life facilities, and military construction plans 
and expected costs. At the installation level, we collected and 
analyzed data on the estimated number of personnel arrivals and 
departures by fiscal year, along with installation- developed military 
construction requirements. We also analyzed installation-developed 
requirements for quality of life facilities at the nine Army growth 
bases we visited and compared these requirements to Army funding plans 
for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also met with Army Corps of 
Engineers' officials and discussed the challenges they face in 
providing an unprecedented volume of military construction across the 
country at gaining installations within allotted costs and time frames. 
Although we did not validate military construction requirements, the 
Army Audit Agency was validating the requirements at the time of our 
review for selected Army BRAC 2005 military construction projects. We 
also sought views from officials from the installations we visited as 
to the challenges they faced in planning for and funding their 
personnel growth requirements and their ability to fully fund 
continuing base operations and support and maintenance activities as 
the installations expand. At the Army headquarters level, we collected 
personnel restationing movement data and discussed overall 
infrastructure implementation plans for the expected growth 
installations. We further discussed the Army's efforts to fully fund 
necessary infrastructure in the face of recognized overall funding 
challenges across the Army's programs. 

To determine how communities surrounding the Army's gaining bases were 
planning for and funding the necessary infrastructure to support 
incoming personnel and their families, we contacted community leaders 
during our installation visits and discussed their relationships with 
installation officials and steps they were taking to address community 
infrastructure issues as a result of expected increased defense-driven 
personnel growth and non-Department of Defense (DOD) growth in their 
communities. While we focused most of our efforts on such areas as the 
availability of housing, schools, and transportation to accommodate the 
expected growth, we also learned of other areas of concern, including 
the adequacy of utilities. We collected and analyzed available relevant 
community planning documents relating to growth impacts and specific 
strategies and actions for addressing these impacts. Because the 
federal government has a role in providing financial, technical, and 
other assistance to communities affected by defense actions, we 
discussed with community officials to what extent they were seeking 
federal assistance in addressing growth issues. We further discussed 
community growth issues with officials from the Office of Economic 
Adjustment (OEA), an organization within DOD that provides technical 
assistance and financial assistance in the form of grants to eligible 
communities affected by defense actions. We also attended the May 2006 
DOD-sponsored BRAC conference to learn about the ramifications of DOD 
growth on communities and the federal support and assistance available 
to these communities. We further collected and analyzed OEA grant data 
already provided to affected growth communities and discussed in 
general with OEA officials the activities of other federal agencies 
that are included in the President's Economic Adjustment Committee, a 
committee of 22 federal agencies that have varying roles in providing 
assistance to communities adversely affected by defense activities. We 
did not conduct work at those other federal agencies. 

In addition to representatives of the nine domestic Army gaining 
installations we visited and nearby community leaders, we contacted the 
following organizations during our review: 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

- Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), BRAC Office, Arlington, Virginia: 

- Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military 
Community and Family Policy, Arlington, Virginia: 

- OEA, Arlington, Virginia: 

* Army: 

- Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Arlington, 
Virginia: 

- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Arlington, Virginia: 

- Installation Management Command Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia: 

- Installation Management Command, Northeast Region, Hampton, Virginia: 

- Installation Management Command, Northwest Region, Rock Island, 
Illinois: 

- Installation Management Command, Southeast Region, Atlanta, Georgia: 

- Installation Management Command, Southwest Region, San Antonio, 
Texas: 

- Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

- Training and Doctrine Command, Hampton, Virginia: 

- Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Newport News, 
Virginia: 

Our analysis was complicated by the evolving nature of the Army's 
infrastructure implementation plans, which continued to change 
throughout our review. Business plans intended to direct the 
implementation of the BRAC recommendations affecting the gaining bases 
were in draft at the time of our review. Army officials said that the 
information they provided to us and that we present in our report 
represented their current plans at the time of our review and should be 
considered an approximation of their projected restationing and funding 
actions because these plans are subject to change. Consequently, 
civilian planning for providing infrastructure was subject to change 
based on changes in the Army's plans. Although we found some 
discrepancies in the Army's data, we concluded that, overall, they were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our 
review from March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-3000: 

August 28, 2007: 

Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

Mr. Brian Lepore
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore:

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO- 07-1007, `Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase 
Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army 
Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth,' dated July 26, 
2007 (GAO Code 350838). Specific comments are provided at the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Philip W. Grone: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated July 26, 2007 GAO Code 350838/GAO-07-1007: 

"Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 
Personnel Growth" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to determine why there are differences 
between headquarters and gaining bases with respect to the number of 
arriving and departing personnel. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. While the Department of Defense concurs 
with the findings, the Department of the Army has already determined 
the cause and taken corrective action without the need for direction 
from the Secretary of Defense. Differences in population projections 
developed as a result of installations generating their own estimates 
using locally- developed ratios and formulas, lacking specific 
direction from Department of the Army headquarters. In January 2007, 
Department of the Army headquarters recognized this situation and took 
corrective action by establishing the Army Stationing Installation Plan 
(ASIP) as the single, unified source of installation planning 
population data to be used Army-wide. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that Army headquarters and 
base officials are collaborating to agree on Army personnel movement 
plans so that base commanders and surrounding communities can 
effectively plan for expected growth. This collaboration to reach 
agreement should continue as expected personnel movement actions are 
revised over time. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. While the Department of Defense concurs 
with the findings, the Department of the Army has already taken action 
without the need for direction from the Secretary of Defense. In May 
2007, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management on the 
Army headquarters staff issued guidance on installation population 
reporting to enhance the consistency and effectiveness of installation 
planning efforts. The guidance allows installations to plan for 
anticipated unit moves (not yet reflected in the ASIP) and discuss 
these plans with local communities as long as they are appropriately 
qualified as pre-decisional and subject to change. Also, installations 
were given the opportunity to request approval to use a locally-based 
school age population planning ratio to better reflect anticipated 
local conditions in lieu of using the standard DoD-wide ratio. In 
addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management 
established an agreement with the Army Installation Management Command 
in June 2007 to ensure that installations forward all population and/or 
stationing issues to Department of the Army headquarters for 
resolution. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Barry W. Holman, Director 
(retired); James R. Reifsnyder, Assistant Director; Nelsie S. Alcocer; 
Grace A. Coleman; Nancy T. Lively; Richard W. Meeks; David F. Nielson; 
and Roger L. Tomlinson made major contributions to this report. 

Related GAO Products: 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 
Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. 
GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 
2005 Round. GAO-07-1230R. Washington D.C.: September 06, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 
Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 
Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007. 

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the 
Importance of Oversight. GAO-07-672T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 
GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. 

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are 
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture 
Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans 
Continue to Evolve. GAO-06-913R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006. 

[End of section] 

Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain 
Uncertain. GAO-06-548T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. Washington, 
D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future 
Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure 
Overseas. GAO-05-680R. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and 
Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556. Washington, 
D.C.: June 15, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 
Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005. 

[End of section]

Footnotes: 

[1] These 18 installations are those where the expected net personnel 
increase exceeds 2,000 over the period fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 
based on March 2007 data. The 18 installations account for nearly 90 
percent of the expected total net increase of about 154,000 personnel 
across all domestic Army gaining bases. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, 
Title XXX (2001). 

[3] 31 U.S.C. 717. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001). 

[5] This excludes personnel gains resulting from the Army's plans to 
increase its active end strength authorization by 65,000. 

[6] These installations are some of the Army's largest growth bases and 
were selected for our analyses primarily because data were readily 
available for comparison purposes. 

[7] S. Rep. No. 110-77, at 585 (2007), and H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, at 443 
(2005). 

[8] The initial estimate for the BRAC implementation costs increased by 
over 50 percent from $11.6 billion to $17.6 billion. Included in this 
figure is more than $1 billion provided by the Army to the TRICARE 
Management Activity to construct a new hospital at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, and necessary infrastructure at the National Naval Medical 
Center, Maryland, to provide services formerly provided by the Walter 
Reed Army Medical Center, which is slated for closure. 

[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore 
the Importance of Oversight, GAO-07-672T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2007). 

[10] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in 
Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556 
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005). 

[11] These quality of life facilities include only child and youth 
centers, physical fitness centers, religious facilities, and soldier 
and family support centers. 

[12] This is another name for modular building methods where sections, 
or modules, of a building are constructed either on-site or off-site 
and then transported to the building site where the modules are 
assembled to construct a building. 

[13] The types of construction are based on fire combustibility ratings 
with type I being the least combustible. 

[14] The House Committee on Armed Services has directed the Secretary 
of Defense to submit an analysis of these construction cost inflation 
differences by February 1, 2008. H.R. Rep. No. 110-146, at 520 (2007) 
(Conf. Rep.) 

[15] School districts with 20 percent enrollment of military or DOD 
civilian dependent children are eligible to receive DOD supplemental 
impact aid funding that has been provided since 1991. For fiscal years 
2006 and 2007, Congress provided $30 million for DOD supplemental 
impact aid. 

[16] The Defense Access Road Program provides the legal means for DOD 
to pay for public highway improvements to mitigate an unusual impact of 
a defense activity, such as a significant increase in personnel at a 
military base. Military construction funds are specifically budgeted, 
authorized, and appropriated for these projects. 

[17] GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base 
Realignments and Closures, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 
2005). 

[18] None of these grants help underwrite construction. 

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