Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but
Significant Challenges Remain (11-SEP-06, GAO-06-955).
In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, a key element of its effort
to transform military operations to be network centric. Using
emerging software-defined radio technology, the JTRS program
plans to develop and procure hundreds of thousands of radios that
give warfighters the capability to access maps and other visual
data, communicate via voice and video, and obtain information
directly from battlefield sensors. The JTRS program has
encountered a number of problems, resulting in significant delays
and cost increases. The program is currently estimated to total
about $37 billion. Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force
transformation, Congress directed GAO to continue its ongoing
review of the JTRS program. This report (1) assesses whether a
recent restructuring puts the program in a better position to
succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the
successful fielding of JTRS.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-955
ACCNO: A60606
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces
Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain
DATE: 09/11/2006
SUBJECT: Cost analysis
Defense procurement
Military communication
Military radio
Procurement planning
Program evaluation
Program management
Risk assessment
Risk management
Schedule slippages
Strategic planning
DOD Joint Tactical Radio System
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GAO-06-955
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
GAO
September 2006
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain
GAO-06-955
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain
What GAO Found
The proposed JTRS restructuring-a plan DOD approved in March 2006- appears
to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others have documented in
recent years. While still meeting key requirements, including those
related to DOD's network centric transformation effort, the revised
approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments
rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once.
Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later
increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature
critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system
before committing to production. JTRS program management has also been
strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Program Executive Office
(JPEO). The more centralized management structure should help the program
improve oversight and coordination of standards, system engineering, and
development of the radios.
The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management and
technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details of the
restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies, independent cost
estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to develop
migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking capabilities will be
used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of these activities is
needed to ensure the JTRS program is executable. There are also a number
of longer-term technical challenges that the JTRS program must address.
For example, the proposed interim solutions for enabling network
interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be developed.
In addition, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and
meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has also been a
longstanding challenge that must be overcome. Furthermore, operating in a
networked environment open to a large number of potential users has
generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has
resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving
certification process from the National Security Agency. At the same time,
the program must address the need to obtain and sustain commitments and
support from the military services and other stakeholders-a challenge that
has often hampered joint development efforts in the past. The extent to
which DOD overcomes these challenges will determine the extent to which
the program manages cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports
JTRSdependent military operations.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Program Restructuring Appears to Address
Many Concerns with
JTRS 14 Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain 19 Conclusions 28
Recommendations 28 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel
Bandwidth, and Data Rates for Selected Legacy
Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms 5 Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS
Program/Product Offices until
2005 9 Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November
2005 12 Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains 13 Table 5:
Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other
Radio Systems from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring
Organization 14 Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program
15
Figures
Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview 7 Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on
Product Schedules 17
Page i GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
GAO Government Accountability Office
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
JPEO Joint Program Executive Office
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
September 11, 2006
The Honorable Thad Cochran Chairman The Honorable Robert C. Byrd Ranking
Member Committee on Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable David Obey Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a
major transformation of its military operations-one that will rely on
network centric communications to improve force information sharing,
collaboration, and situational awareness and, thereby, enable more rapid
and effective decision-making and speed of execution on the battlefield.
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, initiated in 1997, is a
key effort in this transformation. By capitalizing on emerging
software-defined radio technology, the program plans to develop and
procure hundreds of thousands of JTRS radios, which are expected to
interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the warfighter with
additional communications capability to access maps and other visual data,
communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command,
and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors.
Although JTRS offers the potential to address key communications
shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities, the program
has encountered a number of problems, including unstable requirements,
immature technologies, and aggressive schedules, which have resulted in
significant cost increases and delays. In August 2003, we reported that
the lack of a strong, joint-management structure presented significant
challenges to the program's ability to control costs 1-currently estimated
1GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System
Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
Page 1 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
to total about $37 billion. In response, Congress directed DOD to
strengthen program management, and in February 2005, DOD established a
Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to manage the JTRS program and its
various components. Following JPEO's assessment of the program, the
Defense Acquisition Board directed JPEO to come up with a plan to
restructure the JTRS development effort-a plan that DOD approved in March
2006.
Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force transformation, Congress
directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program. 2 This
report (1) assesses whether the recent restructuring puts the program in a
better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the
successful fielding of JTRS.
We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess program
progress and risks, we reviewed program restructuring data from the JTRS
JPEO, including cost, schedule, and performance data. We also reviewed the
fiscal year 2007 budget request and projected future year budget requests.
We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and service organizations
and reviewed reports produced by Defense organizations. More details about
our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
Results in Brief
The recent restructuring of the JTRS program appears to put the program in
a better position to succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate
risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities. The incremental
approach reflects the military services' most urgent priorities for a
mobile, flexible communications and networking capability and defers the
development of some of the more challenging requirements to later
increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature
critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system
before committing to production. DOD expects that JTRS program management
through the JPEO and other structural changes will improve oversight and
coordination of standards and development of the radios. The centralized
management structure is also empowered to manage
2
Conference Report, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for
the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, And For Other Purposes, House
of Representatives Report 109-359, December 18, 2005
Page 2 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
development costs, which are expected to total $2.1 billion more than
originally projected between fiscal years 2006 and 2011. In addition, the
restructuring attempts to facilitate information-sharing and competition
by ensuring government purpose rights 3 to contractor-developed products.
While the restructuring appears to address many of the problems that
affected JTRS in the past, several management and technical challenges
still remain. JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring,
including test and evaluation plans and formal acquisition strategies.
Estimated program costs also require independent review and validation and
the services need to work out migration and fielding plans for the radios.
Completing these activities and obtaining DOD's approval of the completed
JTRS program restructuring are essential to ensuring the JTRS program is
executable. Over the longer term, the program faces several key management
and technical challenges. For example, although the new joint management
structure for JTRS is a significant improvement over the previous
fragmented program management structure, joint development efforts in DOD
have often been hampered by an inability to sustain requirements
commitments and funding support from the military services and other
department stakeholders. Regarding technical challenges, integrating the
radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size,
weight, and power limitations has been a long-standing challenge and
remains so. Operating in a networked environment-open to a large number of
potential users-has also resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging,
and still evolving information assurance certification process from the
National Security Agency. Furthermore, the proposed interim technical
solutions for enabling network interoperability among different JTRS
variants have yet to be designed and developed.
We are recommending the Secretary of Defense ensure that the activities
required for completing the JTRS restructuring reflect stable
requirements, knowledge-based acquisition strategies, and comprehensive
test plans, as well as to develop plans for fielding JTRS radios. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations.
Government purpose rights means the rights to (1) use, modify, reproduce,
release, perform, display, or disclose technical data or computer software
(or computer software documentation) within the government without
restriction and (2) to release or disclose technical data or computer
software (or computer software documentation) outside the government and
authorize persons to whom release or disclosure has been made to use,
modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose the work for
U.S. government purposes.
Background
The JTRS program was initiated to exploit advancements in softwaredefined
radio technology and provide battlefield commanders with superior
information capabilities. Since its initiation in 1997, the program has
experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls, due
primarily to immature technologies, unstable requirements, and aggressive
schedules. In an effort to address these problems, the program was
restructured in March of this year. However, due to JTRS' lengthy
development path, DOD has had to continue buying other tactical radios-
currently estimated to cost $11 billion-to support its communication
needs.
JTRS Was Initiated to Address Long-Term Military Communications Needs
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on
smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and
communication capabilities. The single function hardware design of DOD's
existing radio systems lack the functionality and flexibility necessary to
achieve and maintain information superiority or to support the rapid
mobility and interoperability required by today's armed forces. To support
new operational or mission requirements, DOD determined that the large
number and diversity of legacy radios in use would require wholesale
replacement or expensive modifications.
Software-defined radios such as JTRS primarily use software rather than
hardware to control how the radio works and, because they are
programmable, JTRS offers significant flexibility to meet a wide variety
of needs. Rather than developing radios that are built to different
standards and operate on different fixed frequencies, as was the case in
the past, JTRS is to be a single, interoperable family of radios based on
a common set of standards and applications. The radios are expected to not
only satisfy the requirements common to the military's three operational
domains-air, sea, and ground-but be able to communicate directly with many
of DOD's existing tactical radios. To facilitate interoperability, JTRS
will develop a set of waveforms (software radio applications) designed
with the same operating characteristics as many of DOD's existing radios.
4
4
A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency,
modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. In general
usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of characteristics, for
example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, and UHF), modulation techniques (FM,
AM), message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS usage, the term
waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur
from the user input to the RF output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is
implemented as a reusable, portable, executable software application that
is independent of the JTRS operating system, middleware, and hardware.
Depending on operational needs, different waveforms could be loaded onto a
JTRS radio and used to communicate with a variety of other radios.
In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is to contribute to DOD's
goal of network centric warfare operations by introducing new wideband
networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of data and
speed at which the data can be transmitted. As such, the waveforms would
facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to support the
decisionmaking of tactical commanders at all echelons. Table 1 compares
the frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and data rates of selected
legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms.
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and Data
Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms
Frequency band Nominal channel Data rate
Waveform Legacy (millions of bandwidth (thousands of bits
Hertz (MHz)) (thousands of per second (Kbps))
Hertz (KHz))
Single Channel Airborne 30 - 88 Voice: 16 Data:
Ground andRadio .075 - 16
System (SINCGARS) 25
Enhanced Position Data: 57 or 228
Location Reporting
System (EPLRS) 420 - 450 3,000
High Frequency Voice and Data: 11
distinct data
rates between .075
2 - 30 3/6/12 - 9.6
Have Quick Voice: 16 Data:
225 - 400 25 .075 - 16
Tactical Data Voice: 2.4 and 16
Information Data: 28.8 - 1,137
Link-Joint
(TADIL-J) 960 - 1,215 3,000
Wideband Networking
a 2 - 2,000 25 - 30,000 Data: up to 5,000
Soldier Radioa 2 - 2,000 13,000 Data: up to 1,000
Joint Airborne
Network - Tactical 2 - 2,000 To be determined To be determined
Edge
Ultra High Frequency Satellite
Communications Demand A ssigned Voice and Data: .075 -
56,
Multiple Access (UHF SATCOM 225 - 400 5 and 25 or 64
DAMA)
New
Source: GAO analysis of April 2003 JTRS Operational Requirements Document,
Annex E.
aThe Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform are actually
families of waveforms. The Wideband Networking Waveform family consists of
four different waveforms and the Soldier Radio Waveform family consists of
three different waveforms.
In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios
would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice, data,
and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For example, a
four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle could be
programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, Have Quick, the
Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All four
channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be transferred
from one channel (or network) to another through a "gateway" device
implemented with hardware and software.
Figure 1 depicts the JTRS operational overview.
Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview
Source: JTRS Operational Requirements Document, April 2003. Notes: IBS:
Integrated Broadcast Service GPS: Global Positioning System UAV: Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle EKMS: Electronic Key Management System IA: Information
Assurance C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Developing JTRS is a significant challenge. Because JTRS is intended to
operate on the battlefield where there is no fixed infrastructure of cell
towers, fiber optic lines, and other network components such as routers
and switches, the radios must be powerful enough to transmit and relay
information wirelessly over long distances, maintain network linkages and
quality of service while on the move, and ensure that communications and
the network itself are secure. Development of the individual waveforms and
their ability to function effectively on different JTRS sets is critical
to the success of JTRS. The Wideband Networking Waveform, for example,
will require complex software development and include over 1.6 million
lines of software code. To ensure the waveforms perform as intended, they
will go through a rigorous certification process-one that involves testing
the functionality, portability, 5 interoperability, and security aspects
of the waveforms when operating on production representative JTRS radios.
To manage JTRS' development, DOD established a Joint Program Office and
service-led program/product offices in the late 1990s. Table 2 summarizes
the general management structure of JTRS until 2005, at which time it was
changed.
Porting the waveform involves the transfer of the software from one
operational environment (hardware, operating system, etc.) to another.
Page 8 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS Program/Product Offices until 2005
Program/Product Office (lead service) Responsibilities Major milestones
Joint Program Office o JTRS Software Communications Architecture o
Development of Software
o Waveform applications and associated Communications Architecture
started in cryptographic algorithms 2000
* Certifying compliance of hardware and o Development of waveform
applications
* software with the architecture and associated cryptographic
algorithms started in 2002
o Ensuring overall joint interoperability
Cluster 1 (Army) o Radios for ground vehicles and helicopters o System
development started in 2002
Cluster 5 (Army) o Handheld and manpack radios o System development
started in 2004
o Radios for use in weight- and powerconstrained platforms, such as
sensors and weapons systems
Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (Air o Radios for aircraft o Pre-system
development started in 2004 Force/Navy) Cluster o Radios for maritime
platforms
o Radios for fixed-site locations
Multifunctional o Radios for selected o System development
Information airborne platforms started in 2004
Distribution equipped with
System-JTRS (Navy) Multifunctional Information
Distribution System terminals
Special Operations o Handheld radios for Special System development
Command Operations Forces o started in 2002
Source: GAO analysis of JTRS documents.
Note: A JTRS cluster was the term used to describe a grouping of platforms
with similar requirements.
JTRS Program Restructured to Address Cost, Schedule, and Performance
Problems
Achieving JTRS' technical requirements has proven to be a significant
challenge. In 2001, an independent assessment of the program identified
numerous concerns, including the program's aggressive acquisition approach
and schedule, unstable requirements, and an ambiguous management decision
chain. 6
In our reviews, we have found similar problems. For example, the JTRS
Cluster 1 program-which includes development of the Wideband Networking
Waveform, the waveform intended to serve as the main
6
The independent assessment was requested through the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' Tri-Service
Assessment Initiative. The Tri-Service Assessment Initiative was founded
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1998 to address software
acquisition issues. Subsequently, Independent Expert Program Reviews,
which serve as the basis for the Defense Acquisition Program Support, were
incorporated into the DOD acquisition regulation and became part of the
Defense Acquisition Guidebook.
conduit of information among Army tactical units-began development with an
aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined
and stable requirements. As a result, the program struggled to mature and
integrate key technologies and was forced to make major design changes.
These factors contributed to significant cost and schedule problems that
led DOD to stop key development work and propose restructuring the
program. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios proved even more
challenging, given the radios' smaller size, weight, and power needs. 7
Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest also slowed
progress of the Cluster 5 program.
Subsequent to our reporting that the JTRS program lacked a strong,
jointmanagement structure for resolving requirements and funding
differences among the services, 8 Congress directed DOD to develop a plan
for managing JTRS's development under a single joint program office. Under
DOD's plan, all JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a
single JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer, established within the Navy's
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The JPEO's assessment of the JTRS
program revealed that
o the program evolved from a legacy radio replacement program to a
network centric radio program without a re-baselining of program
impacts;
o requirements significantly changed and never stabilized;
o the complexity of information assurance/security problems were not
anticipated; and
o the program was executing at high technical, schedule, and cost risk.
To get the program on track, JPEO was directed by DOD to come up with a
proposal for JTRS that addressed the services' priority requirements, was
technically doable, and could be executed within a reasonable budget. In
November 2005, JPEO presented three program options reflecting different
sets of capabilities and development costs (see table 3). Each
7
The smallest Cluster 5 radio weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84
pounds for Cluster 1.
8
GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System
Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
Page 10 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
option included a specific mix of form factors 9 and waveforms for each of
the services. For example, under option 3, the Marine Corps would use
4-channel vehicle radios, capable of operating two or three legacy
waveforms and up to three new waveforms, as well as 2-channel manpack
radios operating one or two legacy waveforms and one or two new waveforms.
The Army would also use 4-channel vehicle radios, but with the capability
to operate three or four legacy waveforms and two or three new waveforms,
as well as 1-channel and 2-channel radios operating the Soldier Radio
Waveform for its sensors and weapons systems. The Air Force would use a
4-channel Multifunctional Information Distribution System terminal form
factor operating two legacy waveforms and one new waveform. The Navy would
use the same form factor, operating one legacy and one new waveform, as
well as a ship form factor operating one new waveform.
Form factors is a term used to describe the various types of radios used
by the services. For example, there are radios that will be customized for
ground vehicles, manpacks, aircraft, ships, and embedded in sensors and
weapons systems.
Page 11 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November 2005
Option 1: Option 2: Option 3:
Execute program within Transformational Transformational plus
Waveform existing budget profile capability only some legacy capabilities
Legacy
SINCGARS o o
EPLRS o
High Frequency o
Have Quick o
TADIL-J (Link 16) o o o
New
Wideband Networking o o
Solider Radio o o o
Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge a o o
Mobile User Objective System b (or UHF SATCOM o o
DAMA)
Additional fiscal year 2006-2011 development
cost, in billions NA $1.8 $2.1
Total fiscal year 2006-2011 development cost,
in billions $1.9 $3.7 $4.0
Prior development cost (through fiscal year
2005), in billions $1.5 $1.5 $1.5
Total development cost, in billions $3.4 $5.2 $5.5
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO.
a
A wideband waveform for airborne platforms.
b
A waveform for a new satellite communication system that will provide low
data rate voice and data communications capable of penetrating most
weather, foliage, and manmade structures.
Note: NA = Not applicable.
DOD selected option 3, which establishes a priority for developing a
networking capability mainly through the introduction of transformational
wideband waveforms. Since future JTRS capabilities are still planned,
option 3 also reflects an incremental approach to developing full JTRS
capabilities. The initial option 3 increment is referred to as JTRS
Increment 1. 10
10
Subsequent to the selection of option 3, DOD determined that the Have
Quick waveform was not a priority and thus would not be included in the
Increment 1 development effort.
Page 12 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
To implement JTRS Increment 1, JPEO established a new organizational
structure for JTRS that includes three domains and a program for "special
radios." Table 4 summarizes the general management structure of JTRS after
the program restructuring.
Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains
Domain Responsibilities
Ground Communications and networking capabilities for vehicles, dismounted
soldiers, sensors, and weapons systems
Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site Communications and networking capabilities
for aircraft, ships, and ground fixed site platforms
A JTRS radio to replace the Multifunctional Information Distribution
System terminals on selected platforms, including the F/A-18 aircraft
Network Enterprise Waveforms, gateways, and common networking services solutions
Special Radios JTRS Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio used by Special
Operations Forces
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO.
It is likely that the first users of operational JTRS radios will be Navy
F/A-18 aircraft equipped with Multifunctional Information Distribution
System-JTRS radios and Special Operations Forces using the JTRS Enhanced
Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio. Initially, the radios will operate legacy
waveforms only.
Delay in JTRS Development Has Required Investments in Other Radio Systems
From the start of JTRS development through the end of this year, DOD
estimates that $11 billion has been required to buy other radio systems.
11 Of this total amount, $1.3 billion has been used in fiscal years 2005
and 2006 to procure SINCGARS radios to meet urgent operational needs in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, because of delays in the development of
JTRS, several users depending on JTRS have had to make adjustments and
procure interim radios to meet operational needs. For example, the Army
11
In August 1998, shortly after the establishment of the JTRS program, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence identified a need to stem the continuing
efforts by the services to acquire unique radios and communications
terminals. All component efforts to initiate any contracting activity
related to the development and acquisition of any radio system were to be
held in abeyance. However, service, command, or agency acquisition
executives were allowed to submit requests for exceptions to the policy
through the JTRS Joint Program Office. Eventually, the waiver process was
suspended. As of May 2005, the services no longer had to request a JTRS
waiver; they only had to notify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration of plans to acquire non-JTRS radios
to meet current operational needs.
is in the process of procuring radios for several of its existing
helicopter platforms and a new development effort to outfit and equip
individual ground soldiers. Since JTRS development will require at least
several more years, it is likely that the estimated $11 billion investment
in legacy radios will continue to grow. Table 5 shows the annual
procurement amounts for radio systems other than JTRS from 1998 through
2006.
Table 5: Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other Radio Systems
from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring Organization
Dollars in millions
Combatant commands and Year Army Air Force Marine Corps Navy agencies
Total
0 $7.74 0 0 0 $7.74
$91.55 $19.25 $1.30 $1.28 $24.87 $138.25
2000 220.89 65.68 25.63 63.74 0.60 376.54
2001 142.72 4.00 0 72.79 1.52 221.03
2002 54.02 1.62 2.38 60.56 71.17 189.75
2003 199.99 78.66 51.07 49.94 0.30 379.96
668.18 104.10 42.58 326.32 3.29 1,144.47
1,564.52 2,289.17 314.43 368.79 0.75 4,537.66
aaaaa
2006 4,170.00
Total $2,941.87 $2,570.22 $437.39 $943.42 $102.50 $11,165.40
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD.
a
DOD provided only a total estimate for 2006.
Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with JTRS
The proposed JTRS restructuring approach appears to address past concerns
with the program that GAO and others have documented in recent years.
While still meeting the needs of key users such as Future Combat Systems,
the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in
increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities
all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred
to later increments. In addition, through the establishment of the JPEO
and other structural changes, JTRS program management has been
strengthened and has become more centralized. The centralized management
structure should help the program control development costs and improve
oversight through the coordination of standards, system engineering, and
development of the radios and waveforms. A new governance structure is
also expected to help ensure appropriate oversight and establish clear
lines of accountability while, according to JPEO officials, the
establishment of an information repository is expected to help facilitate
the delivery of waveform and operating system software to the radios'
hardware developers. These efforts, if carried out, should help the
restructured JTRS program address previous cost, schedule and performance
problems. Table 6 summarizes the significant changes to the JTRS program
as a result of the restructuring.
Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program
Parameter Pre-JPEO JPEO
Management Structure Decentralized Centralized/Enterprise
Requirements Approach Unconstrained (Big Bang) Constrained (Incremental)
Program Milestones Compressed Expanded
Waveform Deliveries Expansive Reduced
JPEO Assessment of Program High Moderate Risk
Source: GAO analysis.
New Approach Emphasizes Developing Capabilities in Increments
and Deferring Some Requirements
A central feature of the JTRS program restructuring is its
evolutionary acquisition approach. The program plans
to develop capabilities in increments rather
than attempt to field a complete capability all at once,
which was the previous approach. Specifically, the program plans to defer
or reduce costly and non-transformational requirements
to later increments. At the same time, the approach
prioritizes the development of
networking capabilities, primarily through the development of three
networking waveforms, and the ability to interoperate with key legacy
radios. These capabilities are critical to key dependent users such as the
Army's Future Combat Systems and the implementation of DOD's vision of
network centric operations warfare. Program officials noted several
requirements that were reduced or deferred from the previous program to
later increments:
o Reduced number of waveforms: The number of waveforms to be delivered
for the first increment has been reduced from 32 to 11. The waveforms
deferred to later increments are all non-networking legacy waveforms.
Reducing the number of waveforms allows the program to focus the
initial JTRS increment on developing and testing the critical
networking waveforms as well as some of the more commonly-used legacy
waveforms. In addition, the smaller number of waveforms reduces
porting efforts.
* Reduced number of radio variants: The number of variants to be
delivered for the first increment has been reduced from 26 to 13.
For
* example, only 9 of the 15 small form radios will be developed for
the first increment. Reducing the number of variants provides
relief in the hardware design and platform integration work,
allowing the program to focus the initial JTRS increment on
developing the variants most critical to key dependent users such
as the Future Combat Systems.
o Reduced number of waveform combinations per radio variant: The
original intent of JTRS was that most waveforms would operate on most
radio variants. However, DOD determined that porting 32 different
waveforms onto 26 different variants would have been an immense and
costly undertaking. In addition, operating numerous waveforms
simultaneously on a JTRS radio would have substantially increased
power demands. By reducing the number of waveform combinations per
variant, program officials expect to both reduce porting efforts and
more easily meet size, weight, and power requirements on some
variants. In addition, program officials expect that reducing the
number of waveforms operating on each radio will help to mitigate
interference.
o Interim solutions for network interoperability: To achieve DOD's
desired networking capabilities, the waveforms must be able to
interoperate reliably and securely with each other. The optimal
solution is to have this functionality performed inside JTRS radios as
it reduces the overall footprint of the communication network.
However, technologies and radio designs are not mature enough at this
point to develop an interoperability capability that would function
inside individual JTRS radios. Thus, for the initial increment,
interoperability between the waveforms may be facilitated by
developing gateway devices that reside outside of the JTRS radio. This
should help developers mitigate integration challenges.
While lesser capabilities will be delivered in the first increment, the
program could still significantly enhance current communications and
networking capabilities through the development of the networking
waveforms and the ability to interoperate with the more commonly used
legacy radios, such as SINCGARS. The incremental approach should also make
the program more achievable by allowing more time to develop and test key
technologies. Figure 2 shows the impact of the expanded schedule on
Increment 1 product milestones. Despite the lengthened schedule, the
program schedules are still intended to address the needs of key users
depending on JTRS such as Future Combat Systems.
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules
Ground Mobile radios
Low-rate production decision Multiservice operational test and evaluation
Handheld, Manpack and Small Form radios
Low-rate production decision Full-rate production decision
Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site radios
System development and demonstration decision Low-rate production decision
2005 2006 2007 20082009 2010 2011
Original New
Source: GAO analyses of JTRS doment.
JTRS Program Management Strengthened
With the creation of the JPEO, DOD has established a stronger, more
centralized joint management structure. Under the new management
structure, all JTRS domains-Ground; Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site;
Special Radios, and Network Enterprise-report directly to the JPEO while
the JPEO reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As such, the JPEO controls
development funding and has full directive authority over standards,
systems engineering, and developing radios and waveforms. Such a
comprehensive authority did not exist in the previous structure where
authority was fragmented and the domains reported to individual service
executives. Also, to facilitate more effective management, the JPEO has
realigned various components of JTRS. Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 are now
combined under the new Ground domain while the waveform development was
placed under the newly established Network Enterprise domain. Meanwhile,
DOD removed the Army helicopter requirements from the JTRS Cluster 1
program and transferred them to the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site
domain. With the new strengthened management structure, the program is in
a better position to manage requirements growth and control costs.
A key feature of the new management structure is the new governance model
which aims to streamline decision making and empower the oversight
capacity of the JPEO. We previously reported that the existing management
structure had been unable to get the services to reach agreement over new
and changing requirements expeditiously. 12 Under the prior structure, key
decisions were made by consensus, which made it difficult to resolve
interservice differences involving requirements and funding. This resulted
in a lengthy decision-making process. Under the revised governance
structure, stakeholder disagreements are elevated to and decided by a JTRS
Executive Council and later by a JTRS Board of Directors, if necessary.
The purpose is to make the acquisition process timelier, provide
appropriate oversight, and establish clear lines of accountability.
Another key feature of the new management structure, according to JPEO, is
ensuring greater information sharing among JTRS components takes place to
better facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating system software
to the radios' hardware developers. JTRS components depend on several
software developers to deliver the required waveforms to their programs
for integration onto their particular radios. This involves transfers of
complex contractor-owned software code. Because waveforms are such an
integral part of the radio's functionality, delaying their integration
onto the radio's hardware could have a ripple effect on a radio's overall
development. To mitigate this risk, the JPEO has established an
information repository where waveform developers would place their
waveform software code for the purposes of information sharing. 13
Operating system software code-critical to ensuring the development of a
common software architecture-would also be placed in the repository. DOD
intends to hold government-purpose rights to all of the software
specifications in the repository, so that no single contractor will have
complete control over JTRS software development. While the information
repository is new and its usefulness is yet to be determined, it remains
to be seen whether and to what extent the contractors will be willing to
share their software code. If successful, the JPEO expects that
information sharing will not only make available software code to hardware
developers more timely, but will also contribute to technology innovation
as developers attempt to enhance existing software code. In
12
GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System
Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
13
According to JPEO, while a library of completed waveforms was envisioned
under the original JTRS management structure, the JPEO has implemented
this concept by permitting incremental builds of software to be placed in
the library. The library is now called the information repository.
Page 18 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
addition, because the software will be shared with many different vendors,
the JPEO expects to enhance competition among hardware developers.
Furthermore, it is hoped that by developers reusing the same software code
in the information repository, waveforms will be more standardized,
cutting down on development and integration costs.
Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain
While the restructuring appears to place JTRS in a better position to
succeed, several management and technical challenges remain. The JPEO must
first finalize the details of the restructuring, including completing
formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and
evaluation plans. DOD also needs to revise the Concept of Operations so
that it effectively describes how JTRS networking capabilities will be
used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of these activities is
needed to ensure the program is executable. Over the longer term, the
program faces key management and technical challenges that must be
overcome. For example, although the new joint management structure for
JTRS is a significant improvement over the previous fragmented program
management structure, joint development efforts in DOD have often been
hampered by an inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support
from the military services and other stakeholders. Regarding technical
challenges, developing waveforms and porting them to radio hardware is a
complex and lengthy undertaking. The proposed interim technical solutions
enabling network interoperability have also yet to be developed. In
addition, operating in a networked environment open to a large number of
potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information
assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging,
and still evolving certification process from the National Security
Agency. Moreover, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms
and meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a
longterm challenge and remains so.
Details of the Restructuring yet to Be Finalized
According to program officials, efforts to complete the restructuring have
taken time and delays have occurred in gaining approval to go forward. As
such, important details of the restructuring have yet to be finalized.
This includes completing acquisition strategies, independent cost
estimates, test plans, and obtaining final approval of an amended
operational requirements document. These activities are currently in the
process of being completed. However, until each of these activities is
completed and DOD ensures that requirements are firm, acquisition
strategies are knowledge-based, cost estimates are realistic, and test
plans provide insight into the achievement of the networking capability
priorities, there will be uncertainty as to whether the JTRS program, as
restructured, is executable.
o Operational Requirements Document: An Operational Requirements
Document contains the requirements and operational parameters for a
system. The most recent JTRS Operational Requirements Document was
approved in April 2003. To reflect the restructured approach of
achieving JTRS requirements incrementally, it was necessary to develop
an amendment to the April 2003 Operational Requirements Document. The
process to develop the amendment has been led by the Joint Staff and
involved input from the requirements community, the services, and
other stakeholders; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has
provided oversight of the process. Through the process of developing
the Operational Requirements Document amendment, some `"gaps" in
requirements have been identified by some stakeholders. In particular,
the proposed amendment to the Operational Requirements Document
includes a requirement for certain JTRS sets to be able to interface
with a new satellite system called the Mobile User Objective System.
Some stakeholders, however, have identified a need for the manpack and
handheld radios to also have this capability. According to agency
officials, if the capabilities are deferred to later increments, then
the Mobile User Objective System will have to consider options other
than JTRS to meet its terminal requirements. Also, according to agency
officials, the amendment process is nearly complete. The amendment to
the JTRS Operational Requirements Document is awaiting final approval
from the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
o Acquisition strategies: Individual acquisition strategies need to be
developed for each JTRS component. An acquisition strategy outlines
the business and technical management approach to achieve program
objectives within the constraints imposed by resources. A
well-developed knowledge-based strategy minimizes the time and cost
required to satisfy approved capability needs, and maximizes
affordability throughout the program lifecycle. 14 Until the
acquisition strategies are complete, there is less assurance that a
well-developed and executable approach is in place. This could affect
program cost estimates, and fielding plans. Furthermore, an
acquisition strategy serves as the basis for other important
activities such as testing plans and contract negotiations. As such,
any delay in the acquisition strategy could have a ripple effect and
delay these activities.
Our past work has shown that systems without sufficient knowledge-stable
requirements, mature technologies, and the funding needed to meet
requirements-will take longer and cost even more than promised and deliver
fewer quantities and other capabilities than planned.
Page 20 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
o Test and evaluation plans: Plans for the overall structure and
objectives of the test and evaluation program are also under development
and need to be completed. Given the radio's unprecedented performance
capabilities and technical complexity, it is critical that a
well-developed test and evaluation plan be developed. Not only is the
testing of individual radio components important, but testing the network
with sufficient scale is critical to demonstrating transformational
capabilities. At this point, it is not clear how DOD plans to test the
entire JTRS network including interoperability between all the networking
waveforms. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation recommended
that the Army develop a test and evaluation strategy that supports an
evaluation of network maturity as part of Future Combat Systems'
production.
In addition to the activities that JPEO needs to accomplish to finalize
the restructuring, DOD also needs to complete its revisions to the Concept
of Operations and determine transition and fielding plans for JTRS.
According to JPEO officials, when JTRS development was first initiated,
DOD envisioned replacing virtually all legacy radios with JTRS sets. Since
then, there has been an evolution of thinking in DOD about networked
operations. Although the Concept of Operations for JTRS has gone through
several iterations, according to JPEO the current version does not
effectively provide a joint vision of how JTRS networking capabilities
will be used. How JTRS radios will be used may also be affected by the
large increase recently in fielding thousands of newer versions of legacy
radios. The recent fielding of so many new legacy radios to the current
force may call into question the affordability of replacing them
prematurely with JTRS sets. If sufficient detail is not provided by the
Concept of Operations, then JTRS development efforts may be inadequate and
operational goals may be unfulfilled. Moreover, if migration and fielding
plans are not driven by an effective Concept of Operations, the production
costs and quantities for JTRS may need to be adjusted.
Untested Management Structure
DOD has historically had difficulty managing joint programs primarily
because of inter-service differences involving funding and requirements.
To succeed, the new JTRS management structure will have to meet those
challenges. According to DOD officials, obtaining the necessary resources
to execute JTRS development will be one such challenge. The proposed
funding arrangement is for the services to individually request and secure
development funding that then gets rolled into a centralized account under
JPEO control. As currently proposed, each service will fund equal shares
unless there are service-unique development efforts, which would be funded
by the proponent services. The services will also be required to
fund the integration of the radio into their respective platforms. Some
agency officials expressed concern whether the services would have the
budget capacity to fund integration once the radio sets were available for
installation. Stakeholders also need to come to agreement on requirements
by obtaining final approval of the amended Operational Requirements
Document. If requirements are not thoroughly vetted through the various
stakeholders and agreed upon, there is greater risk of future requirements
growth or decreased stakeholder support for the program.
Regarding JPEO's new governance model, the decision-making model is
untested. The JPEO expects the system development decision for the JTRS
Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site product line to be decided through the
new governance structure.
Program Continues to Face Significant Technical Risks
While the program has reported making progress in maturing technologies
and stabilizing system designs, several technical challenges must still be
overcome to achieve program success.
Waveform Development and Portability
The development of waveforms-particularly the networking waveforms-remains
a technically challenging and lengthy effort. This effort involves complex
software development and integration work by contractors as well as
oversight by the government through a series of rigorous tests and
certifications from various authorities, including the JTRS Technology
Laboratory, National Security Agency, and the Joint Interoperability Test
Command. If waveforms are not available as planned, potential schedule
delays or performance impacts could occur to key dependent users,
particularly the Future Combat Systems.
The JTRS program began with the assumption that the Wideband Networking
Waveform would meet the networking waveform needs for all the services.
However, the program underestimated the complexity of meeting the Wideband
Networking Waveform requirements and the services' needs within the size,
weight, and power constraints of the various user platforms. As a result,
DOD began developing two additional networking waveforms to address
specialized capabilities. The Soldier Radio Waveform is being designed for
radios with severe size, weight, and power constraints such as the
handheld, manpack, and small form radios. The Joint Airborne
Network-Tactical Edge waveform is being designed to better enable time
critical airborne operations. The networking waveforms are the core of the
JTRS networking capability and their availability is crucial to the
program's success. The three networking waveforms are in various stages of
development:
o Wideband Networking Waveform: The Wideband Networking Waveform-
designed for JTRS ground vehicle radios-is the farthest along in
development of the three networking waveforms. Nevertheless, while
initial functionality has been demonstrated through a contractor
demonstration held in the summer of 2005, some technical challenges
remain. The demonstration showed that ground mobile radios operated in
a network with the Wideband Networking Waveform and were able to
connect to the network as well as reconnected when the network was
disrupted. However, the Wideband Networking Waveform also experienced
various performance problems including limited data throughput,
latency, and start-up time. 15 Program officials believe these
performance problems have largely been corrected. Nonetheless, the
demonstrated network linked only 4 users, far fewer than the required
250. In addition, program officials noted that meeting the Wideband
Networking Waveform requirement for voice communications over a mobile
ad hoc network remains challenging.
o Soldier Radio Waveform: The Soldier Radio Waveform is a low power,
short range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size,
weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and
small form radios. Currently, the waveform is transitioning from a
science and technology program. 16 Program officials expect to award a
sole source contract in fiscal year 2007 for further development of
the waveform. While the Soldier Radio Waveform has demonstrated some
functionality, program officials noted that it will take significant
effort to transition the waveform from a science and technology
project to meet full operational requirements. In particular, program
officials are concerned about the waveform's insufficient security
architecture and how this may affect porting it onto a JTRS radio.
Given these concerns, the waveform's development schedule may be
ambitious. Future Combat Systems is the driver of near-term Soldier
Radio Waveform requirements. The success of the first spin-out of
Future Combat Systems is dependent on the delivery of the certified
waveform ported to selected JTRS small form radios.
o Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge: The Joint Airborne Network-
Tactical Edge is an extremely low latency networking waveform
optimized
15
Latency refers to the amount of time it takes data to travel from source
to destination. Together, latency and bandwidth define the speed and
capacity of a network.
16
The Soldier Radio Waveform capability will leverage the Soldier Level
Integrated Communications Environment program being developed as a science
and technology project under the Army's Communications-Electronics
Research, and Development and Engineering Center.
Page 23 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
for airborne platforms. Like the Soldier Radio Waveform, the Joint
Airborne Network-Tactical Edge is transitioning from a science and
technology project and program officials expect to award a sole source
contract in fiscal year 2006. 17 For Increment 1, the waveform will
initially operate on a Multifunctional Information Distribution
System-JTRS radio and will have limited capabilities. Program officials
expect that it will be upgraded to full networking functionality in
subsequent increments.
After waveforms are developed, they must be ported to radio hardware.
According to agency officials, porting waveforms onto JTRS radios has been
more technically challenging than originally expected. The intent of JTRS
is that waveforms be highly portable meaning that waveforms can be
transported and adapted to a variety of radio platforms at a cost lower
than the cost of redeveloping the waveform again for a radio set with
different hardware components. When waveforms are developed, the software
code is designed to operate on a particular radio's hardware architecture.
When the same waveform is transported to different hardware, changes to
the software code may be necessary to ensure proper integration of the
waveform onto the new hardware. The more costly the integration effort is,
the less portable the waveform.
Although the JTRS Software Communications Architecture specifies design
rules for waveform software to enhance portability across different
hardware, the limited experience of porting waveforms thus far has shown
significantly higher costs and longer schedules than anticipated. The JPEO
noted that government direction and oversight as well as coordination
between waveform, operating environment, and hardware developers needs
improvement. Officials are also concerned about the porting of the
networking waveforms being developed in science and technology programs to
meet the full requirements for the Soldier Radio Waveform and the Joint
Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform. To make this happen the waveforms
will need to become compliant with the JTRS Software Communications
Architecture, incorporate network management functions, and develop
required security capabilities. Efforts to rework software to effectively
transfer the waveforms, therefore, could result in cost and schedule
problems.
The Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge capability will leverage the
Tactical Targeting Network Technology program being developed as a science
and technology project under the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
Page 24 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions
Interoperability of Networking Waveforms
The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network interoperability
have yet to be developed. To achieve DOD's desired networking
capabilities, waveforms must be able to communicate and interoperate with
each other. However, technologies and radio designs are not mature enough
at this point to develop an interoperability capability that would
function inside individual JTRS radios. As a result, the program plans to
meet network interoperability requirements for the initial increment
through the use of gateways. A gateway is a separate node within a network
equipped to interoperate with another network that uses different
protocols. As such, key functions facilitating interoperability between
waveforms may be performed outside of the JTRS radio rather than inside.
At this point, the JPEO is assessing different options to achieve the
gateway function and anticipates that development will start in 2007. The
JPEO expects that the development of the gateway will result in a separate
acquisition decision but is uncertain as to whether it will be acquired
through the forthcoming Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site system development
contract or through a separate contract. In addition, the JPEO is
uncertain as to whether the gateway will be employed as a separate piece
of hardware or whether it will leverage an existing radio in the network.
According to JPEO officials, employing the gateway as a separate piece of
hardware could result in additional size, weight, and power risks for some
platforms. JPEO officials also noted that without a fully functioning
gateway capability, users operating in separate networks will not be able
to communicate directly with one another. For example, a ground soldier
operating on a Soldier Radio Waveform with a handheld radio would not be
able to call directly for fire support from an aircraft operating on the
Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge Waveform with a Multifunctional
Information Distribution System-JTRS radio.
Hardware Integration/Size, Weight, and Power
Integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting their
respective size, weight and power limitations remains a challenge. To
realize full networking capabilities, the radios require significant
amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and
power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the result
of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated.
While progress has been made in meeting the size, weight, and power
requirements for the ground mobile radios, developers still face some
challenges. The JPEO has already delivered 30 partially functioning
prototype radios-built on production assembly lines-to the Future Combat
Systems program. However, until the ground mobile radios demonstrate
greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality-a key source of power
consumption-using a fully functioning prototype, size, weight, and power
concerns remain. The delivery of new power amplifiers that are currently
being developed as part of a science and technology program by the Army's
Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center
could help address these concerns. According to center officials, the
power amplifiers are approaching maturity and have demonstrated
significantly higher power output and improved efficiency over the current
amplifier used on the ground mobile radios. The JPEO expects to begin
receiving the new power amplifiers this September.
Meeting the requirements of the handheld, manpack, and small form radios
continues to be the most challenging of all JTRS components because of
their smaller size, weight, and power constraints. Program officials
expect that the requirements relief provided through the restructuring
should help to address size, weight, and power requirements. For example,
the restructuring reduces the number of waveforms required to operate on
each radio, which is expected to reduce power demands, thereby reducing
the size and weight demands. In addition, like the ground mobile radios,
the JTRS small form radios are also expected to benefit from the delivery
of new wideband power amplifiers. However, these technologies are still
maturing. Moreover, the handheld, manpack, and small form radio designs
are not stable.
Security
The JTRS requirement to operate applications at multiple levels
of security in a networked environment has resulted in significant
information assurance challenges. Developers not only have to be concerned
with traditional radio security issues but also must be prepared to
implement the features required for computer and network security. One
challenge is that military software defined radio technology capable of
processing data at multiple security levels is immature. In addition, the
requirement to operate in an open networked environment allows greater
access to external networks increasing the number of potential users and
the likelihood of threats to the network. These challenges will require
the development of new technologies, obtaining certification through a
rigorous process by the National Security Agency, and accommodating an
expected growth in security requirements.
The complexities and uncertainties involved with JTRS security
certification were illustrated when the National Security Agency
determined that the design for the Cluster 1 radio was not sufficient to
meet newly identified operational requirements from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to operate in a networked environment. This resulted
in the need for additional security requirements and significant hardware
design changes to the radio's security architecture that ultimately
resulted in significant cost increases. National Security Agency officials
noted that one of the key lessons learned from the Cluster 1 experience
was that security requirements need to be considered early in the
development of the radio. As such, the JPEO has taken steps to better
coordinate with the National Security Agency to meet security
requirements. Specifically, the National Security Agency currently has a
representative in each JTRS domain and participates in management reviews,
design reviews, vendor technical exchanges, and weekly conference calls.
The National Security Agency is also expected to be a member of the JTRS
Executive Council and advisory member of the JTRS Board of Directors in
the new JTRS governance structure. Both National Security Agency and JPEO
officials noted that coordination and cooperation between the agencies has
significantly improved since the JPEO was established. In addition,
National Security Agency officials do not expect the other JTRS radios
will encounter the same design problems experienced by the Cluster 1 radio
as contractors now have a greater understanding of security requirements.
Further, the restructured schedules for Ground domain radios appear to be
sufficiently aligned to receive National Security Agency certification in
time to meet the needs of Future Combat Systems. Nevertheless, because of
the complex software encryption and networking requirements, security will
continue to be a challenge for all JTRS components.
Spectrum Availability
JTRS radios will require considerable radio spectrum for effective
operations especially when using the new networking waveforms that could
operate within several different bands of radio spectrum. However,
obtaining sufficient radio spectrum allocations is problematic because the
program must compete with other military and civilian users. Radio
spectrum in general is becoming more saturated and demand for spectrum is
increasing. Efforts are underway by the JPEO to work through the required
DOD spectrum certification processes; however, certification of software
defined radios remains a challenge because, according to spectrum
management officials, these processes were designed around hardware-based
radios and may not fully support the certification of cutting edge
technologies such as JTRS. DOD has recognized the shortcomings of the
existing processes and has taken initial steps to address them. Most
recently, DOD has worked with the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration to stand up a permanent software defined radio
working group that would study how to proceed.
Conclusions
U.S. military forces' communications and networking systems currently lack
the interoperability and capacity DOD believes are needed to access and
share real-time information, identify and react quickly to threats, and
operate effectively as a joint force. JTRS is critical to providing the
capabilities to support DOD's future vision of net-centric warfighting.
Yet, since its inception, the JTRS development effort has struggled due to
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations. As a
consequence, DOD and the military services have had to make adjustments
and acquire interim communications solutions to meet their near-term
communications requirements.
The restructuring approach developed by JPEO and approved by DOD holds
promise for delivering much needed communications capability to the
warfighters. However, given the program's troubled development history,
putting the approach into action will be a challenge and require strong
and continuous oversight. Key details of the JTRS restructuring- including
assurance that there are stable operational requirements, knowledge-based
acquisition strategies for each domain's product lines, and effective test
plans that reflect the priority of developing networking capabilities-must
be finalized and approved by DOD. In addition, significant programmatic
and technical risks-including further technology maturation, certification
of waveforms and radios, and implementation of the new JTRS governance
model-must still be overcome. Furthermore, detailed migration and fielding
plans that are consistent with a well-developed concept of operations are
needed to ensure an affordable and operationally effective use of JTRS
radios in the future. Any manifestations of these risks will likely
increase program costs, delay fielding, or reduce planned capabilities. To
the extent JTRS delivers less capability than planned, future warfighting
concepts may have to be altered as well as the design of weapons systems
such as Future Combat Systems that are dependent on JTRS.
Recommendations
To enhance the likelihood of success of the JTRS program, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense:
o before approving the detailed program plans for each JTRS domain,
ensure that they reflect stable and well-defined requirements;
knowledgebased acquisition strategies; clear and meaningful test plans
that address the need to not only test individual JTRS components but
the overall networking capabilities of JTRS as well; and, funding
commitments necessary to execute the program; and
o develop JTRS migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a
welldeveloped concept of operations for using JTRS networking
capabilities and effectively balances recent investments in acquiring
legacy radios with future needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations. DOD's letter is reprinted in appendix II. DOD noted that
the report recommendations are consistent with the measures taken by the
department to restructure the JTRS program, develop JTRS radios in an
incremental manner, and effectively balance recent investments in legacy
radios with future needs. While we acknowledge that DOD has taken measures
to put the JTRS program in a better position to move forward, we continue
to believe that additional measures, as outlined in our recommendations,
are needed to ensure that the program will be successfully executed and
achieve its intended objectives.
DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that have
jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send
copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force,
Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies
will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841, or Assistant Director John
Oppenheim at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether recent actions taken by DOD puts the JTRS program in a
better position to succeed, we obtained briefings on restructuring
assessments, plans, and decisions, analyzed documents describing Increment
1 requirements, and interviewed program and product officials from the
Joint Program Executive Office, San Diego, California. To obtain the
perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance, oversight, and
technology support for the JTRS program, we interviewed officials from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks
and Information Integration, Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington,
Virginia; and, the Army's Communications-Electronics Research, Development
and Engineering Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
To identify the risks that might continue to undermine the successful
fielding of JTRS, we obtained and analyzed briefings from the JTRS Domain,
Program, and Product Managers, as well as the JTRS Technical Director, San
Diego, California. We also reviewed Selected Acquisition Reports, budget
requests, acquisition decision memorandums, and the JTRS governance
structure. We interviewed officials from the National Security Agency,
Fort Meade, Maryland; Joint Interoperability Test Command, Fort Huachuca,
Arizona; Defense Contract Management Agency, Anaheim, California; Project
Manager for Future Combat Systems Network Systems Integration, Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey; and, JTRS contractors in Arlington, Virginia and
Anaheim, California.
Our review was conducted from August 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
John Oppenheim, Assistant Director, (202) 512-4841
GAO Contact
In addition to the contact above, Katherine Bittinger, Ridge Bowman,
Staff Acknowledgment
Karen Sloan, Amy Sweet, James Tallon, Tristan To, Hai Tran, and Paul
Williams made key contributions to this report.
(120470)
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