Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring (13-SEP-06, GAO-06-852).
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Posture and
Basing Strategy calls for a comprehensive restructuring of U.S.
forces overseas. DOD's planned changes will require billions of
dollars to implement at a time when DOD is supporting operations
in Iraq and realigning domestic bases. As requested, GAO examined
(1) the extent to which DOD has articulated a global posture
strategy that has the characteristics necessary to guide its
efforts and to achieve desired results and (2) the challenges
that could affect DOD's implementation of its strategy and the
mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of its overall
progress in achieving global posture goals.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-852
ACCNO: A60825
TITLE: Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual
Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's
Global Posture Restructuring
DATE: 09/13/2006
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense cost control
Federal agency reorganization
Military bases
Military forces
Performance measures
Program evaluation
Reporting requirements
Strategic forces
Strategic planning
Program implementation
Program goals or objectives
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GAO-06-852
* Results in Brief
* Background
* DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics
* Global Posture Strategy Articulated in Four Principal Docume
* GAO-Identified Characteristics of an Effective National Stra
* DOD Has Not Fully Developed Some Important Strategy Characte
* Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, and Performance M
* Resources, Investments, and Risk Management
* Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination
* Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, an
* Complexity and Sensitivity of Host-Nation Negotiations Conti
* DOD's Estimate of Global Posture-Related Costs Is Uncertain
* Global Posture-Related Costs Were Estimated at $9 Billion to
* Negotiations with Host Nations Contribute to Cost Uncertaint
* Detailed Cost Estimates Not Prepared for the Network of Smal
* Management and Funding Challenges Exist with Establishing th
* No Routine, Comprehensive Mechanism Exists to Report on Prog
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Matter for Congressional Consideration
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: GAO's Identification of the Six Characteristics
* Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
* Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
September 2006
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress
and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring
GAO-06-852
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 6
DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics of an
Effective Strategy in Its Global Basing Strategy Documents 9
Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, and No Routine,
Comprehensive Mechanisms Exist to Report on Progress 18
Conclusions 26
Recommendations for Executive Action 27
Matter for Congressional Consideration 28
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
Appendix I GAO's Identification of the Six Characteristics of an Effective
National Strategy 32
Appendix II Scope and Methodology 38
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 42
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44
Tables
Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents
Identified by DOD 10
Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy 12
Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture Strategy
Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy 14
Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 36
Figure
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility and Areas
Affected by the Global Posture Strategy 8
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense IGPBS Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 13, 2006 September 13, 2006
The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman The Honorable
Solomon P. Ortiz Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
In August 2004, President George W. Bush announced what has been described
as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas
since the end of the Korean War. In his announcement, the president stated
that this restructuring is intended to increase U.S. military capabilities
and combat power in every part of the world, provide service members with
more time at home, reduce the number of moves service members must undergo
over a military career, and significantly reduce the number of overseas
facilities. In August 2004, President George W. Bush announced what has
been described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. In his announcement, the
president stated that this restructuring is intended to increase U.S.
military capabilities and combat power in every part of the world, provide
service members with more time at home, reduce the number of moves service
members must undergo over a military career, and significantly reduce the
number of overseas facilities.
In September 2004, shortly after the president announced this new policy,
the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Report to Congress entitled
Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report outlined DOD's
proposed changes, which were aimed at implementing the president's new
policy and which DOD called the "Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy" (IGPBS). Overall changes involved in this shift in overseas
posture would be significant. For example, DOD plans to transfer home to
American territory up to 70,000 service members and about 100,000 family
members and civilian employees currently living overseas. The 2004 Report
to Congress also described DOD's strategy to transform the U.S. posture
abroad into a network of worldwide locations of three types: main
operating bases, which will be enduring, large sites with permanently
stationed service members and their families; forward operating sites,
which will be smaller but expandable sites that can support rotational
forces; and cooperative security locations, which will be small, rapidly
expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence. According to
DOD's Report to Congress, many advantages would be gained by using this
network of locations. The new U.S. overseas posture is intended to
position U.S. forces to better conduct the Global War on Terrorism, ease
the burden of the post-9/11 operational tempo on members of the armed
forces and their families, and improve the U.S. ability to meet its
alliance commitments while making these alliances more affordable and In
September 2004, shortly after the president announced this new policy, the
Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Report to Congress entitled
Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report outlined DOD's
proposed changes, which were aimed at implementing the president's new
policy and which DOD called the "Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy" (IGPBS). Overall changes involved in this shift in overseas
posture would be significant. For example, DOD plans to transfer home to
American territory up to 70,000 service members and about 100,000 family
members and civilian employees currently living overseas. The 2004 Report
to Congress also described DOD's strategy to transform the U.S. posture
abroad into a network of worldwide locations of three types: main
operating bases, which will be enduring, large sites with permanently
stationed service members and their families; forward operating sites,
which will be smaller but expandable sites that can support rotational
forces; and cooperative security locations, which will be small, rapidly
expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence. According to
DOD's Report to Congress, many advantages would be gained by using this
network of locations. The new U.S. overseas posture is intended to
position U.S. forces to better conduct the Global War on Terrorism, ease
the burden of the post-9/11 operational tempo on members of the armed
forces and their families, and improve the U.S. ability to meet its
alliance commitments while making these alliances more affordable and
sustainable. DOD will be making these global posture changes, which will
entail significant amounts of funding, at a time when it is also
supporting operations in Iraq and implementing other initiatives such as
those approved by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. DOD has
reported to Congress that it will cost $9 billion to $12 billion to
implement the strategy over a period of several years.
In our report on 21st Century challenges facing the federal government, we
cite some of the most urgent issues the Department of Defense must address
as it seeks to meet the demands of the new security environment.1 One of
the issues cited is whether DOD's plans to restructure its overseas
posture provide a significantly improved capability to respond to global
threats in the new security environment, considering diplomatic,
operational, and cost factors. We have also issued reports on DOD's plans
to build new facilities overseas, as reported to Congress in master plans
for overseas infrastructure.2 These reports have discussed the degree to
which the information provided by DOD to Congress on the military
construction costs at overseas locations was complete and reliable, and we
have made recommendations for improvement.
You requested that we assess DOD's efforts to realign its military posture
overseas. Specifically, we examined the following questions: (1) To what
extent has DOD articulated a global posture strategy that addresses the
characteristics necessary to guide its efforts and achieve desired
results? (2) What key challenges, if any, could affect DOD's
implementation of its strategy, and does DOD have mechanisms in place to
inform Congress of its mitigation plans and overall progress in achieving
IGPBS goals?
To determine the extent to which DOD's IGPBS contains all the desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the
content of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents
identified by DOD officials using six desirable characteristics of
effective national strategies we have developed in prior work.3 In this
prior work, we identified a set of desirable characteristics by reviewing
several sources of information, such as the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget
on the President's Management Agenda. We also researched recommendations
from various research organizations that have commented on national
strategies, such as the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution. To
identify key challenges that could affect DOD's implementation of its
strategy, we examined global posture strategy plans, programs, cost
estimates, and other documentation obtained from the geographic combatant
commands, service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and State Department Headquarters. To identify the mechanisms DOD has in
place to inform Congress of its efforts to overcome these challenges and
report on overall progress in achieving the strategy's goals, we reviewed
congressional testimony, briefings prepared for congressional Members and
other organizations, and reports produced as a result of legislative
requirements. We assessed the reliability of the data used in this report
and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
Appendix I provides additional information on the six characteristics of
effective national strategies. Appendix II provides additional information
on our scope and methodology. We conducted our review from November 2004
through January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
1 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
2 GAO, Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans
for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R
(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005).
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated May
2006.4 That report provides additional details on the proposed changes to
the U.S. military posture overseas and specific examples that highlight
the challenges faced by DOD in implementing its strategy.
3 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 3, 2004). In this testimony, we identified the six characteristics of
an effective national strategy as the following: (1) purpose, scope, and
methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals,
objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources,
investments, and risk management; (5) roles, responsibilities, and
coordination; and (6) integration.
4 GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic Reporting
Are Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring, GAO-06-486C (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006).
Results in Brief
The Department of Defense has articulated its strategy to restructure the
U.S. military overseas posture in four principal documents, but the
characteristics of effective national strategies have not been fully
addressed in these documents, which may limit the department's efforts to
implement the strategy and achieve desired results. In prior work, we
identified six characteristics of an effective national strategy that can
assist organizations to develop and implement strategies, to enhance their
usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and to better assure
accountability. DOD's four principal strategy documents for restructuring
overseas presence address three important characteristics of effective
national strategies: the overall purpose and scope of changing the global
military posture, the problems the strategy is intended to address, and
the way the strategy is to be integrated with other related strategies.
However, the following three other important characteristics have been
only partially addressed by the documents:
o Establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, and
performance measures-DOD has not established ways to measure the
extent to which intended improvements in operational effectiveness
or quality of life are occurring.
o Identifying resources, investments, and methods of managing
risk-DOD has not identified sources of funding (for example,
specific appropriations or military services) for the network of
smaller operating locations it plans to establish.
o Defining organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordinating mechanisms-DOD has not identified a process for
resolving conflicting priorities either within DOD or between DOD
and other government organizations, such as the State Department.
Without clearly and fully identifying these elements, the
Secretary of Defense and other stakeholders may be limited in
their ability to demonstrate progress toward achieving DOD's
identified goals, such as improving worldwide response times and
quality of life for service members. Moreover, Congress will lack
assurance that funds allocated to implement the strategy will
produce the benefits DOD intends.
Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the
complexity and uncertainty of the overseas basing restructuring
effort. DOD is taking some steps to address these challenges;
however, many actions are incomplete, and the department has not
established a comprehensive, routine method of informing Congress
on its progress toward addressing these issues or its progress
toward implementing the strategy. Up-to-date and reliable
information on issues such as these is important to Congress and
the Secretary of Defense in helping to shape decisions about
funding policies and defense-related programs. The three
challenges we identified that limit DOD's ability to implement its
IGPBS strategy are the following:
o DOD faces a challenge in determining how to adjust its global
basing strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve.
o DOD faces a challenge in accurately estimating the costs of
implementing the strategy as its plan matures and changes.
o DOD is encountering difficulties in establishing management and
funding responsibilities as it develops its worldwide network of
smaller operating sites.
These issues will continue to make the restructuring of overseas
military posture a dynamic process and contribute to the
uncertainty of the costs and overall progress of the department's
efforts. DOD has not yet established a comprehensive and routine
method of keeping Congress informed of its progress. Reliable and
timely information about the full cost, activities, and outputs of
defense-related programs is important to Congress in making
decisions about allocating resources, authorizing and modifying
programs, and evaluating program performance. Although DOD has
provided a September 2004 Report to Congress on the strategy and
has periodically testified and briefed various Members of Congress
and their staffs, DOD has not established a mechanism for
providing comprehensive and routine reporting of the overall
program status and costs. As a result, Congress may not be fully
informed of DOD's progress and challenges in implementing the
strategy or have a complete understanding of the potential
financial obligations on the horizon.
To facilitate DOD's management of its global basing strategy and
to establish a routine method of keeping Congress informed of
progress in achieving its goals, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense fully address the six characteristics of an
effective national strategy, develop a periodic reporting process
that summarizes important information such as up-to-date costs to
increase the transparency of this process, and address management
and funding issues for new operating locations.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
agreed with our recommendations. However, DOD's response to our
recommendations was unclear in that the department did not cite
any specific actions it planned to take to implement the
recommendations. Specifically, the department did not acknowledge
the need to update its strategy document or to provide Congress
with routine updates on host-nation negotiations and cost. Also,
while DOD emphasized that improving the management and funding of
new operating locations should be synchronized with other DOD
initiatives, it did not indicate how it planned to synchronize
these efforts. As we state in our report, we continue to believe
that the department needs to identify specific actions it will
take to ensure that our recommendations are implemented. Because
DOD's response to our recommendations does not clearly indicate
how it plans to provide comprehensive and routine information to
Congress, we have included a matter for congressional
consideration to suggest that Congress may wish to consider
requiring that DOD report annually on its global posture strategy,
costs, and implementation plans.
Background
In September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
which addresses, among other issues, the need to reorient the U.S.
military global posture. The report called for developing a
permanent basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S.
forces in critical areas of the world as well as providing
temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable
U.S. forces to train and operate in the absence of permanent
ranges and bases.
In April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began
an initiative to explore the issue of U.S. global posture and
presence in more detail.5 OSD developed a broad set of ideas and
assumptions about the strategic environment facing the United
States in the 21st Century, the most critical of which was the
uncertainty facing the United States and its allies in the
post-Cold War world. In May 2003, an integration team was formed
to help guide the IGPBS process. This team was led by OSD Policy
and included officials from the Joint Staff; the Office of the
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation; and the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. This group held working-level and senior-level meetings
that helped steer the early analysis and all the decision
briefings for the Senior Level Review Group and the Senior
Planning Committee.6 In mid-2003, four geographic combatant
commands-the U.S. European, Pacific, Southern, and Central
Commands7-started presenting their proposals, which were reviewed
by the OSD-led integration team. The team evaluated the proposals
against four risk categories.8
In the September 2004 Report to Congress, DOD stated that the
United States had held Ambassadorial-level consultations with over
30 countries on five continents.9 According to DOD, allies stated
that they understood and shared the U.S. general perception of the
need to update its force posture globally to meet 21st Century
challenges. DOD officials also stated that allies expressed their
appreciation for the opportunity to suggest adjustments to U.S.
proposals.
In August 2004, the president announced the proposed restructuring
of the U.S. military posture overseas. As previously discussed, in
September 2004, DOD issued a Report to Congress - Strengthening
U.S. Global Defense Posture, which listed the specific locations
for 87 proposed "changes and continuities" in positioning U.S.
forces worldwide by U.S. combatant command and by country. Figure
1 provides a map of the areas of responsibility for the geographic
combatant commands.
5 The Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
is the DOD lead for IGPBS.
6 The Senior Leader Review Group is composed of the Secretary of Defense,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service Secretaries, and a
select few Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The Senior Planning Committee
is composed of the Senior Leader Review Group plus the combatant
commanders. In December 2003 and January 2004, these two groups had six
meetings during which IGPBS was discussed.
7 The five geographic commands-U.S. Central Command, U.S. European
Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern
Command-are responsible for all U.S. military operations within their
geographic areas of responsibility.
8 The four risk categories were "political-military risk," "force
structure risk," "operational risk," and "cost risk."
9 In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the
United States visited "over 20 countries."
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility and Areas
Affected by the Global Posture Strategy
aThe state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's area of
responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, remain assigned to the
U.S. Pacific Command.
DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics of an Effective
Strategy in Its Global Basing Strategy Documents
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four key documents but
has not addressed all of the characteristics of effective national
strategies, which may limit its ability to guide implementation efforts
and achieve desired results. In prior work, we identified six
characteristics of an effective national strategy that can aid
organizations to develop and implement their strategies, to enhance their
usefulness in resource and policy making, and to better assure
accountability.10 DOD has generally addressed three of these
characteristics, for example, the overall purpose and scope of this
effort, but the documents only partially address three other
characteristics. Specifically, DOD does not (1) establish performance
measures such as ways to measure the extent to which intended improvements
in operational effectiveness or quality of life are occurring, (2)
identify sources of funding for the network of smaller operating locations
it plans to establish, or (3) identify a process for resolving conflicting
priorities either within DOD or between DOD and other government
organizations. In addition, the dispersion of the strategy in a collection
of documents and briefings limits its overall clarity. Without clearly and
effectively addressing the desirable characteristics that would shape the
policies, programs, priorities, and resource allocations in a single
document, DOD and other stakeholders may be limited in their ability to
implement the strategies and to demonstrate progress in achieving the
identified goals.
Global Posture Strategy Articulated in Four Principal Documents
Officials in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Strategy (OSD/Strategy) identified four documents that they believe
are key to describing the global defense posture strategy: (1) the
Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms of Reference
(June 2001); (2) the National Security Strategy of the United States
(September 2002); (3) Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report to
Congress (September 2004); and (4) the National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America (March 2005). Table 1 describes these four
documents and how they relate to the U.S. global defense posture.
10 GAO-04-408T .
Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents
Identified by DOD
Strategy document Description of strategy
September 2001 Quadrennial The Quadrennial Defense Review and its Terms of
Defense Review and its Reference provide a broad framework for guiding
June 2001 Terms of the development of U.S. forces and
Reference capabilities. The Quadrennial Defense Review
also describes DOD's current security
Issued by the Secretary of environment, defense strategy, changes in force
Defense planning, transformation of operations and
capabilities, and a risk management framework.
The Quadrennial Defense Review also devotes one
section to reorienting the U.S. global defense
posture to focus on new challenges the military
will face, new ways to deter conflict, plans to
place forces in forward areas to respond to
threats, goals to reorient global defense
posture, and general activities that each of
the military services should take to address
those goals.
September 2002 National The National Security Strategy provides a broad
Security Strategy of the framework for strengthening U.S. security in
United States the future. It identifies the national security
goals of the United States, describes the
Issued by the President foreign policy and military capabilities
necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the
current status of these capabilities, and
explains how national power will be structured
to utilize these capabilities. The strategy
highlights the need but does not provide
specific guidance on how to reorient DOD's
global defense posture.
September 2004 The Report to Congress on Strengthening U.S.
Strengthening U.S. Global Global Posture identifies the reasons for the
Posture -Report to restructuring and defines the key elements of
Congress global posture as relationships, activities,
facilities, legal arrangements, and global
Issued by the Under sourcing and surge. It also describes the key
Secretary of Defense for objectives for changing the U.S. global defense
Policy posture, provides a region-by-region synopsis
of those changes, and highlights diplomatic
relationships and interactions with Congress.
Further, it provides a rough order of magnitude
cost estimate and describes how the
restructuring is integrated with DOD's Base
Realignment and Closure process.
March 2005 National The National Defense Strategy provides a
Defense Strategy of the general planning framework for DOD to address
United States of America current and future defense challenges. The
strategy describes U.S. defense strategic
Issued by the Secretary of objectives, actions to accomplish these
Defense objectives, and implementation guidance for
strategic planning and decision making. It
devotes one section to the key aspects of
reorienting the U.S. global defense posture,
which were outlined in the 2004 Report to
Congress.
Source: GAO.
In addition to these four principal documents, OSD officials stated that
congressional testimonies and briefings, the military service
implementation plans, budget documents, senior-level review board
meetings, and the overseas master plans provide additional details on
DOD's strategy and plans.
GAO-Identified Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy
In our February 2004 testimony related to combating terrorism, we
identified six desirable characteristics of effective national
strategies.11 In our testimony, we reported that there are no legislative
or executive mandates identifying a single, consistent set of
characteristics for all national strategies. Given that there is no such
mandate, we identified a set of desirable characteristics by reviewing
several sources of information. For example, we consulted the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature on strategic
planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of Management and
Budget on the President's Management Agenda. In addition, we studied our
past reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining
to desirable elements of a national strategy. Similarly, we researched
recommendations from various research organizations that have commented on
national strategies, such as the ANSER Institute on Homeland Security, the
RAND Corporation, and the Brookings Institution. Table 2 provides a
summary of the six characteristics we identified.
11 GAO-04-408T .
Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy
Desirable Characteristic Description
Purpose, scope, and methodology Addresses why the strategy was produced,
the scope of its coverage, and the process
by which it was developed.
Problem definition and risk Discusses the particular national problems
assessment and threats the strategy is intended to
address.
Goals, subordinate objectives, Addresses what the national strategy
activities, and performance strives to achieve and the steps needed to
measures garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and performance
measures to gauge results.
Resources, investments, and Addresses what the strategy will cost, the
risk management sources and types of resources and
investments needed, and where those
resources and investments should be
targeted.
Organizational roles, Addresses what organizations will
responsibilities, and implement the strategy, their roles and
coordination responsibilities, mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts, and a process
for resolving conflicts.
Integration Addresses how a national strategy relates
to other strategic goals, objectives, and
activities.
Source: GAO.
Notes: See GAO-04-408T . Our prior work identified the sixth
characteristic as "integration and implementation." For the purposes of
this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the four
principal strategy documents addressed "implementation" because our second
reporting objective addresses challenges associated with implementation in
more detail.
In our prior testimony, we stated that a clearly defined set of desirable
characteristics would aid responsible parties in further developing and
implementing their strategies, in enhancing their usefulness in resource
and policy decisions, and in better assuring accountability. Although the
authors of national strategies might organize these characteristics in a
variety of ways and use different terms, we present them in this order
because we believe that they flow logically from conception to
implementation. Specifically, the strategy's purpose leads to specific
actions for tackling those problems and risks, allocating and managing the
appropriate resources, identifying different organizations' roles and
responsibilities, and integrating actions taken by all relevant parties
implementing the strategy. See appendix I for additional details on these
characteristics, and see appendix II for our scope and methodology in
developing them.
DOD Has Not Fully Developed Some Important Strategy Characteristics
In the four principal global posture strategy documents discussed above,
DOD generally addresses three of the desirable characteristics to guide
the overseas posture initiatives. Specifically, DOD addresses the overall
purpose and scope for changing its global posture, the problems and
threats its strategy is directed against, and how the strategy will be
integrated with those of other governmental organizations. However, the
four principal strategy documents only partially address aspects of three
other important characteristics of an effective national strategy,
including (1) milestones and outcome-related performance measures, such as
tools to gauge the extent to which intended improvements in operational
effectiveness or quality of life are occurring; (2) sources of funding and
types of resources; and (3) a description of how conflicts will be
resolved. According to our methodology, a strategy "addresses" a
characteristic when it explicitly cites all elements of a characteristic,
even if it lacks specificity and details and thus could be improved upon.
A strategy "partially addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites
some but not all elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of
"partially addresses," there is a wide variation between a strategy that
addresses most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that
addresses few of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy "does not
address" a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are either
too vague or too general.12 Table 3 summarizes the extent to which the
principal global posture strategy documents collectively address,
partially address, or do not address the six characteristics.
12 See app. II for more details on our methodology.
Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture Strategy
Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy
Extent to which
Desirable characteristic is
characteristic addressed Description
Purpose, scope, and Addressed The stated purpose of the
methodology strategy is to reorient the
current global defense posture
to meet the threats of the new
strategic environment. Key
terms were defined, such as
global posture, main operating
bases, forward operating sites,
and cooperative security
locations. The key elements
that guided the development of
the strategy include strengths,
vulnerabilities, opportunities,
and challenges that DOD faces
in the 21st Century.
Problem definition and Addressed The strategy is intended to
risk assessment address a combination of
changes in U.S. forces'
operating patterns, advances in
military capabilities, and an
increasingly uncertain global
security environment, in
particular the threat of
terrorism. Risks were discussed
as traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive.
Goals, subordinate Partially addressed The overall goal articulated by
objectives, the strategy is to strengthen
activities, and U.S. global defense posture
performance measures while providing U.S. service
members and their family
members with more
predictability and stability.
Subordinate objectives include
expanding allied roles and
building new security
partnerships, developing
rapidly deployable
capabilities, and positively
affecting service members and
their families. The activities
are identified by a list of
specific initiatives DOD
intends to implement. The
strategy does not address,
however, milestones and
outcome-related performance
measures (such as metrics to
demonstrate improvements in
operational response times or
in quality of life for service
members) that would identify
progress in achieving the
stated goals and objectives.
Resources, Partially addressed The cost to implement the
investments, and risk strategy was estimated at $9
management billion to $12 billion, but
there were no detailed
estimates, such as costs for
each global posture initiative
or costs incurred by the
military services, to support
that estimate. The strategy
does not address sources of
funding, types of resources, or
a mechanism to prioritize and
allocate resources. Further,
there is no discussion of the
timing of how the initiatives
will be funded over the next
decade. (We discuss the
uncertainty and understatement
of the reported estimate in
more detail later in the
report.)
Organizational roles, Partially addressed In the strategy, DOD is
responsibilities, and assigned the lead role and
coordination responsibility for strategy
implementation and
accountability. The military
services were assigned lead and
supporting roles and
responsibilities to implement
specific initiatives. DOD
coordinates the implementation
of the strategy with the
Department of State. However,
the strategy does not describe
a process for how conflicts
will be resolved within and
outside of DOD. (For example,
the documents do not describe a
process that would resolve
interagency conflicts.)
Integration Addressed According to the strategy, the
global posture strategy helped
inform DOD's 2004 Base
Realignment and Closure
process.
Source: GAO analysis.
The following is a more detailed discussion of the characteristics that
are partially addressed in the key documents we examined.
Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures
The global posture strategy addresses its goals, subordinate objectives,
and activities, but performance measures are not developed. Specifically,
the overall end-state of the global defense strategy is to strengthen
DOD's global defense posture while providing U.S. service members and
their families with more predictability and stability over the course of a
military career. The overarching defense policy goals are to assure allies
and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats and
coercion against U.S. interests; and decisively defeat any adversary if
deterrence fails. Subordinate objectives related to global posture include
(1) expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships; (2)
creating greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing
agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few
locations; (3) focusing within and across regions by complementing
regional military presence with the capability to respond quickly to a
location across the world; and (4) developing rapidly deployable
capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that forces will
not likely fight where they are stationed. The Report to Congress -
Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture provides a general description
of activities within each geographic region as well as a detailed list of
specific IGPBS initiatives, many of which require discussions and
negotiations with host nations.
The principal strategy documents did not address milestones and
outcome-related performance measures. For example, the 2004 Report to
Congress highlighted the positive effect on service members and their
dependents as a key strategy goal but did not identify related performance
measures to gauge how the quality-of-life goal would be achieved. Also,
the global posture strategy identified the development of rapidly
deployable capabilities and the improvement of operational flexibility as
subordinate objectives but did not identify related performance measures.
Furthermore, officials at the Pacific Command, the European Command, the
Central Command, the Southern Command, the Special Operations Command, and
the military service headquarters told us that they had not conducted
detailed analysis, including performance metrics, to support how quality
of life or operational capabilities would be improved by implementing the
global posture strategy.13
Resources, Investments, and Risk Management
The 2004 Report to Congress estimated rough order of magnitude costs to
implement the strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over the 2006-2011
future years defense program. (We discuss the uncertainty and
understatement of the reported estimate in more detail later in this
report.) However, the 2004 Report did not provide any details beyond this
overall estimate, such as costs for each global posture initiative or
costs incurred by the military services, to support the reported estimate.
Further, the principal strategy documents did not identify sources of
funding, such as military service or combatant command funds; types of
resources, such as military construction or operations and maintenance
funds; or a mechanism to allocate resources. OSD officials told us that
information related to the sources of funding and types of resources and
investments is contained in the regional combatant commands' overseas
master plans and does not need to be included in the principal strategy
documents because it would be duplicative. However, in prior work, we
reported that overseas master plans do not provide a definitive picture of
future U.S. funding requirements, particularly for future locations.14 In
addition, there is no discussion in the principal strategy documents of
when the initiatives will be funded over the next decade. OSD officials
told us that DOD had programmed about $3.9 billion to implement the global
posture strategy in the 2006-2011 future years defense program and that
the services will program additional funds in the fiscal year 2008 budget
submission as initiatives move toward implementation. Regarding risk
management, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review's Terms of Reference
generally identified overall defense priorities for investment in areas
such as people, intelligence, precision strike, rapidly deployable
maneuver forces, and infrastructure and logistics. However, these
priorities are not sufficient to determine how DOD will manage the cost
risk associated with implementing the global restructuring, such as the
potential for cost estimates to change and for unexpected costs to be
incurred without sufficient time to budget for them and to make
appropriate tradeoffs with other competing DOD demands.
13 According to an OSD official, OSD compared the current global defense
posture with the future desired global defense posture to determine the
effect of these planned changes on response times. The OSD analysis
indicated that response times for the larger-sized forces would not be
substantially improved. Improvements could be expected, however, in
response times for the deployment of smaller, more mobile forces, such as
special operations forces. This information was not contained in the
strategy documents.
14 Specifically, the master plans only provide information on U.S. funding
sources for military construction costs.
Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination
The global posture strategy addresses which organizations will implement
the strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and a mechanism for
parties to coordinate their efforts. For example, the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review assigned lead responsibilities to each of the services to
plan and implement specific global posture initiatives. Regarding
coordination, the 2004 Report to Congress identifies a process for
coordinating DOD's global posture strategy with the 2005 Base Realignment
and Closure Commission's relocation of service members and dependents from
overseas locations to the United States. The 2004 Report to Congress also
describes coordination with the State Department regarding consultations
with host nations. For example, in the 2004 Report, DOD states that it had
consulted closely with the Department of State, especially with regard to
the diplomatic arrangements needed to secure the desired changes in
foreign countries.
The global posture strategy does not address, however, a process for how
conflicts will be resolved either within DOD or between DOD and other
government organizations. While the Secretary of Defense can resolve
conflicting priorities within the Department of Defense, the four
documents do not describe how interagency conflicts will be resolved if
they arise during the strategy's implementation.
DOD officials agreed that the six characteristics of an effective national
strategy were not fully addressed in the four documents we reviewed but
pointed out that there are other documents, such as the March 2004
Strategic Planning Guidance, the June 2004 Joint Programming Guidance, and
the overseas master plans, that contain additional information on some of
the identified characteristics. We reviewed these supporting documents and
others, such as combatant command proposals, and found that they
individually or collectively did not fully address the desired
characteristics. For example, none of these additional documents provided
outcome-related performance measures or described a process for how
conflicts will be resolved either within DOD or between DOD and other
government organizations. Moreover, while it may be true that alternative
documents in the department may help it manage this effort, we believe
that relying on numerous documents written by different organizations at
different points in time underscores the lack of clarity in how the
strategy is articulated and reduces the overall effectiveness of these
management tools.
Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, and No Routine,
Comprehensive Mechanisms Exist to Report on Progress
Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the complexity and
uncertain outcome of the overseas basing restructuring effort. DOD has
taken some steps to address these challenges, but many actions are
incomplete, and the department has not established a comprehensive,
routine method of informing Congress of its progress in addressing these
issues or the overall results of its efforts to implement the strategy.
The three challenges include (1) determining how to adjust the global
basing strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve; (2) accurately
estimating the cost of implementing the strategy as DOD's plans evolve;
and (3) assigning management and funding responsibilities for establishing
and maintaining DOD's planned network of worldwide locations. These issues
will continue to make the restructuring of overseas military posture a
dynamic process and contribute to the uncertainty of the global posture
strategy's end-state. Despite this uncertainty and the changing nature of
DOD's global posture plans, DOD has not established a comprehensive and
routine method of informing Congress of adjustments to its plans and
estimated overall costs. Department officials we spoke with believe that
current reporting mechanisms such as testimonies and briefings to Members
of Congress are adequate in keeping Congress informed of their efforts and
that no additional formal reporting mechanisms are needed. The Congress,
however, has expressed concern over the information it receives on the
global posture strategy and recently required DOD to provide additional
information in several areas, such as the status of host-nation agreements
and funding for critical infrastructure at new locations. These collective
reporting requirements, however, do not provide a comprehensive and
routine representation of the overall status of DOD's efforts. Without
such information, Congress may not be fully informed and remain abreast of
changes in military capabilities, relationships with U.S. partners and
allies, and future financial requirements.
Complexity and Sensitivity of Host-Nation Negotiations Continue to Alter Planned
Moves
One challenge in the implementation of DOD's global posture strategy
relates to the need to adjust the pace and scope of DOD's announced
restructuring as negotiations with host nations evolve. Before the United
States can establish a U.S. presence in a host country, many complex and
critical legal arrangements must be made between the two countries. The
time it takes to finalize these agreements can vary from days or months to
years; involves close coordination between DOD, the Department of State,
and host nation governments; and frequently involves having the countries'
legislative bodies formalize the agreements. The arrangements typically
cover issues of interest to DOD, such as U.S. forces' access to training
areas, U.S. forces' ability to conduct operations and deploy from the
countries where they are located, and arrangements with the host nations
for sharing the costs of maintaining these locations. The types of
provisions found in these legal arrangements include access/use
provisions, status provisions, and general provisions on cooperation.
Many of the initiatives identified in the September 2004 Report to
Congress have already been changed, are still being negotiated with the
host countries, or have been put on hold until DOD can ascertain whether
negotiations will allow U.S. forces the access they need. These changes
sometimes involve significant political sensitivities and large amounts of
investment by the United States and the host countries. If one of DOD's
proposed initiatives must be changed, corresponding changes may need to be
made to DOD's overall IGPBS plans to accommodate the new conditions. The
classified version of this report provides specific examples that
illustrate how sensitive DOD's overall IGPBS plans are to negotiations
with individual host countries.
DOD's Estimate of Global Posture-Related Costs Is Uncertain and May Be
Understated
In September 2004, DOD estimated one-time, nonrecurring costs to implement
the global posture strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over the fiscal
year 2006-2011 future years defense program. However, significant cost
uncertainties still remain, and the cost to implement the strategy may be
understated. In some cases, host-nation negotiations have necessitated
adjustments to initial plans and estimated costs. In other cases, the
services did not prepare detailed cost estimates for the network of
smaller operating locations because limited planning had been done at the
time the estimates were submitted. Because the costs of implementing IGPBS
may be higher than what is now reported, the services may be forced to
make difficult funding tradeoffs when the actual costs are identified, or
Congress may be required to allocate more resources to implement IGPBS
than what are now expected.
Global Posture-Related Costs Were Estimated at $9 Billion to $12 Billion
In 2004, DOD estimated costs of $9 billion to $12 billion to implement its
global posture strategy. DOD's estimate of the cost of implementing its
global posture strategy was based on a cost methodology developed by the
Office of the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation. This office
distributed the methodology to the services to use in estimating initial
one-time nonrecurring global posture-related costs to the United States in
the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program. DOD grouped these
costs into three categories: (1) costs related to vacating current
facilities, such as the cost of environmental cleanup; (2) costs of
transporting equipment, personnel, and families; and (3) costs related to
the facilities that would be receiving personnel, including the
construction of new facilities, the renovation of old facilities, and the
establishment of new leases. The methodology also sought to estimate
savings from the closure or consolidation of facilities and operations.
The estimate excludes burden-sharing contributions by host nations because
cost-sharing agreements generally had not been completed when the report
was issued in September 2004. An OSD official told us that the reported
cost estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion represents a reasonable range
of the projected costs. Further, the costs are dynamic and continually
refined over time as better data becomes available. For example, OSD
officials stated that since the September 2004 reported estimate, DOD has
included recurring costs when they have been available. The new estimated
costs reflect the difference between the current recurring costs and
future recurring costs. OSD officials pointed out that, despite the cost
estimate's evolution, it has continued to stay within the $9 billion to
$12 billion range over the past 2 years. They also stated that, though the
$9 billion to $12 billion was estimated to be spent during the years
covered by the future years defense plan (2007-11), adjustments might
require that global posture moves be paid for in years further into the
future.
Negotiations with Host Nations Contribute to Cost Uncertainty
Negotiations between the United States and host nations contribute to cost
uncertainty because they will determine, among other things, specific
locations where U.S. forces will have a presence and the nature of that
presence. This information is critical to developing detailed cost
estimates. In addition, cost-sharing agreements will determine the
financial responsibilities of host nations and the United States, which
will also be critical to estimate accurately the cost of implementing the
global posture strategy. Until negotiations between the United States and
host nations are completed, there will be significant uncertainty with the
reported estimates of IGPBS initiatives, and costs may be understated.15
The classified version of this report provides specific examples of cases
in which host-nation negotiations may significantly alter the initially
planned costs.
15 According to DOD officials, the amount of burden-sharing that the
United States can expect varies widely by country and by type of operating
location. Also, in countries where smaller operating sites are located,
the United States will not be using military construction funds to build
large-scale family support infrastructure.
Detailed Cost Estimates Not Prepared for the Network of Smaller Operating
Locations
There is uncertainty regarding the estimated costs for the network of
smaller operating locations16 partly due to limited planning at the time
the estimate was reported in September 2004. For example, because precise
estimates had not been developed for all cooperative security locations in
the plan, DOD used a rough order of magnitude estimate in the $9 billion
to $12 billion estimate to cover the cost of these locations. In addition,
it is unclear what the comprehensive costs for all forward operating sites
anticipated in the strategy will be.
Two factors primarily contributed to the limited planning for smaller
operating locations and their cost estimates. First, senior DOD leadership
had decided to first concentrate its planning efforts on initiatives that
involved moving large numbers of forces around the world, such as
returning the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions from Germany to the
continental United States. Second, the services generally had not
conducted site surveys, partly because negotiations with host nations were
in the early stages and the services were often reluctant to fund low-use
sites, according to an OSD official. Site surveys are critical to
developing comprehensive cost estimates but depend on specialists'
visiting and assessing the current state of facilities at given locations.
Management and Funding Challenges Exist with Establishing the Network of
Operating Locations
The third challenge that creates uncertainty about the status of the
global posture strategy involves difficulties DOD is encountering in
establishing management and funding responsibilities and synchronizing
service priorities as it develops its planned network of smaller operating
locations. Specifically, although combatant commanders have developed a
plan for assigning executive agent responsibilities for each of these
locations to individual services, some services are reluctant to assume
"host" status for these locations because of the potential funding
responsibilities they may entail. The department has recognized that new
funding mechanisms may be needed to overcome this issue and is examining
alternative ways of addressing this issue. Similar challenges have arisen
in cases where a service operates a base used jointly by other military
services. The classified version of this report provides examples of
challenges the services have encountered in managing and funding what are
envisioned to be multiservice sites.
16 Forward operating sites are planned to be smaller but expandable sites
that can support rotational forces, whereas cooperative security locations
are planned to be small, rapidly expandable sites with little or no
permanent U.S. presence.
In prior work, we have reported on long-standing challenges DOD has faced
at military installations managed by one service but used by multiple
services.17 For example, in late 2004, DOD formed a Senior Joint Basing
Group to address installation management issues, such as problems
involving support agreements where one service is a tenant on an
installation operated by another service. A lack of common definitions
among the services can lead to differing expectations for base operating
support services, and it obscures a full understanding of the funding that
is required for these support services. The working group planned to
develop common definitions and DOD-wide standards, metrics, and
reimbursement and costing rules for base operating services and programs
of all military services. DOD completed a base operations assessment study
in March 2005 and funded an extensive cross-department initiative to
develop definitions for the common delivery of installation services.
Similarly, in recognition of funding issues at joint use bases, the Joint
Governance Working Group of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review Committee
is responsible for developing alternatives for prioritizing and funding
joint projects18 desired by the combatant commanders. One option envisions
that the Deputy Secretary of Defense will have the authority to assign
"executive agency" or "host" status for joint locations to the military
services. Any military construction projects for these locations would be
vetted through a Joint Infrastructure Working Group that will qualify and
accept the projects, validate the project plans, prioritize the projects,
and recommend funding levels. It is envisioned that a joint funding
mechanism would be used to fund these projects either directly or on a
reimbursable basis. Officials initially hoped that a process for assigning
responsibility for managing overseas operating sites that benefit more
than one service would be finalized during the Quadrennial Defense Review.
However, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued in February 2006 did
not identify a solution, and the issue is still unresolved. As a result,
it is not clear whether or how the services will plan for costs associated
with these sites in preparing upcoming budget submissions.
17 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing
and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).
18 In this context, "joint" is applied when combatant commanders have an
interest in the project for the good of the joint force, but no single
service has a major interest. "Joint" projects traditionally fare poorly
under standard service rating schemes for determining funding priority
because they do not directly support the service's daily activities.
Projects eligible for being considered "joint" include joint command
headquarters buildings, some en route infrastructure (generally overseas),
and designated joint forward operating sites and cooperative security
locations.
No Routine, Comprehensive Mechanism Exists to Report on Progress Toward
Achieving Strategy Goals
Reliable and timely information on the full costs, activities, and outputs
of federal programs is important to Congress and the Secretary of Defense
in making decisions about allocating resources, authorizing and modifying
programs, and evaluating program performance. In some cases, DOD has
established mechanisms to provide routine reporting on program status and
performance information for large-scale, complex efforts. For example, DOD
determined that a new initiative to improve stability operations
capabilities was important enough to require, among other things, a
semiannual report to the Secretary of Defense that includes identifying
performance metrics and evaluating progress made in achieving the stated
policy goals.19 This type of reporting mechanism can provide the Secretary
of Defense with timely information to shape decisions about authorizing
and modifying programs and evaluating program performance.
In contrast, DOD has a more fragmented approach to provide Congress with
information on selected aspects of the global posture restructuring
effort. In June 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy testified
before the House Armed Services Committee on the Integrated Global Posture
and Basing Strategy, preceding the president's announcement of the
strategy. This testimony was followed by the September 2004 Report to
Congress - Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. The Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of the
regional commands have also testified before some congressional
committees. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it
had provided "over 40 briefings to the Hill" on its global basing
strategy. According to OSD/Strategy officials, the department believes
that these existing reporting mechanisms provide Congress with sufficient
information on the status of the restructuring effort.
However, the Senate Committee on Appropriations has expressed concern
about the use of military construction budget authority and has directed
DOD to provide information on various aspects of the global posture
strategy. The Senate report to the fiscal year 2004 military construction
appropriations bill20 required those plans to identify precise facility
requirements and the status of properties being returned to host nations.
The report also states that the plan should identify funding requirements
as well as the division of funding responsibilities between the United
States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report directed us to
monitor the master plans developed and implemented for the overseas
regional commands and to provide congressional defense committees with
annual assessment reports. Additionally, the House conference report
accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation
bill21 directed DOD to prepare comprehensive master plans for overseas
military infrastructure and provide them with its fiscal year 2006 budget
submission with yearly updates on the status of those plans and their
implementation with annual military construction budget submissions
through fiscal year 2009.
19 In a November 2005 Directive, DOD identified stability operations as a
core U.S. mission that is to be given priority comparable to combat
operations and specifically addressed and integrated across all DOD
activities. DOD defines stability operations as "military and civilian
activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to
establish or maintain order in States and regions."
In addition, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States was created by Congress in the Military
Construction Appropriations Act of 2004 and was required to report on its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislation by August 15,
2005.22 The Commission provided Congress with a report that contained
several conclusions.23 For example, the Commission stated that Congress
should provide more rigorous oversight (including hearings) of the global
basing process, given the scope and impact of DOD's rebasing plans.
Particular attention, the Commission believed, should be paid to the
timing, synchronization, and cost of all the related efforts. The
Commission was also concerned about the costs associated with IGPBS and
whether budgetary forecasts had adequately addressed the investments that
will be required to meet the implementation timelines set for fiscal years
2006-2011. Furthermore, the Commission expressed great concern on
quality-of-life issues and their ultimate impact on DOD's ability to
maintain a volunteer force. For example, the Commission stated that DOD
should further analyze what the impact would be on a volunteer force of
frequently lengthy peacetime rotations abroad.
20 S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
21 H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342, at 17 (2003).
22 Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-132, S:
128 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-324, S: 127 (2004)).
23 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the
United States, Report to the President of the United States, August 15,
2005.
Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directs
the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on specified global basing
issues by no later than March 30, 2006.24 The Act states that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, shall develop criteria for assessing, with respect to
three kinds of facilities25 to be located in a foreign country, several
factors,26 as well as develop a mechanism for analyzing overseas basing
alternatives, incorporating factors (1) through (5) referenced in footnote
26. The act also directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to
congressional defense committees, not later than 30 days after an
agreement is made, a written notification of agreements with a foreign
country to support the deployment of elements of U.S. forces in that
country.
We believe that the current reporting requirements, while providing
Congress with significant information on some aspects of the global
posture strategy, do not provide a periodic mechanism through which DOD's
progress in achieving the overall goals and objectives of the strategy can
be reported. For example, none of the reporting requirements addresses the
extent to which DOD will achieve its strategic goals, such as expanding
allied roles, providing service members with more time at home, developing
greater operational flexibility, or developing rapidly deployable
capabilities. In addition, DOD's master plans provide annual information
on expected military construction costs, but none of the reports provides
Congress with complete and up-to-date information on the total costs to
implement the global restructuring, including operations and maintenance
costs. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 only provides for a one-time report to the Congress on aspects of the
plan, written notification of host-nation agreements once they are
concluded, and information regarding the funding sources for the
establishment, operation, and sustainment of the main operating bases,
forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations as an element
of the annual budget request. As a result, Congress will not have a clear
understanding of the extent to which global posture objectives are being
achieved or whether resources are being efficiently and effectively
applied.
24 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, S: 1233 (2006).
25 These facilities are main operating bases, forward operating sites, and
cooperative security locations.
26 Factors these criteria should address include (1) the effect of any new
basing arrangement on DOD's strategic mobility requirements, (2) the
ability of U.S. forces deployed to overseas locations in areas to which
forces have not traditionally been deployed to meet mobility response
times required by operational plans, (3) the cost of deploying units
overseas to the locations required in (2) on a rotational basis, (4) the
strategic benefit of rotational deployments through countries with which
the United States is developing a close or new security relationship, (5)
whether the relative speed and complexity of conducting negotiations in a
particular country is a discriminator in the decision to deploy U.S.
forces in a country, (6) the appropriateness and availability of funding
mechanisms for the establishment, operation, and sustainment of specific
facilities referenced in footnote 25, (7) the effect of proposed
unaccompanied deployments of new units to new facilities in overseas
locations on quality of life, and (8) other criteria as the Secretary of
Defense determines appropriate.
Conclusions
Restructuring the U.S. military presence overseas is a complex and dynamic
process that will require a significant investment in resources, time, and
commitment by military and civilian leaders. The goals of this effort-a
repositioning of U.S. military forces to enhance warfighting capabilities,
quality of life for service men and women, and alliances with host nations
while reducing overall costs to the American taxpayer-are important to the
successful execution of the Global War on Terror and the transformation of
the Department of Defense. Accomplishing these goals efficiently and
effectively will require a comprehensive strategy, periodic review and
evaluation of progress, and a mechanism to communicate program status to
key decision makers and Congress. To its credit, the department has
recognized the importance and need to change the overseas military
presence and has begun to articulate a strategy to achieve this goal, but
we have highlighted key characteristics of effective strategies that the
department has not fully addressed. For example, the department has not
established results-oriented performance measures and therefore is not in
a position to demonstrate whether the actions it takes to change overseas
presence are in fact achieving its goals in the most efficient and
effective manner.
The challenges DOD faces in implementing this strategy, as discussed in
this report, add to the uncertainty of the costs and potential outcomes of
DOD's efforts, and current reporting mechanisms will not give Congress
routine and comprehensive information to facilitate effective oversight.
DOD is challenged to develop complete and accurate cost estimates because
ongoing negotiations with host nations will significantly influence the
planned moves and burden-sharing between the United States and host
nations. The challenges the department faces in establishing operating
locations that may be jointly used by more than one service, yet funded by
a single service through the traditional budget process, are delaying the
establishment of these locations, which are the backbone of the new
strategy. These and other uncertainties, while understandable considering
the magnitude and complexity of the changes underway, present a
significant challenge to the Department of Defense to effectively manage.
Similarly, Congress is presented with the challenge of conducting
oversight responsibilities and allocating resources over the long term
with incomplete information, while the program matures and more refined
estimates of cost, operational capabilities, and other aspects of overseas
presence are developed. Without a routine reporting mechanism that can
clearly communicate the extent to which these uncertainties exist and,
more importantly when they are resolved, Congress may not have the
information it needs as it evaluates and prioritizes these requirements
with other aspects of government operations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate DOD's management and implementation of its global basing
strategy and to establish a clear and routine method of informing Congress
of significant changes to the strategy and progress in achieving its
goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
o Develop an updated strategy document that includes the six
characteristics of an effective national strategy as discussed in
this report, including performance measures and metrics for
assessing progress in achieving stated goals.
o Summarize the status of host-nation negotiations and annually
update DOD's global basing strategy to reflect changes resulting
from these negotiations.
o Periodically update DOD's estimate of the total cost to
implement the global basing strategy and identify the extent to
which these costs are included in DOD's future years defense
program.
o Establish a process to prioritize, assign management
responsibility for, and fund the network of operating locations
DOD is planning.
o Develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes to
Congress the above information, includes progress in achieving
performance goals, and complements but does not duplicate
information contained in DOD's annual comprehensive master plans
for overseas military infrastructure.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
The Congress should consider requiring that DOD report annually on
the status and costs of its plans to implement global basing
initiatives to ensure that it has more comprehensive and routine
information to guide it in overseeing this important effort.
Congress may wish to require that DOD include in such a report all
the elements of an effective national strategy-such as performance
metrics-as well as the status of host-nation negotiations, the
evolving costs of global posture initiatives, and a process for
assigning management responsibility for operating and funding the
locations DOD is planning in its worldwide network of sites.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
agreed with our five recommendations. (DOD's comments appear in
their entirety in app. III of this report.) However, the
department did not describe what actions, if any, it plans to take
to implement our recommendations. Because DOD's response is vague
and ambiguous in describing its planned actions, we have added a
matter for congressional consideration that the Congress require
DOD to report annually on its global posture strategy, costs, and
implementation.
In overall comments on the report, DOD pointed out that the
information we present represents snapshots at different points in
time on the status of negotiations, cost estimates, and force
posture changes. As we discuss in the report, this information has
been in constant flux since it was summarized in DOD's Report to
Congress in September 2004. To clarify the report, we have added
additional dates to our discussions of changes to the global
posture strategy. DOD also stated that it did not believe that
"creating new formal processes for decision-making and assessment"
was called for in implementing its global posture strategy. In our
recommendations, we are not suggesting that DOD create new formal
processes for decision making and assessment. We are recommending
that DOD add a formal and regular reporting requirement to
communicate to Congress on the implementation of DOD's global
posture strategy so that Congress will be kept more fully
informed.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an updated strategy
document that contains all six characteristics of an effective
national strategy, DOD agreed that the strategy framework we
suggested may serve as a helpful tool for the future. However, it
stated that it is unnecessary to update its global posture
strategy at this point in time. DOD also stated that its September
2004 Report to Congress was not intended to serve as a formal,
comprehensive management mechanism for posture changes. We
continue to believe that developing a comprehensive, single,
consolidated strategy document with all six characteristics of an
effective national strategy would be useful for DOD in managing
the complex, long-term effort that its global posture strategy
represents. At present, some elements of such a management tool
are contained in different, isolated documents, and other elements
of an effective strategy are not articulated at all. We believe
that such a comprehensive, consolidated strategy document will not
only allow DOD to more effectively manage its future
implementation of the strategy but also could become a basis for
satisfying the periodic reporting process we are recommending in
this report.
In response to our second recommendation-that DOD summarize the
status of host-nation negotiations and annually update its global
strategy to reflect changes resulting from these negotiations-DOD
believes that its current reporting requirements on host-nation
agreements after they have been signed are sufficient. DOD also
states that changes are reported in combatant commanders' master
plans and in service implementation plans. We agree that DOD is
not currently required to report to Congress on the status of
host-nation agreements until after they have been entered into.
However, we believe that Congress should be kept apprised of the
status of host-nation negotiations as they evolve because the
resulting agreements could involve significant commitments of U.S.
resources to other countries and have foreign policy implications.
We acknowledge that combatant commanders' master plans include
information on planned military construction for many global
basing initiatives, but the master plans do not contain detailed
information on the status of host-nation negotiations before or
after they occur. In fact, in a prior report,27 GAO recommended
that the department provide more detailed information on the
status of host-nation negotiations to Congress in the
comprehensive overseas master plans. DOD did not agree with that
recommendation, stating that they did not believe the master plans
were the appropriate vehicle in which to report this information.
Further, the services' implementation plans do not contain a
complete listing of all global posture initiatives, and these
plans are not routinely provided to Congress.
In response to our third recommendation-that DOD periodically
update its estimate of the total cost to implement the global
posture strategy and report this information to Congress-DOD
states that it plans to "internally update and keep Congress
informed of estimated programmed costs." As we state in our
report, DOD's current method of informing Congress of global
posture costs is not comprehensive or routine. At present, DOD
reports annually to Congress on some of the military construction
costs of global posture initiatives. Also, once, in September
2004, DOD reported its estimated cost of the entire global basing
effort. However, as we discuss in this report, DOD has no routine,
comprehensive method of keeping Congress informed of changes to
its cost estimates as they evolve over time, and DOD's global
posture restructuring effort will take place over several years to
come and will compete with other government initiatives for
resources. DOD and Congress will need accurate information on the
costs of its overseas basing initiatives so that they can make
informed decisions about spending future budget dollars.
In responding to our recommendation that DOD establish a process
to prioritize, assign management responsibility for, and fund the
network of operating locations DOD is planning, DOD states that
the department has cited this need in its recently issued
Quadrennial Defense Review Report and that establishing this
process should be synchronized with existing execution processes
in the department. As we state in our report, the Quadrennial
Defense Review Report cited joint funding issues as an area that
required further study. In that report, DOD states that it is
implementing a Joint Task Assignment Process that will centrally
assign and oversee joint management arrangements. However, the
report does not state how this process will work or how it will be
applied to assigning management responsibilities to the services
for jointly used overseas locations. We agree that any effort to
establish such a process should be synchronized with existing
processes in the department.
In response to our fifth recommendation-that DOD develop a
periodic reporting process that summarizes to Congress
comprehensive information on DOD's global posture strategy and its
costs-DOD agrees that keeping Congress informed of posture changes
is important. However, DOD believes that its current informal
processes of briefing and testifying before Congress when Congress
requests such information are sufficient. We disagree. As we state
in our report, we believe that the current methods do not provide
Congress with the regular and comprehensive information on DOD's
global posture strategy that would enable Congress to fully
perform its oversight functions. In March 2006, DOD provided
Congress a briefing on changes in its planned overseas posture and
cost estimates. However, this briefing was developed in response
to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act and is
intended to be a one-time report. We continue to believe that DOD
should be required to report annually to Congress comprehensive
information on the implementation of DOD's global posture strategy
because this initiative will entail significant investments on the
part of the United States, will involve fundamental changes in our
relationships with U.S. allies, and will take place over an
extended period of time.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at [email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: GAO�s Identification of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy
In a prior report, we identified what we consider to be six
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that
would enable its implementers to effectively shape policies,
programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards and that
would enable federal departments and other stakeholders to achieve
the identified results.1 To develop the six desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we reviewed
several sources of information. First, we gathered statutory
requirements pertaining to national strategies as well as
legislative and executive branch guidance. We also consulted the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature
on strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the
Office of Management and Budget on the President's Management
Agenda. In addition, we studied its past reports and testimonies
for findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable elements
of a national strategy. Simultaneously, we consulted widely within
GAO to incorporate the most up-to-date thinking on strategic
planning, integration across and between the government and its
partners, implementation, and other related subjects.
We used our judgment to develop desirable characteristics based on
their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and
the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We then
grouped similar items together in a logical sequence, from
conception to implementation. This was GAO's first effort to
develop desirable characteristics for an effective national
strategy, so they may evolve over time. The desirable
characteristics are the following:
o Purpose, scope, and methodology: This characteristic addresses
why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the
process by which it was developed. For example, a strategy might
discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written (or
updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or
other events. Furthermore, a strategy would enhance clarity by
including definitions of key, relevant terms. In addition to
describing what it is meant to do and the major functions, mission
areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally
address its methodology. For example, a strategy might discuss the
principles or theories that guided its development, what
organizations or offices drafted the document, whether it was the
result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in its
development. A complete description of purpose, scope, and
methodology would make the document more useful to the
organizations responsible for implementing the strategy as well as
to oversight organizations, such as Congress.
o Problem definition and risk assessment: This characteristic
addresses the particular national problems and threats the
strategy is directed toward. Specifically, this means a detailed
discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to
address, their causes, and operating environment. In addition,
this characteristic entails a risk assessment, including an
analysis of threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical assets
and operations. If the details of these analyses are classified or
preliminary, an unclassified version of the strategy could at
least include a broad description of analyses and stress the
importance of risk assessment to the implementing parties. A
discussion of the quality of data available regarding this
characteristic, such as known constraints or deficiencies, would
also be useful. More specific information on both problem
definition and risk assessment would give the responsible parties
better guidance to implement those strategies. Better problem
definition and risk assessment also provide greater latitude to
responsible parties to develop innovative approaches that are
tailored to the needs of specific regions or sections and can be
implemented as a practical matter, given fiscal, human capital,
and other limitations. Such assessments help identify desired
goals and end-states without one-size-fits-all solutions.
o Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance
measures: This characteristic addresses what the national strategy
strives to achieve and the steps needed to garner those results,
as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to
gauge results. At the highest level, this could be a description
of an ideal "end-state," followed by a logical hierarchy of major
goals, subordinate objectives, and specific activities to achieve
results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy
discussed the importance of implementing parties' efforts to
establish priorities, milestones, and performance measures, which
help ensure accountability. Ideally, a national strategy would set
clear desired results and priorities, specific milestones, and
outcome-related performance measures while giving implementing
parties the flexibility to pursue and achieve those results within
a reasonable timeframe. If significant limitations on performance
measures exist, other parts of the strategy might address plans to
obtain better data or measurements, such as national standards or
indicators of preparedness.2 Elements of this characteristic
provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon
which to assess and improve global posture. A better
identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures
would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific
time frames and would enable more effective oversight and
accountability.
o Resources, investments, and risk management: This
characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources
and types of resources and investments needed, and where those
resources and investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy
would also identify appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources,
such as grants, in-kind services, and loans, based on identified
needs. Alternatively, a strategy might identify appropriate "tools
of government," such as regulations, tax incentives, and
standards, to mandate or stimulate federal organizations to use
their unique resources. In addition, a national strategy might
elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned earlier and give
guidance to implementing parties to manage their resources and
investments accordingly-and begin to address the difficult but
critical issues about who pays and how such efforts will be funded
and sustained in the future. Furthermore, a strategy might include
a discussion of the type of resources required, such as budgetary,
human capital, information technology, research and development,
procurement of equipment, or contract services. Finally, a
national strategy might also discuss in greater detail how risk
management will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and
allocating resources, including how this approach will weigh costs
and benefits. Guidance on resource, investment, and risk
management would help implementing parties allocate resources and
investments according to priorities and constraints, track costs
and performance, and shift such investments and resources as
appropriate. Such guidance would also assist Congress and the
administration in developing more effective federal programs to
stimulate desired investments, enhance oversight, and leverage
finite resources.
o Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: This
characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the
strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts. It helps to answer the fundamental
question of who is in charge, not only during times of crisis, but
also during all phases of DOD activities. This characteristic
entails identifying the specific federal departments, agencies, or
offices involved, and where appropriate, the different sectors,
such as state, local, private, or international sectors. A
strategy would ideally clarify implementing organizations'
relationships in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering.3 In
addition, a strategy should describe the organizations that will
provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight,
such as the National Security Council, the Office of Management
and Budget, Congress, and other organizations. Furthermore, a
strategy might also identify specific processes for coordination
and collaboration between sectors and organizations-and address
how conflicts would be resolved. These elements would be useful to
agencies and other stakeholders in fostering coordination and
clarifying specific roles, particularly where there is overlap,
and thus enhancing both implementation and accountability.
o Integration: This characteristic addresses how a national
strategy relates to other strategies' goals, objectives, and
activities (horizontal integration) and how the strategy relates
to subordinate levels of government and other organizations and
their plans to implement the strategy (vertical integration). For
example, a national strategy could discuss how its scope
complements, expands upon, or overlaps other national strategies.
Similarly, related strategies could highlight their common or
shared goals, subordinate objectives, and activities. In addition,
a national strategy could address its relationship with relevant
documents from implementing organizations, such as the strategic
plans, annual performance plans, or the annual performance reports
that the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires
of federal agencies. A strategy might also discuss, as
appropriate, various strategies and plans produced by the state,
local, private, or international sectors. A strategy could also
provide guidance such as the development of national standards to
link together more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and
capabilities of the implementing parties. More information on this
characteristic would build on the identified organizational roles
and responsibilities-and thus further clarify the relationships
between various implementing parties, both vertically and
horizontally. This identification would in turn foster effective
implementation and accountability.
Table 4 provides the desirable characteristics and examples of
their elements.
27 GAO-05-680R .
Appendix I: GAO's Identification of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy Appendix I: GAO's Identification of the Six
Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy
1 GAO-04-408T .
2 For more information on the importance of national indicators for
measuring problems, see GAO, Forum on Key National Indicators: Assessing
the Nation's Position and Progress, GAO-03-672SP (Washington, D.C.: May
2003).
3 By partnering, we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities among
implementing parties where there is otherwise no clear or established
hierarchy of lead and support functions.
Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy
Desirable
characteristic Description Examples of elements
Purpose, scope, and Addresses why the o Statement of broad or
methodology strategy was produced, narrow purpose, as
the scope of its appropriate.
coverage, and the o How it compares and
process by which it contrasts with other
was developed. national strategies.
o What major functions,
mission areas, or
activities it covers.
o Principles or
theories that guided its
development.
o Impetus for strategy,
e.g., statutory
requirement or event.
o Process to produce
strategy, e.g.,
interagency task force.
o Definition of key
terms.
Problem definition and Addresses the o Discussion or
risk assessment particular national definition of problems,
problems and threats their causes, and
the strategy is operating environment.
directed toward. o Risk assessment,
including an analysis of
threats and
vulnerabilities.
o Quality of data
available, e.g.,
constraints,
deficiencies, and
"unknowns."
Goals, subordinate Addresses what the o Overall results
objectives, activities, strategy is trying to desired, i.e.,
and performance achieve, steps to "end-state."
measures achieve those results, o Hierarchy of
as well as the strategic goals and
priorities, subordinate objectives.
milestones, and o Priorities,
performance measures milestones, and
to gauge results. outcome-related
performance measures.
o Specific performance
measures.
o Process for
monitoring and reporting
on progress.
o Limitations of
progress indicators.
Resources, investments, Addresses what the o Resources and
and risk management strategy will cost, investment associated
the sources and types with the strategy.
of resources and o Types of resources
investments needed, required, such as
and where resources budgetary, human
and investments should capital, information
be targeted by technology, and research
balancing risk and development.
reductions and costs. o Sources of resources,
e.g., federal, state,
local, and private.
o Economic principles,
such as balancing
benefits and costs.
o Resource allocation
mechanisms, such as
grants, in-kind
services, loans, or user
fees.
o "Tools of
government," e.g.,
mandates or incentives
to spur action.
o Importance of fiscal
discipline.
o Linkage to other
resource documents,
e.g., the federal
budget.
o Risk management
principles.
Organizational roles, Addresses who will be o Roles and
responsibilities, and implementing the responsibilities of
coordination strategy, what their specific federal
roles will be compared agencies, departments,
to others, and or offices.
mechanisms for them to o Roles and
coordinate their responsibilities of
efforts. federal, local, private,
and international
sectors.
o Lead, support, and
partner roles and
responsibilities.
o Accountability and
oversight framework.
o Potential changes to
current organizational
structure.
o Specific processes
for coordination and
collaboration.
o How conflicts will be
resolved.
Integration Addresses how a o Integration with
national strategy other national
relates to other strategies (horizontal).
strategies' goals, o Integration with
objectives, and relevant documents from
activities. implementing
organizations
(vertical).
o Details on specific
federal, state, local,
or private strategies
and plans.
Source: GAO.
Notes: See GAO-04-408T . Our prior work identified the sixth
characteristic as "integration and implementation." For the purposes of
this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the four
principal strategy documents addressed "implementation" because our second
reporting objective addresses challenges associated with implementation in
more detail.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOD's IGPBS contains all the desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the
content of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents
identified by OSD officials using six desirable characteristics of
effective national strategies developed by GAO in prior work.1 According
to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOD's
articulation of its IGPBS strategy is contained in the following four
principal documents:
o the Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms
of Reference (June 2001);
o the National Security Strategy of the United States (September
2002);
o Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report to Congress
(September 2004); and
o National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
(March 2005).
We evaluated the content of each of the four principal global
posture strategy documents identified by OSD officials using our
six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy.
We developed a checklist based on our criteria, which enabled us
to apply the criteria to the relevant documents. The team
pretested the checklist to verify its relevance and the team's
ability to apply the checklist to the information contained in the
documents. Two readers independently assessed a selected strategy
document to pretest the checklist. The team concluded that the
checklist was relevant and appropriate for assessing the principal
global posture documents.
Next, we independently read through each strategy document to
apply our characteristics and record the results on separate
checklists. We gave each of the elements a rating from one of
three potential scores: "addresses," "partially addresses," or
"does not address." According to our methodology, a strategy
"addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites all elements
of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity and details and
thus could be improved upon. Within our designation of "partially
addresses," there is a wide variation between a strategy that
addresses most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy
that addresses few of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy
"does not address" a characteristic when it does not explicitly
cite or discuss any elements of that characteristic and/or any
implicit references are either too vague or too general to be
useful. The analysts' ratings were the same in 67 percent of the
cases. The two analysts then met to discuss similarities and
resolve differences in their respective checklist analyses. On the
basis of those discussions, both analysts developed consolidated,
final checklists for each of the four principal IGPBS documents.
Because we examined four principal strategy documents and each
document may not contain all of the elements, we decided to rate
the strategy element as "addresses" if one of the documents
provided sufficient information. For example, if the Quadrennial
Defense Review, the National Security Strategy, and the Report to
Congress are all rated as "does not address" in a particular
element, but the National Defense Strategy is rated "addresses"
for the same element, then the overall rating for DOD is
"addresses." We assessed the reliability of the data used in this
report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
To identify key challenges that could affect DOD's implementation
of its strategy, we examined global posture strategy plans,
programs, cost estimates, and other documentation obtained from
the geographic combatant commands, service headquarters, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department Headquarters,
and U.S. embassies in six countries. Specifically, we identified
the status of the proposed and ongoing initiatives associated with
DOD's overseas posture strategy by reviewing DOD's September 2004
Report to Congress, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture;
various congressional testimonies; implementation plans of
combatant commands; and briefings by service components and OSD.
To understand the challenges associated with host-nation
negotiations, we obtained documentation of various types of legal
arrangements to be negotiated with host countries, information
papers, briefings, and legal analyses of international agreements
that affect IGPBS prepared by OSD, U.S. European, Pacific,
Central, and Southern Commands, and the military services' 2004
and 2005 implementation plans.
To examine cost and funding issues related to implementation, we
reviewed OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation estimates that
supported costs reported in the September 2004 Report to Congress
- Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture; the military
service's 2004 and 2005 implementation plans; the February 2005
comprehensive master plans prepared by the U.S. European, Pacific,
and Central Commands; the European Command's Strategic Theater
Transformation Strategy, January 2005; and the Pacific Command's
Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy 2003 and 2005.
We also reviewed prior GAO work related to DOD's overseas master
plans. Further, we discussed DOD's cost-estimating methodology
with knowledgeable officials at the Office of the Director,
Program Analysis and Evaluation.
To identify challenges in establishing a worldwide network of
operating locations, we obtained briefings that included
information on joint infrastructure funding, proposed assignments
of executive agency responsibilities for new locations, and U.S.
European and Pacific Command implementation plans for IGPBS. We
also reviewed legislation relating to the funding of DOD
infrastructure, as well as prior GAO reports on the subject.2 In
addition, we visited selected cooperative security locations and
spoke with officials concerning implementation issues.
To identify the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of
its efforts to overcome these challenges and report on overall
progress in achieving the strategy's goals, we reviewed
congressional testimony, multiple briefings conducted for
congressional Members and their staffs, and reports produced as a
result of legislative requirements. Specifically, we examined
existing reporting requirements in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the House conference
report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction
appropriation bill, the Senate report on the fiscal year 2004
military construction appropriation bill report, the 2005 report
by the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States, and prior GAO reports on overseas
military infrastructure. We assessed the reliability of the data
used in this report and determined that it was sufficiently
reliable for our purposes.
To obtain the information described above, we contacted officials
at the following organizations:
o Pentagon.
o DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation.
o The Joint Staff (J-5 and J-8).
o Service headquarters: Army Headquarters, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Marine Corps
Headquarters, Plans, Policies, and Operations Department/Plans and
Strategy Division; Navy Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations/Strategy and
Policy; Air Force Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and Programs, Combat Support and Analysis.
o U.S. European Command Headquarters; U.S. Army, Europe; Special
Operations Command, Europe; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and U.S.
Naval Forces, Europe.
o U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters; U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific;
U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific
Fleet; U.S. Special Operations Forces, Pacific; U.S. Eighth Army,
Korea; U.S. Forces Korea.
o U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters.
o U.S. Transportation Command.
o State Department Headquarters and U.S. Embassies in Bulgaria,
Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.
o U.S. Southern Command Headquarters.
o U.S. Central Command Headquarters.
We conducted our review from November 2004 through January 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant
Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Kenneth Daniell; Susan Ditto; Kate
Lenane; Guy Lofaro; Charles Perdue; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Terry
Richardson; and Beverly Schladt made key contributions to this
report.
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1 GAO-04-408T .
2 H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003);
GAO-05-556 ; and GAO-05-680R .
(350884)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-852 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-852 , a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
September 2006
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress
and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy calls for a comprehensive restructuring of U.S. forces overseas.
DOD's planned changes will require billions of dollars to implement at a
time when DOD is supporting operations in Iraq and realigning domestic
bases. As requested, GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has
articulated a global posture strategy that has the characteristics
necessary to guide its efforts and to achieve desired results and (2) the
challenges that could affect DOD's implementation of its strategy and the
mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of its overall progress in
achieving global posture goals.
What GAO Recommends
To facilitate DOD's management of global restructuring, GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense take specific steps to improve the strategy,
periodically report to Congress on cost and host-nation negotiation
status, and address management and funding issues for new operating
locations. In responding to a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with GAO's recommendations. However, it did not specify any actions it
plans to take in response to our recommendations. Because DOD's response
was unclear, we have added a matter for congressional consideration
suggesting that Congress require DOD to report annually on its strategy
and implementation.
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four principal
documents, but these documents fully address only three of the six
characteristics that GAO's prior work has identified as useful components
of an effective strategy. Specifically, DOD's strategy documents state the
purpose, scope, and methodology for changing its global posture; define
the problems its strategy is directed against; and describe how the
strategy is to be integrated with related strategies. However, the
documents do not fully address other important characteristics such as
performance metrics to measure intended improvements in operational
effectiveness and service members' quality of life; sources of funding for
implementing global restructuring initiatives; or methods of resolving
conflicts that may arise during implementation. In the absence of a
comprehensive strategy that addresses important characteristics such as
performance measures, Congress will lack sufficient information to
evaluate funding requests and assess whether the strategy is improving
operational capabilities, quality of life, and alliances as intended.
Ongoing negotiations between the United States and host nations, evolving
cost estimates, and difficulties establishing service management and
funding responsibilities for new overseas sites contribute to the
complexity and uncertainty of DOD's overseas restructuring effort. In
addition, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to
keep Congress informed on its progress dealing with these issues and the
overall status of implementing the strategy. First, negotiations between
the United States and host nations continue to evolve, causing periodic
adjustments to the pace and scope of DOD's plans and making it difficult
to determine the overall status of this effort. Second, DOD's initial cost
estimate of $9 billion to
$12 billion will continue to change, reflecting uncertainties such as
those related to host-nation negotiations and burden-sharing, and total
costs may be understated. Third, DOD has not yet fully determined how it
will allocate responsibilities for managing and funding its planned
worldwide network of smaller operating sites to the services, and
therefore, it is still uncertain who will manage these sites and how they
will be paid for. DOD has not established a comprehensive, routine method
of informing Congress of ongoing changes to the strategy and its total
costs. Reliable and timely information about the full costs, activities,
and outputs of federal programs is important as Congress makes decisions
about allocating resources in an environment of competing demands. DOD has
not established a comprehensive and periodic reporting process because DOD
officials believe that current congressional briefings and reporting
requirements, which largely focus on military construction requirements,
provide Congress with sufficient information. However, these existing
reports do not provide comprehensive information on total costs, overall
progress, or changes to DOD's plan. Without a periodic reporting process
focused on overall progress and costs, Congress may not be well positioned
to evaluate funding requests for implementing the strategy.
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