Rail Transit: Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight
Program (19-JUL-06, GAO-06-997T).
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily.
Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight
of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated
oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all
transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is
based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe
(1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what
is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and
security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide
information about oversight of transit systems that cross state
boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program
documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from
FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the
American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed
state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program,
interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit
agencies across the country.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-997T
ACCNO: A57121
TITLE: Rail Transit: Observations on FTA's State Safety
Oversight Program
DATE: 07/19/2006
SUBJECT: Critical infrastructure
Critical infrastructure protection
Federal/state relations
Mass transit
Performance measures
Program evaluation
Rail security
Railroad safety
Safety regulation
Transportation safety
Government agency oversight
FTA State Safety Oversight Program
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GAO-06-997T
* Background
* Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Pro
* FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Prog
* State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Tr
* Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit
* Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worth
* Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Progra
* FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does No
* FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State
* Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff
* Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's E
* Contact Information
* Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems
* Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Stru
* Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Their Administ
* Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Ag
* Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
RAIL TRANSIT
Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director Physical Infrastructure
GAO-06-997T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the mechanisms in
place to oversee the safety and security of the nation's rail transit
system. This system moves more than 7 million daily passengers, and,
according to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, accounts for
less than 6 percent of all public transportation accidents while providing
almost 32 percent of all passenger trips, making it one of the safest
forms of public transportation. However, safety and security are still
concerns. Although safe, the number of fatalities and accidents has varied
over the past few years. For example, between 1999 and 2005, fatalities
have ranged from 26 to 57 per year, with an approximate average of 40 per
year. In addition, recent acts of terrorism on European and Indian transit
systems illustrate the need to maintain high levels of safety and security
for transit.
The focus of my testimony today is FTA's State Safety Oversight program.
In 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations requiring states
to designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety and security of
rail transit agencies, and (2) withhold federal funds if a state did not
comply with the regulations. Through the resulting State Safety Oversight
program, FTA requires states to designate an oversight agency to implement
FTA safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies.
My testimony today (1) describes how the State Safety Oversight program is
designed, (2) identifies what is known about the impact of the program on
rail transit safety and security, and (3) identifies any challenges to the
State Safety Oversight program. It also provides information on how the
State Safety Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems
cross state lines (see app. I). My comments are based on our ongoing work
for this subcommittee's committee-the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure. We plan to release this work soon. To obtain
information on how the program is designed and identify what is known
about the impact of the program, we reviewed program guidance and
interviewed a wide range of stakeholders including FTA, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), an industry group. To identify challenges facing the program, we
conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety oversight agencies
across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail transit agencies.1 We
also visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies-of these 17
transit agencies, 2 will soon begin operations and 3 cross state
boundaries. We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to participate in
our review.
In summary:
o FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which
FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies
collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit
systems. FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight
agency and develops and oversees the implementation of rules and
guidance on safety and security that the designated agencies are
to use to oversee transit operations; however, it does not fund
state agencies' ongoing oversight. The designated state oversight
agencies directly oversee transit agencies' activities including
their safety and security plans. Most commonly, these oversight
agencies are state transportation departments, but public utility
commissions and regional transportation authorities also serve in
this role. Transit agencies develop and implement safety and
security plans, assess hazardous conditions, report certain
incidents to the oversight agency, conduct self audits, and keep
the state oversight agency apprised of corrective actions.
Finally, federal agencies including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also
have a role in transit security.
o Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State
Safety Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and
improving the safety and security of rail transit systems;
however, there is limited information showing its impact on safety
and security. For example, transit agency officials cite the
importance of having state oversight agency staff help them
identify larger, systemic issues. Although many officials support
the program, FTA's methods for obtaining information on transit
safety and security (i.e., transit and oversight agency data and
FTA audits of the oversight agencies) do not include performance
measures and related program goals. FTA issued annual reports from
1999 through 2003 that track transit accident, crash, fatality,
and other safety data, but FTA officials have found it difficult
to identify performance measures for the program and set
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of
fatalities and incidents and the varying design of rail transit
systems. Furthermore, in the past 8 years, FTA has audited all
oversight agencies in operation before 2004 at least once;
however, FTA has not conducted audits as often as it envisioned
when it started the program (i.e., once every 3 years). This
reduced schedule limits FTA's ability to conduct oversight,
including collecting information on the safety oversight agencies
and making informed and timely revisions to the program. According
to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated audit schedule
because they were reassessing the priorities for the program after
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also noted that
they continued conducting "safety and security readiness reviews"
to ensure that new transit systems would be able to safely and
securely begin passenger operations. Recent changes in FTA's
program regulations and leadership provide an opportunity to
address this lack of information, performance measures, and
program goals, and to resume its stated audit schedule.
o FTA faces challenges in managing and implementing the program.
First, the level of state oversight-staff expertise and number of
oversight staff (and thus their potential ability to oversee
transit agencies), varies widely across the country. For example,
one oversight agency requires its staff have at least 5 years of
rail transit experience while another oversight agency assigned a
state department of transportation planner to work on safety and
security oversight as a collateral duty. Although no officials
identified a safety or security problem resulting from lack of
staff expertise, most transit and oversight agency officials with
whom we spoke believe that federal funding for training and an
FTA-developed curriculum-including training on how to oversee
safety and security-would improve the qualifications and
effectiveness of state oversight agency personnel. Furthermore,
FTA's approach contrasts with the approach other Department of
Transportation (DOT) agencies, such as FRA and the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) take, which is
to provide free training or use agency funds to pay for state
agency personnel's attendance at training sessions, in some
instances.2 A second challenge to implementing the program,
according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and
14 of 37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the role of
TSA in FTA's program since Congress designated TSA the lead agency
on security matters in 2001. Although TSA has regulatory authority
over security activities in transportation, its rail program is
still developing, and several oversight and transit agency
officials with whom we spoke were concerned about the potential
for duplication of effort given that state safety oversight
agencies and TSA both review and comment on transit systems'
security plans. TSA and FTA recognize this concern and have begun
discussions on how to coordinate their oversight efforts.
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),3 which added Section 28 to the
Federal Transit Act.4 ISTEA required FTA to establish a
state-managed safety and security oversight program for rail
transit agencies. As a result, on December 27, 1995,5 FTA
published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's
rule), to improve the safety and security of rail transit
agencies. FTA's rule required state oversight agencies to have
approved transit agencies' safety plans by January 1, 1997, and
security plans by January 1, 1998. At the time of the FTA rule's
publication, 5 of 19 states affected by the FTA rule had oversight
programs in place for rail transit safety and security, and no
oversight agency met all the requirements in FTA's rule. During
the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to
develop compliant programs that addressed FTA's requirements. Ten
years after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a
revision to it in the Federal Register on April 29, 2005, which
required that oversight agencies had to comply with the revised
FTA rule by May 1, 2006.
FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead
the State Safety Oversight program-and hired the current Program
Manager in March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other
safety duties in addition to the State Safety Oversight program.
Additional FTA staff within the Office of Safety and Security
assist with outreach to transit and oversight agencies and
additional tasks. FTA regional personnel are not formally involved
with the program's day-to-day activities, though officials from
FTA Regional Offices help address specific compliance issues that
occasionally arise and help states with new transit agencies
establish new oversight agencies. FTA also relies on contractors
to do many of the day-to-day activities, ranging from developing
and implementing FTA's audit program of state oversight agencies
to developing and providing training classes on system safety.
The revised FTA rule applies to all states with rail fixed
guideway systems operating in their jurisdictions. As specified in
the FTA rule, a rail fixed guideway system is defined as: "any
light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail, inclined plane,
funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is not regulated by
FRA and
o is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles
or receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized
areas (49 U.S.C. 5336); or
o has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be
included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to
receive funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas
(49 U.S.C. 5336)."
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are
included in the State Safety Oversight program.
2PHMSA requires new inspectors to complete applicable Transportation
Safety Institute (TSI) training courses in a 3-year period.
Background
3P.L. 102-240.
4Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330.
5Codified at 49 CFR Part 659.
Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety Oversight
Program
FTA's program generally differs from other agencies within DOT, such as
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FRA, and PHMSA. These agencies
promulgate their own technical standards that govern how vehicles or
facilities must be operated or constructed, while FTA does not prescribe
technical standards, though the state oversight agencies can develop
technical standards.
Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under the program, FTA is
responsible for developing the regulations and guidance governing the
program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to ensure the
regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance and other
information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only limited
instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly oversee the
safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing safety and
security plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents. Rail
transit agencies are responsible for developing safety and security plans,
reporting incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other
regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA,
federal agencies such as FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training, and TSA
also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit safety and
security.
FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program
FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach
in developing the State Safety Oversight program.6 Federal and state
agencies and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit
system is operated safely and each of these agencies has some monitoring
responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and
administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA is responsible
for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight agencies are to
use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is
responsible for informing oversight and transit agencies of new program
developments, facilitating and informing the transit and oversight
agencies of training available through FTA or other organizations,
facilitating information sharing among program participants, and providing
technical assistance.
FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-management
approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that each
state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This
is consistent with our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on
where their assets can best be used, both in transportation security and
safety. However, FTA recognizes that some parts of the State Safety
Oversight program are not risk-based, including requiring minimum
standards for all transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or
ridership.7
While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with
regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through reviews of
oversight agency reports and audits, state oversight agencies comply with
the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when a
state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the
proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the
required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in two
instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight
agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with
the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA
is responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit.
FTA officials ensure they include all the required information-such as
descriptions of program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions;
they then compile this information for a program annual report, and look
for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. Furthermore, FTA
is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure they
are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits evaluate
how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the FTA rule,
including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating accidents
properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews properly,
and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is required.
6A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and
managerial skills to identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards and
risks.
7FTA states that to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on
universally applied rules is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated
that they felt it was inappropriate to use a risk-based approach in this
area of the program.
Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the operation of their
oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section 5309 (New Starts
program) funds-normally used to pay for transit-related capital
expenses-to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency before a
transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated this year
that FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated for FTA
audits to pay for one person from each oversight agency to attend training
on the revisions to FTA's rule, which oversight agencies had to comply
with by May 1, 2006.
State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies
In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are
responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. According to
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any "New
Starts" project involving a new rail transit system, or before the transit
agency applies for FTA formula funding. States have designated several
different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most
frequently-in 17 cases-states have designated their departments of
transportation to serve in this role. In three instances-California,
Colorado, and Massachusetts-states have designated utilities commissions
or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security. According to
state officials, since these bodies already had regulatory and oversight
authority, it was a natural extension of their powers to add rail transit
oversight to their responsibilities. Two states have designated emergency
management or public safety departments to oversee their rail transit
agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two separate
oversight agencies, both local transportation funding authorities, to
oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the state. In the
Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail transit system
runs between two states and the District of Columbia. These states and the
District of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight Committee as the
designated oversight agency.8 Finally, one state, New York, has given its
oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB
officials said they have authority similar to the public utilities
commissions discussed above, but have no other mission than ensuring and
overseeing transit safety in New York. See appendix II for a table showing
each oversight agency and the rail transit agencies they oversee.
The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five states
where the states granted their oversight agencies some punitive authority
over the rail transit agencies they oversee. Officials from oversight
agencies that have the authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit
agencies all stated that they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but
each stated that they believed it gives their actions extra weight and
forced transit agencies to acquiesce to the oversight agency more readily
than they otherwise might. The majority of oversight agencies, 19 of the
24 with which we spoke, have no such punitive authority, though officials
from some oversight agencies stated they may be able to withhold grants
their oversight agencies provide to the transit agencies they oversee.9
Although officials from several of these agencies stated that they believe
they would be more effective if they did have enforcement authority, under
the current program this authority would be granted by individual states.
8The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives-two each from
Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
9Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some form
of grant funding to transit agencies they oversee and that they could,
potentially, withhold those grants to force a transit agency to take a
particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials stated
that they had taken this step.
While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies
with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of
rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program,
oversight agencies are responsible for the following:
o Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail
transit agency responsibilities, providing "guidance to the
regulated rail transit properties concerning processes and
procedures they must have in place to be in compliance with the
State Safety Oversight program."
o Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and
annual reports.
o Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies
on at least a triennial basis.
o Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are
addressed, and tracking and eliminating hazardous conditions that
the transit agency reports to the oversight agency outside the
audit process.
o Investigating accidents that meet a certain damage or severity
threshold and developing a corrective action plan for the causes
leading to the accident.
o Submitting an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight
activities, including results of accident investigations and the
status of ongoing corrective actions.
FTA's rule also lays out several specific requirements that
oversight agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such
as developing separate system safety and security plans,
performing internal safety and security audits over a 3-year
cycle, developing a hazard management process, and reporting
certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2 hours. The
locations and types of transit agencies participating in the
program are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
State Safety Oversight Program
Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and Security,
but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight Program
In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit
agencies, two entities within DHS are involved in transit safety security.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),10 passed by Congress
in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave TSA
authority for security over all transportation modes, including authority
to issue security regulations.11 While TSA's most public transportation
security duties are its airport screening activities, TSA has taken steps
to enhance all rail security, including rail transit. For example, in May
2004, TSA issued security directives to rail transit agencies to ensure
all agencies were implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also,
TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.12
While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being
determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce
compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as
well as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies, riders,
and others.
In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, another DHS agency, the Office
of Grants and Training plays a role in ensuring rail transit security
through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants and Training
(formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is the primary
federal source of security funding for rail transit systems, as well as
for state and local jurisdictions; this security funding goes toward the
purchase of equipment, support planning and the execution of exercises,
and the provision of technical assistance to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to acts of terrorism. The Office of Grants and Training has
provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the Urban
Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program.
FRA, within DOT, also plays a role in ensuring transit agencies operate
safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction over parts of a rail
transit system that share track with the general railroad system, or
places where a rail transit system and the general railroad system share a
connection (e.g., a grade crossing).13 According to FRA, if a rail transit
vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and at the same time as general
railroads, this would make the rail transit agency operating the vehicle
use much sturdier (and more expensive) vehicles. Therefore, 11 rail
transit agencies have requested waivers from FRA and, according to an FRA
official, as of June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail
transit agencies that applied for them.14
10Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
11ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to DHS.
12These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005
and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with $12
million in funding for rail security activities.
Finally, NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit
safety, though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB has
authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads,
including rail transit agencies. NTSB officials stated they generally will
investigate only the more serious accidents, such as those involving
fatalities or injuries, or those involving recurring safety issues. Often,
NTSB accident investigations of rail transit accidents will result in
recommendations to federal agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate
the condition that led to the accident.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA
Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State
Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security
The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we
spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and
security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations
about how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have
limited statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or
security. FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from
sources such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight
agencies, and its own audits of the oversight agencies. However, these
data are not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA
officials recognize the need for performance measures for its safety and
security programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this
need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every
3 years, it has not conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned
(it has conducted eight audits since September 2001). However, program
officials stated they are committed to getting "back on track" to meet the
planned schedule.
13FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared-track
situations. See 65 Fed. Reg. 42529 (Jul. 10, 2000).
14FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail transit
agency that did not receive its waiver that its application was
unnecessary-what the agency proposed was already allowed under FRA
regulations.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as Worthwhile and
Valuable
Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's State
Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps them
maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit officials with
whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their safety and
security is worthwhile. One transit agency official explained that the
oversight agency helps them identify larger, systemic issues. In addition,
the program provides support to exert extra influence on a transit
agency's board of directors or senior management to get safety or security
improvements implemented faster and improve the safety and security of
their equipment. For example, one oversight agency helped its transit
agency's safety department address problems with train operators running
red light signals by helping convincing the transit agency's senior
management to replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals
that were brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials
believe that FTA's program is an effective method for overseeing safety
and security. Several officials said that they felt having a state or
local (rather than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety
and security improvements and consistent working relationships with the
oversight staff.
In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state
safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State
Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving
transit systems' safety and security. Several officials commented that the
program provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and
avoid complacency. Furthermore, several officials commented that they
believed the current system worked well and that the program provides
consistency, endowing the state safety oversight agencies with enough
authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the
states carry out the program provides on-going oversight in addition to
formal audits, which helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and
security issues.
Finally, several transit and oversight agency officials stated that,
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved
safety in their rail system, but it was difficult to show statistics
proving this. For example, the California oversight agency found an 87
percent drop in rail transit collisions at the San Francisco transit
agency (MUNI) from 1997, when the oversight agency began oversight, to
2005.15 Although FTA changed its definition of a reportable accident
during this time period-making it impossible to determine exactly what
impact external oversight had on MUNI safety-both MUNI and the oversight
agency staff stated they were confident the oversight efforts had been a
major factor in reducing accidents.
APTA officials with whom we spoke were concerned that, although the State
Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and
security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry
officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving for improved
safety and security.16 However, transit officials with whom we spoke often
discussed the benefits of a federal program. In addition, officials from
17 transit agencies reported that their respective state safety oversight
agencies imposed requirements above those required in FTA's requirement.
FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the Data to
Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security
One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through
the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The
reports include information on many different issues including program
resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any
corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations.
FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agencies' reports to
publish their own annual reports on transit safety; however, the
information was not tied to any program goals or performance measures. In
addition, the 2003 report is the most recent one FTA has issued.
15Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program,
California law dictated that the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) had oversight authority over rail transit agencies, but exempted
municipally operated systems. Since the City of San Francisco operates
MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC oversight. However, since 49 CFR Part 659
required that California designate an agency to oversee all rail transit
systems receiving federal funds, the governor of California designated
CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997.
16Prior the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program,
according to APTA, most transit agencies were self-regulated and submitted
to occasional APTA-sponsored safety audits as a way of obtaining outside
feedback about their safety practices and areas for potential improvement.
APTA charged transit agencies for their participation in these audits.
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better
information and performance measures for its safety and security programs
and has not published a report since the 2003 report because it has been
looking into improving the type of safety and security data it can
collect, and how it can use the information to track program performance
and progress toward yet to be defined goals. FTA's 2006 business plan for
its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing
and implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to
help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focus on
performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA officials
explained they are working with a contractor who is working with oversight
and transit agencies to identify measures that they can use to develop
performance measures for the State Safety Oversight program.
Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that
FTA had planned to conduct every 3 years. However, the agency has not met
this schedule. Although the audits provide detailed information on
specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together information from
these audits to provide information on the safety and security of transit
systems across the country. FTA tracks the deficiencies and areas of
concern and follows up with oversight agency staff to assure that each
state safety oversight agency resolves the suggested corrective actions.
Given this lack of consistent audits, we are unsure if FTA has obtained
enough information to provide a current picture of transit system safety
and security, or a framework to identify potential challenges that
oversight and transit agency officials may face in implementing the
program. FTA has audited each state oversight agency that existed prior to
2004 at least one time since the program began; two agencies were audited
twice. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency's
priorities shifted in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However,
officials indicated they continued to evaluate the readiness of rail
transit projects to safely and securely enter operations. In addition,
according to FTA officials, FTA is not conducting audits in fiscal year
2006 so it can use the money and time to help states comply with the
revised FTA rule, and has planned a detailed outreach effort-including a
workshop for oversight agency officials-to help ensure compliance. FTA
plans to return to its triennial audit schedule in fiscal year 2007, with
10 audits scheduled for the first year to get back on the triennial
schedule.
FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety Oversight
Program
Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges
in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to manage the
program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not
confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail
transit system safety and security, and they are unsure the current
training available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of
staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the
country. A second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that
many transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how
security issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be
responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail
transit security.
Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are Adequately
Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff
While a majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with whom
we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight program,
many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that they were
adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, officials from 18 of 24
oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they believed additional
training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and
security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight
agency staff varied widely across the country. For example, 11 of the 24
oversight agencies with which we spoke had oversight staff that had no
career or educational background in transit safety or security.
Conversely, another 11 oversight agencies required their staff to have
certain levels of experience or education. For example, New York's Public
Transportation Safety Board requires its staff to have 5 years of
experience in transit safety. According to some oversight agency officials
who had no previous transit safety or security background, they had to
rely on the transit agency staff they were overseeing to teach them about
transit operations, safety, and security. These officials stated that if
they left their positions, any new staff taking over for them would face a
similar challenge.
Therefore, several oversight agency staff cite the lack of a training
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. For
example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the training
they had received in transit operations, accident investigations, and
other areas was beneficial, but they had not received any training on how
to perform oversight functions. Although many oversight agency officials
acknowledged that they felt the training that had been made available to
them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the
National Transit Institute (NTI) had been adequate,17 officials from 17 of
24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that they were somewhat
unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their
oversight role.
Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight
agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel
to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and
travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI.18 Officials from
10 of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds
as one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.
Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA
provided some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for
training they wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to
spend their limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as
staff overtime, travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring
contractors. Several oversight agency officials also cited the example of
other DOT agencies that provide free training or pay for state staff to
travel to attend training. For example, 30 states participate in FRA's
State Rail Safety Participation Program. These states have inspectors who
FRA has certified to enforce FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their
initial and ongoing classroom training and state staff's travel to this
training. In addition, the federal agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA,
authorizes state-employed inspectors to inspect pipelines in many states.
PHMSA also recently paid for two inspectors from each state to attend
training when it instituted a new inspection approach. Officials from both
FRA and PHMSA stated that providing funding to states to train their
employees helps the federal agencies more effectively carry out their
enforcement activities, easing the states' burden of paying to enforce
federal regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies'
personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis,
where FTA provided technical assistance and shared best practices in
meeting the requirements of the revised FTA rule. FTA officials agree that
they have not provided training specifically pertaining to oversight
activities or provided a recommended training curriculum to oversight
agencies, but stated that it would not be difficult to take these steps.
17TSI is a part of DOT's Research and Innovative Technology
Administration. NTI, which FTA funds, is affiliated with Rutgers
University and dedicated to training employees of the public
transportation industry.
18FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and
oversight agencies but do charge a nominal fee for course books and
materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests to teach courses in field
locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants.
FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of
consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were
revising FTA's rule in 2005; however, they stated they did not have the
legal authority to direct states to require certain education, experience,
or certifications for oversight agency staff. Furthermore, these officials
noted that, despite the lack of formal requirements, FTA checks to ensure
oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its audits, and
have recommended in five instances that oversight agency staff take
additional training. They also stated that FTA could issue guidance or
recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of training their
oversight staff should have.
In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure
they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a transit
agency's operations. Officials at 14 of 24 oversight agencies with whom we
spoke stated that more staff would help them do their job more
effectively. Officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they devoted the
equivalent of less than one person working half-time on oversight, and, in
some cases, described oversight as a "collateral duty." See table 1 for
the amount of personnel oversight agency representatives estimated their
agencies dedicate to oversight responsibilities. While in some of these
instances, the transit agencies overseen are small, some of the transit
agencies with the highest ridership levels have similar levels of
oversight. For example, one state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time
equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions is responsible for
overseeing a major transit agency that averages nearly 200,000 daily
passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time with the services
of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of the transit
agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to oversight
functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies (including
two systems not yet in operation) in different cities, making it difficult
to maintain active oversight when their responsibilities are so spread
out. As FTA resumes its audit schedule, it would be practical for FTA to
focus on this issue. (See app. II for information on estimated FTE and
transit system information for each state safety oversight agency and
related transit agency).
Table 1: Estimated FTEs Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee Transit
Agency Safety and Security
Estimated FTEs 0.5 or less 0.6-1 1.1-3 3.1-5 Over 5 Total
Number of oversight agencies 11 5 6 1 1 24
Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.
Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging Role in
Transit Security Will Affect the Program
Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors
might affect oversight of transit security. As I mentioned earlier, TSA
has regulatory authority over transportation security, and, according to
TSA officials, has hired 100 rail inspectors, who are to monitor and
enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004.
However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke,
officials at 20 agencies stated they did not have a clear picture of who
was responsible for overseeing transit security issues. Similarly,
officials at 14 of 37 transit agencies were also unsure of lines of
responsibility regarding transit security oversight. Several state
oversight agencies were particularly concerned that TSA's rail inspectors
would be duplicating their role in overseeing transit security. One
oversight agency official stated it would be more efficient if TSA and
oversight agency staff audited transit agencies' security practices at the
same time.
TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies; FTA
program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both indicate that they are
committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating their
respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as
possible. However, as TSA is still developing its program, currently there
is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight program,
and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for its rail
inspectors. While FTA's rule discusses requirements for a transit agency's
security plan, it does not discuss TSA's specific role in the program, and
both TSA and FTA officials state that exactly how TSA would participate in
the program was still to be determined. However, the officials added that
they are working together to ensure inspection activities are coordinated,
thereby fostering consistency and minimizing disruption to rail transit
agency operations. For example, in May 2006, TSA's director of the rail
inspector program reported that it had designated 26 rail inspectors as
liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, these TSA rail inspectors
attended a training session where FTA presented information on the State
Safety Oversight program, and they have contacted 13 oversight agencies to
begin discussions on how they can coordinate activities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I plan to include
recommendations to address these challenges in the report we plan to issue
next week. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other
Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contact Information
For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine
Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Ashley Alley, Catherine Colwell,
Colin Fallon, Michele Fejfar, Joah Iannotta, Stuart Kaufman, Joshua
Ormond, Tina Paek, Stephanie Purcell, and Raymond Sendejas.
Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems
Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States-the Port
Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St.
Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in
Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia)-cross state lines and require the
collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety
Oversight program; alternatively, states can agree that one state will be
responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state
transit systems has a different structure to handle oversight
responsibilities. The oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis
have both developed strategies to centralize decision making, streamline
collaboration, and respond promptly to safety and security audit findings.
In contrast, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the
oversight agency in the District of Columbia area, requires majority
decision making by the six committee members of the agency, including at
least one member from each jurisdiction. However, WMATA has experienced
difficulty obtaining funding, responding to FTA information requests, and
ensuring audit findings are addressed.
Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and Handle
Oversight Responsibilities Differently
Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure and each performs
oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to
serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state
agencies-namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)
agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) to
serve as the sole oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line.
MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through
the St. Clair County Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri
Department of Transportation); the two organizations share oversight
duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from
each jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia), provides oversight for WMATA.
The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily
and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's track is
in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early
2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania
and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a
regional transportation and economic development agency serving both
Southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA implemented
organizational and functional changes, DRPA leadership no longer believed
that DRPA could perform its role as the designated oversight agency
without facing conflicting interests. As a result, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey agreed to have NJDOT replace DRPA as the oversight agency. This
arrangement allows the oversight agency to take corrective action without
seeking additional levels of approval from Pennsylvania, although the
oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania informed of its activities. Also,
Pennsylvania provides some support to NJDOT by having PennDOT perform
oversight functions for the stations, passageways, and concourses located
in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports any deficiencies or hazardous conditions
that may be noted during the performance of oversight directly to New
Jersey. Through meetings or other means of communication, the follow-up
actions may be performed by the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a
supporting role or directly by New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes
two full-time staff members and one part-time staff member to its
oversight program, and while these staff members must oversee several
transit systems, including PATCO, their sole responsibilities are for
safety and oversight functions.
The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport in St. Louis and Scott Air Force Base outside
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system
included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track
in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials
agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to provide
safety and security oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001,
MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which roughly
equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this, the states
agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a greater role in
safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated the St. Clair
County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. Clair is one of the
few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight agency. The involvement of
two separate oversight agencies could create challenges to effective
implementation, but the agencies have taken steps to ensure close
coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies have
agreed to use only one uniform safety and security standard across the
entire MetroLink system.1 According to area officials, this arrangement
creates consistency throughout the system and allows both agencies to
perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the
agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial
audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate very
closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there is one
full-time employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to
safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several employees
who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to the program,
but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for coordinating with
Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding to state safety
oversight directives is a priority, and the agency works quickly to
implement changes.
1In the most recent revision to 49 CFR Part 659, the Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems; State Safety Oversight rule, governing the State Safety Oversight
program, FTA mandated that in areas where transit agencies ran through
multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure they use the same program
standard for the transit agency to meet. This way one transit agency does
not have to meet two separate standards in different parts of their
system.
WMATA operates a heavy rail system within the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of Columbia decided to
carry out their oversight responsibilities through a collaborative
organization managed by TOC. TOC is composed of six representatives-two
each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. All of the
representatives have other primary duties, and their activities on TOC are
collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case with staff at
several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any dedicated staff,
and TOC members have limited rail operational experience. To gain access
to additional experience and expertise in rail oversight, TOC contracts
with a consultant to provide technical knowledge, perform required audits
of WMATA, and ensure that audit recommendations are completed. In
addition, TOC funding comes from, and must be approved by, each of the
jurisdictions every year. The Washington Council of Governments processes
TOC funds and handles their contracting procedures. These issues result in
a lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly funding and process its
expenses.
Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Their Administrative Challenges in
Different Ways
The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have
attempted to streamline their decision making, while TOC has a more
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's staff.
New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight
program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and
provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the implementation
of any new safety or security processes. Although St. Louis has two
agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies have made it
a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent information to the
transit agency, and they are coordinating their activities so MetroLink is
not burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. To do this, the
Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact with each
other. Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated
to safety and security oversight, and the agencies have very good working
relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could face
challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and new
employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In addition,
officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had disagreements over
safety or security standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it
would be highly problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and
Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the
current arrangements have produced one set of standards, good
communication, and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight
agency staff in St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment
where this system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well.
In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have contributed
to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information requests.
On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC's audit in
late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to facilitate
the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State Safety
Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an extension
by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August, FTA
initiated its audit even though it had not received requested information,
but was not able to complete the audit until the end of September, when it
received all requested materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10
areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues.
According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held
a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating how
many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA stated
that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating procedures to
address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition, TOC
representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA found
were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident investigation
procedures and approving modifications, and could not be addressed within
the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff emphasized that, although
WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC audit recommendations or
information requests, they were pleased with their relationship with WMATA
and that WMATA was responsive to TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed
that they recognized and appreciated the effort TOC had undertaken in
addressing FTA's findings.
TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on at
least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC
members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA's
initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the
year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the
consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their
files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring
additional funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions
represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding
quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its
members, and at least one member from each jurisdiction, approving the
action. Reaching such majority agreements can be time consuming since all
members of TOC have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a
concern when quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA's
audit recommendations.
TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and
oversight agencies, due to their location in the District of Columbia, and
their proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these challenges,
the chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time
overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the
administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a
full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a
full-time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However,
funding this position could be a challenge, and the administrator would
need to have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.
Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They
Oversee
Annual
ridership and
Rail transit directional
State safety agency route miles
oversight agency (estimated Annual
(estimated FTE) FTE) Rail ridership and
State safety transit agency Type of directional
oversight agency (estimated City center system route miles
(estimated FTE) FTE) Rail served City Type of Annual
State safety transit agency center served system ridership and
State State oversight agency (estimated City center Type of directional
State (estimated FTE) FTE) served system route miles
Single state
systems
Arkansas Arkansas State Central Little Rock, Trolley 159,458
Highway and Arkansas AR 2.8
Transportation Transit
Department (0.5) Authority
(0.08)
California California Public Bay Area Rapid San Heavy 99,296,028
Utilities Transit (7) Francisco, CA rail 209
Commission (9.6)
Los Angeles Los Angeles, Heavy 74,242,912
County CA rail and 141.6
Metropolitan light
Transportation rail
Authority
(1.5)
San Francisco San Light 53,768,895
Municipal Francisco, CA rail, 81.7
Railway (7) trolley,
and cable
car
San Diego San Diego, CA Light 29,334,362
Trolley, Inc. rail 96.6
(0.9)
Sacramento Sacramento, Light 12,008,620
Regional CA rail 58.4
Transit
District (N/A)
Santa Clara San Jose, CA Light 6,780,431
Valley Transit rail 58.4
Authority
(N/A)
Colorado Colorado Public Denver Denver, CO Light 11,142,220
Utilities Regional rail 31.6
Commission (1.2) Transit
District
(1.25)
Florida Florida Metro-Dade Miami, FL Heavy 26,479,423
Department of Transit rail and 53.5
Transportation Authority automated
(1) (N/A) guideway
Jacksonville Jacksonville, Automated 736,510
Transportation FL guideway 5.4
Authority
(N/A)
Hillsborough Tampa, FL Trolley 565,002
Area Regional 4.8
Transit (0.85)
Georgia Georgia Metropolitan Atlanta, GA Heavy 70,984,053
Department of Atlanta Rapid rail 96.1
Transportation Transit
(0.1) Authority (6)
Illinois Regional Chicago Chicago, IL Heavy 186,759,524
Transportation Transit rail 206.3
Authority (1) Authority (11)
Louisiana Louisiana New Orleans New Orleans, Trolley 5,667,952
Department of Regional LA 25.3
Transportation Transit
(0.1) a Authority
(N/A)
Maryland Maryland Maryland Baltimore, MD Heavy 18,059,117
Department of Transit rail and 87
Transportation Administration light
(1.3) (5) rail
Massachusetts Massachusetts Massachusetts Boston, MA Heavy 215,787,440
Department of Bay rail, 127.3
Telecommunication Transportation light
and Energy (2.67) Authority rail, and
(5.1) trolley
Michigan Michigan Detroit Detroit, MI Automated 1,340,646
Department of Transit guideway 2.9
Transportation Corporation
(0.5) (1.1)
Minnesota Minnesota Hiawatha Metro Minneapolis, Light 7,901,668
Department of Transit MN rail 24.4
Public Safety (1-1.5)
(0.1)
New Jersey NJDOT (2-3) New Jersey Newark, NJ Light 14,312,676
Transit Newark rail 99.9b
City Subway
(0.5)
New Jersey Jersey City, Light
Transit NJ rail
Hudson-Bergen
Light Rail
(N/A)
New Jersey Trenton, NJ Light
Transit River rail
Line (2)
New York New York Public New York City New York Heavy 1,803,536,486
Transportation Transit (15) City, NY rail 493.8
Safety Board
(3.5)
Niagara Buffalo, NY Light 5,373,321
Frontier rail 12.4
Transit
Authority
(0.5)
Ohio Ohio Department Greater Cleveland, OH Heavy 8,236,840
of Transportation Cleveland rail and 68.5
(1) Regional light
Transit rail
Authority
(1.2)
Oregon Oregon Department Portland Portland, OR Light 34,755,147
of Transportation Tri-Met (10) rail 92.9b
(1.2)
Portland Portland, OR Light
Streetcar rail
(0.5)
Pennsylvania PennDOT (0.5) Southeastern Philadelphia, Heavy 113,252,100
Pennsylvania PA rail, 141.1
Transit light
Authority (2) rail, and
trolley
Port Authority Pittsburgh, Light 8,072,099
of Allegheny PA rail and 45.8
County (0.3) inclined
plane
Cambria County Johnstown, PA Inclined 86,031
Transit plane 0.3
Authority (1)
Puerto Rico Puerto Rico State Puerto Rico San Juan, Heavy 2,182,668
Emergency and Highway and Puerto Rico rail (N/A)
Disaster Transportation
Management Agency Authority Tren
(3) Urbano (1.6)
Tennessee Tennessee Chattanooga Chattanooga, Inclined 435,780
Department of Area Rapid TN plane 2
Transportation Transit
(0.25) Authority
(N/A)
Memphis Area Memphis, TN Trolley 1,015,448
Transit 10
Authority
(0.3)
Texas Texas Department Galveston Galveston, TX Light 47,706
of Transportation Island Transit rail 4
(0.4) (0.25)
Dallas Area Dallas, TX Light 17,487,057
Rapid Transit rail and 87.7
(0.75) trolley
Metropolitan Houston, TX Light 10,233,638
Transit rail 14.8
Authority of
Harris County
(2)
Utah Utah Department Utah Transit Salt Lake Light 13,101,791
of Transportation Authority City, UT rail 37.3
(0.8) (1.5)
Washington Washington State Sound Transit Tacoma, WA Light 884,895
Department of Tacoma Link rail 3.6
Transportation (N/A)
(0.35)
Seattle Center Seattle, WA Automated 1,506,240c
Monorail guideway 1.8
(0.02)
Wisconsin Wisconsin Kenosha Kenosha, WI Trolley 68,209
Department of Transit (0.85) 1.9
Transportation
(0.3)
Multi-state
systems
Illinois and St. Clair County Bi-State St. Louis, MO Light 15,648,233
Missouri Transit District Development rail 75.8
(0.25-0.5) and Agency - St.
Missouri Louis Metro
Department of (2)
Transportation
(0.9)
New Jersey NJDOT (2-3) Port Authority Philadelphia, Heavy 9,362,839
and Transit PA rail 31.5
Pennsylvania Corporation
(1)
Maryland, PennDOT (0.2) Washington Washington, Heavy 259,430,055
Virginia, and Metropolitan DC rail 206.6
Washington, Area Transit
DC Authority (1)
Sources: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.
Notes: Full-time equivalent (FTE) data comes from our interviews with
oversight agencies and transit agencies. The data do not include
contractor staff that assist transit or oversight agencies, though several
agencies reported using contractors. Data on ridership is current as of
2005, and includes the total number of passengers boarding the rail system
annually (also known as "unlinked passenger trips") as provided by FTA.
Directional route miles-the miles of track in each direction over which
transportation vehicles travel while carrying passengers-are current as of
2004, and were obtained from data published by FTA in the National Transit
Database. The data in this table are presented for background purposes and
were not verified. FTA defines trolley operations as "light rail" for
statistical purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley
operations and modern light rail operations, we have created separate
categories for them in this chart.
N/A = Not available
aBecause we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE data was
provided by FTA.
bAnnual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles represent the
total for all systems within a transit agency.
cAccording to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this table
represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an extended
period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In prior years
the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded about 2 million.
(542097)
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Highlights of GAO-06-997T , a report to Subcommittee on Highways, Transit
and Pipelines, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
July 19, 2006
RAIL TRANSIT
Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike
most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit
is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over
all transportation modes, including rail transit.
This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's
committee-the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I
describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what
is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and
(3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about
oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these
issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders
including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety
Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also
surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program,
interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies
across the country.
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to
designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit
agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible
for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies'
safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include
security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has
security oversight authority over transit agencies.
Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit
agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as
reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample
anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not
definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated
3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack
of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it
will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help
determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents
involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this
task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will
make auditing oversight agencies a top priority.
FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from
16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough
qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom
we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address
this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about
what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security,
since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar
function, which could result in duplication of effort.
Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety Oversight
Program
*** End of document. ***