Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about
the Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study
and Report (20-SEP-06, GAO-06-938).
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued the Mobility Capabilities
Study (MCS), which was intended to identify and quantify the
mobility capabilities needed to support U.S. strategic objectives
into the next decade. The MCS found that projected capabilities
are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level
of risk--that is, current U.S. inventory of aircraft, ships,
prepositioned assets, and other capabilities are sufficient, in
conjunction with host nation support, and assuming planned
investments take place. The Senate report accompanying the bill
for the fiscal year 2005 Defense Authorization Act required GAO
to report on the adequacy and completeness of the MCS. GAO
assessed the extent to which the MCS met generally accepted
research standards that this type of study would be expected to
meet to be considered sound and complete.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-938
ACCNO: A61198
TITLE: Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions
about the Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities
Study and Report
DATE: 09/20/2006
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Documentation
Evaluation methods
Military forces
Reports management
Standards
Strategic planning
Transportation
C-17 Aircraft
C-5 Aircraft
DOD Mobility Capabilities Study
C-17A Aircraft
C-X Aircraft
Globemaster Aircraft
C-5A Aircraft
Galaxy Aircraft
C-5B Aircraft
C-5D Aircraft
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GAO-06-938
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Limitations in the MCS Study and Report Raise Questions abou
* Aspects of Modeling and Data Were Inadequate
* Exclusive Use of Warfighting Metrics in MCS Analyses Limited
* Results Are Not Always Complete or Presented Clearly and Are
* VV&A of Models and Data Was Not Complete
* Conclusions
* Recommendation for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
* GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments
* Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
September 2006
DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
Study Limitations Raise Questions about the Adequacy and Completeness of
the Mobility Capabilities Study and Report
GAO-06-938
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 5
Limitations in the MCS Study and Report Raise Questions about Adequacy and
Completeness 7
Conclusions 13
Recommendation for Executive Action 13
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 14
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 18
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 22
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29
Table
Table 1: Generally Accepted Research Standards Relevant to MCS
Requirements 19
Figure
Figure 1: MCS Hypothetical Ongoing Contingencies during 7-year Baseline
Security Posture Time Frame 9
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 20, 2006
Congressional Committees
The National Security Strategy of the United States requires global
mobility through rapid, effective, and efficient projections of power at
home and abroad to deploy and sustain America's armed forces. To improve
its mobility capabilities, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend
more than $50 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 for aircraft,
ships, ground transportation, prepositioned assets, and other mobility
assets. DOD has conducted several studies to determine mobility
requirements and recently completed a study of its mobility capabilities
and issued a report in December 2005. The intent of the Mobility
Capabilities Study (MCS) was to identify and quantify the mobility
capabilities needed to support U.S. strategic objectives into the next
decade. The MCS determined that the projected mobility capabilities are
adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk
during the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2013; that is, the
current U.S. inventory of aircraft, ships, prepositioned assets, and other
capabilities are sufficient, in conjunction with host nation support. The
MCS emphasized that continued investment in the mobility system, in line
with current departmental priorities and planned spending, is required to
maintain these capabilities in the future. This includes, for example,
fully funding Army prepositioned assets as planned and completing a
planned reengineering of the C-5 aircraft. The MCS report also made
recommendations to conduct further studies, develop plans and strategies,
and improve data collection and mobility models. In fact, DOD officials
told us that a Mobility Capabilities Study--2006 is underway.
In the Senate report accompanying the bill for the fiscal year 2005
Defense Authorization Act, you asked us to monitor the process used to
conduct the MCS and report on the adequacy and completeness of the study.1
Specifically, our objective was to determine whether the MCS was adequate
and complete. On March 1, 2006, we briefed your staff on our preliminary
observations. This report expands on that briefing and makes
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
1 S. Rep. 108-260, at 126 (2004).
To conduct our review of the MCS, we analyzed the final MCS report, the
MCS Terms of Reference and MCS Study Plan, as well as other DOD policies
and guidance concerning how DOD would conduct the MCS and the databases
and models used in the study. We identified generally accepted research
standards that define a sound and complete quality study that were
relevant to the MCS, and assessed the extent to which the MCS report met
these standards. We interviewed study officials, study participants, and
subject matter experts from several DOD entities, including the combatant
commands and the military services. As we monitored the development of the
MCS, we requested that DOD provide documentation supporting and verifying
key analytical and decision-making processes.2 DOD officials could not
produce this documentation during the development of the MCS or following
issuance of the report. Consequently, we were unable to fully determine
whether the analytical and decision-making processes that we believe are
significant to the credibility of the study supported the MCS effort and
its conclusions. Our scope and methodology are discussed in more detail in
appendix I. We conducted our work from July 2004 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
DOD used an innovative approach in conducting the study and acknowledged
some methodological limitations in its report, as any sound study should.
However, it did not fully disclose how these limitations could affect the
MCS conclusions and recommendations. Therefore, it is not transparent how
the analyses done for the study support DOD's conclusions. As measured
against relevant generally accepted research standards, we identified
limitations in the MCS study and report that raise questions about their
adequacy and completeness. Among our findings:
2 Examples of the documentation we requested to support and verify key
analytical and decision-making processes used by DOD to conduct the MCS
included (1) the accreditation report and supporting documentation or
evidence of the verification, validation, and accreditation process for
the models and data used in the MCS; (2) copies of MCS working group
meeting minutes that verify and validate the analytical processes the
various MCS study teams and study participants used to vet and agree upon
data, scenarios, assumptions, models, and associated risk; and (3) copies
of MCS General Officer Steering Committee and Executive Committee meeting
minutes that verify and validate the analytical and decision-making
processes the DOD senior leadership used to vet and agree upon the key
data, scenarios, assumptions, models, and associated risk used to conduct
the MCS, as well as agreement with the study results.
o Aspects of modeling and data were inadequate in some areas
because data were lacking and some of the models used could not
simulate all relevant aspects of the missions. The report did not
explain how these limitations could affect the study results or
what the effect on the projected mobility capabilities might be.
Relevant research standards require that models used are adequate
for the intended purpose, represent a complete range of
conditions, and that data used are properly generated and
complete. For example, the MCS modeled hypothetical homeland
defense missions rather than homeland defense demands derived from
a well defined and approved concept of operations for homeland
defense, because the specific details of the missions were still
being determined, and DOD acknowledged that the data used may be
incomplete. The MCS also was unable to model the flexible
deterrent options/deployment order process to move units and
equipment into theater due to lack of data, but the study assumed
a robust use of this process, which in one scenario accounted for
approximately 60 percent of the airlift prior to beginning combat
operations.3 In addition, the MCS report contains more than 80
references to the need for improved modeling, and 12 of these
references call for additional data or other refinements.
Additionally, the MCS modeled the year 2012 to determine the
transportation capabilities needed for the years 2007 through
2013. The year 2012 did not place as much demand for mobility
assets in support of smaller military operations, such as
peacekeeping, as other years. However, DOD officials considered
2012-the year modeled-as "most likely" to occur and stated that
statistically it was not different from other years in the 2007 to
2013 period even though the number of smaller military operations
is the least of any of the years reviewed.
o While the MCS concluded that combined U.S. and host nation
transportation assets were adequate to meet U.S. objectives with
acceptable risk, the report, in describing the use of warfighting
metrics in its analyses, does not provide a clear understanding of
the direct relationship of warfighting objectives to
transportation capabilities. Acknowledging this point, the report
stated that further analysis is required to understand the
operational impact of increased or decreased strategic lift on
achieving warfighting objectives. Relevant generally accepted
research standards require that conclusions be supported by
analyses. The use of warfighting metrics is a measure to determine
whether combat tasks, such as achieving air superiority, are
achieved. However, they do not measure whether appropriate
personnel, supplies, and equipment arrived in accordance with
timelines. As a result, we could not determine how the study
concluded that planned transportation assets were adequate because
the study did not contain a transparent analysis to support its
conclusion or a clear roadmap in the report to help decision
makers understand what that conclusion meant in terms of type and
number of mobility assets needed. Previous DOD mobility studies
primarily used mobility metrics, which measured success in terms
of tons of equipment and personnel moved per day to accomplish
military objectives. The use of both warfighting and mobility
metrics to measure success would allow decision makers to know
whether combat tasks were achieved and how much strategic
transportation is needed to accomplish those tasks.
o In some cases, the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or
contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify
findings and evaluate evidence. Relevant research standards
require results to be presented in a complete, accurate, and
relevant manner. For example, the report contains several
recommendations for further studies and assessments, five of which
are under way. However, DOD has no plans to report the effect of
these studies on the MCS results after the studies are complete.
In addition, the report contains qualified information that is not
presented clearly, such as varying assessments of intratheater
assets in three different places in the report. The lack of
clarity and conciseness of the reported results can limit the
study's usefulness to decision makers and stakeholders.
o Verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of models
and data used to conduct the study was not complete because it was
not done in accordance with DOD policy or relevant research
standards. Moreover, relevant research standards state that a
study report should include a VV&A accreditation report that is
signed by the study director and addresses the models and data
certification. DOD officials acknowledged that they did not comply
with DOD VV&A policy when using legacy models in the MCS because
they contended that long-term use of models and data constitutes
an equivalent VV&A process. Other than a description of the
process contained in the MCS report, DOD officials could provide
no additional documentation to verify and validate this equivalent
process to provide the assurance that models and data used in the
MCS reduced the risk inherent in modeling and simulation and added
to the credibility of the results. Moreover, officials could not
provide documentation to support key analytical and
decision-making processes used by senior DOD leadership, thus
undermining the credibility of the reported study results.
These limitations to the study's methodology raise questions
concerning the accuracy of the study's finding that projected
capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an
acceptable level of risk. Until DOD conducts an adequate and
complete future MCS and clearly discloses all limitations and
their effects on the study results, decision makers may be unable
to clearly understand the operational implications of the study
results and make fully informed programmatic investment decisions
concerning mobility capabilities. We are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense, when conducting future mobility capabilities
studies, beginning with any study currently under way, develop and
use models and data for critical missions and processes that are
verified, validated, and accredited as required; include in study
reports an explanation of how stated limitations might impact the
study results and, at a minimum, describe how recommended future
studies might be conducted to enhance the results of the original
study; and incorporate both mobility and warfighting metrics in
determining capabilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
first and third recommendations and claimed that they did not
understand the second. We have clarified that recommendation to
the Secretary of Defense to include in study reports an
explanation of how stated limitations might impact the study
results and, at a minimum, describe how recommended future studies
might be conducted to enhance the results of the original study.
In its comments, DOD also stated that the report contained
misleading information and factual errors. We disagree with DOD's
assertion. We did modify our report to respond to a DOD technical
comment related to homeland defense missions. DOD's comments and
our evaluation of them are discussed in the agency comments
section of this report.
Background
The MCS was the first assessment of DOD's mobility system since
2000. The study was designed to identify changes in DOD's
transportation force structure due to changes in threats and
national security and military strategies. The MCS is the fourth
in a series of major mobility studies that DOD has conducted since
the end of the Cold War. The first study, the Mobility
Requirements Study, conducted in 1992, was undertaken because of
concern about the DOD's strategic mobility capabilities in the
wake of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. That
study established mobility requirements for the post-Cold War era;
defined baseline requirements for intertheater, or strategic,
mobility; and proposed a long-range investment plan to meet these
requirements. The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review
Update, conducted in 1994, reaffirmed the need for increases in
key mobility components and validated the prior study's
recommendation for the procurement of additional ships for afloat
prepositioning and for surge deployments of forces based in the
continental United States. The Mobility Requirements Study-2005,
issued in 2001, projected future mobility requirements based on
two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. It included
a broader range of factors, including host nation support and
enemy use of weapons of mass destruction, than the previous
studies.
The current MCS, which began in May 2004, reassessed DOD's
mobility capabilities against the backdrop of a revised National
Military Strategy that included the ongoing war against violent
extremism, an evolving global defense posture, a new force-sizing
construct, revised campaign scenarios, and ongoing departmentwide
transformation efforts. The study results were intended to support
decisions on future strategic airlift, aerial refueling aircraft,
and sealift procurements needed to meet varying military
requirements. The study used an innovative "capabilities-based"
approach, measuring existing and currently projected mobility
capabilities against warfighting demands that could be expected in
fiscal year 2012 while also considering mobility demands during
the 7-year period from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013.
According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense believed this
approach would give him greater flexibility in deciding which
capabilities to fund in a constrained budget environment. In
considering each aspect of the National Military Strategy,4 the
MCS modeled warfighting scenarios in the year 2012 using different
premises with varying assumptions to develop and evaluate mobility
capability mix alternatives. The models were used to evaluate
transportation alternatives, including variations in alternative
transportation modes (air, land, sea) and sources (military,
civilian, foreign), as well as factors that affect transportation
mode and source decisions. The scope of the MCS described the
study as an assessment of the full range of transportation needs
required to support (1) combat operations; (2) smaller military
efforts, such as peacekeeping or overseas evacuation of American
citizens; (3) homeland defense/civil support, such as disaster
relief and antiterrorism response; and (4) other strategic
missions, such as strategic nuclear and global strike missions.
The study was coauthored by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E), and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the
Director of Logistics. Other DOD components involved in the study
included the U.S. Transportation Command and its subordinate
commands, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), the combatant commanders,
the military services, and others. The final report was signed on
December 19, 2005, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Limitations in the MCS Study and Report Raise Questions about
Adequacy and Completeness
As measured against relevant generally accepted research
standards, limitations in the MCS study and report raise questions
about their adequacy and completeness. For example, aspects of
modeling and data were inadequate in some areas because data were
lacking and some of the models used could not simulate all
relevant aspects of the missions. Furthermore, the exclusive use
of warfighting metrics in the MCS analyses limited the usefulness
of the report. Moreover, in some cases the MCS results were
incomplete, unclear, or contingent on further study, making it
difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence. Finally,
verification, validation, and accreditation of models and data
used to conduct the study were incomplete because they were not
done in accordance with DOD policy or relevant research standards,
and supporting documentation for key processes could not be
provided.
Aspects of Modeling and Data Were Inadequate
Aspects of modeling and data were inadequate in some areas because
data were lacking and some of the models used could not simulate
all relevant aspects of the missions. Relevant research standards
require that models used are adequate for the intended purpose,
represent a complete range of conditions, and that data used are
properly generated and complete. As DOD acknowledged in the MCS
report as a study limitation, some modeling tools were not
available to analyze key missions. The MCS cited deficiencies in
several existing mobility models and the need for follow-on MCS
analyses. The MCS report also acknowledged that the identified
deficiencies in data hindered analysis of future requirements and
transportation system performance. However, the report did not
explain how these limitations could affect the study results or
what the effect on the projected mobility capabilities might be.
For example, the MCS modeled hypothetical homeland defense
missions rather than homeland defense demands derived from a well
defined and approved concept of operations for homeland defense,
because the specific details of the missions were still being
determined, and DOD acknowledged that the data used are
incomplete. The MCS report recommended further analysis of
mobility capabilities after homeland defense needs are refined.
However, the report did not identify the potential effect that
using these hypothetical scenarios might have on the MCS results.
The MCS also was unable to model the flexible deterrent
options/deployment order process to move units and equipment into
theater because of lack of data on how deployment orders have been
issued in the past for major combat operations. However, the MCS
assumed a robust use of the flexible deterrent option/deployment
order process, which in one scenario accounted for approximately
60 percent of the early airlift movement prior to the beginning of
combat operations. Instead, the MCS modeled the flow of forces and
equipment contained in the time-phased force deployment data
process.5 Based on the scenarios provided for the MCS analyses, we
could not determine how the deployment order process would affect
the mobility assets required for major combat operations. The MCS
report noted that additional analysis is required to determine the
implications of the deployment order process and to provide
sufficient information for decision makers concerning the amount
of future mobility assets actually needed.
In addition to these modeling and data issues, the MCS report
contains more than 80 references to the need for improved
modeling, and 12 of these references call for additional data or
other refinements, such as follow-on analyses, further
assessments, future evaluations, additional study, and
investigation of alternatives in a wide range of areas, such as
antiterrorism response, infrastructure availability, intratheater
airlift, strategic sealift, air refueling, and availability of
civil reserve aircraft. Some of these studies are currently
underway, as discussed later in this report.
Moreover, our analysis of the MCS report showed that the year
modeled (2012) to determine the DOD transportation capabilities
needed for the years 2007 through 2013 did not place as much
demand for mobility assets in support of smaller military
operations, such as peacekeeping, as other years. To establish
transportation demands for mission requirements, DOD developed and
used a baseline security posture6 that covered a 7-year period.
This baseline was developed, in part, using a historical analysis
of DOD's movement of personnel, equipment, supplies, and other
items. According to DOD officials, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, which developed the baseline security
posture, selected the year modeled in the MCS because it was
deemed the "most likely" to occur in terms of transportation
demands and because it was not statistically different from other
years in the 7-year period. However, our analysis showed that 2012
involved the least demand for transportation assets in support of
smaller military efforts than any year in the 7-year period and
did not fully stress the defense transportation system. Figure 1
depicts the number of hypothetical ongoing contingencies for each
year in the baseline as shown in the MCS.
Figure 1: MCS Hypothetical Ongoing Contingencies during 7-year
Baseline Security Posture Time Frame
Note: A particular contingency may be ongoing in more than 1 year.
Each contingency has unique cargo and passenger requirements. For
example, a contingency that may be ongoing over a 2- or 3-year
time frame may require more or less mobility capability than a
6-month contingency.
Although not transparent in the study, DOD officials said
scenarios in the year modeled were not intended to fully stress
the defense transportation system. DOD officials provided no
further explanation for the year selected to develop the DOD
transportation capabilities other than it was directed by Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and agreed to by the
study leadership. We believe that selection of a different year
that placed an increased demand on transportation assets for
smaller military efforts may have revealed gaps in mobility
requirements. Therefore, we found that the selection of 2012 as
the modeling year was a limitation in the MCS with respect to
smaller military efforts.
Because of these modeling and data limitations, the MCS may have
incorrectly estimated the future mobility requirements needed to
support homeland defense missions, major combat operations, and
smaller contingencies. Until DOD improves aspects of the modeling
and data used to conduct the MCS-to include defining its homeland
defense mission needs, developing models for the deployment order
process, and explaining how identified modeling and data
limitations could affect the study results-decision makers may not
have adequate and complete information about DOD's mobility
capabilities.
Exclusive Use of Warfighting Metrics in MCS Analyses Limited
Usefulness of Report
While the MCS concluded that combined U.S. and host nation
transportation assets were adequate to meet U.S. objectives with
acceptable risk, the report, in describing the use of warfighting
metrics in its analyses, does not provide a clear understanding of
the direct relationship of warfighting objectives to
transportation capabilities. The report acknowledged that further
analysis is required to understand the operational impact of
increased or decreased strategic lift on achieving warfighting
objectives. Relevant generally accepted research standards require
that conclusions be supported by analyses. The use of warfighting
metrics is a measure to determine whether combat tasks, such as
establishing air superiority, are achieved. However, they do not
measure success in terms of whether appropriate personnel,
supplies, and equipment arrived in accordance with timelines. As a
result, we could not determine how the study concluded that
planned transportation assets were adequate because the study did
not contain a transparent analysis to support its conclusion. In
our opinion, it is important for decision makers to have an
understanding of both combat tasks that must be achieved and the
amount of transportation assets needed to achieve those tasks with
some level of success. This understanding would allow creation of
a clear roadmap for investment decisions. However, we could not
determine how the study calculated the specific numbers of
transportation assets needed or whether there are specific gaps,
overlaps, or excesses in transportation assets, a key objective of
the study. Previous DOD mobility studies, including the Mobility
Requirements Study-2005, primarily used mobility metrics, which
measured success in terms of tons of equipment and personnel moved
per day to accomplish military objectives. Million-ton-miles per
day is a commonly accepted measure of airlift performance and
reflects how much cargo can be delivered over a given distance in
a given period of time based on the capability of each type of
aircraft. A similar mobility metric-short tons-is used to measure
ship capability. However, these studies did not fully integrate
combat tasks as a metric. The use of both warfighting and mobility
metrics to measure success would allow decision makers to know
whether there is sufficient capability to achieve warfighting
objectives, as well as to understand the number, type, and mix of
mobility assets that are actually needed.
Results Are Not Always Complete or Presented Clearly and Are
Qualified or Contingent on Further Study or Analysis
In some cases, the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or
contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify
findings and evaluate evidence. Relevant research standards
require results to be presented in a complete, accurate, and
relevant manner; conclusions to be sound and complete; and
recommendations to be supported by analyses. Our analysis of the
MCS report found that it contains several recommendations for
further studies and assessments, five of which are under way. The
five studies address intratheater lift capabilities; sealift
petroleum, oil, and lubricants; logistics contingency operations
capabilities; aerial refueling; and integrated global presence and
basing. However, the report does not explain the potential effect
of these ongoing studies on the MCS results after the studies are
complete, nor does DOD have plans to report the effect of these
studies on the MCS results.
In addition, the report contains qualified information that is not
presented clearly in the report, such as varying assessments of
intratheater assets in three different places. For example, the
report states in the assessment section of the executive summary
that projected transportation assets are sufficient to address
intratheater demands in the fiscal years 2007 through 2013 time
frame. However, in the recommendations section of the executive
summary, the report states that DOD should take action to
determine the proper mix of intratheater assets needed to meet
requirements. Then, in the part of the report that discusses
intratheater airlift, the report states that a detailed analysis
of intratheater airlift needs would require improved modeling
tools to accurately capture interactions among land, sealift, and
airlift capabilities and that data sets must be developed that
accurately describe the requirement in light of emerging concepts.
VV&A of Models and Data Was Not Complete
VV&A of models and data used to conduct the study was not complete
because it was not done in accordance with DOD policy or relevant
research standards. DOD policy issued by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics requires that
DOD models and data go through a VV&A process. Moreover, relevant
research standards state that a study report should include a VV&A
accreditation report that is signed by the study director and
addresses the models and data certification. DOD officials
acknowledged that they did not comply with the VV&A policy when
using legacy models in the MCS because they believed such an
approach was not warranted for legacy models that have been used
for many years and have proved reliable. Moreover, these officials
believe that such long-term use constitutes a VV&A process
equivalent to that required in the policy. However, the DOD policy
does not specify that the actual use of a model constitutes an
equivalent VV&A process. VV&A of models and data reduces the risk
inherent in the use of models and simulations by improving the
credibility of modeling and simulation results. We previously
reported our concerns that DOD did not follow its policy in
executing the MCS and had little documentation to support the VV&A
process used.7 We found that the final MCS report contained a
description of the equivalent VV&A process, but DOD officials
could provide no further documentation to verify and validate this
equivalent process other than the description included in the
report. We also found no documentation in the study report to
support DOD claims that the models have proven reliable.
Furthermore, DOD officials were unable to provide documentation to
support and verify key analytical and decision-making processes
used by senior DOD leadership throughout the study. Relevant
research standards support documenting the study's analytical and
decision-making processes to ensure the accuracy, completeness,
and credibility of study results. DOD officials told us that the
study's key analytical and decision-making processes were
validated and approved by study participants during working group
meetings and by senior leadership during General Officer Steering
Committee meetings and Executive Committee meetings. PA&E
officials could not produce documentation of these meetings
because they said documentation did not exist. Nor could they
produce other documents we requested during the development of the
MCS or following issuance of the report. Consequently, we were
unable to determine the adequacy and completeness of the
analytical and decision-making processes that supported the MCS
effort and that we believe are significant to the credibility of
the study and its conclusions.
Conclusions
The methodological limitations in the MCS that we identified-some
of which were acknowledged by DOD in the MCS report-raise
questions about the adequacy and completeness of the study and its
report. Until DOD improves aspects of the modeling and data used
to conduct the MCS-such as defining its homeland defense mission
needs and developing models for the deployment order
process-decision makers may not have adequate and complete
information about DOD's mobility capabilities to enable them to
make fully informed investment decisions. Furthermore, in the
absence of an explanation of how identified modeling and data
limitations could affect the study results or how such limitations
could affect projected mobility capability requirements, the
accuracy of the study's finding that projected capabilities are
adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of
risk during the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2013 is
unclear. Moreover, without a transparent comparison between
existing mobility assets and projected needed assets, decision
makers will be unable to use study results to identify and
quantify the specific types and mix of mobility assets needed to
address mobility gaps, overlaps, and excesses. Until DOD conducts
an adequate and complete future MCS and clearly discloses all
limitations and their effects on the study results, decision
makers likely will not have full information concerning DOD's
mobility capabilities. As a result, we suggest that Congress and
other decision makers exercise caution in using the MCS to make
programmatic investment decisions.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with adequate and complete information
concerning mobility capabilities so they are able to clearly
understand the operational implications of the study and make
fully informed programmatic investment decisions, and to improve
the usefulness of future mobility capabilities studies, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three
actions, when conducting future mobility capabilities studies
beginning with any study currently underway:
o develop models and data for all critical missions, such as
homeland defense, and processes, such as the flexible deterrent
options/deployment order process;
o include in study reports an explanation of how stated
limitations might impact the study results and, at a minimum,
describe how recommended future studies might be conducted to
enhance the results of the original study; and
o incorporate both mobility and warfighting metrics in
determining capabilities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
first and third recommendations. DOD stated it did not understand
our second recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, when
conducting future mobility studies, beginning with any study
currently underway, include in study reports an explanation of how
ongoing and follow-on studies and modeling and data limitations
that are referenced in the report could affect the reported
results. DOD also noted that it plans to continue its ongoing
efforts to enhance the models and data collection processes used
to assess mobility capabilities across the full range of strategic
missions and supports the notion that continual improvements are
needed. As we noted throughout our report, the MCS report contains
numerous and repeated references to the need for improved modeling
and additional data or other refinements, such as follow-on
analyses, further assessments, future evaluations, additional
study, and investigation of alternatives in a wide range of areas.
DOD further commented that while a completed study can recommend
that follow-on studies be conducted, it cannot explain how future
studies might affect the results of the current study. We
acknowledge that DOD cannot quantitatively predict the outcome of
an ongoing or future study. However, we believe DOD should be able
to explain what ongoing follow-on studies or evaluations seek to
determine, what changes are being made to the data inputs and
modeling tools that are being used to conduct the studies, and how
DOD expects the results may differ from current study results.
While the explanation may be hypothetical, as are many operations
research study hypotheses, it can provide decision makers with a
better understanding of the current study's limitations and
results and how an ongoing or future study's results may differ.
Therefore, we refined our recommendation to recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, when conducting future mobility studies,
beginning with any study currently under way, include in study
reports an explanation of how stated limitations might impact the
study results and, at a minimum, describe how recommended future
studies might be conducted to enhance the results of the original
study. For example, if modeling and data are limitations to a
study, the report should discuss the ways in which the results
might change with better models and data.
DOD also commented that our report contained misleading
information and factual errors and that it stands by the adequacy
and completeness of the MCS. The department provided examples in
its technical comments where it believed our report contained
misleading information and factual errors. We disagree with the
department's comments regarding the facts in our report and have
addressed each of the department's comments in appendix II.
Lastly, DOD stated that the MCS and its conclusions are well
accepted by the civilian and military leadership of the
department, and pointed out that in March 2006 testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, stated that the planned strategic airlift
fleet determined by the MCS is "about the right capacity". However
we note that in the same hearing, the Commander also stated that
he thought DOD needed "somewhere in the neighborhood of" 20 C-17
cargo aircraft beyond what is planned. We also note that in the
Commander's April 2006 testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Sealift, he stated that, in an internal
Focused Mobility Analysis to study strategic mobility from a
Transportation Command perspective, the MCS will be the baseline,
"but we will explore how changes in key assumptions may impact the
analytical outcome."
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;
the Director of PA&E; and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov . If you or your staff have any
questions regarding the briefing or this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix III.
William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P.
Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee
on Appropriations House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To conduct our review of the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), we
reviewed and analyzed the final MCS report; the MCS Terms of
Reference; the MCS Study Plan; applicable Department of Defense
(DOD) strategic planning guidance; as well as other DOD guidance,
directives, instructions, and memos that describe how DOD would
conduct its MCS. We also reviewed the National Security Strategy
of the United States of America and the National Military Strategy
of the United States of America; DOD guidance concerning data
collection, development, and management in support of strategic
analysis; DOD modeling and simulation instruction; Defense
Modeling and Simulation Office guidance; descriptions of models
used to conduct the study; and the databases used in the models.
We interviewed study officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), and the office of
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Logistics, as well as study
participants and subject matter experts from the U.S.
Transportation Command, Air Mobility Command, Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command, the combatant commands, and the military
services concerning the extent of their input to the study. We
also interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Modeling
and Simulation Technical Director at the Defense Modeling and
Simulation Office.
Additionally, we reviewed research literature and DOD guidance and
identified frequently occurring, generally accepted research
standards that are relevant for defense studies such as the MCS
that define a quality or sound and complete study. The following
were our sources for these standards:
o GAO, Government Auditing Standards: 2003 Revision, GAO-03-673G
(Washington, D.C.: June 2003);
o GAO, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-10.1.4 (Washington, D.C.:
March 1991);
o GAO, Dimensions of Quality, GAO/QTM-94-1 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2004);
o RAND Corporation, RAND Standards for High-Quality Research and
Analysis (Santa Monica, Calif.: June 2004);
o Air Force Office of Aerospace Studies, Analysts Handbook: On
Understanding the Nature of Analysis (January 2000);
o Air Force, Office of Aerospace Studies, Air Force Analysis
Handbook, A Guide for Performing Analysis Studies: For Analysis of
Alternatives or Functional Solution Analysis (July 2004);
o Department of Defense, DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S)
Verification, Validation, Accreditation (VV&A), Instruction
5000.61 (Washington, D.C.: May 2003);
o Department of Defense, Data Collection, Development, and
Management in Support of Strategic Analysis, Directive 8260.1
(Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2003); and
o Department of Defense, Implementation of Data Collection,
Development, and Management for Strategic Analyses, Instruction
8260.2 (Washington, D.C.: January 21, 2003).
During the process of identifying generally accepted research
standards we noted that not all studies are conducted the same
way. For example, while all studies use data, not all use baseline
data. Likewise, all studies require analyses, but not all use
models or simulation to conduct analyses. We tailored the research
standards we identified as relevant to the MCS, as shown in table
1.
3 Deployment orders are issued to deploy specific capabilities as
commitment decisions are made, rather than a deploying unit's full set of
equipment or capabilities. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) provide
escalation options during the initial stages of a conflict. FDOs are
employed under certain conditions to deter adversarial actions contrary to
U.S. interests.
Background
4 The 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States calls for a
force sized to defend the homeland, proactively dissuade adversaries in
and from four global regions, and conduct two overlapping "swift defeat"
campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser
contingencies, the force must be able to "win decisively" in one of the
two campaigns. This "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct places a premium on
increasingly innovative and efficient methods to achieve objectives.
Limitations in the MCS Study and Report Raise Questions about Adequacy and
Completeness
Aspects of Modeling and Data Were Inadequate
5 In joint military planning, time-phased force deployment data are
defined as a computer database that contains detailed personnel and cargo
planning data; it usually includes priority and sequencing of deploying
forces.
6 The baseline security posture projects the position from which combatant
commanders will perform future missions, including how they will address
the global war on terrorism, ongoing operations, and other day-to-day
activities to which U.S. forces remain committed and from which they are
not likely to disengage entirely.
Exclusive Use of Warfighting Metrics in MCS Analyses Limited Usefulness of
Report
Results Are Not Always Complete or Presented Clearly and Are Qualified or
Contingent on Further Study or Analysis
VV&A of Models and Data Was Not Complete
7 See GAO, Defense Transportation: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the
Credibility of the Current and Future Mobility Capabilities Studies,
GAO-05-659R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2005), for a more detailed
discussion.
Conclusions
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Table 1: Generally Accepted Research Standards Relevant to MCS
Requirements
Design: The Study is well designed
I. Study plan, scope, and objectives follow Defense
Planning Guidance
I.a (Do the study scope and objectives fully address the
charter presented in the 2004 Defense Planning
Guidance?)
I.a.1 Does the study plan address specified guidance?
I.b Was the study plan followed?
I.c Were deviations from the study plan explained and
documented?
I.d Was the study plan updated over the course of the
study and the updates explicitly identified in the
study and updated study plan?
II Assumptions and constraints are reasonable and
consistent
II.a Are assumptions and constraints explicitly
identified?
II.a.1 (Are the study assumptions necessary and
reasonable?)
II.b Do the study assumptions support a sound analysis?
II.c Are the assumptions used in analyses common
throughout the study and models?
II.d Do the assumptions contribute to an objective and
balanced research effort?
III Scenarios and threats are reasonable
III.a. Are scenarios traceable back to formal guidance?
III.b Were the threat scenarios validated and Defense
Intelligence Agency approved and documented?
III.c Do scenarios represent a reasonably complete range
of conditions?
III.d (Were the threats varied to allow for the conduct of
sensitivity analysis?)
Execution: The study is well executed
IV Methodology is successfully executed
IV.a Was the study methodology executed consistent with
the (MCS) study plan and schedule?
IV.b (Does the methodology support accomplishing the
objectives presented in the study plan?)
IV.c Were the models used to support the analyses
adequate for their intended purpose?
IV.d Were the model input data properly generated to
support the methodology?
V (Analytical ) Baseline data and other data used to
support study and analyses validated, verified, and
approved
V.a Is the (analytical) baseline fully and completely
identified and used consistently throughout the
study for the various analyses?
V.b Were data limitations identified (and the impact of
the limitations fully explained?)
V.c Were the (baseline security posture) data verified
and validated?
V.d Was the data verification and validation process
documented?
VI Models, simulations, and verification, validation,
and accreditation are reasonable
VI.a Was a VV&A accreditation report that addresses the
models and data certification signed by the study
director and included in the report?
VI.b Were modeling and simulation limitations identified
and explained?
VI.c Has each model in the study been described?
VI.d Are the model processes clearly explained,
documented and understood?
VII Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and essential
elements of analysis (EEAs) are addressed
VII.a (Do MOEs adhere to the guidance in the study terms
of reference?)
VII.b (Are the MOEs fully addressed in the study?)
VII.c (Are the EEAs addressed in the study?)
Presentation of results: Timely, complete, accurate,
concise, and relevant to the client and stakeholders
VIII Presentation of results support findings
VIII.a Does the report address the objectives?
VIII.b Does the report present an assessment that is well
documented and conclusions that are supported by the
analyses?
VIII.c Are conclusions sound and complete?
VIII.d Are recommendations supported by analyses?
VIII.e Is a realistic range of options provided?
VIII.f Are the study results presented in the report in a
clear manner?
VIII.g Are study participants/stakeholders (i.e., services
and Combatant Commands) informed of the study
results and recommendations?
Source: GAO analysis of industry and DOD study and research standards.
We used these relevant standards as our criteria to assess the reported
MCS results. All eight key areas of the study process were considered to
have equal importance relative to the soundness and completeness of the
study; that is, a sufficiently serious concern in any category could raise
questions concerning the adequacy and completeness of the report. The
analysts independently reviewed evidence relevant to each subquestion,
including the study itself, the study Terms of Reference, and its
strategic planning guidance. For each of the subquestions in the key study
process areas, the analysts determined whether (1) the evidence had no
limitations or raised no concerns, (2) the evidence had some limitations
or raised some concerns, (3) the evidence had significant limitations or
raised significant concerns, or (4) we could not determine the extent of
limitations or concerns because there was not sufficient information. The
analysts then met, compared, and discussed their individual assessments,
and reached an overall assessment for each subquestion. Areas of the study
where we identified either "some" or "significant" limitations or concerns
were considered to affect the adequacy or completeness of the study.
Additionally, areas of the study that could not be assessed because of the
lack of supporting documentation were considered to affect the credibility
of the study.
Throughout our review PA&E officials told us that the documentation needed
to support and verify the key analytical and decision-making processes
used to conduct the MCS, documentation that was vetted and approved by DOD
leadership and all of the study participants, would not be completed and
available for our review until the study report was issued. However, after
the report was issued, we were told that the report provides all of the
supporting documentation needed and that the other documentation we
requested could not be provided. As a result, we were unable to determine
the adequacy and completeness of the analytical and decision-making
processes that supported the MCS effort to evaluate the credibility of the
study. We believe these processes are significant to the credibility of
the study and its results.
We conducted our review from July 2004 through July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
See comment 3.
See comment 2.
See comment 1.
See comment 5.
See comment 4.
GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments
1. DOD disagreed with our assessment that the modeled
year-2012-did not place as much demand for mobility assets in
support of smaller military operations, such as peacekeeping, as
other years. DOD also stated that we incorrectly focused on the
number of operations, not the level of effort. We disagree. The
MCS report (Annex A to Appendix F) made no distinction between the
number of lesser contingencies and the level of effort.
Specifically, the Vignettes for Baseline Security Posture Analysis
did not report the level of effort by year and instead aggregated
the data, in many instances across several modeled years.
Consequently, we compared the number of operations conducted in
the model year. Throughout our review, PA&E officials consistently
told us that the completed MCS report would contain all the
documentation needed to support its analyses. Furthermore,
although demand in the modeled year may exceed previous efforts,
the MCS was chartered to assess the ability of the mobility system
to support the National Military Strategy into the next decade.
The size of the selected model year in relation to efforts
conducted between 1941 and 2006 is not at issue. As our report
makes clear, our concern is that modeling what appears to be the
least demanding year does not address whether the United States
has sufficient capability to support national objectives during a
peak demand period and may underestimate and underreport demands
to senior decision makers.
2. DOD disagreed with our observation that the MCS report does not
provide a clear understanding of the direct relationship of
warfighting objectives to transportation capabilities. We
disagree. We understand that achieving a combat task requires
delivering the right commodity to the right place at the right
time. However, the specific combat tasks (e.g., attaining air
superiority) necessary to satisfy the commander's campaign
objectives are not a direct measure of mobility capability. For
example, the problems in using a single metric are reflected in
the MCS Appendix H, where the MCS report states that "the study
itself still had difficulty in evaluating the operational impact
of the delivery of theater support elements," adding that "we
[DOD] were unable to develop a satisfactory mechanism to capture
the linkage of the closely related, but delayed, follow-on support
needed..." Finally, the MCS concludes that "there was no way to
model a decrease in [Air Force] squadron effectiveness if this
support was late. Additional effort is required to develop a
methodology for evaluation the operational impact of support
equipment availability." We continue to believe, and DOD agreed
with our recommendation, that warfighting metrics, in conjunction
with mobility metrics, can give decision makers a full picture of
the capabilities needed to meet a specific warfighting goal.
3. DOD disagreed with our statement that the MCS was unable to
model the flexible deterrent options/deployment order process and
that the study in fact analyzed flexible deterrent option (FDO)
movements to theater. We do not dispute that DOD analyzed FDO
movements as part of the MCS analysis. However, the degree to
which the MCS analyses successfully modeled FDOs is in question.
The MCS report, Appendix H, stated that an individual FDO is
essentially the same as a deployment order. It also states in that
section that "Deployment orders [DEPORDS] are issued to deploy
specific capabilities as commitment decisions are made. This was
not modeled due to lack of data on how DEPORDS would have been
issued for an MCO [major combat operation] deployment." In the
same paragraph, the MCS concludes that "the impact on the mobility
system of the DEPORD process should be assessed in follow-on MCS
analyses," adding that "there is a data deficit on how to model
and execute a DEPORD process." Furthermore, the MCS report states
that "additional analysis is required to investigate the
implications of the DEPORD process decisions and provide data for
future decision-makers to develop a DEPORD execution process."
4. DOD believes our statement concerning homeland defense missions
is misleading and is not sure what the report means by "actual
homeland defense demands." We removed the word "actual" and
clarified our report to discuss "demands derived from a well
defined and approved concept of operations for homeland defense",
which were not available for the study according to the MCS
report. Furthermore, in chapter 4, the MCS report states that
"maintaining a dedicated capability to support multiple, nearly
simultaneous homeland defense/civil support events concurrent with
the peak demand period of two overlapping warfights, greatly
exceeds programmed lift capabilities". This raises questions about
the conclusions of the MCS that there are adequate mobility
capabilities to meet national security objectives. Also, in
Chapter 3 of the MCS report, it states that the DOD homeland
defense concept of operations required refinement and was one of
nine issue areas cited within the homeland defense portion of the
study that "need to be addressed and investigated in more detail."
All of these nine areas potentially impact mobility support for
homeland defense operations. Moreover, the MCS Executive Summary
notes that reassessment of these missions is required as DOD's
role in homeland defense evolves. The MCS report, chapter 4,
concludes by calling for further refinement of mission
requirements, continuing risk assessments, and an effort to
determine corresponding mobility solutions. We continue to believe
that the MCS conclusion that adequate mobility capability exists
is conditional given the results of the homeland defense portion
of the study and that the accuracy and completeness of the data,
modeling, and results for this portion of the MCS remain in
question.
5. We disagree with DOD's characterization that our information
was "misleading" regarding the adequacy of some aspects of the
MCS' modeling and data. Furthermore, we continue to disagree with
DOD's statement that the models and data used by the study were
sound and adequate to assess relevant aspects of missions required
to support the National Military Strategy, and that the results of
the study are valid. In this report, as in our September 14, 2005
report,1 we reaffirm our concern that the data and models used by
the study may not be sound and the results may not be valid since
the verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of the
models and data used to conduct the study was not done in
accordance with DOD policy or relevant research standards. VV&A of
models and data reduces the risk inherent in the use of models and
simulations by improving the credibility of modeling and
simulation results. We do not dispute DOD's assertion that it has
relied upon the same models to produce mobility studies done
"since the end of the Cold War". However, as we discuss in our
report, the MCS report fails to explain or qualify the impact that
identified data or modeling limitations might have on its results.
For example, in the MCS chapter 4, entitled Operational Data, the
MCS states that "data deficiencies negatively affected MCS's
ability to use current execution data to project future
requirements and assess system performance." Unclear is the extent
to which these deficiencies impacted the MCS ability to meet the
objective of identifying mobility capability gaps, overlaps, or
excesses and provide associated risk assessments, an MCS
objective. Similarly, in the section of chapter 4 entitled
Analysis Tools, the report states that "MCS analysis revealed
several deficiencies in existing mobility models." The section
concludes with five recommended tool enhancements but it does not
explain the impact that the absence of these enhanced tools may
have. We continue to believe that because of these modeling and
data limitations, the MCS may have incorrectly estimated the
future mobility requirements needed to support homeland defense
missions, smaller contingencies, and major combat operations.
1 See GAO, Defense Transportation: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the
Credibility of the Current and Future Mobility Capabilities Studies,
GAO-05-659R (Washington, D.C., September 14, 2005), for a more detailed
discussion.
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; Brian Lepore, Assistant Director;
Nabajyoti Barkakati; Renee Brown; Claudia Dickey; Ron La Due Lake; Oscar
Mardis; Deborah Owolabi; Kenneth Patton; and Stephen Woods made
significant contributions to this report.
(350558)
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Highlights of GAO-06-938 , a report to congressional committees
September 2006
DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
Study Limitations Raise Questions about the Adequacy and Completeness of
the Mobility Capabilities Study and Report
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued the Mobility Capabilities Study
(MCS), which was intended to identify and quantify the mobility
capabilities needed to support U.S. strategic objectives into the next
decade. The MCS found that projected capabilities are adequate to achieve
U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk-that is, current U.S.
inventory of aircraft, ships, prepositioned assets, and other capabilities
are sufficient, in conjunction with host nation support, and assuming
planned investments take place.
The Senate report accompanying the bill for the fiscal year 2005 Defense
Authorization Act required GAO to report on the adequacy and completeness
of the MCS. GAO assessed the extent to which the MCS met generally
accepted research standards that this type of study would be expected to
meet to be considered sound and complete.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in future mobility s
capabilities studies beginning with any study currently under way, develop
models and data for critical missions and processes; include in study
reports an explanation of how stated limitations might impact results;
and, incorporate both mobility and warfighting metrics to determine
capabilities. In comments, DOD concurred with two of the recommendations
and claimed they did not understand the third, which GAO clarified.
DOD used an innovative approach in conducting the study and acknowledged
methodological limitations in its report; however, it did not fully
disclose how these limitations could affect the MCS conclusions and
recommendations. Therefore, it is not transparent how the analyses done
for the study support DOD's conclusions. Measured against relevant
generally accepted research standards, GAO has identified limitations in
the MCS and its report that raise questions about their adequacy and
completeness. GAO suggests that Congress and other decision makers
exercise caution in using the MCS to make investment decisions. Among
GAO's findings:
o Aspects of modeling and data were inadequate in some areas
because data were lacking and the models used could not simulate
all relevant aspects of the missions. The report did not explain
how these limitations could affect the study results or what the
impact on projected mobility capabilities might be. Generally
accepted research standards require that models used are adequate
for the intended purpose, represent a complete range of
conditions, and that data used are properly generated and
complete. For example, the MCS modeled hypothetical homeland
defense missions rather than homeland defense demands derived from
a well defined and approved concept of operations for homeland
defense, because the specific details of the missions were still
being determined and the data used may be incomplete. The MCS also
was unable to model the flexible deterrent options/deployment
order process to move units and equipment into theater because of
lack of data, but the study assumed a robust use of this process.
In addition, the MCS report contains over 80 references to the
need for improved modeling or data.
o While the MCS concluded that combined U.S. and host nation
transportation assets were adequate, in describing the use of
warfighting metrics in its analyses, the report does not provide a
clear understanding of the direct relationship of warfighting
objectives to transportation capabilities. Additionally, the
report stated that further analysis is required to understand the
operational impact of increased or decreased strategic lift on
achieving warfighting objectives. Relevant generally accepted
research standards require that conclusions be supported by
analyses. The use of both warfighting and mobility metrics would
allow decision makers to know whether combat tasks were achieved
and how much strategic transportation is needed to accomplish
those tasks.
o In some cases, the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or
contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify
findings and evaluate evidence. Relevant research standards
require results to be presented in a complete, accurate, and
relevant manner. For example, the report contains recommendations
for further studies and assessments, five of which are under way.
However, DOD has no plans to report the impact of these studies on
the MCS results after the studies are complete. In addition, the
report contains qualified information that is not presented
clearly, such as varying assessments of intra-theater assets in
three different places.
*** End of document. ***