Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support
Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation
Challenges (05-SEP-06, GAO-06-928R).
As part of the Army's ongoing transformation efforts, in October
1999 the Army announced the Stryker brigade concept. The Stryker
brigade is a unit designed to provide the Army with a rapidly
deployable force that is capable of operating against the full
spectrum of military threats. To meet the Army's requirements for
being rapidly deployable and combat capable, the Stryker brigade
relies on new sustainment concepts, such as minimizing the number
of personnel and spare parts within the brigade and reaching back
to assets outside the brigade for support, which are not found in
other existing Army brigades. In a span of 6 years, the Army
announced its intention to create a new brigade, chose a vehicle,
tested the operational concept, and deployed three brigades in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army is also sending one
Stryker brigade for a second rotation to Iraq and is developing
four additional Stryker brigades. To support the accelerated
development and deployment timeline, the Army relied on
contractors to support some equipment within the Stryker brigade,
such as the Stryker vehicle and computer and communication
systems. The largest group of contractor support within the
brigade focuses on the Stryker vehicle, and the duties of those
contractor personnel include conducting maintenance on the
Stryker vehicle and managing the Stryker-specific supply chain.
An Army official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology stated that
at the time the first brigade deployed, the Army did not have the
institutional capacity to train soldiers on conducting Stryker
vehicle maintenance, and it faced an immediate need for
maintenance personnel to support the deployment. This official
also stated that the Army has since developed the institutional
capacity to train soldiers to conduct Stryker vehicle
maintenance. On November 1, 2005, the Army directed changes to
Stryker vehicle support. One of these planned changes is to
replace the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel
within the brigade with soldiers. Army officials stated that the
Army's general preference is to use soldiers instead of
contractor personnel, and the specific rationale for making this
change is to increase the flexibility of the Stryker brigade to
perform in different combat missions. The Army expects to begin
implementing this change by fiscal year 2008. We initiated this
work under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative and are providing this
report to Congress because of its' committees' oversight
responsibility. We reviewed issues related to implementing the
Army's planned change to use soldiers, rather than contractors,
to conduct maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and specifically
assessed the extent to which the Army's planned change will
achieve the desired outcome when implemented.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-928R
ACCNO: A60207
TITLE: Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance
Support Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation
Challenges
DATE: 09/05/2006
SUBJECT: Armored vehicles
Army personnel
Department of Defense contractors
Equipment maintenance
Maintenance services contracts
Military forces
Military land vehicles
Military training
Program evaluation
Strategic forces
Strategic planning
DOD Stryker Brigade
Stryker Armored Vehicle
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GAO-06-928R
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September 5, 2006
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Subject: Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support
Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation Challenges
As part of the Army's ongoing transformation efforts, in October 1999 the
Army announced the Stryker brigade concept. The Stryker brigade is a unit
designed to provide the Army with a rapidly deployable force that is
capable of operating against the full spectrum of military threats. To
meet the Army's requirements for being rapidly deployable and combat
capable, the Stryker brigade relies on new sustainment concepts, such as
minimizing the number of personnel and spare parts within the brigade and
reaching back to assets outside the brigade for support, which are not
found in other existing Army brigades. In a span of 6 years, the Army
announced its intention to create a new brigade, chose a vehicle, tested
the operational concept, and deployed three brigades in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army is also sending one Stryker brigade for
a second rotation to Iraq and is developing four additional Stryker
brigades.
To support the accelerated development and deployment timeline, the Army
relied on contractors to support some equipment within the Stryker
brigade, such as the Stryker vehicle and computer and communication
systems. The largest group of contractor support within the brigade
focuses on the Stryker vehicle, and the duties of those contractor
personnel include conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and
managing the Stryker-specific supply chain. An Army official from the
office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology stated that at the time the first brigade deployed, the
Army did not have the institutional capacity to train soldiers on
conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance, and it faced an immediate need for
maintenance personnel to support the deployment. This official also stated
that the Army has since developed the institutional capacity to train
soldiers to conduct Stryker vehicle maintenance.
On November 1, 2005, the Army directed changes to Stryker vehicle support.
One of these planned changes is to replace the Stryker vehicle maintenance
contractor personnel within the brigade with soldiers. Army officials
stated that the Army's general preference is to use soldiers instead of
contractor personnel, and the specific rationale for making this change is
to increase the flexibility of the Stryker brigade to perform in different
combat missions. The Army expects to begin implementing this change by
fiscal year 2008.
We initiated this work under the statutory authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative and are providing
this report to you because of your committees' oversight responsibility.
We reviewed issues related to implementing the Army's planned change to
use soldiers, rather than contractors, to conduct maintenance on the
Stryker vehicle and specifically assessed the extent to which the Army's
planned change will achieve the desired outcome when implemented.
To assess the extent to which the Army's planned change will achieve its
desired outcome, we reviewed Stryker vehicle maintenance support contracts
and documents related to the Army's plan for implementing its proposed
changes to Stryker vehicle support. We also obtained documentation and met
with personnel from three Stryker brigades, representatives from the
vehicle maintenance contractor, and officials at Army Headquarters and
from various Army major commands. We conducted our review from September
2005 to June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief
The Army's change from contractor personnel to soldiers conducting
maintenance on the Stryker vehicle may not fully achieve its intended
outcome of increasing the brigade's flexibility to perform in different
types of combat operations. We identified three potential challenges that
may affect the Army's ability to achieve its intended outcome. First,
personnel challenges may affect implementation of the planned change.
Since vehicle maintenance contractors focus solely on the Stryker vehicle
while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition to maintenance, the
Army's plan replaces the existing 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance
contractor personnel with 71 soldiers. Accordingly, to implement its plan,
the Army must annually recruit or retain 497 additional soldiers with
specific military specialties to support all seven Stryker brigades. As we
have previously reported,1 some of these specialties have been
consistently underfilled. The Army also may experience difficulties in
sustaining soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance,
due to the limited number of Stryker brigades combined with regularly
scheduled transfers of soldiers among units. However, the Army's plan does
not include strategies to (1) enable it to recruit and retain the soldiers
necessary to implement this change or (2) sustain soldier skills and
knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance. Second, the Army's plan
increases the size of the brigade, and transporting the additional
personnel and their associated equipment may exacerbate the existing
difficulties in meeting deployment timelines that we have previously
reported.2 Deploying the Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 96
hours is a component of the Stryker brigade's flexibility. However, the
Army's plan does not address the effect of the increased logistical
footprint on the brigade's ability to deploy within 96 hours. Finally,
since the Stryker brigade was designed with a limited ability to perform
major combat operations, achieving the Army's desired flexibility requires
the Stryker brigade to receive additional sustainment support from Army
units external to the brigade in order for it to perform a major combat
operation. However, the Army has not addressed this support in its planned
change. Until the Army addresses all of these challenges as part of its
planned change, it may not achieve its intended outcome of increasing the
Stryker brigade's flexibility to perform in different types of combat
operations.
1GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). Contractors would be replaced with soldiers from
five military occupational specialties. We found that the Army has
consistently been unable to fill one of these specialties. The Army also
experienced challenges filling the other four specialties in fiscal year
2005.
Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the
Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support, (1)
strategies to enable the Army to recruit and retain the additional
soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of existing personnel
challenges; (2) strategies to sustain Army skills and knowledge on Stryker
vehicle maintenance, given the limited number of Stryker brigades; (3) an
assessment of the effects of an increased logistical footprint, such as
the need for additional airlift, on the brigade's deployment timeline; and
(4) plans to ensure the Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment
support so that the brigade can participate in major combat operations.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)
partially concurred with our recommendations, but said that no additional
direction was required because the Army could achieve its missions using
existing processes and strategies for recruiting and training soldiers and
deploying and supporting the Stryker brigade. We continue to believe that
our recommendations have merit and that the Army should identify
strategies for addressing these implementation challenges. DOD's comments
are reprinted in enclosure I and our evaluation of its comments is on page
12.
2GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for
Army Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
Background
As part of the Army's ongoing efforts to transform its forces, in October
1999 the Army announced the creation of a new brigade that would provide a
lighter and more rapidly deployable force, capable of operating against
the full spectrum of military threats, ranging from small-scale
contingencies to a major theater war. This brigade-known as the Stryker
brigade-was designed to balance lethality, mobility, and survivability
with the capabilities required for responsiveness, deployability,
sustainability, and a reduced in-theater footprint. By February 2009, the
Army plans to create a total of seven Stryker brigades, of which three
have been completed and deployed to Iraq. These brigades will be stationed
inside and outside the continental United States. Each of the seven
Stryker brigades is expected to have approximately 320 Stryker vehicles,
of which there are 10 variants that use a common vehicle platform. A total
of 2,559 Stryker vehicles have been funded, and 8 of the 10 Stryker
vehicle variants3 have been distributed to Army units. Additionally,
Stryker vehicles are used by other organizations, such as Special
Operations Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Air Force
Tactical Air Control Parties.4
Currently, contractors support some equipment within the Stryker brigade,
and the largest group provides maintenance support for the Stryker
vehicle. These 45 contractor personnel, who are embedded in the Stryker
brigade, are centrally managed by the Stryker brigade support battalion,
and the brigade support battalion commander directs the priority of
Stryker vehicle maintenance.5 Army officials stated that the Stryker
vehicle contractor personnel perform duties associated with several Army
military occupational specialties,6 to include conducting maintenance on
the Stryker vehicle and some subsystems and ordering and tracking Stryker
vehicle spare parts. Army officials stated that this contracted
maintenance support exceeded the Army-established performance goal of
maintaining a 90 percent operational readiness rate.7 For the first two
Stryker brigades that deployed to Iraq, Army officials reported
operational readiness rates for the Stryker vehicle averaging 96 percent
from October 2003 through September 2005. Contractor personnel were able
to exceed the Army's performance goal of maintaining a 90 percent
operational readiness rate despite the 5.6 million miles driven by the
Stryker vehicle during the first two deployments, which Army officials
estimated to be 800 percent higher than anticipated peacetime usage.
3The Stryker vehicle variants are: (1) Infantry Carrier Vehicle; (2)
Medical Evacuation Vehicle; (3) Reconnaissance Vehicle; (4) Commander's
Vehicle; (5) Mortar Carrier Vehicle; (6) Antitank Guided Missile Vehicle;
(7) Engineer Squad Vehicle; (8) Fire Support Vehicle; (9) Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; and (10) the Mobile Gun
System. The Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and
Mobile Gun System are in various stages of development and testing.
4Other Stryker vehicles are dedicated as Operational Readiness Float (ORF)
and Ready-to-Fight (RTF) equipment. ORFs are vehicles that are maintained
by the brigade and used at the brigade commander's discretion. There are
approximately 10 ORF vehicles per Stryker brigade. The RTF fleet vehicles
are used to replenish the ORF. Army officials said that they intend to
create three RTF fleets, each with 14 vehicles.
5There are 30 contractors that provide support to various Army computer
and communication systems in the Stryker brigade. These contractors are
not embedded in the Stryker brigade and are centrally managed by brigade
logistics support teams that are controlled by the Army Materiel Command.
6Stryker vehicle contractor personnel perform duties that are similar to
five military occupational specialties: wheeled vehicle mechanic (63B),
fire control repair (45G), armament repair (45K), automated logistics
specialist (92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y).
7The operational readiness rate requirement in the contract is specific to
the Stryker vehicle and does not include all of the subsystems on the
vehicle. For example, the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor is
responsible for the engine, chassis, and wheels, but is not responsible
for communications equipment.
Army personnel in the Stryker brigades also expressed satisfaction with
the performance of the Stryker vehicle's contracted support and provided
several explanations for the quality of support, noting that the
contractors were knowledgeable about maintenance issues; were able to
deliver parts faster than the standard Army supply system; provided the
Stryker brigades with information on the status of maintenance and repair
parts in the frequency and manner requested; and focused exclusively on
performing Stryker vehicle maintenance tasks. Army officials also stated
that the use of contractor personnel enabled soldiers to dedicate more
time to train on soldier skills and perform other missions, such as guard
duty and convoy escort. Because Stryker vehicle contractors were able to
focus on the Stryker vehicle, soldiers were able to perform these
additional tasks without degrading the quality of maintenance on the
Stryker vehicle. Additionally, Army officials praised the ongoing
collaborative relationship between the Stryker brigade and the
contractors, observing that the contractors worked with the soldiers while
in garrison. As we have previously reported,8 contractors deployed with a
Stryker brigade to Army training centers. This preexisting relationship
ensured a working collaboration between soldiers and contractors before
the brigades deployed to Iraq.
The Army directed that the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor
personnel embedded at the brigade level be replaced with soldiers in order
to increase the Stryker brigade's flexibility to perform in different
combat operations.9 Army officials stated that the plan to transition to
soldier maintenance is based on the Army's preference to minimize the
number of contractors in forward locations in order to increase
flexibility in different combat situations. Based on our review and
discussions with various Army officials, this decision to transition was
not predicated on the costs of providing support. Army officials
specifically cited the march to Baghdad conducted by other Army units
during Operation Iraqi Freedom as the type of combat operation the brigade
could have the flexibility to perform with the transition from contractor
to soldier maintenance.10 The Army is still developing the plan for
transitioning from contractor to soldier field-level maintenance, and one
of its assumptions is that its plan will be properly resourced, to include
the necessary personnel and funding. The Army intends to begin this
transition by fiscal year 2008, and is expected to finalize its plan in
2006.
8GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues
Remain for Future Brigades, GAO-04-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003).
9The Army's plan will also reduce the number of contractors that provide
support to Army computer and communication systems from 30 to 17.
10 DOD officials also stated that the transition to soldier maintainers
would improve the Stryker brigade's deployability in a broader range of
environments and conditions, thereby improving the brigade's strategic and
operational capability.
Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support May Not Achieve Intended
Outcome
The Army may be unable to fully achieve the increased flexibility intended
by the change to Stryker vehicle maintenance support due to three
challenges. First, the Army's ability to replace contractor personnel with
soldiers may be affected by personnel challenges, particularly with
respect to the recruitment and retention of additional soldiers, as well
as sustaining soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance.
Second, the increased size of the brigade resulting from additional
soldiers may exacerbate the brigade's existing difficulty in meeting its
96-hour deployment goal. Third, the planned change does not include
additional sustainment support from Army units external to the brigade
that could enable the Army to fully achieve the desired flexibility for
the Stryker brigade to perform in major combat operations.
Personnel Challenges May Affect Implementation of Change
Two personnel challenges may affect the Army's ability to implement the
change to replace the contractors with soldiers. First, recruiting or
retaining the additional soldiers needed for the planned change is a
challenge that could affect implementation. According to Army officials,
there are currently a total of 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor
personnel within each Stryker brigade. To implement the change and have
soldiers fill the functions provided by these contractor personnel, the
Army plans to add 71 soldiers of different specialties for each Stryker
brigade, or a total of 497 soldiers for all seven brigades.11 Recruiting
these additional soldiers may be a challenge because, as we have
previously reported,12 the Army faced difficulties in meeting its
recruiting goals in fiscal year 2005 (92 percent of target). With the
transition from contractor personnel to soldiers, the maintenance and
supply tasks currently performed by contractor personnel within the
brigade would be conducted by soldiers from five military occupational
specialties. Army officials acknowledged that there is a general shortage
in maintenance capability across the Army. Additionally, as we have
previously reported,13 the Army has consistently been unable to fill one
of these five specialties. Further, all of these specialties were
underfilled in fiscal year 2005. If the Army is unable to find soldiers in
these specialties and assign them to the Stryker brigade, the brigade may
not have enough people to perform Stryker vehicle maintenance.
The second personnel challenge is the ability of soldiers to develop and
sustain skills and knowledge on the maintenance of the Stryker vehicle.
Army officials noted that the contractor personnel's exclusive focus on
the Stryker vehicle increased their expertise on the system, so they
became more knowledgeable about maintenance issues. In contrast, soldiers
usually work on a system for about 3 years and then leave the unit because
of promotion or a scheduled transfer to another unit. For vehicles that
are common throughout the Army, soldiers can transfer to another unit and
then continue to perform maintenance and develop skills and knowledge on
that same vehicle. However, since there will be only seven Stryker
brigades, building long-term expertise on the Stryker vehicle would
require ensuring that the soldiers conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance
are only transferred among the different Stryker brigades. Without
long-term personnel management to target soldiers' transfers, the Army may
face difficulties in developing and sustaining its skills and knowledge on
the Stryker vehicle.
11Army officials told us that replacing the contractor vehicle maintenance
personnel with soldiers would require more than a one-for-one swap. As
noted earlier, the vehicle maintenance contractors focus solely on the
Stryker vehicle while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition to
maintenance, to include training, guard duty, and other missions.
12GAO-06-134, p. 8.
13GAO-06-134, p. 52.
Changes May Exacerbate Existing Difficulties in Meeting Deployment
Timelines
The increased size of the Stryker brigade associated with additional
soldiers may exacerbate the brigade's existing difficulties in meeting its
deployment timelines. According to its organizational and operational
concept, the Stryker brigade is designed as an early entry combat force
that is intended to deploy within 96 hours of "first aircraft wheels up"
and to begin operations immediately upon arrival in theater. Army
officials told us that the reason for the 96-hour goal is to deter
conflict and promote peace by getting the brigade into the theater
quickly. However, as we noted in our earlier report14 on Stryker brigade
deployment timelines, airlift shortages already preclude meeting the 4-day
deployment goal, which would require transporting about 15,000 tons of
vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about 3,900 personnel. In its
response to that report, DOD stated that the Army continues to maintain an
overall Stryker brigade program goal of deploying the brigade anywhere in
the world in 96 hours and is working with other services to address
transportation constraints.
Army officials told us that each Stryker brigade would require more
soldiers than the existing number of contractor personnel they were
replacing because contractors focus on their specific tasks, while
soldiers must perform other activities in addition to their maintenance
duties. To support these additional soldiers, Army officials estimated an
8 percent increase in the amount of equipment and supplies required by the
brigade. Some items that increase when the brigade adds soldiers include
more wheeled vehicles to support the new soldiers as well as additional
maintenance parts, fuel, food, and headquarters personnel. Army officials
acknowledged that, as more people and their associated equipment are added
to the brigade, the logistical footprint grows.
This increase in the Stryker footprint may affect the ability of the
brigade to deploy within the 96-hour goal. As we have previously reported,
the deployment goal of 96 hours is unrealistic because airlifting a
Stryker brigade within that time frame would require use of a sizeable
portion of available military airlift. Army officials did not identify
deploying the brigade in 96 hours as a concern, and continued to state
that the issue is a lack of airlift resources, which is outside of the
Army's control. However, the increased size of the Stryker brigade may
increase the number of aircraft required to deploy the brigade, and these
aircraft may not be available when needed to support the deployment.
Without addressing the effects of the increased logistical footprint on
the deployment timelines, the Army will continue to face challenges in
rapidly deploying the Stryker brigade within 96 hours.
14GAO-03-801, p. 6.
Change Does Not Include Sustainment Support for Major Combat Operations
The Army's planned change does not include the additional sustainment
support that would enable the Stryker brigade to achieve the desired
flexibility to perform in major combat operations. The business case
analysis the Army is developing focuses on the cost of the transition
between contractor maintenance personnel and soldiers. However, there are
other considerations specific to supporting a Stryker brigade in major
combat operations. The example cited by Army officials as a rationale for
changing Stryker vehicle maintenance support to allow the brigade to
perform in different combat operations was the march to Baghdad that
occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the Stryker brigade was
not optimized for this type of combat operation. According to the Stryker
organizational and operational concept, the Stryker brigade was optimized
for small-scale contingencies instead of major combat operations. Unlike
other Army units, the logistical footprint for the Stryker brigade is
smaller, and the brigade is capable of sustaining itself for only 72
hours. In order to perform in major combat operations, such as a march to
Baghdad, the Stryker brigade would require significant combat service
support augmentation. This augmentation would come from Army units
external to the brigade, which is generally the Army division under which
it fights. Army officials stated that if a Stryker brigade needed
augmentation, the Army would then decide what actions to take based on the
situation.
According to the Army, units that participated in the actual march to
Baghdad experienced some sustainment challenges. Although these Army units
were able to successfully defeat the enemy and travel across great
distances very quickly, these successes resulted in Army units not
receiving an immediate resupply of spare vehicle parts, with some brigades
not receiving additional parts for periods greater than a month. This
sustainment schedule would be difficult for the Stryker brigade, but the
Army's planned change does not address the support challenges associated
with determining how the Stryker brigade would receive the necessary
sustainment support. Until the Army develops plans to augment the support
of the Stryker brigade, the change may not be able to provide the Army's
desired flexibility.
Conclusions
The Army is focused on implementing the specific change to replace
contractors with soldiers to allow the brigade to perform in all types of
combat operations. However, the Army has not addressed challenges that may
hinder its ability to achieve this intended outcome. By not addressing
personnel recruiting and management challenges, the Army may be unable to
replace contractors with soldiers or build and sustain the long-term
skills and knowledge necessary to ensure quality Stryker vehicle
maintenance. Additionally, without addressing the effect of the increased
size of the Stryker brigade on its deployment timeline, the brigade may
face even greater difficulty in meeting its 96-hour deployment goal.
Finally, if the Army does not plan for how the Stryker brigade will
receive additional sustainment support, it may be difficult for the
brigade to perform in major combat operations such as a march to Baghdad.
Clear identification of challenges that may limit the Army's ability to
achieve the desired outcome of the proposed change, an assessment of the
effects of these challenges, and development of strategies to address
these challenges during the planning process could enhance the likelihood
that the Stryker vehicle continues to receive high levels of maintenance
support and meet performance requirements after the proposed change is
implemented. Because the Stryker brigade concept is the bridge between the
existing force and the Army of the future, the process by which conceptual
changes are viewed and implemented determines not only how the Stryker
brigade operates, but also how the Army plans to address the same issues
for future brigades.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and include, as part of the Army's planning process for
changes to Stryker vehicle support, (1) strategies to enable the Army to
recruit and retain the additional soldiers needed to implement the
changes, in light of existing personnel challenges; (2) strategies to
sustain Army skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given
the limited number of Stryker brigades; (3) an assessment of the effects
of an increased logistical footprint, such as the need for additional
airlift, on the brigade's deployment timeline; and (4) plans to ensure the
Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the
brigade can participate in major combat operations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with all four of our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in
enclosure I. Regarding our recommendation to develop strategies to enable
the Army to recruit and retain the additional soldiers needed to implement
the changes, in light of existing personnel challenges, DOD partially
concurred, stating that it agreed with the importance of recruiting and
retaining soldiers. According to DOD, existing processes have achieved the
Army's recruiting and retention goals. The department also noted that the
Army has effective processes for distribution of occupational skills in
support of the total force, which it has used to meet recruiting and
retention objectives within the Stryker brigade and can use to fully
support the incremental inclusion of soldier mechanics. The department
stated that additional direction is not required. We disagree that the
existing processes are effective because, as we have noted in this report,
the Army has not achieved its recruiting and retention goals in recent
years. While the Army may have met the personnel objectives for the
Stryker brigade in the past, Army officials have already acknowledged that
there is a general shortage of maintenance capability across the Army.
Further, implementing the Army's planned transition increases the
personnel requirement for the Stryker brigade in five specific
occupational specialties where the Army has been unable to meet its
recruiting goals. For example, as our report points out, in fiscal year
2005 the Army experienced shortages in filling requirements for wheeled
vehicle mechanic (63B), fire control repair (45G), armament repair (45K),
automated logistics specialist (92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y),
and has consistently been unable to fill one of these five specialties. As
a result, we continue to believe that the Army may face challenges in
recruiting and retaining personnel for the Stryker brigade in current and
future years, and that the Army should consider strategies to address this
issue in its planning for changes to Stryker vehicle support.
In response to our recommendation to develop strategies to sustain Army
skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given the limited
number of Stryker brigades, DOD partially concurred, agreeing that
sustaining skills and knowledge is essential. The department stated that
the Army's Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) is meeting current
requirements for Stryker training and is prepared to meet the Army's
timeline for the transition to soldier field-level maintenance. DOD said
that TRADOC will provide the necessary training base for the soldier
mechanics and that additional direction is not required. We believe that
DOD has misunderstood the intent of our recommendation. We are not
questioning the Army's training capability for Stryker vehicle
maintenance. As we acknowledged in this report, the Army has developed the
institutional capacity to train soldiers on Stryker vehicle maintenance.
As this report points out, our concern is about the Army's ability to
develop and sustain long-term institutional expertise on the Stryker
vehicle. Army officials told us that expertise on any vehicle is best
developed by continuous use of the skill through hands-on maintenance, and
that this expertise must be managed because soldiers routinely transfer to
different units after a 3-year period. These officials also acknowledged
that building this expertise would take time because the Stryker vehicle
will not be found in all Army units. In contrast, developing and
sustaining expertise on other Army vehicles, such as the High-Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, requires less management because the vehicle
is found throughout the Army and soldiers are able to continue building
expertise after reassignment. Since the Stryker vehicle will only be
located in the seven Stryker brigades and in a limited number of other
locales, ensuring that soldiers are assigned to other units with Stryker
vehicles is necessary to develop and sustain their skills and knowledge on
maintaining the Stryker vehicle. Accordingly, we continue to believe that
our recommendation has merit and that the Army should identify strategies
to build long-term expertise on the Stryker vehicle.
The department partially concurred with our recommendation to include in
its planning process the effects of an increased logistical footprint,
such as the need for additional airlift, on the brigade's deployment
timeline, agreeing with the importance of minimizing the effect of any
increased logistical footprint. DOD agreed that the structures required to
provide the logistics of projecting, moving, protecting, and sustaining
contract personnel are not included in Stryker's current structure, but
noted that the transition to soldier field maintenance includes adding
required equipment into Stryker's formal structure and will facilitate
accurate planning for strategic deployability. According to DOD, the
transition from interim contractor field maintenance to soldier
field-level maintenance will not result in a significant increase to the
logistics footprint, so additional direction is not required. We disagree.
Army officials estimate that the transition will require an 8 percent
increase in the amount of equipment and supplies required for the brigade,
which is an increase in the size of the Stryker brigade logistics
footprint. Because the amount of equipment necessary to support
contractors is not formalized, as noted in DOD's response, the Army does
not currently have an accurate picture of the assets necessary to deploy
the Stryker brigade. We are encouraged that DOD is taking steps to
facilitate accurate planning for strategic deployability of the Stryker
brigade. As we have stated in previous reports, the existing goal of
deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours is
unrealistic. By implementing the transition, the Army now has the
opportunity to reexamine the deployment goals for the Stryker brigade.
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and
that the Army, with the data provided by the more formalized logistics
structure, should take additional action and consider the effects of the
increased logistical footprint on the brigade's deployment timeline, to
include identifying the number of assets necessary to transport the
brigade to meet more realistic deployment goals.
With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop plans to ensure the
Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the
brigade can participate in major combat operations, DOD partially
concurred, agreeing with the objective of enhancing the Stryker brigade's
capability to participate in major combat operations, with augmentation,
as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a
variety of possible roles. The department noted that all Army units
require some level of support based on mission, enemy, terrain, available
troops, time, and civilian considerations. DOD stated that the transition
from interim contractor support to a permanent support strategy
significantly improves operational flexibility and the Army's ability to
employ the Stryker brigade by giving it the capability to logistically
support a much broader range of military operations. DOD said that
additional direction is not required. While we agree that using soldiers
who possess expertise on Stryker vehicle maintenance provides the Stryker
brigade with improved operational flexibility, as we stated in this
report, the Army has not developed a plan for how to support the Stryker
brigade in a major combat operation. Army officials told us that if a
Stryker brigade needed augmentation, the Army would decide what actions to
take based on the situation. The department's response reinforces this
point. As we have stated in this report, the Stryker brigade is different
than other Army units in that it has a smaller logistical footprint, is
self-sustaining for only 72 hours, and requires augmentation from Army
units external to the brigade in order to perform a major combat
operation. Since the Stryker vehicle is not found in most other units, the
existing division and corps headquarters that would provide combat service
support to the Stryker brigade in a major combat operation would not
necessarily have the support packages and spare parts needed for the
brigade. Resupply functions in Iraq are currently being performed by
contractor personnel, and the Stryker brigade is currently operating from
forward operating bases. The Stryker brigade deployed for the first time
to Operation Iraqi Freedom and has yet to perform as a subordinate
maneuver component within a division or corps in a major combat operation
and with reduced contractor support. As we have stated in this report,
other non-Stryker brigades that had an existing relationship with division
support structures still faced resupply challenges while performing major
combat operations in the march to Baghdad. We believe that waiting to
develop a plan based on the situation would inhibit the rapid use of the
Stryker brigade in major combat operations. Therefore, we continue to
believe that our recommendation has merit and that the Army should take
action to ensure the Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment
support so that it can participate in major combat operations.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the
body of the report as appropriate. Some of these comments related to the
context of the report. Specifically, DOD stated that the transition to
soldier maintainers will improve Stryker's deployability at all points of
deployment-to include theater reception, staging, and onward integration
in a broader range of environments and conditions-thereby improving both
strategic and operational capability. We do not dispute the point that
soldiers are more deployable than contractors. Instead, our first
recommendation focuses on whether the Army can recruit and retain the
soldiers necessary to accomplish the plan, and our third recommendation
focuses on the effects on the timelines for deploying the brigade given
the overall increase in the size of the Stryker brigade's logistical
footprint. DOD further stated that the transition from Stryker interim
contractor field maintenance to soldier field maintenance may not require
more than a one-for-one swap. The department noted that while contractors
may be able to dedicate more time to performing maintenance tasks, they
are also less deployable than soldiers and require force protection and
sustainment. While we agree that contractors are less deployable than
soldiers, we disagree that the transition may not require more than a
one-for-one swap. Army officials stated that there are currently a total
of 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel within each Stryker
brigade, and these personnel provide functions similar to five military
occupational specialties. According to the Army plan that was provided to
us and sent to Army leadership, the Army intends to add 71 soldiers in
these five specialties to each Stryker brigade, which is greater than a
one-for-one swap. Based on our interviews with Army officials, a
one-for-one swap would likely result in a decrease in operational
readiness rates for the Stryker vehicle, since soldiers perform multiple
functions while contractors focus solely on maintaining the Stryker
vehicle.
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Army's planned change to Stryker
vehicle support will achieve its desired outcome, we reviewed the decision
memorandum and briefings prepared for the Army Systems Acquisition Review
Council's Sustainment Readiness Review and talked with officials at the
Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems. We also reviewed Army
documents related to the plans for implementing the change and previous
GAO reports and reviewed the current and most recent contracts for Stryker
vehicle maintenance support. We collected Army statistics on Stryker
vehicle operational readiness rates, and met with Army Materiel Command
officials to discuss other support for the Stryker brigades.15
Additionally, we met with officials from the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command's System Manager for the Stryker vehicle, the Combined
Arms Support Command, the Project Manager's office at the Tank-Automotive
and Armaments Command, and Army Materiel Command. We also interviewed
officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; personnel from three Stryker
brigades; representatives from the contractor that provides vehicle
maintenance services, operates the Stryker vehicle supply chain, conducts
new equipment training, and performs reset actions; and officials at Army
headquarters (Logistics and Force Development), U.S. Army Forces Command,
and the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. We conducted our review
from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
15For this report, we did not address the cost effectiveness of using
contractors rather than soldiers to perform maintenance on the Stryker
vehicle.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available
on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov . If you or your staff have any
questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report.
William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Enclosures - II
Enclosure I
Comments from the Department of Defense
Enclosure II
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, major contributors
to this report were Lawson Gist, Assistant Director; Jim Melton, Karyn
Angulo, Renee Brown, Julia Denman, Charles Perdue, and John Van Schaik.
(350742)
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