    Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
    Procedures Could Be Strengthened (28-JUL-06, GAO-06-869).

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible
    for screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives
    and has deployed explosive detection systems and developed
    standard procedures for their use. TSA also allows alternative
    screening procedures to be used for short-term, special
    circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA prioritized the
    use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified
    trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational
    efficiencies; (2) how TSA reported use of the procedures and
    ensured that standard procedures are used whenever possible; and
    (3) what steps TSA took to reduce airports' need to use
    alternative screening procedures and to establish performance
    measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO
    interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's
    database on checked baggage screening operations; and conducted
    airport site visits.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-869
        ACCNO:   A57639
      TITLE:     Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage
    Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened
         DATE:   07/28/2006
      SUBJECT:   Airport security
    	     Airports
    	     Aviation security
    	     Baggage
    	     Baggage screening
    	     Checked baggage screening
    	     Explosives
    	     Explosives detection systems
    	     Explosives trace detection
    	     Internal controls
    	     Passengers
    	     Standards
    	     Standards evaluation
    	     Policies and procedures
    	     TSA Explosive Detection System
    	     TSA Explosive Trace Detection System
    	     TSA Performance Management Information
    	     System

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-06-869

         * Results in Brief
         * Background
              * Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD
              * Alternative Screening Procedures
         * TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Re
              * TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedure
              * Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Ef
              * Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Tra
                   * Positive Passenger Bag Match
                   * Canine Screening
                   * Physical Inspection
                   * Alternative Hybrid Procedures
              * TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
         * The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Proced
              * TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard
              * TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of St
                   * Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS
                   * Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures
                   * Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More
         * TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative S
              * TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Sc
              * TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Rela
         * Conclusions
         * Recommendations for Executive Action
         * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
         * Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
         * Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
         * Related GAO Products
              * Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to the Ranking DemocraticMember, Committee on Transportation and
    Infrastructure, House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    July 2006

    AVIATION SECURITY

    TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
    Strengthened

    GAO-06-869

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 5
    Background 9
    TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
    Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
    Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment 14
    The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures Is Not
    Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of Baggage Screening
    Procedures Could Be Improved 21
    TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
    Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets 25
    Conclusions 31
    Recommendations for Executive Action 33
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34
    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 40
    Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43
    Related GAO Products 44

    Table

    Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
    Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines 16

    Figures

    Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
    Screen Checked Baggage 11
    Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 12

    Abbreviations

    ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act DHS Department of Homeland
    Security EDS Explosive Detection System ETD Explosive Trace Detection FAA
    Federal Aviation Administration FSD Federal Security Director GPRA
    Government Performance and Results Act OI Office of Inspections PMIS
    Performance Management Information System TSA Transportation Security
    Administration TSO Transportation Security Officer

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    July 28, 2006

    The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking Democratic Member Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Oberstar:

    Commercial U.S. aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks
    through the use of explosives carried in checked baggage, as demonstrated
    by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which further highlighted the
    vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of terrorism, Congress passed and
    the President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
    (ATSA), mandating, among other things, that all checked baggage at U.S.
    airports be screened using explosive detection systems by December 31,
    2002.1 In response to this mandate, the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of systems and has established
    standard procedures for their use: (1) explosive detection systems (EDS)
    that use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that
    may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt and (2)
    explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, whereby an individual (i.e., a
    baggage screener) swabs a bag and then inserts the swab into the ETD
    machine, which, in turn, can detect chemical residues that may indicate
    the presence of explosives within a bag.2 TSA also allows alternative
    screening procedures to be used when volumes of baggage awaiting screening
    pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there
    is a security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in
    an area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and
    ETD machines in nonstandard ways,3 and also include three procedures that
    do not use EDS or ETD-screening with explosives detection canines,
    physical bag searches, and matching baggage to passenger manifests to
    confirm that the passenger and his or her baggage are on the same plane.
    It is TSA's policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures
    whenever possible and, when necessary, to use EDS or ETD-based alternative
    screening procedures before using non-EDS or ETD alternative screening
    procedures. TSA has also established operating procedures for checked
    baggage screening that instruct Transportation Security Officers
    (TSO-formerly known as screeners) in how to use these standard and
    alternative screening procedures.

    1Congress subsequently extended this deadline by 1 year.

    2TSA interpreted ATSA's reference to "explosive detection systems" to
    allow for the deployment of EDS and ETD to satisfy the mandate.

    3The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security
    information.

    In February 2004, we testified that TSA was unable to fully utilize
    explosive detection systems to satisfy the ATSA mandate to screen 100
    percent of checked baggage for explosives because of TSO shortages and
    problems with screening equipment, among other factors.4 Further, in
    February 2005, we reported that TSA considers one baggage screening
    method-the use of EDS machines-to be the superior baggage screening
    procedure in terms of efficiency compared to ETD because EDS automatically
    detects explosives without direct human involvement and screens more bags
    for explosives per hour. We also reported that at most smaller airports,
    where EDS machines are not installed, TSA screens solely with ETD
    machines. Finally, we reported that while TSA had made progress in
    deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,
    prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to
    achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. In
    February 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress detailing its strategic
    planning framework for its checked baggage screening program. According to
    TSA, the framework, which focuses on identifying optimal checked baggage
    screening solutions for airports, will be used to establish a
    comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening program.
    TSA expects to complete the strategic plan in early fall 2006.

    You asked that we continue to assess TSA's progress in enhancing the
    effectiveness of checked baggage screening operations. In February 2006,
    we issued a report that contained sensitive security information regarding
    TSA's use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
    procedures, including the extent to which the procedures were used by TSA
    and the trade-offs in security effectiveness of using standard and
    alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for
    explosives.5 We concurrently issued a classified correspondence on our
    analysis of the results of TSA's checked baggage screening covert
    testing.6 This report provides the results of our February 2006 report
    with sensitive security information removed. In this report, we address
    the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the use of standard
    and alternative checked baggage screening procedures and what security
    effectiveness trade-offs and operational efficiencies has TSA identified
    in using these procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To
    what extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures to
    screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure that
    standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3) What steps
    has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
    procedures and to establish performance measures and targets for the use
    of the procedures?

    4GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
    Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 12, 2004).

    To address how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
    procedures and identified trade-offs in security effectiveness and
    operational efficiencies of using standard and alternative screening
    procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives, we assessed TSA's
    standard operating procedures, obtained and analyzed relevant legislation,
    and conducted a literature search to obtain information on screening
    procedures, technologies, and related aviation trends. We also reviewed
    studies conducted by TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory regarding
    checked baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
    offices as well as air carriers, explosive detection systems equipment
    manufacturers, and an airport industry association to obtain information
    regarding TSA's checked baggage screening procedures and the relative
    priority they were given. To determine the extent to which TSA used
    standard and alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
    and how TSA ensured that standard screening procedures are used whenever
    possible, we reviewed TSA's checked baggage standard operating procedures
    manual and its Performance Management Information System (PMIS) database,
    which contains information on checked baggage screening operations.7 We
    compared TSA procedures for use of standard and alternative screening
    procedures with the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control
    in the Federal Government. We interviewed TSA officials to determine the
    reliability of the information contained in the PMIS database and reviewed
    selected database records. Although we determined that the database did
    not always contain accurate data on the duration of each occurrence of
    alternative baggage screening procedures, we nonetheless considered the
    database to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report since the
    data identified overall trends in the use of alternative screening
    procedures. To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to
    use alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA has
    set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA directives
    regarding use of the procedures, PMIS data, standard operating procedures
    for checked baggage, and the inventory of explosive detection systems.
    When we found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive detection
    systems, we worked with TSA to resolve the discrepancies. TSA also
    completed a reconciliation of the inventory database with data collected
    manually by TSA officials. We also examined TSA's checked baggage
    screening performance measures and targets as they relate to the
    Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requirements. We
    visited nine airports during this review to observe baggage screening
    operations. We chose these airports based on reporting in PMIS, selecting
    some airports that had used alternative screening procedures and some that
    had not used the procedures. We also conducted structured interviews with
    TSA Federal Security Directors (FSD)8 and their staffs who were
    responsible for the security of 29 randomly selected airports. Because we
    selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information we
    obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all airports
    nationwide.9 Also, while the interviews we conducted with FSDs were random
    samples of airports, the samples were too small to generalize the
    interview results with a high degree of statistical confidence to all
    airports nationwide.

    5GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Management of Checked Baggage Screening
    Procedures Could Be Improved, GAO-06-291SU (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
    2006).

    6GAO, Analysis of TSA's Covert Testing for Checked Baggage Screening,
    GAO-06-317C (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006).

    7PMIS is a Web-based application used by TSA field staff to submit data to
    headquarters on operations and performance.

    8The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority responsible
    for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the
    nation's commercial airports.

    9Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are
    selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using specific
    characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from nonprobability
    samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because in a
    nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being studied have
    no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

    We conducted our work from August 2004 through July 2006 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
    discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.

                                    Results in Brief

    TSA prioritized the use of standard and alternative checked baggage
    screening procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials'
    judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures, and TSA's use of these
    procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. It is TSA's
    policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening procedures whenever possible
    because of legislative requirements to do so and because TSA has concluded
    that these procedures provide the most effective detection of explosives
    at a checked baggage screening station. TSA considers screening with EDS
    to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more
    bags per hour and automatically detect explosives without direct human
    involvement. Given the high volumes of checked baggage processed at some
    airports and unforeseen events such as equipment failures and severe
    weather, TSA has determined that it will have to continue to at times use
    alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives.
    TSA officials prioritized the use of these procedures based on their
    professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures and the
    classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD machines obtained
    from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory. Alternative screening
    procedures include physical bag searches; alternative hybrid procedures,
    which involve a combination of the standard checked baggage procedures for
    EDS and ETD;10 matching checked bags to passenger manifests to deter
    bombers who try to load a bag on a plane without boarding; explosive
    detection canines; and another screening method TSA has determined to be
    sensitive security information. With regard to operational efficiencies,
    TSA has not determined the throughput (number of checked bags screened per
    hour) and costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part
    because it does not count the number of bags screened using these
    procedures. While TSA has used alternative screening procedures for more
    than 3 years and expects to continue to use them, it has not tested the
    security effectiveness of these procedures in an operational environment.
    TSA has conducted national covert (undercover, unannounced) testing of
    standard screening procedures since September 2002 to assess checked
    baggage screening technologies and procedures, and TSO performance in
    detecting explosives in an operational environment. TSA has also
    authorized FSDs and their designates to conduct local covert testing on
    standard screening procedures at airports since March 2005 to determine if
    TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosive devices hidden in checked
    baggage. However, TSA has not conducted national or local covert testing
    specifically focused on alternative screening procedures. TSA officials
    stated that conducting national testing of alternative screening
    procedures would be challenging, particularly since testing is planned
    ahead of time and it is difficult to predict when an airport might use
    alternative screening procedures. While it may be logistically difficult
    to conduct national covert testing on alternative screening procedures,
    TSA data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
    reasons for the usage could provide TSA with information to use in
    selecting airports for covert testing as part of the risk-based approach
    to covert testing that it is developing. TSA officials also cited
    challenges in conducting local covert testing of alternative screening
    procedures, including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
    procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the testing,
    particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their staffs authorize
    and initiate the use of alternative screening procedures, they could
    schedule some of their ongoing local covert testing for checked baggage
    screening to coincide with the use of these procedures. In not assessing
    the alternative screening procedures through covert testing, TSA is not
    collecting data that could help determine how effective the procedures are
    in an operational setting or how to improve the security effectiveness of
    the procedures.

    10Alternative hybrid procedures use a combination of EDS and ETD at a
    screening station that is usually configured only for EDS. At some
    screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a hybrid configuration
    as a standard screening procedure.

    TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening procedures in
    PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all checked baggage screened
    using EDS and ETD with standard or alternative screening procedures. TSA
    could not identify the percentage of usage of standard or alternative
    screening procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
    contains data on the number of bags screened; whereas for alternative
    screening procedures, it contains data on the number of occasions and
    hours of use. However, TSA officials estimated that a high percentage of
    checked baggage is screened using EDS and ETD machines with standard
    screening procedures11 and a low percentage is screened using alternative
    screening procedures.12 TSA also established internal controls to monitor
    and track the use of standard and alternative screening procedures,
    including requiring FSDs to report the use of alternative screening
    procedures into PMIS and to call headquarters for permission to use the
    alternative screening procedures for more than 2 hours. According to the
    Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control, all transactions and
    other significant events need to be completely and accurately documented.
    However, we identified several areas where TSA's information on its use of
    standard and alternative screening procedures was not complete or accurate
    for the period covered by our review. First, TSA's method for estimating
    the number of bags screened with ETD using standard screening procedures
    led to inaccurate counts of baggage screened. Improved counting of bags
    would provide TSA management with better information to use in making
    decisions related to its baggage screening operations including where to
    deploy screening equipment. Second, FSDs and their staffs did not always
    accurately report the occurrences when a particular alternative baggage
    screening procedure was used, impeding TSA's ability to reliably determine
    how often and for how long the alternative screening procedures were used.
    Third, FSDs and their staffs did not always report the use of alternative
    screening procedures as required. Inaccurate and incomplete reporting on
    how often alternative screening procedures are used or for how long,
    combined with not tracking the number of bags screened using the
    procedures, may limit TSA managers' ability to assess the effect of using
    alternative screening procedures on aviation security and to determine the
    types of actions that should be taken at airports to help minimize the use
    of these procedures. TSA officials stated they are working with FSDs to
    correct these reporting problems and have issued guidance clarifying
    requirements for reporting alternative screening procedures.

    11TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
    bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive its
    estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
    used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
    airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
    the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
    calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
    hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
    baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
    procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.

    12TSA determined that the estimated use of alternative screening
    procedures is sensitive security information.

    TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening
    procedures, but has not established performance measures or targets
    regarding the use of these procedures. According to our review of PMIS
    data, the use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and
    September 2005-measured in terms of the total hours of use reported by
    FSDs-initially increased and then declined.13 TSA attributed the reported
    overall decline in the use of alternative screening procedures to a number
    of factors, including better coordination with groups such as tour
    operators; deploying "optimization teams" to airports that were frequently
    using alternative screening procedures to determine why the procedures
    were being used so often and to suggest remedies; and deploying additional
    EDS machines.14 As we reported in March 2005, additional EDS systems
    integrated into the airport baggage handling system ("in-line" EDS
    systems) could reduce by 78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and
    supervisors needed to screen checked baggage at airports with the
    systems.15 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage screening planning
    framework includes a prioritization of which additional airports should
    receive new funding for in-line systems and a description of how
    stand-alone EDS machines from those airports should be redistributed to
    other airports. After in-line EDS systems are installed and any staffing
    reductions are achieved, redistributing the screening positions to other
    airports with staffing shortages could also reduce the need to use
    alternative screening procedures at these airports. While TSA data
    indicate that the use of alternative screening procedures is declining,
    the strategic planning framework states that at some airports alternative
    screening procedures will increasingly be used because of rising passenger
    traffic. TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
    international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
    current levels by 2010, which could increase airports' need to rely on
    alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
    additional or more efficient EDS machines. Furthermore, while TSA has
    taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at
    airports, it has not created performance measures or targets regarding its
    progress in minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at
    airports. By creating performance measures for the use of alternative
    screening procedures and corresponding targets, TSA could gauge whether it
    is making progress in working to minimize the need to use alternative
    screening procedures at airports and to consider the necessity to take
    further steps to minimize the need for their use.

    13The specific details on the number of hours alternative screening
    procedures were used are sensitive security information.

    14At 46 airports, a combined total of 154 EDS machines were added; at 22
    airports, a combined total of 62 EDS machines were removed; and 47
    airports maintained the same number of EDS machines. One airport with two
    EDS machines in inventory in 2005 was not on the 2004 or 2002 inventory
    lists.

    15GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
    Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 (Washington,
    D.C.: Mar.15, 2005).

    To help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
    operations, including screening with alternative screening procedures, we
    are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to use PMIS data on the use of
    alternative screening procedures at airports to help determine which
    airports to conduct national covert testing at and when to conduct such
    testing, to conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
    procedures, to strengthen its monitoring and tracking of the use of
    alternative screening procedures, and to develop performance measures and
    performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures.

    We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
    written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
    recommendations and stated that the recommendations and findings will help
    strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening operations. The
    full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix II.

                                       Background

    Standard Procedures for Using EDS and ETD

    ATSA mandated that the screening of all checked baggage at commercial
    airports be done using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.
    To satisfy this mandate, TSA deployed two types of screening equipment to
    all airports in the United States where screening is required: (1)
    explosive detection systems, which use computer-aided tomography16 X-rays
    adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the
    characteristic signatures of threat explosives, and (2) explosives trace
    detection systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of
    explosive materials' vapors and residues. As we reported in February 2004,
    largely because of shortages of equipment and insufficient time to modify
    airports to accommodate EDS machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports,
    to meet this deadline. Recognizing the obstacles encountered by TSA, the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002, in effect, subsequently extended the
    deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December
    31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier
    deadline established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of
    fully satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face
    challenges in screening checked baggage because of (1) an insufficient
    number of TSOs to operate the EDS and ETD machines, TSO absenteeism, and a
    lack of TSO training in how to operate the machines and (2) a lack of EDS
    and ETD equipment and inoperable equipment.17

    16Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional
    image of the internal structures of a solid object by the observation and
    recording of the differences in the effects on the passage of waves of
    energy impinging on those structures.

    By taking the equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from
    different angles, the EDS machine examines the objects inside of the
    baggage to identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives
    such as density and atomic number. TSA has certified, acquired, and
    deployed EDS machines manufactured by three companies. EDS machines can be
    installed in airports either in stand-alone mode (not integrated with
    baggage handling systems) or in-line (integrated with baggage handling
    systems). TSA has developed standard procedures for using EDS. Figure 1
    shows EDS machines in use at an airport.

    17 GAO-04-440T .

    Figure 1: EDS Machines In a Stand-alone Configuration Used by TSA to
    Screen Checked Baggage

    At airports that do not have EDS machines and at airports where certain
    screening stations do not have EDS-for example at curbside check-in
    stations-TSA uses ETD machines to conduct primary screening. ETD machines
    are also used for secondary screening, which resolves alarms from EDS
    machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives inside a bag.
    TSA has certified, acquired, and deployed ETD machines from three
    manufacturers. Figure 2 shows an ETD machine in use at an airport.

    Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage

    At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed primary screening with
    both EDS and ETD machines simultaneously. In this hybrid configuration,
    the EDS machine is used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are
    used. Additionally, when the EDS machine alarms, the ETD machines are also
    used for secondary screening.

    Alternative Screening Procedures

    TSA also uses alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage
    for explosives under certain short-term special circumstances, when the
    standard procedures using EDS and ETD are not used. Two of these
    procedures involve the use of EDS and ETD. The first of these is an
    alternative hybrid procedure that is used at a screening station
    configured only for EDS primary screening. Under this procedure, the EDS
    is to be used to capacity and the remainder of the bags are screened with
    ETD. The specifics of the second procedure that involves the use of EDS
    and ETD are sensitive security information.18 If one of these EDS- or
    ETD-based alternative screening procedure is not available, TSA will
    resort to one of the procedures that does not use EDS or ETD-canine
    screening; physical inspections of baggage; and positive passenger bag
    match, which requires that passengers be on the same aircraft as their
    checked baggage.19

    FSDs and their designates not lower than the Assistant FSD for Screening
    may authorize the use of alternative screening procedures under two
    circumstances: (1) when the FSD or his or her designate determines that
    there is a security threat created by large concentrations of passengers
    waiting to have their baggage screened or (2) volumes of baggage awaiting
    screening in a confined baggage screening area pose an explosive or other
    security vulnerability. These circumstances may arise for reasons such as
    high passenger volumes, screening machine breakdowns, or unusual weather
    events such as hurricanes. After alternative screening procedures have
    been used, TSA requires that information on each occurrence be recorded by
    FSD staff into the PMIS database, including circumstances leading to the
    use of the procedure, type of procedure used, and duration. This
    information on the use of alternative screening procedures from PMIS is to
    be included in daily briefing reports for TSA senior management.

    18 TSA also moved additional ETD machines to screening stations to allow
    for ETD screening. Prior to March 2005, TSA had categorized this
    procedure, "additional ETDs," as an alternative screening procedure.
    Beginning in March 2005, TSA began to categorize this procedure as a
    standard screening procedure. We did not include this procedure in our
    analysis of PMIS data on alternative screening procedures.

    19ATSA, as codified at 49 U.S.C. S:44901(d)-(e), authorizes TSA to screen
    checked baggage using canine screening, physical inspection, or a bag
    match program if explosive detection equipment is unavailable.

    TSA Prioritized Screening Procedures Based on Legislative Requirements and
    Judgment of Effectiveness but Has Not Tested the Security Effectiveness of
             Alternative Screening Procedures in an Operational Environment

    TSA prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
    procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
    of the security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's use of these
    various procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA
    officials determined that in general, standard screening procedures are
    more effective than alternative screening procedures. TSA has estimated
    that in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags per hour than ETD.
    With regard to operational efficiencies, TSA has not determined the
    throughput and costs of the various alternative screening procedures, in
    part because it does not count the number of bags screened using the
    procedures. Additionally, while TSA has assessed the security
    effectiveness of screening with standard procedures in an operational
    environment through covert testing, it has not conducted similar testing
    of alternative screening procedures.

    TSA Prioritized Standard and Alternative Screening Procedures Based on
    Legislative Requirements and TSA Officials' Judgment of Security Effectiveness

    TSA is required by legislation to screen all checked baggage using
    explosive detection systems, and TSA officials concluded that standard
    screening procedures that use EDS or ETD provided the most effective
    detection of explosives at a baggage screening station and that
    alternative screening procedures should be used only for short-term,
    special circumstances. These circumstances include times when security
    targets are created by large volumes of passengers awaiting baggage
    screening or when security vulnerabilities are created by volumes of bags
    awaiting screening. According to TSA, a group of officials from its Chief
    Technologist, Chief Counsel, Aviation Operations, and Operations Policy
    offices met to prioritize the use of standard and alternative screening
    procedures. TSA officials stated that this group did not use formal
    criteria to prioritize the procedures but instead prioritized them based
    on their professional judgment of the effectiveness of the procedures,
    including the classified probabilities of detection of EDS and ETD
    machines obtained from the Transportation Security Laboratory. This
    prioritization was subsequently included in TSA's standard operating
    procedures for checked baggage screening. TSA has determined that details
    on the prioritization of alternative screening procedures constitute
    sensitive security information.

    Standard Baggage Screening Procedures Vary in Operational Efficiency

    TSA has estimated that, in terms of efficiency, EDS processes more bags
    per hour than ETD-EDS ranges from a minimum of 80 bags per hour for one
    model of a stand-alone machine up to 500 bags per hour for an in-line
    system, compared to 36 bags per hour by the operator of an ETD machine.20
    Whenever EDS machines have been installed at a screening station, TSA
    requires airports to use them as the primary method to screen checked
    baggage. At some screening stations, TSA has also allowed the use of a
    hybrid configuration as a standard screening procedure that involves
    colocated EDS and ETD machines for primary screening, with the EDS machine
    used to maximum capacity before the ETD machines are used. When the EDS
    machine alarms, the ETD machines are also used for secondary screening.
    Table 1 shows the bags per hour screened by EDS and ETD machines.

    20TSA officials stated that two TSOs can use an ETD machine at the same
    time, raising the baggage screened throughput to 72 bags per hour

    Table 1: Bags per Hour Screened Using Standard Screening Procedures for
    Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines and ETD Machines

    Type of equipment             Maximum bags per hour
    EDS machines                   Stand-alone  In-line
    CTX 2500-stand-alone only              120      NAa
    CTX 5500                               180      250
    CTX 9000-in-line only                   NA      500
    L3 6000                                140      500
    CT-80-stand-alone only                  80       NA
    ETD machines-stand-alone only           36       MA

    Source: TSA.

    aNA: Not applicable.

    At 312 mostly smaller airports and at some airport screening stations such
    as curbside check-in stations, TSA has installed ETD instead of EDS for
    primary screening because of the configuration of screening stations, the
    costs associated with procuring EDS, and the low passenger volume at
    smaller airports. In our March 2005 report, we recommended that TSA assess
    the feasibility, expected benefits, and cost to replace ETD machines with
    stand-alone EDS machines for the primary screening of checked baggage at
    those airports where in-line EDS systems would not be either economically
    justified or justified for other reasons. 21 DHS stated that TSA was
    conducting an analysis of the airports that rely heavily on ETD machines
    as the primary checked baggage screening technology in order to identify
    airports that would benefit from replacing ETD machines with stand-alone
    EDS equipment.22 In February 2006, in response to GAO's recommendation and
    a legislative requirement to submit a schedule for expediting the
    installation and use of in-line systems and replacement of ETD equipment
    with EDS machines, 23 TSA provided its strategic planning framework for
    its checked baggage screening program to Congress. This framework
    introduces a strategy intended to increase efficiency through deploying
    EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the
    program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and
    provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing
    airline traffic and potential new threats.24 The framework is an initial
    step in addressing the following areas:

    21 GAO-05-365 .

    22The stand-alone EDS equipment TSA is considering for these airports
    includes surplus machines no longer needed once airports installed in-line
    EDS machines and a newly certified EDS machine appropriate for baggage
    screening operations that require a lower throughput (bags screened per
    hour).

    23Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
    108-458, S: 4019, 118 Stat. 3638, 3721-22.

               o  optimized checked baggage screening solutions-finding the ideal
               mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening
               solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage
               volumes and

               o  funding prioritization schedule by airport-identifying the top
               25 airports that should first receive federal funding for projects
               related to the installation of explosive detection systems based
               on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors.

               TSA's strategic plan for the checked baggage screening program,
               which TSA expects to complete by early fall 2006, is to include
               funding and cost-sharing strategies for the installation of
               in-line baggage screening systems.

               Use of Alternative Baggage Screening Procedures Involves Trade-offs
    			  in Security Effectiveness, while Trade-offs in Operational Efficiencies
    			  Have Not Been Determined

    			  TSA has determined that the use of alternative screening
               procedures at airports has created trade-offs in security
               effectiveness, but it has not determined the operational
               efficiencies of these procedures in terms of throughput and
               costs.25 TSA based its prioritization of the alternative screening
               procedures on its judgment of the procedures' security
               effectiveness and classified probabilities of detection of EDS and
               ETD machines obtained from the TSA Transportation Security
               Laboratory. TSA has not determined the operational efficiencies of
               the various alternative screening procedures in terms of
               throughput and costs in part because it does not count the number
               of bags screened using the procedures. If the higher-prioritized
               alternative screening procedure is not available at a screening
               station, the FSD may authorize a lower-prioritized procedure.26

               Positive Passenger Bag Match

    			  Under the positive passenger bag match alternative screening
               procedure, TSA coordinates with airlines to ensure that passengers
               are on the same aircraft as their checked baggage. If a passenger
               checks a bag but does not board the airplane, the bag is removed
               before departure. This procedure was first implemented based on
               the premise that a terrorist would seek to place a bomb on an
               airplane without sacrificing his or her life by boarding the
               airplane. In light of the suicide terrorist attacks of September
               11, this premise is now considered flawed. An airline trade
               association and airline officials representing two airlines we
               interviewed also stated that the procedure creates operational
               inefficiencies for airlines. According to these officials, the
               process of matching bags with passengers can delay flights because
               the flight cannot take off until all baggage is matched to an
               on-board passenger. These officials also stated that implementing
               the procedure increases the workload of airline personnel, who are
               responsible for conducting the procedures at the direction of TSA.

               Canine Screening

    			  TSA also uses canine units as an alternative screening procedure.
               These units are composed of trained explosives detection canines
               and handlers. In terms of efficiency, TSA officials reported that
               it can be difficult to mobilize canine units in sufficient time to
               screen checked baggage when alternative screening procedures are
               needed, especially since the need to use the procedures can arise
               without warning. Officials also reported that screening checked
               baggage using canines requires enough open floor space to lay out
               the baggage as well as a sufficient number of personnel to move
               the bags into position for canine screening.

               Physical Inspection

    			  The physical inspection alternative screening procedure requires
               human intervention to detect explosives, weapons, and improvised
               explosive devices and their components, and does not involve use
               of EDS or ETD machines. While TSOs are trained to detect
               improvised explosive devices and their components and to detect
               signs of tampering, the success of the TSOs in finding these items
               depends on their skill in detecting such items through manual
               searches and their adherence to TSA's standard operating
               procedures for checked baggage regarding physical inspection.
               Since human TSOs are involved, the efficiency of physical
               inspection in terms of baggage throughput rate can vary depending
               on the contents of the bag and how quickly the TSO conducts the
               search.

               Alternative Hybrid Procedures

    			  Alternative hybrid procedures involve using a combination of EDS
               and ETD at a screening station normally configured only for EDS.
               The efficiency of alternative hybrid procedures can vary because
               each use of the procedure can involve a different proportion of
               EDS and ETD screening, with greater use of EDS leading to more
               efficient screening in terms of number of bags screened per hour.

               TSA Has Not Tested the Operational Security Effectiveness of
    			  Alternative Screening Procedures through Covert Testing

    			  While TSA has reported using alternative screening procedures for
               more than 3 years, it has not tested the security effectiveness of
               the procedures in detecting explosives in an operational
               environment. TSA has conducted national covert testing of standard
               screening procedures since September 2002, and local covert
               testing of standard screening procedures since March 2005.
               However, it has not specifically focused national or local covert
               testing on alternative screening procedures to determine the
               security effectiveness of the procedures. TSA's Office of
               Inspections (OI- formerly the Office of Internal Affairs and
               Program Review) conducts national covert tests at airports to
               assess the security effectiveness of checked baggage screening
               technology, procedures, and TSO performance in detecting
               explosives in an operational environment. These tests, in which
               undercover inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through
               passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are
               designed to identify vulnerabilities in passenger and checked
               baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems
               affecting screening in the areas of training, procedures, and
               technology.27 The schedule for this testing called for inspectors
               to test all category X airports once a year, category I and II
               airports once every 2 years, and category III and IV airports at
               least once every 3 years.28 In August, 2005, TSA suspended this
               cycle of testing. In April 2006, TSA officials stated that OI was
               moving to a testing schedule to include observations of screening
               stations and concentrated testing for improvised explosive devices
               at the screening checkpoint. The schedule is based on risk-based
               factors such as current intelligence information,
               high-vulnerability airports, procedural changes, training
               initiatives, and introduction of new technologies. According to
               Office of Inspections officials, during the 3-year testing cycle,
               inspectors tested the procedures being used by TSOs at the time of
               the test; alternative screening procedures were tested only if
               inspectors coincidentally conducted a test at a screening station
               while one of the procedures was in use. Office of Inspections
               officials stated that they did not schedule tests of alternative
               screening procedures because their resources were dedicated to
               conducting testing on standard screening procedures. Furthermore,
               the officials stated that since covert testing visits are planned
               in advance of the tests and the need to use alternative screening
               procedures is not always known in advance, it would be
               logistically difficult to plan a covert testing visit to coincide
               with an airport's use of alternative screening procedures because
               of airports' intermittent and often short-term use of the
               procedures. While it may be logistically difficult to conduct
               national covert testing on alternative screening procedures, PMIS
               data on which airports most frequently use the procedures and the
               reasons for the usage could provide the Office of Inspections with
               information to select airports for covert testing as part of the
               risk-based approach to covert testing that it is developing.

               In addition to its national covert testing program, in March 2005,
               TSA also began an airport-based local covert testing program to
               determine if TSA checked baggage TSOs can detect a simulated
               improvised explosive device that is hidden in a test bag.
               Participation in this program is at the discretion of the FSD. FSD
               staff test screening at EDS stations by placing simulant
               explosives in baggage and surreptitiously running the bags through
               the machines. According to TSA, between March 2005 and February
               2006, 2,526 local tests of EDS screening were conducted at 108
               airports. When we asked TSA headquarters officials in charge of
               the local covert testing program about the feasibility and
               usefulness of testing the use of alternative screening procedures,
               they stated that they had not previously considered testing the
               procedures through the local covert testing program. These
               officials also cited challenges in conducting such testing,
               including the difficulty in predicting the need to use the
               procedures and the lack of available federal staff to conduct the
               testing, particularly at smaller airports. Because FSDs and their
               staffs authorize and initiate the use of alternative screening
               procedures, they could schedule some of their ongoing local covert
               testing for checked baggage screening to coincide with the use of
               these procedures. In not testing the alternative screening
               procedures through national or local covert testing, TSA is not
               collecting data that could provide useful information on how to
               improve the security effectiveness of these procedures in
               detecting explosives.

               The Full Extent of the Usage of Alternative Screening Procedures
    			  Is Not Known, and Internal Controls for Monitoring the Usage of
    			  Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Improved

    			  TSA Does Not Collect Consistent Data on the Use of Standard and
    			  Alternative Screening Procedures to Enable an Accurate Determination
    			  of the Full Extent of Their Use

    			  TSA reported using both standard and alternative screening
               procedures in PMIS but could not identify the percentage of all
               checked baggage screening using EDS and ETD with standard or
               alternative screening procedures. TSA cannot identify the
               percentage of usage of standard or alternative screening
               procedures because for standard screening procedures, PMIS
               contains data on the number of bags screened, whereas for
               alternative screening procedures it contains data on the number of
               occasions and hours of use.29 However, TSA officials estimated
               that a high percentage of checked baggage is screened using EDS
               and ETD machines with standard screening procedures30 and a low
               percentage is screened using alternative screening procedures.31
               TSA determined that the number of bags screened using EDS and ETD
               with standard screening procedures between October 2004 and
               September 2005 as well as data on the use of alternative screening
               procedures reported into PMIS during this same period are
               sensitive security information.

               TSA Established Internal Controls to Monitor the Usage of Standard
    			  and Alternative Screening Procedures, but Some Controls Have Not
    			  Been Adequately Implemented

    			  TSA established internal controls to monitor and track the usage
               of standard and alternative screening procedures, but has not
               adequately implemented some of these controls. An internal control
               is an integral component of an organization's management and is
               designed to provide reasonable assurance that agencies achieve
               effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with
               applicable laws and regulations. The Comptroller General's
               Standards for Internal Controls require that transactions and
               events be completely and accurately recorded in order to ensure
               that information is available for management to guide operations
               and make decisions.32 While TSA has established internal controls
               to monitor and track use of baggage screening procedures, such as
               requiring FSDs and their designates to report the use of
               alternative screening procedures into PMIS and to call TSA
               headquarters for permission to use the procedures for more than 2
               hours, some of the controls have not been adequately implemented
               because events have not been completely and accurately recorded.
               Consequently, TSA does not have complete information on the extent
               of the use of alternative screening procedures that would be
               helpful for TSA management in making decisions on actions to
               minimize the need to use alternative screening procedures at
               airports, such as deploying screening equipment.

               Recording of ETD Baggage Screening in PMIS

    			  Information that FSDs and their staffs report in PMIS regarding
               the number of bags screened using ETD machines may not be accurate
               because of the way in which the number of bags screened is
               estimated. While EDS machines automatically count each bag
               screened, ETD machines count each swab analyzed, rather than each
               bag screened. TSA uses this count of analyses to estimate the
               number of bags screened using ETD. The number of analyses for a
               bag screened using ETD may vary depending on how many times the
               machine alarms during the screening process and other factors,
               which may lead to overreporting of baggage screened. TSA officials
               stated that they are aware of these discrepancies and are working
               to improve counting of baggage screened using ETD.33 Improved
               counting of bags would provide TSA management with better
               information to use in making decisions related to its baggage
               screening operations, including where to deploy screening
               equipment.

               Recording Occurrences of Alternative Screening Procedures

    			  FSDs and their staffs did not always completely and accurately
               record information in PMIS on the use of various alternative
               screening procedures. On the basis of our review of PMIS data from
               October 2004 through September 2005, we found that FSDs and their
               designates did not always accurately report the occurrences when a
               particular baggage screening procedure was used. For example, some
               of the airports that reported using alternative screening
               procedures voluntarily reported in a PMIS comments field that they
               used the procedures intermittently over the course of several
               hours, even though in PMIS they reported only one occurrence that
               lasted several hours.34 FSD staff at one of these airports
               reported in PMIS one occurrence of using alternative screening
               procedures for 15.5 hours straight but reported in the comments
               field that the procedures were used during 24 different
               occurrences during the 15.5 hours. According to TSA guidance,
               these data should have been recorded as 24 separate occurrences in
               the PMIS database, not simply noted in the comments field. TSA
               officials stated that they were aware that many airports were
               reporting the use of alternative screening procedures for extended
               periods of time rather than recording each time the use of the
               procedures was started and stopped within the reported time. In
               May 2005, the TSA Assistant Administrator for Aviation Programs
               sent a memo to FSDs noting that the start and stop time of each
               individual use of an alternative screening procedure at each
               screening station should be reported into PMIS. In our analysis of
               PMIS data from May 2005 through September 2005, subsequent to the
               issuance of this memo, some of the airports continued to report
               intermittent use of alternative screening procedures in the
               comments fields.

               The design of PMIS also contributed to incomplete and inaccurate
               recording of information because it does not allow FSDs and their
               designates to report two or more alternative screening procedures
               used during the same occurrence. TSA officials have instructed
               FSDs and their designates to record the alternative screening
               procedure that is used the most during the occurrence. One airport
               voluntarily reported in the PMIS comments field that it used three
               alternative screening procedures throughout the occurrence.
               However, the PMIS database only allowed reporting of the use of
               one of the procedures during this time. Because of these reporting
               limitations, TSA managers do not receive complete information on
               how often or for how long the various alternative screening
               procedures are actually used-information that could affect their
               decisions on what actions to take to minimize the need to use
               alternative screening procedures at airports.

               Another factor that could contribute to incomplete and inaccurate
               reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS is that
               although FSDs and their staffs are required to report every
               occurrence of the procedures in PMIS, they may not have always
               done so. Until August 2005, when this requirement was eliminated,
               FSDs and their staffs were required to report to the
               Transportation Security Operations Center-TSA's command, control,
               communications and intelligence center-whenever they were about to
               begin using alternative screening procedures or to switch back to
               standard EDS or ETD screening after using alternative screening
               procedures.35 While TSA officials stated that they did not keep
               formal records of the calls, they kept what TSA termed "informal
               notes" on sheets that included times when the use of the
               alternative screening procedures began and ended and the type of
               procedure used. When we compared a select number36 of these sheets
               completed between February and March 2005 to PMIS reporting for
               the same period, we found that 21 percent of the occurrences of
               use of alternative screening procedures recorded on the sheets
               were not recorded into PMIS as required by TSA's standard
               operating procedures.37 Inaccurate reporting on the frequency of
               use of alternative screening procedures may hinder management
               decision making on how best to minimize airport need to use these
               procedures.

               Permission to Use Alternative Screening Procedures for More than 2 Hours

    			  While TSA's standard operating procedures require FSDs or their
               designates to call headquarters for permission to use alternative
               screening procedures that are used for more than 2 hours in order
               to ensure that the procedures are used only for short-term,
               special circumstances, TSA does not require headquarters to
               maintain a record of these calls. Because these calls are not
               recorded, TSA management is not able to ensure that the
               requirement in the standard operating procedures is being
               followed. Recording these calls would enable TSA to compare the
               records to the hours of use of alternative screening procedures
               data maintained in PMIS. This comparison would provide TSA with
               information to help provide reasonable assurance that FSDs and
               their staffs are complying with the standard operating procedures'
               requirement to call for permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
               procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that there had not
               been any instances in which airports were denied permission to
               exceed 2 hours' use of alternative screening procedures. However,
               without records of the calls, we were not able to verify that
               permission was granted for the occurrences that exceeded 2
               hours.38

               TSA Has Taken Action to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
    			  Procedures, but Has Not Implemented Performance Measures or Targets

    			  TSA Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Need to Use Alternative Screening
    			  Procedures at Airports

    			  TSA has taken steps to reduce airports' need to rely on the use of
               alternative baggage screening procedures and is working to
               minimize the need to use these procedures. According to our review
               of PMIS data, the use of alternative screening procedures between
               October 2004 and September 2005-measured in terms of the total
               hours these procedures were employed-initially increased and then
               declined. TSA attributed the reported overall decline in the usage
               of alternative screening procedures in part to improved
               coordination among FSDs, airlines, and local organizations.
               According to TSA officials, this coordination helps FSDs and their
               staffs anticipate surges in passenger traffic so that they can
               adequately staff screening stations. In our structured interviews
               with FSDs and their staffs responsible for 29 airports, several
               FSDs also cited the importance of coordination with local
               organizations and how this reduced their need to use alternative
               screening procedures. For example, the FSD for one airport said
               that he coordinated with local summer camps to have campers'
               baggage screened the day before their flights to reduce the amount
               of baggage that has to be screened when campers arrive at the
               airport. The FSD for another airport communicated with cruise ship
               management about the scheduling of cruises in order to anticipate
               any surges in passenger traffic that may have created the need to
               use alternative screening procedures.

               TSA officials have also taken action to reduce airports' need to
               use alternative screening procedures through the use of
               "optimization team" visits to airports. These visits are conducted
               at the request of TSA senior leadership or an FSD with the goal to
               observe screening operations and maximize efficiencies by applying
               practices learned at other airports. According to TSA officials,
               recurring use of alternative screening procedures triggered some
               of the optimization team visits TSA has conducted, and the
               optimization team visits may have led to a reduction in the number
               of occasions in which these procedures needed to be used.39 For
               example, on May 18-19, 2005, an optimization team visited one
               airport and recommended procuring one ETD machine and changing the
               location of another to reduce the airport's need to use
               alternative screening procedures. On July 6-7, 2005, another
               optimization team visited another airport. The team suggested
               reconfiguring EDS machines at the airport's screening stations,
               which resulted in an increase in baggage throughput from 120 to
               150 bags per hour. At both of these airports, alternative
               screening procedures were used more frequently prior to the
               optimization team visit than they were after the visit.

               TSA officials also stated that as additional equipment is deployed
               and enhanced to enable TSA to increase checked baggage screening
               throughputs-bags screened per hour-TSA will be in a better
               position to reduce the need for use of alternative screening
               procedures. We reported in March 2005 that as of June 2004, TSA
               had deployed 1,228 EDS machines.40 Between June 2004 and June
               2006, TSA had deployed 399 additional EDS machines in both in-line
               (integrated into the airport baggage system) and stand-alone (in
               airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas) configurations. EDS
               machines in an in-line configuration are able to screen up to 500
               bags per hour, as compared to EDS machines in a stand-alone
               configuration that screen between 80 and 180 bags per hour. The
               superior efficiency of screening with in-line EDS compared to
               screening with stand-alone EDS may have been a factor in reducing
               the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports where
               in-line systems were installed. TSA reported that, as of June
               2006, 25 airports had operational in-line EDS systems and an
               additional 24 airports had in-line systems under construction.
               Although in-line EDS systems can create improvements in
               operational efficiencies of an airport's checked baggage screening
               system, baggage volumes that exceed the system's capacity and
               equipment breakdowns still sometimes occur, necessitating the use
               of alternative screening procedures. For example, some of the
               airports that have installed airportwide in-line systems reported
               using alternative screening procedures because of equipment
               failures and high passenger and baggage volumes after their
               systems were operational.41 Since stand-alone EDS machines screen
               between 80 and 180 bags per hour compared to ETD machines, which
               allow for screening of 36 bags per hour, additional stand-alone
               EDS machines also may have helped the airports where they were
               installed to screen baggage with standard screening procedures
               rather than alternative screening procedures. Additionally, in May
               2005, TSA certified software and hardware upgrades for 519 out of
               1,322 EDS machines, which are used in both in-line and stand-alone
               configurations. These upgrades are being tested in a pilot
               program. TSA officials anticipate that the upgrades could lead to
               increased baggage throughput for the machines, which could further
               reduce need to use alternative screening procedures.

               Installation of in-line EDS systems at airports that currently use
               stand-alone EDS and ETD for primary screening has further
               potential to reduce the need for alternative screening procedures
               to be used at these airports. In March 2005, we reported that TSA
               had estimated that in-line checked baggage systems would reduce by
               78 percent the number of baggage TSOs and supervisors required to
               screen checked baggage at nine airports that had signed agreements
               to develop the systems.42 Under the congressionally imposed 45,000
               TSO full-time-equivalent limit, when staff requirements are
               reduced at one airport through increased efficiencies, full-time
               equivalent positions will become available to address TSO
               shortages at other airports.43 TSA's February 2006 checked baggage
               strategic planning framework included a prioritization of which
               additional airports should receive funding for in-line systems and
               a description of how stand-alone EDS machines from those airports
               should be redistributed to other airports.44 In the framework, TSA
               also reported that many of the initial in-line systems had
               produced a level of TSO labor savings insufficient to offset
               up-front capital costs of constructing the systems. According to
               TSA, the facility and baggage handling system modifications have
               been higher than expected at the nine airports that have signed
               agreements to fund the systems. TSA stated that the keys to
               reducing future costs are establishing guidelines outlining best
               practices and a set of efficient design choices and using newer
               EDS technology that best matches each optimally scaled design
               solution. In February 2006, TSA reported that recent improvements
               in the design of the in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems
               and the EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
               higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. The final
               strategic plan will include the results of TSA's cost sharing
               study that it is currently conducting in consultation with airport
               operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify ways
               to fund in-line EDS systems.45 After in-line EDS systems are
               installed and staffing reductions are achieved, redistributing the
               TSO positions to other airports with staffing shortages may reduce
               airport need to use alternative screening procedures.

               Technology developments may also help TSA to reduce the use of
               alternative screening procedures. In March 2005, we reported that
               TSA was working to develop a computer-aided tomography explosives
               detection system that is smaller and lighter than systems
               currently deployed in airport lobbies and that the new system was
               intended to replace systems currently in use, including larger and
               heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment.46 The smaller size of the
               system would create opportunities for TSA to transfer screening
               operations to other locations, such as airport check-in counters.
               The machine would also be an option for airports that currently
               rely on ETD machines since it would be cheaper than other
               certified machines and it would have higher baggage throughput
               than screening using ETD machines, potentially reducing the need
               to use alternative screening procedures at airports where it is
               installed. In March 2005, TSA began to pilot this machine at three
               airports. At one of these pilot airports, the FSD stated that he
               anticipates that the smaller EDS machine will reduce staffing
               needs, reduce workers compensation claims, and ultimately enable
               the airport to incorporate the machines in-line behind the ticket
               counters. TSA reported that the machine achieved throughput rates
               of up to 80 bags per hour, higher than the throughput rate of up
               to 36 bags per hour for an ETD operated by one TSO or up to 72
               bags per hour for an ETD operated by two TSOs. In September 2005,
               TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 of these
               machines that will be installed at 24 airports.

               While TSA data indicate that the use of alternative screening
               procedures is declining, TSA reported in its February 2006
               framework that at some airports alternative screening procedures
               will increasingly be used because of rising passenger traffic. TSA
               has projected that the number of originating domestic and
               international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers
               over current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an
               average of 0.76 checked bags per passenger were to remain constant
               through 2010, TSA would be screening about 96 million more bags
               than it now screens. This could increase airports' need to rely on
               alternative screening procedures in the future in the absence of
               additional or more efficient EDS machines. TSA headquarters
               officials stated that while TSA is working to minimize the need to
               use alternative screening procedures, it intends to maintain the
               procedures as part of its standard operating procedures so that
               FSDs will have options to respond to events such as unforeseen
               equipment failures, surges in passenger traffic, and
               weather-related incidents such as hurricanes. Additionally, some
               of the FSDs that we interviewed stated that they anticipate
               continuing to need to use alternative screening procedures because
               of screening capacity limits and rising passenger volume, and some
               of these FSDs anticipated increasing their use of the procedures
               as their airport passenger traffic rises because of limitations in
               the physical layout of their airports that contribute to
               overcrowding.47

               TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or Targets Related
    			  to the Use of Alternative Screening Procedures

    			  Although TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative
               screening procedures at airports, it has not established
               performance measures or targets related to the use of these
               procedures. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
               provides, among other things, that federal agencies establish
               program performance measures, including the assessment of relevant
               outputs and outcomes of measures.48 Performance measures are meant
               to cover key aspects of performance and help decision makers to
               assess program accomplishments and improve program performance. A
               performance target is a desired level of performance expressed as
               a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement
               will be compared. By analyzing the gap between target and actual
               levels of performance, management can target those processes that
               are most in need of improvement, set improvement goals, and
               identify appropriate process improvements or other actions.

               TSA has established four performance measures for the checked
               baggage screening program. Three of these measures make up TSA's
               checked baggage screening performance index. This index measures
               the overall performance of the system through a composite of
               indicators that are derived by combining specific performance
               measures related to checked baggage screening. Specifically, this
               index measures the effectiveness of screening systems through
               machine probability of detection and covert testing results,
               efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per bag
               screened, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA's
               national call center. TSA considers the final performance
               measure-compliance with the ATSA requirement to screen all checked
               baggage using explosive detection systems (EDS and ETD)-to be
               obsolete since it reported all airports as capable of screening
               with EDS or ETD in January 2005. The use of alternative screening
               procedures is not included in the index, nor does TSA have
               stand-alone measures or targets for the use of alternative
               screening procedures.

               TSA officials stated that they did not want to implement
               performance measures or targets for alternative screening
               procedures because they are already working to minimize the need
               to use the procedures at airports. However, TSA officials also
               acknowledged that they will continue to rely on alternative
               screening procedures because of unforeseen circumstances such as
               high baggage volumes or weather-related incidents. By creating a
               performance measure for the use of alternative screening
               procedures as part of the checked baggage screening index or as a
               stand-alone measure, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress
               toward minimizing the need to use these procedures at airports and
               have more complete information on how well the overall checked
               baggage screening system is performing. Furthermore, performance
               targets for the use of alternative screening procedures would
               provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to accept in
               using these procedures, and TSA's monitoring of this indicator
               would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has
               determined is acceptable. For example, if TSA were to determine
               the percentage of checked baggage that should be screened using
               alternative screening procedures, and if its performance data
               showed that it was currently screening a higher percentage than
               the target, TSA would be able to decide whether to take steps to
               bring the use of these procedures into line with its desired level
               of use.

               Finally, the extent to which performance measures and targets will
               assist TSA in minimizing the need to use these procedures at
               airports is dependent upon the accuracy and completeness of the
               reporting of alternative screening procedures in PMIS, including
               the percentage of bags screened using the procedures, as
               previously discussed.

               Conclusions

    			  It has been over 4 years since Congress issued the mandate for TSA
               to screen all checked baggage at commercial airports using
               explosive detection systems. During this time, TSA has deployed
               EDS or ETD machines at more than 400 commercial airports and
               reported achieving the capability to screen 100 percent of checked
               baggage using these machines. As part of this effort, TSA
               developed standard and alternative checked baggage screening
               procedures. While TSA acknowledges that screening with alternative
               screening procedures is less effective than screening with
               standard screening procedures, it has also recognized the need for
               continued use of alternative screening procedures because of high
               passenger and baggage volumes resulting from unpredictable and
               unforeseen circumstances, such as equipment breakdowns and unusual
               weather events. Given TSA's plans to continue to use alternative
               screening procedures and the trade-offs in security effectiveness
               involved in their use, it will be important for TSA to test the
               effectiveness of these procedures in an operating environment. One
               such way for TSA to test the security effectiveness of the various
               alternative screening procedures is through the covert testing
               conducted by the Office of Inspections. While we recognize the
               logistical challenges that the Office of Inspections faces in
               conducting checked baggage covert testing on alternative screening
               procedures, using PMIS data on the use of these
               procedures-including data on the airports that use the procedures
               the most frequently or for extended periods of time-could help the
               Office of Inspections in selecting airports for testing as part of
               the risk-based approach to covert testing that it is currently
               developing. By not assessing alternative screening procedures
               through national or local covert testing, TSA is missing an
               opportunity to gather information to help determine the security
               effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an
               operational setting.

               Additionally, TSA headquarters has established internal controls
               to monitor and track the use of alternative screening procedures
               at airports and has taken steps to improve reporting of these
               procedures in the PMIS database. However, without strengthening
               its controls, such as providing a means for measuring the number
               of bags screened using alternative screening procedures and
               enabling TSA airport staff to report the concurrent use of more
               than one alternative screening procedure, TSA lacks reasonable
               assurance that it has complete and accurate information on the use
               of these procedures.

               Furthermore, TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use
               alternative screening procedures at airports, but does not expect
               to eliminate the use of these procedures. Increasing air travel
               and TSA's effort to operate within or below the current 45,000 TSO
               full-time-equivalent limit could add to the need for alternative
               screening procedures, unless more or more efficient EDS machines
               are deployed. Given TSA's continuing use of the procedures,
               performance measures and targets would provide TSA and Congress
               with objective information to assess TSA's progress in minimizing
               the need to use the procedures at airports, and would help inform
               TSA decision making on whether and when mitigating steps are
               needed to achieve its desired level of use.

               Recommendations for Executive Action

    			  To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative
               screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA
               strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening
               procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
               Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation
               Security Administration, to take the following four actions:

               o  Use PMIS data on use of alternative screening procedures in
               determining at which airports to conduct covert testing and when
               to conduct testing at these airports as part of the Office of
               Inspections' new risk-based approach to covert testing.

               o  Conduct local covert testing of alternative screening
               procedures to determine whether checked baggage TSOs can detect
               simulated improvised explosives when using these procedures.

               o  Strengthen the monitoring and tracking of the use of
               alternative screening procedures to help determine the progress
               the agency is making in minimizing its need to use these
               procedures. This effort would include continuing to address
               reporting problems in the PMIS database system, keeping a record
               of calls requesting permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the
               procedures, and providing a means for measuring the use of
               alternative screening procedures compared to the use of standard
               procedures, such as counting baggage screened with alternative
               screening procedures.

               o  Develop performance measures and performance targets for the
               use of alternative screening procedures in checked baggage
               screening, perhaps as part of the checked baggage screening
               program performance index, to help TSA measure its progress in
               working toward minimizing the need to use alternative screening
               procedures at airports and to have more complete information on
               the overall performance of the checked baggage screening system.

               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    			  We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.
               On July 25, 2006, we received written comments on the draft
               report, which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred
               with our findings and recommendations and stated that the report
               will help strengthen TSA's management of checked baggage screening
               operations.

               Regarding our recommendation that TSA use Performance Management
               Information System data on the use of alternative screening
               procedures in determining at which airports to conduct covert
               testing and when to conduct testing at these airports, DHS
               concurred and stated that TSA's Office of Inspections will
               consider PMIS information on alternative screening procedures as
               part of its new risk-based approach to covert testing and will
               develop new checked baggage screening testing protocols.

               Concerning our recommendation that TSA conduct local covert
               testing of alternative screening procedures, DHS concurred and
               stated that TSA is currently modifying its local covert testing
               program to strengthen the program and expects that these
               modifications will better prepare TSOs to detect simulated
               improvised explosives. We are pleased that TSA is making efforts
               to strengthen its local covert testing program. We continue to
               believe that testing of alternative screening procedures would
               provide TSA with an opportunity to gather information to help
               identify and improve the security effectiveness of alternative
               screening procedures in an operational setting.

               DHS concurred with our recommendation to strengthen the monitoring
               and tracking of the use of alternative screening procedures to
               help determine the progress the agency is making in minimizing its
               need to use the procedures. In response to our recommendation that
               TSA address reporting problems in its PMIS database system, DHS
               stated that PMIS has been enhanced with both functionality and
               data quality-related processes to ensure data reliability.
               According to TSA, the system alerts the user when a data field is
               filled in with a value that falls outside the operational norms
               for a particular airport. Additionally, according to TSA, PMIS
               training and functionality reviews occur on a regular basis and
               user manuals and best practices are updated consistently. While
               these efforts should help improve the data reliability of PMIS,
               they will not fully address the reporting problems highlighted in
               our report. Specifically, the steps TSA has taken do not address
               inaccurate counts of baggage screened resulting from TSA's method
               for estimating the number of bags screened with ETD using standard
               screening procedures or inaccurate reporting of occurrences when a
               particular alternative screening procedure is used. Without
               addressing these reporting problems, TSA will continue to lack
               reasonable assurance that it has complete and accurate information
               on the use of these procedures.

               In response to our recommendation on keeping a record of calls
               requesting permission to exceed 2 hours use of the procedures, DHS
               stated that because the amount of time that alternative screening
               procedures are used is recorded in PMIS, there is no further
               documentation required for exceeding the 2 hour threshold.
               However, while documentation is entered into PMIS on the amount of
               time the procedures are used, recording the length of time that
               the procedures are used does not allow TSA to verify that FSDs are
               actually requesting permission to use the procedures for more than
               2 hours as required. In response to our recommendation on
               providing a means for measuring the use of alternative screening
               procedures compared to the use of standard procedures, such as
               counting baggage screened with alternative screening procedures,
               DHS stated that TSA will evaluate the necessity of requiring the
               recording of the number of bags screened by alternative screening
               procedures, and if it finds it to be a useful metric, it will
               require FSDs to include the number of bags in their report in
               PMIS. We are encouraged that TSA will undertake this evaluation,
               as we believe that it will allow TSA to have more assurance that
               it has complete and accurate information on the use of these
               procedures.

               In response to our recommendation on developing performance
               measures and targets for the use of alternative screening
               procedures, DHS concurred and stated that TSA is currently meeting
               the intent of this recommendation by monitoring and tracking the
               use of alternative screening procedures through PMIS. DHS stated
               that using this system has assisted TSA in identifying areas for
               improvement nationwide and addressing local issues to minimize the
               need for alternative screening procedures. DHS also stated that
               TSA intends to continue monitoring and tracking the use of
               alternative screening procedures and to implement the
               recommendations in this report for refining the data and
               evaluating the need to make adjustments based on the current
               performance level. While we support TSA's efforts to ensure the
               use of alternative screening procedures is accurately reported in
               PMIS, given the security effectiveness trade-offs associated with
               alternative screening procedures, we do not believe that tracking
               the use of the procedures with PMIS is sufficient to provide
               congressional and other decision makers with an indication of the
               progress the agency expects to make in minimizing the need to use
               the procedures at airports. Performance measures and targets would
               provide this information and would help to reinforce
               accountability and to ensure that managers focus on the results
               they are striving to achieve regarding minimizing the use of
               alternative screening procedures in their day-to-day activities.

               We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of the
               Department of Homeland Security; the Assistant Secretary, TSA; and
               interested congressional committees as appropriate. We will also
               make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
               report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
               http://www.gao.gov.

               If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
               contact me at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov . Contact points
               for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
               be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made
               major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

               Sincerely yours,

               Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

               Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    			  To assess the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
               efforts to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
               systems (EDS) and explosive trace detection machines (ETD), we
               addressed the following questions: (1) How did TSA prioritize the
               use of standard and alternative checked baggage screening
               procedures and what security effectiveness trade-offs and
               operational efficiencies has TSA identified in using these
               procedures to screen checked baggage for explosives? (2) To what
               extent has TSA used standard and alternative screening procedures
               to screen checked baggage for explosives and how does TSA ensure
               that standard screening procedures are used whenever possible? (3)
               What steps has TSA taken to reduce airports' need to use
               alternative screening procedures and to establish performance
               measures and targets for the use of the procedures?

               To assess how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening
               procedures and to assess the trade-offs in security effectiveness
               and operational efficiencies associated with various baggage
               screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's standard operating
               procedures for using these procedures. We also obtained and
               analyzed relevant legislation and conducted a literature search to
               obtain information on screening procedures, technologies, and
               related aviation trends. This search identified various TSA
               reports, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General
               reports, and aviation industry reports. We also reviewed studies
               from the TSA Transportation Security Laboratory regarding checked
               baggage screening. We interviewed officials from various TSA
               offices, including the Chief Technologist's Office, Aviation
               Programs, the Transportation Security Operations Center, the
               Transportation Security Laboratory, Chief Operating Officer's
               Office, and Office of Planning to learn about checked baggage
               screening procedures and how they were given relative priority. We
               also interviewed officials from air carriers, explosive detection
               systems equipment manufacturers, and an airport industry
               association to obtain information regarding TSA's checked baggage
               screening procedures. We assessed the results from unannounced,
               undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
               conducted by TSA's Office of Inspections and questioned TSA
               officials about the procedures used to ensure the reliability of
               the covert test data. On the basis of their answers, we believe
               that the covert test data are sufficiently reliable for the
               purposes of our review. We also reviewed results of unannounced,
               undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening operations
               conducted at airports by Federal Security Directors (FSD) and
               their staffs and collected as part of TSA's Screener Training
               Exercises and Assessments program. After reviewing documentation
               from TSA, we found the data from the Screener Training Exercises
               and Assessments program were sufficiently reliable for the
               purposes of our review.

               To assess the extent to which TSA has used standard and
               alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage and how
               TSA ensures that standard checked baggage screening procedures are
               used whenever possible, we reviewed and analyzed TSA's Performance
               Management Information System (PMIS) database, which contains
               information on baggage screening operations and the use of
               alternative screening procedures. We found several issues with
               these data, including, in some cases, multiple occurrences of the
               use of alternative screening procedures recorded as one occurrence
               and also, in some cases, more than one procedure being used during
               an occurrence but the occurrence was entered into the database as
               only one procedure because of the constraints of the database.
               When we interviewed TSA officials about these data reliability
               issues, officials acknowledged that airports may have inaccurately
               reported some occurrences of the use of alternative screening
               procedures. However, the officials stated that they were working
               to correct the reporting problems and consider the data generally
               reliable. On the basis of these discussions and our review of the
               database, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the
               purposes of this report, since the data provide overall trends in
               the use of the procedures. To determine what controls are in place
               to track and report the use of baggage screening procedures, we
               analyzed the PMIS database and the PMIS user guide. We also
               analyzed TSA's operating procedures for checked baggage and policy
               guidance and compared TSA's procedures for ensuring that airports
               correctly report the use of alternative screening procedures to
               the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Controls in the
               Federal Government. We also interviewed officials from TSA's
               Office of Planning, Chief Operating Office, Transportation
               Security Operations Center, and Inspections offices concerning
               checked baggage screening procedures.

               To assess the steps TSA has taken to reduce airports' need to use
               alternative screening procedures and the measures and targets TSA
               has set for alternative screening procedures, we analyzed TSA's
               PMIS data and its standard operating procedures for checked
               baggage screening and TSA's inventory of explosive detection
               systems. We found discrepancies in the inventory data of explosive
               detection systems and worked with TSA to resolve the
               discrepancies. TSA also completed a reconciliation of the
               inventory database with data collected manually by TSA officials.
               We also analyzed documentation from the TSA Transportation
               Security Operations Center and interviewed TSA officials from the
               Chief Operating Officer's Office, Office of Planning, the Office
               of Assistant Secretary, and Chief Technology Office. Additionally,
               we examined TSA's checked baggage performance measures and targets
               in the context of the Government Performance and Results Act of
               1993 (GPRA) requirements.

               In addressing these objectives, we conducted site visits at nine
               airports-three category X, one category I, four category II, and
               one category IV airport. We chose these airports based on one or
               more of the following factors: use of alternative screening
               procedures at the airport as reported in PMIS, testing of
               screening equipment at the airport, proximity to another airport
               being visited by GAO, and size of airport. The results from our
               airport visits provided examples of checked baggage screening
               operations and issues but cannot be generalized beyond the
               airports visited because we did not use statistical sampling in
               selecting the airports. We also conducted structured interviews
               with FSDs and their staffs who were responsible for 29 randomly
               selected airports. One FSD we interviewed was responsible for two
               airports in our sample. We conducted all but one of these
               interviews over the telephone. Using information from PMIS, we
               selected airports that had reported using alternative screening
               procedures and airports that had not reported using alternative
               screening procedures between October 18, 2004, and December 21,
               2004.1 Although the interviews were conducted with FSDs and their
               staffs at random samples of airports, the samples are too small to
               generalize the interview results with a high degree of statistical
               confidence to all airports nationwide. The results from these
               interviews do provide information about checked baggage screening
               operations at the airports for which the FSDs and their staffs are
               responsible.

               We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2006 in
               accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

               Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    			  GAO Contact

    			  Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404

               Acknowledgments

    			  In addition to the contact named above, David Alexander, Leo
               Barbour, Chuck Bausell Jr., Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping,
               Katherine Davis, Josh Diosomito, Christine Fossett, Richard Hung,
               Benjamin Jordan, Thomas Lombardi, Lisa Shibata, Maria Strudwick,
               and Alper Tunca made key contributions to this report.

                 Related GAO Products

    			  Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the
               Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but
               Funding Uncertainties Remain GAO-06-875T , June 29, 2006

               Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked
               Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T .
               Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.

               Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
               Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring
               Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T .
               Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.

               Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using
               Private-Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains.
               GAO-06-166 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.

               Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
               Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
               Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T . Washington,
               D.C.: February 9, 2006.

               Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
               Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.:
               November 28, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic
               Air Cargo Security. GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: October 17,
               2005.

               Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
               Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935 .
               Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
               Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
               GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
               Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight
               Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken
               Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R . Washington,
               D.C.: July 22, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
               of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T . Washington,
               D.C.: July 13, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
               Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457 . Washington,
               D.C.: May 2, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
               Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.
               GAO-05-356 . Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
               Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365 .
               Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using
               Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324 .
               Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

               Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
               Resources. GAO-05-357T . Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
               Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening
               Services. GAO-05-126 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.

               General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
               but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to
               Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: November 10,
               2004.

               Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
               of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728 .
               Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.

               Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention
               Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544 .
               Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
               GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.

               Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
               Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519
               . Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
               Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T .
               Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
               Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of
               Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T .
               Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
               Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
               Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: March 5,
               2004.

               Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
               Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385 .
               Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
               Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T .
               Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.

               The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
               Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development
               Program. GAO-04-341R . Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
               Security Programs. GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: November 20,
               2003.

               Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
               Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
               Actions Needed. GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
               Challenges. GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.

               Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
               Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.:
               September 24, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
               Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
               2003.

               Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
               Efforts. GAO-03-1154T . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

               Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
               Security Challenges. GAO-03-843 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

               Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
               Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T .
               Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.

               Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and
               Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T . Washington, D.C.: April 1,
               2003.

               Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
               Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T .
               Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2003.

               Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
               a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190 . Washington, D.C.: January
               17, 2003.

               Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
               DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: January
               10, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
               the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: December 20,
               2002.

               Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
               Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253 . Washington, D.C.: November 22,
               2002.

               Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
               Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington,
               D.C.: October 15, 2002.

               Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
               Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: October 2,
               2002.

               Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
               Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T . Washington,
               D.C.: July 25, 2002.

               Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
               Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

               Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
               Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T . Washington,
               D.C.: September 25, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
               Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T . Washington,
               D.C.: September 21, 2001.

               Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
               Efforts. GAO-01-1158T . Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
               Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T .
               Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
               Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: September 20,
               2001.

               GAO�s Mission

    			  The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
               investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
               meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
               the performance and accountability of the federal government for
               the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
               evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
               recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
               informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
               commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
               accountability, integrity, and reliability.

               Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

    			  The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
               no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
               GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
               its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
               products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
               to Updates."

               Order by Mail or Phone

    			  The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
               are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
               Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
               Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
               discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

               U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
               Washington, D.C. 20548

               To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
               (202) 512-6061

               To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

    			  Contact:

               Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
               fraudnet@gao.gov Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
               (202) 512-7470

               Congressional Relations

    			  Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400
               U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
               Washington, D.C. 20548

               Public Affairs

    			  Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202)
               512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

    24TSA has determined that the details of its analysis of the optimal
    checked baggage screening solutions are sensitive security information.

    25The specifics of the trade-offs in security effectiveness have been
    determined to be sensitive security information.

    26One alternative screening procedure that involves the use of EDS and ETD
    is not discussed in this report because TSA designated the procedure as
    sensitive security information.

    27GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
    Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
    2005).

    28TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of
    five categories-X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have
    the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have
    the smallest number.

    29Although FSDs and their staffs are not required to report the number of
    bags screened with alternative screening procedures into PMIS, some FSDs
    and staff from airports that reported using alternative screening
    procedures reported this information in comment fields on occurrences of
    use of alternative screening procedures between October 2004 and September
    2005. The number of FSDs and the number of occurrences have been
    determined to be sensitive security information.

    30TSA does not require airports to report information on the number of
    bags screened using alternative screening procedures. To derive an
    estimate of use of alternative screening procedures across the system, TSA
    used alternative screening procedures baggage counts only from those
    airports that voluntarily reported the information in order to calculate
    the average number of bags screened per hour. TSA then used this
    calculation of the average bags per hour and the total number of screening
    hours using the procedures to make this estimate. Because TSA did not have
    baggage counts for all of the occurrences of alternative screening
    procedures, this estimate may be inaccurate.

    31TSA determined that its estimate of the use of alternative screening
    procedures is sensitive security information.

    32GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
    GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

    33TSA determined that the other factors that may influence the number of
    analyses completed for a bag screened using ETD are sensitive security
    information.

    34The comments field is a PMIS database field used to add descriptive data
    on the alternative screening procedures occurrence. TSA determined that
    the exact number of airports that voluntarily reported intermittent use of
    alternative screening procedures in the comments field is sensitive
    security information.

    35TSA officials stated that they eliminated this requirement because
    headquarters could get information on use of alternative screening
    procedures through PMIS.

    36TSA classified the number of sheets that we reviewed as sensitive
    security information.

    37We selected sheets to analyze based on the completeness of the
    information contained on the sheets. Each sheet selected had a date, an
    airport code or name, a beginning and end time of use of alternative
    screening procedures, type of alternative screening procedure used, and
    reason for using the alternative screening procedure.

    38TSA classified the number of occurrences that were more than 2 hours as
    sensitive security information.

    39The optimization visits are also used to improve the design of passenger
    and baggage checkpoints, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport,
    evaluate staffing and scheduling practices, and determine compliance with
    the standard operating procedures.

    40 GAO-05-365 .

    41Each of the airports' in-line systems became operational on a different
    date. The number of airports that reported using alternative screening
    procedures due to equipment failures and high passenger and baggage
    volumes after their systems were operational has been determined to be
    sensitive security information.

    42 GAO-05-365 .

    43Section 4023 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2004 requires TSA to develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
    committees, standards for determining aviation security staffing at
    commercial airports no later than 90 days after December 17, 2004, the
    date of the act's enactment, and GAO to conduct an analysis of these
    standards. These standards were submitted to Congress on June 22, 2005,
    and GAO is currently reviewing these standards.

    44The details of the strategic planning framework for the checked baggage
    screening program constitute sensitive security information.

    45Section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
    of 2004 requires TSA to complete a cost-sharing study in collaboration
    with industry stakeholders to review the benefits and cost of in-line
    checked baggage screening systems, innovative financing approaches,
    formulas for cost sharing between different government entities and the
    private sector, and potential cost-saving approaches.

    46 GAO-05-365 .

    47TSA determined that the exact number of FSDs that anticipate continued
    or increased use of alternative screening procedures is sensitive security
    information.

    48According to the Government Performance and Results Act, the Office of
    Management and Budget, and GAO, outcomes assess actual results as compared
    with the intended results that occur from carrying out a program or
    activity. Outcomes are the results of a program or activity. For further
    information, see GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a
    Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington,
    D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

    1TSA has determined that the exact number of airports we selected is
    sensitive security information.

    (440517)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-869 .

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
    berrickc@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-869 , a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

    July 2006

    AVIATION SECURITY

    TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
    Strengthened

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for
    screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives and has
    deployed explosive detection systems and developed standard procedures for
    their use. TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used for
    short-term, special circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA
    prioritized the use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified
    trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational efficiencies; (2) how
    TSA reported use of the procedures and ensured that standard procedures
    are used whenever possible; and (3) what steps TSA took to reduce
    airports' need to use alternative screening procedures and to establish
    performance measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO
    interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's database on
    checked baggage screening operations; and conducted airport site visits.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO is recommending that TSA use information on airport usage of
    alternative screening procedures in conducting covert testing; strengthen
    TSA's monitoring and tracking of the use of alternative screening
    procedures; and develop performance measures and targets for the use of
    alternative screening procedures. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and
    generally concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations.

    TSA has prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening
    procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment
    of the procedures' effectiveness. Use of various procedures to screen
    checked baggage has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness, which
    vary by the type of procedure used and the circumstances of its use. It is
    TSA's policy to use standard procedures whenever possible because TSA
    officials determined that these procedures provide the most effective
    detection of explosives. TSA policy also allows the use of alternative
    screening procedures when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose
    security vulnerabilities or when TSA airport officials determine that
    there is a security risk associated with large concentrations of
    passengers in an area waiting for their baggage to be screened. Regarding
    operational efficiencies, TSA has not fully determined the throughput and
    costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part because it
    does not count the number of bags screened using these procedures. TSA has
    conducted covert tests (undercover, unannounced) of standard procedures,
    but has not conducted this testing for alternative screening procedures.
    TSA cited logistical difficulties in conducting covert tests for
    alternative screening procedures. However, by not doing so, TSA is not
    collecting data that could provide useful information in determining the
    security effectiveness of the procedures in an operational setting and how
    to improve their effectiveness.

    TSA cannot identify the percentage of checked baggage screened using
    standard versus alternative screening procedures because TSA records
    standard procedures in terms of the number of bags screened in its
    management information system, but records alternative procedures in terms
    of the number of occasions and hours of use. However, TSA officials
    estimated that a low percentage of checked baggage is screened using
    alternative screening procedures. To assess the extent that standard
    screening procedures are used whenever possible, TSA has established
    internal controls to monitor the use of standard and alternative screening
    procedures; however, these controls were not always implemented to ensure
    the gathering of complete and accurate information. This may limit TSA
    managers' ability to assess the effect of using alternative screening
    procedures and determine what should be done to minimize the use of the
    procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are working with
    TSA airport staff to correct such reporting problems.

    TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening
    procedures at airports, including anticipating factors that could increase
    passenger and baggage volume and acting to address these factors. However,
    TSA has not developed performance measures and targets to assess its
    progress in minimizing the need to use the procedures. By creating
    performance measures, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress toward
    minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports.
    Performance targets for the procedures would be an indicator of how much
    risk TSA is willing to accept in using the procedures.
    *** End of document. ***