Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened (28-JUL-06, GAO-06-869).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible
for screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives
and has deployed explosive detection systems and developed
standard procedures for their use. TSA also allows alternative
screening procedures to be used for short-term, special
circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA prioritized the
use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified
trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational
efficiencies; (2) how TSA reported use of the procedures and
ensured that standard procedures are used whenever possible; and
(3) what steps TSA took to reduce airports' need to use
alternative screening procedures and to establish performance
measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO
interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's
database on checked baggage screening operations; and conducted
airport site visits.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-869
ACCNO: A57639
TITLE: Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage
Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened
DATE: 07/28/2006
SUBJECT: Airport security
Airports
Aviation security
Baggage
Baggage screening
Checked baggage screening
Explosives
Explosives detection systems
Explosives trace detection
Internal controls
Passengers
Standards
Standards evaluation
Policies and procedures
TSA Explosive Detection System
TSA Explosive Trace Detection System
TSA Performance Management Information
System
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GAO-06-869
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD
* Alternative Screening Procedures
* TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Re
* TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedure
* Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Ef
* Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Tra
* Positive Passenger Bag Match
* Canine Screening
* Physical Inspection
* Alternative Hybrid Procedures
* TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
* The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Proced
* TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard
* TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of St
* Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS
* Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures
* Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More
* TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative S
* TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Sc
* TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Rela
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
* Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* Related GAO Products
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Ranking DemocraticMember, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
July 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened
GAO-06-869
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 9
TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment 14
The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures Is Not
Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved 21
TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets 25
Conclusions 31
Recommendations for Executive Action 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 40
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43
Related GAO Products 44
Table
Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines 16
Figures
Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
Screen Checked Baggage 11
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 12
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act DHS Department of Homeland
Security EDS Explosive Detection System ETD Explosive Trace Detection FAA
Federal Aviation Administration FSD Federal Security Director GPRA
Government Performance and Results Act OI Office of Inspections PMIS
Performance Management Information System TSA Transportation Security
Administration TSO Transportation Security Officer
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
July 28, 2006
The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking Democratic Member Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Oberstar:
Commercial U.S. aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks
through the use of explosives carried in checked baggage, as demonstrated
by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which further highlighted the
vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of terrorism, Congress passed and
the President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), mandating, among other things, that all checked baggage at U.S.
airports be screened using explosive detection systems by December 31,
2002.1 In response to this mandate, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of systems and has established
standard procedures for their use: (1) explosive detection systems (EDS)
that use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that
may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt and (2)
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, whereby an individual (i.e., a
baggage screener) swabs a bag and then inserts the swab into the ETD
machine, which, in turn, can detect chemical residues that may indicate
the presence of explosives within a bag.2 TSA also allows alternative
screening procedures to be used when volumes of baggage awaiting screening
pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there
is a security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in
an area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and
ETD machines in nonstandard ways,3 and also include three procedures that
do not use EDS or ETD-screening with explosives detection canines,
physical bag searches, and matching baggage to passenger manifests to
confirm that the passenger and his or her baggage are on the same plane.
It is TSA's policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures
whenever possible and, when necessary, to use EDS or ETD-based alternative
screening procedures before using non-EDS or ETD alternative screening
procedures. TSA has also established operating procedures for checked
baggage screening that instruct Transportation Security Officers
(TSO-formerly known as screeners) in how to use these standard and
alternative screening procedures.
1Congress subsequently extended this deadline by 1 year.
2TSA interpreted ATSA's reference to "explosive detection systems" to
allow for the deployment of EDS and ETD to satisfy the mandate.
3The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security
information.
In February 2004, we testified that TSA was unable to fully utilize
explosive detection systems to satisfy the ATSA mandate to screen 100
percent of checked baggage for explosives because of TSO shortages and
problems with screening equipment, among other factors.4 Further, in
February 2005, we reported that TSA considers one baggage screening
method-the use of EDS machines-to be the superior baggage screening
procedure in terms of efficiency compared to ETD because EDS automatically
detects explosives without direct human involvement and screens more bags
for explosives per hour. We also reported that at most smaller airports,
where EDS machines are not installed, TSA screens solely with ETD
machines. Finally, we reported that while TSA had made progress in
deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,
prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to
achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. In
February 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress detailing its strategic
planning framework for its checked baggage screening program. According to
TSA, the framework, which focuses on identifying optimal checked baggage
screening solutions for airports, will be used to establish a
comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening program.
TSA expects to complete the strategic plan in early fall 2006.
You asked that we continue to assess TSA's progress in enhancing the
effectiveness of checked baggage screening operations. In February 2006,
we issued a report that contained sensitive security information regarding
TSA's use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures, including the extent to which the procedures were used by TSA
and the trade-offs in security effectiveness of using standard and
alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for
explosives.5 We concurrently issued a classified correspondence on our
analysis of the results of TSA's checked baggage screening covert
testing.6 This report provides the results of our February 2006 report
with sensitive security information removed. In this report, we address
the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the use of standard
and alternative checked baggage screening procedures and what security
effectiveness trade-offs and operational efficiencies has TSA identified
in using these procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To
what extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures to
screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure that
standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3) What steps
has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
procedures and to establish performance measures and targets for the use
of the procedures?
4GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004).
To address how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
procedures and identified trade-offs in security effectiveness and
operational efficiencies of using standard and alternative screening
procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives, we assessed TSA's
standard operating procedures, obtained and analyzed relevant legislation,
and conducted a literature search to obtain information on screening
procedures, technologies, and related aviation trends. We also reviewed
studies conducted by TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory regarding
checked baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
offices as well as air carriers, explosive detection systems equipment
manufacturers, and an airport industry association to obtain information
regarding TSA's checked baggage screening procedures and the relative
priority they were given. To determine the extent to which TSA used
standard and alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
and how TSA ensured that standard screening procedures are used whenever
possible, we reviewed TSA's checked baggage standard operating procedures
manual and its Performance Management Information System (PMIS) database,
which contains information on checked baggage screening operations.7 We
compared TSA procedures for use of standard and alternative screening
procedures with the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government. We interviewed TSA officials to determine the
reliability of the information contained in the PMIS database and reviewed
selected database records. Although we determined that the database did
not always contain accurate data on the duration of each occurrence of
alternative baggage screening procedures, we nonetheless considered the
database to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report since the
data identified overall trends in the use of alternative screening
procedures. To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to
use alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA has
set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA directives
regarding use of the procedures, PMIS data, standard operating procedures
for checked baggage, and the inventory of explosive detection systems.
When we found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive detection
systems, we worked with TSA to resolve the discrepancies. TSA also
completed a reconciliation of the inventory database with data collected
manually by TSA officials. We also examined TSA's checked baggage
screening performance measures and targets as they relate to the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requirements. We
visited nine airports during this review to observe baggage screening
operations. We chose these airports based on reporting in PMIS, selecting
some airports that had used alternative screening procedures and some that
had not used the procedures. We also conducted structured interviews with
TSA Federal Security Directors (FSD)8 and their staffs who were
responsible for the security of 29 randomly selected airports. Because we
selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information we
obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all airports
nationwide.9 Also, while the interviews we conducted with FSDs were random
samples of airports, the samples were too small to generalize the
interview results with a high degree of statistical confidence to all
airports nationwide.
5GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Management of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved, GAO-06-291SU (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2006).
6GAO, Analysis of TSA's Covert Testing for Checked Baggage Screening,
GAO-06-317C (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006).
7PMIS is a Web-based application used by TSA field staff to submit data to
headquarters on operations and performance.
8The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority responsible
for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the
nation's commercial airports.
9Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are
selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using specific
characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from nonprobability
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because in a
nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being studied have
no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief
TSA prioritized the use of standard and alternative checked baggage
screening procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials'
judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures, and TSA's use of these
procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. It is TSA's
policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures whenever possible
because of legislative requirements to do so and because TSA has concluded
that these procedures provide the most effective detection of explosives
at a checked baggage screening station. TSA considers screening with EDS
to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more
bags per hour and automatically detect explosives without direct human
involvement. Given the high volumes of checked baggage processed at some
airports and unforeseen events such as equipment failures and severe
weather, TSA has determined that it will have to continue to at times use
alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives.
TSA officials prioritized the use of these procedures based on their
professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures and the
classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD machines obtained
from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory. Alternative screening
procedures include physical bag searches; alternative hybrid procedures,
which involve a combination of the standard checked baggage procedures for
EDS and ETD;10 matching checked bags to passenger manifests to deter
bombers who try to load a bag on a plane without boarding; explosive
detection canines; and another screening method TSA has determined to be
sensitive security information. With regard to operational efficiencies,
TSA has not determined the throughput (number of checked bags screened per
hour) and costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part
because it does not count the number of bags screened using these
procedures. While TSA has used alternative screening procedures for more
than 3 years and expects to continue to use them, it has not tested the
security effectiveness of these procedures in an operational environment.
TSA has conducted national covert (undercover, unannounced) testing of
standard screening procedures since September 2002 to assess checked
baggage screening technologies and procedures, and TSO performance in
detecting explosives in an operational environment. TSA has also
authorized FSDs and their designates to conduct local covert testing on
standard screening procedures at airports since March 2005 to determine if
TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosive devices hidden in checked
baggage. However, TSA has not conducted national or local covert testing
specifically focused on alternative screening procedures. TSA officials
stated that conducting national testing of alternative screening
procedures would be challenging, particularly since testing is planned
ahead of time and it is difficult to predict when an airport might use
alternative screening procedures. While it may be logistically difficult
to conduct national covert testing on alternative screening procedures,
TSA data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
reasons for the usage could provide TSA with information to use in
selecting airports for covert testing as part of the risk-based approach
to covert testing that it is developing. TSA officials also cited
challenges in conducting local covert testing of alternative screening
procedures, including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the testing,
particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their staffs authorize
and initiate the use of alternative screening procedures, they could
schedule some of their ongoing local covert testing for checked baggage
screening to coincide with the use of these procedures. In not assessing
the alternative screening procedures through covert testing, TSA is not
collecting data that could help determine how effective the procedures are
in an operational setting or how to improve the security effectiveness of
the procedures.
10Alternative hybrid procedures use a combination of EDS and ETD at a
screening station that is usually configured only for EDS. At some
screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a hybrid configuration
as a standard screening procedure.
TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening procedures in
PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all checked baggage screened
using EDS and ETD with standard or alternative screening procedures. TSA
could not identify the percentage of usage of standard or alternative
screening procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
contains data on the number of bags screened; whereas for alternative
screening procedures, it contains data on the number of occasions and
hours of use. However, TSA officials estimated that a high percentage of
checked baggage is screened using EDS and ETD machines with standard
screening procedures11 and a low percentage is screened using alternative
screening procedures.12 TSA also established internal controls to monitor
and track the use of standard and alternative screening procedures,
including requiring FSDs to report the use of alternative screening
procedures into PMIS and to call headquarters for permission to use the
alternative screening procedures for more than 2 hours. According to the
Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control, all transactions and
other significant events need to be completely and accurately documented.
However, we identified several areas where TSA's information on its use of
standard and alternative screening procedures was not complete or accurate
for the period covered by our review. First, TSA's method for estimating
the number of bags screened with ETD using standard screening procedures
led to inaccurate counts of baggage screened. Improved counting of bags
would provide TSA management with better information to use in making
decisions related to its baggage screening operations including where to
deploy screening equipment. Second, FSDs and their staffs did not always
accurately report the occurrences when a particular alternative baggage
screening procedure was used, impeding TSA's ability to reliably determine
how often and for how long the alternative screening procedures were used.
Third, FSDs and their staffs did not always report the use of alternative
screening procedures as required. Inaccurate and incomplete reporting on
how often alternative screening procedures are used or for how long,
combined with not tracking the number of bags screened using the
procedures, may limit TSA managers' ability to assess the effect of using
alternative screening procedures on aviation security and to determine the
types of actions that should be taken at airports to help minimize the use
of these procedures. TSA officials stated they are working with FSDs to
correct these reporting problems and have issued guidance clarifying
requirements for reporting alternative screening procedures.
11TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive its
estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.
12TSA determined that the estimated use of alternative screening
procedures is sensitive security information.
TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
procedures, but has not established performance measures or targets
regarding the use of these procedures. According to our review of PMIS
data, the use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and
September 2005-measured in terms of the total hours of use reported by
FSDs-initially increased and then declined.13 TSA attributed the reported
overall decline in the use of alternative screening procedures to a number
of factors, including better coordination with groups such as tour
operators; deploying "optimization teams" to airports that were frequently
using alternative screening procedures to determine why the procedures
were being used so often and to suggest remedies; and deploying additional
EDS machines.14 As we reported in March 2005, additional EDS systems
integrated into the airport baggage handling system ("in-line" EDS
systems) could reduce by 78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and
supervisors needed to screen checked baggage at airports with the
systems.15 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage screening planning
framework includes a prioritization of which additional airports should
receive new funding for in-line systems and a description of how
stand-alone EDS machines from those airports should be redistributed to
other airports. After in-line EDS systems are installed and any staffing
reductions are achieved, redistributing the screening positions to other
airports with staffing shortages could also reduce the need to use
alternative screening procedures at these airports. While TSA data
indicate that the use of alternative screening procedures is declining,
the strategic planning framework states that at some airports alternative
screening procedures will increasingly be used because of rising passenger
traffic. TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
current levels by 2010, which could increase airports' need to rely on
alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
additional or more efficient EDS machines. Furthermore, while TSA has
taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports, it has not created performance measures or targets regarding its
progress in minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports. By creating performance measures for the use of alternative
screening procedures and corresponding targets, TSA could gauge whether it
is making progress in working to minimize the need to use alternative
screening procedures at airports and to consider the necessity to take
further steps to minimize the need for their use.
13The specific details on the number of hours alternative screening
procedures were used are sensitive security information.
14At 46 airports, a combined total of 154 EDS machines were added; at 22
airports, a combined total of 62 EDS machines were removed; and 47
airports maintained the same number of EDS machines. One airport with two
EDS machines in inventory in 2005 was not on the 2004 or 2002 inventory
lists.
15GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar.15, 2005).
To help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
operations, including screening with alternative screening procedures, we
are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to use PMIS data on the use of
alternative screening procedures at airports to help determine which
airports to conduct national covert testing at and when to conduct such
testing, to conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
procedures, to strengthen its monitoring and tracking of the use of
alternative screening procedures, and to develop performance measures and
performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures.
We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations and stated that the recommendations and findings will help
strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening operations. The
full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix II.
Background
Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD
ATSA mandated that the screening of all checked baggage at commercial
airports be done using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.
To satisfy this mandate, TSA deployed two types of screening equipment to
all airports in the United States where screening is required: (1)
explosive detection systems, which use computer-aided tomography16 X-rays
adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives, and (2) explosives trace
detection systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of
explosive materials' vapors and residues. As we reported in February 2004,
largely because of shortages of equipment and insufficient time to modify
airports to accommodate EDS machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports,
to meet this deadline. Recognizing the obstacles encountered by TSA, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, in effect, subsequently extended the
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December
31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier
deadline established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of
fully satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face
challenges in screening checked baggage because of (1) an insufficient
number of TSOs to operate the EDS and ETD machines, TSO absenteeism, and a
lack of TSO training in how to operate the machines and (2) a lack of EDS
and ETD equipment and inoperable equipment.17
16Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional
image of the internal structures of a solid object by the observation and
recording of the differences in the effects on the passage of waves of
energy impinging on those structures.
By taking the equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from
different angles, the EDS machine examines the objects inside of the
baggage to identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives
such as density and atomic number. TSA has certified, acquired, and
deployed EDS machines manufactured by three companies. EDS machines can be
installed in airports either in stand-alone mode (not integrated with
baggage handling systems) or in-line (integrated with baggage handling
systems). TSA has developed standard procedures for using EDS. Figure 1
shows EDS machines in use at an airport.
17 GAO-04-440T .
Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
Screen Checked Baggage
At airports that do not have EDS machines and at airports where certain
screening stations do not have EDS-for example at curbside check-in
stations-TSA uses ETD machines to conduct primary screening. ETD machines
are also used for secondary screening, which resolves alarms from EDS
machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives inside a bag.
TSA has certified, acquired, and deployed ETD machines from three
manufacturers. Figure 2 shows an ETD machine in use at an airport.
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed primary screening with
both EDS and ETD machines simultaneously. In this hybrid configuration,
the EDS machine is used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are
used. Additionally, when the EDS machine alarms, the ETD machines are also
used for secondary screening.
Alternative Screening Procedures
TSA also uses alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
for explosives under certain short-term special circumstances, when the
standard procedures using EDS and ETD are not used. Two of these
procedures involve the use of EDS and ETD. The first of these is an
alternative hybrid procedure that is used at a screening station
configured only for EDS primary screening. Under this procedure, the EDS
is to be used to capacity and the remainder of the bags are screened with
ETD. The specifics of the second procedure that involves the use of EDS
and ETD are sensitive security information.18 If one of these EDS- or
ETD-based alternative screening procedure is not available, TSA will
resort to one of the procedures that does not use EDS or ETD-canine
screening; physical inspections of baggage; and positive passenger bag
match, which requires that passengers be on the same aircraft as their
checked baggage.19
FSDs and their designates not lower than the Assistant FSD for Screening
may authorize the use of alternative screening procedures under two
circumstances: (1) when the FSD or his or her designate determines that
there is a security threat created by large concentrations of passengers
waiting to have their baggage screened or (2) volumes of baggage awaiting
screening in a confined baggage screening area pose an explosive or other
security vulnerability. These circumstances may arise for reasons such as
high passenger volumes, screening machine breakdowns, or unusual weather
events such as hurricanes. After alternative screening procedures have
been used, TSA requires that information on each occurrence be recorded by
FSD staff into the PMIS database, including circumstances leading to the
use of the procedure, type of procedure used, and duration. This
information on the use of alternative screening procedures from PMIS is to
be included in daily briefing reports for TSA senior management.
18 TSA also moved additional ETD machines to screening stations to allow
for ETD screening. Prior to March 2005, TSA had categorized this
procedure, "additional ETDs," as an alternative screening procedure.
Beginning in March 2005, TSA began to categorize this procedure as a
standard screening procedure. We did not include this procedure in our
analysis of PMIS data on alternative screening procedures.
19ATSA, as codified at 49 U.S.C. S:44901(d)-(e), authorizes TSA to screen
checked baggage using canine screening, physical inspection, or a bag
match program if explosive detection equipment is unavailable.
TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment
TSA prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
of the security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's use of these
various procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA
officials determined that in general, standard screening procedures are
more effective than alternative screening procedures. TSA has estimated
that in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags per hour than ETD.
With regard to operational efficiencies, TSA has not determined the
throughput and costs of the various alternative screening procedures, in
part because it does not count the number of bags screened using the
procedures. Additionally, while TSA has assessed the security
effectiveness of screening with standard procedures in an operational
environment through covert testing, it has not conducted similar testing
of alternative screening procedures.
TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedures Based on
Legislative Requirements and TSA Officials' Judgment of Security Effectiveness
TSA is required by legislation to screen all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems, and TSA officials concluded that standard
screening procedures that use EDS or ETD provided the most effective
detection of explosives at a baggage screening station and that
alternative screening procedures should be used only for short-term,
special circumstances. These circumstances include times when security
targets are created by large volumes of passengers awaiting baggage
screening or when security vulnerabilities are created by volumes of bags
awaiting screening. According to TSA, a group of officials from its Chief
Technologist, Chief Counsel, Aviation Operations, and Operations Policy
offices met to prioritize the use of standard and alternative screening
procedures. TSA officials stated that this group did not use formal
criteria to prioritize the procedures but instead prioritized them based
on their professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures,
including the classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD
machines obtained from the Transportation Security Laboratory. This
prioritization was subsequently included in TSA's standard operating
procedures for checked baggage screening. TSA has determined that details
on the prioritization of alternative screening procedures constitute
sensitive security information.
Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Efficiency
TSA has estimated that, in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags
per hour than ETD-EDS ranges from a minimum of 80 bags per hour for one
model of a stand-alone machine up to 500 bags per hour for an in-line
system, compared to 36 bags per hour by the operator of an ETD machine.20
Whenever EDS machines have been installed at a screening station, TSA
requires airports to use them as the primary method to screen checked
baggage. At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a
hybrid configuration as a standard screening procedure that involves
colocated EDS and ETD machines for primary screening, with the EDS machine
used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are used. When the EDS
machine alarms, the ETD machines are also used for secondary screening.
Table 1 shows the bags per hour screened by EDS and ETD machines.
20TSA officials stated that two TSOs can use an ETD machine at the same
time, raising the baggage screened throughput to 72 bags per hour
Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines
Type of equipment Maximum bags per hour
EDS machines Stand-alone In-line
CTX 2500-stand-alone only 120 NAa
CTX 5500 180 250
CTX 9000-in-line only NA 500
L3 6000 140 500
CT-80-stand-alone only 80 NA
ETD machines-stand-alone only 36 MA
Source: TSA.
aNA: Not applicable.
At 312 mostly smaller airports and at some airport screening stations such
as curbside check-in stations, TSA has installed ETD instead of EDS for
primary screening because of the configuration of screening stations, the
costs associated with procuring EDS, and the low passenger volume at
smaller airports. In our March 2005 report, we recommended that TSA assess
the feasibility, expected benefits, and cost to replace ETD machines with
stand-alone EDS machines for the primary screening of checked baggage at
those airports where in-line EDS systems would not be either economically
justified or justified for other reasons. 21 DHS stated that TSA was
conducting an analysis of the airports that rely heavily on ETD machines
as the primary checked baggage screening technology in order to identify
airports that would benefit from replacing ETD machines with stand-alone
EDS equipment.22 In February 2006, in response to GAO's recommendation and
a legislative requirement to submit a schedule for expediting the
installation and use of in-line systems and replacement of ETD equipment
with EDS machines, 23 TSA provided its strategic planning framework for
its checked baggage screening program to Congress. This framework
introduces a strategy intended to increase efficiency through deploying
EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the
program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and
provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing
airline traffic and potential new threats.24 The framework is an initial
step in addressing the following areas:
21 GAO-05-365 .
22The stand-alone EDS equipment TSA is considering for these airports
includes surplus machines no longer needed once airports installed in-line
EDS machines and a newly certified EDS machine appropriate for baggage
screening operations that require a lower throughput (bags screened per
hour).
23Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, S: 4019, 118 Stat. 3638, 3721-22.
o optimized checked baggage screening solutions-finding the ideal
mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening
solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage
volumes and
o funding prioritization schedule by airport-identifying the top
25 airports that should first receive federal funding for projects
related to the installation of explosive detection systems based
on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors.
TSA's strategic plan for the checked baggage screening program,
which TSA expects to complete by early fall 2006, is to include
funding and cost-sharing strategies for the installation of
in-line baggage screening systems.
Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Trade-offs
in Security Effectiveness, while Trade-offs in Operational Efficiencies
Have Not Been Determined
TSA has determined that the use of alternative screening
procedures at airports has created trade-offs in security
effectiveness, but it has not determined the operational
efficiencies of these procedures in terms of throughput and
costs.25 TSA based its prioritization of the alternative screening
procedures on its judgment of the procedures' security
effectiveness and classified probabilities of detection of EDS and
ETD machines obtained from the TSA Transportation Security
Laboratory. TSA has not determined the operational efficiencies of
the various alternative screening procedures in terms of
throughput and costs in part because it does not count the number
of bags screened using the procedures. If the higher-prioritized
alternative screening procedure is not available at a screening
station, the FSD may authorize a lower-prioritized procedure.26
Positive Passenger Bag Match
Under the positive passenger bag match alternative screening
procedure, TSA coordinates with airlines to ensure that passengers
are on the same aircraft as their checked baggage. If a passenger
checks a bag but does not board the airplane, the bag is removed
before departure. This procedure was first implemented based on
the premise that a terrorist would seek to place a bomb on an
airplane without sacrificing his or her life by boarding the
airplane. In light of the suicide terrorist attacks of September
11, this premise is now considered flawed. An airline trade
association and airline officials representing two airlines we
interviewed also stated that the procedure creates operational
inefficiencies for airlines. According to these officials, the
process of matching bags with passengers can delay flights because
the flight cannot take off until all baggage is matched to an
on-board passenger. These officials also stated that implementing
the procedure increases the workload of airline personnel, who are
responsible for conducting the procedures at the direction of TSA.
Canine Screening
TSA also uses canine units as an alternative screening procedure.
These units are composed of trained explosives detection canines
and handlers. In terms of efficiency, TSA officials reported that
it can be difficult to mobilize canine units in sufficient time to
screen checked baggage when alternative screening procedures are
needed, especially since the need to use the procedures can arise
without warning. Officials also reported that screening checked
baggage using canines requires enough open floor space to lay out
the baggage as well as a sufficient number of personnel to move
the bags into position for canine screening.
Physical Inspection
The physical inspection alternative screening procedure requires
human intervention to detect explosives, weapons, and improvised
explosive devices and their components, and does not involve use
of EDS or ETD machines. While TSOs are trained to detect
improvised explosive devices and their components and to detect
signs of tampering, the success of the TSOs in finding these items
depends on their skill in detecting such items through manual
searches and their adherence to TSA's standard operating
procedures for checked baggage regarding physical inspection.
Since human TSOs are involved, the efficiency of physical
inspection in terms of baggage throughput rate can vary depending
on the contents of the bag and how quickly the TSO conducts the
search.
Alternative Hybrid Procedures
Alternative hybrid procedures involve using a combination of EDS
and ETD at a screening station normally configured only for EDS.
The efficiency of alternative hybrid procedures can vary because
each use of the procedure can involve a different proportion of
EDS and ETD screening, with greater use of EDS leading to more
efficient screening in terms of number of bags screened per hour.
TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
Alternative Screening Procedures through Covert Testing
While TSA has reported using alternative screening procedures for
more than 3 years, it has not tested the security effectiveness of
the procedures in detecting explosives in an operational
environment. TSA has conducted national covert testing of standard
screening procedures since September 2002, and local covert
testing of standard screening procedures since March 2005.
However, it has not specifically focused national or local covert
testing on alternative screening procedures to determine the
security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's Office of
Inspections (OI- formerly the Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review) conducts national covert tests at airports to
assess the security effectiveness of checked baggage screening
technology, procedures, and TSO performance in detecting
explosives in an operational environment. These tests, in which
undercover inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through
passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are
designed to identify vulnerabilities in passenger and checked
baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems
affecting screening in the areas of training, procedures, and
technology.27 The schedule for this testing called for inspectors
to test all category X airports once a year, category I and II
airports once every 2 years, and category III and IV airports at
least once every 3 years.28 In August, 2005, TSA suspended this
cycle of testing. In April 2006, TSA officials stated that OI was
moving to a testing schedule to include observations of screening
stations and concentrated testing for improvised explosive devices
at the screening checkpoint. The schedule is based on risk-based
factors such as current intelligence information,
high-vulnerability airports, procedural changes, training
initiatives, and introduction of new technologies. According to
Office of Inspections officials, during the 3-year testing cycle,
inspectors tested the procedures being used by TSOs at the time of
the test; alternative screening procedures were tested only if
inspectors coincidentally conducted a test at a screening station
while one of the procedures was in use. Office of Inspections
officials stated that they did not schedule tests of alternative
screening procedures because their resources were dedicated to
conducting testing on standard screening procedures. Furthermore,
the officials stated that since covert testing visits are planned
in advance of the tests and the need to use alternative screening
procedures is not always known in advance, it would be
logistically difficult to plan a covert testing visit to coincide
with an airport's use of alternative screening procedures because
of airports' intermittent and often short-term use of the
procedures. While it may be logistically difficult to conduct
national covert testing on alternative screening procedures, PMIS
data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
reasons for the usage could provide the Office of Inspections with
information to select airports for covert testing as part of the
risk-based approach to covert testing that it is developing.
In addition to its national covert testing program, in March 2005,
TSA also began an airport-based local covert testing program to
determine if TSA checked baggage TSOs can detect a simulated
improvised explosive device that is hidden in a test bag.
Participation in this program is at the discretion of the FSD. FSD
staff test screening at EDS stations by placing simulant
explosives in baggage and surreptitiously running the bags through
the machines. According to TSA, between March 2005 and February
2006, 2,526 local tests of EDS screening were conducted at 108
airports. When we asked TSA headquarters officials in charge of
the local covert testing program about the feasibility and
usefulness of testing the use of alternative screening procedures,
they stated that they had not previously considered testing the
procedures through the local covert testing program. These
officials also cited challenges in conducting such testing,
including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the
testing, particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their
staffs authorize and initiate the use of alternative screening
procedures, they could schedule some of their ongoing local covert
testing for checked baggage screening to coincide with the use of
these procedures. In not testing the alternative screening
procedures through national or local covert testing, TSA is not
collecting data that could provide useful information on how to
improve the security effectiveness of these procedures in
detecting explosives.
The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures
Is Not Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of
Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Improved
TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard and
Alternative Screening Procedures to Enable an Accurate Determination
of the Full Extent of Their Use
TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening
procedures in PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all
checked baggage screening using EDS and ETD with standard or
alternative screening procedures. TSA cannot identify the
percentage of usage of standard or alternative screening
procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
contains data on the number of bags screened, whereas for
alternative screening procedures it contains data on the number of
occasions and hours of use.29 However, TSA officials estimated
that a high percentage of checked baggage is screened using EDS
and ETD machines with standard screening procedures30 and a low
percentage is screened using alternative screening procedures.31
TSA determined that the number of bags screened using EDS and ETD
with standard screening procedures between October 2004 and
September 2005 as well as data on the use of alternative screening
procedures reported into PMIS during this same period are
sensitive security information.
TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of Standard
and Alternative Screening Procedures, but Some Controls Have Not
Been Adequately Implemented
TSA established internal controls to monitor and track the usage
of standard and alternative screening procedures, but has not
adequately implemented some of these controls. An internal control
is an integral component of an organization's management and is
designed to provide reasonable assurance that agencies achieve
effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. The Comptroller General's
Standards for Internal Controls require that transactions and
events be completely and accurately recorded in order to ensure
that information is available for management to guide operations
and make decisions.32 While TSA has established internal controls
to monitor and track use of baggage screening procedures, such as
requiring FSDs and their designates to report the use of
alternative screening procedures into PMIS and to call TSA
headquarters for permission to use the procedures for more than 2
hours, some of the controls have not been adequately implemented
because events have not been completely and accurately recorded.
Consequently, TSA does not have complete information on the extent
of the use of alternative screening procedures that would be
helpful for TSA management in making decisions on actions to
minimize the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports, such as deploying screening equipment.
Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS
Information that FSDs and their staffs report in PMIS regarding
the number of bags screened using ETD machines may not be accurate
because of the way in which the number of bags screened is
estimated. While EDS machines automatically count each bag
screened, ETD machines count each swab analyzed, rather than each
bag screened. TSA uses this count of analyses to estimate the
number of bags screened using ETD. The number of analyses for a
bag screened using ETD may vary depending on how many times the
machine alarms during the screening process and other factors,
which may lead to overreporting of baggage screened. TSA officials
stated that they are aware of these discrepancies and are working
to improve counting of baggage screened using ETD.33 Improved
counting of bags would provide TSA management with better
information to use in making decisions related to its baggage
screening operations, including where to deploy screening
equipment.
Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures
FSDs and their staffs did not always completely and accurately
record information in PMIS on the use of various alternative
screening procedures. On the basis of our review of PMIS data from
October 2004 through September 2005, we found that FSDs and their
designates did not always accurately report the occurrences when a
particular baggage screening procedure was used. For example, some
of the airports that reported using alternative screening
procedures voluntarily reported in a PMIS comments field that they
used the procedures intermittently over the course of several
hours, even though in PMIS they reported only one occurrence that
lasted several hours.34 FSD staff at one of these airports
reported in PMIS one occurrence of using alternative screening
procedures for 15.5 hours straight but reported in the comments
field that the procedures were used during 24 different
occurrences during the 15.5 hours. According to TSA guidance,
these data should have been recorded as 24 separate occurrences in
the PMIS database, not simply noted in the comments field. TSA
officials stated that they were aware that many airports were
reporting the use of alternative screening procedures for extended
periods of time rather than recording each time the use of the
procedures was started and stopped within the reported time. In
May 2005, the TSA Assistant Administrator for Aviation Programs
sent a memo to FSDs noting that the start and stop time of each
individual use of an alternative screening procedure at each
screening station should be reported into PMIS. In our analysis of
PMIS data from May 2005 through September 2005, subsequent to the
issuance of this memo, some of the airports continued to report
intermittent use of alternative screening procedures in the
comments fields.
The design of PMIS also contributed to incomplete and inaccurate
recording of information because it does not allow FSDs and their
designates to report two or more alternative screening procedures
used during the same occurrence. TSA officials have instructed
FSDs and their designates to record the alternative screening
procedure that is used the most during the occurrence. One airport
voluntarily reported in the PMIS comments field that it used three
alternative screening procedures throughout the occurrence.
However, the PMIS database only allowed reporting of the use of
one of the procedures during this time. Because of these reporting
limitations, TSA managers do not receive complete information on
how often or for how long the various alternative screening
procedures are actually used-information that could affect their
decisions on what actions to take to minimize the need to use
alternative screening procedures at airports.
Another factor that could contribute to incomplete and inaccurate
reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS is that
although FSDs and their staffs are required to report every
occurrence of the procedures in PMIS, they may not have always
done so. Until August 2005, when this requirement was eliminated,
FSDs and their staffs were required to report to the
Transportation Security Operations Center-TSA's command, control,
communications and intelligence center-whenever they were about to
begin using alternative screening procedures or to switch back to
standard EDS or ETD screening after using alternative screening
procedures.35 While TSA officials stated that they did not keep
formal records of the calls, they kept what TSA termed "informal
notes" on sheets that included times when the use of the
alternative screening procedures began and ended and the type of
procedure used. When we compared a select number36 of these sheets
completed between February and March 2005 to PMIS reporting for
the same period, we found that 21 percent of the occurrences of
use of alternative screening procedures recorded on the sheets
were not recorded into PMIS as required by TSA's standard
operating procedures.37 Inaccurate reporting on the frequency of
use of alternative screening procedures may hinder management
decision making on how best to minimize airport need to use these
procedures.
Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More than 2 Hours
While TSA's standard operating procedures require FSDs or their
designates to call headquarters for permission to use alternative
screening procedures that are used for more than 2 hours in order
to ensure that the procedures are used only for short-term,
special circumstances, TSA does not require headquarters to
maintain a record of these calls. Because these calls are not
recorded, TSA management is not able to ensure that the
requirement in the standard operating procedures is being
followed. Recording these calls would enable TSA to compare the
records to the hours of use of alternative screening procedures
data maintained in PMIS. This comparison would provide TSA with
information to help provide reasonable assurance that FSDs and
their staffs are complying with the standard operating procedures'
requirement to call for permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that there had not
been any instances in which airports were denied permission to
exceed 2 hours' use of alternative screening procedures. However,
without records of the calls, we were not able to verify that
permission was granted for the occurrences that exceeded 2
hours.38
TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets
TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
Procedures at Airports
TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to rely on the use of
alternative baggage screening procedures and is working to
minimize the need to use these procedures. According to our review
of PMIS data, the use of alternative screening procedures between
October 2004 and September 2005-measured in terms of the total
hours these procedures were employed-initially increased and then
declined. TSA attributed the reported overall decline in the usage
of alternative screening procedures in part to improved
coordination among FSDs, airlines, and local organizations.
According to TSA officials, this coordination helps FSDs and their
staffs anticipate surges in passenger traffic so that they can
adequately staff screening stations. In our structured interviews
with FSDs and their staffs responsible for 29 airports, several
FSDs also cited the importance of coordination with local
organizations and how this reduced their need to use alternative
screening procedures. For example, the FSD for one airport said
that he coordinated with local summer camps to have campers'
baggage screened the day before their flights to reduce the amount
of baggage that has to be screened when campers arrive at the
airport. The FSD for another airport communicated with cruise ship
management about the scheduling of cruises in order to anticipate
any surges in passenger traffic that may have created the need to
use alternative screening procedures.
TSA officials have also taken action to reduce airports' need to
use alternative screening procedures through the use of
"optimization team" visits to airports. These visits are conducted
at the request of TSA senior leadership or an FSD with the goal to
observe screening operations and maximize efficiencies by applying
practices learned at other airports. According to TSA officials,
recurring use of alternative screening procedures triggered some
of the optimization team visits TSA has conducted, and the
optimization team visits may have led to a reduction in the number
of occasions in which these procedures needed to be used.39 For
example, on May 18-19, 2005, an optimization team visited one
airport and recommended procuring one ETD machine and changing the
location of another to reduce the airport's need to use
alternative screening procedures. On July 6-7, 2005, another
optimization team visited another airport. The team suggested
reconfiguring EDS machines at the airport's screening stations,
which resulted in an increase in baggage throughput from 120 to
150 bags per hour. At both of these airports, alternative
screening procedures were used more frequently prior to the
optimization team visit than they were after the visit.
TSA officials also stated that as additional equipment is deployed
and enhanced to enable TSA to increase checked baggage screening
throughputs-bags screened per hour-TSA will be in a better
position to reduce the need for use of alternative screening
procedures. We reported in March 2005 that as of June 2004, TSA
had deployed 1,228 EDS machines.40 Between June 2004 and June
2006, TSA had deployed 399 additional EDS machines in both in-line
(integrated into the airport baggage system) and stand-alone (in
airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas) configurations. EDS
machines in an in-line configuration are able to screen up to 500
bags per hour, as compared to EDS machines in a stand-alone
configuration that screen between 80 and 180 bags per hour. The
superior efficiency of screening with in-line EDS compared to
screening with stand-alone EDS may have been a factor in reducing
the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports where
in-line systems were installed. TSA reported that, as of June
2006, 25 airports had operational in-line EDS systems and an
additional 24 airports had in-line systems under construction.
Although in-line EDS systems can create improvements in
operational efficiencies of an airport's checked baggage screening
system, baggage volumes that exceed the system's capacity and
equipment breakdowns still sometimes occur, necessitating the use
of alternative screening procedures. For example, some of the
airports that have installed airportwide in-line systems reported
using alternative screening procedures because of equipment
failures and high passenger and baggage volumes after their
systems were operational.41 Since stand-alone EDS machines screen
between 80 and 180 bags per hour compared to ETD machines, which
allow for screening of 36 bags per hour, additional stand-alone
EDS machines also may have helped the airports where they were
installed to screen baggage with standard screening procedures
rather than alternative screening procedures. Additionally, in May
2005, TSA certified software and hardware upgrades for 519 out of
1,322 EDS machines, which are used in both in-line and stand-alone
configurations. These upgrades are being tested in a pilot
program. TSA officials anticipate that the upgrades could lead to
increased baggage throughput for the machines, which could further
reduce need to use alternative screening procedures.
Installation of in-line EDS systems at airports that currently use
stand-alone EDS and ETD for primary screening has further
potential to reduce the need for alternative screening procedures
to be used at these airports. In March 2005, we reported that TSA
had estimated that in-line checked baggage systems would reduce by
78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and supervisors required to
screen checked baggage at nine airports that had signed agreements
to develop the systems.42 Under the congressionally imposed 45,000
TSO full-time-equivalent limit, when staff requirements are
reduced at one airport through increased efficiencies, full-time
equivalent positions will become available to address TSO
shortages at other airports.43 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage
strategic planning framework included a prioritization of which
additional airports should receive funding for in-line systems and
a description of how stand-alone EDS machines from those airports
should be redistributed to other airports.44 In the framework, TSA
also reported that many of the initial in-line systems had
produced a level of TSO labor savings insufficient to offset
up-front capital costs of constructing the systems. According to
TSA, the facility and baggage handling system modifications have
been higher than expected at the nine airports that have signed
agreements to fund the systems. TSA stated that the keys to
reducing future costs are establishing guidelines outlining best
practices and a set of efficient design choices and using newer
EDS technology that best matches each optimally scaled design
solution. In February 2006, TSA reported that recent improvements
in the design of the in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems
and the EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. The final
strategic plan will include the results of TSA's cost sharing
study that it is currently conducting in consultation with airport
operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify ways
to fund in-line EDS systems.45 After in-line EDS systems are
installed and staffing reductions are achieved, redistributing the
TSO positions to other airports with staffing shortages may reduce
airport need to use alternative screening procedures.
Technology developments may also help TSA to reduce the use of
alternative screening procedures. In March 2005, we reported that
TSA was working to develop a computer-aided tomography explosives
detection system that is smaller and lighter than systems
currently deployed in airport lobbies and that the new system was
intended to replace systems currently in use, including larger and
heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment.46 The smaller size of the
system would create opportunities for TSA to transfer screening
operations to other locations, such as airport check-in counters.
The machine would also be an option for airports that currently
rely on ETD machines since it would be cheaper than other
certified machines and it would have higher baggage throughput
than screening using ETD machines, potentially reducing the need
to use alternative screening procedures at airports where it is
installed. In March 2005, TSA began to pilot this machine at three
airports. At one of these pilot airports, the FSD stated that he
anticipates that the smaller EDS machine will reduce staffing
needs, reduce workers compensation claims, and ultimately enable
the airport to incorporate the machines in-line behind the ticket
counters. TSA reported that the machine achieved throughput rates
of up to 80 bags per hour, higher than the throughput rate of up
to 36 bags per hour for an ETD operated by one TSO or up to 72
bags per hour for an ETD operated by two TSOs. In September 2005,
TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 of these
machines that will be installed at 24 airports.
While TSA data indicate that the use of alternative screening
procedures is declining, TSA reported in its February 2006
framework that at some airports alternative screening procedures
will increasingly be used because of rising passenger traffic. TSA
has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers
over current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an
average of 0.76 checked bags per passenger were to remain constant
through 2010, TSA would be screening about 96 million more bags
than it now screens. This could increase airports' need to rely on
alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
additional or more efficient EDS machines. TSA headquarters
officials stated that while TSA is working to minimize the need to
use alternative screening procedures, it intends to maintain the
procedures as part of its standard operating procedures so that
FSDs will have options to respond to events such as unforeseen
equipment failures, surges in passenger traffic, and
weather-related incidents such as hurricanes. Additionally, some
of the FSDs that we interviewed stated that they anticipate
continuing to need to use alternative screening procedures because
of screening capacity limits and rising passenger volume, and some
of these FSDs anticipated increasing their use of the procedures
as their airport passenger traffic rises because of limitations in
the physical layout of their airports that contribute to
overcrowding.47
TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Related
to the Use of Alternative Screening Procedures
Although TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative
screening procedures at airports, it has not established
performance measures or targets related to the use of these
procedures. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
provides, among other things, that federal agencies establish
program performance measures, including the assessment of relevant
outputs and outcomes of measures.48 Performance measures are meant
to cover key aspects of performance and help decision makers to
assess program accomplishments and improve program performance. A
performance target is a desired level of performance expressed as
a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement
will be compared. By analyzing the gap between target and actual
levels of performance, management can target those processes that
are most in need of improvement, set improvement goals, and
identify appropriate process improvements or other actions.
TSA has established four performance measures for the checked
baggage screening program. Three of these measures make up TSA's
checked baggage screening performance index. This index measures
the overall performance of the system through a composite of
indicators that are derived by combining specific performance
measures related to checked baggage screening. Specifically, this
index measures the effectiveness of screening systems through
machine probability of detection and covert testing results,
efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per bag
screened, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA's
national call center. TSA considers the final performance
measure-compliance with the ATSA requirement to screen all checked
baggage using explosive detection systems (EDS and ETD)-to be
obsolete since it reported all airports as capable of screening
with EDS or ETD in January 2005. The use of alternative screening
procedures is not included in the index, nor does TSA have
stand-alone measures or targets for the use of alternative
screening procedures.
TSA officials stated that they did not want to implement
performance measures or targets for alternative screening
procedures because they are already working to minimize the need
to use the procedures at airports. However, TSA officials also
acknowledged that they will continue to rely on alternative
screening procedures because of unforeseen circumstances such as
high baggage volumes or weather-related incidents. By creating a
performance measure for the use of alternative screening
procedures as part of the checked baggage screening index or as a
stand-alone measure, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress
toward minimizing the need to use these procedures at airports and
have more complete information on how well the overall checked
baggage screening system is performing. Furthermore, performance
targets for the use of alternative screening procedures would
provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to accept in
using these procedures, and TSA's monitoring of this indicator
would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has
determined is acceptable. For example, if TSA were to determine
the percentage of checked baggage that should be screened using
alternative screening procedures, and if its performance data
showed that it was currently screening a higher percentage than
the target, TSA would be able to decide whether to take steps to
bring the use of these procedures into line with its desired level
of use.
Finally, the extent to which performance measures and targets will
assist TSA in minimizing the need to use these procedures at
airports is dependent upon the accuracy and completeness of the
reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS, including
the percentage of bags screened using the procedures, as
previously discussed.
Conclusions
It has been over 4 years since Congress issued the mandate for TSA
to screen all checked baggage at commercial airports using
explosive detection systems. During this time, TSA has deployed
EDS or ETD machines at more than 400 commercial airports and
reported achieving the capability to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage using these machines. As part of this effort, TSA
developed standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures. While TSA acknowledges that screening with alternative
screening procedures is less effective than screening with
standard screening procedures, it has also recognized the need for
continued use of alternative screening procedures because of high
passenger and baggage volumes resulting from unpredictable and
unforeseen circumstances, such as equipment breakdowns and unusual
weather events. Given TSA's plans to continue to use alternative
screening procedures and the trade-offs in security effectiveness
involved in their use, it will be important for TSA to test the
effectiveness of these procedures in an operating environment. One
such way for TSA to test the security effectiveness of the various
alternative screening procedures is through the covert testing
conducted by the Office of Inspections. While we recognize the
logistical challenges that the Office of Inspections faces in
conducting checked baggage covert testing on alternative screening
procedures, using PMIS data on the use of these
procedures-including data on the airports that use the procedures
the most frequently or for extended periods of time-could help the
Office of Inspections in selecting airports for testing as part of
the risk-based approach to covert testing that it is currently
developing. By not assessing alternative screening procedures
through national or local covert testing, TSA is missing an
opportunity to gather information to help determine the security
effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an
operational setting.
Additionally, TSA headquarters has established internal controls
to monitor and track the use of alternative screening procedures
at airports and has taken steps to improve reporting of these
procedures in the PMIS database. However, without strengthening
its controls, such as providing a means for measuring the number
of bags screened using alternative screening procedures and
enabling TSA airport staff to report the concurrent use of more
than one alternative screening procedure, TSA lacks reasonable
assurance that it has complete and accurate information on the use
of these procedures.
Furthermore, TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use
alternative screening procedures at airports, but does not expect
to eliminate the use of these procedures. Increasing air travel
and TSA's effort to operate within or below the current 45,000 TSO
full-time-equivalent limit could add to the need for alternative
screening procedures, unless more or more efficient EDS machines
are deployed. Given TSA's continuing use of the procedures,
performance measures and targets would provide TSA and Congress
with objective information to assess TSA's progress in minimizing
the need to use the procedures at airports, and would help inform
TSA decision making on whether and when mitigating steps are
needed to achieve its desired level of use.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative
screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA
strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening
procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration, to take the following four actions:
o Use PMIS data on use of alternative screening procedures in
determining at which airports to conduct covert testing and when
to conduct testing at these airports as part of the Office of
Inspections' new risk-based approach to covert testing.
o Conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
procedures to determine whether checked baggage TSOs can detect
simulated improvised explosives when using these procedures.
o Strengthen the monitoring and tracking of the use of
alternative screening procedures to help determine the progress
the agency is making in minimizing its need to use these
procedures. This effort would include continuing to address
reporting problems in the PMIS database system, keeping a record
of calls requesting permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
procedures, and providing a means for measuring the use of
alternative screening procedures compared to the use of standard
procedures, such as counting baggage screened with alternative
screening procedures.
o Develop performance measures and performance targets for the
use of alternative screening procedures in checked baggage
screening, perhaps as part of the checked baggage screening
program performance index, to help TSA measure its progress in
working toward minimizing the need to use alternative screening
procedures at airports and to have more complete information on
the overall performance of the checked baggage screening system.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.
On July 25, 2006, we received written comments on the draft
report, which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred
with our findings and recommendations and stated that the report
will help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
operations.
Regarding our recommendation that TSA use Performance Management
Information System data on the use of alternative screening
procedures in determining at which airports to conduct covert
testing and when to conduct testing at these airports, DHS
concurred and stated that TSA's Office of Inspections will
consider PMIS information on alternative screening procedures as
part of its new risk-based approach to covert testing and will
develop new checked baggage screening testing protocols.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA conduct local covert
testing of alternative screening procedures, DHS concurred and
stated that TSA is currently modifying its local covert testing
program to strengthen the program and expects that these
modifications will better prepare TSOs to detect simulated
improvised explosives. We are pleased that TSA is making efforts
to strengthen its local covert testing program. We continue to
believe that testing of alternative screening procedures would
provide TSA with an opportunity to gather information to help
identify and improve the security effectiveness of alternative
screening procedures in an operational setting.
DHS concurred with our recommendation to strengthen the monitoring
and tracking of the use of alternative screening procedures to
help determine the progress the agency is making in minimizing its
need to use the procedures. In response to our recommendation that
TSA address reporting problems in its PMIS database system, DHS
stated that PMIS has been enhanced with both functionality and
data quality-related processes to ensure data reliability.
According to TSA, the system alerts the user when a data field is
filled in with a value that falls outside the operational norms
for a particular airport. Additionally, according to TSA, PMIS
training and functionality reviews occur on a regular basis and
user manuals and best practices are updated consistently. While
these efforts should help improve the data reliability of PMIS,
they will not fully address the reporting problems highlighted in
our report. Specifically, the steps TSA has taken do not address
inaccurate counts of baggage screened resulting from TSA's method
for estimating the number of bags screened with ETD using standard
screening procedures or inaccurate reporting of occurrences when a
particular alternative screening procedure is used. Without
addressing these reporting problems, TSA will continue to lack
reasonable assurance that it has complete and accurate information
on the use of these procedures.
In response to our recommendation on keeping a record of calls
requesting permission to exceed 2 hours use of the procedures, DHS
stated that because the amount of time that alternative screening
procedures are used is recorded in PMIS, there is no further
documentation required for exceeding the 2 hour threshold.
However, while documentation is entered into PMIS on the amount of
time the procedures are used, recording the length of time that
the procedures are used does not allow TSA to verify that FSDs are
actually requesting permission to use the procedures for more than
2 hours as required. In response to our recommendation on
providing a means for measuring the use of alternative screening
procedures compared to the use of standard procedures, such as
counting baggage screened with alternative screening procedures,
DHS stated that TSA will evaluate the necessity of requiring the
recording of the number of bags screened by alternative screening
procedures, and if it finds it to be a useful metric, it will
require FSDs to include the number of bags in their report in
PMIS. We are encouraged that TSA will undertake this evaluation,
as we believe that it will allow TSA to have more assurance that
it has complete and accurate information on the use of these
procedures.
In response to our recommendation on developing performance
measures and targets for the use of alternative screening
procedures, DHS concurred and stated that TSA is currently meeting
the intent of this recommendation by monitoring and tracking the
use of alternative screening procedures through PMIS. DHS stated
that using this system has assisted TSA in identifying areas for
improvement nationwide and addressing local issues to minimize the
need for alternative screening procedures. DHS also stated that
TSA intends to continue monitoring and tracking the use of
alternative screening procedures and to implement the
recommendations in this report for refining the data and
evaluating the need to make adjustments based on the current
performance level. While we support TSA's efforts to ensure the
use of alternative screening procedures is accurately reported in
PMIS, given the security effectiveness trade-offs associated with
alternative screening procedures, we do not believe that tracking
the use of the procedures with PMIS is sufficient to provide
congressional and other decision makers with an indication of the
progress the agency expects to make in minimizing the need to use
the procedures at airports. Performance measures and targets would
provide this information and would help to reinforce
accountability and to ensure that managers focus on the results
they are striving to achieve regarding minimizing the use of
alternative screening procedures in their day-to-day activities.
We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security; the Assistant Secretary, TSA; and
interested congressional committees as appropriate. We will also
make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made
major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
efforts to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems (EDS) and explosive trace detection machines (ETD), we
addressed the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the
use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures and what security effectiveness trade-offs and
operational efficiencies has TSA identified in using these
procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To what
extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures
to screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure
that standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3)
What steps has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use
alternative screening procedures and to establish performance
measures and targets for the use of the procedures?
To assess how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
procedures and to assess the trade-offs in security effectiveness
and operational efficiencies associated with various baggage
screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's standard operating
procedures for using these procedures. We also obtained and
analyzed relevant legislation and conducted a literature search to
obtain information on screening procedures, technologies, and
related aviation trends. This search identified various TSA
reports, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General
reports, and aviation industry reports. We also reviewed studies
from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory regarding checked
baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
offices, including the Chief Technologist's Office, Aviation
Programs, the Transportation Security Operations Center, the
Transportation Security Laboratory, Chief Operating Officer's
Office, and Office of Planning to learn about checked baggage
screening procedures and how they were given relative priority. We
also interviewed officials from air carriers, explosive detection
systems equipment manufacturers, and an airport industry
association to obtain information regarding TSA's checked baggage
screening procedures. We assessed the results from unannounced,
undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
conducted by TSA's Office of Inspections and questioned TSA
officials about the procedures used to ensure the reliability of
the covert test data. On the basis of their answers, we believe
that the covert test data are sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review. We also reviewed results of unannounced,
undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
conducted at airports by Federal Security Directors (FSD) and
their staffs and collected as part of TSA's Screener Training
Exercises and Assessments program. After reviewing documentation
from TSA, we found the data from the Screener Training Exercises
and Assessments program were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review.
To assess the extent to which TSA has used standard and
alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage and how
TSA ensures that standard checked baggage screening procedures are
used whenever possible, we reviewed and analyzed TSA's Performance
Management Information System (PMIS) database, which contains
information on baggage screening operations and the use of
alternative screening procedures. We found several issues with
these data, including, in some cases, multiple occurrences of the
use of alternative screening procedures recorded as one occurrence
and also, in some cases, more than one procedure being used during
an occurrence but the occurrence was entered into the database as
only one procedure because of the constraints of the database.
When we interviewed TSA officials about these data reliability
issues, officials acknowledged that airports may have inaccurately
reported some occurrences of the use of alternative screening
procedures. However, the officials stated that they were working
to correct the reporting problems and consider the data generally
reliable. On the basis of these discussions and our review of the
database, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report, since the data provide overall trends in
the use of the procedures. To determine what controls are in place
to track and report the use of baggage screening procedures, we
analyzed the PMIS database and the PMIS user guide. We also
analyzed TSA's operating procedures for checked baggage and policy
guidance and compared TSA's procedures for ensuring that airports
correctly report the use of alternative screening procedures to
the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government. We also interviewed officials from TSA's
Office of Planning, Chief Operating Office, Transportation
Security Operations Center, and Inspections offices concerning
checked baggage screening procedures.
To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to use
alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA
has set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's
PMIS data and its standard operating procedures for checked
baggage screening and TSA's inventory of explosive detection
systems. We found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive
detection systems and worked with TSA to resolve the
discrepancies. TSA also completed a reconciliation of the
inventory database with data collected manually by TSA officials.
We also analyzed documentation from the TSA Transportation
Security Operations Center and interviewed TSA officials from the
Chief Operating Officer's Office, Office of Planning, the Office
of Assistant Secretary, and Chief Technology Office. Additionally,
we examined TSA's checked baggage performance measures and targets
in the context of the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 (GPRA) requirements.
In addressing these objectives, we conducted site visits at nine
airports-three category X, one category I, four category II, and
one category IV airport. We chose these airports based on one or
more of the following factors: use of alternative screening
procedures at the airport as reported in PMIS, testing of
screening equipment at the airport, proximity to another airport
being visited by GAO, and size of airport. The results from our
airport visits provided examples of checked baggage screening
operations and issues but cannot be generalized beyond the
airports visited because we did not use statistical sampling in
selecting the airports. We also conducted structured interviews
with FSDs and their staffs who were responsible for 29 randomly
selected airports. One FSD we interviewed was responsible for two
airports in our sample. We conducted all but one of these
interviews over the telephone. Using information from PMIS, we
selected airports that had reported using alternative screening
procedures and airports that had not reported using alternative
screening procedures between October 18, 2004, and December 21,
2004.1 Although the interviews were conducted with FSDs and their
staffs at random samples of airports, the samples are too small to
generalize the interview results with a high degree of statistical
confidence to all airports nationwide. The results from these
interviews do provide information about checked baggage screening
operations at the airports for which the FSDs and their staffs are
responsible.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, David Alexander, Leo
Barbour, Chuck Bausell Jr., Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping,
Katherine Davis, Josh Diosomito, Christine Fossett, Richard Hung,
Benjamin Jordan, Thomas Lombardi, Lisa Shibata, Maria Strudwick,
and Alper Tunca made key contributions to this report.
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24TSA has determined that the details of its analysis of the optimal
checked baggage screening solutions are sensitive security information.
25The specifics of the trade-offs in security effectiveness have been
determined to be sensitive security information.
26One alternative screening procedure that involves the use of EDS and ETD
is not discussed in this report because TSA designated the procedure as
sensitive security information.
27GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2005).
28TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of
five categories-X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have
the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have
the smallest number.
29Although FSDs and their staffs are not required to report the number of
bags screened with alternative screening procedures into PMIS, some FSDs
and staff from airports that reported using alternative screening
procedures reported this information in comment fields on occurrences of
use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and September
2005. The number of FSDs and the number of occurrences have been
determined to be sensitive security information.
30TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive an
estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.
31TSA determined that its estimate of the use of alternative screening
procedures is sensitive security information.
32GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
33TSA determined that the other factors that may influence the number of
analyses completed for a bag screened using ETD are sensitive security
information.
34The comments field is a PMIS database field used to add descriptive data
on the alternative screening procedures occurrence. TSA determined that
the exact number of airports that voluntarily reported intermittent use of
alternative screening procedures in the comments field is sensitive
security information.
35TSA officials stated that they eliminated this requirement because
headquarters could get information on use of alternative screening
procedures through PMIS.
36TSA classified the number of sheets that we reviewed as sensitive
security information.
37We selected sheets to analyze based on the completeness of the
information contained on the sheets. Each sheet selected had a date, an
airport code or name, a beginning and end time of use of alternative
screening procedures, type of alternative screening procedure used, and
reason for using the alternative screening procedure.
38TSA classified the number of occurrences that were more than 2 hours as
sensitive security information.
39The optimization visits are also used to improve the design of passenger
and baggage checkpoints, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport,
evaluate staffing and scheduling practices, and determine compliance with
the standard operating procedures.
40 GAO-05-365 .
41Each of the airports' in-line systems became operational on a different
date. The number of airports that reported using alternative screening
procedures due to equipment failures and high passenger and baggage
volumes after their systems were operational has been determined to be
sensitive security information.
42 GAO-05-365 .
43Section 4023 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 requires TSA to develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees, standards for determining aviation security staffing at
commercial airports no later than 90 days after December 17, 2004, the
date of the act's enactment, and GAO to conduct an analysis of these
standards. These standards were submitted to Congress on June 22, 2005,
and GAO is currently reviewing these standards.
44The details of the strategic planning framework for the checked baggage
screening program constitute sensitive security information.
45Section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 requires TSA to complete a cost-sharing study in collaboration
with industry stakeholders to review the benefits and cost of in-line
checked baggage screening systems, innovative financing approaches,
formulas for cost sharing between different government entities and the
private sector, and potential cost-saving approaches.
46 GAO-05-365 .
47TSA determined that the exact number of FSDs that anticipate continued
or increased use of alternative screening procedures is sensitive security
information.
48According to the Government Performance and Results Act, the Office of
Management and Budget, and GAO, outcomes assess actual results as compared
with the intended results that occur from carrying out a program or
activity. Outcomes are the results of a program or activity. For further
information, see GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a
Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).
1TSA has determined that the exact number of airports we selected is
sensitive security information.
(440517)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-869 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-869 , a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
July 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for
screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives and has
deployed explosive detection systems and developed standard procedures for
their use. TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used for
short-term, special circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA
prioritized the use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified
trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational efficiencies; (2) how
TSA reported use of the procedures and ensured that standard procedures
are used whenever possible; and (3) what steps TSA took to reduce
airports' need to use alternative screening procedures and to establish
performance measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO
interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's database on
checked baggage screening operations; and conducted airport site visits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that TSA use information on airport usage of
alternative screening procedures in conducting covert testing; strengthen
TSA's monitoring and tracking of the use of alternative screening
procedures; and develop performance measures and targets for the use of
alternative screening procedures. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and
generally concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations.
TSA has prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
of the procedures' effectiveness. Use of various procedures to screen
checked baggage has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness, which
vary by the type of procedure used and the circumstances of its use. It is
TSA's policy to use standard procedures whenever possible because TSA
officials determined that these procedures provide the most effective
detection of explosives. TSA policy also allows the use of alternative
screening procedures when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose
security vulnerabilities or when TSA airport officials determine that
there is a security risk associated with large concentrations of
passengers in an area waiting for their baggage to be screened. Regarding
operational efficiencies, TSA has not fully determined the throughput and
costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part because it
does not count the number of bags screened using these procedures. TSA has
conducted covert tests (undercover, unannounced) of standard procedures,
but has not conducted this testing for alternative screening procedures.
TSA cited logistical difficulties in conducting covert tests for
alternative screening procedures. However, by not doing so, TSA is not
collecting data that could provide useful information in determining the
security effectiveness of the procedures in an operational setting and how
to improve their effectiveness.
TSA cannot identify the percentage of checked baggage screened using
standard versus alternative screening procedures because TSA records
standard procedures in terms of the number of bags screened in its
management information system, but records alternative procedures in terms
of the number of occasions and hours of use. However, TSA officials
estimated that a low percentage of checked baggage is screened using
alternative screening procedures. To assess the extent that standard
screening procedures are used whenever possible, TSA has established
internal controls to monitor the use of standard and alternative screening
procedures; however, these controls were not always implemented to ensure
the gathering of complete and accurate information. This may limit TSA
managers' ability to assess the effect of using alternative screening
procedures and determine what should be done to minimize the use of the
procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are working with
TSA airport staff to correct such reporting problems.
TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening
procedures at airports, including anticipating factors that could increase
passenger and baggage volume and acting to address these factors. However,
TSA has not developed performance measures and targets to assess its
progress in minimizing the need to use the procedures. By creating
performance measures, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress toward
minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports.
Performance targets for the procedures would be an indicator of how much
risk TSA is willing to accept in using the procedures.
*** End of document. ***