Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future
Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs (06-SEP-06,
GAO-06-934).
Hurricane Katrina's storm surge and floodwaters breached levees
and floodwalls causing billions of dollars of property damage,
and more than 1,300 deaths. Under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct reviews on his own initiative, GAO reviewed
the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) progress in repairing
damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1, 2006; (2)
plans and estimated costs to make other repairs and complete five
existing hurricane protection projects; and (3) plans and
estimated costs to add enhancements and strengthen hurricane
protection for the region. GAO reviewed related laws and
regulations, Corps planning documents and repair tracking
reports, observed ongoing repair work, and met with key agency
officials and other stakeholders.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-934
ACCNO: A60330
TITLE: Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed to Guide
Future Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs
DATE: 09/06/2006
SUBJECT: Allocation (Government accounting)
Cost analysis
Disaster planning
Disaster recovery
Disaster recovery plans
Emergency preparedness
Emergency preparedness programs
Flood control
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricanes
Natural disasters
Program evaluation
Repairs
Strategic planning
New Orleans (LA)
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GAO-06-934
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Corps of Engineers Has the Authority and Responsibility to R
* Construction of Earthen Levees Depends on Local Building Mat
* Current Repairs to the Hurricane Protection Projects Are Lim
* Orleans East Bank
* Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
* New Orleans East
* Plaquemines Parish
* St. Bernard Parish
* Independent Research Teams Have Studied the Cause of Hurrica
* Billions of Dollars Have Been Appropriated for Post-Katrina
* At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane
* Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurrican
* The Corps Plans to Repair Damaged Pumps, Motors, and Pump St
* Restoration of Hurricane Protection to Authorized Design Ele
* Completion of Previously Authorized but Unconstructed Portio
* Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protect
* West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane Pro
* Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Proj
* Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project
* New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Projec
* The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Ma
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* GAO Contact
* Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
September 2006
HURRICANE KATRINA
Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future Enhancements Beyond Interim
Levee Repairs
GAO-06-934
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane Protection
Had Been Restored to Southeastern Louisiana 21
Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing Construction of
Incomplete Portions Continue to Rise 25
The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Managing the
Multiple Restoration, Construction, and Future Enhancements Proposed for
Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection 36
Conclusions 39
Recommendations for Executive Action 40
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 44
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48
Table
Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps' Plans and
Projects 21
Figures
Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall 8
Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee 9
Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites 12
Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair
Project Sites 13
Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites 15
Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites 16
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites 18
Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps 23
Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project 28
Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project 30
Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
31
Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project 33
Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
35
Abbreviations
Corps Army Corps of Engineers DOD Department of Defense
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 6, 2006
Congressional Committees:
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore near Buras, Louisiana,
about 60 miles southeast of New Orleans, with wind speeds of up to 127
miles per hour and a storm driven wave surge of up to 30 feet. The size
and strength of the storm and subsequent flooding resulted in one of the
largest natural disasters in U.S. history, as storm waters flowed over
floodwalls and breached levees in Louisiana's Orleans and neighboring
parishes, causing widespread flooding, billions of dollars of property
damage, and more than 1,300 deaths.
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) began constructing hurricane
protection projects in southeastern Louisiana almost 60 years ago, in the
1940s. Over the years, the Corps constructed five major hurricane and
flood damage reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana, comprising
about 350 miles of earthen levees and concrete floodwalls across six
parishes. These projects were designed to provide various levels of
hurricane protection, and generally could withstand storms with maximum
wind speeds between 87 and 115 miles per hour. The hurricane protection
projects in Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes suffered the
greatest damage from Hurricane Katrina. The Corps estimates that more than
one-half of the 269 miles of federally constructed levees and floodwalls
in these three parishes were damaged by the storm's winds and flood
waters.
The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1941, as amended,
authorizes the Corps to respond in cases where flooding occurs due to a
storm and repair or restore flood control and hurricane protection
projects including levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures
damaged or destroyed by flood waters.1 Generally, it is Corps policy to
pay for the full costs of repairs to federally constructed levees and to
fund 80 percent of the cost to repair certain nonfederally constructed
levees, and the local sponsor or government funds the remaining 20
percent. However, because of the unprecedented damage and loss caused by
Hurricane Katrina, the Corps deviated from its usual policy and has funded
100 percent of the repair, restoration, and construction costs for both
federal and nonfederal levees and flood control structures.
133 U.S.C. S: 701n(a)(1).
The official Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30,
when 97 percent of all tropical storms and hurricanes normally occur.
After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps stated that it would repair the 169
miles of levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures
damaged by Katrina to prestorm conditions by June 1, 2006-the beginning of
the 2006 Atlantic hurricane season. After June 2006, the Corps had planned
to repair damaged pumps, pump motors and pump stations, restore all
hurricane protection structures that had subsided over time to their
authorized design heights (the elevation specified in their design), and
complete construction of incomplete portions of previously authorized
hurricane protection projects. In April 2006, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency released advisory flood elevations for New Orleans and
the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding, also
called a 100-year flood. In response, the Corps is revising its plans and
cost estimates to raise the height of levees and floodwalls to provide the
area with a 100-year level of protection. In addition, the Congress
required the Corps to conduct an analysis and design for comprehensive
improvements in the coastal area of Mississippi in the interest of
hurricane and storm damage reduction and for several other purposes,2 and
to provide an interim report of its findings on June 30, 2006, and issue a
final report by December 30, 2007.3
We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative, as part of our continued effort
to assist the Congress by (1) monitoring the extensive damage to
southeastern Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and (2) evaluating
ongoing efforts to repair and strengthen the region's hurricane protection
projects. Specifically, for this report we reviewed the Corps' (1)
progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1,
2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs, restore levees
and flood control structures to design elevations, and complete
construction of previously authorized but incomplete portions of five
existing hurricane protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated costs
to add enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection projects for the
region.
2Developed in 1969, the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1 to 5 rating
based on a hurricane's maximum sustained winds. For example, a Category 5
hurricane has wind speeds greater than 155 miles per hour. Prior to this
scale, the Corps built systems designed to withstand a "standard project
hurricane." For some of the projects in southeastern Louisiana this was
roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 storm with winds from 111
to 130 miles per hour. A standard project hurricane was assumed to strike
the Louisiana coast once every 200 to 300 years.
3Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119
Stat. 2680, 2761 (Dec. 30, 2005).
To determine the status of work to repair damage to hurricane protection
projects, we tracked the progress of repairs and funds spent by reviewing
weekly repair reports and daily funds status reports obtained from the
Corps' New Orleans district. We interviewed officials at Corps
headquarters, the New Orleans district office, as well as officials
assigned to the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. We also
observed repairs at selected sites in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. To
determine the Corps' plans and estimated costs to repair pumps and pump
stations, restore projects to design grade, and complete construction of
incomplete portions of previously authorized hurricane protection
projects, we reviewed documentation of the Corps' plans, estimated costs,
and results of surveys and reports of damage assessments. We also
interviewed New Orleans District officials about their plans and estimated
costs for this work. To determine the Corps' plans, timelines and
estimated costs to add hurricane project enhancements and strengthen the
level of hurricane protection, we reviewed documentation of plans,
estimated timelines and costs, and laws authorizing funding and authority
to the Corps to make repairs and rebuild. We also interviewed New Orleans
District officials on their plans, timelines and estimated costs for this
work. We conducted our work between January and July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
Through a combination of permanent and temporary measures, the Corps
restored the level of hurricane protection that existed prior to Hurricane
Katrina to Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes by June 1, 2006.
To restore pre-Katrina levels of protection in a period of about 9 months,
the Corps worked quickly and in some instances, engineered temporary
solutions because not all repairs could be completed in time. For example,
the Corps has plans to build permanent gates and pumps at the points where
three drainage canals in New Orleans meet Lake Pontchartrain. These
structures will help stop water from the lake surging into the canals
during a hurricane. However, these permanent structures could not be
completed by June 1, 2006, so the Corps is installing three interim gated
structures and temporary pumps that will continue to provide protection to
the area for 3 to 5 years until permanent structures can be constructed.
While most repairs that were needed to restore protection were completed
by June 1, 2006, some work was behind schedule. Until this work can be
completed, the Corps has developed emergency procedures to protect against
flooding in the event of a hurricane while repair work is ongoing. For
example, because the construction of one of the interim gates along the
17th Street canal in the Orleans East Bank is behind schedule, the Corps
will drive sheet pile barriers into the canal to block storm surges from
Lake Pontchartrain in the event of a hurricane. Additionally, all repair
work completed by June 1, 2006, was performed only on levees and
floodwalls with obvious damage noted during visual inspections conducted
after the hurricane. Consequently, the reliability of levees and
floodwalls adjacent to those that were repaired is still unknown. In
December 2005, the Corps had estimated that it would cost $841 million to
repair the existing system to pre-Katrina levels. By March 2006, the Corps
had awarded 59 contracts to complete the associated repairs for about $801
million. In June 2006, however, the Corps revised its cost estimates for
this work and expects that when all contracted work is completed for these
repairs, total costs will exceed $1 billion.
After repairing damaged sections of hurricane protection projects to
pre-Katrina levels, the Corps plans additional work to repair all damaged
pump stations; restore to their original authorized design heights, those
sections of the hurricane protection projects that have settled over time;
and construct previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five
hurricane protection projects in the area. Specifically, the Corps plans
to (1) repair pumps, pump motors, and pump stations damaged by the
hurricane and subsequent flooding by about March 2007; (2) raise all
hurricane protection structures to design elevation by September 1, 2007;
and (3) complete construction of incomplete portions of previously
authorized projects by September 30, 2007. The Corps originally estimated
that it would cost $59 million to repair all damaged pumps, motors, and
pump stations. However, to date, the Corps has allocated $70 million for
the pump repairs. Estimated total costs for the other repairs and
construction planned by the Corps are unknown at this time because the
Corps is revising these estimates. The Corps had originally allocated $1.1
billion from the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriation to
cover the cost of additional work needed to restore elevation to sections
of the hurricane protection projects that had settled over time and to
complete construction of the previously authorized but incomplete segments
of all five hurricane protection projects in this area. In June 2006, the
Corps shifted $224 million of these funds to cover the increasing cost of
repairs, leaving a balance of about $871 million allocated for this work.
The Corps is also revising the cost estimates for this work to reflect
design changes, escalating construction costs, and costs to fund the
portion of the work normally paid by local sponsors. According to the
Corps, all of these costs may not have been adequately accounted for in
the original funding allocation.
In response to new and emerging requirements from a broad range of
stakeholders, the Corps continues to propose enhancements to existing
hurricane protection projects as well as new projects to improve and
strengthen hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. Implementing
these enhancements and strengthening the hurricane protection system for
southeastern Louisiana is in itself an immense challenge. For example, the
Corps is concurrently developing options to address the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's new flood control standards; devising solutions to
address some of the findings of the Interagency Performance Evaluation
Task Force; and trying to evaluate approaches that will meet the long term
needs of local interests as well as respond to congressional requirements,
as outlined in three emergency supplemental appropriations. However, we
are concerned that the Corps is proceeding with over $7 billion of interim
repairs and construction without a comprehensive strategy and
implementation plan to ensure that these various efforts are appropriately
coordinated and integrated with each other as well as with any future
plans for a stronger hurricane protection system. Following Hurricane
Katrina, the Corps established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task
Force and Corps officials said they used its findings and lessons learned
to improve engineering practices. However, the Corps has not indicated
that it plans to establish a similar organization to help guide its
interim repair and restoration efforts. While the Corps' preliminary
technical report issued in July 2006 provides a conceptual framework to
help stakeholders make decisions about long-term strategies for building a
stronger and better hurricane protection system for coastal Louisiana, it
neither provided any details on what needs to be done to achieve higher
levels of protection nor how current efforts will be integrated with
future efforts, if authorized. One of the criticisms that has arisen from
investigations of the existing hurricane protection system was that it was
a system in name only and was, in fact, a series of disjointed projects
that did not function together to adequately protect the area. To avoid
the potential for repeating the mistakes of the past and risk creating a
set of disjointed projects that may not work together, may become
redundant or obsolete, and may result in an inefficient use of federal
funds, we believe that it would be imprudent for the Corps to proceed with
such a large scale multibillion dollar construction project without
developing a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to guide its
efforts, measure progress, and ensure accountability.
In light of the billions of dollars that Congress has already appropriated
to rebuild and strengthen existing southeastern Louisiana hurricane
protection projects, and to ensure the most efficient use of these federal
resources, we are recommending that the Corps develop a comprehensive
strategy that incorporates all projects and plans for rebuilding and
strengthening the system and an implementation plan that will achieve that
level of protection in a cost-effective manner, within a reasonable time
frame. We are also recommending that the Corps establish an evaluative
organization like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, to
help the Corps develop a strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide
expert advice on the construction of a stronger and well-integrated
hurricane protection system.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)
generally concurred with both of our recommendations but contended that a
body like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force was not the
proper organization to help the Corps develop a strategic plan, monitor
progress, and provide expert advice on the construction of a stronger and
well-integrated hurricane protection system. The Corps plans to rely on
three teams of experts to provide independent technical reviews, develop a
strategic plan to construct a hurricane protection system, and monitor
implementation. We believe that the Corps' proposal to use three external
groups of experts satisfies the spirit of our recommendation.
Background
There are five major federally authorized projects comprised of more than
350 miles of levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures across
six parishes that provide hurricane protection in southeastern Louisiana.
While construction of hurricane protection projects in southeastern
Louisiana began almost 60 years ago, construction of three major projects
began about 40 years ago in the 1960s. Segments of those were still
incomplete when Hurricane Katrina struck the area in late August 2005. The
projects were designed to provide protection from hurricanes with maximum
wind speeds of 87 to 115 miles per hour (115 miles per hour being roughly
equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane). Hurricane Katrina made landfall
with wind speeds equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane, or winds up to 127
miles per hour, and record high storm surge. To determine the extent of
the damage to levees and floodwalls caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Corps
contracted for an initial assessment in September 2005 and a second
assessment in April 2006. Both assessments were based on visual
inspections of the levees and floodwalls. For the first assessment,
engineers walked the levees and floodwalls in Orleans, Plaquemines and St.
Bernard parishes and looked for damage. The second assessment reexamined
only those sections that were initially reported to be undamaged. The
first assessment found 169 miles of damaged levees and floodwalls of which
128 miles were moderately damaged and 41 were severely damaged or
destroyed. Most of the damage was found in Plaquemines Parish where 150
miles of levees and floodwalls were damaged. The second assessment of
those sections initially found to be undamaged found additional cracks in
the levees, soil erosion near floodwalls, and levee heights that had
settled below their design elevation. Subsequently, the Corps and the
contractors conducted sampling and other tests to determine the extent of
the damage, but this was only done where exterior damage-such as cracks,
depressions, or seepage-was observed. Both assessments documented obvious
external damage but did not indicate whether other structures without
visible damage-but similar in design and composition to damaged levees and
floodwalls-were, in fact, damaged or weakened.
In its May 2006 draft final report, an independent team sponsored by the
National Science Foundation reviewed the failures of the hurricane
protection projects and concluded that the pervasiveness of problems and
failures calls into question the integrity and reliability of other
sections of flood protection projects that did not fail during Hurricane
Katrina. In its June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force-a team of 150 experts from the Corps and about 50
federal, state, international, academic, and industrial
organizations-found that repaired sections of levees and floodwalls were
likely the strongest parts of the system until remaining sections could be
similarly upgraded and completed. The task force report concluded that
since there are many areas where protection levels are only the same as
before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans metropolitan area remained
vulnerable to storm surge and wave conditions equivalent to or greater
than Hurricane Katrina.
The most severely damaged portions of the hurricane protection projects in
the area were found in the three parishes of Orleans, Plaquemines, and St.
Bernard. Within these three parishes, there are approximately 243 miles of
earthen levees and 26 miles of floodwalls. The 26 miles of floodwalls
comprised 19 miles of I-walls and 7 miles of T-walls. I-walls are vertical
concrete barriers anchored to levees by steel sheet pile driven vertically
into the levees. T-walls are vertical concrete barriers with a horizontal
concrete base anchored by multiple steel beams driven diagonally into the
levees and are stronger than I-walls (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall
Corps officials told us that T- or L-walls4 will be constructed to replace
floodwalls that were destroyed and need to be replaced.
Corps of Engineers Has the Authority and Responsibility to Rebuild and Restore
Damage to Hurricane Protection Projects
Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941, as amended, commonly referred
to as Public Law 84-99,5 authorizes the Corps to conduct emergency
operations and rehabilitation activities when levees fail or are damaged
during storms. Under the implementing regulations for Public Law 84-99,
after a storm, the Corps may repair and restore federally authorized flood
control projects and hurricane protection structures, or nonfederal flood
control projects that were inspected and found to have met federal
standards for construction and maintenance prior to the flood event.6
Assistance for the rehabilitation of hurricane protection structures is
limited to repair or restoration to the prestorm condition and level of
protection (e.g., the prestorm elevation/height of levees, allowing for
normal settlement).7
Under Corps policy, damage to federally constructed levees that have been
completed and officially turned over to a nonfederal sponsor are to be
repaired with 100 percent of the cost borne by the federal government and
damage to nonfederally constructed levees are to be repaired with 80
percent of the cost borne by the federal government and 20 percent by the
local sponsor or government. However, in September 2005, the Corps noted
that Hurricane Katrina had caused unprecedented damage and loss of
infrastructure in the Gulf Coast region. According to the Corps, damage to
the region eroded the tax base to such an extent that local sponsors would
have great difficulty funding their share of rebuilding expenses. In
response, the Corps requested a one-time waiver from the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works from the policy requiring local
sponsors to fund 20 percent of the cost of rehabilitating nonfederal flood
and hurricane protection projects. For federally authorized projects that
were under construction when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Corps
also requested a waiver from the policy requirement that local sponsors
fund a share of the repair cost. In October 2005, the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works approved both requests. In the December 2005
emergency supplemental, Congress appropriated funding to the Corps to
repair levees and flood control structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina to
the level of protection for which they were designed, at full federal
expense.
4An L-wall is similar to a T-wall except that the horizontal concrete base
and diagonal steel beams are only on the landward side of the wall.
533 U.S.C. S: 701n.
633 C.F.R. S:S: 203.44-203.45.
733 C.F.R. S: 203.49(b)(1).
Construction of Earthen Levees Depends on Local Building Materials and Soil
Foundations
Most earthen levees are constructed with a mixture of clay and sand. The
most commonly used method is to build an earthen embankment sloped on both
sides and rising to a flat crown (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee
Depending on local conditions and the availability of suitable materials,
levees can be built in one or more stages. The number of stages is
generally dependent on the ability of the local soil to provide an
adequate base, and not sink under the weight of levees, and to compact and
provide suitable strength. When appropriate conditions exist, levees can
be built in a single stage. In other cases, levees may need to be built in
stages (also called lifts) that allow for subsidence of the foundation
soil or settlement of the fill material. Between stages the levees are
allowed to settle for up to 5 years. Because the soil in southeastern
Louisiana has a tendency of settling, historically most levees built in
the New Orleans area were required to be built in three to four stages,
and construction took 15 to 20 years. Because of the urgency of the
repairs that the Corps made after Hurricane Katrina, earthen levees in the
New Orleans area had to be rebuilt in only several months. To do this, the
Corps relied on mechanical compaction by heavy construction equipment to
compensate for the normal settlement that would occur over time.
Building levees quickly can pose risks, however, as was witnessed on May
30, 2006, when a 400-foot section of a reconstructed levee in Plaquemines
Parish slipped 3 to 4 feet under its own weight. Corps officials said the
underlying soil was weaker than previous tests had indicated and was
unable to support the weight of the newly constructed levee. To provide
interim protection, the Corps constructed a small earthen berm on top of
the levee to return it to approved design height by June 7, 2006.
Current Repairs to the Hurricane Protection Projects Are Limited to Prestorm or
Previously Authorized Levels of Protection
By June 1, 2006, the Corps planned to complete repairs to 169 miles of
southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects to prestorm
conditions-that is, to repair most levees and floodwalls to the condition
they were in before Hurricane Katrina. For 128 miles of levees with minor
or moderate damage, the Corps planned to repair or fill scour (erosion)
and holes. For 41 miles of levees and floodwalls with major damage, or
that were completely destroyed, the Corps planned to rebuild these damaged
sections entirely, including rebuilding to the original design grade, plus
an allowance for settlement. The Corps only planned to repair
hurricane-damaged levees and structures and did not plan to repair or
replace any existing levees or floodwalls unless exterior damage was
observed.
The Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair damage in three sections of the
city of New Orleans (Orleans East Bank, New Orleans East and the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal, commonly called the Industrial Canal) and the
parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The following sections briefly
describe the location and damage caused by Hurricane Katrina for these
five areas and the number of contracts the Corps awarded for completing
the repairs.
Orleans East Bank
Orleans East Bank is located south of Lake Pontchartrain, from the 17th
Street Canal to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, and along the western
bank of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal to the Mississippi River. About
19 miles of levees and floodwalls are along the Orleans Lakefront, the
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and three drainage canals-17th Street,
Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue-which drain rainwater from New Orleans
into Lake Pontchartrain (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites
A total of about one mile of levees and floodwalls were damaged along the
17th Street Canal and two sides of the London Avenue Canal. There was also
intermittent minor erosion, and all 13 of the area's pump stations were
damaged. The Corps constructed interim sheet pile walls at the breach
sites along the drainage canals and contracted for the construction of
permanent T-walls at each of the breach sites. However, the Corps was
concerned about the integrity of the canal walls that were not breached
during Hurricane Katrina. The Corps chose to construct interim closure
structures (gates) where the canals empty into Lake Pontchartrain to
reduce storm surge from entering the canals during hurricanes and storms.
According to Corps officials, the Corps did not have the authority to
construct permanent gates; so, in late January and early February 2006,
the Corps awarded contracts for the construction of three interim gates
and 34 pumps along the three drainage canals. A total of 12 contracts were
awarded for the Orleans East Bank area.
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal is a 5.5 mile long waterway that
connects the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain. The east and west
sides of the Industrial Canal are lined by a total of 12.3 miles of levees
and floodwalls (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair
Project Sites
A total of 5 miles of levees and floodwalls were damaged by Hurricane
Katrina along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Two breaches occurred on
the western side of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, near the
intersection of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal, and two separate large breaches occurred on the lower
eastern side, resulting in major flooding to New Orleans' Lower Ninth
Ward. The Corps awarded eight contracts to repair and completely rebuild
damaged and destroyed levees and floodwalls along the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal.
New Orleans East
New Orleans East is bounded by the east bank of the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal on the west, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, Bayou
Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge to the east, and the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway to the south. The area has 39 miles of exterior levees and
floodwalls and eight pump stations (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites
The hurricane damaged 4.6 miles of levees and floodwalls and all eight
pump stations. Ten contracts were awarded to repair this damage.
Plaquemines Parish
Plaquemines Parish includes long, narrow strips of land on both sides of
the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The
Mississippi River levees protect the parish from floods coming down the
river, and the New Orleans to Venice hurricane protection project
(portions of which are not yet completed) protects against
hurricane-induced tidal surges. The distance between these Gulf-side
levees, called back levees, and the Mississippi River levees is less than
1 mile, in most places. Plaquemines Parish has a total of 169 miles of
levees and floodwalls and 18 pump stations (see fig. 6).
Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites
In Plaquemines Parish, a total of 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were
damaged along with 18 pump stations. The Corps awarded 20 contracts to
repair and rebuild levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina in
Plaquemines Parish. According to the Corps, there was considerable erosion
scour along the total length of the levees. The Mississippi River levees
were also damaged by numerous ships and barges that crashed into them.
Five of the 6 miles of floodwalls along the Mississippi River were also
destroyed but will be replaced with earthen levees because the Corps
determined that the underlying foundation could not support the weight of
a concrete floodwall.
St. Bernard Parish
In St. Bernard Parish, levees and floodwalls extend along the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway to the north, along the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet to the east and south, and then turn west toward the Mississippi
River, continuing along the river to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
along the western side. St. Bernard Parish has 30 miles of exterior levees
and floodwalls, 22 miles of nonfederal interior levees, and eight pump
stations (see fig. 7).
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites
In St. Bernard Parish, 8 miles of exterior levees and floodwalls were
damaged, 14 miles of nonfederal interior levees (back levees) were damaged
and all eight pump stations and two control structures were damaged. The
Corps awarded nine contracts to repair and rebuild the levees, floodwalls,
and flood control structures in St. Bernard Parish.
Independent Research Teams Have Studied the Cause of Hurricane Protection
Failure
Following Hurricane Katrina, several independent review teams began
studies to determine the cause of hurricane protection failures in
southeastern Louisiana. These teams included the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force, Independent Levee Investigation Team sponsored by
the National Science Foundation, and the American Society of Civil
Engineers External Review Panel. The Interagency Performance Evaluation
Task Force and Independent Levee Investigation Team have issued
preliminary reports of their findings and conclusions. The American
Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel was assembled to review
the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force work and conclusions. On
June 1, 2006, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force issued a
draft final report that concluded that the levees and floodwalls in New
Orleans and southeastern Louisiana did not perform as a system and that it
was a system in name only. According to the report, the hurricane system's
performance was compromised by the incompleteness of the system, the
inconsistency in the levels of protection, and the lack of redundancy.
Inconsistent levels of protection were caused by differences in the
quality of materials used in the levees and variations in elevations due
to subsidence and construction below design specifications. Corps
officials said they considered the findings and recommendations of the
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force when making decisions about
how to repair levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
Billions of Dollars Have Been Appropriated for Post-Katrina Hurricane Protection
Repairs and Construction
The Corps has received over $7 billion dollars to restore hurricane
protection and complete construction on existing hurricane protection
projects in southeastern Louisiana through three emergency supplemental
appropriations.8 In September and December 2005, the Corps received a
total of $3.299 billion in the second and third emergency supplemental
appropriations. In September 2005, the second emergency supplemental
appropriation provided the Corps with $400 million for repair of flood
control and hurricane protection projects.9 In December 2005, the third
supplemental appropriation provided the Corps with $2.899 billion, of
which $2.3 billion was provided for emergency response to and recovery
from coastal storm damages and flooding from hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.10 The Corps has allocated nearly $2.1 billion to the New Orleans
District to repair damage to existing hurricane protection, rebuild
existing projects to original authorized height, and complete
unconstructed portions of previously authorized hurricane protection
projects. In turn, the New Orleans District has allocated nearly $1.9
billion for this work.
8There have been four emergency supplemental appropriations in response to
Hurricane Katrina. The first emergency supplemental appropriation, Pub. L.
No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988 (Sept. 2, 2005), was used to fund, among other
things, other Corps emergency missions, such as unwatering. The Corps did
not use the appropriation to repair levees destroyed or damaged by the
storm. The second, third and fourth emergency supplementals appropriated
funds to the Corps to repair and rebuild damage caused by Hurricane
Katrina.
9Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs
from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119
Stat. 1990, 1991 (Sept. 8, 2005).
In June 2006, through the fourth emergency supplemental appropriation, the
Congress provided almost $4 billion to the Corps to strengthen the
region's hurricane defenses and restore areas of coastal wetlands. The
legislation included specific provisions for southeastern Louisiana
hurricane protection and flood reduction project enhancements (canal
closures, selective levee armoring, and storm proofing pump stations), and
incorporating nonfederal levees in Plaquemines Parish into the federal
levee system.11 The June 2006 emergency supplemental also provided general
construction funding that the Corps plans to use to, among other things,
raise levee heights for certain hurricane protection projects in order to
certify them in the National Flood Insurance Program (also called a
100-year flood level of protection). Table 1 summarizes the estimated
costs and funds allocated for the Corps' planned work to date.
10Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs
Arising from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-61, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761-2763 (Dec. 30, 2005).
11Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234; 120 Stat. 418,
453-455 (June 15, 2006).
Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps' Plans and
Projects
Initial estimated
Corps plans and projects cost Funds allocated
Repair damage to existing hurricane $841 million $1,018 milliona
protection
Rebuild existing projects to Not estimated $342 milliona
original authorized height
Complete unconstructed portions of $529 million $529 million
previously authorized hurricane
protection projects
Repair pumps, pump motors, and pump $59 million $70 million
stations
Enhance hurricane protection to Not estimated $495.3 million
provide protection from a 100-year
flood
Enhance hurricane protection to Not estimated Funds have not been
provide protection from a Category 5 allocated
hurricane
Source: GAO analysis of Army Corps of Engineers' budgetary and other
documents.
aThe Corps allocated $801 million to repair damage to existing hurricane
protection and $566 million to rebuild existing projects to original
authorized height. In June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million from funds
allocated to rebuild existing projects to fund repair cost increases; that
is, the Corps reallocated $217 million to fund repairs to the existing
hurricane protection and $7 million to fund repairs to other hurricane and
coastal protection projects.
At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane Protection Had Been
Restored to Southeastern Louisiana
On June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 100 percent of prehurricane
protection levels had been restored to southeastern Louisiana. However,
work continued on almost half of the contracts because some were behind
schedule while other contracts were not scheduled to be completed until as
late as March 2007. In instances where the Corps determined it could not
complete permanent repairs by June 1, 2006, the Corps installed temporary
structures or levee supports and developed emergency procedures to protect
against flooding in the event of a hurricane. The Corps originally
allocated $801 million for this phase of the repairs; however, the current
allocation for total costs for this phase is just over $1 billion.
To restore 100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection in
southeastern Louisiana by the start of the 2006 hurricane season, the
Corps worked quickly to award contracts for a variety of work to be
performed in a relatively short period of time. Between October 2005 and
March 2006, the Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair and rebuild earthen
levees, concrete floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures,
and to construct interim repairs in areas where final repairs could not be
completed by June 1. To complete repairs quickly, some contractors worked
24 hours a day, and Corps project managers monitored the progress of the
work. As of June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 22.7 miles of new levees
and 195 miles of scour repairs were completed. Although the Corps reported
that 100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection had been restored by
June 1, 2006, as of July 18, 2006, 27 of the 59 contracts were not
completed. Of those 27 contracts, the Corps projected that 20 would be
completed by September 30, 2006, and the remaining 7 contracts would be
completed by March 2007. The remaining work includes grading, compacting,
and shaping the levees, as well as grass seeding and fertilizing.
In some instances, to restore prehurricane levels of protection, the Corps
decided to change the design of the existing hurricane structure. For
example, in the Orleans East Bank, the Corps determined that it did not
have the time to assess the stability of existing canal walls nor could it
complete repairs to all of the breaches along the drainage canals before
June 1, 2006. As a result, at a cost of $111 million, the Corps decided to
install interim gated closure structures (gates) on all three canals-17th
Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue-where they intersect Lake
Pontchartrain to prevent storm surge from entering the canals and to
install 34 temporary pumps to drain floodwaters from the Orleans East Bank
portion of the city (see fig. 8). According to Corps officials, the agency
planned to install interim gates and temporary pumps because it did not
have the authority to install permanent gates and pumps under its
emergency flood control authority. The Corps expects the interim gates and
temporary pumps to remain in place for 3 to 5 years, after which the Corps
will construct permanent gates and pumps. The 2006 emergency supplemental
appropriation provides $530 million for permanent gates and pumps at the
three drainage canals.12
12Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418,
454 (June 15, 2006).
Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps
According to the Corps, the interim gates will be operated manually, and
the temporary pumps will not be enclosed. If a major storm or hurricane
should occur, the Corps plans to close the gates when water levels in the
17th Street and London Avenue canals reach 5 feet and the water level in
the Orleans Avenue canal reaches 9 feet. The Corps is reviewing the
results of recent soil samples collected in the area and may change its
plans, depending on these results, a Corps official said. The temporary
pumps being installed by the Corps can only pump out a portion of the
drainage water that would normally be pumped into the canals during a
storm event. As a result of the restriction being placed on the water
levels pumped into the canals and the limited pump capacity of the
temporary pumps, the Corps has acknowledged that some flooding could occur
from the heavy rainfall that normally occurs during a hurricane.
In instances where the Corps did not expect permanent repairs to be
completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised some interim and temporary
solutions to provide the same level of protection that existed before
Hurricane Katrina. For example, as of June 1, 2006, construction of one of
the three interim gates-the 17th Street canal gate-was behind schedule.
The Corps estimated it would be completed by September 15, 2006. If a
hurricane threatens before the interim gate is in place, the Corps plans
to drive sheet piling in front of the Hammond Highway Bridge that crosses
the 17th Street canal to close off the canal from Lake Pontchartrain. On
June 12, 2006, the Corps announced that the temporary pumps built for the
drainage canals could not provide the required pumping capacity. The Corps
plans to procure replacement pumps with different specifications for the
17th Street canal and repair new pumps already installed at the Orleans
Avenue and London Avenue canals. Under normal conditions, the Corps said
it would have conducted hydraulic modeling and testing to determine the
correct pump configuration. The Corps did not perform modeling and
testing, officials said, because the process can take months, and there
was insufficient time to do so before the start of the hurricane season.
If the canals must be closed due to a hurricane, before pumping capacity
is restored at the drainage canals, the Corps plans to use a combination
of temporary and portable pumps.
Similarly, in Plaquemines Parish, the Corps made temporary repairs to 5
miles of levees along the Mississippi River after the Corps concluded that
a floodwall located on top of a section of levee was not reliable. The
Corps decided to add a temporary reinforcement because there was not
enough time to replace 5 miles of floodwalls before the start of the 2006
hurricane season. To provide this interim protection, the Corps added
compacted clay along the backside of the damaged levee. The Corps
subsequently determined that the foundation soil in this area would be
unable to support the weight of floodwalls, so the Corps has decided to
construct a full earthen levee embankment instead. However, this permanent
structure is not scheduled to be completed until March 2007.
The Corps allocated about $801 million to repair levees and floodwalls to
pre-Katrina conditions. An additional $217 million was needed to fund the
$125 million costs to increase the pumping capacity of the new temporary
pumps for the drainage canals and $92 million to fund such things as (1)
additional work that has been required on existing repair contracts,
relating to weakened levees in Plaquemines parish, the three drainage
canal gates, and two hurricane protection and flood reduction projects;
(2) contingency measures that had to be implemented until the temporary
gates on the drainage canals are completed; and (3) costs to acquire
nearby real estate for construction of the gates and associated levees.
The Corps allocated these additional funds from the $566 million that was
allocated by the Corps for raising all hurricane protection structures to
their authorized design elevations, which is discussed in greater detail
in the next section of this report.
Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing Construction of Incomplete
Portions Continue to Rise
Beyond the repairs that were to be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps
has additional plans to continue repairs, restoration, and construction
activities on other portions of the existing five southeastern Louisiana
hurricane protection and flood control projects. The Corps plans to (1)
repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations by about March 2007;
(2) restore sections of the five hurricane protection and flood control
projects that have settled over time to their original design elevation;
as well as (3) complete construction of previously authorized but
incomplete portions of these hurricane protection and flood control
projects by September 2007. Although $1.165 billion was originally
allocated for this work, the Corps expects actual costs will be greater
because the original allocation did not reflect design changes, additional
costs to fund the local sponsor's share, and rapidly escalating
construction costs. Further, in June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million
from this allocation to pay for the additional costs to repair damaged
levees and floodwalls, leaving only $941 million for this work.
The Corps Plans to Repair Damaged Pumps, Motors, and Pump Stations by March 2007
The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors at 66 of 75 pump stations
damaged by flood waters that were caused by Hurricane Katrina.13 The pump
stations are located in Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes as
well as in neighboring Jefferson Parish. Pumps remove storm runoff from
city streets. The Corps plans to make electrical and mechanical repairs to
pumps and motors-such as rewiring motors and replacing pump bearings-and
structural repairs to pump stations, such as repairing roof tops. As of
June 2006, the Corps had planned to complete repairs to all of these
pumps, pump motors, and pump stations by March 2007, for an estimated cost
of $59 million. However, to date, the Corps has allocated $70 million for
the pump repairs. A Corps project manager said that five contracts have
been awarded for $7.7 million, as of June 2006, and that he expects to
award a total of 25 contracts for this work.
13Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency dried and cleaned some flooded pumps and motors in an
effort to quickly restore prehurricane pumping capacity to the region.
In April 2006, three pump motors that were flooded during Hurricane
Katrina caught fire during a rainstorm and shut down, raising questions
about the reliability of other pumps that had also been flooded. The
possible failure of pumps due to fires combined with (1) the restrictions
placed on the level of water that can be pumped into the canals because of
uncertainty about the integrity of the canal floodwalls and (2) the
reduced capacity of the temporary pumps to remove water from the canals
has led to widely reported concerns about flooding from rainwater during a
hurricane. In response to these concerns, the Corps accelerated plans to
repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations. A Corps official
estimated it would take several weeks to repair each of the larger and
older pump motors. The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors by
taking some of them offline one at a time, thereby maintaining as much of
the available pumping capacity at each pumping station as possible.
Restoration of Hurricane Protection to Authorized Design Elevations Is Expected
by September 2007
The Corps plans to raise the height of all federal and some nonfederal
levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures within the
southeastern Louisiana area, which have settled over the years, to their
original design elevation by September 1, 2007. In December 2005, the
Corps surveyed levees not damaged by Hurricane Katrina and estimated that
about 48 miles of levees were 1 to 2 1/2 feet below design elevation in
St. Bernard, Orleans, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. The Corps
estimated that restoring these levees to their designed height would cost
$50.8 million. However, the Corps allocated $566 million from funds
provided in the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriation to
raise not only the heights of these levees but also the heights of
floodwalls and other structures in southeastern Louisiana, which may have
settled over time, to their original design height. The primary difference
between the Corps' initial cost estimate and the funds allocated in the
emergency supplemental is the higher cost of raising floodwalls and other
structures, compared with the cost of raising only about 48 miles of
levees. In July 2006, the Corps estimated that 94 miles of levees, about
16 miles of floodwalls, 89 gates, and 2 control structures were below
design elevation in Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes.
According to a Corps official, the agency is revising the plans and
estimated costs for this work to include the costs of raising all settled
floodwalls and the cost of replacing all I-walls with T-walls or L-walls.
As of July 2006, the Corps had not announced the results of its second
damage assessment. Currently, this work is still scheduled to be completed
by September 1, 2007. As of June 2006, funds allocated for this work were
reduced to $342 million because, as previously mentioned, $224 million was
shifted to help fund the escalating costs to repair damaged levees and
floodwalls to pre-Katrina levels by June 1, 2006, and to fund repairs to
hurricane damage at other hurricane protection and coastal protection
projects. According to a Corps official, cost estimates for this work were
to be available by July 15, 2006, after which the Corps plans to determine
if it needs to request more funds.
Completion of Previously Authorized but Unconstructed Portions of Five Hurricane
and Flood Reduction Projects Expected by September 2007
By September 30, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the construction of all
previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five hurricane
protection and flood reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana. In
December 2005, the Corps estimated the cost of completing these five
projects to be $529 million. However, the Corps is revising its cost
estimates due to escalating construction costs and design changes that
have occurred since Hurricane Katrina. The Corps' costs will also increase
because local sponsors are no longer required to share any of the costs
incurred to complete these projects. Details of the five projects are
described below.
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is
located in St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles parishes in
southeastern Louisiana, in the vicinity of the city of New Orleans and
between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The project includes
a series of control structures, concrete flood walls, and about 125 miles
of earthen levees designed to protect residents living between Lake
Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River levees from storm surges in the
lake (see fig. 9).
Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project
This project was designed to provide protection from a standard project
hurricane (equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane). The Flood
Control Act of 196514 authorized the project that, at the time of
Hurricane Katrina, was 90 percent complete in St. Bernard and Orleans
parishes, 70 percent complete in Jefferson Parish, and 60 percent complete
in St. Charles Parish. The pre-Katrina scheduled completion date for this
project was 2015, at an estimated cost of $738 million, where the
estimated federal share was $528 million and the estimated local sponsor
share was $210 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to
complete the remainder of the project were $121 million. This estimate is
expected to increase due to higher construction costs following Hurricane
Katrina.
14Pub. L. No. 89-298, S: 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077.
West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is located on the
west bank of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the city of New
Orleans and in Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. The project
is designed to provide hurricane protection to residents from storm surges
from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador, and waterways leading to the Gulf of
Mexico. The project encompasses 66 miles of earthen levees and floodwalls
(see fig. 10).
Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project
This project was designed to provide Category 3 level of hurricane
protection. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized this
project.15 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was 38 percent
complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2016, at an
estimated cost of $331 million, where the federal estimated share was $215
million and the estimated local sponsor share was $116 million. At the
time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the
project were $148 million; however, the Corps expects the final cost to be
much higher. The design for this project includes 4 miles of T-walls, and
since the cost of T-walls has escalated, officials said they expect the
cost to complete the project will increase as well.
15Pub. L. No. 99-662, S: 401, 100 Stat. 4082, 4128.
Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
The Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project is
located in southeastern Louisiana, about 30 miles southwest of New
Orleans, along Bayou Lafourche and between the communities of Larose and
Golden Meadow in Lafourche Parish. The project is a ring-shaped levee
about 40 miles in length (see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
According to Corps officials, this project was designed to provide a
100-year level of hurricane protection to about 2,300 acres of residential
and commercial land and 9,400 acres of agricultural land. The Flood
Control Act of 196516 authorized this project that, at the time of
Hurricane Katrina, was about 96 percent complete. The pre-Katrina
completion date of this project was 2007, at an estimated cost of $116
million, where the federal estimated share was $81 million and the
estimated local sponsor was $35 million. At the time of the storm,
estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project were $4 million.
However, according to the project manager, significant settlement has
occurred throughout the project and levees are between 1 to 1 1/2 feet
below design elevation. Further, when this project was designed in the
early 1970s, a nearby marsh was expected to help slow storm surge. Since
that time, the local environment has changed causing the marsh to
disappear and, according to the project manager, the Corps is
reconsidering the project design and may have to recommend raising the
height of the levees in order to provide authorized levels of protection,
which could significantly increase the costs of the project.
Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project
The Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project is located on the east
bank of the Mississippi River, in Orleans Parish, and on the east and west
banks of the Mississippi River, in Jefferson Parish and St. Tammany
Parish. The project was designed to provide drainage and flood protection
from a 10-year rainfall event17 and encompasses major drainage lines and
canals, additional pumping capacity, and new pump stations (see fig. 12).
16Pub. L. No. 89-298, S: 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077.
17A 10-year flood means there is a 10 percent annual chance of flood.
Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project
Note: Shading indicates areas where drainage and flood protection work is
planned or in progress.
The project was originally authorized by the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 199618 and the Water Resources Development Act of
1996.19 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was about 60 percent
complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2009, at an
estimated cost of $908 million, of which the federal estimated share was
$678 million and the estimated local sponsor share was $230 million. At
the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the
project were $225 million (this estimate has been revised to $339
million). According to a Corps official, this estimate will increase
further because costs for engineering and construction have escalated in
the months following Hurricane Katrina.
18Pub. L. No. 104-46, S: 108, 109 Stat. 402, 408.
19Pub. L. No. 104-303, S: 533, 110 Stat. 3658, 3775.
New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
The New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project is located along
the east bank of the Mississippi River from Phoenix, Louisiana-about 28
miles southeast of New Orleans-down to Bohemia, Louisiana, and along the
west bank of the river from St. Jude, Louisiana-about 39 miles southeast
of New Orleans-down to the vicinity of Venice, Louisiana. The project was
designed to provide protection from hurricane tidal overflow from a
100-year storm and consists of 87 miles of enlarged levees built on the
back side of the ring of levees (see fig. 13).
Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
Note: Reaches shown above are back levees.
This project was authorized under the River and Harbor Act of 1962.20 At
the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was about 84 percent complete.
The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2018, at an estimated
cost of $253 million, where the federal share was $177 million and the
estimated local sponsor share was $76 million. At the time of the storm,
estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project were $32 million.
According to a Corps official, estimated costs to complete this project
are expected to increase due, in part, to design changes.
20Pub. L. No. 87-874, S: 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1184.
The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Managing the Multiple
Restoration, Construction, and Future Enhancements Proposed for Southeastern
Louisiana Hurricane Protection
In response to various requirements and directives from stakeholders, the
Corps has already developed or is in the process of developing a number of
plans and projects that will further restore, construct, and/or enhance
hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana, to make it stronger and
better. Constructing these projects may take years and require billions of
dollars in federal funds. However, the Corps does not have a comprehensive
strategic plan to ensure that all of these efforts are effectively
integrated and an implementation plan to ensure funding allocations are
made in the most efficient manner possible, avoiding redundancies and
misuse of resources.
In addition to the repairs and construction activities already described
in prior sections of this report, a number of requirements and directives
placed on the Corps over the last several months have required it to
modify existing plans or develop new plans for hurricane protection in
southeastern Louisiana:
o The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided nearly
$4 billion to the Corps to enhance hurricane protection in
southeastern Louisiana.21 Specific provisions provided $530
million for permanent pumps and closures for New Orleans' three
drainage canals; $350 million for two navigable closures to
prevent hurricane surge from entering the Inner Harbor Navigation
Canal and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway; $250 million to
storm-proof existing interior drainage pump stations in Jefferson
and Orleans parishes; $170 million to armor critical sections of
New Orleans levees; and $215 million to include nonfederal levees
in Plaquemines Parish into the federal system, which means the
levees will be repaired and built to Corps standards and eligible
for future rehabilitation. These projects are in addition to the
other work described in prior sections of this report.
o The 2006 emergency supplemental also appropriated nearly $1.6
billion to the Corps to reinforce or replace floodwalls in the New
Orleans metropolitan area and provided that at least $495 million
of the amounts appropriated for construction be used to raise
levees for the Lake Pontchartrain and West Bank levee projects to
provide a level of protection necessary to satisfy the
certification requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program
(often referred to as the 100-year flood standard.) In April 2006,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency announced the release of
new advisory flood elevations for New Orleans and the surrounding
area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding, or a 100-year
flood. The Corps' restoration plans for hurricane protection did
not meet these new elevation requirements. In response, the Corps
revised its plans and estimated costs to raise the height of
levees and floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year level of
protection. The Corps estimated it would need an additional $4.1
billion to upgrade all of the floodwalls and raise levees to meet
the new standard by 2010. The Corps' estimate included $2.5
billion to raise the height of levees in all of the New Orleans
area, except for lower Plaquemines Parish, in some cases by as
much as 7 feet, which included $900 million to complete other
levee work in the area and upgrade or replace existing I-walls
with T-walls. In lower Plaquemines Parish, the estimated cost to
replace all I-walls with T-walls is $1.6 billion.
o As required by the 2006 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act22 and Department of Defense Appropriations
Act,23 the Corps is conducting a study of flood control, coastal
restoration, and hurricane protection measures for the
southeastern Louisiana coastal region. The Corps must propose
design and technical requirements to protect the region from a
Category 5 hurricane.24 The two laws appropriated a total of $20
million to the Corps for this study. The Corps was required to
provide a preliminary technical report to Congress by June 30,
2006 (which was issued on July 10, 2006) and a final technical
report by December 30, 2007. The final study must consider
alternative designs to protect against a storm surge produced by a
Category 5 hurricane originating from the Gulf of Mexico.
According to the Corps, alternatives being considered include a
structural design consisting of a contiguous line of earthen or
concrete walls along southern coastal Louisiana, a nonstructural
alternative involving only environmental or coastal restoration
measures, or a combination of those alternatives. The Corps' July
2006 preliminary technical report did not specifically identify
which alternatives the Corps would recommend but instead provided
a conceptual framework for both structural and nonstructural
components that should be considered in developing long-term
solutions for the region. Although the cost to provide a Category
5 level of protection for the southeastern Louisiana coastal
region has not yet been determined, it would be in addition to the
over $7 billion already provided to the Corps in the three
emergency supplemental appropriations discussed in previous
sections of this report.
o Finally, the Corps is responding to the findings and
recommendations from the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task
Force and its review of the existing hurricane protection and why
it failed. For example, the task force reported that overtopping
and erosion caused most breaches to levees and floodwalls and
recommended armoring to prevent scour from overtopping, thereby
reducing the chance of breaching. As discussed above, the 2006
emergency supplemental appropriation provided $170 million to
armor critical areas on levees.
Although the long-term solutions for southeastern Louisiana have
not yet been determined and may not be decided for some time, the
Corps is proceeding with over $7 billion of already authorized
repair and restoration work without a comprehensive strategy to
guide its efforts. Without such a strategy, we believe that the
Corps may end up replicating past missteps, which occurred because
it was required to follow a piecemeal approach to developing the
existing hurricane protection that, according to experts, is not
well integrated. For example, the draft final report issued May
2006 by the investigation team sponsored by the National Science
Foundation stated (1) that there was a failure to integrate the
individual parts of a complex hurricane system, (2) that
insufficient attention was given to creating an integrated series
of components to create a reliable overall system, and (3) that
projects were engineered and constructed in piecemeal fashion to
conform to incremental appropriations. In its June 2006 draft
final report, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force
also concluded that hurricane protection systems should be
deliberately designed and built as integrated systems to enhance
reliability and provide consistent levels of protection.
According to the Corps, the technical report due to the Congress
in December 2007 will include the long-range strategy that will
provide an integrated and comprehensive review of flood control,
coastal restoration, and hurricane and storm damage reduction
measures for the southeastern Louisiana region, and the
preliminary framework for this strategy is included in the report
provided to the Congress on July 10, 2006. However, according to a
senior Corps official, there is currently no other strategic plan
in place to guide its efforts. We are concerned that the Corps has
embarked on a multibillion dollar repair and construction effort
in response to the appropriations it has already received, without
a guiding strategic plan, and appears to be simply doing whatever
it takes to comply with the requirements placed on it by the
Congress and other stakeholders. Consequently, we are concerned
that the Corps is once again, during this interim period, taking
an incremental approach that is based on funding and direction
provided through specific appropriations and is at risk of
constructing redundant or obsolete structures that may be
superseded by future decisions, thereby increasing the overall
costs to the federal government for this project.
During the past 4 years, we reported that the Corps' planning for
civil works projects were fraught with errors, mistakes, and
miscalculations and used invalid assumptions and outdated data.25
We recommended, and the Corps agreed, that an external peer review
of its plans and decisions was needed, especially for high risk
and costly proposed projects. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the Corps established the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force and used the task force's findings and
lessons learned to improve its engineering practices and policies
to provide hurricane protection. However, the task force is set to
dissolve once its final report is released in September 2006, and
the Corps has not indicated that it plans to establish another
similar body to help guide its interim repair and restoration
efforts, monitor progress, or provide expert advice.
Conclusions
Following Hurricane Katrina-one of the largest natural disasters
in U.S. history-the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly repaired and
restored almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other
flood control structures to prehurricane levels of protection in
time for the start of the 2006 hurricane season. Now that these
urgent repairs have been completed, the Corps is beginning to
implement a variety of other plans to make many additional repairs
and enhancements to existing southeastern Louisiana hurricane
protection projects that may cost billions of dollars and take
years to complete. Further, additional enhancements are being
considered to increase the overall level of protection for the
area to protect against even larger hurricanes that may add many
billions of dollars and many years to the scope of the Corps
efforts.
Currently, the Corps does not know what ultimate level of
protection will be authorized for southeastern Louisiana and
therefore cannot make strategic decisions about which components
of a hurricane protection system will most effectively provide the
required level of protection. Nonetheless, the Corps has been
appropriated over $7 billion to continue repairs and construction
on five existing hurricane protection projects in the area.
However, it does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide these
efforts and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply
with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other
stakeholders. We believe that taking such an incremental and
piecemeal approach for such a complex and expensive repair and
restoration project is imprudent and that, even for these interim
repairs and enhancements, the Corps should be fully considering
project interrelationships to avoid unnecessary duplication and
redundancy, and to reduce federal costs. We also believe that
relying on an independent body like the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force to help guide and oversee this process will
help ensure that the Corps obtains objective and reliable support
as it implements these authorized enhancements to the existing
hurricane protection projects.
Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to construct a hurricane protection system that provides
the appropriate level of protection to southeastern Louisiana and
ensures the most efficient use of federal resources, we are making
the following two recommendations:
The Army Corps of Engineers should develop (1) a comprehensive
strategy that includes an integrated approach for all projects and
plans for rebuilding and strengthening the system and (2) an
implementation plan that will achieve the specific level of
protection in a cost-effective manner, within a reasonable time
frame.
The Army Corps of Engineers should establish an evaluative
organization like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task
Force, to assist in its efforts in developing a strategic plan,
monitoring progress, and providing expert advice for constructing
a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense
(DOD) for its review and comment. In commenting on a draft of the
report, DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the Army
Corps of Engineers develop (1) a comprehensive strategy to
integrate projects and plans for rebuilding and strengthening
hurricane protection and (2) an implementation plan that will
provide a specific level of protection in a cost-effective manner
within a reasonable time frame. DOD partially concurred with our
second recommendation that the Army Corps of Engineers establish
an evaluative organization to assist in its efforts to develop a
strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide expert advice for
constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection
system, because it believes that a body like the Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force is not the proper mechanism for
this work. According to DOD, the Corps will rely on three teams of
experts to plan and monitor the construction of a hurricane
protection system. First, an independent technical review person
or team will identify, explain, and comment on the assumptions
underlying the Corps' economic, engineering, and environmental
analyses for each project, and evaluate the soundness of Corps'
models and planning methods. Second, the team currently reviewing
flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane and storm damage
reduction measures for the southeastern Louisiana region will
assist the Corps in developing a strategic plan for constructing a
stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system. Lastly,
the Corps has assembled a Federal Principals Group consisting of
senior leaders from federal agencies to guide the development of a
comprehensive plan and monitor implementation of the plan. We
believe that the Corps' proposal to use three external groups of
experts satisfies the spirit of our recommendation. DOD's comments
are included in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available, at no charge, on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact points
for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made
major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Anu Mittal Director, Natural Resources and Environment
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable James M. Inhofe Chairman The Honorable James M.
Jeffords Ranking Minority Member Committee on Environment and
Public Works United States Senate
The Honorable Susan M. Collins Chairman The Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman Ranking Minority Member Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs United States Senate
The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable David L. Hobson Chairman The Honorable Peter J.
Visclosky Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Anu Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Edward Zadjura, Assistant
Director; John Delicath, James Dishmon, Doreen Feldman, Christine
Frye, John Kalmar, Carol Kolarik and Omari Norman made key
contributions to this report.
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21Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418, 453-55 (June 15, 2006).
22Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2247 (Nov. 19, 2005).
23Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761 (Dec. 30, 2005).
24Pub. L. No. 109-148, S: 5009, 119 Stat. 2680, 2814 (amending Pub. L. No.
109-103).
25GAO, Corps of Engineers: Observations on Planning and Project Management
Processes for the Civil Works Program, GAO-06-529T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
15, 2006).
(360655)
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-934 .
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Highlights of GAO-06-934 , a report to congressional committees
September 2006
HURRICANE KATRINA
Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future Enhancements Beyond Interim
Levee Repairs
Hurricane Katrina's storm surge and floodwaters breached levees and
floodwalls causing billions of dollars of property damage, and more than
1,300 deaths. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews
on his own initiative, GAO reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
(1) progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June
1, 2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs and complete
five existing hurricane protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated
costs to add enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection for the
region.
GAO reviewed related laws and regulations, Corps planning documents and
repair tracking reports, observed ongoing repair work, and met with key
agency officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps develop a comprehensive strategy and
implementation plan that incorporates all elements for rebuilding and
strengthening the system to ensure that specified levels of protection are
constructed in a cost-effective manner, within reasonable time frames. GAO
also recommends that the Corps establish an independent task force to help
support and guide its ongoing and future repair efforts.
In its response for the Corps, the Department of Defense generally
concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps worked quickly to repair and
restore almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood
control structures to prehurricane levels of protection. Although the
Corps stated that it had restored prehurricane levels of protection to the
area by June 1, 2006, it used temporary solutions and developed emergency
procedures to protect against flooding, in the event of a hurricane, for
sections where permanent repairs could not be completed in time. For
example, the Corps constructed interim gates on three canals to prevent
storm surges from flooding New Orleans. When construction of one canal
gate fell behind schedule and could not be completed by June 1, 2006, the
Corps devised an emergency plan to drive sheet piling into the canal and
close it off if a hurricane threatened before the gate was completed. More
importantly, because these initial repairs were performed only on levees
and floodwalls with obvious visual damage, the reliability of those
adjacent to them is still unknown. The Corps originally allocated $801
million for initial repairs, but the current allocation has increased to
over $1 billion.
After completing the initial repairs, the Corps plans to conduct
additional repairs and construction on the existing hurricane protection
system. These plans include (1) repairing all damaged pumps, motors, and
pumping stations by about March 2007; (2) restoring sections of existing
hurricane protection projects that have settled over time to their
original design elevations; and (3) completing construction of incomplete
portions of five previously authorized hurricane and flood control
projects by September 2007. An additional $941 million had been allocated
for this additional work, but the Corps expects actual costs will be
greater because of subsequent decisions to change the design of these
projects, cover the local sponsor's share, and because of rapidly
escalating construction costs.
In addition, the Corps plans to undertake further work to enhance and
strengthen the hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. These
projects are estimated to take years and require billions of dollars to
complete. Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than $7
billion for some aspects of this work and additional appropriations are
expected. According to an external review organization established by the
Corps, hurricane protection systems should be deliberately designed and
built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent
levels of protection. However, the Corps does not have a comprehensive
strategy and implementation plan to integrate the repairs already
authorized and planned and that would ensure the efficient use of federal
funds. Instead, the Corps appears to be following a piecemeal approach,
similar to its past practice of building projects without giving
sufficient attention to the interrelationships between various elements of
those projects or fully considering whether the projects will provide an
integrated level of hurricane protection for the area.
*** End of document. ***