Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening	 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened (28-JUL-06, GAO-06-869).	 
                                                                 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible  
for screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives
and has deployed explosive detection systems and developed	 
standard procedures for their use. TSA also allows alternative	 
screening procedures to be used for short-term, special 	 
circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA prioritized the 
use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified	 
trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational		 
efficiencies; (2) how TSA reported use of the procedures and	 
ensured that standard procedures are used whenever possible; and 
(3) what steps TSA took to reduce airports' need to use 	 
alternative screening procedures and to establish performance	 
measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO	 
interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's	 
database on checked baggage screening operations; and conducted  
airport site visits.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-869 					        
    ACCNO:   A57639						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage      
Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened			 
     DATE:   07/28/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Airport security					 
	     Airports						 
	     Aviation security					 
	     Baggage						 
	     Baggage screening					 
	     Checked baggage screening				 
	     Explosives 					 
	     Explosives detection systems			 
	     Explosives trace detection 			 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Passengers 					 
	     Standards						 
	     Standards evaluation				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     TSA Explosive Detection System			 
	     TSA Explosive Trace Detection System		 
	     TSA Performance Management Information		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-06-869

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD
          * Alternative Screening Procedures
     * TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Re
          * TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedure
          * Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Ef
          * Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Tra
               * Positive Passenger Bag Match
               * Canine Screening
               * Physical Inspection
               * Alternative Hybrid Procedures
          * TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
     * The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Proced
          * TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard
          * TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of St
               * Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS
               * Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures
               * Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More
     * TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative S
          * TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Sc
          * TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Rela
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
     * Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * Related GAO Products
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Ranking DemocraticMember, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

July 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened

GAO-06-869

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 9
TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment 14
The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures Is Not
Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved 21
TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets 25
Conclusions 31
Recommendations for Executive Action 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 40
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43
Related GAO Products 44

Table

Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines 16

Figures

Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
Screen Checked Baggage 11
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 12

Abbreviations

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act DHS Department of Homeland
Security EDS Explosive Detection System ETD Explosive Trace Detection FAA
Federal Aviation Administration FSD Federal Security Director GPRA
Government Performance and Results Act OI Office of Inspections PMIS
Performance Management Information System TSA Transportation Security
Administration TSO Transportation Security Officer

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 28, 2006

The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking Democratic Member Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Oberstar:

Commercial U.S. aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks
through the use of explosives carried in checked baggage, as demonstrated
by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which further highlighted the
vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of terrorism, Congress passed and
the President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), mandating, among other things, that all checked baggage at U.S.
airports be screened using explosive detection systems by December 31,
2002.1 In response to this mandate, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of systems and has established
standard procedures for their use: (1) explosive detection systems (EDS)
that use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that
may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt and (2)
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, whereby an individual (i.e., a
baggage screener) swabs a bag and then inserts the swab into the ETD
machine, which, in turn, can detect chemical residues that may indicate
the presence of explosives within a bag.2 TSA also allows alternative
screening procedures to be used when volumes of baggage awaiting screening
pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there
is a security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in
an area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and
ETD machines in nonstandard ways,3 and also include three procedures that
do not use EDS or ETD-screening with explosives detection canines,
physical bag searches, and matching baggage to passenger manifests to
confirm that the passenger and his or her baggage are on the same plane.
It is TSA's policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures
whenever possible and, when necessary, to use EDS or ETD-based alternative
screening procedures before using non-EDS or ETD alternative screening
procedures. TSA has also established operating procedures for checked
baggage screening that instruct Transportation Security Officers
(TSO-formerly known as screeners) in how to use these standard and
alternative screening procedures.

1Congress subsequently extended this deadline by 1 year.

2TSA interpreted ATSA's reference to "explosive detection systems" to
allow for the deployment of EDS and ETD to satisfy the mandate.

3The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security
information.

In February 2004, we testified that TSA was unable to fully utilize
explosive detection systems to satisfy the ATSA mandate to screen 100
percent of checked baggage for explosives because of TSO shortages and
problems with screening equipment, among other factors.4 Further, in
February 2005, we reported that TSA considers one baggage screening
method-the use of EDS machines-to be the superior baggage screening
procedure in terms of efficiency compared to ETD because EDS automatically
detects explosives without direct human involvement and screens more bags
for explosives per hour. We also reported that at most smaller airports,
where EDS machines are not installed, TSA screens solely with ETD
machines. Finally, we reported that while TSA had made progress in
deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,
prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to
achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. In
February 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress detailing its strategic
planning framework for its checked baggage screening program. According to
TSA, the framework, which focuses on identifying optimal checked baggage
screening solutions for airports, will be used to establish a
comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening program.
TSA expects to complete the strategic plan in early fall 2006.

You asked that we continue to assess TSA's progress in enhancing the
effectiveness of checked baggage screening operations. In February 2006,
we issued a report that contained sensitive security information regarding
TSA's use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures, including the extent to which the procedures were used by TSA
and the trade-offs in security effectiveness of using standard and
alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for
explosives.5 We concurrently issued a classified correspondence on our
analysis of the results of TSA's checked baggage screening covert
testing.6 This report provides the results of our February 2006 report
with sensitive security information removed. In this report, we address
the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the use of standard
and alternative checked baggage screening procedures and what security
effectiveness trade-offs and operational efficiencies has TSA identified
in using these procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To
what extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures to
screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure that
standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3) What steps
has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
procedures and to establish performance measures and targets for the use
of the procedures?

4GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004).

To address how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
procedures and identified trade-offs in security effectiveness and
operational efficiencies of using standard and alternative screening
procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives, we assessed TSA's
standard operating procedures, obtained and analyzed relevant legislation,
and conducted a literature search to obtain information on screening
procedures, technologies, and related aviation trends. We also reviewed
studies conducted by TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory regarding
checked baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
offices as well as air carriers, explosive detection systems equipment
manufacturers, and an airport industry association to obtain information
regarding TSA's checked baggage screening procedures and the relative
priority they were given. To determine the extent to which TSA used
standard and alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
and how TSA ensured that standard screening procedures are used whenever
possible, we reviewed TSA's checked baggage standard operating procedures
manual and its Performance Management Information System (PMIS) database,
which contains information on checked baggage screening operations.7 We
compared TSA procedures for use of standard and alternative screening
procedures with the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government. We interviewed TSA officials to determine the
reliability of the information contained in the PMIS database and reviewed
selected database records. Although we determined that the database did
not always contain accurate data on the duration of each occurrence of
alternative baggage screening procedures, we nonetheless considered the
database to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report since the
data identified overall trends in the use of alternative screening
procedures. To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to
use alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA has
set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA directives
regarding use of the procedures, PMIS data, standard operating procedures
for checked baggage, and the inventory of explosive detection systems.
When we found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive detection
systems, we worked with TSA to resolve the discrepancies. TSA also
completed a reconciliation of the inventory database with data collected
manually by TSA officials. We also examined TSA's checked baggage
screening performance measures and targets as they relate to the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requirements. We
visited nine airports during this review to observe baggage screening
operations. We chose these airports based on reporting in PMIS, selecting
some airports that had used alternative screening procedures and some that
had not used the procedures. We also conducted structured interviews with
TSA Federal Security Directors (FSD)8 and their staffs who were
responsible for the security of 29 randomly selected airports. Because we
selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information we
obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all airports
nationwide.9 Also, while the interviews we conducted with FSDs were random
samples of airports, the samples were too small to generalize the
interview results with a high degree of statistical confidence to all
airports nationwide.

5GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Management of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved, GAO-06-291SU (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2006).

6GAO, Analysis of TSA's Covert Testing for Checked Baggage Screening,
GAO-06-317C (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006).

7PMIS is a Web-based application used by TSA field staff to submit data to
headquarters on operations and performance.

8The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority responsible
for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the
nation's commercial airports.

9Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are
selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using specific
characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from nonprobability
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because in a
nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being studied have
no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

We conducted our work from August 2004 through July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.

                                Results in Brief

TSA prioritized the use of standard and alternative checked baggage
screening procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials'
judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures, and TSA's use of these
procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. It is TSA's
policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures whenever possible
because of legislative requirements to do so and because TSA has concluded
that these procedures provide the most effective detection of explosives
at a checked baggage screening station. TSA considers screening with EDS
to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more
bags per hour and automatically detect explosives without direct human
involvement. Given the high volumes of checked baggage processed at some
airports and unforeseen events such as equipment failures and severe
weather, TSA has determined that it will have to continue to at times use
alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives.
TSA officials prioritized the use of these procedures based on their
professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures and the
classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD machines obtained
from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory. Alternative screening
procedures include physical bag searches; alternative hybrid procedures,
which involve a combination of the standard checked baggage procedures for
EDS and ETD;10 matching checked bags to passenger manifests to deter
bombers who try to load a bag on a plane without boarding; explosive
detection canines; and another screening method TSA has determined to be
sensitive security information. With regard to operational efficiencies,
TSA has not determined the throughput (number of checked bags screened per
hour) and costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part
because it does not count the number of bags screened using these
procedures. While TSA has used alternative screening procedures for more
than 3 years and expects to continue to use them, it has not tested the
security effectiveness of these procedures in an operational environment.
TSA has conducted national covert (undercover, unannounced) testing of
standard screening procedures since September 2002 to assess checked
baggage screening technologies and procedures, and TSO performance in
detecting explosives in an operational environment. TSA has also
authorized FSDs and their designates to conduct local covert testing on
standard screening procedures at airports since March 2005 to determine if
TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosive devices hidden in checked
baggage. However, TSA has not conducted national or local covert testing
specifically focused on alternative screening procedures. TSA officials
stated that conducting national testing of alternative screening
procedures would be challenging, particularly since testing is planned
ahead of time and it is difficult to predict when an airport might use
alternative screening procedures. While it may be logistically difficult
to conduct national covert testing on alternative screening procedures,
TSA data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
reasons for the usage could provide TSA with information to use in
selecting airports for covert testing as part of the risk-based approach
to covert testing that it is developing. TSA officials also cited
challenges in conducting local covert testing of alternative screening
procedures, including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the testing,
particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their staffs authorize
and initiate the use of alternative screening procedures, they could
schedule some of their ongoing local covert testing for checked baggage
screening to coincide with the use of these procedures. In not assessing
the alternative screening procedures through covert testing, TSA is not
collecting data that could help determine how effective the procedures are
in an operational setting or how to improve the security effectiveness of
the procedures.

10Alternative hybrid procedures use a combination of EDS and ETD at a
screening station that is usually configured only for EDS. At some
screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a hybrid configuration
as a standard screening procedure.

TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening procedures in
PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all checked baggage screened
using EDS and ETD with standard or alternative screening procedures. TSA
could not identify the percentage of usage of standard or alternative
screening procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
contains data on the number of bags screened; whereas for alternative
screening procedures, it contains data on the number of occasions and
hours of use. However, TSA officials estimated that a high percentage of
checked baggage is screened using EDS and ETD machines with standard
screening procedures11 and a low percentage is screened using alternative
screening procedures.12 TSA also established internal controls to monitor
and track the use of standard and alternative screening procedures,
including requiring FSDs to report the use of alternative screening
procedures into PMIS and to call headquarters for permission to use the
alternative screening procedures for more than 2 hours. According to the
Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control, all transactions and
other significant events need to be completely and accurately documented.
However, we identified several areas where TSA's information on its use of
standard and alternative screening procedures was not complete or accurate
for the period covered by our review. First, TSA's method for estimating
the number of bags screened with ETD using standard screening procedures
led to inaccurate counts of baggage screened. Improved counting of bags
would provide TSA management with better information to use in making
decisions related to its baggage screening operations including where to
deploy screening equipment. Second, FSDs and their staffs did not always
accurately report the occurrences when a particular alternative baggage
screening procedure was used, impeding TSA's ability to reliably determine
how often and for how long the alternative screening procedures were used.
Third, FSDs and their staffs did not always report the use of alternative
screening procedures as required. Inaccurate and incomplete reporting on
how often alternative screening procedures are used or for how long,
combined with not tracking the number of bags screened using the
procedures, may limit TSA managers' ability to assess the effect of using
alternative screening procedures on aviation security and to determine the
types of actions that should be taken at airports to help minimize the use
of these procedures. TSA officials stated they are working with FSDs to
correct these reporting problems and have issued guidance clarifying
requirements for reporting alternative screening procedures.

11TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive its
estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.

12TSA determined that the estimated use of alternative screening
procedures is sensitive security information.

TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
procedures, but has not established performance measures or targets
regarding the use of these procedures. According to our review of PMIS
data, the use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and
September 2005-measured in terms of the total hours of use reported by
FSDs-initially increased and then declined.13 TSA attributed the reported
overall decline in the use of alternative screening procedures to a number
of factors, including better coordination with groups such as tour
operators; deploying "optimization teams" to airports that were frequently
using alternative screening procedures to determine why the procedures
were being used so often and to suggest remedies; and deploying additional
EDS machines.14 As we reported in March 2005, additional EDS systems
integrated into the airport baggage handling system ("in-line" EDS
systems) could reduce by 78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and
supervisors needed to screen checked baggage at airports with the
systems.15 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage screening planning
framework includes a prioritization of which additional airports should
receive new funding for in-line systems and a description of how
stand-alone EDS machines from those airports should be redistributed to
other airports. After in-line EDS systems are installed and any staffing
reductions are achieved, redistributing the screening positions to other
airports with staffing shortages could also reduce the need to use
alternative screening procedures at these airports. While TSA data
indicate that the use of alternative screening procedures is declining,
the strategic planning framework states that at some airports alternative
screening procedures will increasingly be used because of rising passenger
traffic. TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
current levels by 2010, which could increase airports' need to rely on
alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
additional or more efficient EDS machines. Furthermore, while TSA has
taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports, it has not created performance measures or targets regarding its
progress in minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports. By creating performance measures for the use of alternative
screening procedures and corresponding targets, TSA could gauge whether it
is making progress in working to minimize the need to use alternative
screening procedures at airports and to consider the necessity to take
further steps to minimize the need for their use.

13The specific details on the number of hours alternative screening
procedures were used are sensitive security information.

14At 46 airports, a combined total of 154 EDS machines were added; at 22
airports, a combined total of 62 EDS machines were removed; and 47
airports maintained the same number of EDS machines. One airport with two
EDS machines in inventory in 2005 was not on the 2004 or 2002 inventory
lists.

15GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar.15, 2005).

To help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
operations, including screening with alternative screening procedures, we
are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to use PMIS data on the use of
alternative screening procedures at airports to help determine which
airports to conduct national covert testing at and when to conduct such
testing, to conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
procedures, to strengthen its monitoring and tracking of the use of
alternative screening procedures, and to develop performance measures and
performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures.

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations and stated that the recommendations and findings will help
strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening operations. The
full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix II.

                                   Background

Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD

ATSA mandated that the screening of all checked baggage at commercial
airports be done using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.
To satisfy this mandate, TSA deployed two types of screening equipment to
all airports in the United States where screening is required: (1)
explosive detection systems, which use computer-aided tomography16 X-rays
adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives, and (2) explosives trace
detection systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of
explosive materials' vapors and residues. As we reported in February 2004,
largely because of shortages of equipment and insufficient time to modify
airports to accommodate EDS machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports,
to meet this deadline. Recognizing the obstacles encountered by TSA, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, in effect, subsequently extended the
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December
31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier
deadline established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of
fully satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face
challenges in screening checked baggage because of (1) an insufficient
number of TSOs to operate the EDS and ETD machines, TSO absenteeism, and a
lack of TSO training in how to operate the machines and (2) a lack of EDS
and ETD equipment and inoperable equipment.17

16Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional
image of the internal structures of a solid object by the observation and
recording of the differences in the effects on the passage of waves of
energy impinging on those structures.

By taking the equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from
different angles, the EDS machine examines the objects inside of the
baggage to identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives
such as density and atomic number. TSA has certified, acquired, and
deployed EDS machines manufactured by three companies. EDS machines can be
installed in airports either in stand-alone mode (not integrated with
baggage handling systems) or in-line (integrated with baggage handling
systems). TSA has developed standard procedures for using EDS. Figure 1
shows EDS machines in use at an airport.

17 GAO-04-440T .

Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
Screen Checked Baggage

At airports that do not have EDS machines and at airports where certain
screening stations do not have EDS-for example at curbside check-in
stations-TSA uses ETD machines to conduct primary screening. ETD machines
are also used for secondary screening, which resolves alarms from EDS
machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives inside a bag.
TSA has certified, acquired, and deployed ETD machines from three
manufacturers. Figure 2 shows an ETD machine in use at an airport.

Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage

At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed primary screening with
both EDS and ETD machines simultaneously. In this hybrid configuration,
the EDS machine is used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are
used. Additionally, when the EDS machine alarms, the ETD machines are also
used for secondary screening.

Alternative Screening Procedures

TSA also uses alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
for explosives under certain short-term special circumstances, when the
standard procedures using EDS and ETD are not used. Two of these
procedures involve the use of EDS and ETD. The first of these is an
alternative hybrid procedure that is used at a screening station
configured only for EDS primary screening. Under this procedure, the EDS
is to be used to capacity and the remainder of the bags are screened with
ETD. The specifics of the second procedure that involves the use of EDS
and ETD are sensitive security information.18 If one of these EDS- or
ETD-based alternative screening procedure is not available, TSA will
resort to one of the procedures that does not use EDS or ETD-canine
screening; physical inspections of baggage; and positive passenger bag
match, which requires that passengers be on the same aircraft as their
checked baggage.19

FSDs and their designates not lower than the Assistant FSD for Screening
may authorize the use of alternative screening procedures under two
circumstances: (1) when the FSD or his or her designate determines that
there is a security threat created by large concentrations of passengers
waiting to have their baggage screened or (2) volumes of baggage awaiting
screening in a confined baggage screening area pose an explosive or other
security vulnerability. These circumstances may arise for reasons such as
high passenger volumes, screening machine breakdowns, or unusual weather
events such as hurricanes. After alternative screening procedures have
been used, TSA requires that information on each occurrence be recorded by
FSD staff into the PMIS database, including circumstances leading to the
use of the procedure, type of procedure used, and duration. This
information on the use of alternative screening procedures from PMIS is to
be included in daily briefing reports for TSA senior management.

18 TSA also moved additional ETD machines to screening stations to allow
for ETD screening. Prior to March 2005, TSA had categorized this
procedure, "additional ETDs," as an alternative screening procedure.
Beginning in March 2005, TSA began to categorize this procedure as a
standard screening procedure. We did not include this procedure in our
analysis of PMIS data on alternative screening procedures.

19ATSA, as codified at 49 U.S.C. S:44901(d)-(e), authorizes TSA to screen
checked baggage using canine screening, physical inspection, or a bag
match program if explosive detection equipment is unavailable.

TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
         Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment

TSA prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
of the security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's use of these
various procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA
officials determined that in general, standard screening procedures are
more effective than alternative screening procedures. TSA has estimated
that in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags per hour than ETD.
With regard to operational efficiencies, TSA has not determined the
throughput and costs of the various alternative screening procedures, in
part because it does not count the number of bags screened using the
procedures. Additionally, while TSA has assessed the security
effectiveness of screening with standard procedures in an operational
environment through covert testing, it has not conducted similar testing
of alternative screening procedures.

TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedures Based on
Legislative Requirements and TSA Officials' Judgment of Security Effectiveness

TSA is required by legislation to screen all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems, and TSA officials concluded that standard
screening procedures that use EDS or ETD provided the most effective
detection of explosives at a baggage screening station and that
alternative screening procedures should be used only for short-term,
special circumstances. These circumstances include times when security
targets are created by large volumes of passengers awaiting baggage
screening or when security vulnerabilities are created by volumes of bags
awaiting screening. According to TSA, a group of officials from its Chief
Technologist, Chief Counsel, Aviation Operations, and Operations Policy
offices met to prioritize the use of standard and alternative screening
procedures. TSA officials stated that this group did not use formal
criteria to prioritize the procedures but instead prioritized them based
on their professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures,
including the classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD
machines obtained from the Transportation Security Laboratory. This
prioritization was subsequently included in TSA's standard operating
procedures for checked baggage screening. TSA has determined that details
on the prioritization of alternative screening procedures constitute
sensitive security information.

Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Efficiency

TSA has estimated that, in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags
per hour than ETD-EDS ranges from a minimum of 80 bags per hour for one
model of a stand-alone machine up to 500 bags per hour for an in-line
system, compared to 36 bags per hour by the operator of an ETD machine.20
Whenever EDS machines have been installed at a screening station, TSA
requires airports to use them as the primary method to screen checked
baggage. At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a
hybrid configuration as a standard screening procedure that involves
colocated EDS and ETD machines for primary screening, with the EDS machine
used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are used. When the EDS
machine alarms, the ETD machines are also used for secondary screening.
Table 1 shows the bags per hour screened by EDS and ETD machines.

20TSA officials stated that two TSOs can use an ETD machine at the same
time, raising the baggage screened throughput to 72 bags per hour

Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines

Type of equipment             Maximum bags per hour
EDS machines                   Stand-alone  In-line 
CTX 2500-stand-alone only              120      NAa 
CTX 5500                               180      250 
CTX 9000-in-line only                   NA      500 
L3 6000                                140      500 
CT-80-stand-alone only                  80       NA 
ETD machines-stand-alone only           36       MA 

Source: TSA.

aNA: Not applicable.

At 312 mostly smaller airports and at some airport screening stations such
as curbside check-in stations, TSA has installed ETD instead of EDS for
primary screening because of the configuration of screening stations, the
costs associated with procuring EDS, and the low passenger volume at
smaller airports. In our March 2005 report, we recommended that TSA assess
the feasibility, expected benefits, and cost to replace ETD machines with
stand-alone EDS machines for the primary screening of checked baggage at
those airports where in-line EDS systems would not be either economically
justified or justified for other reasons. 21 DHS stated that TSA was
conducting an analysis of the airports that rely heavily on ETD machines
as the primary checked baggage screening technology in order to identify
airports that would benefit from replacing ETD machines with stand-alone
EDS equipment.22 In February 2006, in response to GAO's recommendation and
a legislative requirement to submit a schedule for expediting the
installation and use of in-line systems and replacement of ETD equipment
with EDS machines, 23 TSA provided its strategic planning framework for
its checked baggage screening program to Congress. This framework
introduces a strategy intended to increase efficiency through deploying
EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the
program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and
provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing
airline traffic and potential new threats.24 The framework is an initial
step in addressing the following areas:

21 GAO-05-365 .

22The stand-alone EDS equipment TSA is considering for these airports
includes surplus machines no longer needed once airports installed in-line
EDS machines and a newly certified EDS machine appropriate for baggage
screening operations that require a lower throughput (bags screened per
hour).

23Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, S: 4019, 118 Stat. 3638, 3721-22.

           o  optimized checked baggage screening solutions-finding the ideal
           mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening
           solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage
           volumes and

           o  funding prioritization schedule by airport-identifying the top
           25 airports that should first receive federal funding for projects
           related to the installation of explosive detection systems based
           on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors.

           TSA's strategic plan for the checked baggage screening program,
           which TSA expects to complete by early fall 2006, is to include
           funding and cost-sharing strategies for the installation of
           in-line baggage screening systems.

           Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Trade-offs
			  in Security Effectiveness, while Trade-offs in Operational Efficiencies
			  Have Not Been Determined
			  
			  TSA has determined that the use of alternative screening
           procedures at airports has created trade-offs in security
           effectiveness, but it has not determined the operational
           efficiencies of these procedures in terms of throughput and
           costs.25 TSA based its prioritization of the alternative screening
           procedures on its judgment of the procedures' security
           effectiveness and classified probabilities of detection of EDS and
           ETD machines obtained from the TSA Transportation Security
           Laboratory. TSA has not determined the operational efficiencies of
           the various alternative screening procedures in terms of
           throughput and costs in part because it does not count the number
           of bags screened using the procedures. If the higher-prioritized
           alternative screening procedure is not available at a screening
           station, the FSD may authorize a lower-prioritized procedure.26

           Positive Passenger Bag Match
			  
			  Under the positive passenger bag match alternative screening
           procedure, TSA coordinates with airlines to ensure that passengers
           are on the same aircraft as their checked baggage. If a passenger
           checks a bag but does not board the airplane, the bag is removed
           before departure. This procedure was first implemented based on
           the premise that a terrorist would seek to place a bomb on an
           airplane without sacrificing his or her life by boarding the
           airplane. In light of the suicide terrorist attacks of September
           11, this premise is now considered flawed. An airline trade
           association and airline officials representing two airlines we
           interviewed also stated that the procedure creates operational
           inefficiencies for airlines. According to these officials, the
           process of matching bags with passengers can delay flights because
           the flight cannot take off until all baggage is matched to an
           on-board passenger. These officials also stated that implementing
           the procedure increases the workload of airline personnel, who are
           responsible for conducting the procedures at the direction of TSA.

           Canine Screening
			  
			  TSA also uses canine units as an alternative screening procedure.
           These units are composed of trained explosives detection canines
           and handlers. In terms of efficiency, TSA officials reported that
           it can be difficult to mobilize canine units in sufficient time to
           screen checked baggage when alternative screening procedures are
           needed, especially since the need to use the procedures can arise
           without warning. Officials also reported that screening checked
           baggage using canines requires enough open floor space to lay out
           the baggage as well as a sufficient number of personnel to move
           the bags into position for canine screening.

           Physical Inspection
			  
			  The physical inspection alternative screening procedure requires
           human intervention to detect explosives, weapons, and improvised
           explosive devices and their components, and does not involve use
           of EDS or ETD machines. While TSOs are trained to detect
           improvised explosive devices and their components and to detect
           signs of tampering, the success of the TSOs in finding these items
           depends on their skill in detecting such items through manual
           searches and their adherence to TSA's standard operating
           procedures for checked baggage regarding physical inspection.
           Since human TSOs are involved, the efficiency of physical
           inspection in terms of baggage throughput rate can vary depending
           on the contents of the bag and how quickly the TSO conducts the
           search.

           Alternative Hybrid Procedures
			  
			  Alternative hybrid procedures involve using a combination of EDS
           and ETD at a screening station normally configured only for EDS.
           The efficiency of alternative hybrid procedures can vary because
           each use of the procedure can involve a different proportion of
           EDS and ETD screening, with greater use of EDS leading to more
           efficient screening in terms of number of bags screened per hour.

           TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
			  Alternative Screening Procedures through Covert Testing
			  
			  While TSA has reported using alternative screening procedures for
           more than 3 years, it has not tested the security effectiveness of
           the procedures in detecting explosives in an operational
           environment. TSA has conducted national covert testing of standard
           screening procedures since September 2002, and local covert
           testing of standard screening procedures since March 2005.
           However, it has not specifically focused national or local covert
           testing on alternative screening procedures to determine the
           security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's Office of
           Inspections (OI- formerly the Office of Internal Affairs and
           Program Review) conducts national covert tests at airports to
           assess the security effectiveness of checked baggage screening
           technology, procedures, and TSO performance in detecting
           explosives in an operational environment. These tests, in which
           undercover inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through
           passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are
           designed to identify vulnerabilities in passenger and checked
           baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems
           affecting screening in the areas of training, procedures, and
           technology.27 The schedule for this testing called for inspectors
           to test all category X airports once a year, category I and II
           airports once every 2 years, and category III and IV airports at
           least once every 3 years.28 In August, 2005, TSA suspended this
           cycle of testing. In April 2006, TSA officials stated that OI was
           moving to a testing schedule to include observations of screening
           stations and concentrated testing for improvised explosive devices
           at the screening checkpoint. The schedule is based on risk-based
           factors such as current intelligence information,
           high-vulnerability airports, procedural changes, training
           initiatives, and introduction of new technologies. According to
           Office of Inspections officials, during the 3-year testing cycle,
           inspectors tested the procedures being used by TSOs at the time of
           the test; alternative screening procedures were tested only if
           inspectors coincidentally conducted a test at a screening station
           while one of the procedures was in use. Office of Inspections
           officials stated that they did not schedule tests of alternative
           screening procedures because their resources were dedicated to
           conducting testing on standard screening procedures. Furthermore,
           the officials stated that since covert testing visits are planned
           in advance of the tests and the need to use alternative screening
           procedures is not always known in advance, it would be
           logistically difficult to plan a covert testing visit to coincide
           with an airport's use of alternative screening procedures because
           of airports' intermittent and often short-term use of the
           procedures. While it may be logistically difficult to conduct
           national covert testing on alternative screening procedures, PMIS
           data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
           reasons for the usage could provide the Office of Inspections with
           information to select airports for covert testing as part of the
           risk-based approach to covert testing that it is developing.

           In addition to its national covert testing program, in March 2005,
           TSA also began an airport-based local covert testing program to
           determine if TSA checked baggage TSOs can detect a simulated
           improvised explosive device that is hidden in a test bag.
           Participation in this program is at the discretion of the FSD. FSD
           staff test screening at EDS stations by placing simulant
           explosives in baggage and surreptitiously running the bags through
           the machines. According to TSA, between March 2005 and February
           2006, 2,526 local tests of EDS screening were conducted at 108
           airports. When we asked TSA headquarters officials in charge of
           the local covert testing program about the feasibility and
           usefulness of testing the use of alternative screening procedures,
           they stated that they had not previously considered testing the
           procedures through the local covert testing program. These
           officials also cited challenges in conducting such testing,
           including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
           procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the
           testing, particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their
           staffs authorize and initiate the use of alternative screening
           procedures, they could schedule some of their ongoing local covert
           testing for checked baggage screening to coincide with the use of
           these procedures. In not testing the alternative screening
           procedures through national or local covert testing, TSA is not
           collecting data that could provide useful information on how to
           improve the security effectiveness of these procedures in
           detecting explosives.

           The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures
			  Is Not Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of
			  Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Improved
			  
			  TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard and
			  Alternative Screening Procedures to Enable an Accurate Determination
			  of the Full Extent of Their Use
			  
			  TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening
           procedures in PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all
           checked baggage screening using EDS and ETD with standard or
           alternative screening procedures. TSA cannot identify the
           percentage of usage of standard or alternative screening
           procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
           contains data on the number of bags screened, whereas for
           alternative screening procedures it contains data on the number of
           occasions and hours of use.29 However, TSA officials estimated
           that a high percentage of checked baggage is screened using EDS
           and ETD machines with standard screening procedures30 and a low
           percentage is screened using alternative screening procedures.31
           TSA determined that the number of bags screened using EDS and ETD
           with standard screening procedures between October 2004 and
           September 2005 as well as data on the use of alternative screening
           procedures reported into PMIS during this same period are
           sensitive security information.

           TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of Standard
			  and Alternative Screening Procedures, but Some Controls Have Not
			  Been Adequately Implemented
			  
			  TSA established internal controls to monitor and track the usage
           of standard and alternative screening procedures, but has not
           adequately implemented some of these controls. An internal control
           is an integral component of an organization's management and is
           designed to provide reasonable assurance that agencies achieve
           effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with
           applicable laws and regulations. The Comptroller General's
           Standards for Internal Controls require that transactions and
           events be completely and accurately recorded in order to ensure
           that information is available for management to guide operations
           and make decisions.32 While TSA has established internal controls
           to monitor and track use of baggage screening procedures, such as
           requiring FSDs and their designates to report the use of
           alternative screening procedures into PMIS and to call TSA
           headquarters for permission to use the procedures for more than 2
           hours, some of the controls have not been adequately implemented
           because events have not been completely and accurately recorded.
           Consequently, TSA does not have complete information on the extent
           of the use of alternative screening procedures that would be
           helpful for TSA management in making decisions on actions to
           minimize the need to use alternative screening procedures at
           airports, such as deploying screening equipment.

           Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS
			  
			  Information that FSDs and their staffs report in PMIS regarding
           the number of bags screened using ETD machines may not be accurate
           because of the way in which the number of bags screened is
           estimated. While EDS machines automatically count each bag
           screened, ETD machines count each swab analyzed, rather than each
           bag screened. TSA uses this count of analyses to estimate the
           number of bags screened using ETD. The number of analyses for a
           bag screened using ETD may vary depending on how many times the
           machine alarms during the screening process and other factors,
           which may lead to overreporting of baggage screened. TSA officials
           stated that they are aware of these discrepancies and are working
           to improve counting of baggage screened using ETD.33 Improved
           counting of bags would provide TSA management with better
           information to use in making decisions related to its baggage
           screening operations, including where to deploy screening
           equipment.

           Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures
			  
			  FSDs and their staffs did not always completely and accurately
           record information in PMIS on the use of various alternative
           screening procedures. On the basis of our review of PMIS data from
           October 2004 through September 2005, we found that FSDs and their
           designates did not always accurately report the occurrences when a
           particular baggage screening procedure was used. For example, some
           of the airports that reported using alternative screening
           procedures voluntarily reported in a PMIS comments field that they
           used the procedures intermittently over the course of several
           hours, even though in PMIS they reported only one occurrence that
           lasted several hours.34 FSD staff at one of these airports
           reported in PMIS one occurrence of using alternative screening
           procedures for 15.5 hours straight but reported in the comments
           field that the procedures were used during 24 different
           occurrences during the 15.5 hours. According to TSA guidance,
           these data should have been recorded as 24 separate occurrences in
           the PMIS database, not simply noted in the comments field. TSA
           officials stated that they were aware that many airports were
           reporting the use of alternative screening procedures for extended
           periods of time rather than recording each time the use of the
           procedures was started and stopped within the reported time. In
           May 2005, the TSA Assistant Administrator for Aviation Programs
           sent a memo to FSDs noting that the start and stop time of each
           individual use of an alternative screening procedure at each
           screening station should be reported into PMIS. In our analysis of
           PMIS data from May 2005 through September 2005, subsequent to the
           issuance of this memo, some of the airports continued to report
           intermittent use of alternative screening procedures in the
           comments fields.

           The design of PMIS also contributed to incomplete and inaccurate
           recording of information because it does not allow FSDs and their
           designates to report two or more alternative screening procedures
           used during the same occurrence. TSA officials have instructed
           FSDs and their designates to record the alternative screening
           procedure that is used the most during the occurrence. One airport
           voluntarily reported in the PMIS comments field that it used three
           alternative screening procedures throughout the occurrence.
           However, the PMIS database only allowed reporting of the use of
           one of the procedures during this time. Because of these reporting
           limitations, TSA managers do not receive complete information on
           how often or for how long the various alternative screening
           procedures are actually used-information that could affect their
           decisions on what actions to take to minimize the need to use
           alternative screening procedures at airports.

           Another factor that could contribute to incomplete and inaccurate
           reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS is that
           although FSDs and their staffs are required to report every
           occurrence of the procedures in PMIS, they may not have always
           done so. Until August 2005, when this requirement was eliminated,
           FSDs and their staffs were required to report to the
           Transportation Security Operations Center-TSA's command, control,
           communications and intelligence center-whenever they were about to
           begin using alternative screening procedures or to switch back to
           standard EDS or ETD screening after using alternative screening
           procedures.35 While TSA officials stated that they did not keep
           formal records of the calls, they kept what TSA termed "informal
           notes" on sheets that included times when the use of the
           alternative screening procedures began and ended and the type of
           procedure used. When we compared a select number36 of these sheets
           completed between February and March 2005 to PMIS reporting for
           the same period, we found that 21 percent of the occurrences of
           use of alternative screening procedures recorded on the sheets
           were not recorded into PMIS as required by TSA's standard
           operating procedures.37 Inaccurate reporting on the frequency of
           use of alternative screening procedures may hinder management
           decision making on how best to minimize airport need to use these
           procedures.

           Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More than 2 Hours
			  
			  While TSA's standard operating procedures require FSDs or their
           designates to call headquarters for permission to use alternative
           screening procedures that are used for more than 2 hours in order
           to ensure that the procedures are used only for short-term,
           special circumstances, TSA does not require headquarters to
           maintain a record of these calls. Because these calls are not
           recorded, TSA management is not able to ensure that the
           requirement in the standard operating procedures is being
           followed. Recording these calls would enable TSA to compare the
           records to the hours of use of alternative screening procedures
           data maintained in PMIS. This comparison would provide TSA with
           information to help provide reasonable assurance that FSDs and
           their staffs are complying with the standard operating procedures'
           requirement to call for permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
           procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that there had not
           been any instances in which airports were denied permission to
           exceed 2 hours' use of alternative screening procedures. However,
           without records of the calls, we were not able to verify that
           permission was granted for the occurrences that exceeded 2
           hours.38

           TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
			  Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets
			  
			  TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
			  Procedures at Airports
			  
			  TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to rely on the use of
           alternative baggage screening procedures and is working to
           minimize the need to use these procedures. According to our review
           of PMIS data, the use of alternative screening procedures between
           October 2004 and September 2005-measured in terms of the total
           hours these procedures were employed-initially increased and then
           declined. TSA attributed the reported overall decline in the usage
           of alternative screening procedures in part to improved
           coordination among FSDs, airlines, and local organizations.
           According to TSA officials, this coordination helps FSDs and their
           staffs anticipate surges in passenger traffic so that they can
           adequately staff screening stations. In our structured interviews
           with FSDs and their staffs responsible for 29 airports, several
           FSDs also cited the importance of coordination with local
           organizations and how this reduced their need to use alternative
           screening procedures. For example, the FSD for one airport said
           that he coordinated with local summer camps to have campers'
           baggage screened the day before their flights to reduce the amount
           of baggage that has to be screened when campers arrive at the
           airport. The FSD for another airport communicated with cruise ship
           management about the scheduling of cruises in order to anticipate
           any surges in passenger traffic that may have created the need to
           use alternative screening procedures.

           TSA officials have also taken action to reduce airports' need to
           use alternative screening procedures through the use of
           "optimization team" visits to airports. These visits are conducted
           at the request of TSA senior leadership or an FSD with the goal to
           observe screening operations and maximize efficiencies by applying
           practices learned at other airports. According to TSA officials,
           recurring use of alternative screening procedures triggered some
           of the optimization team visits TSA has conducted, and the
           optimization team visits may have led to a reduction in the number
           of occasions in which these procedures needed to be used.39 For
           example, on May 18-19, 2005, an optimization team visited one
           airport and recommended procuring one ETD machine and changing the
           location of another to reduce the airport's need to use
           alternative screening procedures. On July 6-7, 2005, another
           optimization team visited another airport. The team suggested
           reconfiguring EDS machines at the airport's screening stations,
           which resulted in an increase in baggage throughput from 120 to
           150 bags per hour. At both of these airports, alternative
           screening procedures were used more frequently prior to the
           optimization team visit than they were after the visit.

           TSA officials also stated that as additional equipment is deployed
           and enhanced to enable TSA to increase checked baggage screening
           throughputs-bags screened per hour-TSA will be in a better
           position to reduce the need for use of alternative screening
           procedures. We reported in March 2005 that as of June 2004, TSA
           had deployed 1,228 EDS machines.40 Between June 2004 and June
           2006, TSA had deployed 399 additional EDS machines in both in-line
           (integrated into the airport baggage system) and stand-alone (in
           airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas) configurations. EDS
           machines in an in-line configuration are able to screen up to 500
           bags per hour, as compared to EDS machines in a stand-alone
           configuration that screen between 80 and 180 bags per hour. The
           superior efficiency of screening with in-line EDS compared to
           screening with stand-alone EDS may have been a factor in reducing
           the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports where
           in-line systems were installed. TSA reported that, as of June
           2006, 25 airports had operational in-line EDS systems and an
           additional 24 airports had in-line systems under construction.
           Although in-line EDS systems can create improvements in
           operational efficiencies of an airport's checked baggage screening
           system, baggage volumes that exceed the system's capacity and
           equipment breakdowns still sometimes occur, necessitating the use
           of alternative screening procedures. For example, some of the
           airports that have installed airportwide in-line systems reported
           using alternative screening procedures because of equipment
           failures and high passenger and baggage volumes after their
           systems were operational.41 Since stand-alone EDS machines screen
           between 80 and 180 bags per hour compared to ETD machines, which
           allow for screening of 36 bags per hour, additional stand-alone
           EDS machines also may have helped the airports where they were
           installed to screen baggage with standard screening procedures
           rather than alternative screening procedures. Additionally, in May
           2005, TSA certified software and hardware upgrades for 519 out of
           1,322 EDS machines, which are used in both in-line and stand-alone
           configurations. These upgrades are being tested in a pilot
           program. TSA officials anticipate that the upgrades could lead to
           increased baggage throughput for the machines, which could further
           reduce need to use alternative screening procedures.

           Installation of in-line EDS systems at airports that currently use
           stand-alone EDS and ETD for primary screening has further
           potential to reduce the need for alternative screening procedures
           to be used at these airports. In March 2005, we reported that TSA
           had estimated that in-line checked baggage systems would reduce by
           78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and supervisors required to
           screen checked baggage at nine airports that had signed agreements
           to develop the systems.42 Under the congressionally imposed 45,000
           TSO full-time-equivalent limit, when staff requirements are
           reduced at one airport through increased efficiencies, full-time
           equivalent positions will become available to address TSO
           shortages at other airports.43 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage
           strategic planning framework included a prioritization of which
           additional airports should receive funding for in-line systems and
           a description of how stand-alone EDS machines from those airports
           should be redistributed to other airports.44 In the framework, TSA
           also reported that many of the initial in-line systems had
           produced a level of TSO labor savings insufficient to offset
           up-front capital costs of constructing the systems. According to
           TSA, the facility and baggage handling system modifications have
           been higher than expected at the nine airports that have signed
           agreements to fund the systems. TSA stated that the keys to
           reducing future costs are establishing guidelines outlining best
           practices and a set of efficient design choices and using newer
           EDS technology that best matches each optimally scaled design
           solution. In February 2006, TSA reported that recent improvements
           in the design of the in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems
           and the EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
           higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. The final
           strategic plan will include the results of TSA's cost sharing
           study that it is currently conducting in consultation with airport
           operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify ways
           to fund in-line EDS systems.45 After in-line EDS systems are
           installed and staffing reductions are achieved, redistributing the
           TSO positions to other airports with staffing shortages may reduce
           airport need to use alternative screening procedures.

           Technology developments may also help TSA to reduce the use of
           alternative screening procedures. In March 2005, we reported that
           TSA was working to develop a computer-aided tomography explosives
           detection system that is smaller and lighter than systems
           currently deployed in airport lobbies and that the new system was
           intended to replace systems currently in use, including larger and
           heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment.46 The smaller size of the
           system would create opportunities for TSA to transfer screening
           operations to other locations, such as airport check-in counters.
           The machine would also be an option for airports that currently
           rely on ETD machines since it would be cheaper than other
           certified machines and it would have higher baggage throughput
           than screening using ETD machines, potentially reducing the need
           to use alternative screening procedures at airports where it is
           installed. In March 2005, TSA began to pilot this machine at three
           airports. At one of these pilot airports, the FSD stated that he
           anticipates that the smaller EDS machine will reduce staffing
           needs, reduce workers compensation claims, and ultimately enable
           the airport to incorporate the machines in-line behind the ticket
           counters. TSA reported that the machine achieved throughput rates
           of up to 80 bags per hour, higher than the throughput rate of up
           to 36 bags per hour for an ETD operated by one TSO or up to 72
           bags per hour for an ETD operated by two TSOs. In September 2005,
           TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 of these
           machines that will be installed at 24 airports.

           While TSA data indicate that the use of alternative screening
           procedures is declining, TSA reported in its February 2006
           framework that at some airports alternative screening procedures
           will increasingly be used because of rising passenger traffic. TSA
           has projected that the number of originating domestic and
           international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers
           over current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an
           average of 0.76 checked bags per passenger were to remain constant
           through 2010, TSA would be screening about 96 million more bags
           than it now screens. This could increase airports' need to rely on
           alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
           additional or more efficient EDS machines. TSA headquarters
           officials stated that while TSA is working to minimize the need to
           use alternative screening procedures, it intends to maintain the
           procedures as part of its standard operating procedures so that
           FSDs will have options to respond to events such as unforeseen
           equipment failures, surges in passenger traffic, and
           weather-related incidents such as hurricanes. Additionally, some
           of the FSDs that we interviewed stated that they anticipate
           continuing to need to use alternative screening procedures because
           of screening capacity limits and rising passenger volume, and some
           of these FSDs anticipated increasing their use of the procedures
           as their airport passenger traffic rises because of limitations in
           the physical layout of their airports that contribute to
           overcrowding.47

           TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Related
			  to the Use of Alternative Screening Procedures
			  
			  Although TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative
           screening procedures at airports, it has not established
           performance measures or targets related to the use of these
           procedures. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
           provides, among other things, that federal agencies establish
           program performance measures, including the assessment of relevant
           outputs and outcomes of measures.48 Performance measures are meant
           to cover key aspects of performance and help decision makers to
           assess program accomplishments and improve program performance. A
           performance target is a desired level of performance expressed as
           a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement
           will be compared. By analyzing the gap between target and actual
           levels of performance, management can target those processes that
           are most in need of improvement, set improvement goals, and
           identify appropriate process improvements or other actions.

           TSA has established four performance measures for the checked
           baggage screening program. Three of these measures make up TSA's
           checked baggage screening performance index. This index measures
           the overall performance of the system through a composite of
           indicators that are derived by combining specific performance
           measures related to checked baggage screening. Specifically, this
           index measures the effectiveness of screening systems through
           machine probability of detection and covert testing results,
           efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per bag
           screened, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA's
           national call center. TSA considers the final performance
           measure-compliance with the ATSA requirement to screen all checked
           baggage using explosive detection systems (EDS and ETD)-to be
           obsolete since it reported all airports as capable of screening
           with EDS or ETD in January 2005. The use of alternative screening
           procedures is not included in the index, nor does TSA have
           stand-alone measures or targets for the use of alternative
           screening procedures.

           TSA officials stated that they did not want to implement
           performance measures or targets for alternative screening
           procedures because they are already working to minimize the need
           to use the procedures at airports. However, TSA officials also
           acknowledged that they will continue to rely on alternative
           screening procedures because of unforeseen circumstances such as
           high baggage volumes or weather-related incidents. By creating a
           performance measure for the use of alternative screening
           procedures as part of the checked baggage screening index or as a
           stand-alone measure, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress
           toward minimizing the need to use these procedures at airports and
           have more complete information on how well the overall checked
           baggage screening system is performing. Furthermore, performance
           targets for the use of alternative screening procedures would
           provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to accept in
           using these procedures, and TSA's monitoring of this indicator
           would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has
           determined is acceptable. For example, if TSA were to determine
           the percentage of checked baggage that should be screened using
           alternative screening procedures, and if its performance data
           showed that it was currently screening a higher percentage than
           the target, TSA would be able to decide whether to take steps to
           bring the use of these procedures into line with its desired level
           of use.

           Finally, the extent to which performance measures and targets will
           assist TSA in minimizing the need to use these procedures at
           airports is dependent upon the accuracy and completeness of the
           reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS, including
           the percentage of bags screened using the procedures, as
           previously discussed.

           Conclusions
			  
			  It has been over 4 years since Congress issued the mandate for TSA
           to screen all checked baggage at commercial airports using
           explosive detection systems. During this time, TSA has deployed
           EDS or ETD machines at more than 400 commercial airports and
           reported achieving the capability to screen 100 percent of checked
           baggage using these machines. As part of this effort, TSA
           developed standard and alternative checked baggage screening
           procedures. While TSA acknowledges that screening with alternative
           screening procedures is less effective than screening with
           standard screening procedures, it has also recognized the need for
           continued use of alternative screening procedures because of high
           passenger and baggage volumes resulting from unpredictable and
           unforeseen circumstances, such as equipment breakdowns and unusual
           weather events. Given TSA's plans to continue to use alternative
           screening procedures and the trade-offs in security effectiveness
           involved in their use, it will be important for TSA to test the
           effectiveness of these procedures in an operating environment. One
           such way for TSA to test the security effectiveness of the various
           alternative screening procedures is through the covert testing
           conducted by the Office of Inspections. While we recognize the
           logistical challenges that the Office of Inspections faces in
           conducting checked baggage covert testing on alternative screening
           procedures, using PMIS data on the use of these
           procedures-including data on the airports that use the procedures
           the most frequently or for extended periods of time-could help the
           Office of Inspections in selecting airports for testing as part of
           the risk-based approach to covert testing that it is currently
           developing. By not assessing alternative screening procedures
           through national or local covert testing, TSA is missing an
           opportunity to gather information to help determine the security
           effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an
           operational setting.

           Additionally, TSA headquarters has established internal controls
           to monitor and track the use of alternative screening procedures
           at airports and has taken steps to improve reporting of these
           procedures in the PMIS database. However, without strengthening
           its controls, such as providing a means for measuring the number
           of bags screened using alternative screening procedures and
           enabling TSA airport staff to report the concurrent use of more
           than one alternative screening procedure, TSA lacks reasonable
           assurance that it has complete and accurate information on the use
           of these procedures.

           Furthermore, TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use
           alternative screening procedures at airports, but does not expect
           to eliminate the use of these procedures. Increasing air travel
           and TSA's effort to operate within or below the current 45,000 TSO
           full-time-equivalent limit could add to the need for alternative
           screening procedures, unless more or more efficient EDS machines
           are deployed. Given TSA's continuing use of the procedures,
           performance measures and targets would provide TSA and Congress
           with objective information to assess TSA's progress in minimizing
           the need to use the procedures at airports, and would help inform
           TSA decision making on whether and when mitigating steps are
           needed to achieve its desired level of use.

           Recommendations for Executive Action
			  
			  To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative
           screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA
           strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening
           procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
           Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation
           Security Administration, to take the following four actions:

           o  Use PMIS data on use of alternative screening procedures in
           determining at which airports to conduct covert testing and when
           to conduct testing at these airports as part of the Office of
           Inspections' new risk-based approach to covert testing.

           o  Conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
           procedures to determine whether checked baggage TSOs can detect
           simulated improvised explosives when using these procedures.

           o  Strengthen the monitoring and tracking of the use of
           alternative screening procedures to help determine the progress
           the agency is making in minimizing its need to use these
           procedures. This effort would include continuing to address
           reporting problems in the PMIS database system, keeping a record
           of calls requesting permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
           procedures, and providing a means for measuring the use of
           alternative screening procedures compared to the use of standard
           procedures, such as counting baggage screened with alternative
           screening procedures.

           o  Develop performance measures and performance targets for the
           use of alternative screening procedures in checked baggage
           screening, perhaps as part of the checked baggage screening
           program performance index, to help TSA measure its progress in
           working toward minimizing the need to use alternative screening
           procedures at airports and to have more complete information on
           the overall performance of the checked baggage screening system.

           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
			  
			  We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.
           On July 25, 2006, we received written comments on the draft
           report, which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred
           with our findings and recommendations and stated that the report
           will help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
           operations.

           Regarding our recommendation that TSA use Performance Management
           Information System data on the use of alternative screening
           procedures in determining at which airports to conduct covert
           testing and when to conduct testing at these airports, DHS
           concurred and stated that TSA's Office of Inspections will
           consider PMIS information on alternative screening procedures as
           part of its new risk-based approach to covert testing and will
           develop new checked baggage screening testing protocols.

           Concerning our recommendation that TSA conduct local covert
           testing of alternative screening procedures, DHS concurred and
           stated that TSA is currently modifying its local covert testing
           program to strengthen the program and expects that these
           modifications will better prepare TSOs to detect simulated
           improvised explosives. We are pleased that TSA is making efforts
           to strengthen its local covert testing program. We continue to
           believe that testing of alternative screening procedures would
           provide TSA with an opportunity to gather information to help
           identify and improve the security effectiveness of alternative
           screening procedures in an operational setting.

           DHS concurred with our recommendation to strengthen the monitoring
           and tracking of the use of alternative screening procedures to
           help determine the progress the agency is making in minimizing its
           need to use the procedures. In response to our recommendation that
           TSA address reporting problems in its PMIS database system, DHS
           stated that PMIS has been enhanced with both functionality and
           data quality-related processes to ensure data reliability.
           According to TSA, the system alerts the user when a data field is
           filled in with a value that falls outside the operational norms
           for a particular airport. Additionally, according to TSA, PMIS
           training and functionality reviews occur on a regular basis and
           user manuals and best practices are updated consistently. While
           these efforts should help improve the data reliability of PMIS,
           they will not fully address the reporting problems highlighted in
           our report. Specifically, the steps TSA has taken do not address
           inaccurate counts of baggage screened resulting from TSA's method
           for estimating the number of bags screened with ETD using standard
           screening procedures or inaccurate reporting of occurrences when a
           particular alternative screening procedure is used. Without
           addressing these reporting problems, TSA will continue to lack
           reasonable assurance that it has complete and accurate information
           on the use of these procedures.

           In response to our recommendation on keeping a record of calls
           requesting permission to exceed 2 hours use of the procedures, DHS
           stated that because the amount of time that alternative screening
           procedures are used is recorded in PMIS, there is no further
           documentation required for exceeding the 2 hour threshold.
           However, while documentation is entered into PMIS on the amount of
           time the procedures are used, recording the length of time that
           the procedures are used does not allow TSA to verify that FSDs are
           actually requesting permission to use the procedures for more than
           2 hours as required. In response to our recommendation on
           providing a means for measuring the use of alternative screening
           procedures compared to the use of standard procedures, such as
           counting baggage screened with alternative screening procedures,
           DHS stated that TSA will evaluate the necessity of requiring the
           recording of the number of bags screened by alternative screening
           procedures, and if it finds it to be a useful metric, it will
           require FSDs to include the number of bags in their report in
           PMIS. We are encouraged that TSA will undertake this evaluation,
           as we believe that it will allow TSA to have more assurance that
           it has complete and accurate information on the use of these
           procedures.

           In response to our recommendation on developing performance
           measures and targets for the use of alternative screening
           procedures, DHS concurred and stated that TSA is currently meeting
           the intent of this recommendation by monitoring and tracking the
           use of alternative screening procedures through PMIS. DHS stated
           that using this system has assisted TSA in identifying areas for
           improvement nationwide and addressing local issues to minimize the
           need for alternative screening procedures. DHS also stated that
           TSA intends to continue monitoring and tracking the use of
           alternative screening procedures and to implement the
           recommendations in this report for refining the data and
           evaluating the need to make adjustments based on the current
           performance level. While we support TSA's efforts to ensure the
           use of alternative screening procedures is accurately reported in
           PMIS, given the security effectiveness trade-offs associated with
           alternative screening procedures, we do not believe that tracking
           the use of the procedures with PMIS is sufficient to provide
           congressional and other decision makers with an indication of the
           progress the agency expects to make in minimizing the need to use
           the procedures at airports. Performance measures and targets would
           provide this information and would help to reinforce
           accountability and to ensure that managers focus on the results
           they are striving to achieve regarding minimizing the use of
           alternative screening procedures in their day-to-day activities.

           We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of the
           Department of Homeland Security; the Assistant Secretary, TSA; and
           interested congressional committees as appropriate. We will also
           make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
           report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov.

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made
           major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

           Sincerely yours,

           Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

           Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
			  
			  To assess the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
           efforts to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
           systems (EDS) and explosive trace detection machines (ETD), we
           addressed the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the
           use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
           procedures and what security effectiveness trade-offs and
           operational efficiencies has TSA identified in using these
           procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To what
           extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures
           to screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure
           that standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3)
           What steps has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use
           alternative screening procedures and to establish performance
           measures and targets for the use of the procedures?

           To assess how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
           procedures and to assess the trade-offs in security effectiveness
           and operational efficiencies associated with various baggage
           screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's standard operating
           procedures for using these procedures. We also obtained and
           analyzed relevant legislation and conducted a literature search to
           obtain information on screening procedures, technologies, and
           related aviation trends. This search identified various TSA
           reports, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General
           reports, and aviation industry reports. We also reviewed studies
           from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory regarding checked
           baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
           offices, including the Chief Technologist's Office, Aviation
           Programs, the Transportation Security Operations Center, the
           Transportation Security Laboratory, Chief Operating Officer's
           Office, and Office of Planning to learn about checked baggage
           screening procedures and how they were given relative priority. We
           also interviewed officials from air carriers, explosive detection
           systems equipment manufacturers, and an airport industry
           association to obtain information regarding TSA's checked baggage
           screening procedures. We assessed the results from unannounced,
           undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
           conducted by TSA's Office of Inspections and questioned TSA
           officials about the procedures used to ensure the reliability of
           the covert test data. On the basis of their answers, we believe
           that the covert test data are sufficiently reliable for the
           purposes of our review. We also reviewed results of unannounced,
           undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
           conducted at airports by Federal Security Directors (FSD) and
           their staffs and collected as part of TSA's Screener Training
           Exercises and Assessments program. After reviewing documentation
           from TSA, we found the data from the Screener Training Exercises
           and Assessments program were sufficiently reliable for the
           purposes of our review.

           To assess the extent to which TSA has used standard and
           alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage and how
           TSA ensures that standard checked baggage screening procedures are
           used whenever possible, we reviewed and analyzed TSA's Performance
           Management Information System (PMIS) database, which contains
           information on baggage screening operations and the use of
           alternative screening procedures. We found several issues with
           these data, including, in some cases, multiple occurrences of the
           use of alternative screening procedures recorded as one occurrence
           and also, in some cases, more than one procedure being used during
           an occurrence but the occurrence was entered into the database as
           only one procedure because of the constraints of the database.
           When we interviewed TSA officials about these data reliability
           issues, officials acknowledged that airports may have inaccurately
           reported some occurrences of the use of alternative screening
           procedures. However, the officials stated that they were working
           to correct the reporting problems and consider the data generally
           reliable. On the basis of these discussions and our review of the
           database, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the
           purposes of this report, since the data provide overall trends in
           the use of the procedures. To determine what controls are in place
           to track and report the use of baggage screening procedures, we
           analyzed the PMIS database and the PMIS user guide. We also
           analyzed TSA's operating procedures for checked baggage and policy
           guidance and compared TSA's procedures for ensuring that airports
           correctly report the use of alternative screening procedures to
           the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Controls in the
           Federal Government. We also interviewed officials from TSA's
           Office of Planning, Chief Operating Office, Transportation
           Security Operations Center, and Inspections offices concerning
           checked baggage screening procedures.

           To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to use
           alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA
           has set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's
           PMIS data and its standard operating procedures for checked
           baggage screening and TSA's inventory of explosive detection
           systems. We found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive
           detection systems and worked with TSA to resolve the
           discrepancies. TSA also completed a reconciliation of the
           inventory database with data collected manually by TSA officials.
           We also analyzed documentation from the TSA Transportation
           Security Operations Center and interviewed TSA officials from the
           Chief Operating Officer's Office, Office of Planning, the Office
           of Assistant Secretary, and Chief Technology Office. Additionally,
           we examined TSA's checked baggage performance measures and targets
           in the context of the Government Performance and Results Act of
           1993 (GPRA) requirements.

           In addressing these objectives, we conducted site visits at nine
           airports-three category X, one category I, four category II, and
           one category IV airport. We chose these airports based on one or
           more of the following factors: use of alternative screening
           procedures at the airport as reported in PMIS, testing of
           screening equipment at the airport, proximity to another airport
           being visited by GAO, and size of airport. The results from our
           airport visits provided examples of checked baggage screening
           operations and issues but cannot be generalized beyond the
           airports visited because we did not use statistical sampling in
           selecting the airports. We also conducted structured interviews
           with FSDs and their staffs who were responsible for 29 randomly
           selected airports. One FSD we interviewed was responsible for two
           airports in our sample. We conducted all but one of these
           interviews over the telephone. Using information from PMIS, we
           selected airports that had reported using alternative screening
           procedures and airports that had not reported using alternative
           screening procedures between October 18, 2004, and December 21,
           2004.1 Although the interviews were conducted with FSDs and their
           staffs at random samples of airports, the samples are too small to
           generalize the interview results with a high degree of statistical
           confidence to all airports nationwide. The results from these
           interviews do provide information about checked baggage screening
           operations at the airports for which the FSDs and their staffs are
           responsible.

           We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2006 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

           Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
			  			  
			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  
			  Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404

           Acknowledgments
			
			  In addition to the contact named above, David Alexander, Leo
           Barbour, Chuck Bausell Jr., Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping,
           Katherine Davis, Josh Diosomito, Christine Fossett, Richard Hung,
           Benjamin Jordan, Thomas Lombardi, Lisa Shibata, Maria Strudwick,
           and Alper Tunca made key contributions to this report.

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24TSA has determined that the details of its analysis of the optimal
checked baggage screening solutions are sensitive security information.

25The specifics of the trade-offs in security effectiveness have been
determined to be sensitive security information.

26One alternative screening procedure that involves the use of EDS and ETD
is not discussed in this report because TSA designated the procedure as
sensitive security information.

27GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2005).

28TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of
five categories-X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have
the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have
the smallest number.

29Although FSDs and their staffs are not required to report the number of
bags screened with alternative screening procedures into PMIS, some FSDs
and staff from airports that reported using alternative screening
procedures reported this information in comment fields on occurrences of
use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and September
2005. The number of FSDs and the number of occurrences have been
determined to be sensitive security information.

30TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive an
estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.

31TSA determined that its estimate of the use of alternative screening
procedures is sensitive security information.

32GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

33TSA determined that the other factors that may influence the number of
analyses completed for a bag screened using ETD are sensitive security
information.

34The comments field is a PMIS database field used to add descriptive data
on the alternative screening procedures occurrence. TSA determined that
the exact number of airports that voluntarily reported intermittent use of
alternative screening procedures in the comments field is sensitive
security information.

35TSA officials stated that they eliminated this requirement because
headquarters could get information on use of alternative screening
procedures through PMIS.

36TSA classified the number of sheets that we reviewed as sensitive
security information.

37We selected sheets to analyze based on the completeness of the
information contained on the sheets. Each sheet selected had a date, an
airport code or name, a beginning and end time of use of alternative
screening procedures, type of alternative screening procedure used, and
reason for using the alternative screening procedure.

38TSA classified the number of occurrences that were more than 2 hours as
sensitive security information.

39The optimization visits are also used to improve the design of passenger
and baggage checkpoints, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport,
evaluate staffing and scheduling practices, and determine compliance with
the standard operating procedures.

40 GAO-05-365 .

41Each of the airports' in-line systems became operational on a different
date. The number of airports that reported using alternative screening
procedures due to equipment failures and high passenger and baggage
volumes after their systems were operational has been determined to be
sensitive security information.

42 GAO-05-365 .

43Section 4023 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 requires TSA to develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees, standards for determining aviation security staffing at
commercial airports no later than 90 days after December 17, 2004, the
date of the act's enactment, and GAO to conduct an analysis of these
standards. These standards were submitted to Congress on June 22, 2005,
and GAO is currently reviewing these standards.

44The details of the strategic planning framework for the checked baggage
screening program constitute sensitive security information.

45Section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 requires TSA to complete a cost-sharing study in collaboration
with industry stakeholders to review the benefits and cost of in-line
checked baggage screening systems, innovative financing approaches,
formulas for cost sharing between different government entities and the
private sector, and potential cost-saving approaches.

46 GAO-05-365 .

47TSA determined that the exact number of FSDs that anticipate continued
or increased use of alternative screening procedures is sensitive security
information.

48According to the Government Performance and Results Act, the Office of
Management and Budget, and GAO, outcomes assess actual results as compared
with the intended results that occur from carrying out a program or
activity. Outcomes are the results of a program or activity. For further
information, see GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a
Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

1TSA has determined that the exact number of airports we selected is
sensitive security information.

(440517)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-869 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-869 , a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

July 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for
screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives and has
deployed explosive detection systems and developed standard procedures for
their use. TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used for
short-term, special circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA
prioritized the use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified
trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational efficiencies; (2) how
TSA reported use of the procedures and ensured that standard procedures
are used whenever possible; and (3) what steps TSA took to reduce
airports' need to use alternative screening procedures and to establish
performance measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO
interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's database on
checked baggage screening operations; and conducted airport site visits.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that TSA use information on airport usage of
alternative screening procedures in conducting covert testing; strengthen
TSA's monitoring and tracking of the use of alternative screening
procedures; and develop performance measures and targets for the use of
alternative screening procedures. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and
generally concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations.

TSA has prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
of the procedures' effectiveness. Use of various procedures to screen
checked baggage has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness, which
vary by the type of procedure used and the circumstances of its use. It is
TSA's policy to use standard procedures whenever possible because TSA
officials determined that these procedures provide the most effective
detection of explosives. TSA policy also allows the use of alternative
screening procedures when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose
security vulnerabilities or when TSA airport officials determine that
there is a security risk associated with large concentrations of
passengers in an area waiting for their baggage to be screened. Regarding
operational efficiencies, TSA has not fully determined the throughput and
costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part because it
does not count the number of bags screened using these procedures. TSA has
conducted covert tests (undercover, unannounced) of standard procedures,
but has not conducted this testing for alternative screening procedures.
TSA cited logistical difficulties in conducting covert tests for
alternative screening procedures. However, by not doing so, TSA is not
collecting data that could provide useful information in determining the
security effectiveness of the procedures in an operational setting and how
to improve their effectiveness.

TSA cannot identify the percentage of checked baggage screened using
standard versus alternative screening procedures because TSA records
standard procedures in terms of the number of bags screened in its
management information system, but records alternative procedures in terms
of the number of occasions and hours of use. However, TSA officials
estimated that a low percentage of checked baggage is screened using
alternative screening procedures. To assess the extent that standard
screening procedures are used whenever possible, TSA has established
internal controls to monitor the use of standard and alternative screening
procedures; however, these controls were not always implemented to ensure
the gathering of complete and accurate information. This may limit TSA
managers' ability to assess the effect of using alternative screening
procedures and determine what should be done to minimize the use of the
procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are working with
TSA airport staff to correct such reporting problems.

TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening
procedures at airports, including anticipating factors that could increase
passenger and baggage volume and acting to address these factors. However,
TSA has not developed performance measures and targets to assess its
progress in minimizing the need to use the procedures. By creating
performance measures, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress toward
minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports.
Performance targets for the procedures would be an indicator of how much
risk TSA is willing to accept in using the procedures.
*** End of document. ***