Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of
Private Security Providers (13-JUN-06, GAO-06-865T).
GAO was asked to address (1) the extent to which coordination
between the U.S. military and private security providers has
improved since GAO's 2005 report, (2) the ability of private
security providers and the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct
comprehensive background screenings of employees, and (3) the
extent to which U.S. or international standards exist for
establishing private security provider and employee
qualifications. For this testimony, GAO drew from its July 2005
report on private security providers, and its preliminary
observations from an ongoing engagement examining contractor
screening practices.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-865T
ACCNO: A55463
TITLE: Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use
of Private Security Providers
DATE: 06/13/2006
SUBJECT: Americans employed abroad
Biometric identification
Contract performance
Contractor personnel
Criminal background checks
Federal aid to foreign countries
Federal procurement
Performance measures
Personnel qualifications
Personnel security policies
Security services contracts
Standards
Standards evaluation
Iraq
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GAO-06-865T
* Summary
* Background
* The Mission of Private Security Providers in Iraq
* Laws and Guidance Governing Private Security Providers in Ir
* The Cost Impact of Private Security Providers in Iraq
* Coordination between the U.S. Military and Private Security
* Missing or Inaccessible Data May Make Criminal Background Sc
* Information Is Not Always Available or Accessible When Condu
* The Effectiveness of DOD's Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Li
* There Are No Established Standards to Assist Contractors in
* Concluding Observations
* GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, June 13, 2006
REBUILDING IRAQ
Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers
Statement of William Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
GAO-06-865T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to the use of
private security providers by U.S. government agencies and the contractors
that are helping to rebuild Iraq. As you know, because of the continued
hostilities in Iraq, the United States as well as other governments and
nongovernmental agencies are relying heavily on private firms to provide
security for those helping to build a democratic Iraq. This is the first
time that the United States has depended on contractors to provide such
extensive security in a hostile environment, although it has previously
contracted for more limited security services in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and
elsewhere.
Because of growing interest by members of Congress in the use of private
security providers in Iraq, we began a review under the Comptroller
General's authority and issued a report in July 2005 on the use of private
security providers in Iraq.1 We reported that
o Agencies and reconstruction contractors made extensive use of
private security providers because providing security for these
organizations is not part of the U.S. military's stated mission.
We reported that the reconstruction contractors' efforts to obtain
security met with mixed results as they often found that the
security providers they selected could not meet their needs. We
recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the
Administrator of United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) explore options to assist contractors in
obtaining suitable security providers
o The relationship between the U.S. military and private security
providers is based on cooperation and not control. It appeared
that coordination between the military and the private security
providers improved when the Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC)
opened to coordinate military-provider interactions.2 However, we
noted that additional actions could be taken to improve
coordination and recommended that units deploying to Iraq receive
predeployment training to better understand typical private
security provider operating procedures and the role of the ROC.
o Despite the significant role private security providers play in
the reconstruction of Iraq, none of the principal agencies
responsible for reconstruction had complete data on costs
associated with using private security providers. We recommended
that the Secretaries of State and DOD and the Administrator of
USAID establish a means to track and account for security costs to
develop more accurate budget estimates.
There has been growth in the private security industry in Iraq. In
our 2005 report, we reported that the Department of Defense (DOD)
estimated at least 60 private security providers were working in
Iraq with perhaps as many as 25,000 employees. In March 2006, the
Director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq
estimated that approximately 181 private security companies were
working in Iraq with just over 48,000 employees.
Today, my testimony will address some of the issues we raised in
our 2005 report as well our preliminary observations from an
ongoing engagement on the processes used to screen private
security providers. Specifically, my testimony today will address
o the extent to which coordination between the U.S. military and
private security providers has improved since our 2005 report,
o the ability of private security providers and DOD to conduct
comprehensive background screenings of employees, and
o the extent to which U.S. or international standards exist for
establishing private security provider and employee
qualifications.
My testimony is based on our July 2005 report, a May 2006 visit to
Iraq, and our preliminary observations from an ongoing engagement
requested by this subcommittee on the effectiveness of the
processes used to screen contractor employees in the U.S. Central
Command's area of responsibility, which includes Iraq. To obtain
our preliminary observations on the effectiveness of the processes
used to screen contractor employees in Iraq, we have reviewed
relevant documents such as contracts, as well as DOD and
governmentwide policies; met with DOD officials both in the United
States and Iraq, and interviewed contractors providing services to
deployed forces in Iraq as well as professional background
screeners in the United States and India. This work is being done
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Standards
Although we reported in July 2005 that coordination between the
U.S. military and private security providers had improved since
the establishment of the ROC in October 2004, interviews with
military officials we met with in Iraq and with military officials
that have recently returned from Iraq indicate that coordination
is still a problem and needs further improvement. First, private
security providers are still entering the battle space without
coordinating with the U.S. military, putting both the military and
security providers at a greater risk for injury. Second, U.S.
military units are not trained, prior to deployment, on the
operating procedures of private security providers in Iraq and the
mission and role of the ROC. In our 2005 report, we recommended
that a predeployment training program would help address the
coordination issue. DOD agreed with our recommendation; however,
DOD has not issued any guidance or conducted training in regard to
working with or coordinating with private security providers on
the battle field.
On preliminary observations on the background screening of
contractor employees suggests that private security providers and
DOD have difficulty conducting comprehensive background screening
when data are missing or inaccessible. When doing background
screenings of those living in the United States, private security
providers use public information available at the county, state,
or federal level and search state criminal information
repositories and commercial databases such as those that collect
information on incarcerations. None of these types of searches,
however, guarantees a comprehensive background screening.
Screening host nation and third3 country national employees can be
difficult because of inaccurate or unavailable records in some
countries. In addition, officials from some background screening
firms told us that some foreign laws restrict access to criminal
records. Finally, DOD's biometric4 screening of most non-U.S.
contractors (including employees of private security providers)
accessing U.S. installations in Iraq is not as effective as it
could be because the databases used to screen contractor employees
included only limited international data.
No U.S. or international standards exist for establishing private
security provider and employee qualifications. During our review
for our 2005 report, we found that reconstruction contractors had
difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors
replaced their security providers on five of the eight
reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that we reviewed.5
Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors,
including their lack of knowledge of the security market and of
the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency
guidance in this area. We recommended that the agencies explore
options that would enable contractors to obtain such services
quickly and efficiently. Such options could include (1)
identifying minimum standards for private security personnel
qualifications, (2) training requirements and other key
performance characteristics that private security personnel should
possess, (3) establishing qualified vendor lists, and (4)
establishing contracting vehicles which contractors could be
authorized to use. DOD agreed with the recommendation and USAID
did not comment on the recommendation. The State Department
disagreed with our recommendation citing concerns that the
government could be held liable for performance failures, but
determined that they could best assist contractors by providing
access to information related to industry best practices and other
security-related material.
Background
Prior to the war in Iraq, DOD and the U.S. government agencies
responsible for the reconstruction of Iraq believed that
reconstruction would take place in an environment with little
threat from insurgents or terrorists. By June 2003, the security
situation began to worsen, and it became clear in August 2003 with
the bombing of the United Nations complex that insurgents were
targeting nonmilitary targets.
As the Comptroller General testified before this subcommittee in
April 2006, the poor security environment continues to be a
concern as insurgents demonstrate the ability to recruit, supply,
and attack coalition and Iraqi security forces, and impede the
development of an inclusive Iraqi government and effective Iraqi
security forces. The insurgency intensified through October 2005
and has remained strong since then.6 According to a February 2006
testimony by the Director of National Intelligence, insurgents are
using increasingly lethal improvised explosive devices and
continue to adapt to coalition countermeasures.
Our July 2005 report on private security providers addressed,
among other things, the mission of private security providers in
Iraq, the laws and guidance governing the conduct of private
security providers, and the cost impact of using private security
providers.
The Mission of Private Security Providers in Iraq
The mission of private security providers is to protect government
agency officials and reconstruction contractors in Iraq's unstable
security environment. Providers may be U.S. or foreign companies
and their staffs are likely to be drawn from various countries,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa,
Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Fiji, and may include Kurds and Arabs from
Iraq. Generally, private security providers provide the following
services:
o Static security - security for housing areas and work sites,
o Personal security details - security for high-ranking U.S.
officials,
o Security escorts - security for government employees,
contractor employees, or others as they move through Iraq,
o Convoy security - security for vehicles and their occupants as
they make their way into Iraq or within Iraq, and
o Security advice and planning.
During its existence, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
issued a number of orders or memoranda to regulate private
security providers and their employees working in Iraq between
December 2003 and June 2004.7 Among these are CPA order number 3,
which authorized possession, use and registration of weapons used
by private security providers; CPA order number 17, which stated
that contractors (including private security providers) will
generally be immune from the Iraqi legal process for acts
performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of their
contracts; and CPA Memorandum number 17, which stated that private
security providers and their employees must be registered and
licensed by the government of Iraq. According to the Director of
the Private Security Companies Association of Iraq, as of June 1,
2006, the CPA memorandum and orders were still in effect.
In September 2005, U.S. Central Command's Staff Judge Advocate
issued interim legal guidance regarding DOD's use of private
security providers in Iraq. The September 2005 guidance permitted
the use of properly licensed private security providers to protect
civilians, contractors, nonmilitary facilities and equipment as
well as static military facilities and the military personnel and
equipment within them. In January 2006, the U.S. Central Command's
Staff Judge Advocate issued additional guidance which gave
commanders in Iraq the authority to use private security providers
to provide security to convoys transporting military supplies and
to provide personal security. Currently, DOD is using private
security providers to guard facilities located within U.S. bases
and installations, and may expand its use of private security
providers based on the January 2006 guidance. However, it is not
clear to what extent DOD plans to make use of this expanded
authority.
Although private security providers are generally not subject to
prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the
absence of a formal declaration of war by Congress, the federal
government can impose sanctions in response to acts of misconduct.
For example, private security providers are subject to prosecution
by the Department of Justice under applicable U.S. federal laws,
to include the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,8 the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provisions of title
18 of the U.S. code,9 and the War Crimes Act.10
The Cost Impact of Private Security Providers in Iraq
Despite the significant role played by private security providers
in enabling reconstruction efforts to proceed, neither the
Department of State, nor DOD, nor the USAID-the principal agencies
responsible for Iraq reconstruction efforts-had complete data on
the costs associated with using private security providers. As of
December 2004, the agencies and contractors we reviewed had
obligated more than $766 million for security services and
equipment, and by reviewing invoices that providers of security
services and equipment provided to the contractors, we found that
security costs had accounted for more than 15 percent of the
contract's costs in 8 of the 15 contracts we reviewed. We
cautioned, however, that our estimates did not reflect
security-related costs incurred by subcontractors or lower tier
suppliers, or attempt to quantify the impact of the security
environment on the pace of reconstruction efforts caused by
security-related work stoppages or delays or the costs associated
with repairing the damage caused by the insurgency on work
previously completed. In January 2006, the State Department
reported to Congress that direct and indirect costs of security
represented 16 to 22 percent of the overall cost of major
infrastructure reconstruction projects.11 DOD officials
acknowledged, however, that the estimate may not have accounted
for all security costs and that different methodologies and
methods were used to prepare the estimate.
Given the expectation of a relatively benign environment that
would require only a minimal level of security, such costs
undoubtedly diverted resources and contributed to decisions to
cancel or reduce the scope of some projects. In our view, the
absence of reliable data in an area critical to supporting U.S.
efforts, limited the agencies' ability to assess the impact of and
manage security costs on future reconstruction efforts.
Consequently, we recommended in our July 2005 report that agencies
develop a means to track and account for security costs to develop
more accurate budget estimates.
In early June 2006, the State Department issued a procurement
information bulletin in response to our recommendation. The
Department noted that DOD, USAID and the State Department had
agreed to include requirements for reconstruction contractors to
report all costs for private security supplies and services that
the contractor or any subcontractor may have to acquire necessary
for the successful performance of the contract. For example, for
all future contracts where performance or delivery takes place in
Iraq, contractors are required to include in their proposal an
estimate of all costs expected to be incurred by the contractor,
or any tier of subcontractor, for private security goods or
services that the contractor or subcontractor obtained as part of
contract performance. The contractors will be required to report
similar information when submitting invoices for payment for goods
and services provided. If fully implemented, such an approach
should provide the Department with a clearer picture on the impact
of security costs on reconstruction contracts.
Coordination between the U.S. Military and Private Security
Providers Continues to Be a Problem
Despite improvements in coordination between private security
providers and the U.S military, military officials we met with in
Iraq in May 2006 and those who recently returned from Iraq said
that coordination continues to be a problem. Coordination between
the U.S. military and private security providers evolved from an
informal coordination based on personal relationships to a more
structured, although voluntary, mechanism-the ROC. U.S. military
and contractor officials we spoke with prior to issuing our July
2005 report had indicated that coordination had improved.
While the ROC has helped improve coordination between the military
and security providers, military officials we spoke to during our
May 2006 visit to Iraq and representatives from the 3rd Infantry
Division remain concerned about coordination. Officials from the
3rd Infantry Division, who were located in Baghdad from January
2005 to January 2006, told us that (1) they had a difficult time
working and interfacing with private security providers during
their deployment because they had no means to communicate with the
private security providers, (2) they were unfamiliar with the ROC,
and (3) private security providers frequently entered their battle
space without notifying the division. Military officials we spoke
with stated that private security providers should be required to
coordinate with the military. Several U.S. military officers whom
we interviewed who served in Iraq said that they had a
responsibility to aid contractors who need assistance. If private
security providers do not coordinate their movements with military
units, it places both the U.S. military and the private security
providers at risk. Also, with better coordination, private
security providers would be informed of areas that were unsafe and
either change their route or delay the movement.
At the time we issued our report in July 2005, incidents of U.S.
military shooting at private security providers were a concern.
During the 5-month period of January through May 2005, the ROC
received reports of 20 friendly-fire incidents. It is likely that
the number of actual incidents during that time period was higher
since some providers told us they stopped reporting these types of
incidents. For the 12-month period, from June 1, 2005 to June 1,
2006, 12 incidents were reported to the ROC. We spoke with the
Director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq about
these incidents, among other things. He said that he believes the
decrease in such incidents is the result of better enforcement of
the rules of engagement by the U.S. military. In addition to
better enforcement of the rules of engagement, which require that
U.S. troops determine whether a person's intent is hostile before
the military uses deadly force, the director of the ROC believed
that our 2005 report led to increased awareness of the issue.
We recommended in 2005 that the Secretary of Defense develop a
training package for units deploying to Iraq to improve
coordination between the U.S. military and private security
providers. The training package would include information on the
ROC, typical private security provider operating procedures, and
any guidance or procedures developed by Multi-national Force-Iraq
(MNF-I) or Multi-national Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)12 applicable to
private security providers. Although the Department of Defense
agreed with our recommendation and tasked the Joint Staff to
develop the training package, no action had been taken. Early this
year, we contacted officials from the 10th Mountain Division (who
deployed to Iraq in early 2006) to determine if their
predeployment training had included any information on working
with private security providers. Division officials advised us
that they had received no information on working with private
security providers. While in Iraq, we met with Army officials at
Camp Anaconda who told us that they received little guidance
regarding private security providers in Iraq prior to deployment
and stated that they needed better guidance regarding the
military's responsibility to private security providers. Finally,
in May 2006 while in Iraq we met with the director of the ROC who
told us that military units should receive some training regarding
private security providers before the units deployed to Iraq. He
stated that such training would help improve U.S. military and
private security provider coordination.
Missing or Inaccessible Data May Make Criminal Background Screening
of Private Security Provider Employees Difficult
Private security providers and DOD have difficulty conducting
comprehensive criminal background screening when data are missing
and inaccessible. When doing such background screenings of those
living in the United States, background screening firms generally
use public information available at the county, state, or federal
level or search commercial databases such as those that collect
information on incarcerations or arrest records. None of these
types of searches, however, guarantees a comprehensive background
screening. Private security firms may find it difficult to
complete background screenings of their Iraqi and third country
national employees because of a lack of reliable information. In
addition, DOD's program to biometrically screen all Iraqi private
security provider employees as well as most third country
nationals who are private security provider employees seeking
access to U.S. installations is not as effective as it could be
because of the limited number of international and foreign
databases available for screening. Because of the numerous
difficulties in screening employees, particularly those who do not
live in the United States, it may not be possible to know the true
identities and backgrounds of the thousands of private security
provider employees working in Iraq. This lack of knowledge
increases the security risk to U.S. military forces and civilians
in Iraq.
Information Is Not Always Available or Accessible When Conducting
Criminal Background Screening
Many private security providers that conduct criminal background
investigations use screening firms. The private security provider
requesting the screening determines the parameters of the
background screening. Information is not always available or
accessible when conducting criminal background investigations of
U.S. nationals, third country nationals, and Iraqi nationals.
Another factor that can contribute to difficulties is foreign
privacy laws that make some criminal information inaccessible
according to screening firm officials.
U.S. Nationals: When screening firms conduct background
investigations of those living in the United States, they
generally use public information available at the county, state,
or federal level, search state maintained criminal information
repositories, and commercial databases such as those that collect
information on incarcerations. However, none of these actions
guarantees a comprehensive background check. For example,
screening companies may not review federal court records if not
directed to by the client. Furthermore, background screening firms
generally only check the records of the court that maintains the
preponderance of criminal data and may miss some records
maintained by specialized courts such as domestic or family law
courts. State repositories of information may not include all
criminal data. For example, one official from a background
screening firm explained that only 66 of the 88 counties in Ohio
report crimes to the state repository. Similarly, the State of
Illinois reported that in 2003 only 59 percent of the computerized
criminal history records they audited had complete information.
Furthermore, commercial databases may not provide a complete
background investigation because the databases may not contain the
most recent criminal data; certain criminal offenses may not be
reported; and there are no standards on how data in commercial
databases should be collected and validated.
Third Country Nationals: Screening third country nationals
presents additional challenges according to background screeners
to whom we have spoken. Officials from international background
screening firms cited the challenges in verifying criminal
background information on third country nationals because they are
relying on the applicant to provide all prior addresses. Since
some countries, such as India, maintain criminal data at the local
level, persons doing the background screenings may miss crimes
that were committed in other locations within the country if the
applicant did not reveal all previous addresses. Those doing
screenings face other challenges as well. For example, some
countries lack criminal records or the records are unreliable
because of high levels of corruption according to representatives
of the screening firms we interviewed. Additionally, some
countries only maintain records for 3 to 5 years which some in the
background screening industry consider to be insufficient. Also,
many countries lack national identification numbers, which makes
it difficult to know if the person being screened was the person
who committed the crimes cited in the court or police records.
Iraqi Nationals: Some private security companies have been
encouraged by their clients to hire Iraqi nationals to put money
back into the Iraqi economy and to reduce security costs compared
with the salaries of other employees. However, screening Iraqi
nationals is very difficult because of a lack of criminal
information. One firm we spoke with told us that they have
encountered problems screening Iraqi nationals because the Iraqi
police lack criminal records or criminal information. Another
company depends on their Iraqi subcontractors to screen Iraqi
applicants and may not have a clear understanding of how the
screening takes place. According to officials from one of the
private security providers we spoke with, their Iraqi
subcontractor claims to have a screening process, and the provider
trusts the company to provide qualified individuals. One company
we spoke with told us that they rely on local tribal leaders to
screen their employees. Finally, the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior also screens Iraqi private security employees as part of
the registration and licensing process.
Privacy Laws: Privacy laws may also make it difficult to complete
accurate screenings on those who live outside of the United
States. According to officials from background screening firms,
some countries do not permit criminal background searches of their
citizens or limit the type of information that can be released to
a third party. In other countries, criminal information cannot be
given to third parties and is only released to the applicant who
can then determine whether to release the information. According
to screening company officials, there are often issues related to
the authenticity of documents provided by applicants.
The Effectiveness of DOD�s Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Limited
Because of Missing Data
DOD conducts biometric screening of most non-U.S. private security
provider employees needing access to installations in Iraq;
however, the value of the screening process is limited because the
databases used to screen the applicants have little international
biometric data. In March 2005, shortly after a dining facility
bombing at a U.S. installation in Iraq killed 14 U.S. soldiers and
wounded at least 50, the deputy secretary of Defense issued a
policy requiring the biometric screening of most non -U.S.
personnel (including private security provider employees) seeking
access to U.S. installations in Iraq. The goal of this policy is
to improve force protection for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq
and to provide positive identification of local and third country
nationals accessing U.S. facilities.13 This policy requires that
those seeking access to installations in Iraq be fingerprinted,
photographed, have their irises scanned and be enrolled in one of
two systems DOD uses to gather the required biometric data. The
biometric screening is in addition to the in-person interview and
screening of Iraqis (and some third country nationals) wishing to
access a base or installation.
Biometric information from the two installation access systems is
sent to DOD's Biometric Fusion Center in West Virginia where it is
merged with other biometric data to form the Automated Biometric
Identification System (ABIS). The Biometric Fusion Center screens
the applicant's data against the ABIS system as well as the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)
database. The IAFIS database includes the fingerprint records of
more than 51 million persons who have been arrested in the United
States as well as information from databases maintained by other
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of State and the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol).14
While DOD's biometric screening process has successfully
identified several persons seeking access to bases in Iraq who
have criminal records in the United States, the lack of
international biometric data limits its usefulness. According to
an official from the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services
Division, the IAFIS database includes criminal fingerprint data
from only a limited number of foreign countries because some
countries are reluctant to share criminal history information and
others do not have fingerprint repositories or do not collect
fingerprints in a manner compatible with the FBI's system. In
addition, although the IAFIS database includes about 50,000
fingerprint records from Interpol, Interpol does not maintain a
repository of all criminal offenses committed in the member
countries. Instead, Interpol's criminal database is composed of
wanted notices submitted by the member countries and the
information is only retained for 5 years. Access to international
criminal biometric information is vital to meeting DOD's goal of
establishing the positive identification of local and third
country nationals accessing U.S facilities in Iraq. Without access
to foreign biometric information, DOD may find it difficult to
determine if third country nationals may pose a threat to U.S.
military and civilians in Iraq.
There Are No Established Standards to Assist Contractors in
Obtaining Suitable Security Providers
At the time we issued our report in July 2005, there were no U.S.
or international standards that would establish security provider
qualifications in such areas as training and experience
requirements, weapons qualifications, and similar skills that are
applicable for the type of security needed in Iraq. Security
industry associations and companies have discussed the need for
and desirability of establishing standards, but as of June 2006,
no such standards have been developed or implemented. As we
reported in our 2005 report, reconstruction contractors had
difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors
replaced their security providers on five of the eight
reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that we reviewed.15
Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors,
including their lack of knowledge of the security market and of
the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency
guidance in this area.
In our report, we recommended that the State Department, USAID,
and DOD explore options that would enable contractors to obtain
security services quickly and efficiently. Such options may
include identifying minimum standards for private security
personnel qualifications, training requirements and other key
performance characteristics that private security personnel should
possess; establishing qualified vendor lists; and/or establishing
contracting vehicles which contractors could be authorized to use.
In response to our recommendation, the State Department noted in
November 2005 that it had met with representatives from DOD and
USAID to discuss ways to assist contractors in acquiring security
services. According to the State Department, all agencies agreed
that it was not practical to prequalify vendors or establish
contracting vehicles, in part due to concerns regarding the
agency's liability if contractors failed to perform. Rather, they
determined that they could best assist contractors by providing
access to information related to industry best practices and other
security-related material.
Concluding Observations
Mr. Chairman, we believe two recommendations we made in our July
2005 report continue to have merit and should be implemented.
Specifically, we believe private security provider operations
would be improved by (1) developing a training package for
deploying units to Iraq that would provide information on the ROC,
private security providers operating procedures, and any MNF-I or
MNC-I guidance on private security providers and (2) further
exploring options to assist contractors in obtaining suitable
security providers. Further, U.S. military officials who have been
in Iraq or who we interviewed during our May 2006 visit stated
that coordination between the military and private security
providers should be required. Given the increased risk both
parties are subject to when private security providers do not
coordinate their activities with the military, we believe U.S.
government agencies using private security providers in Iraq may
want to consider such a requirement utilizing the ROC as the focal
point for such a requirement. Additionally, based on our
preliminary observations, incomplete criminal background
screenings may contribute to an increased risk to military forces
and civilians in Iraq. The military would benefit by reviewing the
installation security measures in place in Iraq to ensure that the
risk private security contractors may pose has been minimized.
Lastly, as noted in our July 2005 report, our experience in Iraq
has made us aware that future operations may include
reconstruction efforts in an unstable or deteriorating security
environment, thus requiring extensive use of private security
providers. Given their important role in Iraq, planning that
includes the use of private security providers will need to be
incorporated in future military operations and reconstruction
efforts.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
For questions regarding this testimony, please call William Solis
at (202) 512-8365. Other key contributors to this statement were
Vincent Balloon, Carole Coffey, Grace Coleman, Laura Czohara, Gary
Delaney, Timothy DiNapoli, and Wesley A. Johnson.
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1 GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Providers, GAO-05-737 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005).
2 The national ROC is located in Baghdad with six regional centers
collocated with the military's major subordinate commands. Participation
is open at no cost to all U.S. government agencies, contractors, and
nongovernmental organizations operating in Iraq. The ROC and the regional
centers are staffed with a combination of military, U.S. government
civilian, and contractor personnel and provide such services as
disseminating unclassified intelligence information and specific threat
assessments on future building sites and planned vehicle routes to
contractors; recording information about incidents and threats to
coalition forces; facilitating military assistance, such as a quick
reaction force or medical services, to contractors in need; and
facilitating communication between contractors and U.S. military units.
3 A third country national is a person working for a contractor who is
neither a citizen of the United States nor the host country.
4 A biometric measures a person's unique physical characteristics (such as
fingerprints, hand geometry, facial patterns, or iris and retinal scans)
or behavioral characteristics (voice patterns, written signatures, or
keyboard typing techniques) and can be used to recognize the identity, or
verify the claimed identify, of an individual.
5 On one additional 2003 contract, the contractor provided its own
security.
6GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges, GAO-06-697T (Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006).
7 The CPA served as Iraq's interim government from April 2003 to June 28,
2004, and was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating
rebuilding efforts.
8 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 18 U.S.C. 3261.
9 Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provisions of 18 U.S.C.
7(9).
10 War Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. 2441.
11 Department of State, Report to Congress, Section 2207 Report on Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction, January 2006.
12 Multi-National Force-Iraq is responsible for counter-insurgency
operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign
terrorists and for organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's security
forces. Multi-National Corps-Iraq is the tactical unit of MNF-I
responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq.
13 At the time of our visit to Iraq in May 2006, only a limited number of
bases were using the biometric information to verify the identities of
contractor employees accessing the base on a daily basis.
14 States voluntarily provide fingerprint records to the FBI for inclusion
in the IAFIS database. According to FBI officials, not all persons
arrested and convicted of crimes in the U.S. are included in the IAFIS
database.
15 On one additional 2003 contract, the contractor provided its own
security.
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