Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate  
Risks of the Visa Waiver Program (28-JUL-06, GAO-06-854).	 
                                                                 
The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to	 
travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days  
or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 
15 million people entered the country under the program. After	 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens 
would exploit the program to enter the United States became more 
of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe the Visa Waiver	 
Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S. government's  
process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions	 
taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials
in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures,
and reports on participating countries. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-854 					        
    ACCNO:   A57630						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and   
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program			 
     DATE:   07/28/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Aliens						 
	     Border security					 
	     Databases						 
	     Embassies						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     International travel				 
	     Passports						 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Visas						 
	     Waivers						 
	     Tourism						 
	     INS Visa Waiver Pilot Program			 

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GAO-06-854

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks
          * Visa Waiver Program Facilitates Travel to the United States
          * Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law Enf
               * Visa Waiver Travelers and Visa Applicants Face Different Lev
               * Lost and Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Program Countries
     * Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses
          * Initial Steps Taken to Assess Risk of Visa Waiver Program
          * DHS Lacks a Clearly-Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process
               * Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders
               * Review Process Lacked Clear Criteria to Make Key Judgments
               * Inconsistent Preparation for Site Visits
               * Reporting Untimely
               * Despite Adjustments to Process, Weaknesses Remain
          * DHS Cannot Effectively Monitor Ongoing Concerns in Visa Waiv
               * Lack of Staffing and Funding Impedes Ability to Assess Risks
               * Gaps in DHS's Communications with its Overseas Posts and Oth
     * DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks
          * DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Wai
          * DHS Lacks Standard Procedures for Obtaining Stolen Blank Pas
          * Some Participating Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Resisti
          * Inefficient Access to Interpol's Database on Lost and Stolen
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations
     * Matter for Congressional Consideration
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries
     * Appendix III: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiv
     * Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
          * GAO Comments
     * Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
     * Appendix VI: Comments from the International Criminal Police
     * Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Staff Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

July 2006

BORDER SECURITY

Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver
Program

GAO-06-854

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks 9
Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses 16
DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks 25
Conclusions 31
Recommendations 32
Matter for Congressional Consideration 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries 39
Appendix III Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004 40
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 41
Appendix V Comments from the Department of State 54
Appendix VI Comments from the International Criminal Police Organization
57
Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60

Table

Table 1: Fraudulent Passport Intercepts, January through June 2005 15

Figures

Figure 1: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program, from
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004 8
Figure 2: Visa Waiver Program Admissions as a Percentage of Total
Nonimmigrant Admissions into the United States, Fiscal Years 2002 through
2004 10
Figure 3: Comparison of Screening for U.S. Visas versus Arrival Inspection
Screening at U.S. Air Ports of Entry 13
Figure 4: Timeline of 2004-2005 Country Assessment Process and Other Key
Milestones 22
Figure 5: CBP's Access to Interpol's Lost and Stolen Travel Document
Database 30

Abbreviations

CBP Customs and Border Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

Interpol International Criminal Police Organization

OIE Office of International Enforcement

OIG Office of the Inspector General

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 28, 2006 July 28, 2006

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: Dear Mr. Chairman:

In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million travelers entered the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program. This program facilitates
international travel and commerce, and eases consular workload at overseas
posts, by enabling citizens of 27 participating countries to travel to the
United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first
obtaining a visa1 from U.S. embassies and consulates.2 The Visa Waiver
Program was created as a pilot program in 1986,3 and it became a permanent
program in 2000,4 about 1 year prior to the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. Participating countries were selected because their citizens had
demonstrated a pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and the
governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S.
citizens. After the terrorist attacks, the potential risks of the program
became more of a concern. In particular, convicted terrorist Zacarias
Moussaoui and "shoe-bomber" Richard Reid both boarded flights to the
United States with passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries. In
May 2002, Congress mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
evaluate and report to Congress at least biennially on the effect that
each country's continued participation in the In fiscal year 2004, more
than 15 million travelers entered the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program. This program facilitates international travel and commerce, and
eases consular workload at overseas posts, by enabling citizens of 27
participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or
business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa12345 from U.S.
embassies and consulates. The Visa Waiver Program was created as a pilot
program in 1986, and it became a permanent program in 2000, about 1 year
prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Participating
countries were selected because their citizens had demonstrated a pattern
of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and the governments of these
countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S. citizens. After the
terrorist attacks, the potential risks of the program became more of a
concern. In particular, convicted terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and
"shoe-bomber" Richard Reid both boarded flights to the United States with
passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries. In May 2002, Congress
mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) evaluate and
report to Congress at least biennially on the effect that each country's
continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and
security interests. Effective oversight of the Visa Waiver Program is
essential to find the right balance between facilitating legitimate travel
and screening for potential terrorists, criminals, and others that may
pose law enforcement and immigration concerns.

1The United States also issues visas to those who intend to immigrate to
the United States. In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to
nonimmigrant visas only.

2The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom (see app. II for a map of these countries). Canada and
Bermuda are not participants in the Visa Waiver Program; however,
nationals of Canada and Bermuda may, under certain circumstances, qualify
for visa-free travel to the United States.

3The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603.

4The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, P.L. 106-396.

In response to your request, this report (1) describes the Visa Waiver
Program's benefits and potential risks; (2) examines the U.S. government's
process for assessing the program's risks; and (3) assesses actions taken
to mitigate these risks.

To identify the benefits of the program, we reviewed relevant
documentation, including DHS's Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
reports and our 2002 report on the implications of eliminating the
program.6 We also interviewed political, economic, consular, commercial,
and law enforcement officials at U.S. embassies in six Visa Waiver Program
countries. To determine the risks the Visa Waiver Program, we interviewed
officials from DHS's National Targeting Center, Intelligence and Analysis
Directorate, and Forensic Document Laboratory. In addition, we observed
fraudulent document detection training of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) agents at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. To evaluate
the U.S. government's efforts to assess and mitigate these risks, we
analyzed the laws governing the program, relevant regulations and agency
operating procedures, and OIG reports. We also examined 15 of the 25
completed reports from the 2004 review process assessing the participation
of Visa Waiver Program countries.7 As of June 2006, the remaining 10
assessments were pending classification review. We met with officials from
several DHS component agencies and offices, the Department of State's
(State) Consular Affairs Bureau and its Europe and Eurasia Bureau, and the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in Lyon, France. We
also met with the Department of Justice's (Justice) Interpol-U.S. National
Central Bureau in Washington, D.C., which facilitates international law
enforcement cooperation among the United States and Interpol and its other
member countries. In addition to U.S. officials in the six Visa Waiver
Program countries, we spoke with foreign government officials in three of
these countries. We conducted our evaluation from September 2005 through
June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

5Prior to this change, DHS was required to report at least once every 5
years. See the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, P.L
107-173.

6See GAO, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

7As of June 2006, the reviews of the remaining two participating
countries-Italy and Portugal-were in process.

                                Results in Brief

The Visa Waiver Program provides many benefits to the United States;
however, travelers attempting to enter the United States under the program
may pose security or law enforcement risks, including immigration law
violations, because they are not subject to the same degree of screening
as non-visa-waiver travelers. The program was designed to boost
international business and tourism, and allows State to shift its consular
resources to posts with higher-risk visa applicants. However, travelers
visiting the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are not subject
to the same degree of screening as travelers with visas because they need
not be interviewed by a consular officer before arriving at a U.S. port of
entry. In addition, border inspectors at U.S. ports of entry are
disadvantaged in screening visa waiver travelers because they may not know
the alien's language or local fraudulent document trends in the alien's
home country, nor have the time to conduct an extensive interview. In
contrast, visa-issuing officers at U.S. embassies generally have more time
to interview applicants-often in the applicants' native language-and have
more country-specific knowledge of passports and fraud trends.
Furthermore, lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are
highly prized among those travelers seeking to conceal their true
identities or nationalities, creating an additional program risk. In our
discussions with DHS officials, they acknowledged that an undetermined
number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a
stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country, and, in fact,
passports from Visa Waiver Program countries have been used illegally by
travelers attempting to enter the United States. For example, from January
through June 2005, at U.S. ports of entry, DHS confiscated 298 passports
issued by Visa Waiver Program countries that travelers were attempting to
use fraudulently for admission into the United States. Thus, there is a
potential risk that the program could be exploited for illegal entry into
the United States.

DHS, in coordination with State and Justice, has developed a process for
assessing the law enforcement and security risks of the Visa Waiver
Program; this process has weaknesses, however. In 2002, Congress mandated
that DHS review the security risks posed by each visa waiver country's
participation in the program at least every 2 years. In 2004, DHS
established the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit within the Office of
International Enforcement (OIE).8 DHS conducted its first mandated
biennial reviews in 2004, and determined that all of the countries it
reviewed should remain in the program.9 In general, the reviews contained
an analysis of issues, such as individual countries' border controls,
security over passports and national identity documents, and other matters
relevant to law enforcement, immigration, and national security. However,
we identified several problems with the country review process.
Specifically, key interagency stakeholders,10 such as embassies overseas,
State's regional bureaus, and forensic document analysts were left out of
portions of the 2004 country review process; preparation for the
in-country site visits was not always consistent; and, the review process
lacked clear criteria and guidance to make key judgments. Also, the
country assessments prepared by DHS were not completed in a timely fashion
and contained some dated information that did not necessarily reflect the
current risks posed by a country's continued participation in the program.
In particular, interagency teams conducted site visits as part of the
country assessments from May through September 2004, and transmitted the
final report to Congress more than 1 year later, in November 2005.
Moreover, DHS has not provided sufficient resources to OIE to effectively
monitor the risks posed by visa waiver countries on an ongoing basis.
While the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit developed a strategic plan to
monitor the program, it has been unable to implement this plan with its
current staff of two full-time employees. In addition, DHS has not
established points of contact within the U.S. embassies so it can
communicate directly with foreign government contacts and field officials,
who are best positioned to monitor compliance with the program's
requirements and report on current events and issues of potential concern.
Without this outreach, DHS is not able to leverage the existing resources
at U.S. embassies in all visa waiver countries to obtain current
information on potential risks, as well as countries' progress in
addressing these risks.

8OIE is located in the Office of Policy Development under the direction of
the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Policy.

9DHS's Office of Policy began this review in early 2004, several months
before the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit was established in July of
that year.

10The interagency working group charged in 2004 with assessing
participating countries' adherence to the program's statutory requirements
comprised officials from Justice's Office of International Affairs,
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, and several components within DHS,
including the Intelligence and Analysis Directorate, CBP's Office of Field
Operations, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Forensic Document
Laboratory, among others. Representatives from some of these agencies
formed the in-country site visit teams.

DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver
Program, including terminating the use of the German temporary passport
under the program; however, the department has faced difficulties in
further mitigating the risks of the program, particularly regarding lost
and stolen passport reporting-a key vulnerability. For example, not all
countries have consistently reported their data to the United States on
stolen blank passports, even though reporting such data is vital to
mitigating program risks. In one instance, a visa waiver country reported
to the United States the theft of nearly 300 blank passports more than 9
years after the theft occurred. In 2002, timely reporting of such thefts
became a statutory requirement for continued participation in the program,
but DHS has not issued standard operating procedures for obtaining these
data. DHS has also sought to expand this requirement to include the
reporting of data, to the United States and Interpol,11 about lost and
stolen issued12 (as well as blank) passports; however, the United States
lacks a centralized mechanism for foreign governments to report all stolen
passports, and DHS has not identified the U.S. government entity to which
participating countries should report this information. While most visa
waiver countries contribute to Interpol's database, four do not. Moreover,
some countries that do contribute do not do so on a regular basis,
according to Interpol officials. In addition, Interpol's data on lost and
stolen travel documents is not automatically accessible to U.S. border
inspectors at primary inspection-one reason why it is not an effective
border screening tool, according to DHS, State, and Justice officials.
According to the Secretary General of Interpol, until DHS can
automatically query Interpol's data, the United States will not have an
effective screening tool for checking passports. However, DHS has not yet
finalized a plan to acquire this systematic access to Interpol's data.

We are making a series of recommendations to DHS to strengthen its ability
to assess the risks of the Visa Waiver Program, including a recommendation
to create real-time monitoring mechanisms to improve communication between
the department and overseas posts, and to provide additional resources for
the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit. We are also making a series of
recommendations to mitigate the program's risks, including communicating
clear standard operating procedures for the reporting of lost and stolen,
blank and issued, passport data. Finally, we are including a matter for
congressional consideration: to improve the timeliness of DHS's
assessments of the risks of each country's continued participation in the
program, Congress should consider establishing a deadline by which the
department must complete its biennial country assessments and report to
Congress.

11Interpol is the world's largest international police organization, with
184 member countries . Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police
cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, and
services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. In
July 2002, Interpol established a database on lost and stolen travel
documents. As of June 2006, the database contained about 11.6 million
records of lost and stolen passports.

12Issued passports have been officially personalized with the bearer's
biographical information.

We received written comments from DHS, State, and Interpol, which we have
reprinted in appendices IV, V, and VI, respectively. DHS either agreed
with, or stated that it is considering, all of our recommendations.
Regarding our matter for congressional consideration, DHS did not appear
to support the establishment of a deadline for the biennial report to
Congress. Instead, DHS suggested that Congress should require continuous
and ongoing evaluation of the risks of each country's continued
participation in the program. We agree that continuous and ongoing
evaluation is necessary, which is why we recommended that DHS create
real-time monitoring arrangements and provide additional resources to the
Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit to achieve this goal. Regarding the
mandated biennial country assessments, we believe that they can serve a
useful purpose if they are completed in a timely fashion. State agreed
with our report, and welcomed our recommendations calling for enhanced
communication to and from DHS, and for the timely reporting of lost and
stolen passport data. Interpol did not comment on our recommendations, but
provided information about its lost and stolen travel document database
and tools that it has developed to allow law enforcement officers to
instantly check this database at airports and other border entry points.

                                   Background

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver
Program as a pilot program.13 It was initially envisioned as an
immigration control and economic promotion program, according to State.
Participating countries were selected because their citizens had a
demonstrated pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and the
governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S.
citizens. In 2000, the program became permanent under the Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act.14 In 2002, we reported on the legislative
requirements to which countries must adhere before they are eligible for
inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.15 In general, these are the
requirements:

13P.L. 99-603.

           o  A low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate. To qualify for visa
           waiver status, a country must maintain a refusal rate of less than
           3 percent for its citizens who apply for business and tourism
           visas.
           o  A machine-readable passport program. The country must certify
           that it issues machine-readable passports to its citizens. As of
           June 26, 2005, all travelers are required to have a
           machine-readable passport to enter the United States under this
           program.
           o  Reciprocity. The country must offer visa-free travel for U.S.
           citizens.

           Figure 1 shows the number of foreign nationals admitted to the
           United States under the program in recent years (see app. III for
           more detailed admissions statistics). Persons entering the United
           States under the Visa Waiver Program must

           o  have a valid passport issued by the participating country and
           be a national of that country;
           o  be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for
           business or tourism;16 
           o  have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to
           represent no threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of
           the United States;
           o  have complied with conditions of any previous admission under
           the program (for example, individuals must have stayed in the
           United States for 90 days or less during prior visa waiver
           visits);
           o  if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation
           ticket issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the
           U.S. government to participate in the program, and must have
           arrived in the United States aboard such a carrier; and
           o  if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a
           domicile abroad to which they intend to return.

           Figure 1: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver
           Program, from Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004

           Note: As of June 2006, CBP officials stated that admissions data
           from fiscal year 2005 are not yet available.

           Following the events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed
           additional laws to strengthen border security policies and
           procedures, and DHS and State instituted other policy changes that
           have affected a country's qualifications for participating in the
           Visa Waiver Program. For example, all passports issued after
           October 26, 2005, must contain a digital photograph printed in the
           document; passports issued to visa waiver travelers after October
           26, 2006, must be electronic (e-passports).17 E-passports aim to
           enhance border security by making it more difficult to misuse the
           passport to gain entry into the United States. Travelers with
           passports issued after the deadline that do not meet these
           requirements must obtain a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate
           overseas before departing for the United States. In addition, the
           May 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act required
           that participating countries certify that the theft of their blank
           passports is reported to the U.S. government in a timely manner.
           Moreover, the act increased the frequency-from once every 5 years
           to once every 2 years-of mandated assessments of the effect of
           each country's continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program
           on U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration interests.

           Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks
			  
			  The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits, including facilitating
           international travel for millions of foreign citizens seeking to
           visit the United States each year, creating substantial economic
           benefits to the United States, and allowing State to allocate
           resources to visa-issuing posts in countries with higher-risk
           applicant pools. However, there are inherent security and law
           enforcement risks in the program that pose challenges to the
           United States.

           Visa Waiver Program Facilitates Travel to the United States
			  
			  The Visa Waiver Program was created to facilitate international
           travel without jeopardizing the welfare or security of the United
           States, according to the program's legislative history. In fact,
           visa waiver travelers have represented about one-half of all
           nonimmigrant admissions to the United States in recent years, as
           demonstrated by figure 2 below. According to economic and
           commercial officers at several of the U.S. embassies we visited,
           visa-free travel to the United States boosts international
           business travel and tourism, as well as airline revenues, and
           creates substantial economic benefits to the United States. In its
           report accompanying the 2000 bill to make the program permanent,
           the House Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged the program's
           importance to the U.S. travel and tourism industry, and the
           benefit it provides to American citizens by allowing reciprocal
           visa-free travel to visa waiver countries. As we reported in 2002,
           any decision to eliminate the program could discourage some
           business and tourism in the United States.18 In addition, visa
           waiver countries could begin requiring visas for U.S. citizens
           traveling to the 27 participating countries for temporary business
           or tourism purposes, which would impose a burden of additional
           cost and time on U.S. travelers to these countries.

           Figure 2: Visa Waiver Program Admissions as a Percentage of Total
           Nonimmigrant Admissions into the United States, Fiscal Years 2002
           through 2004

           Note: Data on total nonimmigrant admissions are derived from DHS's
           2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. These data do not include
           visa-free entries by citizens of Canada or travelers entering the
           U.S. territory of Guam under its visa waiver program.

           Moreover, the program allows State to allocate its resources to
           visa-issuing posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools.
           In 2002, we reported that eliminating the program would increase
           State's resource requirements.19 Specifically, if the program were
           eliminated, we estimated that State's initial costs at that time
           to process the additional workload would likely range between $739
           million and $1.28 billion and that annual recurring costs would
           likely range between $522 million and $810 million. For example,
           millions of visa waiver travelers who have benefited from
           visa-free travel would need to obtain a visa to travel to the
           United States if the program did not exist. Furthermore, we
           reported that U.S. officials, including those from State as well
           as from some law enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the
           Visa Waiver Program could have negative implications for U.S.
           relations with governments of participating countries and could
           impair their cooperation in efforts to combat terrorism.

           Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law
			  Enforcement, and Immigration Interests
			  
			  The Visa Waiver Program can pose risks to U.S. security, law
           enforcement, and immigration interests because some foreign
           citizens may exploit the program to enter the United States. In
           particular, visa waiver travelers are not subject to the same
           degree of screening as those travelers who must first obtain a
           visa before arriving in the United States. Furthermore, lost and
           stolen passports from visa waiver countries could be used by
           terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators to gain entry
           into the United States.

           Visa Waiver Travelers and Visa Applicants Face Different Levels of
			  Screening
			  
			  Since September 11, 2001, the visa issuance process has taken on
           greater significance as an antiterrorism tool, as we have
           previously reported.20 Those travelers who must apply for visas
           before traveling to the United States receive two levels of
           screening before entering the country (see fig. 3).21 However,
           visa waiver travelers are first screened in person by a CBP
           inspector once they arrive at the U.S. port of entry, perhaps
           after having already boarded an international flight bound for the
           United States with a fraudulent travel document. For visa waiver
           travelers, CBP primary inspectors observe the applicant, examine
           his or her passport, collect the applicant's fingerprints as part
           of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
           program (US-VISIT),22 and check his or her name against automated
           databases and watch lists, which contain information regarding the
           admissibility of aliens, including known terrorists, criminals,
           and immigration law violators. However, according to the DHS OIG,
           primary border inspectors are disadvantaged when screening Visa
           Waiver Program travelers because they may not know the alien's
           language or local fraud trends in the alien's home country, nor
           have the time to conduct an extensive interview. In contrast,
           non-visa-waiver travelers, who must obtain a visa from a U.S.
           embassy or consulate, undergo an interview by consular officials
           overseas, who conduct a rigorous screening process when deciding
           to approve or deny a visa. As we have previously reported, State
           has taken a number of actions since 2002 to strengthen the visa
           issuance process as a border security tool.23 Moreover, consular
           officers have more time to interview applicants and examine the
           authenticity of their passports, and may also speak the visa
           applicant's native language, according to consular officials.
           Inadmissible travelers who need visas to enter the United States
           may attempt to acquire a passport from a Visa Waiver Program
           country to avoid the visa screening process.

           Figure 3: Comparison of Screening for U.S. Visas versus Arrival
           Inspection Screening at U.S. Air Ports of Entry

           Lost and Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Program Countries Are
			  Highly Valued
			  
			  One of the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit's primary concerns
           is the potential exploitation by terrorists, immigration law
           violators, and other criminals of a visa waiver country's lost or
           stolen passports. DHS intelligence analysts, law enforcement
           officials, and forensic document experts all acknowledge that
           misuse of lost and stolen passports is the greatest security
           problem posed by the Visa Waiver Program. Lost and stolen
           passports from visa waiver countries are highly prized travel
           documents, according to the Secretary General of Interpol.
           Moreover, Visa Waiver Program countries that do not consistently
           report the losses or thefts of their citizens' passports, or of
           blank passports, put the United States at greater risk of allowing
           inadmissible travelers to enter the country.

           Fraudulent passports from Visa Waiver Program countries have been
           used illegally by travelers seeking to disguise their true
           identities or nationalities when attempting to enter the United
           States. For example, from January through June 2005, DHS reported
           that it confiscated, at U.S. ports of entry, 298 fraudulent or
           altered passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries that
           travelers were attempting to use for admission into the United
           States (see table 1).24 Two more recent cases demonstrate
           continued attempts to enter the United States with fraudulent
           passports issued by visa waiver countries:

           o  In December 2005, a Pakistani citizen attempted to enter the
           United States under the program with a counterfeit United Kingdom
           passport that she had purchased. During secondary inspection, the
           CBP officer detected flaws in the passport.
           o  In March 2006, an Albanian citizen attempted to enter the
           United States using a Belgian passport that he had purchased. The
           traveler confessed to this upon questioning by CBP officers during
           secondary inspection.

           Table 1: Fraudulent Passport Intercepts, January through June 2005

           Source: CBP.

           In 2004, the DHS OIG reported that aliens applying for admission
           to the United States using lost or stolen passports have little
           reason to fear being caught. DHS's OIG reported that a lack of
           training hampered border inspectors' ability to detect passport
           fraud among Visa Waiver Program travelers, and recommended that
           CBP inspectors receive additional training in fraudulent document
           detection.25 At that time, the 12-week training course for new
           inspectors at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center devoted
           1 day to passport fraud, according to the OIG. Currently, CBP
           dedicates 16 hours out of the 16-week basic training program to
           fraudulent document detection training for new border inspectors,
           and provides additional courses for inspectors throughout their
           assignments at ports of entry. Nevertheless, training officials
           said that fraudulent and counterfeit passports are extremely
           difficult to detect, even for the most experienced border
           inspectors-which makes it imperative that lost and stolen
           passports are reported on a timely basis.

           Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with fraudulent
           passports at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that
           an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the
           United States using a lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver
           country. According to State, these aliens may have been
           inadmissible because they were immigration law violators,
           criminals, or terrorists. Following are several examples:

           o  In July 2005, two aliens successfully entered the United States
           using lost or stolen Austrian passports. DHS was not notified that
           these passports had been lost or stolen prior to this date; the
           aliens were admitted, and there is no record of their departure,
           according to CBP. In October 2005, CBP referred this case to DHS
           Immigration and Customs Enforcement for further action.
           o  In June 2005, CBP inspectors admitted into the United States
           two aliens using Italian passports that were from a batch of
           stolen passports. CBP was notified that this batch was stolen;
           however, the aliens altered the passport numbers to avoid
           detection by CBP officers. DHS has no record that these
           individuals departed the United States.
           o  Also in June 2005, three aliens traveling together-all using
           fraudulent Italian passports-were interviewed at primary
           inspection. CBP referred one alien, an Albanian citizen, to
           secondary inspection because she was reluctant to answer the
           inspector's questions. In secondary inspection, CBP determined
           that her passport had been altered. CBP admitted the other two
           aliens, but subsequently determined that their passports were part
           of the batch of stolen Italian passports cited in the previous
           example.

           In July 2004, DHS created the Visa Waiver
			  
			  In July 2004, DHS created the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit
           within OIE to monitor the Visa Waiver Program. Its mission is to
           oversee Visa Waiver Program activities and monitor countries'
           adherence to the program's statutory requirements, ensuring that
           the United States is protected from those who wish to do it harm
           or violate its laws, including immigration laws. In 2004, DHS
           reviewed the law enforcement and security risks posed by the
           continued participation of 25 of the 27 countries in the program.
           However, we identified problems with the country review process by
           which DHS assesses these risks. For example, DHS did not involve
           key interagency stakeholders in certain portions of the review
           process, and did not establish transparent protocols for the
           country assessments-including internal milestones or deadlines for
           completing the final country assessments, the goals of the site
           visits, and an explanation of the clearance process. Furthermore,
           OIE is unable to effectively monitor the immigration, law
           enforcement, and security risks posed by visa waiver countries on
           a continuing basis because of insufficient resources.

           Initial Steps Taken to Assess Risk of Visa Waiver Program
			  
			  In April 2004, the DHS OIG identified significant areas where DHS
           needed to strengthen and improve its management of the Visa Waiver
           Program.26 For example, the OIG found that it was unclear who was
           managing the program following the dissolution of the Immigration
           and Naturalization Service. In addition, the OIG found that a lack
           of funding, trained personnel, and other issues left DHS unable to
           comply with the mandated biennial country assessments. In response
           to these findings, DHS established OIE's Visa Waiver Program
           Oversight Unit in July 2004, and named a director to manage the
           office. Since its establishment, DHS, and particularly OIE, has
           made strides to address concerns raised by the 2004 OIG review.
           Specifically, DHS has:

           o  conducted site visits in all 27 participating countries;
           o  completed comprehensive assessments of 25 participating
           countries, examining the effect of continued participation in the
           Visa Waiver Program on U.S. security and law enforcement
           interests, including the enforcement of immigration laws;
           o  identified risks in some of the countries and brought the
           concerns to the attention of host-country governments in five visa
           waiver countries;27 
           o  submitted a six-page report to Congress in November 2005 that
           summarized the findings from the 2004 assessments; and
           o  initiated assessments for the remaining two countries in August
           and September 2005.

           In addition, in September 2005, DHS and State organized a
           technical conference in Washington, D.C., with representatives
           from Visa Waiver Program countries, to discuss the passport
           requirements for visa waiver travelers, and the October 2005 and
           2006 deadlines for digital photographs and e-passports,
           respectively. Together, these actions demonstrate significant
           improvements since the April 2004 OIG report.

           DHS Lacks a Clearly-Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to
			  Assess Risks of Visa Waiver Program
			  
			  Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of
           the program, we identified several problems with the process DHS
           uses to assess the risks posed by each of the visa waiver
           countries' continued participation in the program-namely the
           mandated biennial country assessment process. For the 2004
           assessments, we found the following:

           o  some key stakeholders were excluded from the decision-making
           process;
           o  the reviews lacked clear criteria to make key judgments;
           o  there was inconsistent preparation for the in-country site
           visits for the reviews; and
           o  DHS and its interagency partners neither completed the 25
           country assessments nor issued the summary report to Congress in a
           timely manner.

           OIE has acknowledged such weaknesses and has begun to make
           adjustments; however, concerns remain.

           Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders
			  
			  We found that the review process lacked clear protocols, as key
           stakeholders were left out of the report development process.
           Specifically, after conducting the site visits and contributing to
           the reports on the site visits, DHS and the interagency working
           group did not seek input from all site visit team members while
           drafting and clearing the final country assessments and subsequent
           report to Congress. For example, DHS's forensic document analysts,
           who participated in the site visits in 2004, told us that they did
           not see, clear, or comment on the draft country assessments,
           despite repeated attempts to obtain copies of them. Thus, these
           analysts questioned the integrity of the process because they had
           not seen how their analyses were incorporated into the final
           assessments. Additionally, State's headquarters officers who cover
           diplomatic relations in Visa Waiver Program countries, as well as
           embassy officials in all of the posts we visited, stated that they
           were not asked to review or provide comments on the draft
           assessments, nor had they seen the final assessments. CBP
           officials also stated that they repeatedly requested copies of the
           country assessments and subsequent report to Congress, but did not
           receive them. According to State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, DHS
           did not seek feedback from U.S. embassies and State's regional
           bureaus on the draft site visit or individual country assessments.
           Because these assessments contained classified information, OIE
           officials told us that they were not broadly distributed in draft
           or final form. Nevertheless, without this information, key
           stakeholders could not be effective advocates for U.S. concerns.

           Review Process Lacked Clear Criteria to Make Key Judgments
			  
			  We found that DHS did not have clear criteria when assessing each
           country's participation in the program to determine at what point
           security concerns would trigger discussions with foreign
           governments about these concerns and an attempt to resolve them.
           As previously mentioned, the DHS-led interagency working group
           identified five countries from its 2004 assessment with
           significant security concerns, and DHS, in coordination with
           State, discussed these concerns with government officials.
           Furthermore, U.S. embassies issued a formal diplomatic demarche to
           the five governments regarding the concerns in March 2005.28
           However, while the working group also had concerns with a sixth
           country, it decided not to issue a demarche to this government.
           According to State, the working group determined that the concerns
           identified in this country were not directly related to the Visa
           Waiver Program and the country's participation in the program.
           However, OIE officials and other working group members stated that
           they did not use any standard criteria in making this
           determination. State officials agreed that qualitative and/or
           quantitative criteria would be useful when making these
           determinations, although DHS stated that the criteria should be
           flexible. During our visit to the U.S. embassy in the sixth
           country, which was not issued a demarche, U.S. officials told us
           they were unaware that the working group had discussed security
           concerns in the context of the country assessment. While embassy
           officials had already been addressing these issues as part of
           their mission, they said that they would have likely seen greater
           progress made in discussions with foreign government officials if
           all parties had known that there was a potential link between
           these security concerns and visa waiver requirements.

           Inconsistent Preparation for Site Visits
			  
			  The site visits associated with each country review were not
           always well-prepared and lacked a consistent approach, according
           to the site visit team members. Several team members representing
           different agencies stated that they did not receive adequate
           information and guidance prior to conducting the site visits and,
           thus, were not well-prepared to conduct the visits. DHS did not
           brief or train the site visit team members prior to conducting the
           2004 reviews, and many said that the goals of the in-country
           visits were not clear. One team member stated that the site visits
           were largely "fact-finding trips," as opposed to a targeted
           analysis of law enforcement and security concerns. Moreover, prior
           to conducting the site visits, DHS sent each country a background
           questionnaire; however, OIE and team members stated that some
           countries did not provide responses to the questionnaire prior to
           the site visit, which would have been useful for preparation.
           Furthermore, senior U.S. officials in each of the embassies we
           visited stated that the goals and priorities of the 2004 DHS-led
           site visit teams were not clear to them. Consular officials at
           half of the posts we visited also said that the site visit teams
           arrived on short notice and did not give them adequate time to
           prepare. As a result, the teams may not have made the most
           efficient use of their time in-country, and may not have gathered
           their information on a consistent basis.

           Reporting Untimely
			  
			  DHS did not issue, in a timely manner, the summary report to
           Congress that generally described the overall findings from the 25
           country assessments. Although DHS is mandated to conduct the
           country assessments every 2 years, Congress did not establish a
           deadline by which the assessments must be completed or the summary
           report issued. OIE, State, and Justice officials acknowledged that
           the assessments took too long to complete. The interagency teams
           conducted site visits as part of the country assessments from May
           through September 2004, and transmitted the final summary report
           to Congress more than 1 year later, in November 2005. The report
           to Congress was a six-page summary that did not include detailed
           descriptions of the law enforcement and security risks identified
           during the review process, which were discussed at length in the
           individual country assessments. According to interagency working
           group members, DHS did not establish internal milestones or
           deadlines for completing the final country assessments. OIE
           officials attributed the lengthiness of the assessment process to
           the multiple rounds of clearances for each of the 25 assessments
           and the summary report.

           While the country assessments were awaiting clearance, there were
           missed opportunities to capture more recent developments, and the
           final assessments contained dated information or were incomplete.
           For example, in May 2005, a post in one visa waiver country was
           notified there had been a large-scale, high-profile theft of blank
           passports. While the U.S. government was aware of this theft, this
           information was not captured in that country's assessment as it
           was being cleared. Moreover, the teams collecting information
           about the visa waiver countries' risks in 2004 used, in some
           cases, information from 2 years prior; by the time the summary
           report was issued in November 2005, some of the data was over 3
           years old. As a result of this lengthy process, the final report
           presented to Congress did not necessarily reflect the current law
           enforcement and security risks posed by each country, or the
           positive steps that countries had made to address these risks (see
           fig. 4).

14P.L. 106-396.

15GAO-03-38.

16According to State, the Visa Waiver Program is a substitute entry
mechanism for nonimmigrant, short-term, business, and tourism visas only;
it does not apply to students, temporary workers, and others who require
visas to enter the United States.

                   Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks

Visa Waiver Program Facilitates Travel to the United States

17In general, e-passports will contain a chip embedded in the passport
that will store the same information that is printed on the data page of
the passport, such as name, date of birth, gender, place of birth, dates
of passport issuance and expiration, place of issuance, passport number,
and a photo image of the bearer. In addition, e-passports will hold a
unique identification number and a digital signature to protect the stored
data from alteration. E-passports provide two key pieces of information:
the digital signature and the digital image of the passport holder.
Digital signatures provide a higher level of security for the passport by
providing a means to electronically verify the authenticity of the data on
the chip, including the traveler's photograph and biographical
information.

18 GAO-03-38 .

Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law Enforcement, and
Immigration Interests

  Visa Waiver Travelers and Visa Applicants Face Different Levels of Screening

19 GAO-03-38 .

20GAO has issued a series of reports on how the visa issuance process
serves as an antiterrorism tool, including: GAO, Border Security:
Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
Information Sharing, GAO-05-859 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005); Border
Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of
Homeland Security's Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, D.C.:
July 29, 2005); and, Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened
as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).

21All foreign visitors, whether they have visas or are seeking to enter
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, undergo inspections by
CBP inspectors at U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry to ensure that
only admissible persons enter the United States.

22The US-VISIT program is a government-wide program to collect, maintain,
and share information on foreign nationals, and better control and monitor
the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors. Under the program, foreign
visitors are required to submit to fingerprint scans of their right and
left index finger and have a digital photograph taken upon arrival at U.S.
ports of entry.

23 GAO-05-859 and GAO-03-132NI .

  Lost and Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Highly Valued

24In 2005, CBP established a Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit to conduct
trend analyses on travel documents used to enter the United States. The
unit's first statistical report covered fraudulent document trends from
January through June 2005, primarily focusing on passport statistics.

Visa Waiver Program country of issuance Number of passports 
France                                                   67 
Italy                                                    52 
United Kingdom                                           38 
Japan                                                    29 
Singapore                                                24 
Spain                                                    19 
Portugal                                                 19 
Slovenia                                                 14 
Netherlands                                               9 
Germany                                                   6 
Austria                                                   5 
Belgium                                                   5 
Norway                                                    4 
Ireland                                                   3 
Sweden                                                    2 
Switzerland                                               2 
Total                                                   298 

25GAO has also reported on inspections at land ports of entry. GAO, Land
Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
Inspections Process, GAO-03-1084R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 2003).

               Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses

Initial Steps Taken to Assess Risk of Visa Waiver Program

26Prior to the establishment of DHS in 2003, Justice's Office of the
Inspector General examined visa waiver operations in 1999 and 2001, when
the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service managed the program.
Justice's Inspector General identified several chronic and recurring
problems and made a series of recommendations to strengthen implementation
of the program.

27In this report, we do not name the specific Visa Waiver Program
countries where DHS identified security concerns because the department
determined that this is sensitive information.

DHS Lacks a Clearly-Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess Risks of
Visa Waiver Program

  Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders

  Review Process Lacked Clear Criteria to Make Key Judgments

28In coordination with DHS, U.S. embassy officials communicated these
concerns through an official demarche to each government. A demarche
presents a formal U.S. government position or request to a foreign
government. Demarches are generally presented in writing, but can also be
transmitted orally. According to diplomatic protocol, a demarche requires
an official, formal response from the other government.

  Inconsistent Preparation for Site Visits

  Reporting Untimely

Figure 4: Timeline of 2004-2005 Country Assessment Process and Other Key
Milestones

  Despite Adjustments to Process, Weaknesses Remain

OIE officials acknowledged weaknesses in the 2004 reviews, and made some
adjustments for the 2005 country assessments for Italy and Portugal, the
two remaining countries. For the 2005 reviews, DHS conducted a 1-day
training seminar to explain the objectives of the visit and share
information about the countries to the site visit teams, including
findings from prior country assessments. Additionally, the team members
met prior to conducting the site visits, and reconvened upon returning to
Washington, D.C., to ensure consensus on their report on the site visit.
However, the 2005 country review process still lacked consistency and
transparency. In particular, DHS has not finalized its operating
procedures for site visits. The site visit teams traveled to the remaining
two countries in August and September 2005; however, as of June 2006, DHS
had neither updated the interagency working group team members on the
status of the reviews of Italy and Portugal, nor provided them with a
timeline for proceeding with the review. Furthermore, stakeholders
continued to express concern about DHS's lack of communication about the
process and the findings, and no changes have been made to the review
process that would make the final report to Congress timely. Therefore,
there are no assurances that the next biennial assessment round will
proceed more quickly than the previous round.

DHS Cannot Effectively Monitor Ongoing Concerns in Visa Waiver Countries

DHS cannot effectively monitor the law enforcement and security risks
posed by visa waiver countries on a consistent, ongoing basis because it
has not provided OIE with adequate staffing and resources. Furthermore, we
found weaknesses in communication between DHS and overseas posts and other
agencies.

  Lack of Staffing and Funding Impedes Ability to Assess Risks

OIE is limited in its ability to achieve its mission because of
insufficient staffing and funding. The office has numerous
responsibilities, including

           o  conducting the mandated biennial country reviews;

           o  monitoring law enforcement, security, and immigration concerns
           in visa waiver countries on an ongoing basis;
           o  working with countries seeking to become members of the Visa
           Waiver Program;29 and
           o  briefing foreign government representatives from participating
           visa waiver countries, as well as those countries that are seeking
           admission into the program, on issues related to program
           membership.

           In 2004, the DHS OIG found that OIE's lack of resources directly
           undercut its ability to assess a security problem inherent in the
           program-lost and stolen passports. The office received funding to
           conduct the country reviews in 2004 and 2005; however, OIE
           officials indicated that a lack of funding and full-time staff has
           made it extremely difficult to conduct additional overseas
           fieldwork, as well as track ongoing issues of concern in the 27
           visa waiver countries-a key limitation in DHS's ability to assess
           and mitigate the program's risks. According to OIE officials, the
           unit developed a strategic plan to monitor the program, but has
           been unable to implement its plan with its current staffing. As of
           June 2006, the office was staffed with two full-time employees, as
           well as one temporary employee from another DHS component.
           Moreover, OIE does not have a separate budget, but must request
           funds (for example, to conduct travel related to the Visa Waiver
           Program) from the Office of Policy Development. In addition,
           program officials stated that they have paid for their own office
           supplies using their personal savings due to funding constraints.
           Without adequate resources, OIE is unable to monitor and assess
           participating countries' compliance with the Visa Waiver Program's
           statutory requirements.

           Gaps in DHSï¿½s Communications with its Overseas Posts and Other
			  Agencies
			  
			  DHS has not clearly communicated its mission to stakeholders at
           overseas posts, nor identified points of contact within U.S.
           embassies, so it can communicate directly with field officials
           positioned to monitor countries' compliance with Visa Waiver
           Program requirements and report on current events and issues of
           potential concern. In particular, within DHS's various components,
           we found that OIE is largely an unknown entity and, therefore, is
           unable to leverage the expertise of DHS officials overseas.
           Specifically, only 3 of the 15 DHS field officials with whom we
           spoke in the six visa waiver countries we visited were aware of
           the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit and its mission. A senior
           DHS representative at one post showed us that her organizational
           directory did not contain contact information for OIE. In
           addition, an official from the Immigration and Customs
           Enforcement's Office of International Affairs acknowledged that
           DHS needs a better communication plan for the Visa Waiver Program.
           He stated that DHS had not prioritized the workload for all its
           officials overseas, including their role in overseeing the Visa
           Waiver Program; he also told us that OIE had not yet articulated
           what information it needed, designated a mechanism to share that
           information, or gained agency-wide acceptance of procedures for
           monitoring the compliance of visa waiver countries. In fact, a
           senior DHS official in Washington, D.C., told us that he may find
           out about developments-either routine or emergent-in visa waiver
           countries by "happenstance." Without an outreach strategy, DHS is
           not able to leverage its existing resources at U.S. embassies in
           all visa waiver countries.

           Furthermore, key stakeholders, who are in a position to influence
           and monitor visa waiver countries' compliance with the program's
           requirements, were not informed of the major findings of the
           country assessments. In fact, at the time of our visits,
           ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission in each of the six posts
           told us that they were not fully aware of the extent to which the
           country assessments discussed law enforcement and security
           concerns posed by the continued participation of the country in
           the program. The Deputy Chief of Mission at one post stated that
           without the appropriate information, such as was contained in the
           assessments, embassy officials could not be effective agents for
           the U.S. government with regard to these issues. Bureau of
           Consular Affairs officials in Washington, D.C., agreed that any
           concerns identified in the assessments should be brought to the
           attention of the embassy, so that the posts can address the
           concerns accordingly. Due to the lack of outreach and clear
           communication about its mission, OIE is limited in its ability to
           monitor the day-to-day law enforcement and security concerns posed
           by the Visa Waiver Program, and the U.S. government is limited in
           its ability to influence visa waiver countries' progress in
           meeting requirements.

           We also found gaps in interagency communication. According to OIE,
           State plays a significant role in conveying information relevant
           to the Visa Waiver Program to U.S. embassy officials and their
           host government counterparts. Therefore, it is important that
           State and DHS have clear lines of communication. For example, in
           October 2005, one government expressed willingness to share data
           on lost and stolen issued passports with the United States, and
           asked for technical specifications on how to do so. However, at
           the time of our February 2006 visit, the post in that country had
           not received direction from headquarters on how this passport
           information should be shared. Moreover, OIE officials told us that
           they were unaware that this country was willing to share this data
           until we brought it to their attention in early March 2006. As a
           result, the United States missed opportunities to potentially
           deter the fraudulent use of passports from this country, which in
           fact has the highest rate of misuse among all visa waiver
           countries, according to DHS. Additionally, a senior consular
           official in another participating country expressed frustration
           that DHS had not fully explained to embassy officials why visa
           waiver countries needed to report lost and stolen passport
           information directly to the United States and Interpol, which
           maintains a global database of lost and stolen travel documents.
           Several other senior consular officials also expressed the need
           for more information about OIE's mission and goals, as well as the
           desired role for overseas posts.

           DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks
			  
			  DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa
           Waiver Program, such as terminating the use of the German
           temporary passport for travel under the program. Since 2002, the
           law has required the timely reporting of passport thefts for
           continued participating in the Visa Waiver Program, but DHS has
           not established and communicated time frames and operating
           procedures to participating countries. In addition, DHS has sought
           to expand this requirement to include the reporting of data, to
           the United States and Interpol, on lost and stolen issued
           passports; however, participating countries are resisting these
           requirements, and DHS has not yet issued guidance on what
           information must be shared, with whom, and within what time frame.
           Furthermore, U.S. border inspectors are unable to automatically
           access Interpol's data on reported lost and stolen passports,
           which makes it more difficult to detect reported lost or stolen
           passports at U.S. ports of entry.

           DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
			  
			  As previously mentioned, during the 2004 assessment process, the
           working group identified security concerns in several
           participating countries, and DHS took actions to mitigate some of
           these risks. For example, DHS determined that several thousand
           blank German temporary passports30 had been lost or stolen, and
           that Germany had not reported some of this information to the
           United States. In March 2005, at the working group's request, the
           U.S. embassy in Berlin conveyed these concerns to the German
           government to seek a solution. In March 2006, DHS determined that
           sufficient progress had not been made to address the concern over
           German temporary passports, and, as of May 1, 2006, German
           temporary passport holders are not allowed to travel to the United
           States under the Visa Waiver Program without a visa.

           DHS has also made some progress in enforcing new passport security
           measures. For example, DHS has enforced an October 26, 2005,
           deadline requiring travelers under the Visa Waiver Program to have
           digital photographs in their passports. Specifically, Italian and
           French citizens with noncompliant passports issued after October
           26, 2005, must first obtain a visa before traveling to the United
           States because these countries did not meet the deadline.
           Furthermore, as previously mentioned, by October 26, 2006, visa
           waiver travelers must have e-passports for travel under the
           program. E-passports aim to enhance the security of travel
           documents, making it more difficult for imposters or inadmissible
           aliens to misuse the passport to gain entry into the United
           States. DHS and State officials told us that nearly all 27
           participating countries report that they are on schedule to meet
           this deadline.31 According to US-VISIT, DHS will deploy machines
           to read the e-passports at 33 airports by the October 2006
           deadline, covering about 98 percent of all visa waiver travelers.
           While US-VISIT intends to deploy e-passport readers to all ports
           of entry in the future, it has not articulated clear timeframes to
           do so.32 Therefore, until this is achieved, it will not be
           possible for DHS to read the information on the chips embedded in
           the passports for the remaining ports of entry.

           DHS Lacks Standard Procedures for Obtaining Stolen Blank Passport Data
			  
			  A key risk in the Visa Waiver Program is stolen blank passports
           from visa waiver countries, because detecting these passports at
           U.S. ports of entry is extremely difficult, according to DHS. Some
           thefts of blank passports have not been reported to the United
           States until years after the fact, according to DHS intelligence
           reports. For example, in 2004, a visa waiver country reported the
           theft of nearly 300 stolen blank passports to the United
           States-more than 9 years after the theft occurred. In addition, in
           2004, a visa waiver country reported the theft of 270 blank
           passports more than 8 months after the theft occurred. The 2002
           Enhanced Security and Visa Entry Reform Act provides that the
           Secretary of Homeland Security must terminate a country from the
           Visa Waiver Program if he and the Secretary of State jointly
           determine that the country is not reporting the theft of its blank
           passports to the United States on a timely basis. DHS and State
           have chosen not to terminate from the program countries that have
           failed to report these incidents.

           DHS officials told us that the inherent political, economic, and
           diplomatic implications associated with removing a country from
           the Visa Waiver Program make it difficult to enforce the statutory
           requirement in the broadest terms. Moreover, DHS has not
           established time frames or operating procedures to enforce this
           requirement. In April 2004, the DHS OIG recommended that the
           then-Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, in
           coordination with State, develop standard operating procedures for
           the routine and proactive collection of stolen passport
           information from host governments for dissemination to U.S.
           agencies. While the statute requires visa waiver countries to
           certify that they report information on the theft of their blank
           passports to the United States on a timely basis, as of June 2006,
           DHS has not defined what constitutes "timely." Moreover, the
           United States lacks a centralized mechanism for foreign
           governments to report all stolen passports. In particular, DHS has
           not defined to whom in the U.S. government participating countries
           should report this information.

           Some Participating Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Resisting
			  Additional Reporting to United States and Interpol
			  
			  In addition to blank passports, lost or stolen issued passports
           also pose a risk because they can be altered. In June 2005, DHS
           issued guidance to participating Visa Waiver Program countries
           requiring that they certify their intent to report lost and stolen
           passport data on issued passports by August 2005. However, DHS has
           not yet issued guidance on what information must be shared, with
           whom, and within what time frame. Some visa waiver countries have
           not yet agreed to provide this information to the United States,
           due in part to concerns over the privacy of their citizens'
           biographical information. In addition, several consular officials
           expressed confusion about the current and impending requirements
           about sharing this data, and felt they were unable to adequately
           explain the requirements to their foreign counterparts.

           In June 2005, the U.S. government also announced its intention to
           require visa waiver countries to certify their intent to report
           information on both lost and stolen blank and issued passports to
           Interpol. In 2002, Interpol developed a database of lost and
           stolen travel documents to which its member countries may
           contribute on a voluntary basis. The United States has endorsed
           Interpol's database, and, since May 2004, State has been
           contributing U.S. data from lost and stolen blank passports to it.
           In 2005, State reported to Congress that it also instructed all
           U.S. embassies and consulates to take every opportunity to
           persuade host governments to share this data with Interpol. While
           most visa waiver countries use and contribute to Interpol's
           database, four do not. Moreover, some countries that do contribute
           do not do so on a regular basis, according to Interpol officials.
           Interpol stated that it continues to encourage countries to send
           this information more systematically. In addition, participating
           countries have expressed concerns about reporting this
           information, citing privacy issues; however, Interpol's database
           on lost and stolen travel documents does not include the passport
           bearers' biographical information, such as name and date of
           birth.33 According to the Secretary General of Interpol, in light
           of the high value associated with passports from visa waiver
           countries, it is a priority for his agency to encourage these
           countries to contribute to the database.

           Inefficient Access to Interpolï¿½s Database on Lost and Stolen Passports
			  
			  Though information from Interpol's database could potentially stop
           inadmissible travelers from entering the United States, CBP's
           border inspectors do not have automatic access to the database at
           primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry-the first line of
           defense against those who might exploit the Visa Waiver Program to
           enter the United States. The inspection process at U.S. ports of
           entry can include two stages-a primary and secondary inspection.
           If, during the primary inspection, the inspector suspects that the
           traveler is inadmissible either because of a fraudulent passport
           or other reason, the inspector refers the traveler to secondary
           inspection. At secondary inspection, border inspectors can contact
           officials at the National Targeting Center, who can query
           Interpol's stolen-travel-document database to determine if the
           traveler is attempting to enter the United States with a passport
           that had been previously reported lost or stolen, but is not yet
           on CBP's watch list (see fig. 5).34 However, Interpol's data on
           lost and stolen travel documents is not automatically accessible
           to border inspectors at primary inspection-one reason why it is
           not currently an effective border screening tool, according to
           DHS, State, and Justice officials. According to the Secretary
           General of Interpol, until DHS can automatically query Interpol's
           data, the United States will not have an effective screening tool
           for checking passports.

29See GAO, Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver
Program, GAO-06-835R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).

  Gaps in DHS's Communications with its Overseas Posts and Other Agencies

               DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks

DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program

30German temporary passports are valid for one year, and are less
expensive than standard German passports. In addition, they are issued at
more than 6,000 locations across Germany, whereas the Ministry of Interior
issues the standard passports centrally.

31According to a US-VISIT official, as of June 2006, it had verified
e-passports from 12 of 27 visa waiver countries.

DHS Lacks Standard Procedures for Obtaining Stolen Blank Passport Data

32In May 2006, a US-VISIT official stated that DHS had not yet decided
from which company the department would procure the e-passport readers.
DHS still needs to decide how it will use the digital image from the
e-passport, including whether the image will be displayed on the US-VISIT
screen during inspection, and if so, whether it will be displayed in place
of or in addition to the photo already stored in US-VISIT. Furthermore,
countries have the option to store other biometric information, such as
fingerprints or iris images, on the chip, and DHS will need to make
decisions about whether it will use such information, if available, during
inspections. According to US-VISIT, it will deploy e-passport readers to
the remaining ports of entry at a future date to take advantage of
anticipated improved reader technology, while minimizing procurement and
training costs.

Some Participating Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Resisting Additional
Reporting to United States and Interpol

Inefficient Access to Interpol's Database on Lost and Stolen Passports

33Interpol's database includes the passport's identity number, the country
of issuance, and the country where the loss or theft occurred. According
to officials from Justice's Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau, it is
particularly important that countries report this information, as well as
the date of the theft and the issuance date.

34Interpol's data on lost and stolen passports are not available when
border inspectors screen travelers against US-VISIT or the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS), unless Interpol has shared this
information with the United States in separate reports and it has been
manually entered into TECS by DHS. TECS maintains watch list data,
interfaces with other agencies' databases, and is used by inspectors at
ports of entry to verify traveler information and update traveler data.
TECS's watch list data sources include DHS' CBP and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); State; and
the Drug Enforcement Agency, among others.

Figure 5: CBP's Access to Interpol's Lost and Stolen Travel Document
Database

According to Interpol officials, the United States is working actively
with Interpol on a potential pilot project that would allow for an
automatic query of aliens' passport data against Interpol's database at
primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry. However, DHS has not yet
finalized a plan to do so. In December 2005, Interpol began a similar
program at all border stations in Switzerland. Through this program, Swiss
border agents query Interpol's database as soon as travelers appear at a
border station. According to the Secretary General of Interpol, in a
2-month period, Switzerland encountered 282 potential instances of
travelers attempting to enter the country with a previously reported lost
or stolen passport. In addition, during this time frame, Swiss border
agents queried Interpol's database more than all other member countries
combined because it was the only country accessing the database
automatically.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice's Interpol-U.S. National
Central Bureau stated that from April through June 2006, Justice, CBP's
National Targeting Center, and Interpol compared records from certain
passengers arriving in the United States against Interpol's lost and
stolen travel document database. According to the National Central Bureau,
the test's objectives were to simulate an automatic query of passenger
records against Interpol's database and analyze discrepancies between that
database and U.S. watch lists. The National Central Bureau stated that, by
early August 2006, it and the National Targeting Center will finalize a
report on this test to help facilitate a pilot program for real-time,
systematic queries of passenger records against Interpol's data at U.S.
ports of entry.

                                  Conclusions

The Visa Waiver Program aims to facilitate international travel for
millions of people each year and promote the effective use of government
resources. Effective oversight of the program entails balancing these
benefits against the program's potential risks. To find this balance, the
U.S. government needs to fully identify the vulnerabilities posed by visa
waiver travelers, and be in a position to mitigate them. However, we found
weaknesses in the process by which the U.S. government assesses these
risks, and DHS's Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit is not able to manage
the program with its current resource levels. Moreover, DHS has not
communicated clear reporting requirements for lost and stolen passports-a
key risk-nor can it automatically access all stolen passport information
when it is most needed-namely, at the primary inspection point at U.S.
points of entry. It is imperative that DHS commit to strengthen its
ability to promptly identify and mitigate risks to ensure that the Visa
Waiver Program does not jeopardize U.S. security interests.

                                Recommendations

To improve the U.S. government's process for assessing risks in the Visa
Waiver Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with State and other appropriate agencies, take the following
five actions:

           o  Provide additional resources to strengthen OIE's visa waiver
           monitoring unit.
           o  Finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for the
           biennial country assessments and provide these protocols to
           stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas.
           These protocols should provide timelines for the entire assessment
           process, including the role of a site visit, an explanation of the
           clearance process, and deadlines for completion.
           o  Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including the
           identification of visa-waiver points of contact at U.S. embassies,
           for all 27 participating countries; and establish protocols, in
           coordination with appropriate headquarters offices, for direct
           communication between points of contact at overseas posts and
           OIE's Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit.
           o  Require periodic updates from points of contact at posts in
           countries where there are law enforcement or security concerns
           relevant to the Visa Waiver Program.
           o  Provide complete copies of the most recent country assessments
           to relevant stakeholders in headquarters and overseas posts.

           To improve the U.S. government's process for mitigating the risks
           in the Visa Waiver Program, we recommend that the Secretary of
           Homeland Security, in coordination with State and other
           appropriate agencies, take the following three actions:

           o  Require that all visa waiver countries provide the United
           States and Interpol with non-biographical data from lost or stolen
           issued passports, as well as from blank passports.
           o  Develop and communicate clear standard operating procedures for
           the reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passport data,
           including a definition of timely reporting and to whom in the U.S.
           government countries should report.
           o  Develop and implement a plan to make Interpol's stolen travel
           document database automatically available during primary
           inspection at U.S. ports of entry.

           Matter for Congressional Consideration
			  
			  The May 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
           mandated DHS to conduct country assessments of the effect on U.S.
           law enforcement and security interests of each country's continued
           participation in the Visa Waiver Program at least every 2 years.
           Given the lengthy time it took for DHS to issue the November 2005
           summary report to Congress, and to ensure future reports contain
           timely information when issued, Congress should consider
           establishing a biennial deadline by which DHS must complete the
           country assessments and report to Congress.

           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
			  
			  DHS, State, and Interpol provided written comments on a draft of
           this report (see apps. IV, V, and VI). DHS, State, Interpol, and
           Justice's Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau provided technical
           comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

           DHS either agreed with, or stated that it is considering, all of
           our recommendations. Regarding our matter for congressional
           consideration, DHS did not appear to support the establishment of
           a deadline for the biennial report to Congress. Instead, DHS
           suggested that Congress should require continuous and ongoing
           evaluation. With continuous review, DHS stated that it would be
           able to constantly evaluate U.S. interests and report to Congress
           on the current 2-year reporting cycle on targeted issues of
           concern, rather than providing a historical evaluation. We agree
           that continuous and ongoing evaluation is necessary, and that is
           why we recommended that DHS create real-time monitoring
           arrangements and provide additional resources to the Visa Waiver
           Program Oversight Unit to achieve this goal. Regarding the
           mandated biennial country assessments, we believe that they can
           serve a useful purpose if they are completed in a timely fashion.
           In addition, DHS provided information on actions that it has taken
           to improve the management of the biennial country assessment
           process.

           State agreed that efforts by U.S. embassies and consulates to
           monitor and assess the Visa Waiver Program would benefit from
           enhanced communication to and from DHS, and endorsed our
           recommendation that DHS provide more information to these
           stakeholders on Visa Waiver Program issues. In addition, State
           acknowledged the risk of misuse of previously lost or stolen
           passports, particularly by persons who are not eligible for a
           visa. With regard to timely reporting on lost and stolen
           passports, State welcomed our recommendation calling for clear
           guidelines and reporting mechanisms to achieve this goal.

           Interpol provided information about its lost and stolen travel
           document database and tools that it has developed to allow law
           enforcement officers to instantly check this database at airports
           and other border entry points. In addition, Interpol noted that
           many developing countries lack the resources necessary to
           implement these tools. Therefore, Interpol urged the United States
           and other countries to provide funding to facilitate access for
           all countries to its lost and stolen travel document database. It
           also provided its views on the risks associated with lost and
           stolen passports.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will provide
           copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Homeland
           Security, as well as the Attorney General and the Secretary
           General of Interpol. We will also make copies available to others
           upon request.

           In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO
           Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any
           questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128
           or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
           Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
           report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
           listed in appendix VII.

           Sincerely yours,

           Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade

           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
			  
			  To describe the benefits of the Visa Waiver Program, we reviewed
           relevant documentation, including Office of Inspector General
           (OIG) reports and our 2002 report on the implications of
           eliminating the program.1 We also interviewed political, economic,
           consular, commercial, and law enforcement officials at U.S.
           embassies overseas to discuss the advantages of the program for
           U.S. business and tourism. To describe the risks in the Visa
           Waiver Program, we examined documentation on the screening process
           at U.S. ports of entry for travelers from Visa Waiver Program
           countries. In addition, we analyzed data from Customs and Border
           Protection (CBP) on interceptions of fraudulent, lost, or stolen
           passports from participating countries. We also observed
           fraudulent document detection training of CBP agents at the
           Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and spoke with training
           officials regarding the difficulty in detecting fraudulent
           passports. We also interviewed officials from the Department of
           Homeland Security's (DHS) National Targeting Center, Intelligence
           and Analysis Directorate, and Forensic Document Laboratory on the
           risks posed by Visa Waiver Program travelers.

           In particular, we analyzed data on the number of nonimmigrants
           that entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program from
           fiscal years 2002 though 2004. While we did not fully assess the
           reliability of these statistics because we used them for
           background purposes, we conducted interviews and obtained other
           corroborating evidence that confirmed the importance of the Visa
           Waiver Program in terms of the broad numbers of admissions to the
           United States in recent years.

           Regarding DHS's data on fraudulent passports, DHS reported that
           these data are limited to those cases in which the fraudulent
           document from the Visa Waiver Program country was intercepted at a
           port of entry, and do not include instances when fraudulent
           passports were used to enter the United States but were not
           detected. While we could not fully assess the reliability of the
           data, we found them sufficiently reliable to establish that
           hundreds of fraudulent documents from a broad range of Visa Waiver
           Program countries were intercepted in 2005. In addition, the
           number of documents that DHS reports by country is not necessarily
           indicative of the extent of the problem in that country, as these
           data only cover instances when fraudulent documents were
           intercepted.

           To evaluate the U.S. government's efforts to assess and mitigate
           these risks, we analyzed the laws governing the program, relevant
           agency operating procedures, and DHS OIG reports. We also examined
           15 of the 25 completed reports assessing the participation of Visa
           Waiver Program countries.2 As of June 2006, the remaining 10
           assessments were pending classification review by DHS's Office of
           International Enforcement. These assessments contained, among
           other things, detailed analyses of an individual country's

           o  political, social, and economic conditions;
           o  security over its passport and national identity documents;
           o  border controls;
           o  immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and
           practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement,
           immigration, and national security;
           o  patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse;
           o  assessments of terrorism, by the country's nationals, within or
           outside the country, and;
           o  evaluations of the impact of the country's participation in the
           Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security and law enforcement.

           To discuss these assessments and actions taken in response to
           their findings, we met with officials from several DHS component
           agencies and offices, the Department of State's Bureau of Consular
           Affairs and its Europe and Eurasia Bureau, and the International
           Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in Lyon, France. In
           addition, we met with officials from the Department of Justice's
           U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C., which
           facilitates international law enforcement cooperation among the
           United States and Interpol and its other member countries. We also
           spoke with U.S. Embassy officials in six Visa Waiver Program
           countries, as well as foreign government officials in three of
           these countries. During these visits, we observed visa operations
           and interviewed embassy management, consular staff, and
           representatives from law enforcement agencies regarding their
           roles and responsibilities in overseeing the Visa Waiver Program.

           We conducted our evaluation from September 2005 through June 2006
           in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
           standards.
			  
			  Appendix II: Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries

Appendix III: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004
                                    Fiscal year            
Country of citizenship       2002       2003       2004 
Andorra                       386        478        654 
Australia                 445,242    484,086    577,161 
Austria                   107,636    115,164    136,050 
Belgium                   166,286    155,693    185,836 
Brunei                        303        323        404 
Denmark                   124,819    141,880    165,190 
Finland                    71,338     73,585     89,190 
France                    932,847    920,774  1,121,824 
Germany                 1,208,121  1,254,490  1,446,806 
Iceland                    17,733     19,810     26,727 
Ireland                   297,496    328,769    392,938 
Italy                     515,126    576,346    693,628 
Japan                   3,347,900  3,303,878  4,044,284 
Liechtenstein                 996        995      1,182 
Luxembourg                  6,001      6,447      7,287 
Monaco                        377        432        614 
Netherlands               486,672    498,528    560,403 
New Zealand               187,235    180,572    202,904 
Norway                    110,713    119,846    140,015 
Portugal                   57,245     64,330     82,089 
San Marino                    279        300        375 
Singapore                  49,713     54,539     71,579 
Slovenia                    6,951      9,703     11,643 
Spain                     350,044    375,021    487,715 
Sweden                    198,532    220,577    273,007 
Switzerland               228,298    221,757    244,921 
United Kingdom          3,938,842  4,189,906  4,639,055 
Total                  12,857,131 13,318,229 15,603,400 

           Appendix III: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver
			  Program, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004
			  
			  Source: CBP.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security


Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 6.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 6.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

                                  GAO Comments

                       1. We understand that DHS's organizational structure
                        changed during the 2004 review process. To avoid
                        confusion regarding the DHS units that had some
                        involvement in this process, we have replaced
                        references to the Office of International Enforcement
                        (OIE) with DHS, as appropriate.
                        2. Our review focused on the 2004 biennial review
                        process for 25 of the 27 Visa Waiver Program
                        countries. We agree that DHS has taken some steps to
                        improve the 2005 process for Italy and Portugal,
                        whose reviews are still in process, and we discuss
                        these improvements in our report. However, we
                        disagree that DHS has corrected most of the problems
                        associated with the 2004 review process. As we note
                        in our report, as of June 2006, DHS had neither
                        updated the interagency working group team members on
                        the status of the reviews of Italy and Portugal, nor
                        provided them with a timeline for proceeding with the
                        review. Furthermore, stakeholders continued to
                        express concern about DHS's lack of communication
                        about the process and the findings. Therefore, we
                        recommended that DHS finalize clear, consistent, and
                        transparent protocols for biennial country
                        assessments and provide these protocols to
                        stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and
                        overseas.
                        3. We did not intend to suggest that the evaluation
                        of U.S. security and law enforcement interests needed
                        to be conducted or finalized during the in-country
                        site visits. Our point is that important events may
                        take place while the country assessments are in the
                        clearance process. We believe that DHS should update
                        the country assessments to reflect these events, such
                        as large scale thefts of blank passports like the May
                        2005 theft that we noted in our report, to ensure
                        that Congress has a comprehensive analysis of the
                        current law enforcement and security risks posed by
                        each country.
                        4. We agree that DHS cannot continue to incorporate
                        data indefinitely into the country assessments.
                        However, as we reported, the teams collecting
                        information about the visa waiver countries' risks in
                        2004 used, in some cases, information from 2 years
                        prior; by the time the summary report was issued in
                        November 2005, some of the data was more than 3 years
                        old. Indeed, as DHS noted elsewhere, the 2004 country
                        assessments provided a "rearview mirror" and
                        "backward-looking" evaluation. Thus, the assessments
                        may not necessarily have contained the best
                        information available at the time the assessments
                        were finalized. Given the lengthy time it took for
                        DHS to issue the November 2005 summary report to
                        Congress, and to ensure future reports contain timely
                        information when issued, we believe that Congress
                        should consider establishing a biennial deadline by
                        which DHS must complete the country assessments and
                        report to Congress.
                        5. We agree that continuous and ongoing evaluations
                        of Visa Waiver Program countries are needed and
                        recommended that DHS create real-time monitoring
                        arrangements and provide additional resources to the
                        Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit to achieve this
                        goal. However, as long as DHS is required to report
                        biennially to Congress, DHS should ensure that future
                        reviews are conducted in a timely fashion. Based on
                        our review of the 2004 country assessment process,
                        the assessments may not necessarily have contained
                        the best information available at the time the
                        assessments were finalized given the lengthy time it
                        took for DHS to finalize its reviews.
                        6. We agree that it is in the U.S. government's best
                        interest to engage with countries on global concerns
                        identified during the course of the country
                        assessment process. It is not our intention to
                        inhibit this kind of consultation. Furthermore, we
                        acknowledge that a consultative process may involve
                        tradeoffs between timely reporting and complete
                        information gathering and analysis. Our concern is
                        that key stakeholders in headquarters and at overseas
                        posts, as well as members of the in-country site
                        visit teams, expressed concerns about their roles in
                        the 2004 country assessment process, and stated that
                        they had not received enough detail from DHS about
                        the process and the findings. Thus, we recommended
                        that DHS provide transparent protocols to all
                        stakeholders that provide timelines for the entire
                        assessment process, including the role of a site
                        visit, an explanation of the clearance process, and
                        deadlines for completion. We believe it is important
                        that DHS finalize its standard operating procedures,
                        and share these procedures with relevant stakeholders
                        at headquarters and overseas. As we noted in our
                        report, due to the lack of outreach and clear
                        communication about its mission, OIE is limited in
                        its ability to monitor the day-to-day law enforcement
                        and security concerns posed by the Visa Waiver
                        Program, and the U.S. government is limited in its
                        ability to influence visa waiver countries' progress
                        in meeting requirements.
                        7. We strongly agree that classified and sensitive
                        information should be protected. However, we also
                        believe that cleared U.S. officials at overseas posts
                        in Visa Waiver Program countries, including
                        ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission, have a need
                        to know the extent to which law enforcement and
                        security concerns were identified during the mandated
                        biennial reviews, and should receive copies of the
                        final country assessments. Without the appropriate
                        information, such as was contained in the
                        assessments, embassy officials can not be effective
                        agents for the U.S. government with regard to these
                        issues. We believe that the establishment of a
                        classified sharing system that allows U.S. government
                        agencies to access the country assessments is a
                        positive step.
								
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix VI: Comments from the International Criminal Police Organization

           Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  
			  Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or [email protected] .

           Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  In addition to the contact named above, John Brummet, Assistant
           Director; Kathryn H. Bernet, Joseph C. Brown, Joseph Carney,
           Richard Hung, Jane S. Kim, Mary Moutsos, and Jena Sinkfield made
           key contributions to this report.

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1See GAO, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 22, 2002).

2As of June 2006, the reviews of the remaining two participating
countries-Italy and Portugal-were in process.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State Appendix V: Comments
from the Department of State

(320389)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854.

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-854, a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives

July 2006

BORDER SECURITY

Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver
Program

The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the
United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without
obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people entered
the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to enter the
United States became more of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe
the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S.
government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions
taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six
program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures, and reports on
participating countries.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making a series of recommendations to DHS to strengthen its ability
to assess and mitigate the program's risks, such as providing more
resources to the program's monitoring unit and issuing standards for the
reporting of lost and stolen passport data. Congress should also consider
establishing a deadline for the mandated biennial report to Congress.

DHS and State generally agreed with the report. DHS either agreed with, or
said that it would consider, all of our recommendations, but did not agree
that Congress should establish a deadline for the biennial report.

The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks.
It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload,
but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver
travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth
interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are
prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law
violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of
entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of
inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or
lost passport from a visa waiver country.

The U.S. government's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver
Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years,
DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the
program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not
set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the
program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the
2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during
portions of the process, preparation for the in-country site visits was
not consistent, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS
cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing
law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to
insufficient resources.

DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the
U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks.
In particular, the department has not established time frames and
operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting-a program
requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the
reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not
issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most
visa waiver countries participate with Interpol's database, four do not.
DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border
screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the data at
primary inspection.

Visa Waiver Program Admissions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004
*** End of document. ***