Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor	 
Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical		 
Information, but U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk	 
Contractors May Pose (22-SEP-06, GAO-06-999R).			 
                                                                 
The U.S. military has long relied on contractors to provide a	 
variety of goods and services to U.S. forces around the world,	 
including those located in Iraq and Afghanistan. These services  
range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up and
operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter
security, interpreting foreign languages, preparing meals and	 
doing laundry for the troops. The U.S. Department of Defense	 
(DOD) uses contractors for a variety of reasons, including a lack
of skilled and qualified military personnel and the need to	 
conserve scarce skills to ensure that they will be available for 
future deployments. DOD estimates that it has more than 50,000	 
contractor employees in support of operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Depending on the types of services being offered, 	 
contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, or third country	 
nationals, and contractors are often encouraged to hire host	 
country nationals to help rebuild local economies and get local  
nationals back to work. While contractor employees can provide	 
significant benefits to U.S. forces, contractor employees can	 
also pose a risk to U.S. troops. For example, the terrorists who 
attacked the U.S.S. Cole were suspected to be contractor	 
employees associated with its refueling operations. This attack  
led military officials to realize the risk that contractors could
pose to the safety and security of U.S. installations and	 
military personnel. The risk is increased when U.S. forces are	 
involved in a military operation against an insurgency, as they  
are in Iraq. Background screenings of contractor employees can	 
provide some insight into the likelihood that the employee may	 
cause harm to U.S. troops and may deter some criminals and	 
terrorists from working at U.S. installations. Although DOD is	 
not required to screen contractor employees, in some situations, 
such as in Iraq, DOD is using biometrics to screen contractor	 
employees for past criminal activity and security threats. GAO	 
was asked to review the process used to screen contractor	 
employees who support U.S. deployed forces. Specifically, we were
asked to determine the ability of DOD and contractors that	 
support deployed forces to conduct comprehensive background	 
screenings of employees and the steps installation commanders	 
have taken to protect their troops.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-999R					        
    ACCNO:   A61326						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor 
Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical		 
Information, but U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk	 
Contractors May Pose						 
     DATE:   09/22/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Background investigations				 
	     Contractor personnel				 
	     Criminal background checks 			 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Department of Defense contractors			 
	     Employment of foreign nationals			 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Service contracts					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Afghanistan					 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-06-999R

     

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          * Order by Mail or Phone

September 22, 2006

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Subject: Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor
Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but
U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk Contractors May Pose.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Force protection has long been a challenge for Department of Defense (DOD)
in the Middle East and elsewhere. Since the 1996 Khobar Tower attack in
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. servicemembers, DOD and the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) have issued policies and procedures to help
commanders, who are responsible for the safety and security of their
installations, reduce the risk of terrorist attack and mitigate those
risks that cannot be eliminated. However, DOD recognizes that all risks
cannot be eliminated and terrorist attacks will still occur. To help
installation commanders address force protection challenges, DOD, CENTCOM,
and others, such as the Multi-national Forces- Iraq (MNF-I), provide
guidance and assistance to installation commanders. For example DOD and
CENTCOM have developed force protection standards that apply to
installations in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, including Iraq and
Afghanistan. These standards describe specific actions commanders should
take to help prevent terrorist attacks. MNF-I has issued guidance to its
subordinate commands directing among other things, the development of
anti-terrorism plans, which include specific physical security measures.
In addition, the Joint Staff periodically visits installations in Iraq and
elsewhere to complete antiterrorism vulnerability assessments. The expert
teams assess an installation for potential areas of attack and suggest
actions the installation commander can take to reduce risks. Commanders
are also provided with threat assessments which are updated as necessary,
and routinely receive intelligence information, which could affect the
security of their installations and forces.

The U.S. military has long relied on contractors to provide a variety of
goods and services to U.S. forces around the world, including those
located in Iraq and Afghanistan. These services range from maintaining
advanced weapon systems and setting up and operating communications
networks to providing gate and perimeter security, interpreting foreign
languages, preparing meals and doing laundry for the troops. DOD uses
contractors for a variety of reasons, including a lack of skilled and
qualified military personnel and the need to conserve scarce skills to
ensure that they will be available for future deployments. DOD estimates
that it has more than 50,000 contractor employees in support of operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 Depending on the types of services being
provided contractor employees may be U.S. citizens or third country
nationals from countries such as the United Kingdom, the Philippines,
Bangladesh, India, or Pakistan.2 In addition, contractors are often
encouraged to hire host country nationals from, for example, Iraq to help
rebuild local economies and get local nationals back to work.

While contractor employees can provide significant benefits to U.S.
forces, contractor employees can also pose a risk to U.S. troops. For
example, the terrorists who attacked the U.S.S. Cole were suspected to be
contractor employees associated with its refueling operations. This attack
led military officials to realize the risk that contractors could pose to
the safety and security of U.S. installations and military personnel. The
risk is increased when U.S. forces are involved in a military operation
against an insurgency, as they are in Iraq. Military officials we spoke
with from three units who served in Iraq told us that they believed they
observed contractor employees pacing off military facilities in an attempt
to provide information on the location of critical facilities to hostile
forces operating outside of installations. Force protection officials from
another unit told us that they found a contractor employee with sensitive
information that could aid hostile forces. Additionally, contractor
employees have been responsible for additional illegal activities,
including acts of theft and black market activities.

Background screenings of contractor employees can provide some insight
into the likelihood that the employee may cause harm to U.S. troops and
may deter some criminals and terrorists from working at U.S.
installations. Although DOD is not required to screen contractor
employees, in some situations, such as in Iraq, DOD is using biometrics to
screen contractor employees for past criminal activity and security
threats.3 Contractors that screen their employees generally do not use
biometrics and depend on public records and commercial databases to screen
potential employees.

You asked that we review the process used to screen contractor employees
who support U.S. deployed forces. Our objective was to determine the
ability of DOD and contractors that support deployed forces to conduct
comprehensive background screenings of employees and the steps
installation commanders have taken to protect their troops. In our June
13, 2006, testimony before your committee on actions needed to improve the
use of private security contractors in Iraq;4 we provided you with
preliminary information about the difficulties contractors and DOD
encounter when conducting background screenings of contractor employees.
This correspondence updates our preliminary observations and responds to
your request concerning the process used to screen contractor employees.

1Neither DOD nor the services know the exact number of contractors working
in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are issuing a report in fall 2006 that will
discuss this and other contractor-on- the- battlefield issues in more
detail. See also GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital
Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).

2A third country national is a person working for a contractor who is
neither a citizen of the United States nor the host country. Data from our
survey of contractors who provide support to deployed forces revealed that
contractors hired employees from 18 different nations, including the
United Kingdom, Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Bangladesh, India, the
Philippines, and Nepal.

3 A biometric measures a person's unique physical characteristics (such as
fingerprints, hand geometry, facial patterns, or iris and retinal scans)
or behavioral characteristics (voice patterns, written signatures, or
keyboard typing techniques) and can be used to recognize the identity, or
verify the claimed identify, of an individual See GAO, ELECTRONIC
GOVERNMENT: Agencies Face Challenges in Implementing New Federal Employee
Identification Standard GAO-06-178 ( Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006)

To determine the ability of DOD and contractors that support deployed
forces to conduct comprehensive background screenings of employees and the
steps commanders have taken to protect their troops, we reviewed DOD,
CENTCOM,

MNF-I, and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), polices including
acquisition, force protection, base access, and biometric policies. We
reviewed these policies to determine what, if any, background screening
guidance and requirements were included in those documents as well as to
determine who is responsible for installation safety and security.

We traveled to Iraq to meet with officials from MNF-I and, MNC-I as well
as the garrison commander of a large logistics base to discuss issues
related to background screenings, DOD's biometric screening program, and
actions installation commanders take to reduce the risk posed by
contractors. We also traveled to various locations within the United
States where we met with representatives of 11 units most of whom had
recently returned from Iraq and were available to meet with us. We met
with them to gain an understanding of the military's role in conducting
background screenings, their ability to conduct screenings on third
country and host country nationals, the challenges they faced, the
limitations of background screenings, and steps they took to mitigate the
risks contractors pose. Additionally, we met with representatives of
CENTCOM, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and
representatives of DOD's acquisition community.

We also interviewed officials from three background screening firms, one
of whom served in an official capacity at a national background screening
association, to obtain an understanding of the methods used by screeners
and the challenges background screeners encounter when trying to screen
foreign nationals. Our work focused on contractors who provide support to
deployed forces in CENTCOM's area of operation and on those contractor
employees who did not require security clearances.5 6 Enclosure I contains
more detail on our scope and methodology. We conducted our review from
August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

4 GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Provides, GAO-06-865T, (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006).

5 DOD grants a security clearance to individuals needing access to
classified information after conducting a personnel security
investigation. DOD has established standards for these types of
investigations which include examining a person's loyalty to the United
States, financial situation, and criminal history. We have ongoing work
looking at the process used by the government to conduct and grant
security clearances for contractors, and as a result, we limited our work
for this report to those employees not requiring a government issued
clearance.

6 Contractors who deploy with the forces are employees of system support
and external support contractors and associated subcontractors who are
specifically authorized in their contracts to deploy and provide support
to U.S. military forces in contingency operations. A contingency operation
is a military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of
Defense as a contingency operation or becomes one as a matter of law.

Results in Brief

DOD and contractors have difficulty conducting comprehensive background
screening for U.S. and foreign nationals because of a lack of resources
and inaccurate, missing, or inaccessible data. Because force protection
officers, intelligence officers, and other officers have concerns about
the comprehensiveness of background screenings and the risks contractors
pose, installation commanders take steps to protect their troops. The
information available to contractors that screen employees who live in the
Unites States is limited to public information from county, state, or
federal courts; state databases; or commercial databases, such as those
that collect information on incarcerations. None of these types of
searches guarantees a comprehensive background screening because these
sources may not include all criminal data, among other things. Screening
host nation and third country national employees can be difficult because
of inaccurate or unavailable records in some countries. Also, officials
from the background screening firms we spoke with told us that some
foreign laws can restrict access to criminal records. Moreover, DOD's
biometric screening programs are not as effective as they could be because
the databases used to screen contractor employees include only limited
international data, and some systems do not make all data accessible.
Recognizing the limitations of data, military officials we interviewed who
were responsible for security at installations in Iraq and elsewhere told
us that they take steps to mitigate the risks contractors, particularly
non-U.S. contractors, pose. For example, officials from most of the units
we spoke with told us that contractor employees are routinely searched as
they enter and leave the installation, while the majority of the units we
spoke with told us that they interviewed some contractor employees before
granting them access to the base.

DOD and the Department of Justice reviewed a draft of this report and
neither agency disagreed with the contents of the report. Both agencies
provided technical comments which we have incorporated into the report as
appropriate.

Background

DOD guidance does not require that contracts contain clauses requiring
contractors to conduct screenings of their employees' backgrounds However,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD -12), which was issued
in August 2004, and its implementing guidance, requires that the
government develop standard forms of identification for all persons who
need regular access to a federal facility, including U.S. military
installations located overseas. Implementing guidance requires employees
and contractors seeking access to federal facilities to undergo a National
Agency check with written Inquiries (NACI) type background screening. 7 In
January 2006, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended to
require that all contracts (including DOD contracts) contain a clause
mandating compliance with HSPD-12.8 In February 2006, we issued a report
on issues related to implementing HSPD-12, which noted that doing a NACI
on foreign nationals may be difficult because foreign nationals generally
cannot have their identities verified through the standard NACI process.9
In order to conduct a NACI, an individual must have lived in the United
States long enough to have a traceable history which may not be the case
for foreign nationals.

7A NACI consists of searches of the Office of Personnel Management
Security/Suitability Investigations Index, the Defense Clearance and
Investigations Index, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification
Division's name and fingerprint files, and other files or indexes when
necessary. It also includes written inquiries and searches of records
covering specific areas of an individual's background during the past 5
years (inquiries sent to current and past employers, schools attended,
references, and local law enforcement authorities).

Some DOD contracts contain employee screening requirements; however, there
are no DOD-wide standards or procedures for conducting these screenings
when a contract requires background screenings. Furthermore, contracts do
not provide guidance regarding the processes to be used or the depth of
the investigations to be conducted, leaving the contractor to determine
how to conduct the background screening. In addition, some contractors
conduct background screenings as a result of company policy.10 When
background screenings are conducted, contractors generally use firms that
specialize in conducting background screening.

Background Screenings of Contractor Employees May Not Be Comprehensive,
but Military Officials Take Steps to Reduce the Risk.

Military commanders and other officers are aware that DOD and contractors
have difficulties conducting comprehensive criminal background screenings
and take steps to reduce the risk contractors may pose to U.S. forces and
installations. When performing background screenings of contractor
employees who live in the United States background screening firms use
records, such as court records, which are available to the general public,
or databases maintained by commercial or state entities. Using these
resources does not ensure a comprehensive background screening for reasons
such as incomplete data. Contractors may find it difficult to complete
background screenings of their Iraqi and third country national employees
because of a lack of reliable information. Another factor that can
contribute to difficulties is foreign privacy laws that make some criminal
information inaccessible, according to screening firm officials. Moreover,
DOD's program to biometrically screen all Iraqis and most third country
national contractor employees who seek access to U.S. installations is not
as effective as it could be for a number of reasons, including the limited
number of international and foreign databases available for screening.
However, military officials we spoke with recognize the risk contractors
pose to U.S. forces in part because of the numerous difficulties in
screening employees, particularly those who do not live in the United
States and have taken steps, such as requiring escorts for some contractor
employees, to reduce the risk.

8Contracts awarded prior to October 27, 2005, must be amended to include
the new FAR clause by October 2007.

9GAO-06-178

10Our survey of contractors that support deployed forces revealed that 3
firms that conducted background screenings did so because it was required
by the contract while 21 firms conducted background screenings on their
employees to satisfy internal company policies.

The Backgrounds and Identities of Contractor Employees May Be Unknown
Because Important Data May Be Missing

Accurate information is not always available or accessible when
contractors try to conduct criminal background investigations of U.S.
nationals; third country nationals; and host country nationals, such as
Iraqis. When screening firms conduct background investigations of those
living in the United States, they generally use publicly available court
records from the county, state, or federal level or search state criminal
information repositories or commercial databases, such as those that
collect information on incarcerations. However, none of these actions
guarantees a comprehensive background check. For example, screening
companies may not review federal court records if not directed to do so by
the client. Moreover, background screening firms generally only check the
records of the court that maintains the preponderance of criminal data and
may miss some records maintained by specialized courts, such as domestic
or family law courts. Furthermore, state repositories of information may
not include all criminal data. For example, one official from a background
screening firm explained that only some of the 88 counties in Ohio report
crimes to the state repository. Similarly, the state of Illinois reported
that in 2003 only 59 percent of the computerized criminal history records
they audited had complete information. In addition, commercial databases
may not provide a complete background investigation because the databases
may not contain the most recent criminal data; certain criminal offenses
may not be reported; and commercial databases do not have standards on how
its data should be collected and validated.

Screening third country and host country nationals presents additional
challenges according to background screeners to whom we have spoken.
Officials from international background screening firms cited challenges
in verifying criminal background information on foreign nationals for
reasons such as the following.

           o  Some contractors must rely on the applicant to provide all
           prior addresses. Since some countries, such as India, have no
           national criminal database and maintain criminal data at the local
           level, persons doing the background screenings may miss crimes
           that were committed in locations within the country if the
           applicant did not reveal all previous addresses.
           o  Some countries lack criminal records. Officials from one firm
           we spoke with told us that they have encountered problems
           screening Iraqi nationals because the Iraqi police lack criminal
           records or criminal information.
           o  Criminal records may be unreliable. Some countries experience
           high levels of corruption. According to screening firm
           representatives we interviewed. Records could be destroyed,
           changed, or not acknowledged.
           o  Some countries lack national identification numbers. Without a
           national identification number the screener may not know if the
           person being screened was the person who committed the crimes
           cited in the court or police records.
           o  Privacy laws limit access to data. According to officials from
           background screening firms, some countries do not permit criminal
           background searches of their citizens or limit the type of
           information that can be released to a third party. In other
           countries, criminal information cannot be given to third parties
           and is only released to the applicant who can then determine
           whether to release the information. According to screening company
           officials, there are often issues related to the authenticity of
           documents provided by applicants.

Information regarding those who pose a national security risk typically is
not accessible to background screeners. For example, both the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol) gather information on terrorists and others who
pose a national security risk, but this information is not available to
commercial background screening firms. There are some online resources
available but they may not provide reliable information. For example, some
of the firms we spoke with told us they check the U.S. Treasury's Office
of Foreign Asset Control's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons list, which consists of individuals designated as terrorists,
narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, this type of search
is limited because the primary identifier is an individual's name and
aliases, thus making it difficult to know if the person being screened is
the same person cited on the list.

As GAO reported in July 2005,11 screening for human rights violators is
problematic, and others we have spoken with agree that screening
individuals for human rights abuses or convictions is very difficult.
First, there is no unclassified U.S. government or international database
of persons accused or convicted of human rights abuses. Second, crimes
that might be considered human rights violations, such as homicides, are
categorized by their designated criminal offense code. Third, those
accused of human rights violations are difficult to track because
individuals accused of such crimes can simply change their identities and
their connection to human rights abuses would be lost.

The Effectiveness of DOD's Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Limited Because
of Missing Data

DOD conducts biometric screening of most non-U.S. contractor employees
needing access to installations in Iraq; however, the value of the
screening process is limited because the databases used to screen
applicants have little international biometric data. In March 2005,
shortly after a dining facility bombing at a U.S. installation in Iraq
killed 14 U.S. soldiers and wounded at least 50, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense issued a policy requiring the biometric screening of most non
-U.S. personnel seeking access to U.S. installations in Iraq. The goal of
this policy is to improve force protection for U.S. and coalition forces
in Iraq and provide positive identification of local and third country
nationals accessing U.S. facilities. In July 2005 the Deputy Secretary of
Defense issued an additional policy which requires that those seeking
access to U.S. bases and installations in Iraq be fingerprinted,
photographed, have their irises scanned, and be enrolled in one of two
biometric systems DOD uses to gather the required biometric data. The two
systems used by DOD are the Biometric Identification Systems for Access
(BISA), a system specifically designed to facilitate base access, and the
Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), which was originally used in Iraq for
purposes related to counterintelligence and detainee management and was
later adapted for use as a base access control system.

11 GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning
Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces; GAO-05-793
(Washington D.C.: July 29, 2005).

Biometric information from BISA and BAT is sent to the DOD's Biometric
Fusion Center in West Virginia where it is merged with other biometric
data collected in Iraq as well as other DOD biometric data to form the
Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS). The Biometric Fusion
Center screens the applicant's data against the ABIS system as well as the
FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)
database. The IAFIS database includes the fingerprint records of more than
51 million persons who have been arrested in the United States as well as
information submitted by other agencies such as the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of State, and Interpol  .12

While DOD's biometric screening process has successfully identified
several persons seeking access to bases in Iraq who have criminal records
in the United States, the lack of international biometric data limits its
usefulness. According to an official from the FBI's Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, the IAFIS database includes criminal
fingerprint data from only a limited number of foreign countries because
some countries are reluctant to share criminal history information and
others do not have fingerprint repositories or do not collect fingerprints
in a manner compatible with the FBI's system. In addition, although the
IAFIS database includes fingerprint records submitted by Interpol,
Interpol does not maintain a repository of all criminal offenses committed
in the member countries. Instead, Interpol's criminal database is composed
of wanted notices as well as some limited criminal histories. This
information is submitted by the member countries, and is only retained for
5 years.

System Limitations Impact the Effectiveness of DOD's Biometric Screening

BISA and BAT both collect biometric data from a number of sources in Iraq,
including contractor employees working at installations in Iraq; however,
because of system shortcomings, installation commanders, who are
responsible for making base access decisions in Iraq, may not have all the
information necessary to make an informed decision when deciding who will
have access to a U.S. installation.13 As we noted earlier, biometric data
from both BISA and BAT is sent to the Biometric Fusion Center where they
are merged with other data to form the ABIS database. While data from BISA
enters the ABIS database immediately, it takes, on average, 71 days for
BAT biometric data to be merged into the ABIS database. As a result, any
derogatory information entered into BAT in the weeks prior to a person
applying for a BISA identification card might not be brought to the
attention of the installation commander until after the applicant had been
given access to the base. However, an official we spoke with in Iraq told
us that eventually the installation commander receives this information
and can revoke the employee's base access if necessary. Nevertheless, the
employee may have been able to collect sensitive information or place the
installation at risk during the interim.

12States voluntarily provide fingerprint records to the FBI for inclusion
in the IAFIS database. According to FBI officials, not all persons
arrested and convicted of crimes in the United States are included in the
IAFIS database.

13The MNF-I base access policy states that installation commanders have
the responsibility to make all base access decisions and makes the
commanders responsible for adjudicating derogatory information found on
individuals seeking base access.

Another limitation of BAT is its inability to easily determine those who
pose a threat to U.S. forces from those who do not. BAT was used in Iraq
as a detainee management system and was later adapted as a base access
control system to improve force protection. Iraqis and others suspected of
being insurgents are enrolled in BAT. In addition, Iraqis and many third
country national contractor employees have also been enrolled in BAT. To
distinguish detainees from contractor employees, BAT contains a text field
that provides a description of why an individual was enrolled into the
system. However, an official responsible for BAT told us that the text
field is not a required field and data may not always be entered in the
field. Officials we spoke with who have served in Iraq explained that the
inability to determine why an individual was enrolled in BAT was
frustrating because they could not identify those who had been enrolled as
detainees from those who had been enrolled because they are contractor
employees. Moreover, the descriptive text field is not included when BAT
biometric data are sent to ABIS. As a result, the screening of persons
enrolling in BISA who have previously been enrolled in BAT will result in
a fingerprint match that must be adjudicated by the installation
commander, which adds to the commander's workload unnecessarily.

Military Officials Responsible for Installation Security Recognize the
Risk Contractors May Pose to their Installations but, Took Steps to Reduce
the Risk

Force protection officers, military police, intelligence officers, and
others from 10 of the 11 units we spoke with who served in Iraq as well as
the installation commander of a large logistics base we visited in Iraq
recognized the risk some contractor employees posed and took actions at
their installations to minimize the risk. 14 Army officials from nine
units and officers from the one U.S. Marine Corps unit we spoke with were
aware of the shortcomings of the background screenings that were done by
contractors or DOD. For example, several officers we spoke with told us
that they believed BAT was ineffective as a screening tool because of the
length of time it took to receive information from the database. Also,
they noted that they did not have access to a server that contained all
data collected in BAT, and thus did not have access to information
collected at other installations. Moreover, one commander told us that he
had concerns about whether contractors and subcontractors were screening
their employees. When he asked a logistical support contractor's
representative about the screening process and for screening
documentation, the representative did not know if the company had
conducted background screenings and could not produce any documentation of
background screenings.

Given the inherent risk contractors may pose to military installations and
the fact that DOD makes commanders responsible for the security of their
installations, military commanders take a variety of actions to reduce
that risk. Force protection officers and other military officials we spoke
with who had served in Iraq described some of the steps that had been
taken at their installations to reduce the risk posed by contractors. For
example, host country and third country nationals were searched, prior to
entering bases and installations, for contraband and other items that
could jeopardize the safety of others, such as explosive materials, mobile
telephones, and cameras. Officials told us that employees were also
searched when they left the base. If employees were found with prohibited
items, they could be arrested, detained, and lose their jobs. In addition
the military requires that many contractor employees, particularly host
country and some third country nationals be escorted while on the base or
installation. At other installations some contractor employees are
required to undergo interviews with military or contractor personnel
trained in human intelligence gathering. For example at one base we
visited in Iraq, the installation commander required that all third
country nationals from selected countries in Southwest and Central Asia be
interviewed. This was in addition to the MNF-I requirement that employees
who come from countries on the State Department's list of State Sponsors
of Terrorism be interviewed. Also, contractor employees must display
badges at all times. These badges allow or restrict an employee's access
to certain areas of the installation, such as the dining facility.
Finally, an official noted that he did not let host country or third
country nationals from other installations have access to his installation
due to concerns with security and knowing how or if the employees had been
screened.

14 DOD's antiterrorism standards (DOD Instruction 2000.16) require that
each unit have a designated antiterrorism officer who acts as the
commander's advisor on force protection. See DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD
Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001, standard E3.1.1.6 page 12.

Agency Comments

DOD and the Department of Justice provided technical comments on a draft
of this report. Those comments were incorporated where appropriate.
Neither agency disagreed with the contents of the report.

                                   _ _ _ _ _

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
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Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] if you or your staff
have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

Sincerely yours,

William M. Solis, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures-II

Scope and Methodology

Our objective was to determine the ability of the Department of Defense
(DOD) and contractors that support deployed forces to conduct
comprehensive background screenings of employees and the steps commanders
have taken to protect their troops. To meet this objective we took several
steps.

First, we met with DOD and service acquisition officials to obtain an
understanding of both the extent to which background screening provisions
are included in contracts as well as to learn the screening practices of
their contractors. We also met with 12 U.S. and foreign contractors that
provide support to deployed forces in Southwest Asia to gain an
understanding of what types of background screenings are required in their
contracts with DOD and the methods they use to screen their employees. We
selected these contractors based upon a convenience sample, where the
selection of contractors from the population was based on their
availability. The contractors reflected a wide range of services provided
to deployed forces. For example, we met with contractors who maintain
weapons systems such as the Army's Stryker vehicle; contractors that
provide base operations support, such as food and housings; and
contractors that provide technical services such, as linguists or
security. The contractors represented both prime contractors and
subcontractors. Additionally, we met with officials from three U.S.
background screening firms, two of which had international affiliates,
that conduct screenings both in the United States and internationally to
discover what screening practices, methods, and standards are used in the
United States and other countries as well as the challenges faced in
performing background screenings of U.S. nationals, third country
nationals, and host country nationals. The screening firms were selected
because they conducted background screenings for contractors with which we
met. We also met an official from the National Association of Professional
Background Screeners to obtain an industrywide perspective on methods used
by screeners and challenges background screeners encounter when trying to
screen foreign nationals.

To get a better understanding of the biometric screening programs being
used in Iraq, we traveled to Iraq to meet with officials responsible for
the biometric data systems to learn how the collection of biometric data
is used to screen contractor employees and the compatibility between the
systems. We also met with officials from the Biometrics Management Office
and the Biometrics Fusion Center to obtain an understanding of the
systems' limitations. In addition, we reviewed several DOD and
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) policy documents dealing with base access
and the biometric data systems.

To obtain a better understanding of the military's views and concerns
regarding background screenings, we met with commanders from 11 units from
4 units (3 Army divisions and a Marine Expeditionary Force) who served in
Iraq between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their ability to conduct background
screenings of contractor employees who performed work at and had access to
installations in Iraq. Specifically, we met with force protection
officers, military police, intelligence officers, and others responsible
for base operations and logistical support to gain an understanding of the
military's role in conducting background screenings, their ability to
conduct screenings on third country and host country nationals, the
challenges they faced, the limitations of background screenings, and steps
they took to mitigate the risks contractors pose. These units were
selected because, for the most part, they had recently returned from Iraq,
and unit members had not moved to other locations. Additionally, we
traveled to locations within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to meet with
commanders responsible for force protection at deployed locations to
discuss the methods they use to conduct background screenings, actions
taken to mitigate the risk, and their ability to protect their troops. We
also reviewed DOD, U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) and MNF-I documents
related to installation security and force protection.

In addition, we surveyed the contractor representatives from a random
probability sample of 114 contracts providing combat support services with
the principle place of performance in CENTCOM's area of responsibility
originated or ongoing from the beginning of FY 2004 through May of 2005.
Contracts through the end of FY2005 were included in the universe for
three large contracting offices (Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan), however,
the majority of contracts included in the universe originated or were
ongoing though May of 2005. The contracts were randomly selected from the
universe of 560 contracts from the DD-350 database providing combat
support services during the time period. We understood that achieving a
survey response rate high enough to generalize to the population of DD-350
combat support services contracts would be difficult but acknowledged that
gathering greater breadth of information through a random probability
sample would be worthwhile. The questionnaire was developed with social
science survey specialists in collaboration with GAO subject matter
experts and was pretested with contractor representatives from 4 firms.
The web based survey was administered between the dates of May 3, 2006 and
July 14, 2006. We sent one follow-up e-mail message to all nonrespondents
after the questionnaire had been online for 2 weeks. We then contacted
remaining non-respondents by telephone after 5 weeks and sent a final
email follow-up message after 9 weeks. We obtained responses from 35
contractor representatives for a response rate of 31.58 percent. The
survey responses offer information from 36 contracts with 35 contracting
firms providing combat support services and are not representative of the
universe of all contracts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. We
include information obtained from selected survey questions to supplement
information we obtained through site visits. The information from the
following questions was used in this report:

[After being asked to indicate the nationalities of people hired by your
firm to perform this contract] If you indicated "Nationals from other
third countries" in the previous question, please describe the
nationalities of these employees hired by your firm to perform this
contract.

Why does your firm perform these checks for this contract? (Check all that
apply.)

Required as part of the contract

Required as part of company standard policy

Other reasons

Don't know

Our work focused on contractors who provide support to deployed forces in
CENTCOM area of operation and on individuals who did not require security
clearances. We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:

The Department of Defense:

           o  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence, the
           Pentagon
           o  Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
           Technology and Logistics, the Pentagon
           o  US Central Command, Tampa, Florida
           o  Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, Virginia;
           Atlanta, Georgia; Houston, Texas; Baghdad, Iraq
           o  Personnel Security Research Center, Monterey, California
           o  Defense Manpower Data Center, Arlington, Virginia
           o  Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Resources and
           Sustainment
           o  Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence
           o  Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic
           Operations/Force Protection
           o  Multinational Corps-Iraq, Operations Directorate/
           Antiterrorism/Force Protection Office

Department of the Army:

           o  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army-Policies and
           Procurement,

           Arlington, Virginia

           o  Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Stryker Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington

                        o Stryker Brigade: 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry
                        Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
                        o Stryker Brigade: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry
                        Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
                        o Task Force Olympia, Fort Lewis, Washington
                        o 593rd Corps Support Group, Fort Lewis, Washington

           o  Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

                        o Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois
                        o Army Field Support Battalion-Southwest Asia, Camp
                        Arifjan, Kuwait

           o  3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia

                        o Division Staff, Fort Stewart, Georgia
                        o 26th Field Support Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia
                        o 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Fort Stewart, Georgia
                        o 703rd Field Support Battalion Fort Stewart, Georgia
                        o Division Support Brigade, Fort Stewart, Georgia
                        o 87th Combat Support Battalion, Fort Stewart,
                        Georgia

           o  3Rd Corps Support Command, Balad Iraq
           o  Camp Anaconda Garrison Command, Balad Iraq
           o  US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir,
           Virginia
           o  US Army Central Command (rear), Fort McPherson, Georgia
           o  US Army Central Command (forward), Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Army Contracting Agency, Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort
           McPherson, Georgia
           o  Area Support Group-Kuwait Provost Marshall Office, Camp
           Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Biometrics Management Office, Arlington, Virginia
           o  Biometrics Fusion Center, Clarksburg, West Virginia
           o  Biometrics Fusion Center (Forward), Camp Victory, Iraq

Department of the Navy

           o  1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California

Other Government Agencies:

           o  Department of Justice, Washington, DC

                        o FBI, Washington, DC

                                     Criminal Justice Information Services
                                     Division, Clarksburg, West Virginia

           o  Department of State

                        o Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Arlington, Virginia
                        o US Embassy Kuwait, Kuwait City, Kuwait

           o  US National Central Bureau of International Criminal Police
           Organization (INTERPOL), Washington, DC

Background Screening Firms:

           o  First Advantage, St. Petersburg, Florida
           o  First Advantage International, Bangalore, India
           o  Kroll Background America, Westminster, Maryland
           o  Kroll Background International, Nashville, Tennessee
           o  Background Information Services, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio
           o  National Association of Professional Background Screeners,
           Cleveland, Ohio

Contractors:

           o  Kellogg, Brown and Root, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Houston, Texas;
           Dubai, United Arab Emirates
           o  Triple Canopy Inc., Herndon, Virginia
           o  L3/Titan, Reston, Virginia
           o  CACI International, Arlington, Virginia
           o  Risk Management Solutions, Panama City, Florida
           o  Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  British Link Kuwait, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Tamimi Global Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  IAP World Services, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  ITT Industries, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
           o  Prime Projects International, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

GAO contact

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]

Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, major contributors to this report
were David A. Schmitt, Assistant Director; Carole F. Coffey, Assistant
Director; Vincent Balloon, Grace Coleman, Jennifer Cooper, Laura Czohara
Wesley Johnson, Kenneth E. Patton, and James A. Reynolds.

(350732)

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