Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North	 
African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight (31-JUL-06,
GAO-06-850).							 
                                                                 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the	 
war on terrorism. The United States provides these countries with
security assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when	 
credible evidence exists that foreign security units have	 
committed gross human rights violations. GAO (1) describes the	 
goals of U.S. security assistance to these countries and examines
U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance, (2) assesses U.S.  
agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy
to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with	 
congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines
agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense	 
articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in	 
the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that	 
they are not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in	 
Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files to determine	 
compliance with human rights vetting policy.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-850 					        
    ACCNO:   A57840						        
  TITLE:     Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in 
North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight	 
     DATE:   07/31/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Human rights violations				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     International relations				 
	     Monitoring 					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Security policies					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Security operations				 
	     Algeria						 
	     Morocco						 
	     Tunisia						 

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GAO-06-850

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Cou
          * U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterr
          * State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equi
               * Security Assistance to Algeria Primarily Funded Training for
               * Security Assistance to Morocco Funded a Mixture of Training
               * Security Assistance to Tunisia Primarily Funded Equipment Pr
          * State and DOD Assess the Broader Goals of Security Cooperati
     * Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted
          * To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Right
          * Lapses in Human Rights Vetting Existed at Posts Due to Uncle
          * State Has Clarified Procedures and Responsibilities for Huma
               * State Has Taken Steps to Clarify Procedures and Responsibili
               * State Has Required Points of Contact at Posts
               * State Lacks a Monitoring Mechanism to Ensure Posts' Complian
     * Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles
          * End-Use Monitoring Program Established to Comply with Arms E
          * Morocco's Use of Equipment in Western Sahara
     * Conclusion
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in
     * Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006
     * Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence
     * Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
     * Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Staff Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

July 2006

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need
for Further Oversight

GAO-06-850

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 5
U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Counterterrorism
and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed Collectively with
Other Activities 9
Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from Unclear
Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts' Compliance with
State Policy 17
Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that Require
Systematic Monitoring 23
Conclusion 26
Recommendations for Executive Action 26
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28
Appendix II Human Rights Vetting Process in Morocco and Tunisia as of
February 2006 31
Appendix III Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting in
Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 33
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 35
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37

Tables

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years
2002-2005 13
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years
2002-2005 14
Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years
2002-2005 15
Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia 19
Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal Years
2004-2005 33
Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 34

Figures

Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005 11
Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005 12

Abbreviations

ACES Abuse Case Evaluation System

ALP Aviation Leadership Program

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance

CTFP Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EDA Excess Defense Articles

EUCOM U.S. European Command

FMF Foreign Military Financing

IMET International Military Education and Training

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training

OIG Office of Inspector General

PART Program Assessment Rating Tool

UN United Nations

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 28, 2006

The Honorable Tom Coburn Chairman Subcommittee on Federal Financial
Management, Government Information, and International Security Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Chairwoman Subcommittee on the Middle
East and Central Asia Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives

The Honorable Ted Poe House of Representatives

The U.S. government views Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as stable Islamic
countries that are key partners in the war on terrorism. These countries
are adjacent to vast expanses of ungoverned desert and have porous borders
vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations. The Department of
State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD) provide these countries
with security assistance1 to further U.S. foreign policy and security
goals, such as supporting counterterrorism, promoting stronger bilateral
relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities, and promoting
greater respect for democracy and human rights. To further human rights
goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds from being
provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible evidence
exists that such units have committed gross violations of human rights.2
However, we recently found lapses in State's process for human rights
screening, or vetting,3 of foreign candidates for U.S.-funded training in
other countries.4 Additionally, an unresolved territorial dispute in the
Western Sahara is viewed as an impediment to regional cooperation and
contributes to concerns about human rights abuses.

1For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as U.S.
government assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign security
forces (military and police).

In response to your request, this report (1) describes the goals of U.S.
security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and examines U.S.
agencies' assessment of this assistance; (2) assesses U.S. agencies'
implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to screen foreign
security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights
funding restrictions; and (3) examines U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor
the use of U.S-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security
assistance programs in the three countries, including in Western Sahara,
to ensure that they are not misused or diverted for unauthorized uses.

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State and DOD planning,
funding, and evaluation documents, and the agencies' policies and
procedures. We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C.;
Rabat, Morocco; and Tunis, Tunisia. We also interviewed DOD officials at
the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. In addition, we
met with government officials from Morocco to discuss U.S.-provided
security assistance and spoke with the commander of the United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding Morocco's military
presence there. In Rabat and Tunis, we analyzed a stratified random
probability sample of 273 out of 468 available human rights vetting case
files to determine U.S. agencies' compliance with State's human rights
vetting policy. These State and DOD files were maintained for nominees for
U.S.-provided training during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We did not
collect data on whether any individual or unit trained by the United
States, whether vetted or not, had committed human rights violations. We
did not visit Algeria because the United States provides much less
security assistance to Algeria than it does to Morocco and Tunisia.
Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our scope and
methodology. We performed our work from October 2005 to July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2This restriction, commonly referred to as the "Leahy Amendment," first
appeared in the1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related
Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) and only applied to funds appropriated
to State's International Narcotics Control program. It was broadened in
fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under the 1998 Foreign
Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118).
In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared in the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262), which applied to funds
appropriated under the act. The two provisions have appeared each year
since in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, respectively.

3Human rights vetting involves checking the names of individuals or units
proposed for training against files, databases, and other sources of
information to ensure that they do not have records of gross human rights
violations.

4GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning
Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-793
(Washington, D.C.: July 2005).

                                Results in Brief

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security,
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, State and DOD
have allocated5 approximately $146.6 million to train and equip security
forces in these countries from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005.
All three countries participated in a variety of U.S.-provided training
programs for their domestic and military security forces. The U.S.
government also provided Morocco and Tunisia with excess military
equipment from U.S. stockpiles, such as used transport vehicles and
1960s-era helicopters. The government also provided Foreign Military
Financing grants, which were used to purchase spare parts to refurbish and
maintain the equipment. State and DOD assess whether and how these
security assistance programs, in addition to other activities such as
humanitarian assistance and military-to-military events, support U.S.
foreign policy and security goals through evaluations of security
cooperation and counterterrorism goals.

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found lapses in the human rights vetting of
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-funded training in fiscal years
2004 and 2005. We found that the lapses in vetting took two forms: (1) no
files existed to determine whether vetting occurred for approximately 438
trainees and (2) for the 468 trainees for whom posts maintained files, we
estimate that 27 percent of the files (127 trainees)6 lacked evidence of
vetting. These lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance
on vetting policies and procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities
for vetting, and a lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure
that procedures were followed. In July 2005, we found similar lapses at
U.S. posts in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Since then, State
has taken steps to address two of the three weaknesses. State has
clarified vetting policies and procedures by issuing a guide to human
rights vetting for posts. State has also defined roles and
responsibilities by requiring each post to assign a single point of
contact with responsibility for oversight of vetting procedures. However,
State has not established a systematic monitoring mechanism. In Morocco
and Tunisia, we found that the assigned points of contact did not
routinely monitor whether vetting procedures were followed at the posts.
In addition, State headquarters does not monitor whether posts are
following procedures for vetting foreign security forces.

5We use the terms allocated and allocations to include appropriations,
expenditures, or estimated values dependent upon the data available for
each program.

6We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no
evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the total number
of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143.

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin
equipment subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, which
include physical inventory and inspection requirements. U.S. law generally
limits the transfer of defense articles and services to countries for
purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense, or regional or
collective arrangements. To ensure compliance with these limitations, DOD
employs an end-use monitoring program, which requires systematic
monitoring only for the most sensitive defense articles, such as stinger
missiles and night vision devices. For nonsensitive articles, DOD guidance
directs security assistance officers at overseas posts to conduct
monitoring in conjunction with other routine visits with host country
officials. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations,
there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin
equipment in Tunisia, Morocco and Western Sahara that would require
greater scrutiny. Because there are no sensitive U.S.-origin defense
articles or allegations of unauthorized use, DOD officials have not
conducted end-use monitoring activities involving Morocco's use of
equipment in Western Sahara.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process of human rights
vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic monitoring
mechanism that will ensure that State's vetting procedures are carried out
at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend the following two actions:

           o  The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at
           each post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S.
           training at the post comply with State's vetting policy.

           o  Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to
           a designated State headquarters unit to provide State with
           assurance of posts' compliance with its human rights vetting
           policy.

           We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
           and State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our
           draft. State provided a written response that is reprinted in
           appendix IV and technical comments, which we incorporated in the
           report as appropriate. In commenting on our draft and in a
           subsequent e-mail, State concurred with our recommendations and
           indicated that they are taking steps to implement them. State also
           noted that our review did not uncover any evidence that the U.S.
           government has trained any individual or unit that has committed
           gross violations of human rights. However, our review only focused
           on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis vetted trainees.
           We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained
           by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human
           rights violations.

           Background
			  
			  State and DOD provide a variety of security assistance programs to
           train and equip security forces (military and police) in North
           Africa. Many of these programs are funded by State and implemented
           by DOD. DOD manages security assistance under its Theater Security
           Cooperation umbrella along with a variety of other activities.7
           The European Command, which is the U.S. military entity
           responsible for these countries' programs, focuses its security
           cooperation activities on assisting allies and partner countries
           to develop the capabilities to conduct peacekeeping, participate
           in the war on terrorism, and perform contingency operations with
           U.S. forces.

           State funds the following programs to train and equip foreign
           security forces:

           o  Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) provides strategic, operational,
           and technical training and equipment to foreign law enforcement
           agencies to assist them in detecting and eliminating terrorist
           threats and in protecting facilities, individuals, and
           infrastructure. State implements this program.

           o  Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans for
           the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training
           by foreign governments. The goal of these grants is to enable key
           allies to improve their defense capabilities and to foster closer
           military relationships between the United States and recipient
           nations. DOD implements the program.

           o  International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides
           training to foreign military and related civilian personnel. IMET
           training is intended to promote professional militaries around the
           world and strengthen U.S. military alliances. DOD implements the
           program.

           o  International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
           seeks to enhance the law enforcement capabilities of foreign
           governments in combating criminal, drug, and terrorist threats.
           INCLE programs support counternarcotics, intelligence, border
           patrol, and interdiction activities. State implements the program
           through interagency agreements with other U.S. government
           agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Homeland
           Security.

           DOD funds and implements several programs to train foreign
           security forces.

           o  The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
           provides education and training on counterterrorism activities to
           foreign military and related civilian officials. This training is
           intended to bolster the capacity of friendly foreign nations to
           detect, monitor, and interdict or disrupt the activities of
           terrorist networks.

           o  Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special
           operations forces to train with foreign military forces to enhance
           readiness through language proficiency, cultural immersion,
           knowledge of foreign environments, and instructor skills. The
           training primarily benefits U.S. forces. Benefits to the host
           nation's security forces are incidental.

           o  The Aviation Leadership Program (ALP) is a U.S. Air
           Force-funded program that provides undergraduate pilot training to
           a small number of international students from friendly, less
           developed countries.

           o  Regional Centers for Security Studies provide a forum for
           bilateral and multilateral communication, and military and
           civilian exchanges within a region. Activities at five regional
           centers range from extended academic programs to conferences on
           topics such as regional security issues, defense planning, and
           civilian-military relations.

           o  DOD's three service academies conduct traditional academic
           exchange programs of varying length and content. Up to 60 foreign
           students may attend one of the service academies as members of an
           academy class. The goal of the program is to expose future foreign
           leaders to their U.S. peers and to promote military
           professionalism.

           State and DOD also coordinate to provide nonappropriated
           assistance for foreign security forces.

           o  Excess Defense Articles (EDA) is nonappropriated assistance to
           help build the defense capabilities of friendly countries in the
           form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks.
           Defense articles declared as excess by the military departments
           can be transferred in an "as-is, where-is" condition to the
           recipient.

           o  Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that transfers in-stock
           defense articles and services from DOD's inventory, as well as
           from any other U.S. agency of the U.S. government, to foreign
           countries and international organizations in response to
           unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes,
           peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics requirements.

           The governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered
           stable, although State has reported problems with their human
           rights practices.8

           o  Algeria. Algeria has emerged from a period of terrorist and
           related violence during the 1990s when more than 100,000 lives
           were lost, according to State. Since then, as Algeria has made
           progress toward democratization, casualties have declined sharply.
           Although Algerian government actions have weakened terrorist
           groups domestically, Algerians have been found among suicide
           bombers and terrorists captured in Iraq. Terrorist cells operate
           in the Algerian east and far south and in the Sahel, the area
           bordering southern Algeria. State's most recent human rights
           report stated that the Algerian government had several human
           rights problems, including impunity of security forces,
           allegations of abuse and torture of detainees, and arbitrary
           arrest and prolonged pretrial detention. State also credited the
           Algerian government for taking steps to strengthen human rights,
           which resulted in fewer such incidents than in the past.

           o  Morocco. The United States views Morocco as a stable, moderate
           Arab regime; an ally against terrorism; and a free trade partner.
           King Mohammed VI retains ultimate power, including over the
           military. In May 2003, Moroccan suicide bombers attacked several
           sites in Casablanca. In response, the government arrested an
           estimated 3,000 people and sentenced at least 900 for crimes under
           counterterrorism laws, according to State. Moroccan-born
           extremists associated with al Qaeda affiliates were implicated in
           the March 2004 train blasts in Madrid. According to State's human
           rights report, Morocco's human rights record "remained poor in
           many areas." The report highlighted accusations of excessive force
           and harsh sentences against demonstrators in Western Sahara and
           torture of human rights activists in that region. Also included
           among the human rights problems were reports of police impunity,
           arbitrary arrest, and incommunicado detention.

           o  Western Sahara. Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular
           Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro
           (Polisario) have disputed the independence of Western Sahara since
           the 1970s, when Spain decolonized the territory.9 Following a long
           war in Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario, the UN
           brokered a ceasefire that went into effect in 1991, and a UN
           peacekeeping force remains in the region. Morocco currently
           occupies 80 percent of Western Sahara. The United States, which
           does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara,
           supports efforts to reach a mutually acceptable resolution under
           UN auspices; however, the situation remains at an impasse. This
           issue is the main impediment to improving bilateral relations
           between Morocco and Algeria, as Algeria backs the Polisario.

           o  Tunisia. Tunisia has a stable yet authoritarian government with
           a dominant majority political party and a president who has been
           in power since 1987. The Tunisian government harshly suppressed an
           Islamist opposition movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
           More recently, suspected terrorists bombed a synagogue on the
           Tunisian island of Djerba in 2002 and Tunisian expatriates have
           been arrested in Europe and North America on terrorism-related
           charges. State's human rights report stated that Tunisia's human
           rights record remained poor. Among the human rights problems
           reported were incidents of torture and abuse of prisoners and
           detainees, police impunity, and sanctioned attacks by police on
           citizens who criticize the government.

           U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support
			  Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is
			  Assessed Collectively with Other Activities
			  
			  The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco,
           and Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and
           counterterrorism. Security assistance programs provide these
           countries a mixture of training and equipment through programs
           such as IMET, FMF, EDA for foreign military forces, and
           counterterrorism and other training for domestic security forces.
           To carry out these security assistance programs, State and DOD
           have allocated10 the equivalent of approximately $146.6 million
           from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. The contributions of these
           security assistance programs to achieving security cooperation and
           counterterrorism goals are assessed collectively with those of
           other activities, such as military-to-military events and economic
           and humanitarian assistance.

           U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterrorism
			  and Security Cooperation Goals
			  
			  In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the goals for U.S.-provided
           security assistance programs are to enhance security and political
           relationships, fight terrorism, improve foreign military
           capabilities and interoperability, and increase U.S. access for
           overflight rights and port visits. The security assistance
           programs in each of these countries may support one or more of
           these goals. Security assistance programs attempt to achieve these
           goals by training and equipping foreign security forces.

           State has a mission performance process in which the posts outline
           goals for their countries and identify the security assistance and
           other programs that would support those goals. For example, State
           has a goal to increase Tunisia's antiterrorism capabilities. State
           planning documents list the ATA program, which provides training
           in airport security and crisis management, as one of the resources
           it will employ to meet its goal. Additionally, State has a goal to
           cooperate with Morocco on counterterrorism and provides
           communications equipment and intelligence officer training, under
           the FMF and IMET programs, as a means to achieve this goal.

           Similarly, DOD develops country campaign plans that include
           country security cooperation goals and implementation activities,
           which encompass security assistance programs. For example, DOD's
           goals in Algeria are to increase military professionalization and
           interoperability. To achieve these goals, DOD uses security
           assistance programs, such as IMET and JCET. Additionally, DOD
           links its goals to State's mission planning documents.

           State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip
			  Security Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
			  
			  State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million
           through their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco,
           and Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Tunisia was the
           largest recipient of U.S.-provided security assistance in this
           region, receiving $74.8 million, although about 40 percent of this
           came from the estimated value of excess U.S. equipment delivered
           in fiscal year 2002 under the EDA program. Morocco received
           approximately $66.9 million, and Algeria received $5 million.
           Figure 1 illustrates a breakdown of total assistance to each North
           African country.

           Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria,
           Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005

           Figure 2 shows the total allocations by program that Algeria,
           Morocco, and Tunisia received from fiscal years 2002 to 2005.

                                   Background

7These activities include multinational exercises, military-to-military
contacts, and humanitarian assistance.

8See State's 2005 country reports on human rights practices, http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005 .

9Western Sahara, a Spanish possession from the 1880s until the 1970s, is a
desert area that has a population of approximately 267,000, bordering the
Atlantic Ocean between Mauritania and Morocco. It has valuable phosphate
resources and fishing grounds and the possibility of off-shore oil
reserves.

 U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Counterterrorism and
    Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed Collectively with Other
                                   Activities

U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterrorism and Security
Cooperation Goals

10We use the terms allocated and allocations to describe a broad mix of
appropriated and nonappropriated assistance provided to foreign security
forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. For State's FMF, IMET, and INCLE
programs, we used appropriations as allocated by State to these countries'
programs. For State's ATA program and DOD's CTFP, JCET, and other funded
programs, we used expenditure data because no separate appropriation and
country allocation data existed. The EDA and Drawdown programs are
nonappropriated equipment transfers.

State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005

  Security Assistance to Algeria Primarily Funded Training for Military Forces

State and DOD allocated approximately $5 million to Algeria in security
assistance from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. The IMET and ATA
programs were the principal security assistance programs (85 percent of
funding) in Algeria. IMET was used to train approximately 263 Algerian
security force personnel during this period.11 Unlike Morocco and Tunisia,
Algeria does not receive FMF funding or EDA equipment transfers. Table 1
shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided
security assistance.

11The data provided for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia did not allow us to
determine if some individuals received training in more than one fiscal
year. Therefore, there may be some over-counting of trainees in the
numbers reported from 2002 to 2005.

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years
2002-2005

Dollars in thousands                 
Funding agency   Program Allocation  Examples of assistance provided       
State            IMET      $2,321.0  Trained approximately 263 Algerian    
                                        security personnel in courses such as 
                                        intelligence, English, and basic      
                                        officer training.                     
                    ATA        1,847.5  Trained Algerian security personnel   
                                        in hostage negotiation and incident   
                                        management.                           
DOD              CTFP         247.5  Trained 25 Algerian security          
                                        personnel in counterterrorism.        
                    JCET         212.8  Provided joint training for U.S.      
                                        Special Operations Forces and         
                                        Algerian security forces.             
                    Other       $293.1  Provided training for 182 Algerian    
                                        security personnel at Regional        
                                        Centers for Strategic Studies.        

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

  Security Assistance to Morocco Funded a Mixture of Training and Equipment
  Programs for Security Forces

State and DOD allocated approximately $66.9 million in security assistance
to Morocco for training and equipment from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Of
U.S. security assistance programs in Morocco, FMF and EDA are the largest,
accounting for about $47 million (71 percent) of the total. IMET trained
approximately 458 Moroccan security forces. Also, State-funded training
was provided in fiscal year 2005 through the INCLE program for border
security at ports-of-entry. Morocco is an active user of the EDA program,
acquiring hundreds of used U.S. 5-ton and 2.5-ton trucks, which they use
for spare parts. Additionally, Morocco uses the FMF program to obtain
spare parts to sustain aging equipment. According to DOD officials in
Morocco, as the equipment continues to age, it will become unsustainable,
and Morocco will need to find resources to replace this equipment. Table 2
shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided
security assistance.

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years
2002-2005

Dollars in thousands               
Funding agency Program Allocation  Examples of assistance provided         
State          FMF      $33,468.0  Purchased spare parts for aircraft and  
                                      other vehicles, radio equipment, and    
                                      packaging and shipping charges for EDA  
                                      transfers.                              
                  IMET       6,533.0  Trained approximately 458 Moroccan      
                                      security personnel in logistics         
                                      readiness, munitions inspections, and   
                                      command and general staff training.     
                  INCLE      2,992.0  Trained Moroccans in border             
                                      interdiction and border control.        
                  ATA        8,394.1  Funded hostage negotiation, management  
                                      of mass casualty, and cyberterrorism    
                                      training.                               
DOD            EDA         13,931  Provided several hundred 2.5-ton-cargo  
                                      and other truck acquisitions.           
                  CTFP         508.2  Trained 19 Moroccan security personnel  
                                      in counterterrorism.                    
                  JCET         246.0  Provided joint training for U.S.        
                                      Special Operations Forces and Moroccan  
                                      security forces.                        
                  Other       $836.3  Provided one slot for Morocco at the    
                                      U.S. Air Force Academy in fiscal years  
                                      2003 and 2004. Provided training at     
                                      Regional Centers for Strategic Studies. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

  Security Assistance to Tunisia Primarily Funded Equipment Procurement Programs

State and DOD allocated approximately $74.8 million for training and
equipment to Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. FMF and EDA were the
largest security assistance programs in Tunisia, accounting for 80 percent
of the country's total security assistance. EDA value is based on DOD's
estimated value of the equipment at the time of delivery. Tunisia received
EDA in fiscal year 2002 only. The United States offered Tunisia 15 UH-1H
1960s-era helicopters in fiscal year 2005, 7 of which are being
refurbished as of April 2006 and will be delivered thereafter, according
to DOD officials. DOD would like to refurbish one or two additional
helicopters, if additional funds can be found. As in Morocco, the
equipment becomes unsustainable as it ages, and Tunisia will need to find
resources to replace it, according to State and DOD officials. IMET
funding was used to train approximately 406 Tunisian security personnel
from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. State provided ATA training in

fiscal years 2003 and 2004, but not in 2005. Table 3 shows the U.S.
agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security
assistance.

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years
2002-2005

Dollars in thousands         
Funding                                                                    
agency  Program  Allocation       Examples of assistance provided
State   FMF       $28,634.0       Purchased spare parts for vehicles and   
                                     radios, helicopter refurbishment, and    
                                     miscellaneous equipment.                 
           IMET        6,272.0       Trained approximately 406 Tunisian       
                                     security personnel in English language   
                                     skills, crisis command and control, and  
                                     water treatment.                         
           ATA         1,999.8       Provided training in crisis management   
                                     and airport security.                    
DOD     EDA        30,929.0       Provided surplus guided chaparral        
                                     missiles, guided missile system, and     
                                     tool kits.                               
           CTFP          158.3       Trained 19 Tunisian security personnel   
                                     in counterterrorism.                     
           JCET          311.0       Provided joint training for U.S. Special 
                                     Operations Forces and Tunisian security  
                                     forces.                                  
           Drawdown    5,000.0  Provided maintenance of C-130 aircraft to
                                Tunisia in fiscal year 2002.
           Other      $1,480.7  ALP provided two scholarships to two cadets
                                at the Tunisian Air Force Academy in fiscal
                                year 2003. The United States also provided
                                several slots for Tunisians to attend U.S.
                                service academies in fiscal years 2004 and
                                2005.

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

State and DOD Assess the Broader Goals of Security Cooperation and
Counterterrorism

For these countries, State and DOD assess whether and how security
assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy and security goals through
their evaluation of how broad goals, such as counterterrorism, regional
stability goals, and security cooperation goals, are being achieved. State
assesses these goals in its annual mission planning process. While the
goals are rated for the degree to which they are being achieved, the
effectiveness of specific programs, such as FMF or IMET, is not assessed.
State officials in Tunis and Rabat said that the assessments of goals in
country planning documents are qualitative and that the outcomes or
results are difficult to measure, requiring professional judgment to
determine the progress made from one year to the next.

DOD assesses the collective effectiveness of its programs, which include
security assistance and other activities. DOD's unified command for the
region, EUCOM, is developing a new evaluation tool to assess how they are
achieving their country goals. This tool will attempt to measure the
degree to which desired outcomes, such as reduction in terrorist
activities, are achieved. EUCOM plans to use these assessments to allocate
its resources and set priorities.

Although neither State nor DOD conducts assessments for specific security
assistance programs, results from some programs are periodically reported
to Congress, and some results indicators are monitored for other
programs.12 The ATA program annually reports to Congress on program
activities and provides some examples of how these activities were
implemented worldwide. For example, the ATA fiscal year 2005 report states
that Morocco's use of ATA cyberterrorism training supported U.S. efforts
to arrest a primary terrorism suspect. The IMET program tracks individuals
trained through IMET if they rise to important positions within their
government. IMET program officials are also developing a survey tool to be
administered to foreign trainees to measure whether the training has
affected their preparedness for joint military activities with the United
States and has instilled respect for U.S. values of democracy, human
rights, rule of law, and civilian control of the military.

12The Office of Management and Budget assesses government programs using
the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which is intended to help form
conclusions about program benefits and whether the program is meeting its
annual and long-term goals. The ATA program was included in a PART
assessment of State and international assistance programs, in which the
worldwide ATA program was rated effective. In addition, State officials
expect a PART review of security assistance to the Middle East and North
African countries in August 2006.

    Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from Unclear
  Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts' Compliance with State
                                     Policy

In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights abuses
occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We found that these lapses
consisted of (1) the absence of vetting files at posts for approximately
438 trainees13 and (2) the absence of vetting evidence in an estimated 27
percent14 (127 of 468 trainees15) of the vetting files maintained at
posts.16 These lapses resulted from unclear vetting procedures, undefined
roles for vetting, and the lack of a monitoring mechanism to ensure posts'
compliance with vetting procedures. State took steps in December 2005 to
address the need for clear procedures and defined vetting roles. However,
we found that responsible officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia
did not monitor whether offices within each post were following vetting
procedures, and State headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the
posts to vet trainees.

13We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently,
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals.

14We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no
evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent.

15We are 95 percent confident that the total number of files with no
evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143.

16In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that a post
could not locate at least some documentation or indication that the post
or State headquarters responded to the sponsoring office with vetting
results, which would demonstrate that training candidates had been
screened for human rights abuses.

To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting of Foreign
Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has
included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that
restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any
foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence
that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights.17 DOD's
appropriations acts have contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded
training since fiscal year 1999.18 While the legal provisions restrict
funding to "any unit of the security forces of a foreign country," State
policy applies the restrictions to individual members of security forces,
as well.

To implement these legislative restrictions, State's guidance calls for
posts and State headquarters units to vet individuals or units proposed
for training or assistance to determine whether these foreign security
forces have committed gross human rights violations. The various State or
DOD offices that implement different training programs at each post
initiate the vetting process by submitting names of training candidates
for vetting by post officials. These offices also receive the results of
human rights vetting conducted at each post and State headquarters, and
they maintain vetting files for trainees. See table 4 for various offices
implementing training in Morocco and Tunisia. See app. II for details on
the description of the human rights vetting process.

17Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations Export
Financing and Related Appropriations Act for 2006 (P.L. 109-102, S:551)
states, "None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to
any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of
State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations
of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the
Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking
effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces
unit to justice." The provision has also appeared in prior Foreign
Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-118, S:570 (FY1998); P.L.
105-277, S:568 (FY1999); P.L. 106-113, S: 564 (FY2000); P.L. 106-429,
S:563 (FY2001); P.L. 107-115, S:556 (FY2002); P.L. 108-7, S: 553 (FY2003);
P.L. 108-199, S: 553 (FY2004); P.L. 108-447, S:551 (FY 2005).

18The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2006 states,
"None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support any
training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign
country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from
the State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights,
unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken." (P.L. 109-148
S:8069) Similar provisions have also appeared in prior DOD appropriations
acts. See P.L. 105-262, S:8130 (FY1999); P.L. 106-79, S:8098 (FY2000);
P.L. 106-259, S:8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107-117, S:8093 (FY2003); P.L.
107-248, S:8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, S:8077 (FY2004); P.L. 108-287,
S:8076 (FY 2005).

Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia

Office implementing training at posts Applicable training program         
Office of Defense Cooperation (DOD)   IMET, CTFP, FMF, ALP                
Defense Attache Office (DOD)          Regional centers, service academies 
Office of Regional Security (State)   ATA, INCLE                          

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

Lapses in Human Rights Vetting Existed at Posts Due to Unclear Guidance

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found two categories of lapses in human rights
vetting in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The first category consisted of
approximately 438 trainees19 for whom posts did not maintain vetting
files. The second category consisted of files that were maintained at the
posts but lacked evidence of vetting. Based on our review of 273 out of
468 files, we estimate that 27 percent (127 trainees)20 lacked evidence of
vetting.21

Of the 438 trainees for whom posts maintained no vetting files, post
officials stated that no vetting occurred for approximately 148 Moroccan
and Tunisian trainees.22 These trainees included those who attended
DOD-implemented IMET and CTFP training courses outside of the United
States, as well as attendees of regional centers and service academies. In
addition, we found that the two posts did not maintain vetting
documentation on approximately 290 trainees and were, therefore, unable to
determine whether vetting occurred. These trainees, who may not have been
vetted for human rights abuses, attended State-provided training,
including all 168 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 INCLE courses in
Morocco, all 42 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 ATA courses in
Tunisia, and some (80) of the trainees who attended fiscal year 2005 ATA
courses in Morocco. See table 5 in app. III for more information on the
number of trainees and types of training for which no vetting files
existed at the two posts.

19We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently,
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals.

20We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no
evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the total number
of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143.

21In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that post
could not locate at least some documentation or indication that the post
or State headquarters responded to the implementing office with vetting
results, which would demonstrate that training candidates have been
screened for human rights abuses.

22We identified the approximate number of trainees for whom no vetting
files existed by using trainee data provided by State and DOD reports and
officials.

The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. However, we
estimated that 27 percent (127 trainees) of the files did not contain
evidence of human rights vetting. This estimate is based on a stratified
random sample of 273 of 468 available files at the two posts. For these
files lacking vetting evidence, posts could not locate any documentation
indicating that either the posts or State headquarters provided the
implementing office with results on vetting. Based on the results of our
sample, we estimate that 100 percent of the files for DOD-implemented
training in Tunisia had evidence of vetting. In Morocco, however, we
estimate that about two-thirds of the files for DOD-implemented training
contained no evidence of vetting. We also reviewed all the available files
of State-implemented training in Morocco and found that about one-sixth of
them contained no evidence of vetting. Table 6 in app. III shows the
results of the sample of trainees we reviewed at each post for evidence of
human rights vetting.

According to agency officials at both posts, lapses in vetting candidates
in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were generally attributable to unclear
guidance that had been provided over the past decade. The guidance did not
clearly identify all types of training to which the vetting requirement
applied. Until December 2005, the guidance had been issued through
multiple cables from headquarters to posts dating from January 1994
through February 2005. Moreover, in Tunisia, State officials stated that,
in keeping with their understanding of standard State record retention
policies, which were distinct from human rights vetting guidance on record
retention, they destroyed files that may have contained evidence of
vetting for attendees of ATA training courses. Additionally, in Morocco, a
State official stated that he did not know if past vetting occurred
because staff responsible for implementing training at that time had
rotated to a new post.

State Has Clarified Procedures and Responsibilities for Human Rights Vetting,
but Lacks a Monitoring System to Ensure that Posts Comply with Vetting
Procedures

Lapses in vetting occurred in prior years because of weaknesses in
agencies' management controls: lack of clear and consistent vetting
procedures at departments and posts; lack of clear roles and
responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; and lack of an established
system to monitor compliance with these procedures at State and posts.23
Although State has taken steps to correct the first two weaknesses, State
still lacks a mechanism to monitor compliance.

  State Has Taken Steps to Clarify Procedures and Responsibilities for Vetting

To address our prior recommendation for State to establish clear and
consistent vetting procedures, State drafted a standard guide to human
rights vetting and distributed it to overseas posts in December 2005. This
guide clarifies the vetting procedures, outlines key steps in the vetting
process, requires each post to assign a single point of contact with
responsibility for vetting procedures, and provides required vetting
documentation and record retention policy. Moreover, the guide suggests
that each post develop standard vetting operating procedures that take
into consideration its needs and circumstances. In Morocco and Tunisia,
State officials established post-specific vetting procedures. For example,
the procedures at both posts require that the office implementing training
prepare a standard memorandum and send it to other offices within the post
to request vetting of training candidates. According to these officials,
the issuance of a written guide has clarified post officials'
understanding of vetting requirements under State's policy. For example,
the two posts did not always maintain the records of completed vetting
results in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The new State guidance and posts'
standard operating procedures now specify a requirement to maintain these
records for 3 years.

  State Has Required Points of Contact at Posts

Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation that State establish
clear roles and responsibilities at posts for human rights vetting, State
has required that each post assign a point of contact with responsibility
over human rights vetting. Specifically, State's December 2005 guide
specified that this official would have responsibility for

23In the July 2005 report reviewing human rights vetting in Southeast
Asia, we recommended that State establish clear and consistent vetting
procedures, clear roles and responsibilities for human rights vetting, and
monitoring mechanisms to verify that vetting procedures are carried out
properly. See GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and
Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces,
GAO-05-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).

oversight of vetting procedures. At the posts in Morocco and Tunisia, an
official from the political affairs section serves as the designated point
of contact responsible for human rights vetting.

  State Lacks a Monitoring Mechanism to Ensure Posts' Compliance with State
  Policies

As we found in Southeast Asian countries, post officials in Morocco and
Tunisia, along with officials from State headquarters office, do not
monitor posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting procedures.
However, our internal control standards state that an organization should
ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs as part of normal operations to
assess the quality of performance over time. State's December 2005 guide
states that each post's point of contact should have oversight of vetting
procedures, with the Chief of Mission responsible for ensuring that
vetting procedures are in place and being followed. However, neither post
had established specific activities to carry out this oversight
responsibility. For example, the points of contact did not regularly
verify with the State and DOD offices implementing training at posts that
all relevant trainees were vetted. Also, they did not monitor whether
these offices were following vetting procedures, such as maintaining
documentation of completed vetting of trainees.

Furthermore, as of June 2006, no headquarters office within State is
charged with monitoring posts' compliance with State's human rights
vetting procedures. State's December 2005 guide specifically states that
no single bureau is tasked with monitoring human rights vetting
procedures. According to State, some oversight is provided through the
established channel of periodic post inspections conducted by the Office
of the Inspector General (OIG). However, as of May 2006, assessments of
posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting process were not part
of State OIG's post inspections. In March 2006, State officials requested
the OIG to include reviews of human rights vetting procedures in post
inspections. In May 2006, a State OIG official stated that the OIG
workplan for inspection would incorporate a check that posts are vetting
candidates appropriately. However, inspections of a post would be
conducted approximately once every 5 or 6 years, according to a State OIG
official. This periodic inspection of posts' compliance does not meet our
standard for ongoing monitoring.

Without a monitoring system in place, State has no means of determining
whether posts are complying with required procedures intended to ensure
that trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. Consequently,
State lacks the information it needs to ensure that all posts are
following procedures to prevent foreign security forces with suspected
human rights records from receiving U.S. assistance.

Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that Require
                             Systematic Monitoring

To comply with the Arms Export Control Act, DOD established the Golden
Sentry program to monitor countries' use of U.S.-origin defense articles
provided through government-to-government transfers. This program requires
systematic monitoring, such as conducting physical inventories, of only
the most sensitive defense articles. Morocco and Tunisia do not have any
sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this systematic monitoring, and
Algeria does not participate in any programs involving government
transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as foreign military sales or EDA.
Monitoring of non-sensitive defense articles is done in conjunction with
other assigned duties with no reporting requirements or additional
resources. DOD officials in Rabat have not conducted any end-use
monitoring in Western Sahara. Additionally, according to State and based
on our work, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of
U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara that
would trigger greater scrutiny of end use.

End-Use Monitoring Program Established to Comply with Arms Export Control Act

In compliance with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,24 DOD
established an end-use monitoring program called Golden Sentry to ensure
the proper end-use monitoring of government-to-government transfers.25 To
make optimum use of the limited resources available for such monitoring
purposes, the Golden Sentry program requires different levels of
monitoring for different types of defense articles. For those articles
deemed sensitive by Golden Sentry such as man-portable air defense systems
and night vision devices, systematic monitoring, including physical
inventory and inspection procedures, is required. In addition, other
conditions or events can affect the level of monitoring that may occur.
For example, allegations of a country's misuse, a country's development of
ties with countries prohibited from receiving U.S. exports, or unusual
political or military upheaval can result in greater scrutiny.

The monitoring of nonsensitive defense articles and services, such as
trucks and spare parts, is referred to as routine end-use monitoring. This
routine end-use monitoring is performed by DOD officials in conjunction
with other assigned duties. Because DOD applies its resources to end-use
monitoring of sensitive items, it does not expend additional resources nor
require specific reporting on routine monitoring that is performed
incidental to its normal business contacts in these countries.

24In 1996, P.L. 104-164, Title 1, section 150(a), amended the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to require the President to establish
an end-use monitoring program for defense articles and services sold,
leased, or exported under the act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
The provision requires that, to the extent practicable, such a program
shall be designed to provide reasonable assurances that the recipient is
complying with the requirements imposed by the U.S. government with
respect to the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and
services, and that such articles and services are being used for the
purposes for which they are provided. 22 U.S.C. 2785.

25Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, provides that
defense articles and defense services shall be sold or leased to friendly
countries solely for internal security, legitimate self-defense,
preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
participation in regional or collective arrangements or measures
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit
the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by
the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace or security, or for the purpose of enabling foreign
military forces in less-developed friendly countries to construct public
works or engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social
development of friendly countries. 22 U.S.C 2754. The Arms Export Control
Act does not provide any further standards or definitions to apply in
determining whether these eligibility criteria are met. The Act does
provide that either the President, by a report to Congress, or Congress by
joint resolution, may determine whether a violation has occurred that will
render a country ineligible for further assistance. 22 U.S.C.
2753(c)(3)(A). Under the statute the President is required to report
promptly to Congress upon receipt of information that a substantial
violation of an agreement entered into under the Arms Export Control Act
may have occurred. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2753(c)(2).

Only routine end-use monitoring is required in Morocco and Tunisia because
these countries do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment. The U.S.
government gives these countries excess equipment through the EDA program
and sells them material to sustain their aging stocks of U.S.-origin
equipment with the help of FMF grants. Algeria does not obtain any defense
articles from the U.S. government. In accordance with DOD and EUCOM
guidelines for routine end-use monitoring, DOD officials at the posts in
Morocco and Tunisia stated that they visit a sample of host country bases
while conducting other business, such as meetings, exercises, or exchange
events, at those locations. These visits help DOD officials confirm the
proper use and condition of non-sensitive U.S.-origin equipment.
Additionally, according to DOD officials from EUCOM, DSCA, and at the
posts in Rabat and Tunis, there have been no allegations of unauthorized
use of U.S.-origin equipment, including in Western Sahara, that would
trigger greater scrutiny.

Morocco's Use of Equipment in Western Sahara

According to State, the United States has not placed any special
restrictions on Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara beyond those
provided for in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance
Act.26 Since DOD officials in Morocco do not generally conduct other
business in the Western Sahara, they have not conducted end-use monitoring
activities involving Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara,
according to a DOD official in Rabat. This official and a DSCA official
responsible for DOD's end-use monitoring program noted that, given the
absence of sensitive defense articles or allegations of misuse, DOD has no
reason to commit resources to inspections there. According to State and
other officials, State representatives do, however, visit Western Sahara
on other business including fact finding and humanitarian activities. In
addition, a State official stated and DOD guidance indicate that, should
an allegation of misuse arise, procedures exist for investigation. In
addition, the commanding general of the UN peacekeeping mission in Western
Sahara stated that there had been no allegations of Moroccan military
misuse of U.S.-origin equipment in the Western Sahara. Representatives of
the human rights organizations we spoke with also reported that they had
no reports of misuse.

26In congressional testimony in 1980, State and DOD articulated the U. S.
position that the use of U.S.-origin defense articles by Morocco in
Western Sahara was consistent with the Arms Export Control Act's criteria.
State officials told us that this position has not changed and noted that
it does not imply U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western
Sahara. See testimonies of Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; and
Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, Director, Defense Security Assistance
Agency before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs
and on Africa (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 1980).

                                   Conclusion

Security assistance is used as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy and
security goals, including respect for human rights. In 2005, we reported
that U.S. agencies did not have adequate assurance that U.S. training
funds were used to train and equip only foreign security forces with no
violations of human rights. Although State has taken steps to ensure more
consistent human rights vetting of foreign security forces receiving
U.S.-provided training, it still lacks a mechanism to monitor whether or
not posts are following its guidance, which is intended to ensure that
trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. State's guide, issued
in December 2005, assigned responsibility for monitoring the vetting
process to points of contact at U.S. posts but did not provide them with
guidance in carrying out this responsibility. Posts' points of contact in
Morocco and Tunisia were not monitoring posts' compliance with vetting
procedures, and State headquarters lacks assurance that posts are
following its vetting policy. This suggests that additional action is
needed to strengthen the monitoring element of internal controls. Although
State OIG inspections of posts once every 5 years may be a means of
monitoring whether posts follow vetting guidelines, internal control
standards recommend ongoing monitoring in the course of normal operations.
A routine monitoring mechanism would provide greater assurance that all
individuals are properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving
U.S. assistance and that any lapses in the proper screening of recipients
of U.S. assistance could be corrected.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

To provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security assistance
programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State policies
on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process of human
rights vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic
monitoring mechanism that will ensure that State's vetting procedures are
carried out at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend the following
two actions:

           o  The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at
           each post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S.
           training at the post comply with State's vetting policy.

           o  Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to
           a designated State headquarters unit to provide State with
           assurance of posts' compliance with its human rights vetting
           policy.

           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
			  
			  We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
           and State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our
           draft. State provided a written response that is reprinted in
           appendix IV and technical comments, which we incorporated in the
           report as appropriate. In commenting on our draft and in a
           subsequent e-mail, State concurred with our recommendations and
           indicated that they are taking steps to implement them. State also
           noted that our review did not uncover any evidence that the U.S.
           government has trained any individual or unit that has committed
           gross violations of human rights. However, our review only focused
           on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis vetted trainees.
           We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained
           by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human
           rights violations.

           We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of
           Defense and State and interested congressional committees. We will
           also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
           this report will be available on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
           please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]. Contact
           points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
           Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff
           who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix
           V.

           Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and Trade

           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
			  
			  To determine the goals of U.S. security assistance and how these
           goals are assessed, we interviewed officials from the Department
           of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) in
           Washington, D.C., responsible for overseeing security assistance
           programs. We also interviewed DOD officials at the U.S. European
           Command in Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. Embassy officials in Rabat,
           Morocco, and Tunis, Tunisia; and foreign government officials in
           Rabat. We did not include Algeria in our site visits because its
           level of participation in U.S. security assistance programs was
           significantly lower than Morocco's and Tunisia's. Additionally, we
           reviewed State's Mission Performance Plans and DOD's Country
           Campaign Plans for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as a
           variety of other State and DOD documents to determine how U.S.
           security assistance programs were linked to State and DOD goals.
           We obtained data on the nature and extent of the activities funded
           by these programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from program
           officials and State and DOD documents. We reviewed the reliability
           of funding data provided by State and DOD by comparing it with
           similar data obtained from other sources to check for
           completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also interviewed
           program officials responsible for managing the data to assess how
           it was developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently
           reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding
           and activities.

           To assess U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of
           State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure
           compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions,
           we reviewed relevant statutes and implementing guidelines. These
           include the fiscal years 2004 through 2006 Foreign Operations
           Appropriations Acts and the DOD Appropriations Acts, and the DOD
           Security Assistance Management Manual. We also reviewed program
           policy and procedures issued by State and DOD officials in
           Washington, D.C., and at the posts in Rabat and Tunis. To
           understand human rights vetting requirements and processes, we
           interviewed relevant officials in Washington, D.C., the U.S.
           European Command, and the two posts to discuss vetting
           requirements and processes. We also reviewed the recommendations
           made in our July 2005 report on human rights vetting in Southeast
           Asia. Furthermore, we communicated with a State Office of
           Inspector General (OIG) official to determine the extent to which
           State OIG has oversight of human rights vetting at posts. To
           obtain a general understanding of the human rights situation in
           Morocco and Tunisia, we met with State human rights officers and
           representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with
           human rights issues.

           To determine the extent to which the two posts complied with human
           rights vetting policy in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we asked the
           relevant State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at each
           post to determine the number of foreign security force personnel
           receiving training implemented at the posts in fiscal years 2004
           and 2005. We further asked post officials to identify the total
           number of vetting files maintained at the post for trainees in
           this time frame. To identify the approximate number of trainees
           for whom posts did not maintain vetting files and, therefore, who
           may not have been vetted, we used training data provided by agency
           reports as well as State and DOD officials. For vetting files that
           were available at the posts, we drew a stratified random
           probability sample of 273 of 468 trainee vetting files available
           at the U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia. With our probability
           sample, each member of the study population had a nonzero
           probability of being included, and that probability could be
           computed for any member. We stratified the population by country
           and by agency implementing training into the Morocco DOD, Morocco
           State, and Tunisia DOD case files. Each sample case file was
           subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically for
           all the case files in the population, including those who were not
           selected. We reviewed the files for compliance with State human
           rights vetting policy. To conduct the file review, we used a data
           collection instrument to systematically capture whether key steps
           in the post's human rights vetting process occurred, such as
           whether the political affairs office at each post was involved. We
           did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained by
           the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human
           rights violations.

           Because we followed a probability procedure based on random
           selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples
           that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided
           different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of
           our particular sample's results as 95 percent confidence intervals
           (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage points). These are intervals
           that would contain the actual population values for 95 percent of
           the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent
           confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report
           will include the true values in the study population.

           To examine U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor the use of
           U.S.-origin defense articles provided to these countries, we
           reviewed relevant federal laws governing the use of arms exports,
           including the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and the
           Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and reviewed DOD
           end-use monitoring guidance. We interviewed DOD officials
           responsible for end-use monitoring at the Defense Security
           Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in Rabat and Tunis
           to determine what monitoring activities took place in these
           countries, whether these countries have any sensitive defense
           articles requiring systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and
           whether there have been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin
           equipment. Algeria does not receive U.S.-origin defense articles
           from the U.S. government. We also interviewed State human rights
           officers in Rabat, Tunis and Washington, D.C. as well as
           representatives of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to
           determine if there have been any allegations of misuse involving
           U.S.-origin defense articles. Furthermore, we spoke with the
           commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Western
           Sahara regarding Morocco's military presence there. We also
           received intelligence briefings from EUCOM and DIA officials. To
           determine U.S. policy on the use of U.S.-origin equipment by
           Morocco in Western Sahara, we interviewed State and DOD officials
           in Washington, D.C., and at the post in Morocco and reviewed
           relevant State and DOD congressional testimony regarding Western
           Sahara.

           We conducted this review from October 2005 to July 2006 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

           Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process inMorocco and Tunisia
			  as of February 2006
			  
			  Agency vetting of candidates for human rights concerns in Morocco
           and Tunisia typically includes the following steps. First, the
           office at the post implementing the training programs receives
           names of training candidates and reviews background information
           from the host government.

           Second, the implementing office forwards the names of training
           candidates to the point of contact at State's political affairs
           office at the post for screening, which includes searches using
           paper and electronic files, for evidence of the candidates'
           involvement in human rights violations. The political office may
           also consult human rights nongovernmental organizations for any
           information they have on the candidates. The implementing office
           also circulates the candidates' names to other relevant offices
           within the post, such as State's regional security office and
           consular affairs office, for vetting. These offices respond to the
           implementing office with their vetting results.

           The point of contact in the post's political affairs office sends
           the training candidates' names via cable to the relevant regional
           bureau, such as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to request
           human rights screening by State headquarters. The regional bureau
           checks candidates' names against bureau files, and then forwards
           these names to other bureaus at State headquarters for further
           vetting. These bureaus-including the Bureaus of Democracy, Human
           Rights, and Labor; Intelligence and Research; and
           Political-Military Affairs-screen candidates' names using paper
           and electronic files available to them and then report vetting
           results to the regional bureau.

           Finally, the regional bureau communicates State headquarters'
           vetting results via cable to the post to inform the point of
           contact and the implementing office whether credible evidence of
           gross human rights violations existed for training candidates.

           When vetting candidates' names, the political affairs office at
           posts and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor access
           State's Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES), a database that
           contains information on alleged human rights abuses. Data in the
           system come from post reporting, the press, nongovernmental
           organizations, national human rights commissions, and other
           sources. Users at posts and State headquarters enter comments on
           allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
           validates information for completeness and accuracy. In screening
           training candidates, post officials use ACES to conduct vetting
           checks by entering names into the database to determine whether it
           contains derogatory information on an individual. Although State
           implemented ACES in February 2005, officials at posts and State
           headquarters informed us that ACES does not contain entries for
           Morocco and Tunisia because they had no derogatory information on
           specific individuals to report as of June 2006.

           Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of
			  Vetting in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005
			  
			  We obtained the estimated number of trainees for whom posts lacked
           vetting files using data provided by State and DOD training
           reports and agency officials. See Table 5 for more information on
           the types of training which lacked vetting files.

           Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files,
           Fiscal Years 2004-2005
			  
                                                   Number of trainees with no 
Implementing agency and country                  files maintained at posts 
DOD                                             
International Military Education and Training,                             
Morocco                                                                 29
International Military Education and Training,                             
Tunisia                                                                 25
Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship                               
Program, Morocco                                                         6
Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship                               
Program, Tunisia                                                        10
Regional centers, Morocco                                               29 
Regional centers, Tunisia                                               35 
Service academies, Morocco                                               1 
Service academies, Tunisia                                              13 
DOD subtotal                                                           148 
State                                           
Antiterrorism Assistance, Morocco                                       80 
Antiterrorism Assistance, Tunisia                                       42 
International Narcotics Control and Law                                    
Enforcement, Morocco                                                   168
State subtotal                                                         290 
Total                                                                  438 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

           Our review of a sample of human rights vetting files showed that
           an estimated 27 percent had no evidence of vetting. Details by the
           implementing office and country are shown in Table 6.

           Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in
           Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005

                                           GAO sample                         
                        Number of trainees    size by Estimated percentage of 
Implementing agency          with files    agency/  files with no evidence 
and country         maintained at posts    country              of vetting
DOD                                                
Moroccoa                            148         49                     65% 
Tunisiab                            143         47                      0% 
State                                              
Moroccoc                            177        177                     17% 
Morocco subtotald                   325        226                     39% 
Tunisia subtotale                   143         47                      0% 
Totalf                              468        273                     27% 

           Source: GAO.

           aThis number is composed of training nominees for International
           Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense
           Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Foreign Military
           Financing. We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of DOD
           Morocco files with no evidence of vetting is between 53 percent
           and 76 percent.

           bThis number is composed of training nominees for IMET, CTFP, and
           the Aviation Leadership Program. We are 95 percent confident that
           the percentage of DOD Tunisia files with no evidence of vetting is
           between 0 percent and 6 percent.

           cThis number is composed of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
           training nominees for whom State maintained vetting files. Some
           training nominees may not have attended the training course due to
           cancellations. State's data indicated that Morocco held additional
           ATA courses; however, we did not find vetting files for training
           nominees for these courses. The sample size represents the entire
           population of available State-provided training courses with
           vetting files.

           dWe are 95 percent confident that the percentage of Morocco files
           with no evidence of vetting is between 34 and 44 percent.

           eSee table note b.

           fWe are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files
           with no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent.
			  
			  Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State Appendix IV: Comments
			  from the Department of State

           Appendix V: A Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments			  

           GAO Contact
			  
			  Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]

           Staff Acknowledgments

           In addition, Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern;
           Howard Cott; David Dornisch; James Krustapentus; Victoria Lin;
           Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this
           report.

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-850 .

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and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
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Highlights of GAO-06-850 , a report to congressional requesters

July 2006

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need
for Further Oversight

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on
terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security
assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence
exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights
violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to
these countries and examines U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance,
(2) assesses U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of
State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with
congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines
agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense articles
provided through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries,
including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or diverted.
GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files
to determine compliance with human rights vetting policy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, strengthen the process for human rights vetting of
foreign security forces by establishing a systematic monitoring mechanism
that will ensure that State's vetting procedures are carried out at
overseas posts. State concurred with our recommendations.

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security,
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments
of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6
million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security
forces in these countries. DOD and State assess these programs together
with other related activities through evaluations of security cooperation,
counterterrorism, and other country goals.

State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and
Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years
2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no
vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts
maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of
these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting
trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, undefined
roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a systematic
monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were followed. Although
State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and has required posts to
assign an official responsible for vetting, it does not monitor whether
posts are following vetting procedures.

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin
defense articles subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, such
as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD
officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized
use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would call for greater
scrutiny of end use by these countries.

The United States Provides Excess Defense Articles to Morocco and Tunisia
*** End of document. ***