NASA: Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital Management, but
Future Program Challenges Remain (08-AUG-07, GAO-07-1004).

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
engaged in efforts to replace the Space Shuttle with the next
generation of human space flight systems and implement the
President's space exploration policy. To do this, NASA must
recruit, develop, and retain certain critical skills in its
workforce, guided by its strategic human capital management plan.
GAO was asked to examine the extent to which NASA (1) has aligned
its human capital planning framework with its strategic mission
and programmatic goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and
retaining critically skilled personnel, given future workforce
needs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed NASA's policies,
planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents
and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed
cognizant agency officials. To assess NASA's efforts to recruit,
develop, and retain critically skilled personnel, we analyzed
demographics data, and critical skills information; NASA's
policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; and
implementation of information systems programs, and processes
that support human capital management and planning. We are not
making any recommendations in this report.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-1004						        
    ACCNO:   A74211						        
  TITLE:     NASA: Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital
Management, but Future Program Challenges Remain	 
Facilities							 
     DATE:   08/08/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace research
             Employee retention
             Human capital
             Human capital management
             Human capital planning
             NASA Space Shuttle Program
             Personnel recruiting
             Policy evaluation
             Program evaluation
             Skilled labor
             Space exploration
             Staff utilization
             Strategic planning

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GAO-07-1004



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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

August 2007: 

NASA: 

Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital Management, but Future Program 
Challenges Remain: 

GAO-07-1004: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1004, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is engaged in 
efforts to replace the Space Shuttle with the next generation of human 
space flight systems and implement the Presidentï¿½s space exploration 
policy. To do this, NASA must recruit, develop, and retain certain 
critical skills in its workforce, guided by its strategic human capital 
management plan. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which NASA (1) 
has aligned its human capital planning framework with its strategic 
mission and programmatic goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and 
retaining critically skilled personnel, given future workforce needs. 
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed NASAï¿½s policies, planning, 
and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents and performance 
and accountability reports; and interviewed cognizant agency officials. 
To assess NASAï¿½s efforts to recruit, develop, and retain critically 
skilled personnel, we analyzed demographics data, and critical skills 
information; NASAï¿½s policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and 
hiring; and implementation of information systems programs, and 
processes that support human capital management and planning. We are 
not making any recommendations in this report. 

What GAO Found: 

NASAï¿½s strategic human capital framework is generally aligned with its 
strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. NASAï¿½s leaders 
have set its overall direction and goals and involved its mission 
directorates and centers in implementing human capital strategy and 
providing feedback to headquarters. Recently, NASA has been improving 
its workforce planning information technology matching program 
requirements with human capital resources. Some centers have been 
critical of the systemsï¿½ performance, but others find these tools 
useful. 

NASA attracts and retains critical personnel by using tools such as 
recruiting and retention bonuses. Recently, NASA has asked Congress for 
additional human capital flexibilities to help manage its workforce. 
The centers also have their own programs that address their critical 
skills shortfalls by training and developing employees. NASA recognizes 
that critical skills now present in the civil service and contractor 
Space Shuttle workforce are needed to complete present and future 
mission objectives, but also understands that additional capability 
will also be needed in certain areas. Given this, NASA is looking ahead 
and considering how best to mitigate any potential loss of skills and 
knowledge that could take place in the period between the Space 
Shuttleï¿½s retirement in 2010 and the resumption of human space flight 
in 2015. 

Figure: NASA needs to manage its workforce to maintain core technical 
capabilities as it works through retirement of the Space Shuttle to 
enable it to achieve its mission: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1004]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain, 202-
512-4841, or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter1: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

NASA's Strategic Human Capital Framework Is Generally Aligned with Its 
Strategic Mission, Outcomes, and Programmatic Goals but Some 
Improvements in Workforce Planning Can be Made: 

NASA Has Generally Been Effective in Recruiting, Developing, and 
Retaining Science and Engineering Employees, but Future Uncertainties 
Could Adversely Affect Its Overall Workforce Capacity: 

Concluding Observations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Use of Human Capital Authorities by NASA: 

Appendix III: Comments from NASA: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Development Programs Used by NASA: 

Table 2: NASA Science and Engineering New Hires by Type of Appointment 
and Hiring Level: 

Table 3: NASA's Use of Human Capital Flexibilities: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NASA Centers, Workforce, and Projects: 

Figure 2: NASA Strategic Decision Making: 

Figure 3: The Average Age of the Science and Engineering Workforce in 
NASA and the Federal Government is Increasing: 

Figure 4: GAO's Five Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce 
Planning: 

Figure 5: NASA's Strategic Workforce Planning Governance Structure: 

Abbreviations: 

Co-op: Cooperative Education Program: 
CPDF: Central Personnel Data File: 
FIRST: Foundations of Influence, Relationships, Success, and Teamwork: 
GAO: Government Accountability Office: 
NAPA: National Academy of Public Administration: 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
NRC: National Research Council: 
OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 
Vision: A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. 
Space Exploration: 
WICN: Workforce Information Cubes for NASA: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

August 8, 2007: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the 
midst of a complex transition effort due to the impending retirement of 
the Space Shuttle in 2010 and its replacement by the next generation of 
human space flight systems such as the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, 
the Ares family of launch vehicles, and other exploration vehicles. An 
effort of this scope has not been attempted since the end of the Apollo 
program, which was designed to land humans on the Moon and bring them 
safely back to Earth, and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more 
than three decades ago. In 2004, the President established a new 
exploration policy--A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's 
Vision for U.S. Space Exploration (Vision for Space Exploration). The 
cost of implementing it over the coming decades will require hundreds 
of billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple 
administrations and Congresses. A major component of this transition 
involves NASA's workforce, which comprises about 18,000 civil servants 
at various centers across the country. To meet its future needs, NASA 
is seeking to maintain certain critical skills in space exploration, 
scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. The agency needs to 
take action to align its workforce to the new mission and goals in a 
timely fashion to help the safe operation of the shuttle through 
retirement and a smooth transition to exploration activities. We 
reported that strategic human capital management must be the 
centerpiece of any serious change in NASA's management strategy. 

NASA's workforce challenges are not unique within the federal 
government. Federal agencies, as a whole, face new and increasingly 
complex challenges in the 21st century. These agencies must transform 
their organizations to meet the challenges of long-term fiscal 
constraints, changing demographics, evolving governance models, and 
other factors. To do so, they must engage in strategic workforce 
planning, including systematic assessments of current and future human 
capital needs and the development of long-term strategies to fill any 
gaps. We recently reported that human capital management is a 
governmentwide high-risk area because federal agencies typically lack a 
strategic approach to human capital management that integrates human 
capital efforts with their missions and program goals. 

Given the importance of NASA's ability to sufficiently recruit, 
develop, and retain the staff it needs to execute the agency's 
missions, you requested that we examine the extent to which NASA (1) 
has aligned its human capital planning framework with its strategic 
mission and programmatic goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and 
retaining critical science and engineering personnel needed to address 
future workforce requirements. To assess the alignment of NASA's human 
capital framework with its strategic mission and programmatic goals, we 
analyzed a range of policies, planning, and implementation documents; 
reviewed budget documents and performance and accountability reports; 
and interviewed cognizant officials in NASA's Office of Human Capital 
Management, mission directorates, and various field centers. To assess 
NASA's efforts to recruit, develop, and retain critical science and 
engineering personnel, we applied our five strategic workforce planning 
principles (see figure 4). In doing so, we analyzed NASA's (1) 
demographics data; (2) critical skills information; (3) policies, 
procedures, and guidance for recruiting and hiring; (4) implementation 
of information systems, programs, and processes that support human 
capital management and planning. We also assessed the internal and 
external challenges that NASA faces in achieving its workforce needs, 
by conducting interviews with key NASA officials in headquarters and 
various centers, and researching recent publications on workforce 
trends affecting NASA. We conducted our work from July 2006 through 
June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

NASA's strategic human capital framework is generally aligned with its 
strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. NASA's leaders and 
human capital managers have taken the lead in setting the agency's 
overall direction and goals and involving the mission directorates and 
centers in developing human capital strategy documents. NASA's centers 
have a clear understanding of how they contribute to the attainment of 
overall agency goals and provide feedback to headquarters on proposed 
strategic plans and programmatic guidance. In recent years, NASA has 
been enhancing its workforce planning information systems that can be 
used to match programmatic requirements with human capital resources. 
Many of these tools have not yet been fully implemented, and thus their 
effectiveness cannot be determined at this time. However, some centers 
have raised concerns that these systems do not properly identify skills 
and competencies needed to meet programmatic goals. 

Currently, NASA is able to attract and retain critical science and 
engineering personnel needed for mission accomplishment by employing a 
wide variety of human capital tools such as recruiting and retention 
bonuses. The agency recently requested Congress to amend the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and the NASA Flexibility 
Act of 2004 to authorize NASA to use additional human capital 
flexibilities so that the workforce might be reduced without having a 
reduction in force. The centers also have their own programs that 
address their critical skills shortfalls by training and developing 
employees. NASA recognizes that the critical skills currently embedded 
in the civil service and contractor Space Shuttle workforce are needed 
to safely and successfully complete its mission objectives; some of 
those skills must then be transferred to the Constellation 
Program.[Footnote 1] The current workforce also possesses much of the 
talent that NASA will need to meet the challenges presented by the 
Vision for Space Exploration. NASA is mapping the available skills of 
the Space Shuttle workforce with the skills it will need for future 
work so that it can better plan and implement workforce reassignments. 
Furthermore, the gap between the scheduled retirement of the Space 
Shuttle in 2010 and the resumption of human space flight currently 
scheduled for 2015 will pose a unique set of challenges, and the agency 
is developing plans to mitigate the potential loss of critical skills 
and institutional knowledge. While senior managers at some centers told 
us that they would like to better prepare for the future, they are 
currently more focused on implementing human capital programs to 
address their immediate needs. We are not making any recommendations in 
this report. 

Background: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, established 
NASA as the civilian agency that exercises control over U.S. 
aeronautical and space activities and seeks and encourages the fullest 
commercial use of space.[Footnote 2] NASA's mission is to pioneer the 
future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics 
research. Its activities span a broad range of complex and technical 
endeavors: from investigating and evaluating the composition and 
resources of Mars, and working with its international partners to 
complete and operate the International Space Station, to providing 
satellite and aircraft observations of Earth for scientific and weather 
forecasting; to developing new technologies designed to improve air 
flight safety. 

NASA Organization and Staff: 

NASA is organized under four mission directorates--Aeronautics 
Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations--each of 
which covers a major area of the agency's research and development 
efforts: 

* Aeronautics Research conducts research in aeronautical disciplines 
and develops capabilities, tools, and technologies that improve 
aircraft and air transportation system. 

* Exploration Systems develops systems and supports research and 
technology development to enable sustained and affordable human and 
robotic space exploration. 

* Science conducts the scientific exploration of the Earth, the Sun, 
the rest of the solar system, and the universe. 

* Space Operations directs space flight operations, space launches, and 
space communications and manages the operation of integrated systems in 
low Earth orbit and beyond, including the International Space Station. 

NASA is composed of NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., nine centers 
located around the country, and the contractor-operated Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (as shown in figure 1). In addition, NASA partners with 
academia, the private sector, state and local governments, other 
federal agencies, and a number of international organizations. 

Figure 1: NASA Centers, Workforce, and Projects: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: NASA data. Copyright Corel Corp, all rights reserved (map). 

Note: The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is a federally funded research and 
development facility staffed and managed by the California Institute 
Technology for NASA. 

[End of figure] 

NASA considers itself a mission-driven agency, and its strategic 
management approach requires all of its organizations to use a program/ 
project management method to manage requirements, schedule, and 
budget.[Footnote 3] NASA's management functions are centralized at its 
headquarters. NASA manages through its governance structure, which 
consists of three agency-level management councils (see figure 2.) 

* Strategic Management Council, which determines NASA strategic 
direction at the vision and mission level, and assesses the agency's 
progress; 

* Program Management Council, guides program and project performance, 
defining successful achievement of NASA strategic goals and objectives; 
and: 

* Operations Management Council, which reviews and approves 
institutional plans. 

Figure 2: NASA Strategic Decision Making: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

The primary roles of the mission directorates include development of 
strategy and program assessment. While the mission directorates provide 
direction and oversight to programs, the centers execute programs and 
projects, including developing approaches for workforce planning that 
meet agency and center goals. For example, centers develop human 
capital plans to meet workforce requirements, such as recruiting 
engineers and developing programs redirecting employees from 
nonenduring work to new work. 

Workforce Trends in the Federal Government and NASA: 

NASA's efforts are taking place in the context of broader federal 
workforce trends. Today and in the near term, the federal government is 
facing a retirement wave and with it the loss of leadership and 
institutional knowledge at all levels. In 2006, The Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) reported that approximately 60 percent of the 
government's 1.6 million white-collar employees and 90 percent of about 
6,000 federal executives will be eligible for retirement over the next 
10 years. Agencies not only face a fiercely competitive market for 
talent but hiring is also affected by uncompetitive salaries in some 
critical occupations and lengthy hiring processes. 

NASA projects that by fiscal year 2012 the total number of personnel 
needed to meet its strategic goals will decrease from 18,100 to 17,000. 
Approximately 59 percent of NASA's overall workforce is comprised of 
scientists and engineers, some 14 percent of whom were eligible for 
retirement as of the end of fiscal year 2006. According to NASA 
officials, employees eligible for retirement at NASA tend to stay on 
longer than is typical in the federal workforce, however. On average, 
NASA's scientific and engineering employees retire 6.2 years after 
eligibility, versus 4.6 years for the overall NASA workforce. 

In fact, the average age of NASA's science and engineering employee is 
steadily increasing (See fig. 3 for information on the average age of 
NASA science and engineering employee and the average of federal 
governmentwide age). At this time, within the science and engineering 
workforce, the 55 and over population outnumbers the under-30 
population nearly 3 to 1. In time, this will be a concern, as the 
process of retiring the Space Shuttle will last several years and 
affect thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and 
contractor employees that support the program. We have reported that 
the safety of the Space Shuttle is largely contingent on NASA's ability 
to sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support Space 
Shuttle operations through retirement. While the agency is taking 
advantage of the flexibilities outlined in the NASA Flexibility Act of 
2004[Footnote 4] to attract highly qualified candidates, continued 
buyouts and the threat of a reduction in force could create a feeling 
of instability among its workforce. 

Figure 3: The Average Age of the Science and Engineering Workforce in 
NASA and the Federal Government is Increasing: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of data from OPM's central personnel data file. 

[End of figure] 

NASA Human Capital Management: 

In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited progress toward 
developing a detailed long-term strategy to retain a critically skilled 
workforce for shuttle operations, and recommended that the agency 
implement an approach for identifying the space shuttle program's 
future workforce needs based upon various possible future scenarios. 
NASA concurred with our recommendation--acknowledging that shuttle 
workforce management and critical skills retention will be a major 
challenge for the agency--and has taken action on this issue. Since we 
made our recommendation, for example, NASA has developed an agencywide 
strategic human capital plan and workforce analysis tools to assist it 
in identifying critical skills needs, along with a human capital plan 
with a focus on sustaining and transitioning the space shuttle 
workforce. 

Since our report, two recently completed studies contain 
recommendations on how the agency should address the space shuttle 
workforce transition. In March 2006, the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and 
NASA asked the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to 
assist the agency in planning for the Space Shuttle's retirement and 
transition to future exploration activities. In February 2007, a NAPA 
panel recommended that the Space Shuttle Program adopt a RAND model for 
projecting a core workforce because of its emphasis on "long-term 
scheduling projections, quantification of core competencies and 
proficiencies, and analysis of overlapping mission needs."[Footnote 5] 
Under the RAND model, an organization maintains a core capability for 
any competency that will be needed in the future. According to NAPA, 
this model is useful where a given expertise is not immediately 
required, but is likely to be needed in the future--in this case, for 
the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. 

In 2005, NASA requested assistance from the National Research Council 
(NRC) to assess the current and future supply of a qualified U.S. 
aerospace workforce, and identify realistic and actionable solutions to 
meet identified needs. In April 2007, the NRC reported that the average 
age of NASA's workers has marched steadily upward over the past decade 
and a half, and the agency now has a relatively low number of younger 
workers to assume future leadership roles as older workers 
retire.[Footnote 6] It noted that if NASA does nothing to achieve a 
better age distribution across its workforce, it will suffer gaps in 
technical leadership and experience, especially if the development 
dates for key Vision for Space Exploration components slip and highly 
skilled workers with experience in the Space Shuttle Program retire. 
The report concluded that if NASA is to avoid a long-term shortage of 
the required in-house technical expertise in human space flight systems 
and other areas, it will have to adopt a strategy to address potential 
long-term shortfalls. The report found that NASA does have programs and 
methods currently available for meeting its workforce needs. 

Strategic Human Capital Management and Workforce Planning: 

NASA's issues with human capital strategy development are also taking 
place in the context of broader federal trends. Beginning in 2001, we 
have designated strategic human capital management as a high-risk area 
in our biannual high-risk series and performance and accountability 
series. We reported that serious human capital shortfalls are 
threatening the ability of many federal agencies to economically, 
efficiently, and effectively perform their missions.[Footnote 7] 
Federal agencies are faced with a workforce that is becoming more 
retirement-eligible and finding gaps in talent because of changes in 
the knowledge, skills, and competencies in occupations needed to 
accomplish their missions. 

Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that 
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use 
strategic management approaches to prepare their workforces to meet 
present and future mission requirements. For example, preparing a 
strategic human capital plan encourages agency managers and 
stakeholders to systematically consider what is to be done, how it will 
be done, and how to gauge progress and results. Federal agencies have 
used varying frameworks for developing and presenting their strategic 
human capital plans.[Footnote 8] 

Strategic workforce planning, an integral part of human capital 
management and the strategic workforce plan, involves systematic 
assessments of current and future human capital needs and the 
development of long-term strategies to fill the gaps between an 
agency's current and future workforce requirements. Agency approaches 
to such planning can vary with each agency's particular needs and 
mission. However, our previous work suggests that irrespective of the 
context in which workforce planning is done, such a process should 
incorporate five key principles: (1) involve management and employees, 
(2) analyze workforce gaps, (3) employ workforce strategies to fill the 
gaps, (4) build the capabilities needed to support workforce 
strategies, and (5) evaluate and revise strategies. Figure 4 provides a 
fuller description of each of the five principles. 

Figure 4: GAO's Five Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce 
Planning: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Taken together, these five principles can help federal agencies 
successfully implement strategic workforce planning strategies. 
Planning, developing, and implementing workforce planning strategies, 
such as those that involve reshaping the current workforce, can cause 
significant changes in how an agency implements its policies and 
programs. It is essential that agencies determine the skills and 
competencies that are critical to successfully achieving their missions 
and goals. This is especially important as changes in national 
security, technology, budget constraints, and other factors change the 
environment within which federal agencies operate. 

NASA's Strategic Human Capital Framework Is Generally Aligned with Its 
Strategic Mission, Outcomes, and Programmatic Goals but Some 
Improvements in Workforce Planning Can be Made: 

NASA's strategic human capital planning framework is generally aligned 
with its strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. We found 
that many of NASA's efforts related to workforce planning were 
consistent with effective strategic workforce planning, such as 
developing effective communication strategies. Other efforts, such as 
monitoring and evaluating progress toward achieving programmatic goals, 
are still being developed, but NASA's efforts to identify critical 
skills needed in the future could be improved. 

NASA's Strategies Aligned with Mission: 

NASA's leaders have generally aligned its human capital management 
strategies with its agency mission, goals, and organizational 
objectives, and integrated those strategies into its strategic plans, 
performance and accountability plans, and budget requests. NASA has 
developed a strategic human capital plan and workforce strategy plan 
with input from its mission directorates, centers, and union 
representatives. NASA's centers have also aligned their human capital 
programs to support the objectives of the agency. These linkages allow 
NASA to assess and understand the extent to which its workforce 
contributes to achieving the overarching mission.[Footnote 9] Other 
examples of some key policies and plans that guide NASA's human capital 
efforts include the following: 

* development of the Strategic Management and Governance Handbook and 
policy directives that set forth principles by which NASA manages 
itself and identifies the specific requirements that drive NASA's 
strategic planning process; 

* development of a workforce strategy in April 2006 that identified 
three underlying workforce principles: building and sustaining 10 
healthy centers,[Footnote 10] maximizing the use of NASA's current 
human capital capabilities, and evolving to a more flexible workforce 
that permits NASA's human capital efforts to help carry out the Vision 
for Space Exploration and science and aeronautics research; and: 

* the creation of NASA's Workforce Integrated Product Team--which 
consists of human capital office division directors and selected human 
resource directors--for day-to-day implementation and tracking of 
progress and results of human capital initiatives. 

NASA's centers have also aligned their programs with agencywide mission 
and goals, and their human capital approaches support the 
organizational performance objectives of the agency. For example, the 
Langley Research developed career path development plans, and proposes 
defining career development plans for individual employees based upon 
planned organizational staffing that is driven by current and 
anticipated work, budget, and center requirements. Similarly, Glenn 
Research Center has developed a strategic implementation plan that 
includes internal milestones used to assess the center's progress in 
meeting agencywide goals. 

Developing Effective Communications Strategies: 

NASA's headquarters' leaders and human capital office have involved the 
mission directorates and centers in establishing a communication 
strategy that intended to create shared expectations for the outcome of 
the workforce planning process. NASA's Workforce Integrated Product 
Team, for example, solicited input on its white paper on NASA's mission 
support implementation plan from mission directorates, mission support 
offices and centers. They also created a document that captured the 
disposition of comments and included this feedback and the status of 
the recommendation. The Johnson Space Center hosted a conference for 
human resources directors to discuss the redesigning of agency 
leadership training, and also worked with Marshall Space Flight Center 
and Glenn Research Center to share training and development program 
approaches. 

All of NASA's centers have regular communication with headquarters 
human capital office on policy and procedures relating to the workforce 
planning process through telephone conferences, meetings, e-mails 
exchange, and video conferences. NASA's centers also communicate with 
each other to leverage knowledge on key policies and programs. The 
centers conduct their own communication strategy directly to employees 
through committees, working groups, town hall meetings, e-mail 
messages, and center newsletters. The Langley Research Center, for 
example, sends regular e-mail updates on human capital policy issues to 
employees, as well as a human capital newsletter. The Glenn Research 
Center uses the Office of Human Resources and Workforce Planning 
Personnel Newsletter, the Human Capital Information Environment 
Steering Committee Review, and Senior Management Meetings to convey 
relevant information on workforce planning and human capital policies. 

Efforts to Monitor and Evaluate Progress toward Achieving Programmatic 
Goals Are Still Being Developed: 

In 2007, NASA implemented a new strategic workforce planning governance 
structure to strengthen the agency's human capital strategic planning 
capability (see fig. 5). This governance structure has representation 
from NASA's human resources community, mission directorates, other 
mission support offices, and the NASA centers. The governance process 
will be used to align the agency's resources in a manner that ensures 
the effective utilization of the workforce and skills needed are 
available to accomplish the agency's mission and will focus on: 
increasing the level of integration and collaboration across workforce 
planning functions; improving the quality of information used to make 
decisions; balancing short and longer-term planning needs. 

There are three main components of the Governance Structure: the Agency 
Governance Group; a Workforce Planning Technical Team; and other issue- 
specific technical teams as needed. The Agency Governance Group is 
responsible for surfacing high-risk issues and recommendations to 
senior management, evaluating the results of planning activities and 
redirecting resources and efforts to areas of highest priority, and 
overseeing progress of the operational groups and development of 
workforce planning capabilities. The Workforce Planning Technical Team 
is a standing, on-going group that implements workforce planning 
guidance and policies; helps develop and implement Center workforce 
planning capabilities; and assists in collecting data in support of 
workforce activities undertaken by the team. It is the hub of workforce 
planning information collection, distribution, and reporting across 
NASA. The ad hoc technical teams are formed to deal with specific 
issues. Their purpose is limited to the issue they are tasked with 
solving, with a defined scope and timeline. 

Figure 5: NASA's Strategic Workforce Planning Governance Structure: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, NASA's human capital office has been reengineering work 
processes and developing tools for workforce planning purposes. For 
example, according to NASA officials, the Workforce Integrated 
Management System ties together the agency's budgeting and planning 
process. The Workforce Integrated Management System is the designated 
agency workforce planning tool for future workforce requirements, which 
has various modules such as the Workforce Planning System, the 
Competency Management System, and others, provides a single repository 
of workforce and competency planning data for use in NASA's workforce 
planning decisions and analysis. The Competency Management System is 
designed to capture the competencies and skills of NASA's individual 
employees so that the agency can respond to current and projected 
workforce requirements, assess center readiness for new activities, 
locate expertise, and better align projected work with demand. 

NASA is also in the process of developing the Human Capital Information 
Environment, which will integrate NASA's human capital information 
tools into one Web-enabled portal. This will allow NASA's management to 
go to one source for information on full-time equivalent vacancies, 
contractor data, and workforce forecasting tools. 

While we have not evaluated these workforce planning tools, center and 
union officials gave NASA's Competency Management System mixed reviews. 
Some told us that the system does not correctly capture the skill sets 
of the workforce, while others found it a useful planning tool. 

The Identification of Critical Skills Could Be Improved: 

Our previous work has found that human capital strategies can work as 
intended when periodic measurements and evaluation are conducted that 
obtain data for identifying shortfalls and revising future workforce 
planning efforts. A 2007 National Research Council report noted that 
the agency's gap analysis was conducted by NASA headquarters and is not 
specific enough to determine the number of positions needed in the 
future at centers where most of the hiring will occur.[Footnote 11] 

NASA conducted a survey to gauge employee sentiments as the agency 
faces the impending retirement of the shuttle and the onset of 
Constellation activities.[Footnote 12] While NASA officials told us 
that there was an overall "goodwill" towards the agency and the Space 
Shuttle Program specifically, there were some differences in response 
by centers and some neutral responses. For example, the survey found 
that 72 percent of Marshall Space Flight Center respondents indicated 
they will likely stay through the retirement of the Space Shuttle 
Program because the nature of Marshall's work is easily transitioned to 
the Constellation program, but 63 percent of these respondents 
indicated that they will likely start looking for jobs outside the 
Space Shuttle Program (or retire) starting in 2010 or later. The 
Kennedy Space Center response was similar to Marshall's, with 69 
percent of Kennedy's respondents indicating they would likely stay 
through the retirement of the Space Shuttle and approximately 60 
percent indicating that they would start seeking jobs outside of the 
program or retire starting in 2010. The Johnson Space Center 
respondents were slightly different, with 59 percent likely to stay 
through retirement and 53 percent of respondents likely to seek job 
elsewhere starting in 2010 or later. At the Stennis Space Center, 71 
percent of respondents stated they would stay through the retirement 
and approximately 71 percent indicated that they would leave Stennis 
starting in 2010 or later. Finally, NASA told us that a number of the 
neutral responses in the survey indicate that some level of the 
workforce is adopting a "wait and see position." These neutral 
responses make up 13 percent of Kennedy, 19 percent of Johnson, 14 
percent of Marshall, and 18 percent of Stennis respondents. 

The survey is one step in evaluating how some of the workforce is 
reacting to ongoing changes. NASA has established metrics to measure or 
evaluate its progress toward achieving programmatic goals that has been 
made by its human capital efforts, in particular the impact its 
programs are having on addressing anticipated problems from the shift 
from the shuttle to the Constellation program. We have not evaluated 
the new metrics. 

NASA Has Generally Been Effective in Recruiting, Developing, and 
Retaining Science and Engineering Employees, but Future Uncertainties 
Could Adversely Affect Its Overall Workforce Capacity: 

NASA uses a variety of approaches to meet its long-term needs for 
recruiting, retraining, and sustaining its workforce. In the past 5 
years, NASA hired on average about 330 scientists and engineers per 
year (ranging from 199 to 571), the majority of those hired were 
engineers, and most of the new hires were for midlevel positions. 
Recruiting is accomplished using a multifaceted approach at 
universities and colleges and the private sector, that some centers 
have found quite successful. The agency has also been granted a number 
of human capital flexibilities that allow it to offer incentives to 
attract and retain scientist and engineers. However, the agency as a 
whole faces challenges in recruiting and retaining highly experienced 
senior-level engineers in certain specialties. NASA's principal 
workforce challenge will be faced in the transition to the next 
generation of human space flight systems. 

NASA Recruitment Efforts Use a Combination of Techniques: 

NASA uses a multifaceted approach to recruiting critically skilled 
workers, including targeted recruitment activities, educational 
outreach programs, improved compensation and benefits packages, 
professional development programs, and streamlined hiring authorities. 
Despite the array of initiatives used across field centers, they used 
generally similar approaches for recruiting and retaining critically 
skilled workers. 

Many of NASA's external hires have been entry-level positions through 
the Cooperative Education Program, which provides centers with the 
opportunity to develop and train future employees; discover firsthand 
the abilities of potential employees; ensure they are able to meet 
professional, technical, and administrative requirements; and achieve a 
quality workforce. Another source of candidates for NASA are its 
education programs which help inspire students to pursue careers in 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. These programs help 
NASA to develop a pipeline of highly trained scientists and engineers 
in aeronautics and space-related disciplines. 

NASA believes its reputation also helps centers recruit by attracting a 
pool of student applicants for the Cooperative Education Program (co- 
op). Centers also administer and tailor their own programs for 
students, such as the Johnson Space Center's efforts with the graduate 
student research program, fellowships, and the Minority University 
Research Education Program help create a pipeline of students. These 
programs assits the center to cultivate ties with local universities 
and outreach to others with engineering programs that meet the Johnson 
Center's critical workforce needs. NASA centers use other approaches to 
stimulated interest in working for the agency. For example, Ames' 
Education Associates program allows the center to access students and 
faculty at universities while giving them the opportunity for hands-on 
learning opportunities within mission-relevant NASA programs and 
projects. Thus, the program gives Ames' scientists, engineers and 
managers another way to have direct access to short-term, high quality 
human capital and the opportunity to tryout potential employees. The 
Dryden Flight Research Center sponsors fellowships for students in 
engineering and science to continue their graduate studies. Similarly, 
centers attend university job fairs and administer student loan 
repayment programs as a tool to retain their new hires (see table 1 for 
additional examples). While NASA centers have developed numerous talent 
development programs, NASA does not generally coordinate these programs 
across the agency. The agency is missing opportunities to leverage its 
resources. 

Table 1: Examples of Development Programs Used by NASA: 

Center: All; 
Program: Foundations of Influence, Relationships, Success, and Teamwork 
(FIRST); 
Description: This is a 1 year part-time program that targets junior 
employees for leadership development through residential training 
modules, group projects, on-the-job training, and mentoring. 

Center: Glenn; 
Program: Space Mission Excellence Program; 
Description: The center--working in coordination with NASA's Academy of 
Program/ Project and Engineering Leadership[A] and Cal Tech --created 
the center's Space Mission Excellence training program to develop 
systems engineering skills. 

Center: Johnson; 
Program: Program/Project Management Development; 
Description: This program is expected to create a well-prepared 
candidate pool for future program and senior-level project mangers. 
Development is focused on building leadership and project management 
competencies through work assignments, mentoring, and coaching. 
Participants include employees from other Centers. 

Center: Langley; 
Program: Langley Aerospace Research Summer Scholars Program; 
Description: A summer program which attracts students that are 
interested in needed or forecasted needed skill areas at the Center 
according to a NASA official. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[A] NASA's Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership is 
operated by NASA's Office of the Chief Engineer to provide support to 
NASA centers by providing leadership, advice, direction, and support 
for the development and learning to NASA organizations. 

[End of table] 

In addition to recruiting, NASA uses a variety of approaches to retain 
and sustain its workforce. These tools include nurturing NASA's 
reputation as one of the best places in the federal government to work, 
pursuing the strategy of building and engaging all 10 NASA centers, 
establishing an agencywide career development program to foster 
lifelong learning, and using a number of targeted incentives (e.g., pay 
and relocation incentives, pay enhancements for candidates in critical 
positions, and Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments). 

While some centers told us that they are competitive in recruiting 
students to entry-level positions, the agency faces challenges in 
recruiting and retaining senior-level employees such as experienced 
aerospace engineers. For example, NASA is unable to compete with the 
private sector in recruiting senior management because of its lower 
salaries and smaller compensation packages, in spite of flexibilities 
granted to NASA by Congress through the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004, 
NRC reported. Industry senior-level compensation packages, including 
recruitment bonuses, far exceed federal government pay scales, which 
include stock and retirement packages for senior executives in industry 
that can range into the tens of millions of dollars.[Footnote 13] (See 
app. II for additional information on use of the act.) However, NRC did 
find that NASA's pay scale is competitive with industry's at the entry 
and middle levels. 

NASA centers have developed several ways to respond to this challenge. 
According to Langley Research Center officials, for example, enhanced 
annual leave under the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 is used to recruit 
senior executives from outside of the federal government, members of 
the Senior Executive Service, and senior-level employees so that they 
can accrue more vacation time. The Johnson Center uses retention 
bonuses to recruit and retain personnel in hard-to-fill positions that 
can have undesirable hours, such as mission operations controller 
positions and physicians. For example, it developed the Gemini flight 
controller initiative, which has improved retention of controllers. 
Gemini flight controllers are certified in three systems and work 
nights and weekends to maintain the International Space Station. The 
Center had difficulty recruiting and maintaining employees in this 
area, so it piloted a 2-year program that offered additional training 
and retention bonuses with 1-year service agreements. To help the 
Johnson Center retain its medical officers, a Physician's Comparability 
Allowance is used to make the center more competitive with the private 
medical community. The Center also uses retention bonuses, but 
sparingly; these are generally related to specific knowledge retention 
or transition needs. 

Despite the many challenges that NASA faces today, the agency continues 
to rank as one top places to work in federal government. Additionally, 
NASA officials told us that the NASA's brand name continues to attract 
new applicants from colleges and universities throughout the country. 
Furthermore, NASA officials said that its employees are motivated by 
the agency's mission. In some cases, this results in employees 
continuing to work after they become eligible for retirement, and some 
former employees volunteer their time and expertise after retiring from 
the agency. 

NASA Increased Use of Term Appointments: 

NASA uses term appointments for most of the agency's new hires of 
scientists and engineers (see table 2). Term appointments are offers of 
nonpermanent employment with NASA for a limited amount of time, which 
is extendable. A NASA term employee, if he or she meets eligibility 
criteria, may be converted to a career or career-conditional 
appointment without going through the competitive examination process 
normally used to make such appointments. According to NASA officials, 
job candidates can be offered term appointments up to 6 years, but each 
center varies the length of appointment. For example, the Langley 
Research Center offers appointments to all new hires of 2 to 4 years; 
according to Johnson Space Center officials, it offers appointments to 
all new term hires for 6 years, but usually converts them to permanent 
after 2 years; depending on a continuing need for the position and 
proven performance of the employee on the job; Glenn Space Center 
converts cooperative program students to 6 year appointments. NASA has 
increased the used of term appointments for recent science and 
engineering hires. The use of such appointments for all new hires at 
NASA has increased from 6 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in 2006, and 
for entry-level science and engineering positions, from less than 2 
percent in 2002 to 42 percent in 2006. Center officials stated that 
using term appointments generally does not deter applicants. 

Table 2: NASA Science and Engineering New Hires by Type of Appointment 
and Hiring Level: 

Percent. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Entry level: Term: 0.4; 
Entry level: Permanent: 22.6; 
Entry level: Temporary: 0.4; 
Entry level: Intern-Fellow: 0.0; 
Midlevel: Term: 1.3; 
Midlevel: Permanent: 51.3; 
Midlevel: Temporary: 0.0; 
Senior level: Term: 4.3; 
Senior level: Permanent: 19.7; 
Senior level: Temporary: 0.0. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Entry level: Term: 1.5; 
Entry level: Permanent: 20.6; 
Entry level: Temporary: 0.5; 
Entry level: Intern-Fellow: 0.0; 
Midlevel: Term: 7.0; 
Midlevel: Permanent: 47.2; 
Midlevel: Temporary: 0.0; 
Senior level: Term: 5.0; 
Senior level: Permanent: 18.1; 
Senior level: Temporary: 0.0. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Entry level: Term: 4.9; 
Entry level: Permanent: 8.1; 
Entry level: Temporary: 12.1; 
Entry level: Intern-Fellow: 2.8; 
Midlevel: Term: 27.1; 
Midlevel: Permanent: 30.3; 
Midlevel: Temporary: 2.3; 
Senior level: Term: 5.1; 
Senior level: Permanent: 7.0; 
Senior level: Temporary: 0.4. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Entry level: Term: 1.2; 
Entry level: Permanent: 0.9; 
Entry level: Temporary: 0.9; 
Entry level: Intern-Fellow: 17.3; 
Midlevel: Term: 46.9; 
Midlevel: Permanent: 11.4; 
Midlevel: Temporary: 5.2; 
Senior level: Term: 5.6; 
Senior level: Permanent: 7.4; 
Senior level: Temporary: 3.1. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Entry level: Term: 10.0; 
Entry level: Permanent: 1.2; 
Entry level: Temporary: 1.5; 
Entry level: Intern-Fellow: 11.2; 
Midlevel: Term: 54.3; 
Midlevel: Permanent: 8.6; 
Midlevel: Temporary: 3.8; 
Senior level: Term: 2.7; 
Senior level: Permanent: 5.9; 
Senior level: Temporary: 0.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: Entry level refers to GS-01 through GS-11, midlevel refers to GS-
12 through GS-14, and senior level GS-15 or higher. 

[End of table] 

NASA Has Development Programs in Place to Enhance Existing Capacity: 

NASA's centers also invest in professional development and mentoring 
programs to help meet specific performance needs and help centers 
create cohesive cultures for new employees. For example, according to 
Glenn Space Center officials, it uses the Advancing Careers and 
Employee Success program as a formal mentoring effort designed to match 
interested staff with more seasoned personnel who serve as mentors and 
engage in activities such as designing developmental assignments and 
networking opportunities. The centers also use additional programs that 
include opportunities for formal and on-the-job training, individual 
development plans, and rotational assignments for students to gain 
different work experiences during their co-op, periodic consultations 
with senior managers, periodic formal assessments, and mentoring 
relationships with other employees. For example, the Johnson Center's 
co-op students have rotational assignments, formal mentors that provide 
guidance, and performance feedback during the course of their co-op 
assignments. 

NASA Is Taking Efforts to Develop Long-Term Solutions: 

NASA recognizes the challenges it faces in its transition into the 
future from the present, and has submitted to Congress a Human Capital 
Plan for Mission Execution, Transition, and Retirement of the Space 
Shuttle program. This focuses on retaining critical workforce skills 
needed for safe and successful mission execution and the smooth 
transition of Shuttle workforce skills to other agency programs. 
Currently NASA is mapping the shuttle workforce to Constellation 
Program work in a document that will reflect the planned migration of 
the employees, phased to correspond to key milestones in both programs. 
According to NASA, the first mapping is scheduled to be completed in 
September 2007 and will be revised as the shuttle flight manifest 
schedules are updated and Constellation Program needs are further 
defined. The agency estimates that many of the employees currently 
working on the Space Shuttle Program will be working on other agency 
programs such as the International Space Station or Constellation 
Systems Program. 

NASA decided to maintain program management and systems engineering 
competencies within the civil service workforce to enable it to have 
the capabilities it needs to develop programs and projects for its 
missions. However, NASA does expect to use prime contractors in the 
development of major systems such as launchers, upper stages, and crew 
vehicles. It sees its role as the manager of the interfaces between 
major systems. In order to accomplish this, NASA will develop strategic 
workforce plans to align its workforce with the current and planned 
work of the agency. Specifically, centers will need to determine 
whether the composition of their workforce has the needed competencies 
to accomplish its tasks. Centers will need to reshape their workforce 
to meet changes in workforce demand as projects progress or are 
completed. 

Human Capital Challenges in Retiring the Space Shuttle Program and 
Transitioning to Constellation Activities: 

The gap between the scheduled retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 
and the resumption of human space flight currently scheduled for 2015 
will pose a unique set of challenges. NASA must realign where necessary 
and plan for a workforce that will not be quite as large after the 
retirement of the Shuttle Space Program. Technology funding must be 
redirected to major development activities, programs canceled, 
aeronautics program funding reduced, the science program restructured 
and planned funding reduced. All these redirections, restructurings, 
and cancellations will contribute to NASA's "uncovered capacity" 
problem.[Footnote 14] The agency plans to use its civil service 
workforce to sustain its core technical capabilities. This is a long- 
standing workforce challenge for NASA, particularly since it must 
balance the workload across NASA centers to maximize the effectiveness 
of the overall organization. 

Recognizing that its workforce is its most critical asset and it must 
continue to have the scientific and technical expertise necessary to be 
a leader in aeronautics, earth and space science, and technology, NASA 
has tried, over the last several years, to address its workforce 
problems by using employee buyouts to rebalance its workforce and 
establishing hiring guidelines that emphasize filling vacancies from 
within the agency. The agency recently requested Congress to amend the 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and the NASA 
Flexibility Act of 2004 to authorize NASA to use additional human 
capital flexibilities so that the workforce might be reduced without 
having a reduction in force. 

NASA is also attempting to ensure that its field centers can accomplish 
their missions through a focus on required core capabilities, to be 
accomplished by directing all research, technology development, and 
programs and projects, to the maximum extent possible, to the centers. 
While improving workforce planning to better prepare for challenges in 
the future is definitely an agencywide priority, some senior center 
officials told us that they are currently focused on implementing 
immediate human capital programs. To the agency's credit, some centers 
have created knowledge management programs. For example, the Johnson 
Space Center recently appointed a Chief Knowledge Officer who is 
developing efforts to capture the experiences and knowledge of senior 
employees in engineering, management, and administration who may retire 
in the near future. In addition, the Johnson Space Center has an active 
Oral History Program that captures the experience of those individuals 
who first developed the technologies used in previous space flight 
programs, including life sciences and astromaterials. Participants 
include managers, engineers, technicians, doctors, astronauts, and 
other employees of NASA and aerospace contractors who occupied key 
roles during the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle 
programs. The Glenn Research Center's Knowledge Management Working 
Group, has piloted programs that record interviews with their senior 
managers to retain some of their work experiences, and the center uses 
the Advancing Careers and Employee Success mentoring program and 
shadowing of senior engineers by recently hired engineers to transfer 
knowledge. 

Concluding Observations: 

NASA has placed considerable emphasis on human capital management and 
addressing challenges that the agency has been facing in recruiting, 
retaining, and developing critical personnel. At the headquarters 
level, this has involved strategic planning to align agency goals with 
actions taken by the centers such as the introduction of new 
information systems to enhance workforce planning. At the center level, 
this has involved the application of new ways to attract and develop 
staff. Taken together, these actions represent credible progress in 
enhancing the workforce and preparing for the future. However, there 
are challenges ahead for NASA that will test its ability to sustain its 
progress--notably the retirement of the shuttle program and the 
expansion of exploration activities. The magnitude of these changes and 
their implication for future workforce needs will require NASA to 
accurately measure its progress, identify gaps or obstacles that need 
to be addressed, and sustain a high degree of coordination with its 
centers and work is just getting under way. The extent to which NASA 
can anticipate these challenges and lay the groundwork for addressing 
them will greatly affect its ability to negotiate them in the future. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided draft copies of this report to NASA for review and comment. 
NASA provided written comments and they are included in appendix III. 
Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which have been addressed 
in the report, as appropriate. 

We will send copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and 
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the alignment of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's (NASA) human capital framework with its strategic 
mission and programmatic goals, we analyzed a broad range of NASA's 
policy, planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget 
documents and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed 
officials in NASA's Office of Human Capital Management, Office of the 
Chief Financial Officer, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, 
Office of the Chief Engineer, Office of Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity, Office of Education, the Aeronautics Research Mission 
Directorate, and the Space Operations Mission Directorate and attended 
NASA Advisory Council meetings. We did not evaluate how well the 
various NASA plans, programs, systems and teams (such as the Available 
for New Work Technical Team) actually functioned. We visited 3 of 
NASA's 9 centers--the Glenn Research Center, the Johnson Space Center, 
and the Langley Research Center. We collected data from the following 
centers--the Ames Research Center, the Dryden Flight Research Center, 
the Goddard Space Flight Center, the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall 
Space Flight Center, and the Stennis Space Center. Finally, we 
conducted interviews at the National Research Council. 

To assess NASA's efforts to effectively recruit, develop, and retain 
critically skilled science and engineering staff we applied our five 
strategic workforce planning principles.[Footnote 15] In doing so, we 
analyzed NASA's (1) demographics data; (2) critical skills information; 
(3) NASA's policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; 
(4) implementation of information systems, programs, and processes that 
support human capital management and planning. Specifically, we 
interviewed NASA Center managers about the supply and demand for 
critically skilled workers, examined NASA's efforts to develop a 
"pipeline" for recruiting these personnel and reviewed its application 
of new flexibilities and authorities under the NASA Flexibility Act of 
2004. Also, we interviewed NASA officials responsible for workforce and 
strategic human capital planning to determine how NASA plans to address 
future challenges in managing its science and engineering workforce. We 
also analyzed and compared NASA's science and engineering workforce and 
strategic human capital planning efforts with GAO's principles of 
effective human capital management. In addition, we interviewed NASA 
officials responsible for workforce and strategic human capital 
planning to determine how NASA plans to address future challenges in 
managing its science and engineering workforce. We also analyzed and 
compared NASA's science and engineering workforce and strategic human 
capital planning efforts with principles of effective human capital 
management. In addition to obtaining NASA officials' views and concerns 
regarding future human capital challenges, we analyzed data from the 
Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File 
(CPDF), which is its database of federal civilian employees, and we 
reviewed data from NASA's Workforce Information Cubes for NASA (WICN) 
which is a workforce reporting and monitoring system. Specifically, to 
assess the potential for retirements in the next few years in NASA's 
science and engineering workforce, we analyzed CPDF data on NASA 
employees--as of September 30, 2006. We limited our analysis to science 
and engineering occupational categories that comprise NASA's science 
and engineering workforce. We analyzed CPDF separations and demographic 
data (on the ages and years of service) and NASA's WICN data for 
scientists and engineers in order to identify the extent to which 
NASA's experienced science and engineering workforce is eligible for 
and thus has the potential for retiring in the near future. We did not 
independently verify the CPDF data on NASA's science and engineering 
occupation series employees for the year we reviewed. However, we 
previously reported that data from the CPDF for key variables used in 
this study--occupation, agency/subagency, birth date, and service 
computation date--were 99 percent accurate.[Footnote 16] Moreover, we 
compared the CPDF results for NASA employees to data from NASA's WICN 
system. CPDF data is limited to federal Executive Branch civilian 
employees, and excludes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
intelligence agencies, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Office of 
the Vice President, Postal Rate Commission, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
U.S. Postal Service, White House Office, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Public Health Service's Commissioned Officer Corps, Non- 
appropriated fund employees and foreign nationals overseas, and the 
Judicial Branch. Legislative Branch CPDF data is limited to the 
Government Printing Office, U.S. Tax Court, and selected commissions. 
To assess the reliability of the data we received from NASA's WICN 
system we (1) reviewed system documentation, (2) interviewed 
knowledgeable agency officials, (3) performed manual data testing for 
missing data, outliers, and obvious errors, (4) compared the data to 
CPDF results, and (5) reviewed the SQL code that produced the data. We 
determined the data we used from the CPDF and NASA's WICN system to be 
sufficiently reliable for our purpose. We leveraged previous GAO work 
on the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program and the subsequent 
transition of its workforce to the Constellation program.[Footnote 17] 

We conducted our work from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Use of Human Capital Authorities by NASA: 

The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 provides new human capital authorities 
to NASA to enable the agency to address its workforce 
challenges.[Footnote 18] The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 requires that 
the agency submit a report to Congress for 6 fiscal years, beginning in 
fiscal year 2004, summarizing NASA's use of these authorities during 
each preceding fiscal year. Below is a summary of NASA's use of these 
flexibilities and those under another authority during fiscal years 
2004 through 2006. 

Table 3: NASA's Use of Human Capital Flexibilities: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: NASA Data. 

[A] Pub. L. No. 108-411 (2004). 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from NASA: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Headquarters: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

July 19, 2007: 

Reply to Attn of: Office of Human Capital Management: 

Christina T. Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review your draft report entitled, 
"NASA: Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital Management but Future 
Program Challenges Remain" (GAO-07-1004). This draft report contains no 
recommendations to NASA, and we have provided technical corrections, 
via separate correspondence, that GAO has agreed to make. 

If you have any questions, or require additional information, please 
contact Steve Golis on (202) 358-1211 or Timothy Sullivan on (202) 358- 
2222. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Toni Dawsey: 
Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant 
Director; Christopher Kunitz; Masha P. Pastuhov-Purdie; Jose A. Ramos; 
Sylvia Schatz; Rebecca Shea; Robert Swierczek; and Gregory H. Wilmoth 
made key contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Constellation will develop, demonstrate, and deploy systems that 
will enable sustained human exploration. These include Orion, which 
will carry and support crews traveling to low Earth orbit and beyond, 
the Ares launch vehicles to transport both crew and cargo elements, as 
well as ground and mission operations support infrastructure. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 85-568 ï¿½ 102 (b) and (c) (1958) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ï¿½2451(b) and (c). The Department of Defense retains the 
activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of 
weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United 
States. Id. At ï¿½102(b) and NASA NPD 1000.0, at 2. 

[3] A mission is defined as a core function or job of the agency and is 
not limited to flight. 

[4] Pub. L No. 108-201 (2001) (codified at 5 U.S.C. ï¿½ 9801, et seq.) 

[5] NAPA, NASA: Balancing a Multisector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy 
Organization, (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). NAPA also recommended 
that NASA adopt scenario planning into its agencywide workforce 
planning processes and use the results to inform decisionmaking. 

[6] NRC, Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs 
for the National Vision for Space Exploration, The National Academies 
Press, (Washington, D.C.: 2007). 

[7] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2001); GAO, Performance and Accountability Series--Major 
Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, 
GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001); GAO, Major Management 
Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); and GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 
GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

[8] For example, in a March 2002 exposure draft, we introduced a 
strategic human capital model designed to help agency leaders 
effectively use their people and determine how well they integrate 
human capital considerations into daily decision making and planning 
for the program results they seek to achieve. This model is built 
around four cornerstones: (1) leadership; (2) strategic human capital 
planning; (3) acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and (4) 
results-oriented organizational cultures. 

[9] GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to 
Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 9, 2005). 

[10] NASA's key attributes of a healthy center are: core, clear, 
stable, and enduring roles and responsibilities; clear program/project 
management leadership roles; major in-house durable spaceflight 
responsibility; skilled and flexible blended workforce with sufficient 
depth and breadth; technically competent and value-centered leadership; 
capable and effectively utilized infrastructure; and strong stakeholder 
support. 

[11] NRC, 29. 

[12] The survey was sent to over 2900 civil service employees at the 
Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight 
Center, and Stennis Space Center who had charged at least 40 hours to 
Space Shuttle Program from October 2005 to May 2006 and may have 
included employees other than scientists and engineers. 

[13] NRC, 37. 

[14] The term "uncovered capacity" means that there is a quantity of 
available employee work time that is in excess of the quantity that 
programs require and for which they have agreed to pay. 

[15] GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic 
Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). Also 
see GAO, Securities and Exchange Commission: Some Progress Made on 
Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-06-86 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 
10, 2006). 

[16] See GAO, OPM's Central Personnel Data File: Data Appear 
Sufficiently Reliable to Meet Most Customer Needs, GAO/GGD-98-199 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1998). 

[17] GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to 
Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 9, 2005). Also see GAO, NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition 
from the Space Shuttle to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight 
Systems, GAO-07-595T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007). 

[18] Pub. L. No. 108-201 (2004). 

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