DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve
(22-AUG-06, GAO-06-913R).
In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas
since the end of the Korean War. Soon thereafter, the Department
of Defense (DOD) issued a report titled Strengthening U.S. Global
Defense Posture. This report defined the key tenets of the
integrated global presence and basing strategy, which outlines
troop and basing adjustments overseas. Although the strategy is
intended to make the overseas posture of the United States more
flexible and efficient, it will require new facilities costing
billions of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United
States and some by other nations. As plans for overseas basing
began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed
concern about the use of military construction funds for projects
at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or closed because of
changes being considered by DOD and the military services.
Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to prepare
detailed, comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure
requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas
regional commands. The Senate report directed the master plans to
identify precise facility requirements and the status of
properties being returned to host nations. Additionally, the
Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding
requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities
between the United States and host nations. The Senate report
also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and
implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the
congressional defense committees with assessment reports each
year. For this report, we assessed the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance to overseas regional
commands and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD
submitted to Congress on April 27, 2006. This report discusses
the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans (1) complied
with reporting requirements and provided information in a
complete, clear, and consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S.
overseas defense basing strategies and requirements have changed
since last year; and (3) reflected the challenges DOD faces in
the implementation of the plans.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-913R
ACCNO: A59084
TITLE: DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to
Evolve
DATE: 08/22/2006
SUBJECT: Construction costs
Cost analysis
Defense capabilities
Defense cost control
Military bases
Military facilities
Military facility construction
Reporting requirements
Strategic planning
Asia
Europe
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GAO-06-913R
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Congressional Requirement for Detailed Comprehensive Master
* Prior GAO Work
* 2006 Master Plans Exceeded Most Reporting Requirements and
* OSD 2005 Guidance Helped to Further Improve the Overseas Ma
* This Year's Plans Are More Complete, Clear, and Consistent
* Limited Explanation of the Impacts of Other Defense Plans a
* 2006 Master Plans Reflected Recent Changes in Overseas Basi
* 2006 Master Plans Addressed Several Challenges, but PACOM's
* This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Host Nati
* This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environme
* PACOM's 2006 Plan Did Not Describe Training Limitations
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Comments from the Department of Defense
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* end of correspond & Test.pdf
* PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* Order by Mail or Phone
August 22, 2006
Congressional Committees
Subject: DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve
In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end
of the Korean War. Soon thereafter, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued
a report titled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.1 This report
defined the key tenets of the integrated global presence and basing
strategy, which outlines troop and basing adjustments overseas. Although
the strategy is intended to make the overseas posture of the United States
more flexible and efficient, it will require new facilities costing
billions of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United States and
some by other nations.
As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations
Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction funds
for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or closed because
of changes being considered by DOD and the military services. Accordingly,
the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction
appropriation bill directed DOD2 to prepare detailed, comprehensive master
plans for changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities
in each of the overseas regional commands.3 DOD was required to provide a
baseline report on these plans with yearly updates on their status and
their implementation along with annual military construction budget
submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House conference report
accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also
directed the department to prepare comprehensive master plans with yearly
updates through fiscal year 2009.4 The Senate report directed the master
plans to identify precise facility requirements and the status of
properties being returned to host nations. Additionally, the Senate report
stated that the plans should identify funding requirements as well as the
division of funding responsibilities between the United States and host
nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the master plans
developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to
provide the congressional defense committees with assessment reports each
year.
1Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004).
2In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
asked the overseas regional commands to prepare comprehensive master plans
for their areas of responsibility.
3S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
4H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003).
This is our third report that responds to the reporting requirements
contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction
appropriation bill report. Our prior work5 found that although DOD's
overseas master plans provided a more complete picture of future overseas
defense infrastructure and funding requirements than was available in
other DOD documents, opportunities existed for the plans to provide more
complete, clear, and consistent information and to present a more
definitive picture of future requirements. For this report, we assessed
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance6 to
overseas regional commands and its use in developing the overseas master
plans DOD submitted to Congress on April 27, 2006.7 This report discusses
the extent to which the 20068 overseas master plans (1) complied with
reporting requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, and
consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements have changed since last year; and (3)
reflected the challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans.
To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the level
of guidance available to the commands to facilitate consistent preparation
of overseas master plans, and we analyzed whether the guidance meets the
requirements for information contained in congressional mandates and as
suggested by GAO. We also visited overseas regional commands-the Pacific
Command (PACOM), including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan;
European Command (EUCOM); and Central Command (CENTCOM)-to see selected
installations and military construction projects firsthand and to discuss
OSD's guidance and the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure
requirements and costs overseas.9 Once the master plans were issued, we
reviewed them to determine how the plans have changed since last year and
the extent to which they complied with the reporting requirements. We
assessed whether the plans provided information in a complete, clear, and
consistent manner, and we discussed with OSD and command officials whether
improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed.
5GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas,
GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005), and Defense Infrastructure:
Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development
of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2004).
6DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5,
2005). OSD also issued guidance in February and October 2004 to aid the
overseas regional commands in developing their plans last year.
7Last year, OSD provided Congress the overseas master plans along with its
fiscal year 2006 military construction budget proposal in early March
2005. This year's master plans were submitted on April 27, 2006, later
than when the annual budget submissions went to Congress, at least in part
because of OSD's efforts to incorporate last minute changes in basing
plans, such as those in Iceland and Italy. OSD made the plans available to
us on May 2, 2006, which did not provide us sufficient time to fully
assess the plans or provide a draft report to Congress by May 15 as we
have done in the past.
8We refer to the plans in the year that they were issued to Congress. The
content of the plans issued in 2006 covers fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
enclosure I for more information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief
The 2006 master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements
established by Congress and-by addressing most of our recommendations for
improving the plans from last year-they are more complete, clear, and
consistent than last year's plans, although limitations exist in the
information provided on fiscal year 2007 funding required for individual
military construction projects. Whereas last year none of the regional
commands fully identified their precise facility requirements and costs as
specified in the reporting mandate, all of the commands provided precise
facility requirements for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 in their master
plans. However, the plans submitted to Congress did not provide estimated
costs for individual military construction projects for fiscal year 2007
as specified by OSD guidance because of, according to a senior OSD
official, the difficulty of including the cost estimates that had not yet
been finalized during DOD's budget process. Consequently, the master plans
must be matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction budget
request to obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and cost
requirements for fiscal year 2007. Although not required, we believe the
plans could be more complete and useful to decision makers if they also
explained, where applicable, how each implementation is being or has the
potential to be affected by other defense plans and activities that are
likely to affect future facility and funding requirements in a region. In
2005, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities Structure
of the United States10 recommended that the entire effort of overseas
basing be integrated into one overarching design that is coordinated and
synchronized with all ongoing initiatives. Although overseas command
officials told us that their plans were coordinated with other defense
plans and activities, only PACOM's plan explained how its implementation
could be affected by another activity-a potential decrease in host nation
support when the Government of Japan provides resources to help fund the
relocation of approximately 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. EUCOM
and CENTCOM plans did not address other relevant and related plans and
activities.11 For example, EUCOM's master plan did not explain the
potential impact of base realignment and closure implementation on the
movement of troops from Germany to bases in the United States. This
omission is due primarily to OSD guidance that stipulated the plans were
to address overseas locations and to exclude the 50 states and U.S.
territories. Without explanations of the linkage between the overseas
master plans with other defense plans and activities, it is difficult to
determine their impact on U.S. defense infrastructure and funding
requirements overseas.
9For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern Command in
our analysis because this command has significantly fewer facilities
overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, Europe, and
Central Asia.
10U.S. Congress, Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities
Structure of the United States Final Report (Arlington, Va.: Aug. 15,
2005). The commission was established in 2003 by Pub. L. No. 108-132 S:
128 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. S: 111 note) to evaluate the current
and proposed overseas basing structure for U.S. military forces.
The 2006 master plans reflected changes in overseas basing strategies and
requirements that occurred since last year. It was apparent that OSD and
the regional commands worked to incorporate key changes associated with
the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies into the plans
before they were provided to Congress. For example, EUCOM added
requirements for facilities in Romania and Bulgaria to its master plan
based on agreements with those countries to allow DOD use of their
facilities, and CENTCOM removed infrastructure requirements from its
master plan that were planned for Uzbekistan after its government
requested that U.S. forces leave. In some instances, basing decisions were
made after the plans were prepared-such as the realignment at Keflavik,
Iceland, and La Maddelena, Italy-but OSD and the regional commands updated
the plans to reflect those decisions before the plans were submitted to
Congress. Even with these efforts to update the plans as changes occurred
and decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas military basing
strategies and requirements continues. Changes occurring after the most
recent plans were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next
year's plans, and OSD and the regional commands could be faced with more
changes in the future.
This year, the master plans provided a much better description of the
challenges DOD faces in implementing the master plans. For example, all of
the plans addressed the uncertainties associated with host nations and
recent agreements, and generally dealt with environmental concerns and
training limitations, where they existed. An exception involves the fact
that PACOM's plan did not describe the limitations on training in South
Korea and Japan. If these training limitations are not addressed, senior
command officials told us, they could cause the United States to either
train in other locations or to downsize or relocate. As a result of this
omission, PACOM's plan does not provide decisionmakers a complete picture
of the challenges that could affect its implementation and potential
changes in infrastructure and funding requirements needed to address
training limitations in the Pacific region.
We are making two recommendations to improve future master plans for
changing defense infrastructure overseas. Specifically, we are
recommending that OSD (1) revise its guidance to require overseas commands
to explain how other relevant and related defense plans and activities
affect implementation of their master plans in terms of infrastructure and
funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to
address existing training limitations and the potential effects on
infrastructure and funding requirements. In written comments on a draft of
this report, DOD partially agreed with our recommendations and indicated
that it would address these issues in a risk assessment framework in
future master plans. We discuss DOD's comments in detail later in this
report.
11Like last year, CENTCOM's plan excluded any detailed discussion of
facilities in Iraq since DOD does not consider them permanent bases.
Background
Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design,
construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities
worldwide. As of fiscal year 2005, DOD reportedly had 3,376 installations
total, with 737 installations located overseas.12 Operational control of
the U.S. combat forces and installations is assigned to the nation's five
geographic, unified overseas regional commands, which are responsible for
the security environment as directed by the national security strategy and
the national military strategy. Composed of forces from two or more
services, PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM span numerous countries and even
continents and encompass areas with economically, politically, and
socially diverse regions, as shown in figure 1.
12These numbers do not include U.S. facilities in Iraq.
Figure 1: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility
Source: GAO.
Note: Special Operations Command does not have a specific geographic area
of responsibility because it is a functional overseas regional command
with lead responsibility for waging war on terrorism. The command also
provides special operations forces to support the overseas regional
commanders' security plans and is a tenant unit on bases and funds special
operations forces-specific items-such as hangars for aircraft-out of
military construction appropriations, and uses operation and maintenance
appropriations for support items, such as special operations-specific
computers.
The United States has a large portion of its military personnel deployed
abroad at any given time; however, this number varies with the frequency
and types of military operations and deployment demands. Currently, just
more than 119,000 troops are regularly stationed in Europe. Most of these
are U.S. Army forces (62,600) stationed mainly in Germany, with smaller
numbers elsewhere in Europe and some in Africa. Nearly 100,000 military
personnel are located in East Asia, divided between Japan, South Korea,
and on the waters of the Pacific. Additionally, the ongoing global war on
terrorism has resulted in the deployment of much larger numbers of forces
in theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas
basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to
combat conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. U.S. military
presence overseas has been converting from a posture established on
familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one that is intended to be
capable of projecting forces from strategic locations into relatively
unknown areas in an uncertain threat environment. In September 2001, DOD
issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which addressed, among other
issues, reorienting the U.S. military global posture. The report called
for developing a permanent basing system that provides greater flexibility
for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world as well as providing
temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S.
forces to train and operate in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end
of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no longer
needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S. forces
while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in strategic
locations around the world. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing
Strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies, including the overseas
basing and requirements study, the overseas presence study, and the U.S.
global posture study. The military construction appropriation request for
fiscal year 2007 included approximately $16.7 billion for military
construction and family housing, of which nearly $1.3 billion (7.6
percent) is designated for specific overseas locations, mostly comprising
enduring installations, and not for new and emerging requirements outside
existing basing structures.13
Congressional Requirement for Detailed Comprehensive Master Plans
In previous years, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee had expressed concern that the overseas basing
structure had not been updated to reflect the new realities of the
post-Cold War world. The Committee had also expressed concern about the
use of military construction budget authority for projects at bases that
may soon be obsolete because of changes being considered in overseas
presence and basing. Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate
Appropriations Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive
master plans for the changing infrastructure requirements for U.S.
military facilities in each of its overseas regional commands.
Subsequently, the House conference report accompanying the 2004 military
construction appropriation bill also directed the department to submit
comprehensive master plans. According to the Senate report, at a minimum,
the plans are to identify precise facility requirements and the status of
properties being returned to host nations. In addition, the report stated
that the plans should identify funding requirements and the division of
funding responsibilities between the United States and cognizant host
nations. The Senate report also directed DOD to provide congressional
defense committees a report on the status and implementation of those
plans with each yearly military construction budget submission through
fiscal year 2008. The first report was due with the fiscal year 2006
military construction budget submission and is to be updated each
succeeding year to reflect changes to the plans involving specific
construction projects being added, canceled, or modified, or funding for
those projects being redirected to other needs, and justification for such
changes.14 The Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the
comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the
overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense
committees with a report each year giving an assessment of the status of
the plans.
13In our estimates for military construction and family housing for
overseas locations, we included U.S. territories and possessions in the
Pacific, such as Guam and Wake Island. However, we excluded worldwide
classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these
categories may include domestic military construction and family housing.
Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has been tasked with responding to this
legislative requirement. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the
overseas regional commands responsibility for preparing detailed,
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility.
Prior GAO Work
In our prior work,15 we found that while DOD's completion of overseas
master plans provided a more complete picture of future facility and
funding requirements for changing U.S. defense infrastructure overseas
than is available in other DOD reports, documents, and annual budget
requests, opportunities existed to improve the guidance and term
definitions to help overseas regional commands provide more complete,
clear, and consistent information and present a more definitive picture of
infrastructure and funding requirements, particularly for new locations,
in the future. We found limitations in information that could be provided
because of three key factors: ongoing negotiations with host nations,
continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences
commands had in interpretation of OSD guidance. In addition, addressing
the extent to which residual value issues could affect U.S. funding
requirements was an open and continuing recommendation from our prior
report. Additionally, we reported that without more complete, clear, and
consistent reporting of various items-host nation agreements and funding
levels, including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding levels and
sources in addition to military construction funds; environmental
remediation and restoration issues; population levels; and facility
requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and
other insular areas in the Pacific-across future master plans, users do
not have the best data available to facilitate their annual review and
oversight. Also, we reported that without the detailed reporting of
individual construction projects as EUCOM did in its plan and the
anticipated strategic end state of the command's overseas basing
infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did in its plan, Congress and other
users would not have the best available and consistent data on which to
track progress and changes from year to year and between commands. In many
of these instances, providing supplementary narrative explanation of the
assumptions used or reasons data were omitted could improve the usefulness
of the comprehensive master plans.
14See footnote 7.
15See footnote 5.
2006 Master Plans Exceeded Most Reporting Requirements and Are More Complete,
Clear, and Consistent Than Last Year's Plans
While prior overseas master plans generally exceeded the reporting
requirements established by Congress, OSD has further improved the plans
by issuing guidance in 2005 to require overseas regional commands to
provide additional information and address most of our prior
recommendations. As a result, the 2006 plans are not only more complete,
clear, and consistent than last year's plans, they are also more refined,
focusing first on the mission and then on the infrastructure requirements
needed to support the mission. However, the plans do not provide cost
estimates for individual military construction projects planned for fiscal
year 2007 and generally do not explain how their implementation is being
or has the potential to be affected by other relevant and related defense
plans and activities.
OSD 2005 Guidance Helped to Further Improve the Overseas Master Plans
To improve the overseas master plans and address some of our prior
recommendations, OSD provided additional guidance on October 5, 2005, to
the regional commands in preparing this year's plans.16 Among other
things, the guidance specifically required the overseas regional commands
to
o explain any significant variances in population levels and
usage of terminology related to the three base categories-main
operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security
locations;
o address the desired strategic end state of overseas basing
infrastructure using an "as of" date within the range of 2011 and
2015 (OSD provided the commands the discretion in choosing an end
date between 2011 and 2015);
o report host nation funding levels at the project level for
fiscal year 2007 and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008
through 2011;
o report U.S. funding sources, including precise facility
requirements and costs for fiscal year 2007, facility requirements
and total funding for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, and a
single, rolled-up figure for sustainment funding; and
o report environmental remediation issues per DOD Instruction
4715.8.17
16See footnote 6.
OSD 2005 guidance did not address our prior recommendations to require
that PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding levels
for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific
and on residual value issues. In comments on our 2005 report, DOD stated
that Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific were no different from
other U.S. facilities within the continental United States and that it was
inappropriate to include them in the overseas master plans. However,
considering the upcoming move of approximately 8,000 U.S Marines from
Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe that the inclusion of Guam,
Hawaii, U.S. territories, and other insular areas will provide a more
complete picture of PACOM's infrastructure requirements and associated
costs in the Pacific. The omission of these locations from PACOM's plan
provides Congress and other users an incomplete picture of the changing
U.S. military presence in the Pacific and only a portion of the
infrastructure and funding requirements associated with these changes.
Also, as we reported last year, residual value was excluded from OSD's
guidance because it is based on the reuse of property being turned over to
the host nations, which is limited for most categories of military
facilities and is often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental
remediation costs. Consequently, according to a senior DOD official,
residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be
assumed in the master plans. However, since these issues vary by host
nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we continue to
believe OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues
with obtaining residual value from each host nation and report the
implications for U.S. funding requirements.
This Year's Plans Are More Complete, Clear, and Consistent
The 2006 master plans are not only more complete, clear, and consistent
than last year's plans, they are also more refined, focusing first on the
mission and then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support the
mission. For example, see the following:
o Base categories. Whereas last year there appeared to be
differences in interpretation and usage of terminology related to
forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, this
year all of the commands categorized their installations into
applicable base categories of main operating base, cooperative
security location, and forward operating sites, which provided
users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and
requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented the
information on base categories with detailed data on the
installations' capabilities, overall mission, population, and
types of equipment and facilities located at each site.
o End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a
strategic end state date for overseas basing infrastructure using
an "as of" date within a range between 2011 and 2015, which
provided users a more complete and clearer basis for tracking
progress in meeting the commands' infrastructure objectives for
their areas of responsibility. Last year, only CENTCOM reported an
anticipated strategic end state date of 2010 for its basing
infrastructure.
o Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands
reported host nation funding levels at the project level for
fiscal year 2007 and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008
through 2011, which provided users a better basis to determine the
extent to which reported host nation funding levels are realistic
or complete. Also, PACOM identified host nation funding for its
bilateral agreements in South Korea, such as the Land Partnership
Plan and the Yongsan relocation plan.18 While PACOM did not
include host nation estimates for projects related to the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa, it clearly explained the ongoing
nature of bilateral agreements with the Government of Japan and
reported that host nation contributions related to realignments in
Okinawa will be reflected in future master plans once bilateral
agreements are finalized. EUCOM provided information for two
bilateral agreements, as well as information on North Atlantic
Treaty Organization contributions. CENTCOM also provided host
nation estimates and explained that discussions with various
countries about host nation funding were ongoing. Last year, none
of the commands provided complete data for host nation funding
levels and PACOM's schedule of host nation funding did not fully
incorporate projects and funding levels initiated through special
bilateral agreements with host nations.
o Facility requirements and costs. Whereas last year only one of
the regional commands fully identified its precise facility
requirements and costs as specified in the reporting mandate, this
year all of the commands provided facility requirements for fiscal
years 2007 through 201119 and estimated facility sustainment costs
for fiscal year 2007. However, although specified in OSD guidance,
the master plans provided to Congress did not provide cost
estimates for individual military construction projects planned
for fiscal year 2007. According to a senior OSD official
responsible for overseeing the development of the plans,
reconciling the estimated costs while the budget proposal was
evolving proved to be too difficult to capture each project's
estimated costs in the master plans. Accordingly, the master plans
must be matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction
budget request to obtain a complete picture of the precise
facility and cost requirements for fiscal year 2007.
o Environmental remediation issues. This year, EUCOM and PACOM
addressed the extent of their environmental issues, while CENTCOM
did not indicate to what extent it may be confronted with
environmental issues. For example, EUCOM reported that there were
no environmental remediation projects per DOD Instruction 4715.8
programmed for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. PACOM also reported
that there were no environmental restoration issues in Japan and
noted that USFK was in the process of coordinating with the
Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated U.S. bases.20
While CENTCOM's master plan did not mention any environmental
issues, a senior command official said there were no environmental
issues to report. Last year, none of the regional commands
identified environmental remediation and restoration requirements
or issues in their master plans, which made it difficult for users
to compare and comprehend how environment-related activities and
costs have varied, and how these costs may affect planned U.S.
funding levels.
17Department of Defense, Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities
Overseas, DOD Instruction 4715.8 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 1998).
18As discussed in our prior report, within the provisions of the Land
Partnership Plan and the Yongsan relocation plan, USFK intends to
strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating
installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison located
in the Seoul metropolitan area, to two major hubs in the central and
southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the consolidation and
relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase readiness, efficiencies,
and cost savings; enhance quality of life; provide a less intrusive
presence; and increase training opportunities.
19CENTCOM also included information on proposed military construction
projects and estimated costs for fiscal year 2012 in its 2006 master plan.
The 2006 plans are also more refined, focusing first on the mission and
then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. For
example, in CENTCOM's master plan, the descriptions of each forward
operating site focus first on the mission and then on requirements by
providing the type of mission the site has (such as providing logistical
support), the unit that it could host, and its role in the region (such as
supporting the war against terrorism or strengthening capabilities for
rapid and flexible response in the Central Asian states), as well as
identifying the requirements for equipment and facilities to support the
mission at the site. All of the plans provide similar information for
their main operating bases, cooperative security locations, and forward
operating sites.
20On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of facilities and
areas that have been vacated by the command to the Government of South
Korea. USFK's plan includes a number of measures designed to address
issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S. environmental surveys of
these vacated facilities and areas. For example, the plan calls for the
United States to remedy known, imminent, and substantial endangerments to
human health and safety. The United States will also remove underground
fuel storage tanks to preclude future leaks and initiate a technology
process for skimming fuel from the groundwater at locations where this
contamination was found. USFK expects that the plan will accelerate the
return of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea
and the relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations.
Limited Explanation of the Impacts of Other Defense Plans and Activities
Despite improvements to the plans since last year, the 2006 master plans
do not always explain how their implementation could be affected by other
relevant and related defense plans and activities because there is not a
requirement for them to do so. In 2005, the Commission on Review of
Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States recommended that
the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated into one overarching
design that is coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing initiatives.
Further, in a statement to the House Armed Services Committee on June 20,
2006, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and
the Vice Director of Strategic Plans and Policies stated that one of the
key themes the department uses to guide its thinking on force posture
changes is to act both within and across regions. According to these
officials, global force management allows the department to adapt to
increasingly global challenges, relationships, and capability needs by
establishing cross-regional priorities.
Overseas regional command officials told us that generally, the
development of their 2006 master plans were coordinated with other DOD
plans and activities. However, only PACOM's plan gave some indication of
how its implementation could be affected by another activity-the potential
decrease in traditional Japanese funding which could be used to help pay
for the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam, as discussed above. EUCOM's
master plan did not explain the potential impact of implementing base
realignment and closure recommendations on the movement of troops from
Germany to bases in the United States. EUCOM and Army officials told us
that any delay in the implementation of base realignment and closure
recommendations would cause them to delay the movement of Army service
members and their families if facilities were not available at receiving
installations in the United States. This would delay the closings of Army
installations in Europe and increase costs to operate those installations
while they remain open. However, EUCOM's master plan did not address this
matter. Also, while CENTCOM officials emphasized that infrastructure
requirements in their master plan directly supported and responded to
ongoing operations in Iraq, CENTCOM's master plan only made general
references to operations in Iraq and did not fully explain the potential
impact of such operations on other installations and facility requirements
outside of Iraq in its area of responsibility.
These omissions were due primarily to OSD guidance that stipulates the
plans are to address overseas locations only. OSD guidance does not
require regional commands to take into consideration facilities'
requirements and plans in the 50 states, U.S. territories, or at locations
where U.S. troops are deployed temporarily and funded outside of
traditional military construction appropriations, such as is the case in
Iraq. Without such explanations and linkage, it is difficult to determine
the extent to which the master plans are coordinated and synchronized with
other defense plans and activities and the impacts these other activities
have on the master plans in terms of infrastructure and funding
requirements.
2006 Master Plans Reflected Recent Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and
Requirements
OSD and the regional commands incorporated key changes associated with the
continuing evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and
requirements into this year's master plans before they were provided to
Congress. Even with these efforts, changes occurring after the 2006 plans
were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's plans,
and it is likely that the department could face more changes in the
future.
While the plans are driven by periodic changes in U.S. overseas basing
strategies and requirements, OSD and the regional commands incorporated
these key changes into the 2006 master plans before they were provided to
Congress. As a part of DOD's efforts to establish a U.S. presence in
Eastern Europe through a network of forward operating sites and
cooperative security locations, the United States signed individual
agreements with the governments of Romania and of Bulgaria in December
2005 and April 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to their
facilities and training sites. In both instances, EUCOM's master plan
provided significant details, such as the mission, planned capabilities,
equipment and aircraft, population, and in some instances the funding
requirements to transition the camp into full operating capacity, based on
the results of these recent agreements. In addition, CENTCOM removed
infrastructure requirements that were planned for Uzbekistan from its
master plan. In late 2005, following the United States' criticism of human
rights abuses, the Uzbekistan government requested that all U.S.
government forces withdraw from Karshi-Khanabad air base. According to
senior CENTCOM officials, these forces were relocated to other locations
in its area of responsibility, which affected infrastructure and funding
requirements at the receiving locations.
In some instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were
prepared, but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to reflect
those decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress. For example,
after the EUCOM plan was prepared, the department decided to realign the
Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, and the Naval Support Activity La
Maddelena, Italy-for both of which EUCOM had included infrastructure and
funding requirements in its plan. Historically, these installations
existed to meet Cold War security threats. However, because of the
realities of the new century's security environment, DOD determined that
the capabilities provided by these installations were no longer required.
While this effort helped to provide Congress with the most current
available data at the time, it also contributed to DOD providing Congress
copies of this year's master plans nearly 2 months after its fiscal year
2007 military construction budget submission, instead of simultaneously as
specified in the House conference report and Senate report accompanying
the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bills.
Even with these efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and
decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements continues. U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements continue to evolve simultaneously with the
implementation of associated plans and activities encompassed in the
integrated global basing strategy, base realignment and closure, Army's
modularity plans, and war on terrorism. In the 2006 master plans, OSD
recognizes that further changes will result as it continues to implement
the global defense posture decisions. For example, it anticipates that the
department will return about 30 percent of its current overseas sites (22
percent of its overseas assets in terms of plant replacement value) to
host nations over the next 10 years. Accordingly, OSD and the regional
commands will be faced with more changes in the future, and it remains
difficult for such changes to be included in the master plans and for DOD
to provide a definitive picture of infrastructure and funding
requirements. Changes occurring after the most recent plans were submitted
to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's plans.
2006 Master Plans Addressed Several Challenges, but PACOM's Plan Did Not Mention
Training Limitations
As noted, the 2006 master plans addressed a number of challenges that DOD
faces in the implementation of the master plans-such as uncertainties with
host nation relations and environmental concerns-but PACOM's plan did not
address training limitations in South Korea and Japan. In our prior
reports, we explained how some of these challenges could have a
significant impact on infrastructure and funding requirements and, because
the prior plans did not always describe such challenges and their
potential effects, that Congress lacked a complete picture it needed to
evaluate the annual military construction funding request. This year, the
plans provided a much better description of challenges and the potential
impacts on implementation.
This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Host Nation Relations
All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their 2006 master
plans. Last year, we found that none of the commands fully explained the
status or challenges for finalizing host nation agreements and recommended
that the commands briefly explain the status of negotiations with host
nations to provide more complete and clearer plans. These agreements
depend largely on the political environment and economic conditions in
host nations and can affect the extent of host nation support-access to
facilities or funding-to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting
agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future
infrastructure changes. This year, we found the following:
o PACOM's master plan provided substantial information describing
the results of the Defense Policy Review Initiative21 with the
Government of Japan, such as the transfer of a carrier air wing,
collocation of United States and Japanese air command and control
at Yokota Air Base, and the reduction of U.S. forces on Okinawa.
In addition, USFK provided details on significant past and current
realignment efforts, including the Government of South Korea's
approval of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan relocation plan
and coordination on the transfer of U.S.-vacated bases.
o EUCOM's master plan provided specific information on efforts to
consolidate missions because of limitations on training and
military activities, in addition to identifying a possible closure
of a main operating base in its area of responsibility.
o CENTCOM's master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation
contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is
needed from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan also
reflected the results of agreements with host nations, which have
established cooperative security locations and forward operating
sites in strategic areas of the world such as North Africa and
Central Asia.
This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental Issues
As discussed, EUCOM and PACOM addressed the extent of their environmental
issues in their 2006 master plans, while CENTCOM gave no indication
concerning environmental issues in its master plan. Last year, none of the
regional commands identified environmental remediation and restoration
issues in their master plans. This year, EUCOM reported that there were no
environmental restoration and remediation projects programmed for fiscal
years 2007 through 2011. PACOM reported that U.S. Forces Japan had no
environmental restoration and remediation requirements and that USFK was
coordinating with the Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated
U.S. bases. Although CENTCOM did not report any environmental issues, a
senior CENTCOM official said there were no environmental issues in the
command's area of responsibility.
21The Defense Policy Review Initiative, a bilateral agreement between the
U.S. and Japanese governments, established a framework for the future U.S.
force structure in Japan. According to DOD, this effort assessed the
security environment in the region and bilaterally determined the required
roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure. The interim agreement
plan was signed in October 2005.
PACOM's 2006 Plan Did Not Describe Training Limitations
While the 2006 master plans generally addressed the other challenges that
DOD faces in the implementation of the master plans, Congress still does
not have a complete picture of the challenges that DOD faces in
implementing the master plans, which could affect their implementation
because PACOM's plan did not describe the challenges DOD faces in
addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan. Senior command
officials told us that training limitations could cause the United States
to pursue alternatives, such as either to train in other locations or to
downsize or relocate, which could affect funding and facility requirements
included in overseas basing plans. Further, we reported last year that
similar challenges could have a significant impact on funding requirements
but that the plans did not always describe the status and the potential
impact of such challenges on future basing plans and funding requirements.
This year, EUCOM's master plan addressed known training limitations in its
region by identifying a specific instance in which a realignment action
was not successful in part because of training limitations, and explaining
that EUCOM was in the process of exploring further options to meet its
requirements. CENTCOM officials told us that their focus was on ongoing
operations and that training was not an issue in its region.
While PACOM's master plan provided extensive details on other challenges,
it did not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing
training limitations in South Korea and Japan, although senior officials
told us that these limitations could cause the United States to pursue
alternatives, such as to either train in other locations or to downsize or
relocate, which could affect overseas basing plans. Specifically, we found
that PACOM master plan did not address the following:
o The Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain
combat capability in the long term due to lack of adequate
air-to-surface ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK
officials. For decades, the Government of South Korea has
attempted to relocate the Koon-Ni range, which had served as the
primary air-to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. Last year
the air and ground range management of the Koon-Ni training range
was transferred to the Government of South Korea, which closed the
range in August 2005. While there is an agreement with the
Government of South Korea to train at other ranges, according to
senior Air Force and USFK officials, the other ranges do not
provide electronic scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air
Force's air-to-surface training requirements. As a result, the Air
Force has been using ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its
training requirements, which results in additional transportation
costs to the U.S. government. While South Korea has agreed to
upgrade its ranges, senior Air Force officials said that the
Seventh Air Force will be able to maintain its combat capability
only in the short term if the issue is not addressed.
o The Eighth Army in South Korea needs rail links or high-speed
roads to facilitate transportation of troops and equipment between
Camp Humphreys, which is located south of Seoul, to major training
areas located in the northern part of the country, according to
senior USFK officials. While this is not a significant problem at
this time, it remains a necessity to complete a successful
realignment of U.S. forces in South Korea. According to senior
USFK officials, a vital component of the training capability in
South Korea depends upon having access to a rail head or a
high-speed road that can deliver troops and equipment from Camp
Humphreys to major training areas in the northern part of South
Korea.
o There are limited combat arms training ranges and facilities in
Japan, according to senior U.S. Forces Japan and Pacific Air
Forces officials. These officials said that even though they have
received increased range time at Japanese training facilities,
training opportunities still remain insufficient in Japan to meet
their training requirements.
As discussed above, the Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain
combat capability in the future because of a lack of access to modernized
air-to-surface ranges, insufficient opportunities to meet training
requirements in Japan, and the need of the Army in South Korea for rail
links or high-speed roads to facilitate transportation of troops and
equipment between Camp Humphreys to the major training areas in the
northern part of South Korea. While these training issues were readily
identified by USFK, U.S. Forces Japan, and PACOM officials, none of these
issues were recognized as a challenge in PACOM's master plan. We believe
that identifying these issues would provide Congress an awareness of
potential challenges to training U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea,
which are likely to affect facility requirements and funding in these
countries.
Conclusions
U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to
evolve simultaneously with the implementation of associated plans and
activities encompassed in the integrated global basing strategy, base
realignment and closure, Army's modularity plans, and the war on
terrorism, and it remains difficult for such changes to be included in the
master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive picture of infrastructure
and funding requirements. To the department's credit, this year's overseas
master plans provide more complete, clear, and consistent information than
last year's plans. Still, until overseas regional commands link their
master plans with other relevant and related defense plans and activities,
including those involving base realignment and closure implementation and
Iraq operations, and until PACOM addresses training limitations in its
master plan, Congress and other users will lack complete information on
the magnitude of U.S. defense infrastructure and funding requirements
overseas.
Since we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands
address residual value issues and that PACOM provide information on
facility requirements and funding levels for Guam, Hawaii, U.S.
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific in our prior reports,
we are not including them in this report. However, since they have not
been addressed, we consider them open and therefore the department should
implement them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance future comprehensive master plans and facilitate annual
review and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to (1) revise OSD's guidance to
require overseas commands to explain how other relevant and related
defense plans and activities, including those involving base realignment
and closure implementation and Iraq operations, affect implementation of
their master plans in terms of infrastructure and funding requirements and
(2) ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to address existing training
limitations in its area of responsibility and the potential effects of
those limitations on infrastructure and funding requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment partially concurred with both
recommendations. In commenting on our recommendations to require overseas
commands to explain how other relevant and related defense plans and
activities and existing training limitations affect implementation of
their master plans, he agreed with our recommendations' intent and stated
that the department's preference was to address these issues in a risk
assessment framework. Specifically, he stated that future guidance would
require overseas commands to identify and discuss risks to their
plans-such as those that would directly affect execution and could result
from political, financial, base realignment and closure, training, and
other issues-as well as steps taken to mitigate the risks. We have no
basis to question this approach and plan to evaluate its effectiveness in
our next annual review of DOD's overseas master plans.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense further stated that nonprogrammed
and nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components
were not appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the
overseas commands' risk assessment for their master plans. We agree. While
we are not aware of any nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training
limitations, our report discusses only those training limitations raised
by senior command officials during our review. We assume that if there is
a need to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus validated
training limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would work together to
identify those validated limitations that should be addressed in their
master plans.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are reprinted in
enclosure II.
- - - - -
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
overseas regional commanders; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key contributions to
this report are listed in enclosure III.
Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management List of Congressional Addressees
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Chair
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable James T. Walsh
Chairman
The Honorable Chet Edwards
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans complied
with congressional reporting requirements and provided information in a
complete, clear, and consistent manner, we compared the overseas master
plans with the reporting requirements in the congressional mandate, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance, which incorporated
our prior recommendations. In order to identify improvements to the
overseas master plan, we compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 plans.
We assessed the quantity and quality of one plan's responses for each of
the data elements and compared them to equivalent responses in the other
plans to form conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and consistency
of plans. We also discussed with Department of Defense (DOD) officials our
observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. To
determine whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed, we
assessed the plans to identify those elements and properties that provided
information in the most complete, clear, and consistent manner.
To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans reflected
how U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements have changed
since last year, we interviewed cognizant officials from DOD about the
various changes that were identified within the plans. We met with
officials from OSD and each of the following commands and agencies: U.S.
Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S.
Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces Korea; U.S.
Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander, Naval Forces Korea; Army
Installation Management Agency Korea Regional Office; Army Corps of
Engineers Far East District; DOD Education Activity; U.S. Forces Korea
Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S. Forces Korea Judge Advocate
Office; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air Forces Japan;
Commander, Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; U.S. European
Command; U.S. Army Europe; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Naval
Facilities Engineering Command-Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering
Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army Installation Management Agency
Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central Command; and Special Operations
Command. In general, we discussed the reporting requirements contained in
OSD's guidance, host nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding
levels and sources, environmental remediation and restoration issues,
property returns to host nations, and training requirements. In addition,
we compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas master plans to each
other in order to identify changes in overseas defense basing strategies
and requirements. We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies,
directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles to keep
abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies and
requirements. During our overseas visits, to see firsthand the condition
of facilities and status of selected construction projects, we visited and
toured the facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, Camp Foster, Marine
Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Camp Zama,
Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan; Camp Humphreys, South
Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwo:hr, Bitburg Annex, Spangdahlem Air Base, and
Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Naval Support Activity Capodichino
(Naples), Italy.
To determine the extent to which the 2006 master plans reflected the
challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, we met with
officials from the aforementioned agencies and discussed challenges
involving various topics, host nation relations and funding levels, U.S.
funding levels and sources, environmental remediation and restoration
issues, property returns to host nations, and training limitations. We
compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas master plans to each
other to determine the extent to which improvements were made in
identifying key challenges for each command. We also analyzed available
reports, documents, policies, directives, international agreements,
guidance, and media articles pertaining to challenges that may affect
DOD's implementation of the overseas master plans.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning
efforts were not specifically included in the master plans provided in
response to the congressional mandates and detailed data were not
available for inclusion in this report. In addition, we did not include
Southern Command in our analysis because this command has significantly
fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific,
Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Comments from the Department of Defense
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Barry W. Holman, (202) 512-5581
Acknowledgments
In addition to the person named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director;
Nelsie Alcoser; Thom Barger; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Roger Tomlinson
also made major contributions to this report.
(350740)
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