ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage
Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported (03-OCT-05, 	 
GAO-06-92).							 
                                                                 
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in 
the United States by private sector companies and government	 
entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license	 
privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July	 
2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a state  
and local government storage facility, concerns arose about	 
vulnerability to theft. GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives
thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's	 
authority to regulate and oversee state and local government	 
explosives storage facilities, (3) the information ATF collects  
about state and local government storage facilities, and (4)	 
security oversight measures in place at selected state and local 
government storage facilities.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-92						        
    ACCNO:   A38918						        
  TITLE:     ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government
Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported		 
     DATE:   10/03/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Data collection					 
	     Explosives 					 
	     Facility security					 
	     Federal facilities 				 
	     Federal regulations				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     Larceny						 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Noncompliance					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Warehouse facilities				 

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GAO-06-92

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

October 2005

ATF

Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few
                            but May Be Underreported

GAO-06-92

[IMG]

October 2005

ATF

Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few
but May Be Underreported

                                 What GAO Found

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives
from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to
February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives
from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives
thefts reported nationwide during this same period. During the course of
our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government
facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database on thefts
and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at
state and local storage facilities could be higher than that identified by
ATF data.

ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local government
explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies are not
required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and
only licensees-such as private sector explosives storage facilities-are
subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure
that state and local government facilities are in compliance with federal
regulations.

While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local
government explosives storage facilities, information about some of these
facilities is collected-for example, when facility operators voluntarily
request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has conducted 77
voluntary inspections at state and local storage facilities and found no
systemic violations. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities
must submit a variety of information about their facility-including
location and security measures in place- to ATF during the licensing
process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during
mandatory inspections.

At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a
variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates,
fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the
facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories.
But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local
regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible
noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage
safety issues rather than security.

                  Explosives Storage Facility in Pennsylvania

Source: GAO.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State

and Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain

ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage
Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional Oversight
Responsibilities

ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local
Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector
Facilities

Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage

Facilities We Visited Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 6

                                       8

10

13

14 26 27 28

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

  Tables

Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited 16 Table 2:
Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives Storage
Facilities We Visited 20 Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at
the 14 State and Local Entities Visited 24 Table 4: State and Local
Entities Visited 30

  Figures

Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in
Texas and Colorado 17 Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage
Magazines in Pennsylvania and Tennessee 18 Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable
Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in Pennsylvania 19 Figure 4:
Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier Surrounding Type 2
Storage Magazines 21

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
DOJ Department of Justice
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
OIG Office of the Inspector General

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

October 3, 2005

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Honorable Tom Lantos House of Representatives

More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the
United States. These explosives are used by both public sector entities
(such as state and local government agencies) and private sector companies
for a variety of purposes-including mining, construction, avalanche
control, and law enforcement.1 Under current federal explosives laws and
regulations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives manufacturers,
importers, dealers, and users. ATF's authority to regulate explosives
stems originally from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and was
expanded further by enactment of the Safe Explosives Act in 2002.2 It is
primarily through its licensing authority that ATF oversees and inspects
privately owned explosives facilities to ensure they comply with
explosives storage laws and regulations. With regard to governmentowned
explosives storage facilities, state and local agencies are also subject
to federal explosives storage laws and regulations, but exempt from the
ATF licensing requirements.3

In July 2004, several hundred pounds of explosives were stolen from law
enforcement storage magazines at a city/county storage facility in

1 Law enforcement bomb squads, for example, may store explosives for a
number of uses- including destroying recovered explosives, dismantling
explosive devices, and holding explosive materials for evidence.

2 Specifically, Title XI of Public Law 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 952 (1970);
and Subtitle C of Title XI of Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2280
(2002), respectively.

3 An approved storage facility is defined as a place where explosive
materials are stored, consisting of one or more approved storage
magazines. A storage magazine is defined as any building or structure,
other than an explosives manufacturing building, used for storage of
explosive materials.

California. The thieves were subsequently arrested and the explosives were
recovered. Out of concern that state and local government explosives
storage facilities could be vulnerable to theft, you asked us to provide
information regarding the security oversight of these facilities. For this
report, we focused on the following questions:

1. 	What is the extent of explosives thefts from state and local
government facilities and how does this compare with the total number of
explosives thefts reported nationwide?

2. 	What authority does ATF have to regulate and oversee state and local
government explosives storage facilities and how does this compare with
its authority over private sector storage facilities?

3. 	What information does ATF collect regarding the locations and types
and amounts of explosives stored at state and local government explosives
storage facilities and how does this compare with information collected
about private sector storage facilities?

4. 	What security oversight measures are in place at selected state and
local government storage facilities to ensure the safe and secure storage
of explosives?

To address these questions, we obtained information from U.S. government
agencies, law enforcement associations, industry groups, and other experts
on explosives. More specifically, to obtain the perspectives of U.S.
government agencies on their efforts to regulate and oversee state and
local government explosives storage facilities, and to obtain information
on the numbers of explosives thefts and law enforcement bomb squads, we
contacted officials from the Department of Justice (DOJ), ATF, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To obtain other public sector and
private sector perspectives on the security oversight of explosives
storage facilities, we contacted associations representing state and local
law enforcement agencies and the explosives industry. To determine what
selected states and localities are doing to provide oversight of
explosives storage in state and local government sector facilities, we met
with officials at 14 state and local government entities (13 law
enforcement bomb squads and one public university) in four
states-Colorado, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas-and observed their
explosives storage facilities. We selected these four states to obtain a
geographic spread (west, northeast, southeast, and southwest) across the
country, based on (1) the number of explosives licensees and

  Results in Brief

reported explosives thefts, (2) the number of law enforcement bomb squads,
and (3) the location of universities with mining programs.4 Our criteria
for identifying the type of security oversight measures in place included
existing federal explosives storage laws and regulations and security
guidelines issued by the explosives industry. Because we selected and
visited a limited nonprobability sample of 14 state and local entities in
the four states, the information discussed in this report cannot be
generalized to all state and local government agencies that store
explosives. Additional detail on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.

We conducted our work from February through August 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives
from state and local government storage facilities. However, reports of
thefts could be understated by an unknown amount. During the 3-year period
from January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts
or missing explosives from state and local government storage facilities.
By comparison, during this same time period there were a total of 205
explosives thefts reported from all sources nationwide. There are two
federal reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives-one is
specific to explosives licensees (and permittees) and the other generally
applies to "any person who has knowledge of the theft or loss of any
explosive materials from his stock." While ATF has interpreted this second
reporting requirement as applying to nonlicensed state and local
government explosives storage facilities, ATF officials acknowledged that
state and local government entities may be unclear as to whether they are
covered under this requirement. Indeed, this lack of clarity issue may
have contributed to our findings: During our audit, we found evidence of
five thefts from state and local government facilities, one of which did
not appear in ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives.
Because of this, the total number of thefts occurring at state and local
government storage facilities could actually be more than the number
identified by ATF data.

4 We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information
relating to the individual state and local entities we visited to ensure
that security-related information is not unintentionally disclosed.

Although federal storage requirements are applicable to state and local
government explosives storage facilities, ATF does not have oversight
authority with respect to these facilities. With respect to private sector
facilities, ATF oversight-including the ability to conduct regulatory
inspections-is linked to the licensing of facilities. Private sector
businesses and organizations that import, manufacture, or deal in
explosives are required to obtain a federal license. As a requirement of
the licensing process, private sector licensees are generally subject to
mandatory ATF oversight inspections of their explosives storage
facilities. State and local government agencies that use and store
explosives are not required under federal explosives law to obtain a
license from ATF. In addition, ATF does not have specific statutory
authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and local explosives
storage facilities. State and local government storage facilities are
generally not inspected by ATF, unless the facility operator voluntarily
requests such an inspection or shares its storage magazine with ATF. As a
result, ATF has no means to ensure that all state and local government
facilities nationwide are in compliance with federal storage regulations.

ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location of
state and local government storage facilities or the types and amounts of
explosives that are being stored in these facilities. State and local
government agencies are exempt from obtaining a federal explosives
license, and they are not subject to ATF oversight authority. As a result,
ATF has no real way of knowing the precise number of these facilities or
the extent to which their explosives storage facilities are secure from
theft. For a limited number of state and local government facilities-those
that request a voluntary inspection or where ATF shares a state and local
magazine-ATF conducts inspections that allow it to collect information
about such things as the location and characteristics of these storage
facilities. However, because ATF does not have authority to conduct
mandatory inspections of all state and local government entities, ATF has
no means to collect this type of information nationwide. Although ATF
cannot gather information about state and local government entities, it is
able to collect a variety of information about private sector explosives
licensees, who operate roughly 7,500 storage facilities and nearly 23,000
permanent or mobile storage magazines in the United States. Information
about these storage facilities and the explosives being stored is required
to be submitted to ATF during the licensing application process.
Additional information is collected during the course of mandatory ATF
inspections of licensees. During our audit, we identified various types of
state and local government agencies that use and store
explosives-including law enforcement bomb squads, public universities, and
departments of

transportation. However, we did not gather sufficient information about
these entities to reliably estimate the total number of state and local
government storage facilities and magazines nationwide.

At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed a variety of
security measures in place at their 18 storage facilities. Regarding
physical security, most storage facilities had some kind of locked gate to
prevent vehicle access, and several had fencing surrounding their storage
facilities or storage magazines. At each of these facilities, officials
told us they visually inspected or patrolled the facility on a regular
basis. Four storage facilities also had electronic security systems in
place-either monitored alarms or video surveillance-although one of these
was out of service at the time of our visit. Officials at several other
entities said they were actively planning to implement some form of
electronic security or were in the process of installing a security system
in the near future at their storage facilities. These types of security
measures-fences, vehicle barriers and electronic monitoring devices-all
exceed the requirements of federal explosives regulations. Regarding
oversight activities, officials at all the entities we visited told us
they conducted routine inventories of their storage facilities. Most
facilities were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local
regulatory agencies, although several officials said they had previously
had their storage facilities inspected by ATF. Two of the 14 entities we
visited had previously reported a loss or experienced a theft of
explosives, but only one of these incidents appeared in ATF's nationwide
theft database.

To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or
stolen explosives, we are recommending that the Attorney General direct
the ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting regulations
to ensure that all persons and entities who store explosives, including
state and local government agencies, understand their obligation to report
all thefts or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an occurrence.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for its review and comment. DOJ
agreed with our recommendation and also provided technical comments, which
we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

Background

ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the United
States and is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives
manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.5 ATF is also responsible for
regulating most, but not all, explosives storage facilities. ATF's
regulatory authority over explosives stems from the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.6 This statute imposed controls over the importation,
manufacture, distribution, and storage of explosives, and was the basis
for giving ATF enforcement responsibilities for these controls.7 The Safe
Explosives Act expanded ATF's authority to generally require licenses for
persons who purchase or receive explosives and background checks on
licensees and their employees who handle explosives.8

Under federal explosives regulations, a license is required for persons
who manufacture, import, or deal in explosives and, with some exceptions,
for persons who intend to acquire explosives for use. No license is
required solely to operate an explosives storage facility. However, all
persons who store explosive materials (including state and local agencies)
must conform with applicable ATF storage regulations, irrespective of
whether they are required to obtain an explosives license for other
purposes. State and local agencies are not required to obtain an
explosives license to use and store explosives. Similarly, federal
government agencies, the U.S. military, and other federally owned or
operated establishments are exempt from compliance with both the licensing
and the storage regulations. According to ATF data, as of February 2005
there were 12,028 federal explosives licensees in the United States.9
Roughly 7,500 of these had some kind of explosives storage facility,
consisting of 22,791 permanent or mobile storage magazines.

5 Licenses are issued to persons who manufacture, import, or sell
explosives, while permits are issued to persons who intend to acquire and
use explosives. Throughout the remainder of this report, references to
explosives licenses, licensees, or ATF's licensing authority refer to both
explosives licenses and permits.

6 Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title XI, 84 Stat. 922, 952 (1970). The explosives
regulatory functions of ATF are found at 27 C.F.R. Part 555.

7 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135, 2280), ATF's existing enforcement responsibilities, including
its authority over explosives, were transferred from the Treasury
Department to the new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
within the Justice Department. All ATF regulations issued prior to that
time remained in effect.

8 Subtitle C of Title XI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

9 Including licensees in the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands.

ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and
security of explosives storage magazines-that is, any building or
structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for
storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage regulations
include requirements related to location, construction, capacity,
housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as well as a
requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified of the
location of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF storage
regulations include the following requirements:

o  Explosives handling. All explosive materials10 must be kept in locked

magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture, being

physically handled in the operating process of a licensee or user, being

used, or being transported to a place of storage or use. Explosives are
not to be left unattended when in portable storage magazines.

o  	Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and
must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility,
exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks.

o  	Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least
every 7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be
sufficient to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or
attempted entry into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the
magazine contents.

o  	Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive
materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of explosive
materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and checked.

Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage
regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of
the following physical security features-fences, restricted property
access, exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance.
Also, while ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to
conduct a physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar
inventory requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other
persons who store explosives.

10 As defined in the federal explosives law and regulations at 18 U.S.C.
S: 841 and 27 C.F.R. S: 555.11.

  Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and Local
  Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain

According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local government
thefts is relatively small when compared with the total number of thefts
that have occurred nationwide. For example, during a recent 3-year period
(January 2002-February 2005), 9 thefts involving state and local
government storage facilities were reported. Of these, 5 involved state
and local law enforcement agencies (1 was later determined to be the
possible result of training explosives that had been mistakenly
discarded), 3 others involved state government entities (all
universities), and the remaining incident took place at a county highway
department. Two of the 9 incidents occurred in California (including last
year's theft that was mentioned previously), and no other state reported
more than one incident. By comparison, during this same period, ATF
received reports of 205 explosives thefts nationwide from all sources.
Three states- California, Texas, and Pennsylvania-accounted for about
one-quarter (53) of the total reported thefts nationwide. According to ATF
officials, this may be due to the larger numbers of explosives licensees
and storage magazines located in these three states.

The amounts of explosives reported stolen or missing from state and local
government facilities in each reported incident of theft are also
relatively small when compared with the total amounts of stolen and
missing explosives nationwide. For example, during a recent 10-month
period for which data were available (March 2003 through December 2003),
there were a total of 76 theft incidents nationwide reported to ATF,
amounting to a loss of about 3,600 pounds of high explosives, 3,100 pounds
of blasting agents, 1,400 detonators, and 2,400 feet of detonating cord
and safety fuse. By comparison, over an entire 10-year period (January
1995-December 2004), ATF received only 14 reports of theft from state and
local law enforcement storage magazines. In 10 of these incidents, less
than 50 pounds of explosives was reported stolen or missing; while in 3 of
the incidents, more than 50 pounds was stolen or missing.11 In 6 of these
14 cases, ATF data indicate that most or all of the explosives were
recovered; in the other 8 cases, none of the explosives have been
recovered.

While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local
facilities make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide,
these reports may be understated by an unknown amount. There are two
federal reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One is
specific

11 For the remaining incident, no details were available on the quantity
of explosives involved.

to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and requires any
licensee to report any theft or loss of explosives to ATF within 24 hours
of discovery. The second reporting requirement generally requires any
other "person" who has knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive
materials from his stock to report to ATF within 24 hours. Although the
term "person" as defined in law and regulation does not specifically
include state and local government agencies,12 ATF has historically
interpreted this requirement as applying to nonlicensed state and local
government explosives storage facilities. With respect to the second
reporting requirement, according to ATF, the legislative history of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 indicates that Congress believed
visibility over all incidents [emphasis added] of stolen explosives was
necessary to effectively enforce any federal explosives regulatory
statute-primarily because of the special problems presented by stolen
explosive materials and the persons possessing them.

While ATF has interpreted the theft reporting requirement as applying to
state and local government explosives storage facilities, ATF officials
acknowledged that state and local government entities could be unsure as
to their coverage under the theft reporting requirements. As a result,
some state and local government entities may not know they are required to
report such incidents to ATF, and this lack of information could impair
ATF's ability to monitor these incidents and take appropriate
investigative action. Indeed, during our site visits and other state and
local contacts, we identified five state and local government entities
that had previously experienced an incident of theft or reported missing
explosives-two involving local law enforcement agencies, two involving
state universities, and one involving a state department of
transportation.13 However, one of these five incidents did not appear in
ATF's nationwide database of reported thefts and missing explosives. Based
on these findings, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and
local government storage facilities nationwide could be more than the
number identified by ATF data.

12 The term "person" is defined in statute and regulation as "any
individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society,
or joint stock company" (see 18 U.S.C. S: 841(a); and 27 C.F.R. S:
555.11).

13 Two of these five incidents occurred at locations we visited; three
occurred at other locations we identified during the course of our audit
work.

  ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage
  Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional Oversight
  Responsibilities

With certain exceptions (such as for federal agencies), federal explosives
law requires all persons who store explosives to conform to applicable
regulations. However, there is no ATF oversight mechanism in place to
ensure that state and local government facilities have complied with the
regulations. With respect to private sector entities, ATF's authority to
oversee explosives storage facilities is primarily a function of its
licensing process. However, the licensing requirements described in the
law and regulations above do not apply to the transportation, shipment,
receipt, or importation of explosive materials to any state or its
political subdivision (such as a city or county). That is, government
entities, such as state and local law enforcement agencies, are not
required to obtain a federal license to use and store explosives. In
addition, ATF does not have specific statutory authority to conduct
regulatory inspections at state and local explosives storage facilities.
As a result, these facilities are not subject to mandatory oversight under
ATF's licensing authority or any ATF regulatory inspection authority apart
from the licensing process.

ATF may inspect state and local government storage facilities under
certain circumstances-for example, if the operator of the facility
voluntarily requests ATF to conduct an inspection. Since January 2002, ATF
has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage
facilities-34 inspections at facilities that ATF shares with state and
local agencies and 43 inspections at other state and local facilities.14
These inspections basically involve checking for compliance with federal
storage regulations, including verifying proper construction of the
storage magazine and verifying that the amount of explosives stored is
consistent with the approved table of distances.15 In addition to
conducting voluntary inspections, ATF also conducts inspections of state
and local explosives storage magazines that are shared by ATF and a state
or local agency. ATF currently shares space in 52 storage magazines,
including 33 that are owned or leased by state and local agencies. Shared
magazines are subject to mandatory inspections by ATF, and the inspection
procedures are basically the same as those described above for voluntary
inspections. According to ATF officials, no significant or systemic safety
or security problems have been found during inspections of state and local
storage

14 As discussed later in this report, the total number of state and local
government storage facilities nationwide is currently unknown.

15 As published in the federal storage regulations, the table of distances
lists the minimum acceptable distances separating explosives magazines
from inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, public highways, and other
explosives magazines.

magazines. However, regarding those state and local government facilities
that ATF does not inspect, ATF officials acknowledged they had no way of
knowing the extent to which these facilities are complying with federal
storage regulations.

By comparison with state and local government entities, private sector
licensees are subject to mandatory ATF oversight and inspection. Under
provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is generally required to
physically inspect a license applicant's storage facility prior to issuing
a federal explosives license-which effectively means at least one
inspection every 3 years. This inspection is intended to verify that the
applicant's storage facility complies with federal regulations regarding
safety and security, and the inspection requirement applies to original
license applications, as well as renewals (with certain exceptions).16 In
addition, the regulations allow ATF to inspect licensees at any time
during business hours, for the purpose of inspecting or examining any
records or documents required to be maintained and any explosive materials
kept or stored at the premises.

ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct
mandatory inspections of state and local government storage facilities,
they would likely need additional resources to conduct these inspections
because they are already challenged to keep up with inspections that are
mandated as part of the explosives licensing requirements. One factor that
affects ATF's ability to meet inspection goals is that inspectors have to
conduct inspections of licensed firearms dealers, manufacturers, and
importers, as well as explosives licensees. As noted above, ATF must
physically inspect explosives licensees at least once every 3 years-or
about one-third (4,000) of the roughly 12,000 licensees each year.
According to ATF officials, because license applications and renewals are
not evenly distributed over this 3-year cycle, some years there may
actually be more or less than 4,000 inspections per year. ATF currently
has 723 field inspectors, 620 of whom regularly conduct explosives and
firearms inspections (the others are in supervisory or administrative
positions). About 20 percent of the inspection time is spent on explosives
inspections; the remainder is spent on firearms.

16 An exception is made for "limited" licenses which are good for 1 year
and allow a limited number of explosives purchases. For new applicants
(and up to two renewals), ATF may verify the safety and security of the
applicant's storage facility by means other than an inspection.

In July 2004, DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that
ATF's inspections program was being affected by staffing shortages. The
OIG noted that in response to passage of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF had
to divert resources from firearms inspections to conduct explosives
inspections required under the act. The OIG report further stated that ATF
had calculated (and reported to Congress) that it needed almost 1,800
inspectors-including 540 just for explosives inspections-to manage its
existing inspection workload at that time.17 To help ATF carry out its
explosives responsibilities, the conferees on the DOJ appropriations act
for fiscal year 2005 directed funding increases in fiscal year 2005 for
the hiring of an additional 31 explosives inspectors, for purposes of
explosives investigations and regulatory compliance.18 In addition, the
House Committee on Appropriations has recommended additional funding in
ATF's fiscal year 2006 appropriation, for the hiring of another 50
explosives inspectors.19 Despite these increases, giving ATF additional
responsibility to oversee state and local government storage facilities
could further tax the agency's inspection resources. According to ATF
officials, because of the legislative mandate to physically inspect
explosives licensees, the effect of additional state and local government
explosives responsibilities (without similar increases in inspector
resources) could be to reduce the number of firearms inspections that ATF
could conduct.

17 The OIG disputed these figures, but still estimated ATF needed about
800 inspectors just for firearms inspections. This is more than the total
number of firearms and explosives inspectors that are currently on board.

18 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-792, at 733 (2004).

19 H. R. Rep. No. 109-118, at 34 (2005).

  ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local Government
  Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector Facilities

According to ATF officials, ATF does not collect nationwide information on
the number and location of state and local government explosives storage
facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of explosives
being stored in these facilities. With respect to private sector
licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning explosive
storage facilities as part of the licensing process. However, state and
local government explosive storage facilities are not required to obtain a
license from ATF, and ATF does not have specific statutory authority to
conduct regulatory inspections of such facilities. As a result, no
systematic information about these facilities is collected. For those
state and local government facilities that ATF does inspect-either
voluntary inspections of state and local magazines or mandatory
inspections of shared magazines-some information is collected by ATF.
During these inspections, ATF collects information about the location of
the storage magazines, the types and amounts of explosives stored, and
whether the magazines are in compliance with federal storage regulations.
According to ATF officials, the information obtained from these
inspections-along with the results from inspections of licensees-are
maintained in ATF's N-Spect nationwide inspection database. While
mandatory annual inspections are required by ATF at each of the 33 state
and local magazines where ATF shares storage space, there have been only
77 voluntary inspections of state and local storage magazines since
January 2002. ATF also has some ability to monitor state and local storage
facilities at locations where ATF maintains its own storage magazine. ATF
headquarters and field offices currently have 118 storage magazines
colocated at facilities with state and local storage magazines. For these
facilities, ATF collects information about the location of the facility
and the inspection status of any state and local magazines on site.20 Of
the 77 voluntary inspections discussed above, 34 were at these colocated
facilities.

By comparison, ATF collects a variety of information about private sector
explosives storage facilities, primarily under its authority to issue
explosives licenses. For example, ATF license application forms require
applicants for an explosives license to submit information about their
storage capabilities. Specific information applicants are required to
submit to ATF includes the type of storage magazine, the location of the
magazine, the type of security in place, the capacity of the magazine, and
the class of explosives that will be stored. ATF also collects information

20 Such as whether the state and local magazines have been voluntarily
inspected by ATF.

about private sector storage facilities during mandatory licensee
inspections. As noted previously, prior to issuing or renewing an
explosives license, ATF must generally verify by on-site inspection that
the applicant has a storage facility that meets the standards of public
safety and security against theft as prescribed in the regulations.
Thereafter, ATF may also inspect a licensee at any time during business
hours-including inspection of storage magazines, examination of explosives
inventory and sales records, and verification of compliance with ATF
administrative rules. Because state and local government storage
facilities are exempt from the licensing process described above, they are
not required to submit licensing-related information about their storage
facility to ATF and they are not subject to licensing-related mandatory
ATF inspections. In addition, ATF does not have specific statutory
authority to perform regulatory oversight inspections of such facilities
apart from the licensing process. As a result, ATF is unable to collect
complete nationwide information about where these facilities are or the
types and amount of explosives they store.

During the course of our audit work, we compiled data on state and local
law enforcement bomb squads that would be likely to use and store
explosives. At the 13 state and local law enforcement bomb squads we
visited, we identified 16 storage facilities and 30 storage magazines. At
these locations, the number of storage facilities ranged from 1 to 2, and
the number of storage magazines ranged from 1 to 4. According to FBI data,
there are currently 452 state and local law enforcement bomb squads
nationwide. The total number of state and local government storage
facilities and magazines nationwide, however, encompasses other entities
in addition to law enforcement bomb squads-including other law enforcement
agencies, public universities, and departments of transportation. The
precise number of storage facilities and magazines at these locations is
currently unknown. And because of the limited nature of our fieldwork, we
cannot generalize about the extent of security and oversight these
entities may have at their own explosives storage facilities.

We found that security oversight measures varied at the 14 selected state
and local government entities we visited. These 14 entities maintained a
total of 18 storage facilities. With regard to physical security, 13 of
the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle access to the storage area.
Six of the 18 storage facilities also had a barrier immediately
surrounding the storage containers preventing human access. Official
personnel at all 18 facilities said they patrolled or inspected the
storage facility on a regular basis. Regarding electronic security, 4 of
the 18 facilities had either an alarm or

  Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage Facilities We
  Visited

video monitoring system in place. Inventory and other oversight activities
at all 14 of the state and local entities included regular, periodic
inventories of the contents of their explosives storage facilities. In
addition, a federal, state, or local government authority had performed
inspections for 9 of the 14 entities. State government agencies in
Colorado and Pennsylvania required 5 state and local entities we visited
in these states to obtain licenses to operate their explosives storage
facilities. However, 2 of these 5 entities did not have the required
licenses in place at the time of our visit. Two of the 14 entities had
experienced prior thefts or losses from their storage facilities, and we
observed storage practices at four facilities that may not be in
compliance with federal regulations.

The following sections describe our observations of the explosives storage
magazines and types of security measures in place at the 18 state and
local storage facilities we visited. Our criteria for identifying the type
of security measures in place included existing federal explosives storage
laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and security
guidelines issued by the explosives industry (the Institute of Makers of
Explosives). Most of these security measures are not currently required
under federal storage regulations (perimeter fencing, for example).
However, we are presenting this information in order to demonstrate the
wide range of security measures actually in place at the time of our
visits.

    Explosives Storage Facilities Varied with Regard to Users and Size

As shown in table 1, the 14 state and local government entities we visited
included 11 city or county bomb squads (including police departments and
sheriffs' offices), 2 state bomb squads, and one public university. Four
of the 14 state and local entities had two separate storage areas
encompassing a total of 18 explosives storage facilities among the 14
entities. As further shown in table 1, 17 of these explosives storage
facilities were located on state, city, county, or police property. These
included 3 that were located on state property (such as state law
enforcement or state university), 7 that were located at police training
facilities, and 7 that were located on city or county government-owned
property (such as correctional or water facilities). For example, one
local entity we visited in Texas had a storage facility located on the
grounds of a city-owned nature preserve.

  Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited Number Examples
                          State and local entities 14

Agency type

o  State bomb squad 2 State police and highway patrol

o  	City/county bomb Police departments and sheriffs' offices squad 11

o  Public university 1 School with mining engineering curriculum

Storage facility locations 18

Property type

o  Police training 7 Academy or other training facility

o  State 3 University, state law enforcement

o  City/county 7 Correctional facility, water treatment, nature park

o  Airport 1 Airport grounds

                              Storage magazines 34

                                 Magazine types

o  Type 1 (permanent) 10 7 aboveground, 3 underground

o  Type 2 (mobile) 22 19 box-type, 3 trailer-type

o  Type 3 (temporary) 2 2 day-boxes used for permanent storage

Source: GAO observation, comments by state and local government officials,
and ATF regulations.

Also, 11 of the 18 explosives storage facilities we visited contained
multiple magazines for the storage of explosives. As a result, the 18
facilities housed a total of 34 magazines divided into various types as
shown in table 1.21 A Pennsylvania storage facility had 4 magazines, which
was the largest number among the facilities we visited. Figures 1 through
3 depict different types of explosives storage magazines.

21 Title 27, section 555.203, of the Code of Federal Regulations defines
magazine types.

Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in
Texas and Colorado

                                  Source: GAO.

Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage Magazines in Pennsylvania and
Tennessee

                                  Source: GAO.

Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in Pennsylvania

At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of
exterior and interior fencing, other barriers to restrict vehicle or
pedestrian access, and security personnel. Federal explosives storage
regulations do not require any of these physical security attributes;
rather, the regulations generally require theft-resistant magazine
construction (including locks) and weekly inspections of magazines. As
shown in table 2, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle
access to the facility grounds by way of a locked security gate or by
virtue of being an indoor facility. Five of the 13 facilities restricted
vehicle access after normal working hours (nights or nights and weekends).
Officials at 7 other

                                  Source: GAO.

All of the 18 facilities contained a variety of high explosives, including
C-4 plastic explosive, TNT, binary explosives, and detonators. Officials
from 13 of the state and local entities provided us with estimates of the
quantities of explosives they were storing, and they reported amounts
ranging from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the majority of the entities (9)
indicating they had 200 pounds or less.

    Different Types of Physical Security Measures at Explosives Storage
    Facilities

facilities said that vehicle access to the facilities was restricted at
all times, including the indoor facility in Pennsylvania that was located
in the basement of a municipal building.22 While these outdoor facilities
had barriers to vehicle access via roadway, not all of the facilities were
completely surrounded by fencing or some other perimeter barrier, nor do
federal storage regulations require them to have such a barrier or
fencing.

Table 2: Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives Storage
Facilities We Visited

Number of storage Type of physical security facilities Examples of
physical security

Exterior barrier around storage facility

o  	Vehicle access restricted Fence gates with electronic or manual 12
locks

o  	All access restricted Interior storage in basement of 1 municipal
building

o  No exterior barrier 5

                            Extent of access control

o  Constant 7 24 hours, 7 days a week

o  Certain periods only 5 Nights and weekends, or nights only

o  No access control 5 Accessible at all times by vehicle

o  Extent could not be verified 1a

Interior barrier around storage magazine

o  Pedestrian access restricted 6 Chain-link fences with locked gates

o  All access restricted 1 Multiple interior door locks

o  No interior barrier 11

                          Extent of personnel presence

o  	Regular patrols or Bomb squad officers and police officers inspections
18

o  24-hour on-site 9a City or county employees

Source: GAO observation and comments of state and local government
officials.

aAt 1 facility, we were unable to determine the extent of access control
or whether a 24-hour personnel presence existed.

22 At 1 other storage facility in Pennsylvania, we also observed a vehicle
barrier in place. However, local officials at this facility did not
provide information about whether or not the barrier was in place at all
times.

Also, as shown in table 2, 6 of 18 storage facilities had an interior
barrier immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent direct
access by persons on foot. At each of these 6 facilities, the barriers
consisted of a chain-link fence with a locked gate barring entry by
unauthorized personnel (figure 4 reflects one of these facilities). At 1
other facility (the indoor facility in Pennsylvania), the storage
magazines were in the basement of the municipal building, and multiple
locked doors were used to prevent access by unauthorized personnel.
Conversely, at 1 facility in Texas, the storage magazine could be reached
on foot or by vehicle at any time because it did not have fencing or
vehicle barriers to deter unauthorized access.

Figure 4: Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier Surrounding
Type 2 Storage Magazines

Source: GAO.

Officials at all of the 18 storage facilities detailed in table 2 told us
that official personnel patrolled or inspected the storage facility on a
regular basis. For example, bomb squad officers said they regularly
visited the facilities to check on their condition, in addition to
visiting the facilities to retrieve or place explosive materials in them.
In addition to bomb squad personnel, officials at 14 of the 18 facilities
said that police officers from local police departments patrolled the
facilities to check for any obvious signs of problems such as forced
entry. However, these police patrols

typically did not include actual entry into the storage magazines to
inspect the explosives themselves.

As further shown in table 2, officials at 9 of the 18 storage facilities
we visited said that state or local government employees maintained a
24-hour presence at the facilities. Four of these storage facilities were
located on the grounds of police training centers, where either trainees
or facility personnel were present at all times. Two storage
facilities-one each in Tennessee and Texas-were on the grounds of jail
facilities where local correctional personnel worked 24 hours a day, 7
days a week. Two other storage facilities were located on the grounds of
city/county water or sewage treatment plants, and 1 storage facility was
located in the basement of a municipal building. One additional facility
in Pennsylvania was located on the grounds of the police academy, but we
were unable to determine whether there was 24-hour, on-site presence at
that facility.

    Some Explosives Storage Facilities Had Electronic Security Measures

At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of a
monitored alarm or video surveillance system. Although no electronic
security is required under federal regulations, 4 of the 18 explosives
storage facilities had either an alarm or a video monitoring system in
place. Specifically, one entity in Texas had 2 facilities with monitored
alarm systems in place, and two entities in Pennsylvania and Tennessee had
video monitoring of their explosives storage facilities. The Texas entity
had alarm systems in place at 2 of its storage facilities. At 1 facility,
two small detonator magazines-while not alarmed themselves-were located
inside a building protected by an alarm system. At a second facility, the
door to an underground storage magazine was alarmed. Regarding the 2
facilities with video monitoring, the Tennessee facility- which was
located on the grounds of a local correctional facility-took advantage of
a video surveillance system already in place to monitor prisoners. The
Pennsylvania facility with video monitoring was located inside a municipal
building and was part of that building's overall video security system.

The remaining 14 of the 18 storage facilities did not have video or alarm
systems in place at the time of our visit. Officials at 4 facilities told
us they had alarm systems planned (funding not yet approved), and
officials at 3 facilities said they had alarm systems pending (funding
approved and awaiting installation). Officials at 2 facilities also told
us they planned to install video monitoring. For example, 1 facility in
Pennsylvania had its video monitoring system destroyed by lightning and
was planning to

replace it. However, the local government authority had yet to approve
funding for the replacement.

Several officials commented on the feasibility of installing alarm or
video monitoring systems at explosives storage facilities. At 4 of the
state and local entities we visited, officials noted that these storage
facilities are often located in remote areas without easy access to
sources of electricity. The officials added that this lack of necessary
electrical infrastructure could be a cost-prohibitive barrier if they were
required to install some form of electronic monitoring at explosives
storage facilities. Regarding the possibility of new storage regulations
that would require an electronic security system at explosives storage
magazines, officials at 9 state and local entities told us they would not
object to such a requirement as long as it did not create an undue
financial burden.

    Inventory and Other Oversight Activities Varied at Explosives Storage
    Facilities

At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we looked for the presence
of internal inventory procedures, internal or external inspections, and
licensing of the storage facility by state or local government agencies .
Under federal regulations, only explosives licensees are required to
perform periodic inventories and are subject to periodic ATF regulatory
inspections of their storage facilities; other persons who store
explosives are not. As shown in table 3, officials at all 14 of the
entities we visited told us they performed periodic inventories of the
contents of their explosives storage facilities. Typically, during these
inventories, officials said they count all the explosives in the storage
facility and reconcile them with inventory records maintained either
manually or in a computerized database.

 Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at the 14 State and Local Entities
                                    Visited

Number of Type of inventory and state/local Examples of inventory and
oversight activity entities oversight activities

                               Internal inventory

o  Annual 7

o  	More frequent 7 Conducted monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly

                              External inspections

o  ATF only 6 All but one conducted voluntarily

o  	State or local authority only 1 Conducted by state regulatory
authority

o  	Both ATF and state/local 2 Periodic by ATF, plus state/local authority
inspection

o  No external inspections 5

                                 License/permit

o  Required and in place 3 All issued by state regulatory authority

o  Required and not in place 2 Required by state regulatory authority

o  Not required and in place 1 Voluntarily obtained by local police

o  Not required and not in place 8

Source: GAO observations and comments of state and local government
officials.

In addition, 9 of the 14 state and local entities said they had received
inspections of their storage facilities, and ATF had conducted the
inspections in all but 1 of these 9 cases. Regarding this 1 case in
Pennsylvania, officials said a state government authority regularly
performed these inspections. With regard to the ATF inspections, state or
local operators of the selected facilities voluntarily requested these
inspections in all but 1 case (as discussed further below).

Of the 9 selected state and local entities that received inspections by a
regulatory authority, 6 entities told us they received them on a periodic
basis, with another 3 entities having received a onetime inspection (all
by ATF). A Pennsylvania entity that said it received annual inspections
from ATF was unique among those we visited because it had also received a
onetime inspection from a local government authority. This entity was the
only one we visited to have any type of inspection, either onetime or
periodic, from a local government authority. Last, a Colorado entity,
another of the 5 receiving periodic inspections, said it was being
inspected on a recurring basis by both ATF and a state government
authority-it was the only entity we visited that fell into this category.

Also as shown in table 3, 5 of the 14 state and local entities we visited
told us they were required to obtain a license from state regulatory
authorities to operate their explosives storage facilities. One entity in
Colorado had a license to store explosives issued by the state, and this
entity had also obtained a federal explosives license issued by ATF.
Officials at this location told us that the state required them to obtain
the federal license before applying for its mandatory state license.
Indeed, according to ATF officials, state or local government facilities
may apply for a federal explosives license if it is required by their
state regulatory agency. However, once such a license is issued, these
state and local government facilities must then comply with all the same
explosives laws and regulations that are applicable to licensed private
sector facilities.

Officials at the 14 state and local entities we visited commented on the
feasibility of mandatory ATF oversight of their explosives storage
facility. Officials at 13 state and local entities said they did not
object to the possibility of federal licensing or inspection of their
explosives storage facilities. Six state and local entities also said that
they already have close contacts with ATF and would not be concerned about
additional ATF oversight of their storage facilities. Officials at 3 state
and local entities noted that additional federal oversight was not a
concern, as long as they were not held to a higher standard of security
and safety than ATF requires of private industry.

    Some Entities Had Experienced Explosives Thefts or Reported Losses

Two of the 14 state and local entities we visited had previously had a
theft or loss of explosives from one of their storage facilities. At a
storage facility in Texas, officials told us that criminals had once used
a cutting torch to illegally gain entry to an explosives storage magazine.
Some explosives were stolen, but the suspected thieves were later
apprehended and the materials were recovered. At another storage facility
in Colorado, officials said that an unauthorized individual had obtained
keys to an explosives storage magazine and taken some of the material. As
with the previous case, several individuals were apprehended and the
materials were recovered. One of these incidents (the theft of explosives
in Texas) did not appear in ATF's nationwide database of reported thefts
and missing explosives.23

23 In addition to the two incidents described above, we also identified
three other thefts at state and local entities during the course of our
audit work. These other three incidents were all reported to ATF.

The law enforcement community has recently taken action to address the
issue of thefts and security at law enforcement explosives storage
facilities. In April 2005, the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory
Board-which represents more than 450 accredited law enforcement bomb
squads nationwide-initiated a program to increase security awareness at
its members' explosives storage facilities. In a letter to its membership,
the advisory board encouraged all bomb squad commanders to increase
diligence regarding explosives storage security. The advisory board also
recommended that all bomb squads request a voluntary ATF inspection,
ensure they maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and assess the
adequacy of security measures in place at their respective explosive
storage facilities to determine whether additional measures might be
required-such as video monitoring, fencing, and alarms. This is a
voluntary program, and it is too soon to tell what effect, if any, it will
have towards enhancing the security at state and local law enforcement
storage facilities and reducing the potential for thefts.

    Possible Noncompliance With Regulations at Some Storage Facilities

  Conclusions

At 4 of the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed various
storage practices that may not be in compliance with federal explosives
regulations. These circumstances appeared to be related to storage safety
issues, rather than storage security. For example, one explosives storage
facility was located in the basement of a municipal building and utilized
small type 3 temporary magazines (known as day-boxes) for permanent
storage of high explosives and detonators. ATF regulations state that
these magazines should be used only for temporary storage of explosives
and may not be left unattended. At another storage facility, a high
explosives storage magazine housed a small detonator (or "cap") magazine
in its interior, although ATF regulations generally require detonators to
be kept separate from other explosive materials. Another storage facility
contained several boxes of unmarked, 1970s-era plastic explosives
(specifically C-4), possession of which is generally restricted under
federal explosives law when the material in question does not contain a
detection agent. Finally, an official at one storage facility acknowledged
that because of the weight of explosives currently being stored, their
storage magazine was in violation of ATF regulations concerning allowable
distances from other inhabited structures.

The overall number of state and local government explosives storage
facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of
storage magazines associated with these facilities are currently unknown.
Further, because ATF does not oversee state and local government storage

facilities as part of the federal licensing process and ATF does not have
any other statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of these
facilities, ATF's ability to monitor the potential vulnerability of these
facilities to theft or assess the extent to which these facilities are in
compliance with federal explosives storage regulations is limited.
Nevertheless, current federal explosives law as enacted by Congress does
not provide ATF with specific authority to conduct regulatory oversight
with respect to public sector facilities. And although we did observe
possible noncompliance with the storage regulations at some of the state
and local entities we visited, none of these circumstances appeared to
make the facilities more vulnerable to theft.

According to ATF's interpretation of federal explosives laws and
regulations, state and local government agencies-including law enforcement
bomb squads and public universities-are required to report incidents of
theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an occurrence.
However, during the course of our audit work, we identified five incidents
involving theft or missing explosives at state and local government
facilities, one of which had not been reported to ATF. Because this
reporting requirement applies to any "person" who has knowledge of a theft
from his stock and the definition of "person" does not specifically
include state and local government agencies, ATF officials acknowledged
that these entities may be unsure as to whether they are required to
report under this requirement. On the basis of our limited site visit
observations and discussions with state, local, and ATF officials, we did
not identify a specific threat or vulnerability to theft among state and
local government explosive storage facilities. However, if state and local
government entities are unsure about whether they are required to report
thefts and missing explosives, ATF's ability to monitor these incidents
and take appropriate investigative action may be compromised by a
potential lack of information.

Recommendations for 	To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to
incidents of missing or stolen explosives, we recommend that the Attorney
General direct the

Executive Action	ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting
regulations to ensure that all persons and entities who store explosives,
including state and local government agencies, understand their obligation
to report all thefts or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an
occurrence.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

On September 9, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to the Attorney
General for review and comment.

On September 26, 2005, DOJ advised us that the department had no formal
agency comments and further advised us that DOJ agreed with our
recommendation and would take steps to implement it. ATF provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of the report. At
that
time, we will send copies of this report to the House Committee on
Government Reform; House Committee on the Judiciary; House
Committee on Homeland Security; Senate Committee on the Judiciary;
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the
Attorney General; the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives; appropriate state and local government officials;
and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me
at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Key contributors to this report were William Crocker,
Assistant Director; David Alexander; Amy Bernstein; Philip Caramia;
Geoffrey Hamilton; and Michael Harmond.

Laurie E. Ekstrand
Director, Homeland Security

and Justice Issues

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

  Interviews and Other Contacts

In reviewing the security of state and local government explosives storage
facilities, we focused on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives' (ATF) role in overseeing and regulating these facilities,
including the extent to which ATF's licensing operations address state and
local government facilities and what authority ATF has to enforce federal
explosives law and regulations at state and local government facilities.
In addition, we reviewed the extent to which ATF collects information
about state and local government facilities, including locations and types
and amount of explosives stored. To determine what states and localities
are doing to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives, we visited
state and local explosives storage facilities. We also contacted other
state and local government and explosives industry officials.

To obtain the perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts to
regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage
facilities, we met with ATF headquarters officials-specifically
individuals from ATF's Office of Enforcement Programs and Services, Office
of Field Operations, Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information, and
Office of the Chief Counsel. We also met with or obtained information from
officials with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of the Inspector
General, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Bomb Data
Center.

To determine what selected states and localities were doing to ensure the
safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government
facilities, we met with state and local officials in Colorado,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas-specifically 13 state and local bomb
squads and 1 public university. In these four states, we also contacted
other state government agencies, including transportation and
environmental protection agencies and fire marshals. We also contacted
other public university officials in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.

To obtain additional perspectives of law enforcement and explosives
industry experts on the safety and security of explosives storage
facilities, we contacted representatives from the National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board, the International Association of Bomb
Technicians and Investigators, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Sheriffs'
Association.

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

State and Local Site 	To find out what selected states and localities are
doing to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives in state and
local government facilities,

Visits	we visited 14 state and local government entities that stored
explosives, as shown in table 4 below. During these site visits, we met
with state and local officials and physically observed their explosives
storage facilities and storage magazines.

                   Table 4: State and Local Entities Visited

                         State level           County level    City level     
      State     Law enforcement Public          Sheriff's   Police department 
                university                        office      Fire department 
     Colorado                                1                      1         
Pennsylvania               1                                     3         
    Tennessee                 1                           1         2         
      Texas                                                         3         
      Total                                2 1            1         9         

Source: GAO.

We chose law enforcement bomb squads as the primary focus of our site
visits because (1) we concluded that state and local bomb squads would be
the most likely state and local government agencies to have a need for
explosives storage facilities and (2) there was no other source of
nationwide information on the number and location of state and local
government explosives storage facilities. We selected our state and local
site visits based on the following criteria:

o  	In selecting which states to visit, we chose those states most likely
to have significant state and local government and private sector
explosives activities. The state selection criteria included (1) the
number of federally licensed private sector explosives companies, (2) the
number of reported explosives thefts,1 and (3) the number of law
enforcement bomb squads.2 Using these criteria, we then selected a
geographic mix of states-specifically one state in the northeast United
States, one in the southeast, one in the southwest, and one in the west.

1 Based on explosives licensing data compiled by ATF and explosives theft
incidents reported to ATF, both as of February 2005.

2 Based on data about state and local law enforcement bomb squads reported
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in November 2000.

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

o  	Within each state, we selected state and local bomb squads for our
site visits. These were chosen to represent a mix based on the type of
agency, size of jurisdiction, and geographic location. We selected two
state law enforcement agencies, one county sheriff, nine city police
departments, and one city fire department. These included three
jurisdictions with populations over 1 million, five with populations
between 100,000 and 1 million, three with populations below 100,000, and
two with statewide jurisdictions.

o  	We also selected one non-law enforcement explosives storage facility
operated by a state university. This facility was selected as typical of
the various state universities with mining-engineering programs and
because it had a significant amount of explosives (over 100 pounds) in its
storage facility.

During our site visits, we used a semistructured interview guide to
conduct interviews with state and local officials and determine the level
of security at their explosives storage facilities. Our criteria for
identifying the types of security measures in place included existing
federal storage laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and
security guidelines issued in 2005 by the explosives industry (the
Institute of Makers of Explosives). Not all of the security criteria we
used are currently requirements under federal storage regulations
(perimeter fencing, for example). We used these additional criteria to
demonstrate the wide range of security measures actually in place at the
time of our visits to these facilities. Also, while we were not conducting
a compliance audit, during our site visits we observed each storage
magazine and noted any instances where explosives appeared not to be
stored in compliance with federal regulations.

We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information relating
to the individual state and local entities we visited to ensure that
securityrelated information is not unintentionally disclosed. Because our
review was limited to a nonprobability sample of 14 state and local
entities in the four states, the information discussed in this report is
illustrative and cannot be generalized to all state and local government
entities nationwide that store explosives.

ATF and FBI Data 	ATF provided data related to explosives licensing and
inspections, as well as relevant law, regulations, and procedures dealing
with the storage of explosives. We also obtained data from ATF's Arson and
Explosives National Repository related to incidents of theft and missing
explosives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

reported to ATF. FBI provided us with a nationwide list of accredited bomb
squads-including number, location, and name of agency. In addition, FBI
provided policies and guidance related to the bomb squad training and
accreditation process.

The information we obtained from ATF (data on explosives licensees,
explosives inspections, and explosives thefts) and FBI (data on the number
and location of bomb squads) was used to provide background context on the
number of private sector and state and local government explosives storage
facilities and to assist us in selecting locations for our site visits. We
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and as a
result, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. We also obtained data from ATF on incidents of
explosive thefts and missing explosives at state and local government
storage facilities. On the basis of our site visits and other audit work,
we determined that these incidents may be underreported, as discussed
earlier in this report.

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