Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force	 
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements  
for High-Demand Support Forces (05-SEP-06, GAO-06-962). 	 
                                                                 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on	 
terrorism has dominated the global security environment. Ongoing 
overseas operations and heavy reliance on reservists have raised 
concerns about how the Department of Defense (DOD) will continue 
to meet its requirements using an all-volunteer force. The Army, 
in particular, has faced continuing demand for large numbers of  
forces, especially for forces with support skills. GAO was	 
mandated to examine the extent of DOD's reliance on personnel	 
with high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate	 
reliance on these personnel. Accordingly, GAO assessed (1) the	 
combat support and combat service support skills that are in high
demand and the extent to which DOD officials have visibility over
personnel who are available for future deployment and (2) the	 
extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, data-driven	 
analysis of alternatives for providing needed skills.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-962 					        
    ACCNO:   A60205						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its    
Force Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet	 
Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces			 
     DATE:   09/05/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Army personnel					 
	     Army reservists					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Combating terrorism				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Inactive military personnel			 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military personnel deployment			 
	     Military personnel retention			 
	     Mobilization					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 

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GAO-06-962

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * Identifying Forces for Ongoing Operations
     * Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in
          * As the Supply of Available, Trained Personnel for Some High-
          * DOD's Process for Identifying Forces Is Labor Intensive, and
     * DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Analysis
          * The Joint Staff's Limited Analyses of Options for the 07-09
          * Human Capital Best Practices Rely on Data-Driven Analyses to
          * Several Options Exist to Increase the Army's and Other Servi
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
          * GAO Comments
     * Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification Process and
Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces

GAO-06-962

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 6
Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in Increasingly
Short Supply, and Data on Skilled Individuals Available for Future
Deployments Are Not Integrated into the Sourcing Process 10
DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Analysis of Options to
Enhance the Availability of Personnel with High-Demand Skills for Future
Rotations 15
Conclusions 23
Recommendations for Executive Action 24
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36

Table

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 7

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 5, 2006

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Global War on
Terrorism has required large numbers of active duty and reserve1 military
personnel to deploy for overseas missions, including ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) now faces the
unprecedented challenge of sustaining large-scale, ongoing operations with
an all-volunteer military force. As operations have evolved from combat to
counterinsurgency operations, the dynamic operational conditions in Iraq
and Afghanistan have made it more difficult for DOD to anticipate the
number of forces and the specific skills needed in the future. Thus far,
operations have continued to require large numbers of ground forces. The
combatant commander of U.S. Central Command is responsible for the area of
operations that includes Iraq and Afghanistan. The commanders, Joint
Forces Command and Special Operations Command, are charged with
identifying the forces that can be deployed to meet the combatant
commander's requirement considering global risks. While DOD has contracted
with private companies for a significant number of support activities,
Army forces-particularly those with combat support and combat service
support skills,2 such as military police and civil affairs, which reside
heavily in its reserve components-continue to be in high demand. The high
pace of operations and heavy reliance on reserve forces along with
recruiting challenges raise concerns about whether the U.S. military will
be able to continue to meet operational requirements in the future.

1 The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National
Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the
Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.

DOD has identified the need to transform into a more flexible and
responsive force by divesting itself of structure and forces from the Cold
War era and reorganizing its forces to meet new threats. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review Report,3 which outlines the defense program for
the future, recognizes that the department needs to rebalance military
skills between and within the active and reserve components and that the
reserve components need to be more accessible and ready to meet a range of
overseas and domestic missions. The report did not provide details on how
it will accomplish this. Further, as we have previously reported, the
department faces challenges in transforming forces for the future, such as
meeting increased requirements for high-demand skills. For example, we
have reported on problems in DOD's mobilization4 and demobilization of
reservists as well as the issues raised by continuing demands for reserve
personnel to deploy.5 As we reported in July 2005, the number of Army
Reserve personnel that can be deployed under current mobilization
authorities and deployment policies is declining and many personnel have
been moved among units to tailor forces and fill shortages in those
units.6 Further, we have reported that DOD lacks data that would give it
visibility over the health status of reserve members.7 We also reported
that while DOD intends to move military positions to high-demand skills
over time to provide more capability, the degree to which this initiative
will make more military personnel available for operational missions is
uncertain.8 Moreover, in November 2005 we reported that the services were
facing difficulty recruiting and retaining enlisted personnel and that
certain occupational specialties have been consistently over- or
underfilled.9

2 Combat support skills, such as military intelligence, provide
operational assistance for combat forces. Combat service support skills
encompass those activities that sustain all operating forces on the
battlefield, such as transportation.

3 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006).

4 Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and
equipment, activating or federalizing units and members of the National
Guard and reserves for active duty, and bringing the armed forces to a
state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Demobilization is
the process necessary to release from active duty units and members of the
National Guard and reserves who were ordered to active duty under various
legislative authorities.

5 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of
Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21,
2003), and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve
Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

6 GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.:
July 12, 2005).

The House of Representatives report10 accompanying the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200511 directed GAO to
examine the extent of DOD's reliance on personnel with high-demand skills
and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on these personnel. This
report is an unclassified version of a classified report. The classified
report contains additional details comparing operational requirements to
the Army's supply of trained personnel available to deploy and examining
DOD's strategies to meet the requirements for skilled forces. Accordingly,
this report assesses (1) the combat support and combat service support
skills that are in high demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and
the extent to which DOD has visibility over personnel available for future
deployment and (2) the extent to which the department has conducted a
comprehensive, data-driven analysis of its alternatives to continue
meeting requirements for high-demand forces. We concentrated our analysis
on the Army's combat support and combat service support skills because of
the continuing high demand for those forces and examined DOD's process to
identify forces for rotations, referred to as "sourcing."

To assess the key skills in high demand, we collected and analyzed data
provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the U.S.
Special Operations Command and examined how requirements from U.S. Central
Command have been met for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, we observed Department of the Army and Joint Staff conferences
to understand how the department made decisions when identifying support
forces for these operations. To assess what forces remain available to
meet future requirements, we examined documents provided by the Joint
Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Army, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), and we discussed with responsible officials
the challenges they face in identifying forces for deployment. To assess
the extent to which DOD has analyzed alternatives that will allow it to
continue to meet requirements for support forces, we reviewed our work on
human capital management, identified and examined DOD's initiatives to
assess alternatives, and held discussions with officials responsible for
identifying forces. We performed our review from February 2005 through
June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. We determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for
our objectives and in the context in which the data are presented. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

7 GAO, Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical Fitness of
the Reserve Force, GAO-06-105 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2005).

8 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of
Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense
Strategy, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).

9 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).

10 H.R. Rep. No. 108-491 at 305.

11 Pub. L. No. 108-375 (2004).

                                Results in Brief

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high
demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills,
including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials
charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what
personnel remain available for future rotations. Many of the high demand
skills reside heavily in the reserve component. However, the partial
mobilization authority and DOD and Army policy limit reservists'
involuntary active duty service duration and eligibility to deploy. As a
result, the pool of potentially deployable reserve personnel is decreasing
as operations continue, and DOD officials charged with identifying forces
for future rotations are challenged to identify personnel with high-demand
skills who are eligible to deploy. Facing shortages of available Army
personnel in some skills, DOD has used strategies such as reassigning and
retraining Army and other service personnel to meet the combatant
commander's requirements. To identify personnel who were available to
deploy and could be reassigned or retrained, officials charged with
identifying personnel for future rotations needed information from across
the services on personnel deployments and skills that was not readily
available. Lacking integrated, comprehensive personnel data, these
officials developed a labor-intensive process of holding a series of
conferences where service representatives and others came together to
discuss what forces were available to meet operational requirements based
on data gathered from various sources. However, our review of this process
showed that the data used were not comprehensive and did not provide a
complete picture of what forces were available across the services to meet
the requirements. For example, while the Army Reserve and National Guard
had data that identified available units, the data did not provide
complete information on how many individuals remained deployable or had
the required skills. While DOD is taking steps to link data on
individual's deployments and skill sets in its new defense readiness
reporting system that could be helpful in making decisions about forces
for future rotations, these data have not yet been integrated with DOD's
process for meeting combatant commander requirements. Until DOD
systematically integrates reliable personnel data into its process for
identifying forces, it will continue to have limited information with
which to efficiently match available forces with the combatant commander's
requirements and will not have analytical bases for requesting changes in
or exceptions to deployment policies if needed.

Although DOD has examined some options for supporting future rotations to
Iraq and Afghanistan, such as identifying personnel who can be retrained
in high-demand skills, it has not undertaken a comprehensive, data-driven
analysis of options based on complete and reliable data. A key reason why
DOD has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis is that DOD's process for
identifying forces was created to meet the combatant commander's specific
requirements for the next rotation cycle and does not take a long-term
view of forces that might be required in the future. Our prior work on
human capital management demonstrates the need for strategic workforce
planning, especially when the environment has changed significantly.12 The
Army's changing mission from combat to counterinsurgency operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan represents just such a change. Further, data-driven
analyses of the appropriate number of personnel and mix of personnel to
support key competencies are critical components in building a strategic
workforce plan. To meet operational requirements, DOD has used strategies
such as soliciting volunteers and retraining personnel; however, with
comprehensive data it could assess other options, such as transferring
more positions to high-demand areas, changing deployment lengths, and
increasing the size of the force. Each of these options has both
advantages and disadvantages. However, without comprehensive analyses to
examine the options and their related advantages and disadvantages, DOD
will be challenged to plan effectively for future requirements, while
considering global risks and meeting recruiting goals. Additionally,
without the ability to link personnel data to options, the services may
have difficulty deploying all reservists once before other reservists are
required to deploy for a second time, which is a key goal of OSD
officials. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have
complete information on which to base decisions about the size and
composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues, and
Congress will not have complete information with which to carry out its
oversight responsibilities.

12 GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

To facilitate decision making on how to meet the combatant commander's
requirements for high-demand skills, we are making recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense to (1) integrate comprehensive data that link skills
to deployment data in its process for identifying personnel for future
rotations and (2) conduct comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options
for meeting potential requirements for future rotations to Iraq and
Afghanistan. Though the department expressed concern about how we
characterized the current force identification process, it agreed with our
recommendations and cited actions it is taking to compile data that could
provide visibility over personnel and to conduct analyses of options for
meeting potential requirements for future rotations. DOD's comments and
our evaluation are presented in appendix II.

                                   Background

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD
has launched two major overseas military operations related to the Global
War on Terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing
military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in
Iraq. In both cases, operations quickly evolved from major combat
operations into ongoing counterinsurgency and stability operations, which
have continued to require large numbers of forces, ranging from about
138,000 personnel to about 160,000 personnel from 2004 to the present.
These operations have required large numbers of forces with support
skills, such as military police and civil affairs. While some of these
skills have been in high demand across the Army, some skills, such as
civil affairs, reside heavily in the Army's reserve components and
sometimes in small numbers of critical personnel.

Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of authorities.
As shown in table 1, two authorities enable the President to involuntarily
mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations. Full mobilization,
which would enable the mobilization of forces for as long as they are
needed, requires a declaration by Congress.

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces

Statute                        Provisions                                  
10 U.S.C. 12301(a)             Declared by Congress:                       
                                                                              
"Full Mobilization"               o  In time of war or national emergency  
                                     o  No limit on numbers of soldiers       
                                     called to active duty                    
                                     o  For duration of war plus 6 months     
10 U.S.C. 12302                Declared by the President:                  
                                                                              
"Partial Mobilization"            o  In time of national emergency         
                                     o  No more than 1 million reservists can 
                                     be on active duty                        
                                     o  No more than 24 consecutive months    
10 U.S.C. 12304                Determined by the President:                
                                                                              
"Presidential Reserve Call-up"    o  To augment the active duty force for  
                                     operational missions                     
                                     o  No more than 200,000 reservists can   
                                     be on active duty                        
                                     o  No more than 270 days                 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.

On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency
existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the partial
mobilization authority.13 As table 1 shows, this authority restricts the
duration of reservists' active duty to 24 consecutive months. OSD
implements the activation of reservists for Iraq and Afghanistan under
this partial mobilization authority. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing policy, programs,
and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of the reserve
components.

On September 20, 2001, OSD issued mobilization guidance that among other
things directed the services as a matter of policy to specify in initial
orders to reserve members that the period of active duty service would not
exceed 12 months. However, the guidance allowed the service secretaries to
extend orders for an additional 12 months or to remobilize reserve
component members as long as an individual member's cumulative service did
not exceed 24 months.

13 Executive Order 13223, September 14, 2001.

The services implement the authority and guidance according to their
policies and practices. To meet the continuing demand for ground forces,
in 2004 the Army extended the time that reservists must be deployed for
missions related to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
DOD's and the Army's current guidance states the goal that soldiers should
serve 12 months with their "boots-on-the-ground" in the theater of
operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and
demobilization activities, which could add several more months to the time
a reserve member spends on active duty. Further, senior DOD officials
state that under DOD policy, a reservist may not be involuntarily deployed
to either Iraq or Afghanistan more than once.14

Since September 11, 2001, there have been several rotations of troops to
support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Currently,
DOD refers to troop rotations based on troop deployment dates, although
deployments overlap calendar years. For example, the rotation of troops
that deployed or are scheduled to serve from calendar years 2004 through
2006 is known as the 04-06 rotation. The 05-07 rotation is composed of
troops expected to deploy and serve from 2005 through 2007. DOD recently
identified troops to deploy to either theater from 2006 through 2008 in
the 06-08 rotation. DOD recently has started planning for the 07-09
rotation to identify forces for deployments from calendar years 2007
through 2009.

Identifying Forces for Ongoing Operations

In response to the new security environment, in May 2005 the Secretary of
Defense approved a new integrated force assignment, apportionment, and
allocation process, known as Global Force Management. The new process is
designed to identify capabilities or forces to conduct operational
missions. The Secretary tasked the Joint Forces Command with
responsibility for developing global, joint sourcing solutions for
conventional forces15 in support of combatant commander requirements. A
Global Force Management Board, composed of general officer/flag
officer-level representatives from the combatant commands, the services,
the Joint Staff, and OSD, guides the process by reviewing emerging force
management issues and making risk management recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense.

14 Active duty personnel are not restricted by mobilization authority, but
DOD's policy is to allow active duty personnel to remain at home for at
least as long as they were deployed to overseas operations. Because the
deployment time to Iraq or Afghanistan is 12 months, the Army's goal is to
allow individuals or units 1 year at their home stations before they
deploy again.

Under the Global Force Management process, combatant commanders16
determine the capabilities they will need to support ongoing operations,
including identifying the numbers of personnel and specific skills
required to generate the capabilities. In generating their operational
plans, the combatant commanders consider whether private contractors or
civilians rather than military forces could provide any of the desired
capabilities. For missions that require military forces, the combatant
commanders request the forces needed to provide the military capabilities
from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who reviews and validates the
requirements. When the requirements are validated, the Chairman sends the
requirements for conventional forces to the Commander, Joint Forces
Command,17 and to the Commander, Special Operations Command, for special
operations forces such as civil affairs and psychological operations. The
commanders, Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command, are
responsible for identifying the forces that can be deployed to meet the
requirement considering global risks. The Army Forces Command, which
reports to the Joint Forces Command, is charged with identifying the Army
units and personnel that can be deployed to meet the requirements of the
combatant commanders. The Army Special Operations Command, which reports
to the Special Operations Command, is charged with identifying Army units
and personnel to be deployed to support combatant commanders'
requirements. The Secretary of Defense reviews the commanders' force
sourcing recommendations and approves or disapproves them.

15 The U.S. Joint Forces Command was assigned the responsibility for
identifying conventional forces in 2003. Prior to that time, the Joint
Staff performed this activity.

16 There are currently nine combatant commands: U.S. European Command,
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.
Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.

17 The U.S. Joint Forces Command does not provide forces for the U.S.
Strategic Command and the U.S. Transportation Command. These commands
identify forces for combatant commanders.

Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in Increasingly Short
Supply, and Data on Skilled Individuals Available for Future Deployments Are Not
                      Integrated into the Sourcing Process

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high
demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills,
including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials
charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what
personnel remain available for future rotations. While dynamic operational
requirements complicate force-planning efforts, the department will be
increasingly challenged to identify forces for future rotations from a
diminishing supply of readily available personnel under current deployment
policies. The supply of personnel already trained in high-demand skills
and eligible to deploy has decreased as operations have continued because
many personnel with these skills are reservists whose deployments and
duration of involuntary active duty service under the partial mobilization
authority are limited by DOD and Army policy. A primary strategy used to
meet requirements has been to identify personnel from other Army skills or
from other services that can be reassigned or retrained with high-demand
skills. However, DOD officials charged with identifying forces for future
rotations have not had a source of readily available, comprehensive
personnel data on deployment histories and skills across the services.
Lacking such information, DOD officials developed a labor-intensive
process involving a series of conferences with service representatives,
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command where officials identify
actions the services can take to meet the combatant commander's
requirements. DOD is taking steps to consolidate personnel, deployment,
and skill data to support force management decisions through a new defense
readiness reporting system. Until DOD systematically integrates such data
into its process for identifying forces, it will continue to use an
inefficient process and make important decisions about how to meet the
combatant commander's requirements based on limited information. Further,
without complete, reliable, and accessible data that provide greater
visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack analytical bases for
requesting changes in or exceptions to current deployment policies when
needed.

As the Supply of Available, Trained Personnel for Some High-Demand Combat
Support and Combat Service Support Skills Has Decreased, DOD Has Relied
Increasingly on Reassigning and Retraining Personnel to Meet Requirements

As operations have evolved from combat to counterinsurgency operations,
requirements for forces with some high-demand skills-especially combat
support and combat service support skills-have initially exceeded the
number of Army personnel trained and available to deploy.18 As a result,
DOD has relied increasingly on reassigning and retraining personnel to
meet combatant commander requirements. The skills where requirements have
initially exceeded the number of trained personnel include transportation,
engineering, military police, quartermaster, military intelligence, civil
affairs, signal corps, medical, and psychological operations. Many of
these high-demand skills reside primarily in the Army's reserve component.
Reservists serving in Afghanistan and Iraq have been activated under a
partial mobilization authority that enables the secretary of a military
department, in a time of national emergency declared by the President or
when otherwise authorized by law, to involuntarily mobilize reservists for
up to 24 consecutive months. DOD policy implementing the mobilization
authority states that any soldier who has served 24 cumulative months
during current operations is ineligible for any further activation unless
the reservist volunteers for additional duty. Further, DOD's policy is
that no reservist should be involuntarily deployed to either Iraq or
Afghanistan more than once, according to senior DOD officials.19
Consequently, as operations continue and the number of reservists who have
already deployed increases, it is likely to become increasingly difficult
for DOD to identify reserve personnel skilled in high-demand areas who are
eligible to deploy.

One of the primary strategies DOD has used to meet requirements for some
high-demand skills has been to reassign and retrain Army or other service
personnel.20 The percentage of requirements that have been filled by
reassigned or retrained Army personnel to some high-demand skills has
increased as operations have continued. In addition, the combatant
commander's requirements for Army skills increasingly have been met by
retraining personnel from the other services under Army doctrine. The
strategy of reassigning and retraining available personnel from other
services to fill combat support and combat service support requirements
supports the department's goal of deploying all reservists at least once
before any are involuntarily activated for a second time. This will likely
continue to be a primary strategy for providing high-demand forces as
operations continue and the pool of skilled personnel who have not
deployed continues to diminish. However, DOD officials charged with
identifying the personnel who could be reassigned or retrained to meet
requirements were challenged because they did not have information that
linked data on personnel who remained eligible to deploy and their skills
across the services.

18 This report is an unclassified version of a classified report. The
classified report contains additional details comparing operational
requirements to the Army's supply of trained personnel available to deploy
and examining DOD's strategies to meet the requirements for skilled
forces.

19 The Army's goal is to provide active duty personnel at least as much
time at home as time deployed.

20 In addition, personnel from other federal agencies have filled
requirements for some skills.

DOD's Process for Identifying Forces Is Labor Intensive, and Officials Charged
with Identifying Forces Have Not Integrated Comprehensive Data into DOD's
Sourcing Process

Officials charged with identifying forces for future rotations did not
integrate comprehensive data that would allow them to efficiently identify
what skilled personnel are available to be deployed because such data were
not readily available when the department began a rotational force
deployment schedule. Until the need to sustain large numbers of forces for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over a long period emerged, DOD
officials did not anticipate the need for detailed information on
individuals to support a rotational force schedule on a long-term basis.
While officials ultimately identified forces to meet the combatant
commander's operational requirements, our review of the force
identification process showed that the data used were not comprehensive
and did not give officials charged with identifying forces a complete
picture of what forces remained available across the services to meet the
requirements.

DOD officials involved with the process of identifying forces stated that
supporting the rotational force schedule has not permitted them the time
or resources to consolidate the services' personnel data. In the absence
of such data in the early stages of the ongoing operations, DOD officials
developed a labor-intensive process that involves conferences on service
and interservice joint levels21 where officials discuss various strategies
to assign forces because they do not have data that would provide
visibility over available forces. For example, while the Army Reserve and
National Guard had data that identified available units, the data did not
provide complete information on how many individuals remained deployable
or had the required skills. Through a series of conferences, officials
discussed what personnel remained available for future deployments based
on data they gathered from various sources. While DOD is taking steps to
link information about personnel and deployment history in its new defense
readiness reporting system that could be helpful in making decisions about
forces for future rotations, these data have not yet been integrated with
DOD's sourcing process.

21 This process is part of DOD's overall Global Force Management process.

The Joint Staff and the services participated in conferences to identify
forces for the 04-06 rotation in 2004 when identifying skilled personnel
available for deployment became more difficult because of previous
deployments, and the Army recognized the need to identify forces as early
as possible so that they could be retrained in high-demand skills. The
process, managed by the Joint Forces Command, has evolved over time as
operations have continued and now involves months of conferences held at
the service level and across the department where representatives of the
services, the Joint Forces Command, the combatant commander, and others
discuss strategies for meeting requirements.22

To meet the requirements for which the Army could not initially identify
available and trained forces, the Joint Forces Command formed working
groups composed of representatives from the services and Joint Forces
Command, among others, to identify personnel from any of the other
services who could be reassigned and retrained according to Army doctrine.
The work of the joint functional working groups culminated in another
conference, called the Final Progress Review, hosted by the Joint Staff at
the Pentagon. During the executive sessions of the Final Progress Review,
senior military leaders made decisions as to how the services, including
the Army, would fill the remaining requirements.

The process has enabled the department to fill requirements, but
efficiency was lost because these officials did not have data that linked
personnel skills and deployment availability so that trained forces
remaining available under current policies could be readily identified. As
a result, conference participants had to defer decisions until they could
obtain more complete data. Moreover, the process does not provide
assurance that forces identified are the most appropriate match
considering both current requirements and future readiness. Moreover, it
does not provide an ability to make future projections about whether DOD
will be able to meet future requirements or will need to consider other
alternatives. While DOD has begun compiling data through its new readiness
reporting system that links information about personnel according to
deployment history and skill set to provide better visibility of available
forces, and such data were available beginning in August 2005, this
information has not been integrated into the existing sourcing process.

22 To identify forces to meet civil affairs and psychological operations
requirements, the Special Operations Command conducts a series of meetings
separately from the Joint Forces Command process. However, for the 06-08
rotation, Special Operations Command officials also participated in the
Joint Forces Command process because requirements for civil affairs and
psychological operations exceeded the number of available, trained
personnel.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) has
taken steps to develop a new defense readiness reporting system, the
Defense Readiness Reporting System,23 that will link data on personnel
availability and skills, according to a senior agency official. The
system, which consolidates data from multiple sources, such as the
services and the department's manpower data center, is in the early stages
of implementation and validation. When fully implemented and validated,
the Defense Readiness Reporting System could provide the integrated data
that sourcing officials need. However, the information has not yet been
integrated into the sourcing process to identify the most appropriate
forces to meet current requirements from all the services considering
their other missions. In its written comments on a draft of this report,
DOD said that although integrated personnel data were not available during
the entire 06-08 sourcing process, this system could now provide data and
analytical support for identifying forces for future rotations. DOD said
that Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command officials
responsible for identifying forces should use the system to assist in
identifying available personnel in the future. Until DOD systematically
integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will
continue to use an inefficient process and make important decisions about
how to meet the combatant commander's requirements based on limited
information. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible data that
provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack
analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current
deployment policies when needed.

23 The Defense Readiness Reporting System is designed to provide data for
managing the global force and assessing readiness for mission performance.
According to current plans, the system will be fully operational in
September 2007. We did not assess the capability or data reliability of
this system.

DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Analysis of Options to
    Enhance the Availability of Personnel with High-Demand Skills for Future
                                   Rotations

Although DOD found ways to meet the combatant commander's requirements for
high-demand skills through the 06-08 rotation, it has not undertaken a
comprehensive analysis of options to support future rotations in Iraq and
Afghanistan should they continue for a number of years. DOD has not
undertaken a comprehensive analysis because its process for identifying
forces was created to meet the specific combatant commander's requirements
for the next rotation cycle. Our previous work has shown that in the face
of a changing environment, such as that of evolving military operations,
valid and reliable data on the number of employees required are critical
to prevent shortfalls that threaten the ability of an organization to
efficiently and effectively perform its mission.24 However, without a
comprehensive assessment of the most efficient and effective way to
prepare for future rotations, including comprehensive analyses of various
options, DOD will not be able to demonstrate a convincing business case
for maintaining or changing its strategies, such as retraining personnel
and seeking volunteers, for meeting a combatant commander's requirements.

The Joint Staff's Limited Analyses of Options for the 07-09 Rotation Quantified
Shortfalls by Units in Some High-Demand Skills

In summer 2005, the Secretary of Defense asked the Director, Joint Staff,
for a briefing on future force structure challenges for the next 2 to 3
years, although the Secretary did not specify how the review was to be
conducted. In response to the Secretary's request, in fall 2005, the Joint
Staff conducted a study, known as Elaborate Crossbow V, with the
objectives of predicting shortfalls of skilled personnel for the 07-09
rotation, recommending options to make personnel available for
rotations,25 and identifying risks that demonstrated the difficulties
officials face in identifying forces for future rotations, among other
objectives. However, the study was limited to units within selected
high-demand combat support and combat service support skills for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the 2005 assessment, Joint Staff
and DOD officials assumed that the combat commander's requirements for
support skills for the 07-09 rotation would be the same as the
requirements for the 06-08 rotation, and they compared these requirements
to estimates of available units.

Joint Staff officials were charged with developing models that would
assess the number of units that could be made available by using several
options, including requesting a new partial mobilization authority and
allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with residual time under
current mobilization authority. Joint Staff officials requested detailed
information from the Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command
on (1) the total inventory of units in the force structure, (2) the units'
arrival and departure dates from theater, (3) the number of days in
theater for the last rotation for individuals in the units, (4) the amount
of time individuals spent at home stations, and (5) the remaining time
available under the partial mobilization authority for reservists. The
Joint Staff officials planned to use the data in the models to determine
if changing the underlying assumptions associated with an option would
make more units available.

24 GAO-02-373SP .

25 The study did not specifically identify units or personnel to meet the
requirements.

When detailed data were available, Joint Staff officials were able to use
their models to test how changing policies would affect the availability
of units; however, detailed data were only available for civil affairs
units. The fact that an official from the Special Operations Command had
accurate and specific information on the civil affairs specialists' dates
of deployments and time remaining under the mobilization authority enabled
the Joint Staff officials to test how changing policies would change the
availability of units to meet the estimated requirement. For example, the
analysis showed that if DOD allowed the redeployment of reserve personnel
with remaining time under partial mobilization authority, more Army
reserve civil affairs companies would become available. However, according
to a Joint Staff official who assisted in developing the models, the Joint
Staff could not conduct a thorough analysis of other units with skills in
high demand because it did not have key data. While the Joint Staff's
limited review is a first step, it does not represent systematic analyses
of options for continuing to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
beyond the 06-08 rotation.

Human Capital Best Practices Rely on Data-Driven Analyses to Guide Decision
Making

Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number of
employees an agency requires are critical if the agency is to spotlight
areas for attention before crises develop, such as human capital
shortfalls that threaten an agency's ability to economically, efficiently,
and effectively perform its missions.26 We have designated human capital
management as a governmentwide high-risk area in which acquiring and
developing a staff whose size and skills meet agency needs is a particular
challenge. To meet this challenge, federal managers need to direct
considerable time, energy, and targeted investments toward managing human
capital strategically, focusing on developing long-term strategies for
acquiring, developing, and retaining a workforce that is clearly linked to
achieving the agency's mission and goals.

26 GAO-02-373SP .

The processes that an agency uses to manage its workforce can vary, but
our prior work has shown that data-driven decision making is one of the
critical factors in successful strategic workforce management.
High-performing organizations routinely use current, valid, and reliable
data to inform decisions about current and future workforce needs,
including data on the appropriate number of employees, key competencies,
and skills mix needed for mission accomplishment and appropriate
deployment of staff across the organizations. In addition, high-performing
organizations also stay alert to emerging mission demands and remain open
to reevaluating their human capital practices. The change in the Army's
missions from combat to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan represented a new environment, which provided DOD with the
opportunity to reevaluate the mix of personnel and skills and its
deployment policies to determine whether they are consistent with
strategic objectives.

Several Options Exist to Increase the Army's and Other Services' Supply of
Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills

The United States is in its fifth year of fighting the Global War on
Terrorism, and the operations associated with the war, particularly in
Iraq and Afghanistan, may continue. DOD planners are beginning to identify
forces for the 07-09 rotation. Based on our review of DOD's deployment
policies and our prior work, we identified several options that DOD could
assess to increase the supply of high-demand skills to support future
rotations. Each of the proposed options involves both advantages and
disadvantages, and some options could be implemented in conjunction with
others. Moreover, some options might be more appropriate for certain skill
sets than others. However, without key data and analyses, such as the
amount of time remaining under the partial mobilization authority for each
reservist, decision makers will have difficulty weighing which option(s)
would best achieve DOD's overall goals of supplying trained and available
forces to meet the combatant commander's requirements while considering
risks, future readiness, and recruiting and retention. Based on its
challenges in providing personnel with high-demand skills in previous
rotations, DOD will be faced with difficult choices on how to make
personnel in high-demand skills available for future rotations. Options
that could increase the supply of combat support and combat service
support skills for future rotations include the following:

           o  Retraining personnel within the Army and other services in
           high-demand skills. DOD could consider requiring the Army to
           reassign and retrain more of its personnel as well as relying on
           the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps to reassign and
           retrain available personnel for high-demand Army skills. As
           discussed previously, the Joint Forces Command has identified
           significant numbers of Army and other service personnel that the
           Army could retrain for some high-demand skills. As of February
           2006, the Joint Staff estimated that over 200,000 reservists from
           all the services' reserve components could be potentially
           available for deployment under current policies and might be
           retrained for high-demand skills, and the services are attempting
           to verify the actual availability of reservists. However it is
           unclear how many reservists can be reassigned and retrained to
           meet Army requirements for skills and rank. OSD officials said the
           department would consider waiving deployment policies for targeted
           high-demand skill personnel only when the services can provide a
           strong business case for the waiver. Instead, the department
           intends to rely on retraining personnel and seeking volunteers to
           meet future requirements. Joint Staff officials are currently
           seeking from the services more detailed data on potentially
           available personnel, such as their skills and whether they can be
           assigned and trained for deployment. A key advantage of this
           option is that Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel who
           have not deployed already have some military skills and
           experience, such as an understanding of the roles and
           responsibilities of their senior leaders and knowledge of military
           roles and missions that could be useful in supporting ongoing
           operations. In some cases, experienced personnel from the other
           services may have specialized skills that are similar to the Army
           skills in high demand; therefore, they would need less training
           than newly recruited Army personnel. A disadvantage to this option
           would be that the other service personnel would not be available
           to perform missions in their respective services. Further, members
           of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could potentially miss
           training and other opportunities to enhance their careers in their
           parent services. Moreover, recruiting and retention could be
           hindered because potential recruits or experienced personnel may
           not want to retrain for missions and skills other than those they
           originally planned to perform.

           o  Adjusting force structure through increasing the number of Army
           positions in combat support and combat service support by further
           transferring positions from low-demand skills to high-demand
           areas. Another option focuses on shifting positions in low-demand
           skills to high-demand skills, either temporarily or permanently.
           The Army plans to transfer some low-demand positions to
           high-demand skills, such as military police. In addition, DOD
           plans to expand psychological operations and civil affairs units
           by 3,700 personnel as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom and
           Operation Enduring Freedom, according to the 2006 Quadrennial
           Defense Review Report. However, according to a senior Army
           official, the Army is facing challenges in meeting its current
           planned time frames for reassigning positions because providing
           forces to meet the rotational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan
           has created delays in planned transfers of skills and modular
           force transformations may require permanent changes in the numbers
           and types of skills needed. The advantage of creating more units
           with high-demand skills is that continuing operational
           requirements could be met with more available, trained personnel.
           Further, if more units with the combat support and combat service
           support skills that are in high demand were in the active
           component, DOD would not face the restrictions that apply to
           reserve personnel. A major disadvantage to using this option is
           that the Army could encounter further delays in providing
           personnel with high-demand skills because, according to some
           service officials, limitations in the availability of training
           facilities, courses, and instructors may reduce the numbers of
           personnel who can be retrained in the short term.27 Many of the
           Army's skills in high demand reside primarily in the Army's
           reserve component. Therefore, if DOD's deployment policies remain
           unchanged, the Army will continue to face limitations on its use
           of reservists.

           o  Changing the number of days that active duty and reserve Army
           personnel may be in theater for a deployment. OSD could consider
           changing the duration of deployment for Army reservists or active
           duty personnel in theater, known as "boots-on-the-ground," from
           the current 12 months. Current departmental guidance states that
           Army personnel can serve no more than 12 months within the U.S.
           Central Command's theater of operations, not including the time
           spent in mobilization and demobilization activities.28 However,
           because mobilization and demobilization activities require about 3
           months prior to deployment and 3 months after deployment,
           reservists deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan typically serve about
           18 months on active duty. Under DOD's policy, the Army may use
           reserve members for a total of 24 cumulative months. Therefore, by
           the time reservists are deactivated after 18 months of
           mobilization, they have only 6 months of deployment eligibility
           remaining under DOD's policy-not enough to remobilize and redeploy
           for another yearlong overseas assignment. If the amount of
           "boots-on-the-ground" time was lengthened, from the current 12
           months to 18 months, the Army could more fully use reserve
           personnel under the partial mobilization authority. A key
           advantage of this option would be that a longer deployment period
           would permit forces to be in theater longer and provide more force
           stability and continuity, but individuals could be adversely
           affected by longer tours of duty. In addition, a slower rotational
           pace would provide force planners, such as the Army Forces
           Command, more time to identify available personnel and decide
           which personnel will best meet requirements for the next rotation.
           However, lengthening "boots-on-the-ground" time could have
           negative consequences for individuals. If reservists were away
           from their civilian careers and families for longer time frames,
           individual morale could erode, and DOD could face challenges in
           recruiting and retaining skilled personnel.

           Alternatively, the Army could shorten the "boots-on-the-ground"
           time and involuntarily activate reservists to deploy to Iraq and
           Afghanistan more than once. If deployments were shortened, Army
           reservists would not be separated from their civilian careers for
           long periods, and recruiting and retention challenges could
           lessen. However, a major disadvantage to shortening the Army's
           deployment lengths to, for example, 6 months is that the Army
           would have to mobilize and demobilize more personnel in a given
           period. According to Army and Army Forces Command officials, if
           reservists' deployments were shortened without change to the "one
           deployment only" policy, the Army would face critical personnel
           shortages in many skill areas. Any shortages of available reserve
           personnel would likely have to be filled with active duty
           personnel, increasing stress on the active force. Further, less
           time at home for active forces could disrupt training and lower
           readiness for future missions.

           o  Allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with time remaining
           under DOD's 24 cumulative month deployment policy. DOD's policy is
           that personnel should not be deployed for more than 24 cumulative
           months under the partial mobilization authority or involuntarily
           deployed overseas a second time, irrespective of the number of
           months served. However, if OSD allowed the redeployment of reserve
           personnel the services could more fully use reservists' 24 months
           of involuntary active duty. The major advantage to this option is
           that the Army would have access to reservists trained in
           high-demand skills. Further, changing the redeployment policy
           could enable the Army to decrease its reliance on retraining its
           personnel or other service personnel to meet the combatant
           commander's requirements. If the Army collected detailed data
           about the number of days a reservist served in theater and the
           remaining time available under the partial mobilization authority,
           it could compile a comprehensive list of reservists who could
           possibly deploy again and identify the time frames that they would
           be available. However, as discussed in the previous sections of
           the report, DOD and the Army do not have detailed data about
           personnel across the services readily available. A major
           disadvantage of this option would be that DOD would involuntarily
           activate large numbers of reserve personnel for multiple
           deployments. Multiple deployments could disrupt a reservist's
           civilian career and decrease his or her willingness to remain in
           the military. Another disadvantage of redeploying reservists would
           be that some reservists could be deployed more than once in 6
           years, which differs from the Army's plan under its force rotation
           model.29 The Army's force rotation planning model is designed to
           provide reservists more predictability in deployment eligibility.

           o  Increasing the Army's active duty end strength. Congress
           authorizes annually the number of personnel that each service may
           have at the end of a given fiscal year. This number is known as
           authorized end strength. In the National Defense Authorization Act
           for Fiscal Year 2006,30 Congress increased the fiscal year 2006
           end strength of the Army by 10,000-from 502,400 to 512,400.
           Congress also authorized additional authority for increases of up
           to 20,000 active Army personnel for fiscal years 2007 through 2009
           to support ongoing missions and to achieve transformation.
           However, current Army plans project a decrease in personnel to
           482,400 active duty forces by fiscal year 2011. The primary
           advantage of increasing the Army's end strength and funding
           associated positions would be that the Army could provide more
           active duty personnel to meet operational requirements for Iraq
           and Afghanistan, to accommodate the requirements for the modular
           force, and to help meet the Army's rotational force planning goal
           of having active personnel deployed for no more than 1 out of
           every 3 years. Budgetary concerns could be a major drawback to
           this option. Decision makers would have to weigh the increased
           cost of permanently increasing the Army's end strength. According
           to Army personnel and budget officials, in fiscal year 2005, the
           estimated cost to compensate, retain, and train each Army
           servicemember was over $100,000 annually. Further, recruiting
           personnel to meet the higher end strength levels may be difficult
           because of the uncertainty of how long operations in Iraq and
           Afghanistan may continue and whether new recruits could be
           targeted to high-demand skills. Additionally, the Army would
           require time to organize, train, and equip additional units to be
           ready to deploy for overseas operations.

           Using more personnel from the Individual Ready Reserve. Members of
           the Army's Individual Ready Reserve, which is composed of about
           112,700 members, include individuals who were previously trained
           during periods of active service but who have not completed their
           service obligations, individuals who have completed their service
           obligations and voluntarily retain their reserve status, and
           personnel who have not completed basic training. Most of these
           members are not assigned to an organized unit, do not attend
           weekend or annual training, and do not receive pay unless they are
           called to active duty. Members assigned to the Individual Ready
           Reserve are subject to recall, if needed, and serve a maximum of
           24 months.31 As of September 2005, of the total Army Individual
           Ready Reserve population of 112,700, about 5,200 personnel had
           been mobilized. An advantage of this option is that it could
           provide the Army with access to personnel who already have some
           military experience. These reservists could be retrained in their
           active duty skills or retrained in different skills. A significant
           drawback to this option would be the time needed to identify,
           locate, and contact members of the Individual Ready Reserve
           because, as we have reported previously, the services lack vital
           contact information.32 Further, based on the Army's recent
           experience when these reservists were recalled, exemptions and
           delays were encountered that could limit the services' ability to
           use these personnel in significant numbers.

           Identifying forces for future rotations is likely to become more
           difficult for DOD without comprehensive analyses of options for
           meeting potential future requirements. Without complete and
           accurate data that link deployment information and skill areas for
           military personnel to assist in developing and assessing the
           options, the department will continue to have limited information
           with which to make decisions about how to fill the combatant
           commander's requirements. Further, without a systematic evaluation
           of options, the current difficulties in providing personnel with
           the needed skills could worsen and requirements could go unfilled.
           As the Joint Staff's limited analyses of options showed, having
           complete and accurate data enables planners to clearly identify
           how alternative options would affect their ability to efficiently
           identify forces. Additionally, without linking data to options,
           the services may have difficultly deploying all reservists at
           least once before other reservists are required to deploy for a
           second time, which is a key goal of officials in OSD. If DOD had
           data-driven analyses of options to increase available skilled
           personnel, DOD leaders would have a better basis for considering
           policy changes and congressional decision makers would have more
           complete information with which to carry out their oversight
           responsibilities with regard to the size and composition of the
           force, mobilization policies, and other issues.

           Conclusions
			  
			  Although DOD has accommodated the continuing high demands for
           combat support and combat service support skills, primarily
           through retraining and reassigning personnel, the pool of
           available, trained, and deployable reservists is diminishing
           rapidly and could leave the department with significant challenges
           to identifying personnel for future rotations. Until DOD's
           planners and senior decision makers integrate in the sourcing
           process comprehensive, reliable data that link personnel by skills
           and deployment histories, they will have to continue to use an
           inefficient and time-consuming process to determine which
           personnel to deploy. Moreover, DOD will be limited in its ability
           to assess whether it can meet future requirements and to consider
           a range of alternatives for meeting requirements for skills that
           are in high demand. If DOD had better visibility over the
           personnel who are available to deploy and their skills, officials
           could reduce the amount of time they spend in identifying
           personnel for rotations, provide assurance that personnel
           identified are appropriately matched considering both the
           requirements and future readiness, and better manage the risks
           associated with moving personnel from other skills and missions to
           support future operations.

           In addition, without an integrated assessment that uses data to
           examine alternative courses of action, DOD planners and senior
           leaders will not be well positioned to make informed decisions on
           how to meet the requirements of future rotations, particularly if
           rotations continue at roughly the same level for the next few
           years. To meet requirements for future rotations, the department
           intends to continue its strategy of reassigning any eligible
           personnel the services can identify until all reservists from all
           services have been deployed at least once. However, there are
           additional options that DOD could consider that might increase the
           supply of personnel for high-demand skills for future rotations,
           although each option could have negative effects as well as
           positive ones. Data-driven analysis of options could help DOD
           senior leaders make difficult decisions to balance the advantages
           and disadvantages for each option and to apply the best-suited
           option to meet the varying requirements for the range of
           high-demand skills. Until DOD comprehensively assesses these
           options using detailed data linked to individual skills and
           deployment histories, DOD officials cannot weigh what options
           would be most advantageous to the combatant commander and whether
           potential negative effects on readiness for future operations
           would be minimized.

           Recommendations for Executive Action
			  
			  To facilitate DOD's decision making to meet the demands associated
           with the Global War on Terrorism and to increase the availability
           of skilled personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
           take the following two actions:

           o  Integrate comprehensive data that identify active and reserve
           personnel according to deployment history and skill set, including
           personnel who are available to deploy, with DOD's sourcing process
           before identifying combat support and combat service support
           personnel for the next rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan.

           o  Conduct comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for
           meeting potential requirements for future missions to Iraq and
           Afghanistan. Such analyses should include an assessment of
           options, such as using more personnel with support skills from the
           Army and other services; transferring more positions to
           high-demand areas; changing deployment lengths; and increasing
           Army end strength, which would increase the availability of
           personnel in high-demand skills.

           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
			  
			  The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) provided written
           comments on a draft of the classified version of this unclassified
           report. The department agreed with our recommendations and cited
           actions it is taking to implement them. The department's comments
           are reprinted in appendix II. In addition, the department provided
           technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its
           comments, DOD expressed concerns that our report (1) does not
           fully reflect the complicated task of providing forces for dynamic
           operational requirements and (2) subtly suggests that DOD's
           flexibility in meeting operational requirements is a sign of
           failed force management practices. It also stated that its use of
           the total force, not just the Army, enabled it to meet all
           combatant commanders' requirements to date. In addition, the
           department stated that our recommendations should more explicitly
           recognize and support the use of the newly developed Defense
           Readiness Reporting System. It stated that the total force
           visibility our recommendations call for exists in that system and
           that the Joint Forces Command and the Special Operations Command
           should use the detailed, individual-level information in that
           system to support their sourcing processes.

           We agree that the process developed to identify forces is very
           complex. Our report described the process for identifying forces
           for Army combat support and combat service support requirements.
           Moreover, our report discussed how DOD has met the demands and how
           officials used multiple strategies and relied on the total force
           to meet requirements for high-demand skills. The report does not
           make a judgment about the appropriateness of the outcomes of the
           sourcing process. Rather, the report demonstrates that the lack of
           data complicated the force identification process, and that force
           planners did not have visibility over detailed information on
           personnel or how current sourcing decisions would affect the
           readiness of the force. However, we have modified our report to
           reflect that DOD's effort to integrate personnel deployment and
           skill data and readiness information in the new Defense Readiness
           Reporting System represents a positive step toward providing the
           visibility over personnel and deployment histories that would be
           useful to force planners. Although this system has not yet been
           used to support the sourcing process, when it reaches full
           operational capability at the end of fiscal year 2007 and DOD has
           completed data validation, it could be a means to provide
           visibility over detailed information on personnel to improve the
           sourcing process, thereby fulfilling our recommendation. We have
           not modified our recommendation to require that DOD use the
           Defense Readiness Reporting System in its sourcing process because
           it is still in development.

           With respect to our second recommendation that DOD conduct
           comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for meeting
           continuing operational requirements, DOD agreed that all options
           should be considered and said it is conducting a variety of
           data-driven analyses to develop clearer options aimed at better
           positioning forces to meet current and future operational
           requirements. We believe that the department's approach will
           satisfy the intent of our recommendation if the department bases
           its assessments on data that provide decision makers complete
           information on the options and related risks.

           We are sending copies to other appropriate congressional
           committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
           available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
           the report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov.

           If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
           (202) 512-4402 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
           Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
           on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report
           are listed in appendix III.

           Janet A. St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
			  
			  To assess the combat support and combat service support skills
           that are in high demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we
           collected U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations
           Command data showing how U.S. Central Command's requirements were
           met for two rotations-calendar years 05-07 and calendar years
           06-08. Using the data, we compared the number of requirements from
           U.S. Central Command to the number of requirements that the Army
           could meet and determined whether and to what extent combat
           support and combat service support skills initially experienced
           shortages for the 05-07 and 06-08 rotations. To identify what
           strategies the Department of Defense (DOD) took to identify forces
           in cases where demand exceeded the initial supply, we examined the
           decisions made by officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and
           the U.S. Special Operations Command as documented in their data.
           We also compared the U.S. Central Command's documents, which
           identified the specific capabilities and deployment time frames,
           to the U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations
           Command data to identify specific instances where the Army
           reassigned and retrained its personnel or where personnel from the
           other services were reassigned and retrained to perform Army
           requirements. We also reviewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
           analyses of the U.S. Central Command's requirement and the actions
           taken by DOD to meet the requirements for the 04-06, 05-07, and
           06-08 rotations. Since the U.S. Joint Forces Command did not have
           complete data on how the department identified forces for the
           04-06 rotation, we attributed the 04-06 sourcing results to the
           Joint Staff. We met with an official in the Joint Staff
           Directorate for Operations to discuss our analysis comparing the
           combatant commander's requirements for the 05-07 rotation to DOD's
           05-07 sourcing decisions to ensure our methodology was comparable
           to the Joint Staff official's analysis. We also discussed our
           methodology of analyzing the U.S. Joint Forces Command's data for
           the 05-07 and 06-08 rotations with officials in the command's
           Joint Deployment Operations Division. To assess the reliability of
           the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data, we reviewed existing
           information about the data and the systems that produced them,
           interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data, and performed
           limited electronic testing. When we found missing information or
           discrepancies in the key data elements, we discussed the reasons
           for the missing information and data discrepancies with officials
           in the Joint Deployment Operations Division, U.S. Joint Forces
           Command. We determined that the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data were
           sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

           In addition, to assess the extent to which DOD has visibility over
           what forces remain available to meet future requirements, we
           collected and examined the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
           and Department of the Army briefings that document the decisions
           reached to identify the combat support and combat service support
           forces identified for the 05-07 and 06-08 rotations and held
           discussions with officials responsible for identifying forces at
           DOD organizations. We also examined DOD documents that contained
           information on deployment policies and the partial mobilization
           authority to understand how they affect the availability of active
           military personnel and reservists for future deployments. We
           discussed the implications of DOD's deployment policies and the
           status of identifying forces for rotations by obtaining
           testimonial evidence from officials responsible for managing these
           efforts at DOD organizations, including, but not limited to, the
           Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
           Readiness (Readiness, Programming and Assessment), the Joint
           Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Operations, the U.S. Joint Forces
           Command Joint Deployment Operations Division, the U.S. Special
           Operations Command Operations Support Group, the U.S. Army Special
           Operations Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, the U.S.
           Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
           Plans, and the U.S. Army Forces Command Plans Division. Because it
           did not fall within the scope of our review, we did not assess how
           the forces were trained or will be trained and equipped or the
           effects on recruitment and retention as a result of continuing
           operational needs. We also observed the Department of the Army's
           conference in April 2005 and the U.S. Joint Forces Command/Joint
           Chiefs of Staff conference in August 2005 to understand the
           process used by department officials to identify combat support
           and combat service support for the 06-08 rotation. As part of this
           effort, we observed working group meetings that were organized by
           combat support and combat service support skills to understand how
           department officials discussed and developed approaches to meet
           the combatant commander's requirements. At these conferences, we
           held discussions with officials to fully understand the challenges
           they face with using the available data to identify personnel.

           To determine what percentage of combat support and combat service
           support skills reside in the Army's active and reserve components,
           we collected skill set data from the Army's Office of the Deputy
           Chief of Staff for Operations and calculated the percentage of
           positions assigned to several support skills for each of the
           Army's components in fiscal years 2005 and 2011. In addition, we
           analyzed transcripts of public briefings and congressional
           testimony presented by DOD officials. To assess the reliability of
           the fiscal year 2005 and the projected fiscal year 2011 data on
           the composition of the Army's active and reserve components by
           skills, we reviewed existing information about the data and the
           systems that produced them, interviewed officials knowledgeable
           about the data, and compared our analysis to the Army's published
           analysis. We determined that the Army's data were sufficiently
           reliable for the purposes of our objectives.

           To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive,
           data-driven analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting
           requirements for high-demand forces, we met with officials in the
           Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
           Readiness (Readiness, Programming and Assessment), the Joint
           Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of
           Staff for Operations and Plans, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command
           Joint Deployment Operations Division to determine whether the
           department had plans to conduct assessments. We held further
           discussions with officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
           Directorate for Force Assessment to gain an understanding of the
           departmentwide study led by the Joint Staff. Further, we examined
           the Joint Staff's briefing documents to increase our understanding
           of the process used to conduct the study, the data and assumptions
           used during the study, and the results of the study. We discussed
           the status and implications of the study with officials who
           participated in the Joint Staff-led study, including the Under
           Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness,
           Programming and Assessment) and officials from the U.S. Joint
           Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division.

           To identify other options that DOD should consider to increase the
           availability of personnel with high-demand skills, we examined DOD
           documents containing information on deployment policies and the
           partial mobilization authority, held discussions with
           knowledgeable officials about mobilization authority and
           deployment rules, reviewed recently issued reports from think
           tanks related to providing forces for rotations, and reviewed our
           prior audit work related to end strength and initiatives to make
           more efficient use of military personnel. We identified criteria
           for examining force levels through our reports on strategic human
           capital management. Further, we reviewed our prior audit work
           related to recruiting and retention to enhance our understanding
           of the factors that affect the military services' ability to
           attract and retain personnel. Our work was conducted in the
           Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; Norfolk, Virginia; Atlanta,
           Georgia; and Tampa, Florida. We performed our work from February
           2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
           government auditing standards.

           Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  
See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 6.

                                  GAO Comments

The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter.
			  
			                          1. An objective of the report was to identify
                        high-demand skills, and as part of that assessment,
                        we observed and reviewed DOD's force identification
                        process to meet operational requirements for Iraq and
                        Afghanistan, including DOD's current policies and
                        plans. The report describes in detail the structures
                        developed to identify forces and identifies and
                        assesses major analytical tools used during the
                        process. Our report also acknowledges that the
                        department met the combatant commander's requirements
                        for the 04-06, 05-07, and 06-08 rotations. However,
                        we believe that the force identification process
                        could become more efficient if DOD officials charged
                        with identifying forces relied on comprehensive data
                        to inform decision making.

                                     2. We agree with the department that
                                     dynamic operational conditions in Iraq
                                     and Afghanistan have made it more
                                     difficult for the department to
                                     anticipate the number of forces and the
                                     specific skills needed in the future,
                                     and we have added text on pages 1 and 8
                                     to more fully reflect this challenge.
                                     DOD stated that as a result of the
                                     dynamic operational conditions, the
                                     Joint Forces Command-the DOD agent
                                     charged with filling combatant
                                     commanders' force requirements-used a
                                     variety of strategies, such as
                                     reassigning and retraining personnel to
                                     new skill areas (both within the Army
                                     and across service lines), capitalizing
                                     on joint solutions in like skill areas.
                                     According to DOD's comments, in every
                                     case, these forces have deployed only
                                     after having been fully certified as
                                     prepared for their theater missions and
                                     have performed admirably. Our report
                                     extensively described the process for
                                     identifying forces for Army combat
                                     support and combat service support
                                     requirements and illustrated in detail
                                     how DOD officials used multiple
                                     strategies to meet requirements for
                                     high-demand skills. Assessing the
                                     appropriateness of sourcing outcomes and
                                     how the forces were trained were outside
                                     the scope of this review.
                                     3. Our review focused on the Army
                                     because of the high-demand skills that
                                     were found predominantly in the Army,
                                     such as military police and civil
                                     affairs. We disagree that our report
                                     implies that DOD's flexibility in
                                     meeting uncertain operational
                                     requirements is a sign of failed force
                                     management. We point out, however, that
                                     as rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan
                                     have continued to require large numbers
                                     of ground forces, data demonstrate that
                                     the number of available, trained Army
                                     personnel has declined. According to DOD
                                     officials, strategies to meet combatant
                                     commander requirements, such as
                                     reassigning and retraining personnel,
                                     present their own challenges, such as
                                     costs for new training. Further, while
                                     our draft report recognizes the overall
                                     Global Force Management process, it
                                     focuses on the part of that process that
                                     identifies deployable personnel and
                                     develops strategies to meet the
                                     combatant commander's force requirements
                                     using available personnel.
                                     4. We believe that the Defense Readiness
                                     Reporting System could be a mechanism to
                                     provide force planners the visibility
                                     they need when it is fully operational.
                                     We have updated our report to reflect
                                     the status of the system; however, we
                                     did not assess the data reliability of
                                     that system.
                                     5. We do not make a recommendation as to
                                     what system DOD could use to supply
                                     force planners with the data they need
                                     for visibility over personnel skills and
                                     deployment histories. If the department
                                     decides to use the Defense Readiness
                                     Reporting System, it should be
                                     integrated into the force identification
                                     process.
                                     6. See the Agency Comments and Our
                                     Evaluation section.

           Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  
			  Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]

           Acknowledgments
			  
			  In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
           Director; Deborah Colantonio; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Whitney
           Havens; Catherine Humphries; James Lawson; David Marroni; Kevin
           O'Neill; Masha Pastuhov-Pastein; Jason Porter; and Rebecca Shea
           made major contributions to this report.

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27 We did not assess the training requirements and associated costs of
this option.

28 According to a July 30, 2004, OSD memo, "Force Deployment Rules for
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom," Marine Corps units
organized below the regimental/group level deploy for 7 months and Marine
Corps regimental/group headquarters deploy for 12 months. The Marine Corps
volunteers its forces as a surge capability if the on-ground situation
requires more forces. Air Force personnel deploy 120 days in a 20-month
cycle, and some Air Force personnel will deploy longer than a 120 days,
more than once in a 20-month cycle, or both. Navy personnel deploy for 6
months.

29 The Army has proposed a rotational model for its forces similar to
those of the other services with the goal of assuring reservists more
predictable deployments of no more than once in 6 years. See Department of
the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14,
2005). However, as we have reported, when it will be fully implemented is
not clear. See GAO-05-660 .

30 Pub. L. No. 109-163 at 401 (2006).

31 Individual Ready Reserve personnel who have served on active duty up to
24 months, under 10 U.S.C. 12302, may be retained on active duty under 10
U.S.C. 12301(d), with their consent.

32 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency
of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
21, 2003).

(350889)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-962

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on the
link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202)
512-4402 or [email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-962 , a report to congressional committees

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification Process and
Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism
has dominated the global security environment. Ongoing overseas operations
and heavy reliance on reservists have raised concerns about how the
Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to meet its requirements using
an all-volunteer force. The Army, in particular, has faced continuing
demand for large numbers of forces, especially for forces with support
skills.

GAO was mandated to examine the extent of DOD's reliance on personnel with
high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on
these personnel. Accordingly, GAO assessed (1) the combat support and
combat service support skills that are in high demand and the extent to
which DOD officials have visibility over personnel who are available for
future deployment and (2) the extent to which DOD has conducted a
comprehensive, data-driven analysis of alternatives for providing needed
skills.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) integrate personnel data
with the force identification process and (2) assess options to increase
the availability of personnel with high-demand skills. DOD agreed with the
recommendations, though it expressed concerns about how GAO characterized
the current force identification process.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required large numbers of
ground forces, creating particularly high demand for certain combat
support and combat service support skills, such as military police and
civil affairs. After determining which requirements can be met with
contractor personnel, DOD then determines how to meet requirements for
military personnel. DOD officials charged with identifying forces have not
had full visibility over the pool of skilled personnel available for
future deployments. For some skills, the combatant commander's operational
requirements have exceeded the initial supply of readily available trained
military forces. DOD has met demands for these skills through strategies
such as reassigning or retraining personnel. However, many of the skilled
personnel in high demand are reservists whose involuntary active duty is
limited under the current partial mobilization authority and DOD and Army
policy. To meet requirements, officials charged with identifying personnel
for future rotations developed an inefficient, labor-intensive process to
gather information needed for decision making because integrated,
comprehensive personnel data were not readily available. DOD is taking
steps to develop comprehensive data that identify personnel according to
deployment histories and skills; however, until DOD systematically
integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will
continue to make important decisions about personnel for future rotations
based upon limited information and lack the analytical bases for
requesting changes in or exceptions to deployment policies.

Although DOD has developed several strategies to meet the combatant
commander's requirements for previous rotations, it has not undertaken
comprehensive, data-driven analysis of options that would make more
personnel available for future rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A key
reason why DOD has not conducted comprehensive analyses of options is that
its process for identifying forces focuses on one rotation at a time and
does not take a long-term view of potential requirements. Prior GAO work
has shown that reliable data about current and future workforce
requirements are essential for effective strategic planning, as is the
data-driven analysis of the number of personnel and the skill mix needed
to support key competencies. With data that link deployment dates and
skills, DOD could assess options, including using more personnel with
support skills from the Army and other services, transferring more
positions to high-demand areas, and changing deployment lengths. Each of
these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, without a
comprehensive analysis of the options and their related advantages and
disadvantages, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively for future
requirements and to meet recruiting goals. Additionally, without linking
data and options, the services may have difficulty deploying all
reservists once before other reservists are required to deploy for a
second time, which is a key DOD goal. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense
and Congress will not have complete information with which to make
decisions about the size and composition of the force, mobilization
policies, and other issues.
*** End of document. ***