    Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and
    Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina (31-JUL-06,
    GAO-06-903).

    Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our
    nation's history. Significant federal, state, and local resources
    were mobilized to respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster,
    including those of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard played a
    key role in the planning, response, and recovery efforts for
    Hurricane Katrina in three mission areas: search and rescue,
    marine pollution response, and management of maritime commerce.
    This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast
    Guard, as well as the challenges and lessons learned as a result
    of the agency's efforts. More specifically, it focuses on (1) the
    factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform these three
    mission areas in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; (2) the
    Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it
    faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate
    these challenges; and (3) the implications and lessons learned,
    as identified by the Coast Guard, regarding the effect of
    Hurricane Katrina surge operations on its people, assets,
    financial resources, and operations. To determine the Coast
    Guard's preparation factors, the challenges and lessons learned
    we interviewed officials responsible for preparing, and
    responding to disasters, and reviewed the Coast Guard's disaster
    guidance and plans. GAO is not making any recommendations in this
    report.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-903
        ACCNO:   A57841
      TITLE:     Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response,
    and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina
         DATE:   07/31/2006
      SUBJECT:   Coast Guard personnel
    	     Disaster planning
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Hurricane Katrina
    	     Natural disasters
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Agency missions

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    GAO-06-903

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Report to Congressional Committees

    GAO

    July 2006

    COAST GUARD

      Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to
                                   Hurricane Katrina

    GAO-06-903

    COAST GUARD

    Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related
    to Hurricane Katrina

      What GAO Found

    Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over
    33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast
    Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but underpinning
    these efforts were factors such as the agency's operational principles.
    These principles promote leadership, accountability, and enable personnel
    to take responsibility and action, based on relevant authorities and
    guidance. Another key factor was the agency's reliance on standardized
    operations and maintenance practices that provided greater flexibility for
    using personnel and assets from any operational unit for the response.
    Up-to-date and regularly exercised hurricane plans were also
    key-preserving Coast Guard personnel and resources first, so they could
    then respond to search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and
    facilitation of commerce needs after the storm. These various factors are
    consistent with previous GAO findings on lessons learned from past
    catastrophic disasters.

    GAO's work shows that the Coast Guard was most relevant in search and
    rescue, marine environmental protection, and management of maritime
    commerce missions. While the Coast Guard performs these missions daily,
    the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency with several
    challenges that required innovative approaches. The Coast Guard was able
    to mitigate challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage as a result of
    planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members.

    According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant
    damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as a
    result of sending people and assets to the Gulf region. Although
    continuing operations at ports nationwide while conducting Katrina
    operations presented challenges, these challenges have been addressed to
    mitigate negative impacts on the Coast Guard. Finally, the Coast Guard has
    collected afteraction reports from Hurricane Katrina and has made them
    available to Coast Guard personnel through an internal database.

           Helicopter Rescue Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area

                     United States Government Accountability Office

                                        Contents

    Letter               Results in Brief BackgroundSeveral Factors        1 3
                            Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina        4 9
                            Operations Coast Guard Performed Hurricane         17
                            Katrina Missions and Faced Several Challenges It   31
                            Was Largely Able to Mitigate Coast Guard Managed   38
                            the Impact of the Hurricane Response and
                            Collected Information to Improve Future
                            Responses Agency Comments
    Appendix I           GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments              42
    Related GAO Products                                                    43
    Tables                    Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian,
                                Reserve, and Auxiliary Personnel Compared to
                             Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast
                            region during Peak Response, August 26-September
                                   16, 2005 Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type,
                             Homeport, and Number That Responded to the Gulf
                               Coast Region during the Peak Response, August
                             26-September 16, 2005 Table 3: Summary of Coast
                               Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for
                                Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes 8 34
                                      Katrina and Rita, as of April 12, 2006 37

    Figures
                  Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication
                      Platform, Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport
                           Food, Water, and Supplies to the Gulf Coast Region  12
                  Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts,
                                 Detail of Gulf Coast Region                   14
                        Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana           20
                 Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina  22
                  Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area    26
                 Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation  29

    Abbreviations:

    ARSC                  Aircraft Repair and Supply Center
    ATC                   Aviation Training Center
    COTP                  Captain of the Port
    DHS                   Department of Homeland Security
    EPA                   Environmental Protection Agency
    FEMA                  Federal Emergency Management Agency
    NRP                   National Response Plan

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    July 31, 2006

    Congressional Committees

    Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's
    history. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to
    the population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a
    catastrophe and arguably the most devastating natural disaster in United
    States history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage stretched
    over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were driven
    from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and communications
    infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and millions of gallons
    of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never fully know the
    financial cost of Hurricane Katrina, but one projection has put it at more
    than $200 billion.

    Two congressional committees that investigated and reported on Hurricane
    Katrina activities were critical of several federal agencies' response.1
    In contrast to some other federal agencies, the Coast Guard has generally
    escaped criticism by these two investigations. Our work indicates that the
    Coast Guard's major response to Hurricane Katrina was in three mission
    areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and management of
    maritime commerce.

    This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as
    well as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency's
    efforts. More specifically, it focuses on

    o  the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform in these three
    mission areas during Hurricane Katrina;

    1

    House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
    Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of
    the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for
    And Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2006),
    and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
    Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
    These committees were also critical of nonfederal entities, including
    state and nongovernmental organizations.

         o the Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it
           faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate the
           challenges; and
         o the implications and lessons learned, as identified by the Coast
           Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina operations on its
           people, assets, financial resources, and operations.

    In addition, we have undertaken a large body of work to address
    preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to
    Hurricane Katrina. Because of the widespread congressional interest in
    these subjects, our work is being completed under the Comptroller
    General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.2

    To determine the factors used by the Coast Guard to prepare for Hurricane
    Katrina, we interviewed officials responsible for planning, preparing for,
    and responding to disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, as well as city
    and state officials in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina and assisted by
    the Coast Guard. In addition, we reviewed documents provided by two Coast
    Guard districts, the Atlantic Area Command, and Coast Guard headquarters,
    including national plans; Coast Guard severe weather,
    continuity-of-operation, and mission-specific response plans; and Coast
    Guard guidance and directives.

    To obtain a more detailed understanding of the Coast Guard's response and
    challenges related to Hurricane Katrina, we visited and conducted
    interviews at Coast Guard locations, including districts and units that
    supported the Hurricane Katrina response effort, as well as the affected
    district and units in the Gulf Coast region. We also spoke with local
    government and port officials. We selected these specific locations based
    on several factors, including the proportion of Coast Guard assets
    allocated to respond to Hurricane Katrina; proximity to the area
    physically affected by the hurricane, specifically the Gulf Coast region;
    and the Coast Guard's responsibility for response, including the Atlantic
    Area Command and Coast Guard headquarters.

    Finally, to determine the implications of sending people and assets to
    respond to Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned, we spoke to officials
    responsible for identifying and prioritizing the people and assets to send
    to

    31 U.S.C. S: 717(b)(1).

                                    Results in Brief

    the Gulf Coast region, to personnel sent to the region to respond to
    Hurricane Katrina, and to personnel who were stationed in the region. We
    reviewed resource allocation data, and financial guidance and documents,
    and spoke with officials responsible for these areas within the Coast
    Guard. To assess the reliability of the personnel, asset, and financial
    data, we spoke with agency officials knowledgeable in these specific
    areas. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
    purposes of this report.

    We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters to afflict the
    United States. Of the estimated 60,000 people needing to be rescued from
    rooftops and flooded homes, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard.
    Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as it did to
    this disaster may be difficult, but underpinning these efforts were the
    agency's operational principles that promote leadership, accountability,
    and enable personnel to take responsibility and action, based on relevant
    authorities and guidance. Another significant factor that allowed the
    Coast Guard to confront the destruction brought on by Hurricane Katrina
    was the agency's reliance on standardized operations and maintenance
    practices that allowed the Coast Guard to respond with greater flexibility
    using a mix of personnel and assets from any operational unit. Having
    up-to-date and regularly exercised hurricane plans was another factor that
    the Coast Guard employed to prepare for Hurricane Katrina enabling the
    agency to implement its plans to confront the hurricane by first
    preserving Coast Guard personnel and resources and then quickly responding
    with search and rescue assistance, marine environmental protection
    response, and facilitation of commerce measures-missions that the Coast
    Guard conducts every day. GAO findings on lessons learned from past
    catastrophic disasters have highlighted similar factors including such
    things as the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and
    communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority;
    (2) conducting strong planning and robust training and exercise programs;
    and

    (3) strengthening response and recovery capabilities.

    The Coast Guard's mission response to Hurricane Katrina centered most on
    three mission areas: search and rescue, marine environmental protection
    and management of maritime commerce. While the Coast Guard performs these
    missions daily, the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency
    with several challenges that required innovative approaches-for example,
    conducting a full scale search and rescue

                                       Background

    mission without its full communications capacity. The Coast Guard was able
    to mitigate the communication challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's
    damage as a result of advance planning and preparation, as well as
    assistance from the Coast Guard Auxiliary. For example, to overcome
    challenges resulting from communications outages following the storm,
    Coast Guard personnel implemented plans that they had developed prior to
    the storm that were not dependent upon communication systems to execute,
    and they also relied on pre-staged communications equipment,
    pre-distributed satellite and cell phones. In addition, Coast Guard
    auxiliarists provided a critical communications relay for search and
    rescue operations.

    According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant
    losses to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as it
    moved people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane
    Katrina. The Coast Guard conducted surge operations-which are
    highintensity efforts often launched at short notice to address an
    emergency situation-in response to Hurricane Katrina while it continued
    operations at the homeports from where personnel and assets were borrowed.
    To address the health effects stemming from the mental stress that Coast
    Guard personnel experienced responding to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast
    Guard deployed Critical Incident Stress Management teams. These teams
    provided treatment to Coast Guard response personnel as well as to other
    Coast Guard personnel from the region whose homes had been damaged or
    destroyed. Finally, the Coast Guard has developed after action reports
    related to the Hurricane Katrina response and has disseminated this
    information to its personnel for use on other contingency planning efforts
    through the agency's Contingency Preparedness System database-known as CG
    SAILS.

    Background

    There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that
    support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert
    T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
    Act)3 primarily establishes the programs and processes for the federal
    government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states,
    local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private
    nonprofit organizations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency

    3

    42 U.S.C. S:S: 5121-5206.

    (FEMA), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has
    responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.

    For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations under
    the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and Mississippi and
    Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major disaster declarations
    for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama on
    August 29, 2005, the same day that Hurricane Katrina made final landfall
    in the affected states.

    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the DHS to consolidate existing
    federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated
    national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response
    Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan
    establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the management of
    domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. At the time of
    Hurricane Katrina, the NRP applied only to incidents of national
    significance, defined as actual or potential high-impact events that
    require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination
    of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, or private sector
    entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis
    for longterm community recovery and mitigation activities.4 The NRP
    includes planning assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of
    operations, and incident management actions. The NRP also includes a
    Catastrophic Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive
    national response to a "catastrophic incident"-defined as any natural or
    manmade incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels
    of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
    population,

    On May 25, 2006, DHS revised the NRP to address certain weaknesses or
    ambiguities identified following Hurricane Katrina. The revised NRP makes
    clear that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for declaring
    and managing incidents of national significance such as Hurricane Katrina.
    Incidents of lesser severity requiring federal involvement are also
    subject to the NRP, but implementation of the NRP is to be scaled and
    flexible depending on the nature of the event.

    Page 5 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government
    functions.5

    The Coast Guard's authority under federal law to conduct maritime
    operations, such as search and rescue and port security, is continuously
    in effect, rather than dependent upon a presidential Stafford Act
    declaration or the implementation of the NRP. This ongoing authority
    uniquely positioned the Coast Guard to respond to Hurricane Katrina before
    the President made emergency or major disaster declarations under the
    Stafford Act, or the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Katrina an
    incident of national significance under the NRP. Concurrent with the Coast
    Guard's historical missions and authorities, the NRP identifies the Coast
    Guard as a primary agency in the oil and hazardous materials response, and
    the support agency in six other emergency support functions, including
    urban search and rescue, and aspects of clearing waterways.

    The Coast Guard is responsible for performing a variety of homeland and
    non-homeland security missions, including ensuring security in territorial
    and international waters, and within U.S. ports, conducting search and
    rescue, interdicting illegal drug shipments and illegal aliens, enforcing
    fisheries laws, ensuring the safety and facilitation of commerce, and
    responding to reports of marine pollution. According to Coast Guard
    officials, they train for and perform these missions every day, in units
    located all over the United States.

    To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard employs a wide range of
    personnel. In 2005, the Coast Guard consisted of about 39,000 active duty,
    7,000 civilian, and 8,100 reserve members, for a total of approximately
    54,100 personnel. The Coast Guard also has access to approximately

    The responsibility for determining whether an incident of national
    significance meets the NRP's definition of a "catastrophic incident" rests
    with the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary makes a
    "catastrophic incident" designation to activate the provisions of the
    annex. The Secretary declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national
    significance on August 30, 2005, but never declared it a catastrophic
    incident. The revised NRP makes explicit that the Secretary could activate
    the annex to address events that are projected to mature to catastrophic
    proportions, such as strengthening hurricanes.

    31,000 volunteer auxiliary members.6 During the peak response time period
    for Hurricane Katrina, August 26-September 16, 2005, the Coast Guard had
    approximately 5,600 personnel in the Gulf Coast region. About 53 percent
    of these were active duty and civilian personnel who came from other parts
    of the United States to assist in the response.

    Table 1 shows the total number of personnel within the Coast Guard by
    type, compared to the number of personnel who responded in the Gulf Coast
    region during the August through September 2005 period.

    The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a nonmilitary volunteer organization
    administered by the Commandant of the Coast Guard under the direction of
    the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard Auxiliary was created
    to assist the Coast Guard to promote safety and effect rescues on and over
    the high seas and on navigable waters; promote efficiency in the operation
    of motorboats and yachts; foster a wider knowledge of, and better
    compliance with, the laws, rules, and regulations governing the operation
    of motorboats and yachts; and facilitate other operations of the Coast
    Guard.

    Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary
    Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast
    region during Peak Response, August 26-September 16, 2005

    Coast Guard Approximate total number of personnel personnel Number of
    personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina

    Active duty 39,000 4,026

    This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, and
          Louisiana (2,045); and the number of Coast Guard personnel sent to Gulf
                               Coast region from other geographical areas (1,981)

    Civilian 7,000

    This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, and
          Louisiana (170); and number of Coast Guard personnel sent to Gulf Coast
                                       region from other geographical areas (563)

    Reserve 8,100

    Auxiliary 31,000

                                   Total 85,100 5,605

    Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

    Note: The number of auxiliary personnel is an estimate based on a total of
    13,510 hours (563 days based on a 16-hour day) of operational and
    administrative support for Hurricane Katrina operations.

    Of the Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas identified in the Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, 7 three are particularly relevant to the Hurricane
    Katrina response.8 They are the following:

    7

    See 6 U.S.C. S: 468(a). The Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas include
    ports, waterways, and coastal security; illegal drug interdiction;
    undocumented migrant interdiction; defense readiness; other law
    enforcement; search and rescue; living marine resources; aids to
    navigation; ice operations; marine environmental protection; and marine
    safety.

    8

    The Coast Guard noted that activities associated with its ports,
    waterways, and coastal security mission program-which focus on protecting
    the maritime domain, preventing terrorist attacks, and responding to and
    recovering from those that do occur-were also heightened following
    Hurricane Katrina. Activities performed under this mission program include
    aerial, waterborne and shore surveillance patrols, vessel security
    boardings, vessel escorts, and enforcement of international and domestic
    security standards and regulations. According to the Coast Guard, ports,
    waterways, and coastal security program activities were heightened, both
    within the Gulf region and elsewhere, in recognition of the increased
    regional vulnerability and national risk that could have resulted from the
    consequences of an attack on the oil and chemical sector during this time.
    However, the scope of our review focused on the three mission programs
    that were most closely aligned and directly involved with the immediate
    response to the natural disaster presented by Hurricane Katrina.

      Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations

         o Finding and rescuing mariners in distress-a mainstay of Coast Guard
           operations under its search and rescue mission. To conduct this
           mission, the Coast Guard operates aircraft and boats throughout the
           nation's coastlines and interior waterways. The Coast Guard also
           operates a national distress and response communication system that
           facilitates communication with mariners in danger.
         o Marine environmental protection-a program area focused on preventing
           and responding to oil and chemical spills in the maritime environment,
           preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage, and preventing
           biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species. The Coast Guard
           typically conducts this mission with locally based staff but also has
           specially trained and equipped teams that travel nationally and
           worldwide to attend to this mission when needed.
         o Managing waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and accessible
           marine transportation system-a mission area that includes such
           activities as maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids and
           monitoring and inspecting merchant vessels, among other activities.9

    Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations

    Several factors, including operational principles, the use of standardized
    practices, and planning, contributed to preparing the Coast Guard to
    conduct its missions following Hurricane Katrina. The Coast Guard promotes
    principles of leadership and accountability, whereby personnel are trained
    to take responsibility and action, as needed, based on relevant
    authorities and guidance. Organizational structure and standardization-of
    training, assets, and exercises-allowed the Coast Guard to send personnel
    and assets to the Gulf Coast region from units across the United States.
    Also, the Coast Guard's focus on planning enabled personnel to learn
    emergency processes and procedures to respond to situations like that of
    Hurricane Katrina. These factors, which prepared the Coast Guard

    9

    One of the Coast Guard's key functions involves the facilitation of
    maritime commerce and ensuring the security of waterways and waterside
    facilities. These activities are typically conducted under several Coast
    Guard mission programs, including marine safety; ports, waterways, coastal
    security; and aids to navigation. Port security and commerce functions
    within ports resides with the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, whose
    responsibilities are summarized at 33 C.F.R. S:1.01-30.

    Page 9 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    to conduct its Hurricane Katrina missions, are also reflected in previous
    GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters.10

    Coast Guard Operational The Coast Guard response was aided by basic
    operational principles. Principles Aided in Throughout our fieldwork,
    Coast Guard officials referred to the seven Hurricane Katrina principles
    of Coast Guard operations that guide the agency's operations,

    and though they were not necessarily always referred to by name, the

    Preparations themes were relayed to our staff frequently, and Coast Guard
    personnel view these principles as instrumental in their preparation for
    Hurricane Katrina. These principles collectively form the foundation of
    Coast Guard culture and actions during operations.11

         o The Principle of Clear Objective directs every operation toward a
           clearly defined and attainable objective. The Commander's Intent, a
           commanding officer's general instruction to his/her subordinates,
           defined the objectives for Coast Guard units with regard to
           hurricanes, including to ensure the safety of personnel and assets,
           respond to statutory responsibilities (e.g., search and rescue), and
           reopen waterways as soon as possible.
         o The Principle of Effective Presence requires that the right assets and
           capabilities be at the right place at the right time. This also
           reflects the importance of assigning units depending on the
           anticipated need. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina response,
           the Coast Guard recognized the need to send security units to address
           security concerns during rescue operations.
         o The Principle of Unity of Effort describes the performance of
           cooperative operational objectives, by working in concert with
           different Coast Guard units and coordinating these efforts with a
           diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental entities. For example,
           the Coast Guard units worked with members of local area

    10

    GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
    Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: March
    8, 2006).

    11

    U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast
    Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, (Washington, D.C.: 2002).

    Page 10 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    maritime security committees to address maritime-related issues and
    coordinate security planning efforts.12

    o  The Principle of On-Scene Initiative involves Coast Guard personnel
    being given latitude to act quickly and decisively within the scope of
    their authority, without waiting for direction from higher levels in the
    chain of command. For example, during the initial response to Hurricane
    Katrina, a junior-level C-130 pilot, who first arrived on-scene in New
    Orleans with the planned mission of conducting an environmental inspection
    overflight, recognized that search and rescue helicopters in the area
    could not communicate with officials on the ground, including those
    located at hospitals and at safe landing areas. This pilot took the
    initiative to redirect her planned mission, changing it from an
    environmental flight to creating the first airborne communication platform
    in the area. Doing so helped ensure that critical information was relayed
    to and from helicopter pilots conducting search and rescue so that they
    could more safely and efficiently continue their vital mission. Figure 1
    is a picture of the type of aircraft flown by this Coast Guard pilot.

    Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the
    Secretary of Homeland Security has authority to create area maritime
    security committees at ports across the country to assist the Coast Guard
    in addressing vulnerabilities and risks at the port level. See 46 U.S.C.
    S: 70112(a) (2), 33 C.F.R. S: 103.310. Composed of representatives from
    the federal, state, local and private sector, these committees provide a
    forum for sharing information on issues related to port security. See 33
    C.F.R. S: 103.305.

    Page 11 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform,
    Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies to
    the Gulf Coast Region

    Source: GAO.

         o The Principle of Flexibility describes how the Coast Guard pursues
           multiple missions with the same people and assets by adjusting to a
           wide variety of tasks and circumstances. Following this principle
           allows the Coast Guard to conduct "surge operations," which are
           high-intensity efforts often launched at short notice in response to
           an emergency situation. The effect of surge operations is not only on
           people and units directly involved; it demands that the entire service
           adapt to find the resources to meet the needs of the surge operation
           while still continuing critical day-to-day operations. During the
           response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard found ways to send
           people and assets to the Gulf Coast region while maintaining required
           levels of readiness in homeports. For example, in District 1, Air
           Station Cape Cod, worked with Canadian counterparts to cover search
           and rescue needs in the area to minimize the impact of sending some
           air assets to respond to Hurricane Katrina.
              * The Principle of Managed Risk involves two dimensions: First, the
                commander is obligated to ensure that units are properly trained,
                equipped, and maintained, and second, the commander is obligated
                to assess the crew and equipment capabilities against the
              * operational situation to determine whether and how to execute a
                mission. For example, Coast Guard units in District 8 are
                required to develop and exercise hurricane plans. Figure 2
                illustrates Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts. In the face
                of an oncoming storm, the District Commander will order Coast
                Guard personnel and dependents to evacuate. Finally, once the
                storm passes, commanding officers have the discretion to assess
                the safety of deploying Coast Guard personnel and assets.
         o The Principle of Restraint reflects the obligation of Coast Guard
           personnel to act with good judgment and treat American citizens and
           foreign visitors with dignity. For example, Coast Guard rescue
           swimmers we spoke to indicated that they made efforts to keep
           evacuated families together and to handle frustrated evacuees with
           sensitivity.

     Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of Gulf Coast
                                         Region

                           Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO.

        Coast Guard Organizational Structure and Standardization Practices Supported
        Hurricane Katrina Preparations

    Building upon its principles of operations, the Coast Guard's organization
    and practice of standardization streamlines operations processes and works
    to efficiently maintain assets. The Coast Guard has a broadly dispersed
    organization and asset structure-that is, having personnel and assets
    located throughout the United States to expedite the movement of assets to
    respond to disasters.13 This organizational structure, coupled with the
    Coast Guard's standardized training, allows the mixing of personnel and
    assets from anywhere in the country to form operational response teams.
    For Coast Guard asset mechanics, standardization means that they can
    assess, repair, and maintain the same type of Coast Guard asset at any
    unit at any time because they are required to have a common understanding
    of the Coast Guard's standard maintenance and repair requirements for its
    assets.

    To ensure this consistency, the Coast Guard conducts on-site
    inspections-called standardization reviews-at air and boat stations to
    evaluate crew members' skills and knowledge and to inspect air and boat
    assets. Standardization review teams are composed of experienced operators
    whose mission it is to teach, examine, and evaluate the principles of
    sound operations. For air operations, teams review standardized training
    to ensure that flight operations are conducted in the safest possible
    manner consistent with flight mission requirements, Coast Guard-wide.
    According to the Coast Guard's air operations manual, standardization also
    permits randomly selected aviators to form a disciplined, coordinated crew
    on any aircraft. This directly supports the Coast Guard's ability to
    provide a surge capability to meet rapidly escalating situations.
    Similarly, for boat operations, teams conduct inspections to evaluate the
    condition of boats and to review crew member proficiency in boat
    operations. For the Hurricane Katrina response, standardization enabled
    Coast Guard personnel from anywhere in the country to form unified crews
    to perform operations and maintenance. For example, a helicopter pilot
    from Florida, a copilot from Alabama, and a rescue swimmer from Alaska
    formed a crew to perform numerous search and rescue operations.
    Additionally, mechanics arriving at Aviation Training Center (ATC) Mobile
    in the days after Hurricane Katrina's landfall

    13

    The Coast Guard is organized into two major commands that are responsible
    for overall mission performance: one in the Pacific area and the other in
    the Atlantic area, including the Gulf of Mexico region. These commands are
    divided into nine districts, which in turn are organized into over 20 air
    stations and 35 sectors that provide more localized command and control of
    field units and resources, including approximately 188 multimission
    stations and 119 patrol boats.

    Page 15 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    were able to perform maintenance on air assets deployed to the Gulf Coast
    region from various Coast Guard units.

        Coast Guard Contingency Planning and Exercises Contributed to Hurricane
        Katrina Preparations

    Based on the Coast Guard's organizational structure and its practice of
    standardization, plans and complementary exercises are developed to
    clarify processes and procedures (to learn which elements of a plan work
    or need to be made more efficient) and to identify opportunities that
    benefit from the Coast Guard's unique characteristics. According to Coast
    Guard officials, prior to every hurricane season, specific severe weather
    guidance is provided to Coast Guard units to describe procedures for
    responding to a hurricane. For example, in the Gulf Coast region, units
    within District 8 rely on guidance from their leadership (known as the
    Commander's Intent), as well as the District Severe Weather/Hurricane Plan
    and their own unit-focused hurricane plans, which would include plans for
    continuity of operations in the event of an ordered evacuation.14 Coast
    Guard officials stated that these plans are reviewed annually in the
    spring to ensure an opportunity to practice evacuation, continuity of
    operations, and personnel and facility preparedness.

    According to the guidance, during a pending storm situation, the Coast
    Guard maintains its ability to conduct search and rescue missions until it
    is unsafe to do so; efforts are made to warn boaters of the impending bad
    weather; dependents of Coast Guard personnel are evacuated in accordance
    with the continuity of operations plans; units and their equipment are
    secured; and assets (e.g., aircraft, including helicopters and planes, and
    cutters, and other smaller boats) are moved away from the storm. Once the
    storm clears the area, personnel and assets that were scattered will
    reconstitute forces and return to the affected area to begin search and
    rescue, homeland security, and other mission activities.

    Consistent with these plans, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Coast
    Guard units in the Gulf Coast region moved their command and control
    centers out of the threat area, and staged assets and crews outside the
    predicted storm path. For example, District 8 headquarters moved from New
    Orleans, Louisiana, to St. Louis, Missouri, and Sector New Orleans Command
    moved from New Orleans to Alexandria, Louisiana. Air assets

    14

    The Coast Guard mandates annual exercises for these Severe
    Weather/Hurricane plans. For example, Districts 1 (New England), 5
    (mid-Atlantic), 7 (Florida), and 8 (Gulf Coast region) must exercise their
    Hurricane Plan; while District 9 (Great Lake region) must exercise its
    Heavy Weather/Flood Plan.

    Page 16 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    were moved from Coast Guard air stations in the Gulf Coast region to
    locations in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Jacksonville, Florida. Cutters
    located in the Gulf Coast region moved to avoid the storm and into
    positions to assist with poststorm efforts. The Coast Guard also activated
    its mission-specific plans in preparation for Hurricane Katrina. For
    example, in the marine environmental protection area, the Coast Guard
    activated its area contingency plan and integrated the assistance of a
    Coast Guard Strike Team with its specialized environmental response
    capabilities. In particular, the Strike Team provided assistance in the
    response to Hurricane Katrina, using its inventory of specialized
    pollution response equipment and highly trained first response teams to
    combat environmental pollution.

    Previous GAO work identifies critical disaster preparation factors

    Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricane Katrina are similar to those
    GAO identified in past work on Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed much of
    South Florida. Based on our previous review of preparing for and
    responding to catastrophic disasters, we noted several critical factors
    necessary to confront catastrophic disasters: (1) clearly defined and
    communicated leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority;

    (2)
               strong planning and robust training and exercise programs; and

    (3)
               strong response and recovery capabilities.15 In our review of the
               Coast Guard's hurricane preparation practices, it seems many of
               the factors we raised in the past, have been addressed by the
               Coast Guard.

        Previous GAO work identifies critical disaster preparation factors

      Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced Several Challenges
      It Was Largely Able to Mitigate

    During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard performed
    several functions, including search and rescue, marine pollution response,
    and management of maritime commerce-missions it performs every day. As the
    most destructive natural disaster in American history, Hurricane Katrina
    caused tens of thousands of people to be rescued during several weeks
    after the storm made landfall; spilled over 8 million gallons of oil, and
    produced considerable debris, which polluted the Gulf Coast region; and in
    the days following the storm, threatened maritime commerce. While
    conducting its missions during Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard
    experienced several unique challenges that required quick and innovative
    thinking. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate communication challenges
    caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage to communications infrastructure as a
    result of planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard

    15

    GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
    Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: March
    8, 2006).

    Page 17 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    Auxiliary members. Another challenge included the need to provide security
    protection, particularly for search and rescue operations. Logistics also
    proved a challenge as the Coast Guard worked to address food and water
    needs of rescuees, as well as its own need for fuel.

    Search and Rescue Was Coast Guard's Initial Hurricane Katrina Mission

    After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the primary mission was search and
    rescue. As Hurricane Katrina caused damage and destruction for 90,000
    square miles and precipitated an overwhelming flood in New Orleans,
    Louisiana, tens of thousands of people needed to be rescued from their
    homes. Some estimates are that about 60,000 people were rescued by
    federal, state, and local officials after Hurricane Katrina made landfall,
    and approximately 33,500 of them were rescued by the Coast Guard.16 The
    military, of which the Coast Guard is a member, sent massive resources to
    the Gulf Coast region to assist in Hurricane Katrina's response and
    recovery.17 According to data from Coast Guard officials, during the peak
    response period, the Coast Guard deployed approximately 4,000 of its
    39,000 active duty personnel and deployed more than 45 percent of its air
    assets to the Gulf Coast region from across the United States. Notably,
    Coast Guard officials reported that air and boat operations, which
    involved rescuing or evacuating over 33,500 people, were conducted over a
    period of 17 days without any accidents or casualties. Rescue operations
    began quickly, with the first rescue occurring approximately 9 hours
    following Hurricane Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005. By 12 hours
    after landfall, approximately 29 Coast Guard helicopters were conducting
    rescues over New Orleans.

    Search and rescue operations, including both air and boat rescues, were
    conducted by a number of agencies. Coast Guard officials involved in boat
    operations told us that they worked closely with federal, state, and local
    officials to conduct rescues. According to Coast Guard officials, the

    16

    Beginning on August 29, 2005 and continuing for about 17 days, Coast Guard
    officials reported conducting 24,135 rescues of people by boat and
    helicopter, and evacuating 9,409 people from hospitals, as a result of
    Hurricane Katrina. By comparison, for all of 2004, the Coast Guard
    responded to more than 32,000 calls for rescue assistance and saved nearly
    5,500 lives.

    17

    To learn more about the Department of Defense and the National Guard
    response to Hurricane Katrina, please see GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better
    Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
    Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
    2006).

    agency leveraged approximately 130 boats and worked with FEMA teams to
    conduct urban rescues in flooded New Orleans neighborhoods. Attempts were
    also made to partner local responders with out-of-area responders in order
    to share local knowledge and facilitate rescues. According to Coast Guard
    officials involved in boat operations, personnel used Zephyr Field in
    Jefferson Parish, as a base of operations and deployed boat convoys from
    launching points such as bridges and highway overpasses. The boat rescues
    that they were involved with continued through September 16, 2005, almost
    3 weeks after the storm.

          Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana

    MISSISSIPPI

    Tangipahoa Parish

    LOUISIANA

    St.Tammany Parish

    Lake Ponchartrain

    OrleansParish St,CharlesZephyr Field

            Parish

    St. Bernard Parish

    Jefferson Parish

    Plaquemines Parish Lafourche Parish

    GULF OF MEXICO

    Source: USGS.

    Coast Guard officials operating in the Gulf Coast region told us that 3
    days into the response, approximately 43 aircraft and over 2,000 personnel
    had arrived at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, from other
    parts of the United States to join the Hurricane Katrina response. Rescue

    Page 20 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    swimmers-80 of whom were operating out of Air Station New Orleans at the
    peak of air operations-worked among power lines, flying debris, and other
    obstacles not routine to maritime rescues to hoist individuals from
    rooftops. Helicopter crews also conducted search and rescue operations in
    Mississippi, which, according to officials at the Aviation Training Center
    in Mobile, Alabama, were completed within the first 36 hours following
    Hurricane Katrina's landfall. Pilots who conducted rescues in Mississippi
    explained that the first responder infrastructure in Mississippi was not
    destroyed, as it was in New Orleans, and thus Mississippi police and fire
    personnel were able to conduct many of the ground search and rescue
    operations-allowing for quicker completion of the mission.

    Coast Guard officials told us that they coordinated closely with various
    responders for search and rescue operations. Specifically, the Louisiana
    State Police provided police escorts and shared information regarding 911
    calls, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries provided
    local knowledge of areas to be searched. The Louisiana Department of
    Transportation also assisted response operations by providing two ferries
    that were used to evacuate individuals across the Mississippi River to
    higher ground. Coast Guard officials also explained that the Louisiana Air
    National Guard provided assistance with transportation of evacuees by air
    in some locations, and both were located at Zephyr Field delivering large
    quantities of ready-to-eat meals and water to survivors at various
    locations. Coast Guard officials explained that at the local level, the
    New Orleans fire and police personnel accompanied search teams to provide
    assistance and local knowledge. In addition, sheriff's office officials
    from Jefferson Parish provided police escorts, and St. Bernard Parish
    police and fire departments provided boat assets to Coast Guard disaster
    assistance teams. On the north side of Lake Pontchartrain, the Coast Guard
    coordinated search and rescue operations with the St. Tammany Parish
    Sheriff. Figure 4 shows a Coast Guard helicopter hoisting a rescuee to
    safety.

              Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    However, some aspects of search and rescue operations were not as
    efficient as they could have been. 18 For example, different organizations
    involved in search and rescue did not always coordinate with each other.
    In New Orleans, there were two separate command centers for search and
    rescue operations, one being run by the Louisiana National Guard and one
    being run by the Coast Guard. In addition, there was a lack of clear
    search and rescue guidance across agencies because the National Response
    Plan and the National Search and Rescue Plan had never been fully
    integrated.19

    Coast Guard Responded and Continues to Address Environmental Concerns

    The Coast Guard oversaw the cleanup of over 8
    million gallons of oil spilled as a result of Hurricane Katrina.20 As the
    oil and chemical manufacturing industries have a significant presence in
    the Gulf Coast region, particularly in Louisiana, the potential for an
    unprecedented level

    18 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
    Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643
    (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).

    19

    The National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) describes the roles and
    responsibilities of federal agencies during different search and rescue
    situations. The National Response Plan (2004), also provides guidance
    regarding search and rescue; it did not fully incorporate the roles
    previously described in the National Search and Rescue Plan.

    20

    To put this amount into perspective, the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill was
    around 11 million gallons.

    of oil and hazardous substance contamination, especially in and around New
    Orleans, grew as Hurricane Katrina approached. To manage this response,
    unified commands were set up with the Coast Guard and its partners in
    advance of the storm.21 These commands were involved in a range of
    decisions that allowed them to collectively assess the environmental
    situation and make tactical decisions. Coast Guard and state officials
    noted that persons representing federal, state, local, and industry
    entities were involved in these commands, and they worked together to
    manage the marine environmental protection response. As a result, Coast
    Guard officials told us that they were as prepared as possible to manage
    pollution events stemming from Hurricane Katrina.

    According to Coast Guard and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    officials, the initial response to environmental concerns following
    Hurricane Katrina involved multi-agency assessment teams. Following the
    hurricane's landfall, these teams surveyed the entire coastal zone,
    including all area ports, marinas, and related facilities. A state
    official noted that assessment teams recorded the location and size of oil
    spills and assessed the damage.22 He stated that it took two helicopters,
    flying full-time for 3 weeks, to document all the debris to be cleaned up.
    Coast Guard officials said they coordinated their environmental mission
    priorities with other pressing Coast Guard missions by contracting for
    rented commercial planes for their pollution assessment overflights,
    rather than competing for aircraft needed to conduct pressing search and
    rescue missions. In addition, boat crews involved in search and rescue
    missions collected water samples to help document the damage to
    infrastructure and threats to human health, such as sewage plant flooding.

    Oil cleanup efforts were complicated by the magnitude of the spills and
    the location of the spills. According to the Coast Guard, the oil appeared
    as black film, covering dozens of neighborhoods and protected marshes and
    swamps along the Mississippi River. Most spills occurred south of

    21

    Unified command is a unified team that manages an incident by establishing
    a common set of incident objectives and strategies. It is a structure that
    brings together the incident commanders of all major organizations
    involved in an incident and provides a forum for these agencies to
    coordinate an effective response and make consensus decisions. This is
    accomplished without loss or abdication of agency or organizational
    authority, responsibility, or accountability.

    22

    Photographs of the oil spills and debris were taken to document their
    location and size. The photographs not only showed the progress of the
    cleanup but established a record of the pollution and discouraged illegal
    dumping of oil or hazardous material that could be intentionally released
    and then attributed to the storm.

    New Orleans as a result of ruptured and spilled oil tanks. The Coast Guard
    estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were released, including 6 major
    spills, 4 medium spills, and about 1,000 minor spills.23 For example, 1
    spill in the city was notable because it affected approximately 1,800
    homes. The oil residue could be seen on vacated homes months later, when
    the odor of oil in the earth and debris still permeated the air. Another
    significant spill came from the discharge of about 3 million to 4 million
    gallons of oil dispersed into remote marshes, which were difficult to
    reach and therefore difficult to clean up. In addition, the storm
    destroyed 115 oil platforms offshore, significantly damaged 52, and set 19
    adrift. Although, according to Coast Guard officials, there were no spills
    of significance offshore.

    To address the many spills, the Coast Guard reported that each pollution
    incident was prioritized, investigated, and resolved either through a
    private owner taking action to get it cleaned up or a rapid response team
    providing on-site mitigation. However, clean up in many cases was
    complicated by a number of environmental conditions, according to the
    Coast Guard. For example, responders faced heat stress and dehydration as
    well as a profusion of insects, poisonous snakes, and alligators as they
    conducted clean up operations in remote locations. Responders also faced
    uncertain communications, impassible roadways, and clogged waterways.

    Overall, about 1,000 personnel from federal, state, and local agencies and
    private industry were involved in the response to oil spills resulting
    from Hurricane Katrina. At one sector, Mobile, Alabama, over 400 active
    duty and reserve personnel were brought in from Coast Guard commands
    throughout the United States, at various times, to assist with marine
    environmental protection response. Recognizing the Coast Guard's role in
    the prevention of spills, a Coast Guard official reported that numerous
    medium and major hazardous material releases and oil spills were prevented
    by response personnel. For example, response personnel removed oil and
    hazardous materials with the potential to be released into navigable
    waters from grounded vessels. In addition, Coast Guard Strike team members
    repaired piping, and multi-agency entry teams conducted entries into
    laboratories and chemical plants to recover hazardous

    A major spill contains at least 100,000 gallons, and a medium spill
    contains at least 10,000 gallons, while amounts less than 10,000 gallons
    would be considered minor spills.

    Page 24 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

    materials.24 Larger issues were addressed first, such as leaking propane
    tanks that posed a threat to human health. Coast Guard officials also
    noted that response personnel disposed of thousands of containers and
    drums, some filled with petroleum products and pesticides.

    In addition to undertaking the oil pollution response, the Coast Guard
    also helped to address marine debris problems resulting from the over 620
    commercial and recreational vessels that were sunk or grounded in the
    aftermath of the storm. A Coast Guard official described "piles" of
    shrimping vessels on dry ground. Figure 5 shows a damaged vessel stranded
    on a front lawn. The Coast Guard established a Vessel Recovery Branch to
    address those vessels leaking oil or having the potential to release oil
    into navigable waters. A vessel database was also developed and provided
    current information regarding vessel status and tracking information on
    vessel owners. At the height of the vessel recovery operations, 82 Coast
    Guard personnel supported this mission.

    The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force is composed of 168 highly
    trained professionals with specialized skills for combating environmental
    pollution from oil discharges, hazardous substance and biological
    releases, and weapons of mass destruction events. The Strike Force is
    composed of three Strike Teams located in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf
    Coast regions to allow for rapid deployment.

    Page 25 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard

               Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area

    Source: GAO.

    According to Coast Guard officials, marine pollution response, which began
    after Hurricane Katrina moved through the region, is ongoing, with full
    recovery not expected until at least 2007. For example, as of spring 2006,
    in Mississippi, marine pollution cleanup was 50 percent complete.
    According to Coast Guard personnel, members of the Gulf Strike Team
    continue to support marine hazardous material recovery operations
    involving abandoned drums and containers in Mississippi and Alabama. The
    Coast Guard is also participating in an Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA)-led oil and hazardous waste removal and disposal effort inland along
    coastal states. As of February 2006, a Coast Guard official estimated that
    multi-agency environmental teams (consisting of Coast Guard, EPA, FEMA,
    and state and local agencies) had addressed over 5,100 hazardous material
    cases.

    In addition, the Coast Guard has the mission assignment to remove all
    marine debris from along the entire coast of Mississippi. A team of
    federal and state partners identified over 235 sites in residential canals
    that required marine debris removal action. Cleanup work on the 9 worst
    sites has begun and is estimated to continue until at least 2007.

        Limited Maritime Commerce Restored in Four Days

    Despite the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard reopened a
    few ports and restored the movement of some commerce within days after
    Hurricane Katrina struck. This quick response was important because U.S.
    ports and waterways handle over 2 billion tons of cargo annually. Much of
    that commerce flows through Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi-the
    same coastal areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Port of
    New Orleans serves as the focal point for waterborne transportation of
    cargo to 28 states, and its cargo activity supported $37 billion in
    economic benefits to the country and generated $2.8 billion in federal tax
    revenue, according to the American Association of Port Authorities. Senior
    Coast Guard officials commanding certain Coast Guard units possess broad
    authorities in their role as the Captain of the Port (COTP). This
    authority includes the power to close or reopen ports within their
    jurisdiction-an action taken by COTPs at Sector New Orleans, Mobile, and
    Miami. To do this, a COTP typically works collaboratively with key
    stakeholders, including the local Area Maritime Security Committee, Harbor
    Safety Committee, port authorities, and industry officials to determine
    when it is appropriate to close and then reopen a port for commerce. In
    preparation for Hurricane Katrina, COTPs in the Gulf Coast region issued
    Marine Safety Information Bulletins to provide information regarding
    hurricane conditions at the various ports and projected timelines for port
    closures. The bulletins informed the port communities of specific time
    frames for prohibited and authorized operations at the ports.

    Before a port is reopened, the COTP is to ensure that the waterways are
    safe and navigable. One element of ensuring the safe facilitation of
    commerce is the Coast Guard's Aids to Navigation program and its system of
    aids. The aids to navigation system assists mariners in determining their
    position and a safe course of travel, and warns them of dangers and
    obstructions. The system typically consists of a series of devices, such
    as buoys, beacons, and lighthouses that facilitate safe navigation. Coast
    Guard officials reported that approximately 1,800 aids to navigation were
    missing, relocated, or destroyed because of Hurricane Katrina. The aids to
    navigation teams, which specialize in the maintenance of aids to
    navigation equipment, were deployed to assess the damage and repair the
    aids. Additionally, surveys conducted of the underwater and surface areas
    along the Gulf Coast were coordinated with the Coast Guard, the National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and
    the U.S. Navy and helped to determine the conditions of the waterways.
    According to Coast Guard officials, the aids to navigation teams assisted
    the COTPs to reopen the ports. The criteria used to close or reopen ports
    consisted of a combination of factors such as the status of the aids to
    navigation system, the status of various dock facilities, and the
    availability of electrical power and marine pilots.25 The Coast Guard's
    Standard Operating Procedures for District 8 call for a prioritized list
    of aids to navigation in that district to help identify important repair
    decisions to ensure that the aids to navigation most critical to the
    waterways/facilitation of commerce are repaired first.

    The damaged aids to navigation from Hurricane Katrina were a contributing
    factor in the temporary closure of 11 ports in Louisiana, Mississippi,
    Alabama, and Florida.26 Meanwhile, the Coast Guard was aware of the
    importance of the Mississippi River to the nation's economy, particularly
    the export of bulk grain. Despite the shipping disruptions along the Gulf
    Coast, the Coast Guard reopened three ports 4 days after Hurricane Katrina
    struck. Both the Ports of New Orleans and Mobile reopened Friday,
    September 2, 2005, under travel restrictions.27 As of September 29, 2005,
    about 4 weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck, 850 of the 1,350 aids to
    navigation discrepancies identified by the Coast Guard were repaired with
    permanent or temporary aids, and as of late June 2006, Coast Guard
    officials stated that 149 aids to navigation discrepancies still needed to
    be permanently or temporarily repaired. Of the 149 outstanding aids to
    navigation discrepancies, Coast Guard officials reported that 67 temporary
    repairs have been completed. The remaining discrepancies are planned for
    repair by the end of July 2006, contingent upon the completion of waterway
    dredging, calm weather, and availability of an appropriate inland
    construction cutter. Figure 6 shows the Coast Guard repairing aids to
    navigation.

    25

    For the purposes of this report, a marine pilot is a person licensed under
    state or federal law who assumes responsibility for a vessel at a
    particular place for the purpose of navigating it through a river or a
    channel or from or into a port.

    26

    Affected ports included New Orleans, Mobile, Gulfport, Baton Rouge,
    Pensacola, Panama City, Pascagoula, Biloxi, Bayou La Batre, Port Fourchon,
    and Morgan City.

    27

    The COTP will activate maritime travel restrictions when waterways are
    difficult to navigate. These restrictions might include travel of ships
    only in the daytime or allowing only certain size ships to travel on the
    waterways.

              Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation

                               Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    Coast Guard Confronted Several Challenges in Conducting Hurricane
    Katrina Operations

    The Coast Guard experienced personnel security,
    communications, and logistics challenges during the
    Hurricane Katrina response. However, it  was able to
    adapt its existing capabilities to confront those challenges.

    o  Personnel security concerns. District 8 officials
    explained that as the days of operations lengthened and citizens remained
    stranded, security capabilities became an important component of rescue
    operations. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers we interviewed told
    us that their own personal security became a concern as stranded
    individuals became increasingly frustrated because they had no food or
    water. In some instances, tensions among survivors became heated when
    rescue swimmers had to prioritize rescues of children, women, and the
    elderly over ablebodied men. To address such concerns, rescue swimmers
    employed various tactics, including deploying 2 swimmers at one time
    (which is not standard procedure)-one swimmer to triage victims, and the
    other swimmer to assist in hoisting victims into the helicopter. Rescue
    swimmers also learned to use their skills as negotiators by assigning a
    citizen leader from within a group of irritated survivors to promote
    order. For boat operations, officials explained that they deployed Coast
    Guard security teams to provide security coverage for both Coast Guard and
    FEMA search and rescue personnel.28

    o  Communication challenges. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate
    communications challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage to
    communications infrastructure as a result of planning, preparation, and
    assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Aware that communications
    systems could be heavily damaged or destroyed during a natural disaster,
    Coast Guard officials had developed plans that were not reliant on
    communications systems and allowed personnel to act independently or with
    limited guidance from commanding officers. In addition, Coast Guard
    personnel prestaged emergency communications equipment-such as a mobile
    communications unit-and distributed satellite phones and cell phones to
    mitigate communications infrastructure breakdowns.29 After the storm
    passed, Coast Guard personnel procured two-way radios, utilized text
    messaging when cell phones could not make calls, and opened commercial
    e-mail accounts when the agency's own data network was down. In addition,
    the Coast Guard auxiliarists provided communications capabilities after
    the storm passed, including establishing a communications relay critical
    for conducting search and rescue operations.

    28

    The security teams consisted of Maritime Safety and Security Teams
    (MSSTs), which were established after September 11, 2001, and designed to
    provide quick-response capabilities to protect U.S. ports and waterways;
    and Port Security Units (PSUs), which are composed of Coast Guard reserve
    personnel and trained to provide port security and harbor defense duties
    for military assets overseas.

    29

    Although Coast Guard after-action reports indicate that mobile
    communications units did not provide communications capabilities needed
    for operations, officials in District 8 told us that these units were
    useful in providing communications support.

         o Lack of food and water. According to Coast Guard officials, addressing
           food and water shortages in the days following Katrina's landfall
           became an important part of rescue operations. To address these
           shortages, Coast Guard personnel from other regions flew food and
           water to New Orleans, and personnel at Air Station New Orleans
           distributed their own emergency food and water supplies to survivors.
           Helicopter crews loaded food and water onto helicopters and
           distributed these supplies to individuals awaiting rescue. According
           to Air Station New Orleans' commanding officer, shipments of water
           were also delivered to the Superdome on a daily basis. Coast Guard
           responders also provided food and water to individuals at evacuation
           sites.
         o Difficulties securing fuel. Coast Guard officials we interviewed
           explained that securing fuel was challenging in the days following
           Hurricane Katrina's landfall. According to a senior official at Sector
           Mobile, fuel shortages presented a major obstacle to moving supplies
           into Mississippi. One response by the Coast Guard to the lack of fuel
           was to send responding units into the Gulf Coast Region with adequate
           fuel to conduct their missions. For example, aids to navigation teams
           sent from District 7, arrived in the Gulf Coast region as
           self-contained units with sufficient fuel, food, and other supplies to
           immediately begin work addressing compromised buoys and other
           navigational aids. Concurrent with this fuel shortage was the lack of
           electrical power, which rendered fuel pumps- dependent on
           electricity-inoperable. As part of their lessons learned, officials
           told us that in the future, emergency vehicles and first responders
           need to bring fuel with them in order to be selfsufficient. Officials
           also explained that having battery-operated fuel pumps could address
           problems associated with power outages and that this lesson would be
           applied to future contingency planning.

      Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and Collected
      Information to Improve Future Responses

    Because Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our
    nation's history, significant federal resources were mobilized to respond
    to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including resources of the Coast Guard.
    According to Coast Guard officials, they managed the surge of people and
    assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane Katrina without
    significant damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial
    resources. The Coast Guard is also reviewing its actions during the
    Hurricane Katrina response in order to address challenges and prepare for
    future hurricane seasons.

        Response to Hurricane Katrina Seemed to Have Had Limited Impact on Coast
        Guard

    As of late September 2005, Coast Guard personnel sent to respond to
    Hurricane Katrina had returned to their homeports, with the exception of
    Coast Guard personnel specially trained in environmental protection
    issues, who remained in the Gulf Coast region. Coast Guard officials told
    us that personnel were certainly exhausted during the surge response, but
    at no time did they violate required safety standards. For example, they
    said all pilots adhered to aviation standards, flying no more than the
    maximum 8 hours within a 24-hour period. However, Coast Guard personnel
    did report several health-related issues as a result of their response to
    Hurricane Katrina. For example, during the Katrina response rescue
    swimmers reported that they suffered an assortment of medical problems,
    including pink eye, respiratory issues, skin rashes, infections, cuts, and
    scratches from nails, flying fiberglass (from the helicopter swirling
    around homes with loose insulation), and other windswept articles.
    Although the rescue swimmers we spoke to noted that most of these medical
    concerns seemed to clear up a week or two after their experiences in the
    Gulf Coast region, it remains uncertain whether some ailments (e.g.,
    respiratory issues) could have long-term effects.

    Health effects stemming from mental stress may also be a long-term issue
    for the Coast Guard Katrina responders. During the Katrina efforts, the
    Coast Guard recognized that personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina, as
    well as those personnel who experienced the loss of their homes, suffered
    from mental stress. Therefore, Critical Incident Stress Management teams
    were mobilized to treat those personnel who worked in or lived in the
    ravaged Gulf Coast region. For example, after every flight, the rescue
    swimmers underwent an assessment for stress, including a stress
    debriefing, in addition to a physical decontamination because of the
    pollutants they encountered in the flood waters of New Orleans. We were
    told that Critical Incident Stress Management teams also provided support
    to several District 8 staff who had lost their homes or had assisted
    colleagues in cleaning out their destroyed homes and are only now
    beginning to deal with the mental stress effects of the Katrina tragedy.

    Coast Guard officials also told us that they complied with asset
    maintenance standards. For example, they said all required maintenance of
    aircraft took place at one of the maintenance hubs set up in either
    Mobile, Alabama; Houston, Texas; or Elizabeth City, North Carolina.
    According to an engineering official we spoke to at the Aviation Training
    Center in Mobile, Alabama, visiting Coast Guard aircraft from around the
    country were returned to their homeports with updated maintenance
    completed. One Coast Guard official did note a concern for the future
    availability of replacement parts. For example, hoists that pulled up
    rescuees are usually replaced every 3 to 5 years. However, given the
    number of hoist rescues performed during the Hurricane Katrina response,
    the Coast Guard official speculated that replacement may need to occur in
    2 years, affecting the number of hoists in Coast Guard inventory. Coast
    Guard officials also noted that for the Hurricane Katrina response the
    agency complied with vessel maintenance standards, adding that some
    maintenance can be accomplished by the crew while ships are under way.
    However for responses that require surging assets from around the country,
    like that of Hurricane Katrina, officials said that only ships that are
    ready and able to be deployed or those that can safely delay maintenance
    are sent. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that the cutter Oak
    delayed its maintenance for 10 days while it responded to Hurricane
    Katrina, because it could safely do so.

    Data show that in fiscal year 2005, during which the Hurricane Katrina
    response occurred, operational hours for Coast Guard assets (ships and
    aircraft) increased over the previous year's total. For the fourth quarter
    of 2004, Coast Guard operational hours totaled 287,725 hours, while in the
    fourth quarter of 2005, they totaled 302,112 hours-a difference of 14,387
    hours, due in part to the Hurricane Katrina response. According to a
    senior Coast Guard official, no Coast Guard asset was affected by
    Hurricane Katrina, meaning that assets were returned to their homeports
    able to perform routine missions.

    A number of Coast Guard resources responded to Hurricane Katrina in the
    Gulf Coast region. Table 2 summarizes the types and total number of assets
    that the Coast Guard currently maintains, along with the number, name, and
    homeports of those assets that responded to the Gulf Coast region.30

    Along with assets, a wide range of Coast Guard operational and support
    teams were sent to assist in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Port
    Security Units, Law Enforcement Detachment teams, and Maritime Safety and
    Security Teams assisted in security and force protection missions. Strike
    Teams addressed pollution concerns. Transportable Multi-Mission
    Communication Center and Transportable Multi-Agency Communication Center
    assets mitigated some of the communications challenges the Coast Guard
    experienced. Other teams deployed during the peak Coast Guard response
    included several Emergency Response Teams, Civil Engineering Unit Damage
    Assessment Teams, and Incident Management Assist Teams.

    Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to
    the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak Response, August 26-September 16,
    2005

    Total number of Coast Number of Coast Guard Guard assets for each assets
    responding in Gulf Coast Guard asset category of asset Coast region Assets
    and homeport

    Medium-endurance cutter,   13  3 Harriet Lane from LANTa Portsmouth, Va.
    270-foot Cutters               Northland from LANT/Portsmouth, Va. Spencer
                                      from LANT/Boston, Mass.
    Seagoing buoy tender,      16  2 Cypress from D8b/Mobile, Ala. Oak from
    225-foot                       D7/Charleston, SC
    Medium-endurance cutter,   14  2 Confidence from LANT/Cape Canaveral, Fla.
    210-foot                       Decisive from LANT/Pascagoula, Miss.
    Coastal buoy tender,       14  3 Barbara Mabrity from D8/Mobile, Ala.
    175-foot                       Harry Claiborne from D8/Galveston, Tex.
                                      Joshua Appleby from D7/St. Petersburg, Fla.
    Patrol coastals, 179-foot   4  2 Tornado from D8/Pascagoula, Miss. Shamal
                                      from D8/Pascagoula, Miss.
    Inland construction         4  3 Hudson from D7/Miami Beach, Fla. Pamlico
    tenders, 160-foot              from D8/New Orleans, La. Saginaw from
                                      D8/Mobile, Ala.
    Inland construction         8  3 Clamp from D8/Galveston, Tex. Hatchet
    tenders, 75-foot               from D8/Galveston, Tex. Mallet from
                                      D8/Corpus Christi, Tex.
    Coastal patrol boat,       65  9 Bonito from D8/Pensacola, Fla. Coho from
    87-foot                        D8/Panama City, Fla. Pelican from
                                      D8/Abbeville, La. Pompano from D8/Gulfport,
                                      Miss. Razorbill from D8/Gulfport, Miss.
                                      Seahawk from D8/Carrabelle, Fla. Stingray
                                      from D8/Mobile, Ala. Sturgeon from D8/Grand
                                      Isle, La. Cobia from D8/Mobile, Ala.
    River buoy tender, 75-foot 12  2 Greenbrier from D8/Natchez, Miss. Wedge
                                      from D8/Demopolis, Ala.
    Total cutters              150 29

          Small boats

                     Boats under 65 feet 825 131 Districts 8 and 9

          Aircraftc

    HC-130 long-range     27                   18 4 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC
    surveillance aircraft                           5 from D7/Clearwater, Fla.
                                                    3 from D11/Sacramento, Calif.
                                1 from D17/Kodiak, Ark. 5 from ARSCd/Elizabeth
                                City, NC

                          Total number of Coast Number of Coast Guard
                          Guard assets for each assets responding in Gulf
    Coast Guard asset      category of asset Coast region Assets and homeport
    HU-25 medium-range                    23      19 5 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass.
    surveillance                                         5 from D7/Miami, Fla.
    aircraft
                                                   3 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex.
                                                     2 from D11/San Diego, Calif.
                                                   4 from ATC Mobile/Mobile, Ala.
    HH-60 medium-range                    41      19 4 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass.
    recovery helicopter                           3 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC
                                                       9 from D7/Clearwater, Fla.
                                                  3 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala.
    HH-65 multimission                    95    30 2 from D5/Atlantic City, NJ
    cutter helicopter                                       1 D7/Savannah, Ga.
                                                            6 from D7/Miami, Fla.
                                                   1 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex.
                                                       5 from D8/New Orleans, La.
                                                          5 from D8/Houston, Tex.
                                                         2 from D9/Detroit, Mich.
                                                  7 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala.
                                                   1 from ARSC Elizabeth City, NC
    Auxiliary aircraft               unknown        14 aircraft Primarily from
                                                                       District 8
    Total aircraft           186 Coast Guard 86 Coast Guard,
                           operational plus any 14 Auxiliary, which totals
                             Auxiliary aircraft 100 responding aircraft

    Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Coast Guard.

    a

    LANT refers to assets owned by Atlantic Area Command.

    b

    The Coast Guard is divided into geographical areas, or districts. D8
    refers to District 8, which includes the Gulf Coast region and moves up
    the Mississippi River. D1 refers to Coast Guard's District 1, in the New
    England area; D5 refers to District 5, the mid-Atlantic region; D7 refers
    to District 7, southeastern region; D9 refers to District 9, Great Lakes
    region; and D11 refers to District 11, west coast area.

    Number of aircraft as of February 2006.

    d

    The Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (ARSC) in Elizabeth
    City, North Carolina, overhauls and makes major repairs and modifications
    to all Coast Guard aircraft and associated equipment.

    With regard to operational impact, Coast Guard officials told us that in
    some cases, stations that sent personnel and assets to the Gulf Coast
    region experienced challenges in maintaining operations. Relative to other

    military services, the Coast Guard is small,31 and when resources are
    shifted to any one specific mission area, other mission areas may suffer.
    Although Coast Guard officials noted that they were generally able to
    continue with their various missions across the nation, including boarding
    high-interest vessels approaching United States ports, there were
    instances where the movement of Coast Guard assets out of their normal
    areas of operation affected activity levels in these locations. For
    example, Coast Guard units in Florida sent many air and surface assets to
    the Gulf Coast region to respond to Hurricane Katrina, and while these
    assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast region, the Coast Guard observed a
    spike in the level of illegal migration activity off of the Florida coast.
    In response, according to Coast Guard officials, once the assets returned
    to the Florida region, the Coast Guard initiated a more intensive air and
    sea patrol schedule to markedly announce its return to the area and focus
    on interdicting illegal migrants.

        Coast Guard Satisfied with Reimbursement of Hurricane Katrina Mission Costs

    Part of Hurricane Katrina's impact on Coast Guard personnel, assets, and
    operations at its districts nationwide was that the Coast Guard incurred
    unexpected costs conducting Hurricane Katrina missions.32 When we
    discussed the amount of funding requested to reimburse the Coast Guard for
    its Hurricane Katrina activities, Coast Guard officials told us they were
    satisfied with the reimbursement process with both FEMA and EPA. According
    to these officials, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard had received
    "dollar for dollar" the amounts requested for reimbursement, meaning that
    for every bill submitted and processed, the Coast Guard received the same
    amount in reimbursement. Coast Guard officials added that the review of
    billing documentation by FEMA and EPA officials can

    31

    Consisting of approximately 39,000 active duty personnel, the Coast Guard
    is a multimission agency with a long-standing federal leadership role in
    protecting life and property at sea, such as directing search and rescue
    operations. Furthermore, the Coast Guard is a military service responsible
    for protecting U.S. ports and waterways. As of December 2005, other U.S.
    military branches were the U.S. Army, with approximately 489,000 active
    duty personnel; the U.S. Navy, with approximately 359,000 active duty
    personnel; the U.S. Air Force, with approximately 352,000 active duty
    personnel; and the

    U.S. Marines, with approximately 179,000 active duty personnel.

    32

    Coast Guard officials reported that as of April 12, 2006, its
    FEMA-directed missions in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had a
    funding ceiling of $191,913,001, meaning FEMA authorized the Coast Guard
    to spend up to this amount to conduct missions in response to Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita. In addition, the EPA authorized the Coast Guard to spend
    up to $171,327,000 to conduct specific pollution response missions.
    According to Coast Guard officials, this amount is likely to grow as
    mission assignments in the area of pollution response continue to be
    added, and could take at least a year to complete.

    take 30 to 60 days. Coast Guard officials also stated that they met with
    representatives from FEMA this year to reconcile Hurricane Katrina mission
    assignments, funding ceilings, and costs, and these accounting lines and
    totals were consistent.

    As table 3 shows, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it
    had spent $98,811,320 in its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
    had billed FEMA and EPA $66,746,961 and received $48,634,090 in
    reimbursements, given the 30-to 60-day delay in FEMA/EPA review of Coast
    Guard billing documentation. However, even with the delay, Coast Guard
    officials we spoke to were satisfied with the reimbursement process with
    both FEMA and EPA.

    Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for
    Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of April
    12, 2006

    Description of mission Stafford Act funding assignments

            Amount of Amount of Amount of Coast reimbursement reimbursement Guard
             request funding received as expenditures submitted of April 12, 2006

    Coast Guard mission assignments Search and rescue, wreck and $49,746,004
    $34,701,729 $16,588,858

    (reimbursement from FEMA) debris removal, and deployment of strike forces,
    among other activities

    Coast Guard mission assignments Marine pollution response effort,
    49,065,316 32,045,232 32,045,232

    (reimbursement from the EPA) including technical assistance, and direct
    support to EPA, among other activities

                       Total $98,811,320 $66,746,961 $48,634,090

    Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and FEMA data.

    Note: Tables 1 and 2 focused exclusively on the Coast Guard response to
    only Hurricane Katrina; table 3 focuses on the financial impact of the
    Coast Guard response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita missions. Coast
    Guard officials noted when accounting for costs associated with Hurricane
    Katrina, they included costs associated with Hurricane Rita. Note that
    table 3 does not include damages suffered by the Coast Guard, including
    the destruction of several stations, and damage to assets suffered during
    the storms. These infrastructure costs continue to be identified and
    updated by the Coast Guard, and supplemental funding has been requested to
    address these damages. Also note that the amount of reimbursement request
    submitted to EPA, and the amount of reimbursement funding received as of
    April 12, 2006, is the same. Coast Guard officials reported that the
    process of reimbursement from EPA allows for quick reimbursement because
    the missions are more typical of the types of environmental response
    conducted by the Coast Guard. We did not verify the accuracy of the data
    provided by the Coast Guard.

        Coast Guard Collected Information to Improve Future Storm Preparations

    According to Coast Guard officials, the agency has collected information
    regarding its response to Hurricane Katrina and included it in a Coast
    Guard database. In addition, while we conducted site visits for this
    review, we met with a wide range of Coast Guard personnel who participated
    in the response to Hurricane Katrina who shared with us their views on
    certain actions that the Coast Guard could take in the future to further
    improve the agency's response to an event like Hurricane Katrina. These
    actions include efforts to (1) improve the agency's systems to track Coast
    Guard personnel in real time in order to better recall personnel when an
    evacuation is over and forces are sent to respond to the emergency event;

    (2) become more "expeditionary" in nature by having evacuating forces
    remove such things as certain tools and equipment that would allow them to
    be more self-sustaining in order to assist in a disaster response; (3) be
    more flexible in identifying safe places for Coast Guard personnel to
    relocate to in the event of an evacuation; and (4) be flexible in drafting
    orders for personnel to report for duty at a specific time and place in
    order to respond to contingencies that may arise during the course of an
    emergency.

    Furthermore, a senior Coast Guard official reported that the Coast Guard
    has developed a number of after-action reports that it has incorporated
    into its Contingency Preparedness System database-known as CG SAILS-the
    official Coast Guard database for lessons learned. According to this
    official, having these reports in this system allows Coast Guard personnel
    to access this information and incorporate it into other agency planning
    and contingency efforts.

    Agency Comments

    We provided a draft of this report to DHS, including the Coast Guard, for
    comment. DHS and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which have
    been incorporated into the report as appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Commandant of the
    Coast Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
    interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
    of

    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
            report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this report are

    Stephen L. Caldwell Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

    List of Congressional Committees

    The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
    Co-Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe Chair The Honorable Maria Cantwell Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard Committee on
    Commerce, Science and Transportation United States Senate

    The Honorable Susan M. Collins Chairman The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
    Ranking Member Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Judd Gregg Chairman The Honorable Robert C. Byrd Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on
    Appropriations United States Senate

    The Honorable Don Young Chairman The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking
    Democratic Member Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
    Representatives The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo Chairman The Honorable Bob
    Filner Ranking Democratic Member Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
    Representatives

    The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking
    Member Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

    The Honorable Peter T. King Chairman The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
    Ranking Minority Member Committee on Homeland Security House of
    Representatives

    The Honorable Harold Rogers Chairman The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo
    Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on
    Appropriations House of Representatives

    Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

      GAO Contact

    Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice
    Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov

      Staff Acknowledgments

    Individuals making key contributions to this report include Joel Aldape,
    Nancy Briggs, Lisa Canini, Billy Commons, Christine Davis,
    Josh Diosomito, Michele Fejfar, Kathryn Godfrey, Dawn Hoff, and Lori
    Kmetz.

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    (440464)

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