Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps (04-AUG-06,
GAO-06-894).
GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital
issues that have hampered the Department of State's ability to
carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives,
particularly at posts central to the war on terror. In 2002,
State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to
address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees.
This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing
shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps
in the language proficiency of foreign service officers and other
staff. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and
language data and met with State officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-894
ACCNO: A58041
TITLE: Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language
Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps
DATE: 08/04/2006
SUBJECT: Civil service jobs
Diplomats
Employee incentives
Employee training
Employees
Foreign languages
International relations
Labor shortages
Performance appraisal
Staff utilization
Dept. of State Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative
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GAO-06-894
* Results in Brief
* Background
* State's Foreign Language Requirements
* State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but
* State Has Made Progress in Decreasing Staffing Shortages but
* Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured
* Staffing Gaps for Key Mid-Level Positions Persist; Positions
* Staffing Gaps at the Mid-Level Persist
* Mid-Level and Other Staffing Gaps Exacerbated by Low Bidding
* Many Mid-Level Positions Are Staffed by Junior Officers
* Family Issues and Locality Pay Discourage Bidding at Hardshi
* State Reluctant to Use Directed Assignments
* State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language C
* State Has Increased the Number of Language-Designated Positi
* State Continues to Have Shortages of Staff Proficient in For
* Some Staff Do Not Meet the Language Requirements for Their P
* Some Question the Adequacy of the Language Proficiency Requi
* State's Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder Efforts t
* Lack of Foreign Language Capability May Adversely Effect Sta
* State Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* GAO Comments
* GAO Contact
* Staff Acknowledgment
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
Report to the Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
August 2006
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to
Address Gaps
GAO-06-894
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 5
State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but Critical Gaps
Remain at Hardship Posts 11
State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language Capabilities,
but Significant Language Gaps Remain 23
Conclusions 33
Recommendations for Executive Action 34
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37
Appendix II Department of State Staffing 41
Appendix III Foreign Language Proficiency at Language- Designated
Positions 42
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 48
GAO Comments 58
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60
Tables
Table 1: DRI Hiring Goals for Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2004 5
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2006 SND Posts 9
Table 3: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career
Tracks as of December 31, 2005 14
Table 4: Proficiency and Language Capability Requirements 25
Table 5: Percentage of Staff Filling Chinese and Arabic
Language-Designated Positions Who Do Not Meet Proficiency Requirements, by
Type of Position 27
Table 6: State Department Worldwide Staffing by Position Type as of
September 30, 2005 41
Table 7: Location, Number of Language-Designated Positions, and Percent of
Staff Filling the Positions Who Do Not Meet the Speaking and Reading
Language Requirements 42
Figures
Figure 1: Assignment Process for FSOs 7
Figure 2: Percentage of Language-Designated Positions by Category 10
Figure 3: Average Number of Bids by Hardship Differential for Grades 2, 3,
and 4 16
Figure 4: Average Bids per Career Track by Hardship Differential for 2005
18
Figure 5: Percentage of Staff Who Meet Requirements for World, Hard, and
Superhard Languages as of October 2005 26
Abbreviations
DRI Diplomatic Readiness Initiative FSO Foreign Service Officer HR/CDA
Office of Career Development and Assignments SND Service Need Differential
FSI Foreign Service Institute GEMS Global Employee Management System
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
August 4, 2006
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues that
have hampered the Department of State's (State) ability to carry out the
President's foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at
posts central to the United States' war on terror. For example, we
reported that State's permanent positions were understaffed and that the
impact of staffing shortfalls was felt most at hardship posts,1 including
posts in Africa and the Middle East and others of strategic importance to
the United States, such as China and Russia. In particular, we found that
State's assignment system did not effectively meet the staffing needs of
hardship posts and that State had difficulty filling positions there,
particularly at the mid-levels. Where such staffing gaps existed, new or
untenured officers worked well above their grade levels. We also reported
that State had shortages in staff with critical foreign language skills,
making it more difficult to combat international terrorism and resulting
in less effective representation of U.S. interests overseas. To address
shortfalls in the number and skills of foreign service officers (FSO),
State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), beginning in
2002, to hire, train, and deploy additional staff.
This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing
shortfalls since the implementation of DRI, and (2) filling gaps in the
language proficiency of FSOs and other staff.
To assess State's progress in eliminating staffing gaps, we examined
documentation on State's recruitment efforts, and analyzed staffing,
vacancy, and assignment data. To assess State's progress in filling gaps
in the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, we analyzed language
proficiency data for specific posts, specialties, and grades. We also
compared the language proficiency of staff in language-designated
positions with the requirements for the positions. We met with officials
at State's Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Foreign
Service Institute, and six regional bureaus. To observe post staffing and
language proficiency firsthand, we conducted fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos,
Nigeria; Sana'a, Yemen; and Beijing, China. We selected the posts in (1)
Nigeria because of the low number of staff applying for each position; (2)
in Sana'a because of the low number of staff applying for each position,
because it requires staff proficient in Arabic, which is a difficult to
learn language, and because of Yemen's importance to the war on terrorism;
and (3) in Beijing because it requires staff proficient in Chinese, which
is also a difficult language to learn, and because of its strategic
importance to the United States. We performed our work from August 2005 to
May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope and
methodology.
1State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government
provides differential pay incentives-an additional 5 to 35 percent of base
salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of the conditions-to
encourage employees to bid on assignments to these posts and to compensate
them for the hardships they encounter.
Results in Brief
State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since
implementing DRI; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals,
and mid-level vacancies remain a problem at critical posts. DRI was
intended to hire enough additional staff to respond to emerging crises and
to allow staff time for critical job training. From 2002 to 2004, DRI
enabled State to hire more than 1,000 employees above attrition. However,
according to State officials, most of this increase was absorbed by the
demand for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus the desired crises
and training reserve was not achieved. Additionally, in an effort to
address staffing shortfalls at historically hard to fill hardship posts,
many of which are of significant strategic importance to the United
States, State implemented various incentives, including offering extra pay
to officers who serve an additional year at these posts and allowing
employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. More recently, State changed
its promotion requirements to include service in a hardship post as a
prerequisite for promotion to the senior foreign service. However, State
has not evaluated the effectiveness of the incentives and hardship posts
in Africa and the Middle East-including those in countries important to
the war on terror, as well as those in other countries of strategic
interest-and continues to have difficulty attracting qualified applicants
at the mid-level. Currently, mid-level positions at many posts are staffed
by junior officers who lack experience and have minimal guidance. For
example, at the time of our review, the mid-level consular manager
positions in Shenyang and Chengdu, China-two locations with high incidence
of visa fraud-were held by first tour junior officers. We observed similar
shortages and employees above their grades in consular sections in China
when we reported on staffing of hardship posts in 2002.2 This experience
gap at critical posts can severely compromise the department's diplomatic
readiness and its ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and
execute critical post-level duties. We found that inexperienced officers
are not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers, and
having inexperienced officers in key positions forces senior staff to
devote more time to overseeing operational matters and less to advancing
U.S. international interests. State does not assign its limited number of
mid-level employees to particular posts because of risk and priorities;
but rather, it generally assigns them to posts for which they have
expressed an interest. State has recently launched a new initiative to
reallocate positions from Europe and Washington, D.C., to critical
emerging areas such as Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. However,
without directing employees, when necessary, to high priority assignments,
it is unclear whether the reallocation of positions alone will ensure that
they are filled.
State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities,
but significant language gaps remain. State has increased the number of
worldwide positions requiring language proficiency by 27 percent since
2001. In addition, State has enhanced recruitment efforts to target
individuals proficient in certain languages. However, State has not
evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, as we previously
recommended.3 For example, during the time of our review, State had not
systematically analyzed available data to demonstrate whether the
percentage of new hires with foreign language skills has increased since
2003. State continues to have difficulties filling language-designated
positions with language proficient staff. Almost 30 percent of the staff
filling language-designated positions worldwide as of October 2005 did not
meet the language proficiency requirements. The percentage was much higher
at certain critical posts-for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60
percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Moreover, some officers who did meet the
proficiency requirements questioned whether the requirements are adequate.
For example, embassy officials in Yemen and China stated that the speaking
and reading proficiency levels designated for their positions were not
high enough and that staff in these positions were not sufficiently fluent
to effectively perform their jobs. Additionally, several factors-including
the short length of some tours and the limitations on consecutive tours at
the same post-may hinder FSOs' ability to enhance and maintain their
language skills over time, as well as State's ability to take advantage of
those skills and the investment it makes in training. There is also a
perception among some officers that State's current assignment and
promotion systems discourage officers from specializing in any particular
region, making the officers reluctant to apply to posts where they could
utilize their language skills more frequently. State has not conducted the
type of assessment that would prioritize the resources it devotes to
specific languages based on risk and strategic interest in particular
regions or countries. Nonetheless, gaps in language proficiency can
adversely affect State's diplomatic readiness and its ability to execute
critical duties. For example, officials at one high visa fraud post stated
that consular officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully
understanding everything the applicants tell them during the visa
interview. Moreover, officers at some posts, including those in countries
important to the war on terror, cannot communicate effectively with
foreign audiences, hampering their ability to cultivate personal
relationships and explain U.S. foreign policy.
2GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment
System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).
3GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas
Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139 ,
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003) and GAO, Foreign Languages: Human
Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls,
GAO-02-375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the
language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that
the Secretary of State (1) consider using directed assignments, as
necessary, using a risk-based approach, to fill critical positions with
fully qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to
effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at hardship
posts; (2) systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive
programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators
of progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this
analysis; (3) consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours,
consecutive assignments in certain countries, and more regional
specialization in certain areas, in order to hone officers' skills in
certain superhard languages and better leverage the investment State makes
in language training; (4) systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its
efforts to improve the language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists,
establishing specific indicators of progress in filling language gaps and
adjusting its efforts accordingly; and (5) conduct a risk assessment of
critical language needs in regions and countries of strategic importance,
make realistic projections of the staff time and related training float
necessary to adequately train personnel to meet those needs, and target
its limited resources for language training, as needed, to fill these
critical gaps.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State generally
concurred with the report's observations, conclusions, and recommendations
and described several initiatives that it believes address the
recommendations.
Background
The Department of State is the lead agency in formulating and implementing
U.S. foreign policy. The department represents the United States in about
172 countries, operating approximately 266 embassies, consulates, and
other posts. During several years in the 1990s, State lost more staff than
it hired, and the resultant shortfalls of staff and skills endangered
diplomatic readiness. To address these shortfalls, in 2002, State
implemented DRI, a $197 million effort designed to address a range of
goals. In particular, the goals of DRI were to hire 1,1584 new foreign and
civil service employees over a 3-year period, support training
opportunities for staff, enhance the department's ability to respond to
crises and emerging priorities overseas and at critical domestic
locations, improve State's hiring processes to recruit personnel from more
diverse experiences and cultural backgrounds, and fill critical skill
gaps. Table 1 shows DRI hiring goals for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal
2004.
Table 1: DRI Hiring Goals for Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2004
Total FY 2002-2004
Skill group FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 goals
Foreign service generalist 204 206 138 548
Foreign service specialist 81 103 102 286
Total foreign service 285 309 240 834
Civil service 75 90 70 235
Total 360 399 310 1,069
Source: Department of State.
As of October 2005, State had about 19,000 American employees, including
FSOs, also called generalists; foreign service specialists; and civil
servants. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign policy
of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks: management,
consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. Foreign service
specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in
Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories:
administration, construction engineering, information technology,
international information and English language programs, medical and
health, office management, and security. Civil service employees support
the foreign policy mission from offices in Washington, D.C., and across
the United States.
4State received funding for 1,069 employees.
About 65 percent of Foreign Service employees serve overseas. State's
policy is that foreign service employees are to be available for service
worldwide. The process of assigning Foreign Service staff to their
positions begins when the staff receive a list of upcoming vacancies for
which they may compete. Staff then submit a list of positions for which
they want to be considered, or "bids," and consult with their career
development officer. The process varies, depending on an officer's grade
and functional specialty. Figure 1 describes this process.
Figure 1: Assignment Process for FSOs
aThe Director General is the official who heads State's Bureau of Human
Resources.
About 64 percent of full-time FSOs serving overseas are assigned to
hardship posts. State defines hardship posts as those locations where the
U.S. government provides differential pay incentives-an additional 5 to 35
percent of base pay, depending on the severity or difficult of the
conditions-to encourage employees to bid on assignments at these posts and
to compensate them for the hardships they encounter there. A hardship
differential is established for a location only when that location
involves extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical
hardship, or notably unhealthful conditions affecting the majority of
employees officially stationed or detailed there. Living costs are not
considered in differential determination.5 Among the conditions that State
considers in determining hardship pay are poor medical facilities,
substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political
instability, physical isolation, and lack of spousal employment
opportunities. Some hardship posts have greater difficulty in attracting
qualified bidders than others. In response to severe staffing shortages at
such posts, State established the Service Need Differential (SND) Program,
which began with the 2001 summer assignments cycle. Under this program, an
employee who accepts a 3-year assignment at a post designated for SND is
eligible to receive an additional hardship differential over and above
existing hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee's
base salary. However, chiefs of mission, principal officers, and deputy
chiefs of mission are not eligible to receive SND regardless of the length
of their tours. Entry-level employees on 2-year tours directed by the
Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) are also ineligible
for SND. State's geographic bureaus initially identified the posts
designated to offer SND in 2001 and may add or remove posts once per year.
The program included 38 posts the first year. Table 2 lists the fiscal
year 2006 SND posts.
5State pays an additional 15 percent to 35 percent of salary for danger
pay. The danger pay allowance is designed to provide additional
compensation above basic compensation to all U.S. government civilian
employees, including chiefs of mission, for service in foreign areas where
there exist conditions-such as civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism,
or war-that threaten physical harm or imminent danger to employees. These
conditions do not include acts characterized chiefly as economic crime.
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2006 SND Posts
Geographic regions
East Asia and the Europe and Near South Western
Africa Pacific Eurasia East Asia Hemisphere
Overseas posts
Abuja Chengdu Almaty Sana'a Dhaka Georgetown
Asmara Guangzhou Ashgabat Paramaribo
Bamako Port Moresby Astana Port au
Prince
Bangui Shenyang Baku
Brazzaville Ulaanbaatar Bishkek
Conakry Chisinau
Cotonou Dushanbe
Djibouti Kiev
Freetown Minsk
Kigali Tashkent
Kinshasa Tbilisi
Lagos Tirana
Luanda Vladivostok
N'Djamena Yekaterinburg
Niamey Yerevan
Nouakchott
Ouagadougou
Yaounde
Source: Department of State.
In addition, in 2002, State established a working group to examine
incentives to encourage bidding on hardship posts. The working group
evaluated over 80 suggestions and ideas, such as requiring hardship
service for promotion to the senior foreign service and allowing employees
to negotiate shorter tours of duty. State implemented about 25 of the
suggestions.
State's Foreign Language Requirements
As of October 2005, State had 3,267 positions-43 percent of all foreign
service positions overseas-designated as requiring some level of foreign
language proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State
places the required languages into three categories based on the amount of
time it takes to learn them.
o Category I languages are world languages, such as Spanish and
French, which relate closely to English. Fifty-five percent of the
language-designated positions require proficiency in a world
language.
o Category II languages, such as Albanian or Urdu, are languages
with significant linguistic or cultural differences from English.
State refers to such languages as "hard" languages. Twenty-nine
percent of the language-designated positions require proficiency
in a hard language.
o Category III, the "superhard" languages, include Arabic and
Chinese, and are exceptionally difficult for native English
speakers to learn. Sixteen percent of the language-designated
positions require proficiency in a superhard language. Figure 2
shows the percentage of language-designated positions by category.
Figure 2: Percentage of Language-Designated Positions by Category
Note: Other languages include German, Indonesian, Malay, Swahili,
and Tetum, which take longer to learn than category I languages,
but less time than category II languages.
State's philosophy is to hire officers with a wide range of skills
that it believes are predictors of success in the foreign service.
It does not hire exclusively for skills that State can train, such
as foreign languages. As a result, State's primary approach to
meeting its language requirements is through language training,
primarily through classes provided at its training arm, the
Foreign Service Institute (FSI). FSI's School of Language Studies
offers training in more than 60 languages. FSI also provides
full-time advance training in superhard languages at FSI field
schools and programs overseas. In addition, overseas posts offer
part-time language training through post language programs funded
by the regional bureaus and their posts. Although State's main
emphasis is on enhancing its foreign language capability through
training, it does have special mechanisms to recruit personnel
with foreign language skills. For example, applicants who pass the
oral assessment can raise their ranking by passing a language test
in any foreign language used by State. Additional credit is given
to candidates who pass a test in languages that State has deemed
as critical needs languages, including Arabic; Chinese; Korean;
Russian; Turkic languages (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkish,
Turkmen, and Uzbek); Indic languages (Urdu, Hindi, Nepali,
Bengali, Punjabi); and Iranian languages (Farsi/Persian, Tajiki,
Pashto). Officers hired under this initiative must serve in a post
that requires the language for which they were recruited, for
their first or second tour.
State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but
Critical Gaps Remain at Hardship Posts
Although DRI brought in a large number of new FSOs, it made
minimal impact in addressing the staffing gaps at hardship posts,
largely because of new staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The department has implemented new incentives to address the
chronic mid-level shortfalls at hardship posts; however, since
implementing these incentives, State has not yet evaluated their
effectiveness. In our review, we found that mid-level staffing
gaps persist; bids for mid-level positions at hardship posts have
not increased significantly since we reported in 2002; and
positions normally held by mid-level officers are typically
staffed by junior officers, sometimes on their first assignment,
with few mid-level officers to provide supervision or guidance.
Recently, State launched the Global Repositioning Initiative,
which will move positions from places like Europe and Washington
D.C., to critical posts in areas such as Africa and the Middle
East. However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of
this initiative, and State's reluctance to direct its employees to
serve in locations where they have not bid on, means that these
redirected positions may remain vacant.
State Has Made Progress in Decreasing Staffing Shortages but Has Not
Fully Met Its Goals
Since 2002, under its DRI, State has increased its number of
permanent positions and available staff worldwide for both the
foreign and civil service, but these increases were largely offset
by urgent staffing demands at critical posts in countries such as
Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, State had more than 500 unstaffed
foreign service positions; in 2005, there were fewer than 200 such
openings. However, the deficit in civil service staffing has
increased. In 2002, State had over 800 unfilled civil service
positions; in 2005, there were over 1,700 such positions. State
hired most of its new staff through DRI, bringing in more than
1,000 new employees above attrition, thus achieving its numerical
hiring goals. These employees were hired primarily to allow staff
time for critical job training-also referred to as a "training
float"-to staff overseas posts, and to be available to respond to
new emerging priorities. However, according to State's Human
Resources officials, DRI's goals became quickly outdated as new
pressures resulted from staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan.
For example, the department has currently levied what it calls an
"Iraq tax" on all its bureaus in order to support its operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the past 2 years, bureaus have had to
give up a total of 280 mid-level generalist and specialist
positions for Iraq, and it is anticipated that another such tax
will be imposed for 2007.
Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured
Beginning in 2001, in an effort to address the growing number of
mid-level vacancies at hardship posts, State created a series of
incentives-including extra pay and negotiated tour lengths-to
attract mid-level employees to hardship posts around the world.
For example, the SND Program offers employees an extra 15 percent
pay for an additional year of service at the most difficult to
staff posts. While State has information on the number of officers
actually enrolled in the program, it was not able to provide data
on the number of eligible officers who did not. State's Director
General and officials from its HR/CDA said that State has not
completed any formal evaluations of the incentives; instead,
officials from the HR/CDA meet informally to discuss how well the
incentives are working. Without formal evaluations, the department
has not been able to systematically measure whether the extra
hardship pay incentive has had a significant impact on staffing at
hardship posts. Senior officials with whom we spoke in Washington,
D.C., and FSOs at hardship posts had mixed views on whether the
SND program has been effective. Some officers stated that the pay
differential was indeed a factor in their decision to bid on the
post. However, several former ambassadors and the Executive
Director of the Bureau of African Affairs said they believe the
program has not attracted additional bidders to African posts.
These officials stated that the incentive has had limited impact
at posts that were already offering a 25 percent pay differential
because the additional incentive is offset by the harsh conditions
at such posts.
While it may be too early too assess the effectiveness of more
recently implemented initiatives, such as negotiated tour lengths,
former and current ambassadors with whom we spoke stated that this
initiative may not benefit posts. In particular, they noted that
although negotiating a shorter tour length might initially attract
bidders to hardship posts, such frequent rotations negatively
affect a post's ability to carry out the United States' foreign
policy goals. For example, according to State, the average length
of tours at posts in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter
than those elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of 1-year tours in the
Muslim world,6 a senior official at State said that officers with
shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than those with
longer ones.
In addition to incentives, State has implemented a new career
development program-the Generalist Career Development Program-that
stipulates service at a hardship post as a requirement for
consideration of promotion to the senior foreign service. The new
requirements include a mandatory tour at a 15 percent differential
or greater hardship post. Officials from HR/CDA stated that it was
too early to tell whether this new requirement for promotion to
the senior foreign service will be effective in attracting
mid-level officers to hardship posts.
Staffing Gaps for Key Mid-Level Positions Persist; Positions Filled
by Junior Officers in Stretch Positions
State's largest staffing gaps continue to be at mid-level. These
and other gaps are exacerbated by continued low bidding for
positions at hardship posts. Furthermore, many mid-level vacancies
are filled by junior officers. Staff have cited family issues and
the lack of locality pay comparable with what they would receive
in Washington, D.C., as being among the key disincentives to
bidding for hardship positions.
Staffing Gaps at the Mid-Level Persist
As of December 2005, State had a combined deficit of 154
officers,7 with the largest staffing deficits continuing to affect
mid-level positions across all career tracks. Table 3 shows
staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for foreign
service generalists as of December 31, 2005.
State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but Critical Gaps Remain
at Hardship Posts
State Has Made Progress in Decreasing Staffing Shortages but Has Not Fully Met
Its Goals
Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured
Staffing Gaps for Key Mid-Level Positions Persist; Positions Filled by Junior
Officers in Stretch Positions
Staffing Gaps at the Mid-Level Persist
6According to State, the Muslim world is comprised of 58 countries and
territories with significant Muslim populations, many of which are members
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. These countries have a
combined population of 1.5 billion people and are located in Africa, Asia,
and Europe.
7The total deficit decreases to 82 when junior grade levels 05 and 06
positions are included. We did not include them in this calculation
because we were told that these grades were training positions that are
not counted against the deficit.
Table 3: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career
Tracks as of December 31, 2005
Grade Public Surplus/Deficit Total
level Management Consular Economic Political diplomacy by grade level Surplus/Deficit
Senior MC (10) 10 0 21 (8) 13
level
OC (16) (3) 18 29 (20) 8
21
Mid 1 (19) 34 32 71 (93) 25
level
2 (58) 31 17 36 (186) (160)
3 16 (143) (26) (56) 28 (181)
(316)
Junior 4 232 (580) 124 166 199 141 141
level
Total 145.0 (651.0) 165.0 267.0 (80) (154.0)
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
Note: Senior foreign service grades include minister counselor (MC) and
counselor (OC).
In 2003, State officials told us that it would take about 9 to 10 years to
eliminate the mid-level gap.8 Officials whom we met with more recently
said it would take several years for DRI hiring to begin addressing the
mid-level staffing shortages because the earliest DRI hires are just now
being promoted to the mid-level. On average, it takes approximately 4.3
years for a junior officer to receive a promotion to the mid-level.
According to State's comments on this report, the department expects to
eliminate mid-level deficits by 2010.
Mid-Level and Other Staffing Gaps Exacerbated by Low Bidding for Positions at
Hardship Posts
Although bidding for hardship posts with the smallest pay differentials
has increased slightly since we last reported on this issue in 2002,9 it
remained about the same for posts with the highest differentials, such as
those with 20 and 25 percent. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids on
FS-02, FS-03, and tenured FS-04 mid-level positions at overseas posts by
differential rate for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Overall, posts in
Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia continue to receive the lowest
number of bids, averaging about 4 or 5 bids per position, while posts in
Europe and the Western Hemisphere receive the highest bids, averaging 15
and 17, respectively. For example, in 2005, posts in Bujumbura, Burundi;
Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Calcutta, India;
received, on average, between zero and two bids per mid-level officer
position. In addition, we found that in the 2005 assignments cycle, 104
mid-level positions had no bidders at all, including 67 positions in
Africa and the Middle East.
8 GAO-04-139 .
9 GAO-02-626 .
Figure 3: Average Number of Bids by Hardship Differential for Grades 2, 3,
and 4
Note: The line in the graph shows the median of the average number of bids
for each differential rate. Also, only selected posts are named.
Consular positions in the posts with the highest hardship differential (25
percent) continued to receive some of the lowest number of bids in 2005.
As shown in figure 4, consular positions at 25 percent differential posts
received, on average, only 2.5 bids per position compared with 18 for
nonhardship posts. Low numbers of bids at hardship posts have resulted in
positions remaining vacant for long periods of time. For example, a senior
consular position in Lagos, Nigeria, has been vacant since July 2001, and
a consular chief position in Shenyang was vacant from December 2003 until
August 2004. Such gaps negatively impact a post's ability to carry out its
mission.
Figure 4: Average Bids per Career Track by Hardship Differential for 2005
In 2005 consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill,
with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level.
Although the department has seen an increase in spending on U.S. public
diplomacy programs, several embassy officials stated that they do not have
the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. Moreover, these
staffing gaps also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers
receive, because many officers are sent to fill a position quickly and
never benefit from full training, ultimately limiting the success of their
public diplomacy outreach efforts. Further, due to staffing shortages in
consular sections around the world, there are fewer staff to implement the
new interview requirements and screening procedures for visas, resulting
in extensive wait times for applicants for visa interviews at consular
posts overseas. From November 2004 through May 2005, there were 63 posts
reporting wait times of 30 or more days on a given month, signaling a
significant resource problem for State.
Many Mid-Level Positions Are Staffed by Junior Officers
In order to fill vacancies, primarily at hardship posts, State sometimes
allows stretch assignments, which enable staff to bid for a position at
either a higher grade than their current grade level (called an
"upstretch") or a lower grade (a "downstretch"). Often, upstretch
assignments are offered as a reward and career-enhancing opportunity for
staff who have demonstrated outstanding performance, and many officers
successfully fulfill the duties requested of the higher grade level.10
However, a 2004 report by State's Inspector General11 found that in many
African posts, for example, there were significant deficiencies in the
ability, training, and experience of FSOs serving in upstretch
assignments.
At posts we visited in early 2006, we found staffing conditions similar to
those we reported on in 2002, when we found experience gaps and other
staffing shortfalls at hardship posts.12 For example, in 2002, we reported
that, in the 10-officer consular section in Lagos, only the consul had
more than one tour of consular experience. In addition, we reported that
the office had many unfilled mid-level positions, many of which were at
the time being staffed by first-tour junior officers and civil service
employees who had never served overseas. In our most recent visit, we
found that the consulate in Lagos was staffed by a mix of officers,
including numerous junior officers in stretch positions.
Moreover, many officers in stretch positions at hardship posts continue to
lack the managerial experience or supervisory guidance needed to
effectively perform their job-duties. Junior officers in consular sections
at hardship posts consistently reported that they lack management
guidance. In addition, junior officers in stretch assignments at the
various posts we visited stated that, without mid-level officers to guide
them, many times they can only turn to senior management, including the
ambassador, for assistance. According to a 2004 State Inspector General
report, more time is spent by senior staff, including ambassadors, on
operational matters, and less time is devoted to overall planning, policy,
and coordination than should be the case.13 Many junior officers also
stated that, although they were filling stretch positions at the
mid-level, they were not allowed to receive management training from State
due to their lower grade status. According to one officer, she requested
management training to help her manage staff in accordance with her role
as acting chief of a key section of the embassy, but was denied the
opportunity because, despite her current assignment, she was not a tenured
mid-level officer.
10According to State the rationale for stretch assignments (upstretches
and downstretches) is both system- and employee-driven. Upstretches can be
career enhancing, or accommodate family needs or staffing gaps.
Downstretches may happen to accommodate family needs or be the end result
after an employee is promoted when in an at-grade position.
11Strengthening Leadership and Staffing at African Hardship Posts, U.S.
Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Memorandum Report
ISP-I-04-54, July 2004.
12 GAO-02-626 .
Senior management at posts we visited shared some of these concerns. A
former Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria stated that it is extremely
difficult for junior officers to work in stretch assignments when there
are few mid-level officers to guide them. Ambassadors at these posts also
stated that, although many junior officers entering the foreign service
are highly qualified, they did not have sufficient training to handle some
of the high stress situations they encounter and often end up making
mistakes. For example, according to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria-the
third largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees-the embassy
presently had only three senior officers at the time of our visit, and
public affairs were handled entirely by first tour junior officers. Also,
according to U.S. officials in Beijing, the mid-level consular manager
positions in Shenyang and Chengdu, China-two locations with high incidence
of visa fraud-were held by first tour junior officers at the time of our
visit. We observed similar shortages and employees staffed above their
grades in consular sections in Africa and China when we reported on
staffing of hardship posts in 2002. Consular chiefs in Beijing raised
concerns about the lack of management guidance and supervision available
to junior officers due to the lack of mid-level officers at constituent
posts in China. One consular chief stated that the lack of adequate
supervision at constituent posts requires that he or his deputy frequently
travel to the posts outside of Beijing to provide guidance to the junior
officers. Another was concerned that her caseload limited the amount of
guidance she was able to give to her constituent posts.
Other areas, such as regional security, are also compromised as a result
of mid-level vacancies. Security officers at one hardship post told us
that, without mid-level staff, they sometimes lack the resources to
adequately perform basic duties, such as accompanying the ambassador on
diplomatic travel or, as was the case during a recent visit by the First
Lady, providing adequate personnel to accompany her staff. Former
ambassadors with whom we spoke expressed serious concerns about the
department's diplomatic readiness and conveyed their belief that a post's
ability to carry out critical duties is significantly compromised when the
proper staffing levels, and particularly well-trained officers, are not in
place.
13ISP-I-04-54.
Family Issues and Locality Pay Discourage Bidding at Hardship Posts
Many of the overseas staff we whom we met cited family
considerations-child-related and spousal employment concerns, in
particular-as the greatest obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to
hardship posts. The spouses and other household members of FSOs who
responded to a State internet survey14 listed spousal employment as the
primary reason why officers do not bid for hardship posts. In many
hardship posts, it is extremely difficult for spouses to find employment,
particularly in China and most of South Asia, where bilateral work
agreements are not in place. State officials told us that the department
has recently initiated new programs to mitigate this problem, such as
providing fellowships for spouses to continue their professional
development, offering online courses or entrepreneurial workshops to
encourage small business development, or training spouses to find
employment in the local economy. The department plans to expand these
programs in the future with a particular emphasis on spouses in hardship
locations.
The survey respondents also listed child-related issues as a major factor
in the officers not bidding for positions. A particular concern is that
many hardship posts do not have appropriate schooling for American
children, thus limiting options for employees with families. In Sana'a,
Yemen, for example, post positions are only available to staff with
children under age 5 or over 21 due to a lack of schools. This has been an
outstanding concern for the Sana'a post, and post officials told us that
post management is heavily engaged in trying to find a solution to the
problem. In addition, the number of unaccompanied posts15 has increased in
recent years, making it difficult for employees with families to bid on
them. As of April 2006, there were 21 unaccompanied and limited
accompanied posts and more than 700 positions at such posts. Moreover,
State officials said that this number will probably increase due to
increasing security concerns around the world.
14State conducted an internet survey of foreign service spouses and
members of household from January 30 to February 21, 2006. The survey has
a 35 percent response rate (3,258 responses) and thus cannot be
generalized.
15Unaccompanied posts are posts where family members may not accompany an
officer. Limited accompanied posts are posts that are restricted to adult
dependents and minors less than 5 years of age.
Lastly, officers and State personnel we interviewed both, at hardship
posts and in Washington, D.C., consistently cited the lack of locality
pay16 as a deterrent to bidding at hardship positions. In 2002, we
reported that the differences in the statutes governing domestic locality
pay and differential pay for overseas service had created a gap in
compensation penalizing overseas employees.17 This gap grows every year,
as domestic locality pay rates increase, creating an ever-increasing
financial disincentive for overseas employees to bid on hardship posts.
After accounting for domestic locality pay for Washington, D.C., a 25
percent hardship post differential is eroded to approximately 8 percent.
As estimated in our 2002 report, differential pay incentives for the 15
percent differential hardship posts are now less than the locality pay for
Washington, D.C., which is currently 17 percent and can be expected to
soon surpass the 20 percent differential hardship posts. Currently, there
is legislation pending in Congress to alleviate the locality pay disparity
by providing FSOs stationed outside the United States with locality-based
pay equal to that of Washington, D.C.18 However, there has been no final
action in Congress regarding this legislation since 2005.
State Reluctant to Use Directed Assignments
Despite chronic staffing shortages at hardship posts, especially at the
mid-level, State is reluctant to use its authority to direct assignments
based on risk and priorities at particular posts; rather, it assigns
employees to posts for which they have expressed interest. According to
State officials, State has rarely directed FSOs to serve in locations for
which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or
locations of strategic importance to the United States, due to concerns of
an increase in poor morale or lower productivity. With continuing
budgetary limitations, it will be increasingly difficult for the
department to increase financial incentives for hardship posts; moreover,
given the lack of an increase in bidders, the effectiveness of such
incentives is questionable. State's Global Repositioning Initiative,
announced in January 2006, will move positions from Washington and Europe
to critical posts in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. However,
there is no guarantee that these positions will be filled because bidding
will continue to be on a voluntary basis. Throughout the past decade, some
State officials have urged the department to employ a more aggressive
strategy to ensure that employees serve where their skills are needed
most. Additionally, despite concerns of an increase in low morale, several
officials whom we spoke with at hardship posts believe that in order to
effectively address these persistent staffing gaps, State needs to direct
assignments more often, particularly to hard-to-fill posts.
16Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit to attract workers in the
continental United States to the federal government versus the private
sector. Currently locality pay for Washington, D.C., is 17 percent.
17 GAO-02-626 .
18Section 305, H.R. 2601 (109th Cong., 1st Sess.), "Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007."
State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language Capabilities, but
Significant Language Gaps Remain
State has made several efforts in recent years to enhance its foreign
language capabilities, in particular by increasing the number of its
language-designated positions and its efforts to recruit and hire staff
with foreign language skills, as well as by creating additional language
requirements and incentives for staff. However, significant foreign
language gaps remain, and State has not assessed the effectiveness of its
efforts to increase its language capabilities.
State Has Increased the Number of Language-Designated Positions and Made Efforts
to Enhance Foreign Language Capabilities
State has made several efforts to improve its foreign language
capabilities, including creating additional language-designated positions
and enhancing recruiting efforts. State has increased the number of
language-designated positions by 27 percent. In 2001, there were 2,581 (29
percent) of all foreign service positions that required some level of
foreign language proficiency. As of October 2005, there were 3,267
positions (43 percent) that required some level of foreign language
proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State has also
enhanced its efforts to recruit and hire FSOs with language skills. For
example, State's Office of Recruitment has targeted its recruiting
outreach efforts to universities with strong language programs and
conferences of language professionals, as well as associations and
professional organizations, such as the Arab American Institute, that have
members already fluent in critical needs languages. In addition, State
offers bonus points on the foreign service exam to candidates who
demonstrate proficiency in critical needs languages. State then requires
these officers to serve in positions that will employ their language
skills during their first or second assignment. As of April, 2006, almost
80 percent of entry level officers who received additional exam points for
their critical language skills were assigned to locations that could
utilize their language within their first or second tour.
State has also implemented career development criteria, effective January
1, 2005, that require, among other things, foreign language proficiency as
a prerequisite for consideration for promotion. Specifically, in order to
become eligible for promotion to the senior foreign service, generalists
must demonstrate the ability to read and write a foreign language at a
general professional level. State's career development criteria for some
specialists also contain language proficiency requirements. In addition to
these requirements, State has developed financial incentives for officers
with certain proficiency levels in critical languages. Moreover, State has
enhanced its overseas language programs through various initiatives,
including expanded use of overseas language schools and post language
programs, as well as by increasing the number of weeks of training offered
in certain critical languages and by providing language immersion courses
for officers transitioning to new posts.
State Continues to Have Shortages of Staff Proficient in Foreign Languages
Despite its efforts to enhance the language capabilities of its staff,
State continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do
not meet the proficiency requirements. Even some officers who met the
requirements told us their language ability was not adequate for them to
effectively perform their job-related responsibilities. Furthermore, some
officers believe that State's assignment and promotion system hindered
their ability to maintain their language skills over time. Officials whom
we met with at several posts described a number of situations in which the
posts' operations were adversely effected by their lack of language
proficiency. State has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to
increase its language capabilities or conducted a risk assessment to
prioritize the allocation of foreign language resources.
Some Staff Do Not Meet the Language Requirements for Their Positions
State assesses language proficiency based on a scale established by the
federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels-0 to
5-with 5 being the most proficient (see table 4). Proficiency requirements
for language-designated positions at State tend to congregate at the
second and third levels of the scale. When proficiency substantially
exceeds one base skill level yet does not fully meet the criteria for the
next base level, a plus sign (+) designation may be added.
Table 4: Proficiency and Language Capability Requirements
Proficiency level Language capability requirements
0 - None No practical capability in the language.
1 - Elementary Sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival
needs and minimum courtesy and travel
requirements.
2 - Limited working Sufficient capability to meet routine social
demands and limited job requirements. Can deal
with concrete topics in past, present, and
future tense.
3 - General professional Able to use the language with sufficient ability
to participate in most formal and informal
discussion on practical, social, and
professional topics. Can conceptualize and
hypothesize.
4 - Advanced professional Able to use the language fluently and accurately
in all levels normally pertinent to professional
needs. Has range of language skills necessary
for persuasion, negotiation, and counseling.
5 - Functionally native Able to use the language at a functional level
equivalent to a highly articulate, well-educated
native speaker.
Source: Compiled by GAO from Interagency Language Roundtable documents.
We compared the language proficiency of staff in all language-designated
positions as of October 2005 with the requirements for the positions, and
our analysis showed that 71 percent of all worldwide language-designated
positions were filled by individuals who met the position's proficiency
requirements, while 29 percent of the positions were not.19 Language
deficiencies exist world-wide, but were among the greatest in the Middle
East, a region of great importance to the war on terror, where 37 percent
of all language-designated positions were filled by staff without the
language skills required of their positions. The skills gap was even
greater at some critical posts; for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt;
and 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. See appendix III for the worldwide
percentages of staff filling language-designated positions that did not
meet the language speaking and reading requirements of their positions.
To further illustrate how skill gaps differ among languages of varying
levels of difficulty, we analyzed data on superhard, hard, and world
language-designated positions. Our analysis showed that the greatest
deficiencies existed for positions requiring superhard languages, such as
Arabic, compared with hard and world languages. Almost 40 percent of
superhard language-designated positions worldwide (465 positions) were
filled by individuals who did not meet the language requirements of their
position; this figure was 30 and 25 percent for hard and world language
designated positions, respectively. Further, the highest percentage-almost
40 percent-of superhard positions filled by officers that did not meet the
speaking and reading language requirements were among positions requiring
Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. (See fig. 5).
19The percentages are for officers and specialists who met both the
speaking and writing requirement for their positions. The percentage
increases to 74 percent if individuals who met either the speaking or the
reading requirement, but not both, are included. This analysis combined
the language proficiency scores of FSO generalists and specialists. If the
specialists are excluded, 78 percent of generalists met the requirement.
Figure 5: Percentage of Staff Who Meet Requirements for World, Hard, and
Superhard Languages as of October 2005
Note: Several posts had dual language positions. For example, Tunis had
positions that could either be filled by an Arabic or French speaker. See
appendix I for more details on how we treated these positions.
Further analysis of Arabic and Chinese, two languages spoken in regions of
strategic interest to the United States, showed that the percentage of
staff that did not meet language requirements for their positions varied
by career tracks. For example, 100 percent of the staff filling positions
in the management career track requiring Arabic and 88 percent of the
staff filling positions in the management career track requiring Chinese
did not meet the language requirements of their positions.
Foreign service specialists-staff who perform security, technical, and
other support functions-also had high percentages of staff that did not
meet the Chinese or Arabic language requirements of their positions. In
particular, 72 and 75 percent of specialist positions requiring Chinese
and Arabic, respectively, were filled by staff who did not meet the
language requirement. (See table 5). Six of the specialists we met with in
Beijing said they did not receive sufficient language training before
arriving at post. State officials have acknowledged that foreign service
specialists have not received the required amount of training, and FSI
officials attributed this situation to time constraints. Most specialists
only have enough time to participate in FSI's Familiarization and
Short-term Training language courses designed for beginners with 2 months
or less time to devote to training. State's Director General, in a cable
issued in January 2006, stated that the department has been shortsighted
in not providing training to specialists, especially office management
specialists, and stated that required training would be available for
specialists in the future.
Table 5: Percentage of Staff Filling Chinese and Arabic
Language-Designated Positions Who Do Not Meet Proficiency Requirements, by
Type of Position
Staff filling
positions who do not
Filled language-designated meet language
Staff positions requirements Percent
Chinese language
Generalists 147 40 27%
Consular 57 12 21%
Management 8 7 88%
Economic 29 10 34%
Political 24 5 21%
Public diplomacy 18 6 33%
Multifunctional 11 0 0%
Specialists 53 38 72%
Arabic language
Generalists 140 49 35%
Consular 41 12 29%
Management 5 5 100%
Economic 11 6 55%
Political 31 7 23%
Public diplomacy 40 14 35%
Multifunctional 12 5 42%
Specialists 20 15 75%
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
Some Question the Adequacy of the Language Proficiency Requirements of Their
Positions
Some officers whom we met with who attained the proficiency requirements
for their assignments stated that they were not sufficiently fluent to
effectively perform their jobs. For example, the 50 language-designated,
junior officer consular positions at posts requiring Chinese require
proficiency at a speaking level of 2 and reading level of 0. Consular
officers we met with in China who tested at that level said they could ask
appropriate questions during consular interviews, but could not always
understand the answers. They pointed out that Spanish or French
language-designated consular positions require a level-3 speaking and
reading language proficiency. Moreover, a survey of junior officers
currently serving in China revealed that most of the officers not
interested in serving in China again cited language issues as the primary
reason. According to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Sana'a, the level-3
Arabic speaking and reading proficiency requirements for senior officers
do not provide staff with the proficiency needed to participate in debates
about U.S. foreign policy. He described an instance when he was asked to
appear as an embassy spokesperson on an Arabic language media program. The
program, which involved a debate format and addressed U.S. politics,
lasted 1 hour and was conducted entirely in Arabic. The official said
that, given his 4+proficiency in Arabic, he was the only official at the
embassy capable of engaging in such a debate.
According to a State Inspector General report on Embassy Tel Aviv, the
duties inherent in consular positions require staff to have better
speaking and reading Hebrew language skills than the required level 2.20
Therefore, the Office of the Inspector General recommended that
entry-level officers be given the opportunity to study Hebrew for 4 weeks
in Tel Aviv before they begin work at the embassy. Another Inspector
General report said that staff in Cairo who speak Arabic below the
required level-3 would prefer to be able to speak at a more advanced level
to conduct effective public outreach.21 Officials from the Foreign Service
Institute agreed that a level-3 speaking and reading language proficiency
in Arabic and Chinese was more appropriate for junior officers assigned to
consular positions, but they explained that language-designated position
requirements are set at a level officers can realistically achieve in the
limited amount of time available to obtain training.
20ISP-I-05-13A.
State's Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder Efforts to Improve Its
Foreign Language Capability
Several FSOs we met with said they believe State's current assignment and
promotion system may hinder officers' ability to enhance and maintain
their language skills over time, as well as State's ability to take
advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. For
example, State's requirements for tenure stipulate that junior officers
work in a variety of regions and jobs to prepare them for careers as
generalists, while State's assignment regulations do not allow junior
officers and specialists to serve consecutive tours at the same post. As a
result, junior officers are often assigned to second tours that do not
utilize the language skills they acquired for their first tour. For
example, according to FSI, assignments to Russian-speaking posts would be
complemented by assignments elsewhere in the world or Washington, D.C., to
provide the broader experience required at the senior level. There is also
a perception among some officers that spending too much time in one region
can lead to being labeled as too narrowly specialized, which could
adversely impact the officers' career. However, a senior State official
asserted that the belief that regional specialization hurts an officer's
career is untrue, and, further, that State's new career development plan
supports regional specialization.
In addition, the short length of some tours, such as 1-year unaccompanied
assignments, may not give an officer sufficient time to master a language.
According to State's Inspector General, as long as unaccompanied
assignments are restricted to 1 year, there is little incentive for
officers to seek extensive language training.22 In an effort to make
better use of the department's training investment, the FSI has encouraged
officers and specialists to take FSI courses to refine their language
skills and achieve greater facility when dealing with the local community.
But officers in both Yemen and China stated that State's assignment system
does not allow for sufficient time between assignments to utilize FSI's
continued language training. Compounding this problem, officers stated
that their language skills often diminish when a new assignment takes them
to a region requiring different language skills. According to FSI, the
need to fill gaps at posts, the lack of a training float, and other
circumstances particular to individual staff-such as family issues,
learning difficulties and aptitude, and application-hinder FSI's language
training efforts.
21ISP-I-05-04A.
22Employees assigned to one-year unaccompanied posts may extend their
tours.
Lack of Foreign Language Capability May Adversely Effect State's Operations
State's foreign language gaps may negatively impact posts' operations.
According to the Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and Cultural
Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, deficits in foreign
language education negatively affect our national security, diplomacy, law
enforcement, intelligence gathering efforts, and cultural understanding by
preventing effective communication in foreign media environments, impeding
counter-terrorism efforts, and limiting our capacity to work with people
and governments in post conflict zones. We found examples of this negative
impact involving a variety of officers and specialists serving in
language-designated positions without the required foreign language
skills.
o Consular officers: Officials at one high visa fraud post that
we visited stated that, due to language skill deficiencies,
consular officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully
understanding everything the applicants tell them during visa
interviews. In Jakarta, where almost all visa interviews are
conducted in Indonesian, the consul general position was filled,
at the time of our review, by an officer with a language waiver,23
making supervision and monitoring of the six first tour junior
consular officers problematic.
o Economic and political officers: An economic officer in a
superhard language-speaking country had been conducting several
important negotiations in English with foreign government
officials over a number of months with little results. When the
officials began discussing the same issue in the host country
language, the whole tenure of the negotiations changed. According
to the officer, one of the foreign government officials who did
not understand English, and was therefore silent throughout the
initial meetings, had actually been the most valuable source of
information all along, yet could only convey that information when
the meeting was conducted in his own language. Additionally,
according to senior officials in two of the countries we visited,
officers without fluent language skills who accompany them to
high-level meetings often produce inaccurate notes. Since these
notes provide a basis for the embassy's reporting, the officials
spend a great deal of time correcting notes rather than addressing
more pressing concerns. Furthermore, in Beirut, State's Inspector
General reported that most of the political and economic officers
did not receive the Arabic-language training needed to work
professionally in Lebanon, limiting opportunities to expand their
contacts to the less sophisticated urban areas and into the
countryside.
o Public diplomacy officers: Officers at many posts cannot
communicate effectively with foreign audiences in local languages,
hampering their ability to cultivate personal relationships and
explain U.S. foreign policy. According to a recent GAO report24
many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot
communicate with local audiences as well as their positions
require. For example, an information officer in Cairo stated that
his office does not have enough Arabic speaking staff to engage
the Egyptian media effectively. According to a State Inspector
General inspection report on the U.S. embassy in Damascus, public
affairs officers need Arabic language skills to maintain and
expand contacts with nongovernmental, human rights, and civil
society groups, but the language training offered in Damascus
fails to prepare them for the idiomatic Arabic spoken in the
country.
o Management officers: According to one ambassador we met with, a
senior level embassy official, who did not have sufficient
speaking and reading language requirements for his position, met
with a prime minister, but was unable to participate fully in the
top-secret discussion without an outside translator present.
However, because the prime minister would not speak freely with
the translator present, the meeting was not productive.
o Foreign service specialists: A regional security officer stated
that lack of foreign language capability may hinder intelligence
gathering because local informants are reluctant to speak through
locally hired interpreters.
State Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts
State has yet to evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to
improve its foreign language capabilities. In 2002, we reported
that State did not know whether its language incentives had helped
to close skill gaps for certain languages. We recommended that
State adopt a strategic, results-oriented approach to its human
capital management and workforce planning. We recommended an
approach that included setting strategic direction, assessing
agency gaps in foreign language skills, developing an action plan,
and monitoring its implementation and level of success. In
response, State described a number of activities it was
undertaking as examples of how it had addressed many of the
elements of workforce planning. However, we noted that State still
needed to develop an action plan for correcting foreign language
shortfalls and institute a monitoring process to assess the action
plan's implementation and performance.25
In 2003, we reported that State had not established numerical
targets for the number of individuals with hard-to-learn language
skills it aimed to hire. We also reported that State could not
provide current or historical data showing the number of
individuals it hired as a direct result of its targeted outreach
efforts. We further recommended that State collect and maintain
data on the effectiveness of its efforts to address language
gaps.26 At the time of that review, State said that it maintains
data on its recruitment efforts. More recently, State's Director
of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment told us that State has
made greater use of technology to track the results of its
outreach efforts. However, State was not using these data to
routinely and systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its
efforts. For example, when we asked for data to demonstrate
whether the percentage of new hires with foreign language skills
had increased since our last review, State initially told us that
such data were not available.27 State also told us that it still
could not link the results of its hiring to its targeted outreach
efforts. In its comments on this report, State provided a skills
gap analysis, which it submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget under the President's Management Agenda, as an example of
how it evaluates the effectiveness of its efforts to increase the
language proficiency of its FSO generalists and specialists. This
submission included targets for increasing the number of officers
who speak and read a language at a level 3 or above in fiscal year
2007. However, these targets were not linked to individual
languages.
GAO's internal control standards28 instruct agencies to identify
risks that could impede the efficient and effective achievement of
their objectives and assess their impact. State has not conducted
an assessment that would prioritize the resources it devotes to
specific languages based on risk. However, a number of potential
risks are associated with not having staff with the right language
skills at critical posts, including the risks of (1) adjudicating
visas to the wrong applicants, thereby jeopardizing U.S. national
security; (2) missing opportunities to advance U.S. foreign policy
positions due to ineffective communication with foreign media
environments; and (3) compromising U.S. intelligence gathering as
a result of lost information from potential informants. State's
Director General has said that State has not conducted the type of
risk assessment that would potentially reallocate resources from
one area to another based on strategic importance. Instead, State
refines its critical needs languages list on a yearly basis.
Conclusions
Despite the progress made under the DRI, critical gaps in staffing
at hardship posts and shortages of staff with foreign language
proficiency in critical languages continue to impact State's
diplomatic readiness. State has provided a variety of incentives
and taken a number of other actions to attract staff to hardship
posts and to improve its foreign language capabilities since we
last reported on this issue in 2003; however, State has not
evaluated these efforts. Further, some mid-level positions at
hardship posts continue to remain vacant for years, and we found
that bids for such positions have not increased significantly.
Moreover, State has resisted using its authority to direct staff
to hardship posts to fill critical vacancies. Similarly, State has
not conducted the type of risk assessment of its critical language
needs that would allow it to reallocate limited staffing,
training, and other resources to fill critical language gaps in
areas of high priority. Because State does not currently have a
sufficient level and mix of staffing and language resources to
immediately fill all of its gaps in these areas, choices must be
made about diplomatic readiness priorities, given the risk and
strategic interests in particular regions and countries. Without
taking a risk-based approach to the allocation of these limited
resources, these gaps will continue to compromise State's ability
to carry out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical
mission functions, including reaching out to foreign audiences in
regions of critical importance to the war on terror.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as
the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report
recommends that the Secretary of State take the following five
actions:
o Consider using directed assignments, as necessary, using a
risk-based approach, to fill critical positions with fully
qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to
effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at
hardship posts;
o Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the department's
incentive programs for hardship post assignments, establishing
specific indicators of progress and adjusting the use of the
incentives based on this analysis;
o Consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours,
consecutive assignments in certain countries, and more regional
specialization in certain areas, in order to hone officers' skills
in certain superhard languages and better leverage the investment
State makes in language training;
o Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to
improve the language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists,
establishing specific indicators of progress in filling language
gaps and adjusting its efforts, accordingly; and
o Conduct a risk assessment of critical language needs in regions
and countries of strategic importance, make realistic projections
of the staff time and related training float necessary to
adequately train personnel to meet those needs, and target its
limited resources for language training, as needed, to fill these
critical gaps.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments and our responses to specific points are reprinted in
appendix IV. State generally concurred with the report's
observations, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, State
said it would consider using directed assignments when necessary
and evaluate the effectiveness of its incentives programs. The
department also stated that it is examining its assignment system
and expects to make significant changes that will address many of
the concerns noted in this report. State described a number of
programs that it has initiated to address staffing and foreign
language shortfalls. State cited the Generalist Career Development
Program and its Global Repositioning Initiative as examples of
efforts to encourage service at hardship posts and enhance foreign
language proficiency.
State commented that it is evaluating the effectiveness of its
efforts to improve the language capabilities of its staff.
However, while State is evaluating some components of its efforts
to enhance language capabilities, it is not doing so routinely and
systematically. For example, it did not compile data to determine
whether the percentage of new hires with language skills had
increased until we requested it, and State acknowledged that the
department still could not link the results of its hiring to its
targeted outreach efforts. In addition, State commented that it
conducts a risk assessment when the department reassesses its
language needs when realigning positions to support administration
priorities, conducts annual reviews of language designations of
positions, and modifies its critical language requirements to
align with its diplomatic strategies. However, State does not
conduct the type of assessment that we are recommending, which
would allocate language resources based on the strategic
importance of a country or region and the risks associated with
not having language-proficient staff at posts in those locations.
We are sending this report to other interested Members of Congress
and to the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available
at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of State's (State) progress in
eliminating staffing gaps, we
o reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports,
o reviewed documentation on the goals and results of the
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) and reports on incentives to
attract bidders to hardship posts,
o analyzed staffing and vacancy data, including State
surplus/deficit reports,
o analyzed 2004 and 2005 bidding data to determine the average
number of bids per posts by hardship differential and by career
track, and
o interviewed officials in State's Bureau of Human Resources and
Bureau of Consular Affairs and six regional bureaus regarding
vacancy and staffing issues.
To determine the total staff surplus/deficit at the Department of
State, we analyzed State staffing data and compared the number of
positions in each career track with the number of FSOs in each
track. To calculate the deficit for the mid-level officers, we
used data for FS-01, FS-02, and FS-03. For example, if the total
number of employees in the consular career track is 1,055 and the
total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in
officers would be 811. We analyzed data for each career track to
determine the surplus/deficit for each.
We analyzed bidding data to determine the average number of
position bids by posts, the median average bid for each
differential rate, and the areas of specialization that are
difficult to staff.1 For these analyses, we used the mid-level
bidding data for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. In order to
compare 2005 data with 2002 data from our previous report and
remain consistent, we used FS-04 tenured, FS-03, and FS-02 bid
data. To obtain the average number of bids for each post, we took
the total number of bids received on all positions at each post
and divided it by the total number of positions to be filled at
the post. For example, in the 2002 summer assignments cycle, Lagos
had eight positions to be filled and received a total of 11 bids,
resulting in an average of 1.38 bids for this post. To obtain the
median bid at each differential rate, as represented in the line
in figure 3, we arranged in ascending order the average bid for
each post at the corresponding differential rate and used the
middle average bid. For example, assuming there are only five
posts at the 25 differential rate and their average bids are 3, 5,
7, 9, and 16, the median of the average bids is 7. The bidding
data include the number of positions to be filled at each post and
the number of bids received for each position. We used the
mid-level bidding data because mid-level positions comprised 56
percent of the total foreign service workforce. We also used the
bidding data for the summer assignments cycle because, according
to State officials, most employees are transferred during this
cycle, compared to the winter cycle. Although we analyzed data for
the two cycles, we provided information for only the 2005 cycle
because the results for 2004 were similar.
To assess State's progress in filling gaps in the language
proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff, we
performed the following:
o reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports;
o analyzed data on the foreign language requirements of State and
its efforts to enhance its foreign language capability;
o analyzed worldwide data on language-designated positions by
post, languages, career track, specialty, and grade;
o analyzed data on the language proficiency of staff at specific
posts by career track, specialty, and grade; and
o interviewed officials of the Office of Recruitment and the
Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis of the
Bureau of Human Resources, State's Office of Inspector General,
and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) regarding the hiring and
training of language proficient staff.
We compared the number of language designated positions in fiscal
year 2001 with the number in 2005 to determine whether the number
of language-designated positions had increased, decreased, or
remained the same. We also compared staff's language proficiency
skills with their position's language requirements to determine
whether they met the requirements for the positions. For this
analysis we considered language-designated generalist and
specialist positions that were filled as of October, 2005. We
compared the positions' speaking and reading requirements against
their occupants' tested scores in the designated languages. In
cases where the occupants of language-designated positions had no
tested score, we deemed that they had failed to meet the
requirements. Several posts had "dual-language" positions; for
example, Tunis had a number of positions that could either be
filled by an Arabic or a French speaking officer. For some
dual-language positions, the occupants tested for both languages,
and in those instances we selected either the designated primary
language, according to State's records, or the secondary language
if the occupant failed to meet the primary language's requirements
but met the second language's requirements. In our tabulations, we
classified those dual language positions according to the ones we
selected, which were usually, but not always, the designated
primary languages. There were a number of dual language positions
whose occupants met the requirements for both languages. As our
analysis was designed to test whether the positions' requirements
were being met, not to estimate the number of occupants with
language abilities at each post or for each language, we did not
include those secondary languages. For a few positions, State had
created two sets of language requirements; when that occurred, we
compared the higher of the requirements against the tested scores.
We obtained bidding, assignment, and foreign language data from
State's Global Employee Management System (GEMS) database, which
tracks State personnel actions. The data in GEMS are compiled from
a variety of sources. For example, the Office of Career
Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) in State's Bureau of Human
Resources enters data in GEMS on the results of the bidding and
the assignment of employees to overseas posts. FSI provides the
data on the language proficiency of FSOs and specialists. We
reviewed the data for reasonableness and interviewed officials
from the Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis
and HR/CDA, and officials of the Foreign Service Institute
concerning the reliability of the data. The officials stated that
all employees are knowledgeable about their data, which serves as
a reliability check on the system. Based on our analysis of the
data and discussions with the officials, we determined the data
are sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria; Sana'a, Yemen;
and Beijing, China, to study the impact of staffing and language
gaps at selected posts.2 We developed a matrix containing
information on staffing vacancies, number of bids per position,
officers in stretch positions, foreign language requirement, and
the foreign language capabilities of staff in language-designated
positions to identify potential fieldwork locations. We selected
the posts in Nigeria because of the low number of staff applying
for each position. We selected Sana'a because of the low number of
staff applying for each position, because it requires staff
proficient in Arabic, which is a difficult language to learn, and
because of Yemen's importance to the war on terrorism. We selected
Beijing because it requires staff proficient in Chinese, which is
also a difficult language to learn, and because of its strategic
importance to the United States. We performed our work from August
2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Appendix II: Department of State Staffing
As of September 30, 2005, the Department of State (State) had
about 19,000 full-time American employees, including foreign
service generalists, foreign service specialists, and civil
servants. Table 6 illustrates State's staffing by position type,
as of September 30, 2005.
Table 6: State Department Worldwide Staffing by Position Type as
of September 30, 2005
Full-time Full-time Staff
permanent Staff surplus Political
positions available (deficit) appointees
Total Department of State
staffing 21,180 19,255 (1,925) 75
Total foreign service staffing 11,387 11,189 (198) 49
Foreign service
generalist-overseas 4,457 4,232 (225) 45
Foreign service
specialist-overseas 3,403 3,150 (253) 4
Foreign service
generalist-domestic 1,890 2,123 233
Foreign service
specialist-domestic 1,637 1,684 47
Total civil service staffing 9,793 8,066 (1,727) 26
Source: Department of State.
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency at Language-Designated
Positions
Table 7: Location, Number of Language-Designated Positions, and
Percent of Staff Filling the Positions Who Do Not Meet the
Speaking and Reading Language Requirements
Number of language- Percent of staff who do not meet
Location designated positions language requirements
Abidjan 22 47
Abu Dhabi 10 25
Abuja 1 100
Adana 3 67
Addis Ababa 2 100
Algiers 10 11
Almaty 14 30
Amman 18 18
Amsterdam 3 0
Ankara 31 36
Antananarivo 12 55
Ashgabat 11 20
Astana 6 25
Asuncion 20 22
Athens 27 36
Baghdad 6 67
Baku 18 44
Bamako 14 77
Bangkok 41 37
Bangui 3 0
Banja Luka 1 100
Barcelona 4 0
Beijing 104 38
Beirut 9 12
Belgrade 23 38
Belize City 1 100
Berlin 37 30
Bern 15 46
Bishkek 9 11
Bogota 97 20
Bordeaux 1 0
Brasilia 43 47
Bratislava 14 29
Bridgetown 2 100
Brussels 16 20
Brussels NATO 16 47
Brussels USE 11 40
Bucharest 28 33
Budapest 28 48
Buenos Aires 41 24
Bujumbura 10 33
Cairo 32 59
Caracas 45 27
Casablanca 12 56
Chengdu 16 54
Chennai 1 0
Chiang Mai 6 0
Chisinau 11 33
Ciudad Juarez 18 33
Cologne 1 100
Colombo 4 0
Conakry 12 36
Copenhagen 8 12
Cotonou 9 25
Curacao 1 0
Dakar 29 33
Damascus 19 41
Dar-es-Salaam 3 67
Dhahran 3 33
Dhaka 11 18
Dili 2 50
Djibouti 7 75
Doha 4 25
Douala 1 100
Dubai 6 17
Dushanbe 8 62
Du:sseldorf 2 0
Florence 3 0
Frankfurt 32 39
Fukuoka 4 50
Geneva 10 22
Georgetown 1 100
Guadalajara 20 10
Guangzhou 35 31
Guatemala 36 26
Guayaquil 12 0
Hamburg 4 0
Hanoi 19 24
Havana 27 36
Helsinki 7 14
Hermosillo 8 0
Ho Chi Minh City 26 16
Hong Kong 18 44
Islamabad 6 0
Istanbul 19 25
Jakarta 35 21
Jeddah 8 14
Jerusalem 14 29
Kabul 16 67
Kathmandu 8 40
Kiev 40 9
Kigali 13 30
Kinshasa 22 24
Krakow 12 18
Kuala Lumpur 5 40
Kuwait 13 50
La Paz 29 19
Lagos 1 0
Leipzig 3 33
Libreville 7 17
Lima 50 21
Lisbon 20 25
Ljubljana 9 12
Lome 9 29
London 1 0
Luanda 11 33
Luxembourg 8 37
Lyon 1 0
Madrid 35 13
Managua 30 15
Manama 7 17
Manila 6 17
Maputo 15 15
Marseille 2 50
Matamoros 6 0
Medan 2 0
Merida 5 0
Mexico City 1 0
Mexico DF 96 16
Milan 13 18
Minsk 12 9
Monterrey 26 0
Montevideo 16 20
Montreal 13 30
Moscow 95 29
Mumbai 2 0
Munich 8 29
Muscat 6 60
Nagoya 2 50
Naha 5 50
Nairobi 4 100
Naples 8 29
N'Djamena 8 57
New Delhi 15 38
Niamey 10 10
Nicosia 2 0
Nogales 4 67
Nouakchott 6 20
Nuevo Laredo 5 20
OECD Paris 5 20
Osaka-Kobe 10 30
Oslo 10 25
Ottawa 7 17
Ouagadougou 10 43
Panama 31 19
Paramaribo 3 0
Paris 64 22
Paris UNESCO 5 40
Peshawar 3 0
Phnom Penh 10 50
Podgorica 3 33
Punta Delgado 2 50
Port Louis 6 25
Prague 23 12
Praia 3 50
Pristina, KO 8 100
Port-Au-Prince 30 15
Quebec 2 0
Quito 28 17
Rabat 20 42
Rangoon 8 37
Recife 4 0
Reykjavik 4 50
Riga 11 25
Rio de Janeiro 18 24
Riyadh 19 31
Rome 43 38
San Jose 28 16
San Salvador 38 21
Sana'a 19 60
Santiago 29 22
Santo Domingo 50 7
Sao Paulo 30 28
Sapporo 2 100
Sarajevo 20 47
Seoul 33 17
Shanghai 32 37
Shenyang 16 60
Singapore 2 50
Skopje 14 27
Sofia 17 19
St. Petersburg 10 12
Stockholm 11 44
Strasbourg 1 0
Surabaya 7 17
Suva 1 0
Tallinn 9 25
Tashkent 22 29
Tbilisi 14 70
Tegucigalpa 33 19
Tel Aviv 22 28
The Hague 8 14
Thessaloniki 2 0
Tijuana 14 14
Tirana 15 33
Tokyo 45 39
Tokyo RLS 1 0
Toulouse 1 0
Tripoli 6 60
Tunis 26 35
Tunis RLS 1 0
Ulaanbaatar 4 50
Vatican 5 75
Vienna 16 33
Vienna OSCE 1 100
Vientiane 11 27
Vilnius 11 11
Vladivostok 5 40
Warsaw 42 21
Yaounde 18 33
Yekaterinburg 6 20
Yerevan 17 50
Zagreb 17 0
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State Data.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 5.
See comment 4.
See comment 3.
See comment 6.
See comment 7.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's
letter dated July 17, 2006.
1. We have modified our discussion of staffing at
posts in Nigeria and China to show that there is a
mix of officers.
2. Any analysis of bidding data will necessarily
involve "snapshots" in time. Our analysis of the 2005
bidding data was intended to demonstrate whether
posts with higher hardship differentials have
difficulty attracting applicants compared to posts
with low or no differentials. Our approach was
identical to the one we used in 2002, and State
raised no such concerns then. Our analysis shows that
State has not made much progress since 2002 in
attracting employees to bid on hardship posts.
3. We acknowledge that State has a system for
identifying its language requirements. However, State
continues to fill language-designated positions with
staff who do not meet the language requirement. As
noted in this report, foreign language gaps may
negatively impact posts' operations. For example,
consular officers at one post told us they sometimes
adjudicate visas without fully understanding
everything the applicants tell them during visa
interviews. A risk-based approach will allow State to
make choices given its current mix of staffing and
language resources.
4. State did not provide these reports to us until
after our report was drafted, and we did not have
sufficient time to assess them. The language
competency assessment State provided shows the total
number of officers with certain levels of proficiency
in critical needs languages and corresponding ratios
of officers with language proficiency to language
designated positions. The assessment also establishes
out-year targets for increasing the number of
officers with level-3 language proficiency. However,
it does not break out the data and targets by
individual language. Thus, State's overall targets
could be achieved, even if serious proficiency gaps
remained for some languages but not for others. We
also note that the report does not include targets
for specialists. Further, State has acknowledged that
it has not collected data to link its recruitment
efforts to the number of people it hires with foreign
language skills.
5. Our analysis of the language proficiency of
officers in language designated positions is based on
State's own established requirements for these
positions, whether for generalists or specialists. We
provided information on the language proficiency of
the two different groups for Arabic and Chinese, and
we noted that specialists had some of the highest
percentages of staff that did not meet their
position's requirements. We further noted that
State's Director General had stated, in a cable
issued in January 2006 that the department had been
shortsighted in not providing sufficient language
training to specialists. We have included additional
information on the overall percentages of officers
meeting language requirements for the two different
groups.
6. We have included additional information on the
percentages of officers meeting either the speaking
or reading requirement, but not both requirements. We
note that the differences are only 3 percentage
points.
7. We added a statement to the discussion of 1-year
tours noting that employees may extend their tours.
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128
Staff Acknowledgment
In addition to the individual named above, Michael Courts,
Assistant Director; Joseph Carney, Martin de Alteriis, Gloria
Hernandez-Saunders, Julia Roberts, Josie Sigl, and La Verne
Tharpes made key contributions to the report.
GAO�s Mission
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23A language waiver is granted to officers who do not comply with the
position's required language proficiency levels. A language waiver is
requested by a post or bureau and granted by the Bureau of Human Resources
under some circumstances, usually because of an urgent need for the
assignee to proceed to post.
24GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges, GAO-06-535 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006).
25 GAO-02-375 .
26 GAO-04-139 .
27State later compiled the data from FSI records.
28GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: September 1999).
1The bidding and assignment data that we reviewed were for tenured FS-04,
FS-03, and FS-02 mid-level positions. In terms of the foreign service
grade structure, mid-level positions are equivalent to the civil service
GS-12, GS-13, and GS-14, respectively.
2The results of the fieldwork cannot be generalized to posts worldwide.
(320357)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-894 .
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-894 , a report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate
August 2006
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to
Address Gaps
GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that
have hampered the Department of State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign
policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to the war
on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
(DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees.
This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing
shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps in the
language proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff. To
accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data and
met with State officials.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as
language proficiency of foreign service staff, GAO is making five
recommendations to the Secretary of State in the areas of staffing and
assignment of foreign service staff, including using directed assignments,
as necessary, using a risk-based approach to fill critical positions with
fully qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to
effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at hardship
posts; and systematically evaluating the effectiveness of initiatives to
reduce staffing and language gaps. State generally agreed with our
findings and recommendations.
State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since
implementing the DRI. However, the initiative did not fully meet its
goals, and mid-level vacancies remain a problem at many posts, including
some critical to the war on terror. State implemented various incentives
to attract more mid-level officers to these locations, including offering
extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at certain posts.
However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these incentives and
continues to have difficulties attracting qualified applicants. Mid-level
positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack
experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as well-equipped to handle
crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap can severely
compromise the department's readiness to carry out foreign policy
objectives and execute critical post-level duties.
State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities,
but serious language gaps remain. State initiated a number of efforts to
improve its foreign language capabilities. However, it has not evaluated
the effectiveness of these efforts, and it continues to experience
difficulties filling its language-designated positions with language
proficient staff. Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not
meet the language requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain
critical posts-for example, 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Several
factors-including the perception that spending too much time in one region
may hinder officers' and specialists' promotion potential-may discourage
employees from bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain
their language skills over time and limit State's ability to take
advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. Gaps in
language proficiency can adversely impact State's ability to communicate
with foreign audiences and execute critical duties.
*** End of document. ***