Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into
the United States (02-AUG-06, GAO-06-976T).
Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport
when entering the United States from countries in the Western
Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish
citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction. On its Web site,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) advises U.S. citizens
that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of
citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records
and a photo identification document. In 2003, we testified that
CBP officers were not readily capable of identifying whether
individuals seeking entry into the United States were using
counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically,
our agents were able to easily enter the United States from
Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's
licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we
continued to be able to successfully enter the United States
using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but
were denied entry on one occasion. Because of Congress's concerns
that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited by terrorists
or others involved in criminal activity, Congress requested that
we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders.
Specifically, Congress requested that we conduct a follow-up
investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in
our prior work continue to exist.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-976T
ACCNO: A57869
TITLE: Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening
Entrants into the United States
DATE: 08/02/2006
SUBJECT: Accountability
Border security
Fraud
Homeland security
Licenses
Passports
Forgery
Identity verification
Security investigations
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
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GAO-06-976T
Testimony
Before the Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, August 2, 2006
BORDER SECURITY
Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations
GAO-06-976T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our
investigation of the effectiveness of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) in screening entrants into the United States at land border
crossings. Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport
when entering the United States from countries in the Western Hemisphere.1
However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship to a CBP
officer's satisfaction.2 On its Web site, CBP advises U.S. citizens that
an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of citizenship,
including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo
identification document.3
In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of
identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were
using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our
agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico
using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth
certificates.4 Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to
successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at
land border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion.
Specifically, agents entered the United States using counterfeit driver's
licenses at two land crossings in Washington, one in New York, one in
California, and one in Texas. One agent was also able to enter the United
States through both the California and Texas border crossings using an
expired, altered U.S diplomatic passport. At no time did CBP officers
question the authenticity of any of these agents' identification.
Furthermore, at one of the Washington crossings, agents were able to walk
across the border without passing through any security checkpoints and
without presenting identification. However, at the New York crossing, one
agent was not allowed entry into the United States after presenting as
identification an expired, altered U.S. tourist passport and a counterfeit
driver's license. CBP officers detained this agent for further screening
until he identified himself as a GAO employee conducting undercover tests.
5
1 22 C.F.R. S: 53.2(b).
2 8 C.F.R. S: 235.1(b).
3 See
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/vacation/documentary_requirements.xml.
4 We also testified in 2003 that agents successfully entered Florida from
Jamaica via air. GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United
States, GAO-03-438T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).
Because of your concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited
by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, you requested that
we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders.
Specifically, you requested that we conduct a follow-up investigation to
determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior work continue
to exist.
To perform our 2006 follow-up investigation, we created a fictitious
driver's license and birth certificate with the same name that we used in
the tests conducted for the work we did in 2003. We also created another
fictitious license and birth certificate. To create all these documents,
we used commercial software that is available to the public. As agreed
with your offices, we chose to test a nonrepresentative selection of nine
land crossings at both the northern and southern borders, including one in
California, one in Texas, two in Arizona, one in Michigan, two in New
York, one in Idaho, and one in Washington. We conducted our work from
February 2006 through June 2006 in accordance with the President's Council
on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations.
Summary
Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's
licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on
the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the
authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine
crossings. On three occasions-in California, Texas, and Arizona-agents
crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations-Texas and
Arizona-CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking
for or inspecting any identification documents.
After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June
9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms
of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully
supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a
passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this
initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the
United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown
by our work.
5 As part of this investigation, agents also attempted to enter the Unites
States via air. Agents successfully entered the United States from the
Bahamas using counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates.
However, agents were not successful when attempting to enter the United
States from Jamaica; CBP officers detained four agents in Florida until
they identified themselves as GAO employees conducting tests.
Southern Border Crossings
The following information provides details about our agents' experiences
and observations entering the United States from Mexico at border
crossings in California and Texas and at two crossings in Arizona.
California: On February 9, 2006, two agents entered California from Mexico
on foot. One of the agents presented as identification a counterfeit West
Virginia driver's license and the other presented a counterfeit Virginia
driver's license. The CBP officers on duty asked both agents if they were
U.S. citizens and both responded that they were. The officers also asked
the agents if they were bringing anything into the United States from
Mexico and both answered that they were not. The CBP officers did not
request any other documents to prove citizenship, and allowed both agents
to enter the United States.
Texas: On February 23, 2006, two agents crossed the border from Mexico
into Texas on foot. When the first agent arrived at the checkpoint, a CBP
officer asked him for his citizenship information; the agent responded
that he was from the United States. The officer also asked if the agent
had brought back anything from Mexico. The agent responded that he had
not, and the officer told him that he could enter the Unites States. At
this point, the agent asked the CBP officer if he wished to see any
identification. The officer replied "OK, that would be good." The agent
began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver's license from his wallet
and the inspector said "That's fine, you can go." The CBP officer never
looked at the driver's license.
When the second agent reached the checkpoint, another CBP officer asked
him for his citizenship information and he responded that he was from the
United States. The CBP officer asked the agent if he had purchased
anything in Mexico and the agent replied that he had not. He was then
asked to show some form of identification and he produced a counterfeit
West Virginia driver's license. The CBP inspector briefly looked at the
driver's license and then told the agent he could enter the United States.
Arizona, first crossing: On March 14, 2006, two agents arrived at the
border crossing between Mexico and Arizona in a rental vehicle. Upon
request, the agents gave the CBP officer a counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license and counterfeit Virginia driver's license as
identification. As the CBP officer reviewed the licenses, he asked the
agents if they were U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The
officer also asked if the agents had purchased anything in Mexico and they
said they had not. The CBP officer then requested that agents open the
trunk of their vehicle. The agents heard the inspector tap on several
parts of the side of the vehicle first with his hand and again with what
appeared to be a wand. The officer closed the trunk of the vehicle,
returned the agents' driver's licenses, and allowed them to enter the
United States.
Arizona, second crossing: On March 15, 2006, two agents again entered
Arizona from Mexico on foot at a different location than the previous day.
One of the agents carried a counterfeit West Virginia driver's license and
a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The other carried a
counterfeit Virginia driver's license and a counterfeit New York birth
certificate. As the agents were about to cross the border, another agent
who had crossed the border earlier using his genuine identification phoned
to inform them that the CBP officer on duty had swiped his Virginia
driver's license through a scanner. Because the counterfeit driver's
licenses the agents were carrying had fake magnetic strips, the agents
decided that in the event they were questioned about their licenses, they
would tell the CBP officers that the strips had become demagnetized.
When the agents entered the checkpoint area, they saw that they were the
only people crossing the border at that time. The agents observed three
CBP officers on duty; one was manning the checkpoint and the other two
were standing a short distance away. The officer manning the checkpoint
was sitting at a cubicle with a computer and what appeared to be a card
scanner. The agents engaged this officer in conversation to distract him
from scanning their driver's licenses. After a few moments, the CBP
officer asked the agents if they were both U.S. citizens and they said
that they were. He then asked if they had purchased anything in Mexico and
they said no. He then told them to have a nice day and allowed them to
enter the United States. He never asked for any form of identification.
Northern Border Crossings
The following information provides details about our agents' experiences
and observations entering the United States from Canada at Michigan, New
York, Idaho, and Washington border crossings.
Michigan: On May 1, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border
crossing in Michigan. When asked for identification by the CBP officer on
duty, the agents presented a counterfeit West Virginia driver's license
and a counterfeit Virginia driver's license. As the CBP officer examined
the licenses, he asked the agents if they were U.S. citizens and they
responded that they were. The CBP officer then asked if the agents had
birth certificates. One agent presented a counterfeit New York birth
certificate and the other presented a counterfeit West Virginia birth
certificate. The agents observed that the CBP officer checked the birth
certificates against the driver's licenses to see if the dates and names
matched. The CBP officer then asked the agents if they had purchased
anything in Canada and they responded that they had not. The officer also
asked what the agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they
had been visiting a casino in Canada. The CBP officer then returned the
agents' documentation and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, first crossing: On May 3, 2006, two agents entered New York in a
rental vehicle from Canada. The agents handed the CBP officer on duty
counterfeit driver's licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The CBP
officer asked for the agents' country of citizenship and the agents
responded that they were from the United States. The CBP officer also
asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents responded that
they had been gambling in the casinos. The CBP officer told the agents to
have a nice day and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, second crossing: On the same date, the same two agents crossed
back into Canada and re-entered New York at a different location. The
agents handed the CBP officer at the checkpoint the same two counterfeit
driver's licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The officer asked the
agents what they were doing in Canada and they replied that they been
gambling at a casino. The officer then asked the agents how much money
they were bringing back into the country and they told him they had
approximately $325, combined. The officer next asked the agent driving the
car to step out of the vehicle and open the trunk. As the agent complied,
he noticed that the officer placed the two driver's licenses on the
counter in his booth. The officer asked the agent whose car they were
driving and the agent told him that it was a rental. A second officer then
asked the agent to stand away from the vehicle and take his hands out of
his pockets. The first officer inspected the trunk of the vehicle, which
was empty. At this point, the officer handed back the two driver's
licenses and told the agents to proceed into the United States.
Idaho: On May 23, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border
crossing in Idaho. The agents handed the CBP officer on duty a counterfeit
West Virginia driver's license and a counterfeit Virginia driver's
license. As the CBP officer examined the licenses, he asked the agents if
they were U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The CBP officer
then asked if the agents had birth certificates. One agent presented a
counterfeit New York birth certificate and the other presented a
counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The agents observed that the
CBP officer checked the birth certificates against the driver's licenses
to see if the dates and names matched. The officer also asked what the
agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been
sightseeing. The CBP officer then returned the agents' documentation and
allowed them to enter the United States.
Washington: On May 24, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a
border crossing checkpoint in Washington. When the agents arrived at the
border, they noticed that no one was at the checkpoint booth at the side
of the road. Shortly thereafter, a CBP officer emerged from a building
near the checkpoint booth and asked the agents to state their nationality.
The agents responded that they were Americans. The CBP officer next asked
the agents where they were born, and they responded New York and West
Virginia. The agents then handed the CBP officers their counterfeit West
Virginia and Virginia driver's licenses. The officer looked at the
licenses briefly and asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The
agents responded that they had a day off from a conference that they were
attending in Washington and decided to do some sightseeing. The CBP
officer returned the agents' identification and allowed them to enter the
United States.
Corrective Action Briefing
We conducted a corrective action briefing with officials from CBP on June
9, 2006, about the results of our investigation. CBP agreed its officers
are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented
at land border crossings. CBP officials also stated that they fully
support the newly promulgated Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,6 which
will require all travelers, including U.S. citizens, within the Western
Hemisphere to have a passport or other secure identification deemed
sufficient by the Secretary of Homeland Security7 to enter or reenter the
United States. The current timeline proposes that the new requirements
will apply to all land border crossings beginning on December 31, 2007.
The proposed timeline was developed pursuant to the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The act requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to
implement a plan no later than January 1, 2008, to strengthen the border
screening process through the use of passports and other secure
documentation in recognition of the fact that additional safeguards are
needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United States.8 However,
the Senate recently passed a bill to extend the implementation deadline
from January 1, 2008, to June 1, 2009. Additionally, the Senate bill would
also authorize the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Homeland Security, to develop a travel document known as a Passport
Card to facilitate travel of U.S. citizens to Canada, Mexico, the
countries located in the Caribbean, and Bermuda.9 We did not assess
whether this initiative would be fully implemented by either the January
2008 or June 2009 deadline or whether it would be effective in preventing
terrorists from entering the United States.
6 See Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 70 Fed Reg. 52037.
Conclusion
The results of our current work indicate that (1) CBP officers at the nine
land border crossings tested did not detect the counterfeit identification
we used and (2) people who enter the United States via land crossings are
not always asked to present identification. Furthermore, our periodic
tests since 2002 clearly show that CBP officers are unable to effectively
identify counterfeit driver's licenses, birth certificates, and other
documents. This vulnerability potentially allows terrorists or others
involved in criminal activity to pass freely into the United States from
Canada or Mexico with little or no chance of being detected. It will be
critical that the new initiative requiring travelers within the Western
Hemisphere to present passports or other accepted documents to enter the
United States address the vulnerabilities shown by our work.
7 Although a passport will be the preferred form of identification for
entry into the United States, the Department of State and CBP anticipate
that other acceptable forms of identification will be the Border Crossing
Card (BCC or laser visa), the Customs and Border Protection Secure
Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), NEXUS, and
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program cards. BCC cards have a photo and
machine-readable biometric information; SENTRI cards are used for the
automated commuter lanes at the United States/Mexico border crossings;
NEXUS cards are issued to low-risk travelers for travel between Canada and
the United States; and FAST cards are used by low-risk truck drivers,
carriers, and importers at the United States/Canada border crossings.
8 Pub. L. No. 108-458, S: 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004).
9 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
S:135.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
Contact
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this testimony.
(192198)
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