    Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S.
    Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many
    Missions and New Organization (08-SEP-06, GAO-06-847).

    In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the
    creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to
    anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has
    responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear
    deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to
    determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1)
    implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and
    (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing
    relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and
    organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's
    efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful
    organizational transformations.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-847
        ACCNO:   A60546
      TITLE:     Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by
    U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many
    Missions and New Organization
         DATE:   09/08/2006
      SUBJECT:   Agency evaluation
    	     Agency missions
    	     Federal agency reorganization
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Military communication
    	     Performance measures
    	     Security threats
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Agency organizational structure
    	     Interorganizational relations
    	     Policies and procedures

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    GAO-06-847

         * Results in Brief
         * Background
         * USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, b
              * USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Mission
              * USSTRATCOM's Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Suppo
                   * Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges
                   * Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identi
              * New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Cri
              * USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Mana
         * USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a C
              * USSTRATCOM's Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Speci
              * USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy
                   * Command Considers External Outreach Essential
                   * Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach
         * Conclusions
         * Recommendations
         * Matter for Congressional Consideration
         * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United
              * USSTRATCOM's Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establ
                   * Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities
                   * USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Amon
              * Scope and Methodology
         * Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Str
              * Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stabl
                   * Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met W
                   * USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Pos
                   * Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of
              * Scope and Methodology
         * Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
         * Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations a
         * Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
         * Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
              * GAO Contact
              * Acknowledgments
                   * Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
    Services, House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    September 2006

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen
    Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization

    GAO-06-847

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 4
    Background 7
    USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are
    Incomplete 11
    USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide
    Outreach Strategy 26
    Conclusions 34
    Recommendations 35
    Matter for Congressional Consideration 37
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38
    Appendix I GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
    Strategic Command's Budget 43
    Appendix II GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic Command
    Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 46
    Appendix III Scope and Methodology 52
    Appendix IV United States Strategic Command Organizations and
    Responsibilities 58
    Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 61
    Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

    Tables

    Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
    2003 through 2011 10
    Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
    Mission Organizations 20
    Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles 24
    Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
    Organizations as of February 2006 48
    Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
    Positions in October 2007 50
    Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review 57
    Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities 59

    Figures

    Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization 8
    Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate Mission
    Organizations 58

    Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    September 8, 2006

    The Honorable Terry Everett Chairman The Honorable Silvestre Reyes Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed
    Services House of Representatives

    In 2002, following a series of high-level Department of Defense (DOD)
    studies including the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture
    Review, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of
    a new unified command, the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),1
    to effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the diverse and
    increasingly complex global threats the United States faces for the
    foreseeable future. USSTRATCOM was initially assigned responsibility for
    nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network operations. The President,
    in January 2003, expanded USSTRATCOM's global responsibilities and
    capabilities to include global strike planning and execution; integration
    of global ballistic missile defense; oversight of intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global command and control; and DOD
    information operations. In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense also
    assigned the command with responsibilities for integrating and
    synchronizing DOD's efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction. Each
    of USSTRATCOM's seven missions has a significant role in implementing
    DOD's New Triad concept for transforming U.S. strategic capabilities.2 DOD
    envisions that the combination of capabilities provided by these global
    missions would potentially add value for the combatant commanders in
    conducting operations in and across regional areas and provide the
    President and Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of military
    options for responding to future threats, including those involving
    weapons of mass destruction.

    1A previous unified command, also called U.S. Strategic Command, had been
    established in 1992 and had primary responsibility for strategic nuclear
    forces. The new USSTRATCOM was formed from combining the nuclear
    deterrence mission of the previous command and the space and computer
    network operations missions of the also disestablished U.S. Space Command.

    The set of diverse global missions assigned to USSTRATCOM span multiple
    levels and lines of authority, cross combatant command regional
    boundaries, and intersect with various national and international
    organizations. Under USSTRATCOM's most recent reorganization, which it
    began implementing in late 2004, the command has assigned day-to-day
    operations and management responsibility for most of its mission areas to
    five new subordinate organizations.3 These new organizations are
    geographically dispersed and most are aligned with key DOD agencies or
    military services to provide leadership and access to their competencies,
    such as the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare
    partnering with the National Security Agency.

    USSTRATCOM is attempting to transform its organization to better meet the
    security challenges of the new century and effectively anticipate,
    counter, and eliminate the emergence of unconventional threats overseas
    and at home. In our prior work to identify useful practices and lessons
    learned in implementing successful organizational mergers and
    transformations, we found that in successful transformations,
    organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more
    results-oriented, client- and customer-oriented, and collaborative in
    nature. Such high-performing organizations create a culture that includes
    moving from outputs to results; stovepipes to matrixes; hierarchical to
    flatter and more horizontal structures; an inward to an external focus on
    customers and other stakeholders; reactive behavior to proactive
    approaches; hoarding knowledge to sharing knowledge; and protecting "turf"
    to forming partnerships. To successfully transform, an organization must
    fundamentally reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and
    management approaches.4

    2DOD's New Triad concept is intended to bring together nuclear and
    conventional offensive strike, active and passive defense, enhanced
    command and control, planning, and intelligence capabilities and a
    revitalized defense infrastructure to provide the President and Secretary
    of Defense with a broad array of military options to better address the
    spectrum of potential opponents and contingencies that may arise in the
    coming decades. We issued a report on the New Triad that discusses the
    progress made by DOD in determining and allocating resources needed to
    implement the concept today and in the future. See, GAO, Military
    Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad
    Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-540
    (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).

    3The new organizations are the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Space and Global Strike; Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
    Missile Defense; Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint Functional Component Command for
    Network Warfare; and USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
    Destruction.

    At your request, we reviewed the progress made by USSTRATCOM in developing
    and integrating its missions to provide new capabilities and expand U.S.
    options for responding to global threats. Specifically, we assessed the
    extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new
    missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational
    responsibilities and establishing relationships with other DOD commands
    and organizations.

    To obtain information on USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement and assess its
    new missions, define its organization, and establish relationships with
    other organizations, we reviewed USSTRATCOM, DOD, Joint Staff, and
    military service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status
    reports, and other pertinent documentation. We observed a major USSTRATCOM
    command exercise, Global Lightning, in November 2005, at the command's
    headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska; discussed the results with
    participating officials; and reviewed the command's after-action report
    and associated documentation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM officials at
    headquarters; subordinate mission organizations; Army, Air Force, and
    Marine Corps service components; and the Navy Fleet Forces Command. In
    addition, we reviewed organizational assessments prepared by think tanks,
    such as LMI Government Consulting and RAND Corporation, and discussed the
    assessments with their staffs to obtain their perspectives on USSTRATCOM's
    approach for organizing and managing its missions. We also obtained and
    analyzed information on USSTRATCOM's budget and authorized personnel data
    to identify trends in acquiring the resources, staff levels, and skills
    needed to implement the command's missions (see apps. I and II).

    4We have issued several reports addressing best practices followed by
    federal government agencies and private-sector organizations in
    implementing successful mergers and transformations and building
    high-performance organizations. These reports include GAO, Highlights of a
    GAO Forum on High-Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means, and Mechanisms
    for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public Management
    Environment, GAO-04-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004); Highlights of
    a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department
    of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington,
    D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); 21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to
    Meet Current and Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-830T (Washington, D.C.: July
    13, 2005); and Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
    Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.:
    July 2, 2003).

    We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses, and
    determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
    conducted our review from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix III for a
    more complete description of our scope and methodology.

                                    Results in Brief

    USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions but
    additional steps are needed to expand upon this progress in order to
    achieve the vision and goals underlying the command's establishment. To
    date, the command has made progress in developing concepts of operations;
    establishing plans, guidance, and policy for its missions; and obtaining
    personnel and resources needed to begin operations. For example, in
    implementing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission,
    the command has partnered with the Defense Intelligence Agency to improve
    its access and coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies.
    In addition, to prevent and defend against intrusions into DOD's critical
    information network systems, the command has recently instituted new
    controls and trained system users to reduce system vulnerabilities.
    However, while the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on
    its progress to date and has some additional actions underway in its seven
    mission areas, more comprehensive plans and actions are needed in several
    areas to help the command achieve DOD's vision. First, while USSTRATCOM
    has taken initial steps to include its newer missions in its training
    exercises, the command has not yet fully developed a robust exercise
    program that integrates the exercise support available from the U.S. Joint
    Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center, whose mission includes
    providing planning tools and independent observer teams to strengthen
    exercises. Our prior work has shown that robust exercise programs are
    important for assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly
    when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Second,
    USSTRATCOM has established specific milestones for its mission areas to
    achieve full operating capability but neither the command nor its
    subordinate mission organizations have established clear criteria to use
    in assessing whether mission organizations have reached full operating
    capability. Third, the command has not developed a results-oriented
    management approach with strategic goals and performance measures and
    criteria for continuously assessing results across the command and in each
    of its mission areas. Our prior work has shown that organizations
    undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of
    success by adopting a results-oriented management approach to guide and
    measure progress. Developing plans in each of these areas should better
    position the command to meet two of DOD's major goals for the
    command-providing combatant commanders with added value in conducting
    operations and giving the President and the Secretary of Defense an
    expanded set of military options for responding to future threats.

    USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
    organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations
    that have responsibility for daily operations. However, opportunities
    exist to clarify and improve the command's relationships with subordinate
    organizations and other commands. The command's new organizational
    framework, while still being implemented, has led to better identification
    of resources, staffing, and skills for each of USSTRATCOM's diverse
    missions. Also, many of the actions the command has taken to implement its
    latest reorganization-such as establishing a matrixed, horizontal
    organizational structure that openly shares information-are consistent
    with transformation approaches that have been used by high-performing
    organizations. However, moving forward, two areas warrant additional
    attention. Specifically, while USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to
    its service component organizations, this guidance has not been specific
    or well documented and Army, Air Force, and Navy service component
    officials told us that additional guidance is needed to more clearly
    define responsibilities and relationships. In addition, while the command
    conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations,
    USSTRATCOM has not developed a commandwide strategy to effectively manage
    and coordinate its external outreach activities. Because USSTRATCOM
    supports or is supported by a large number of commands and organizations
    in executing its diverse missions, the command considers effective
    relationships and communications essential. However, providing
    coordinated, consistent outreach to other DOD organizations, such as
    combatant commands, has become more difficult since USSTRATCOM established
    separate subordinate organizations for several of its missions. Developing
    additional strategies and plans to address these two challenges should
    help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations better understand their
    roles and the command build more effective relationships with other
    commands.

    To strengthen USSTRATCOM efforts to implement its missions and establish
    its most recent organizational approach, we are recommending that the
    Secretary of Defense take seven actions; three actions that are designed
    to improve the command's access to the services and resources that the
    U.S. Joint Forces Command can provide to support USSTRATCOM's exercise
    program and four other actions intended to (1) clarify guidance on the
    criteria to be used by USSTRATCOM mission organizations in declaring full
    operating capability, (2) improve evaluation of the command's longer-term
    progress in its mission areas, (3) provide more complete guidance to its
    service component organizations, and (4) strengthen its external
    communications with other organizations and commands. DOD, in its comments
    on a draft of this report, generally agreed with our three recommendations
    regarding U.S. Joint Forces Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise
    program. DOD disagreed with our four other recommendations. In its
    comments, DOD stated that measures are already in place that address the
    issues raised by the report. We disagree that the actions taken by
    USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and are
    complete. While USSTRATCOM has taken some positive actions on these
    issues, we do not believe that the command's actions go far enough in
    providing a clear and transparent process for evaluating the command's
    progress in implementing its mission areas, provide more complete guidance
    to its mission and service component organizations, and strengthen its
    external communications with other organizations and commands. For
    example, while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct outreach
    activities to promote its missions and capabilities, we found that these
    activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to
    achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. USSTRATCOM commander's
    summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning
    exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a
    comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among other
    combatant commands about USSTRATCOM's capabilities. However, command
    officials told us that the command does not have any current plans to
    develop such a strategy. Additionally, because of the importance of the
    command's new role in expanding the military options for addressing
    emerging threats, we continue to believe that creation of a longer-term,
    comprehensive, results-oriented management process is needed that would
    improve transparency and accountability of the extent to which the command
    is achieving the desired outcomes of its overall goals and objectives in
    each of its mission areas. Therefore, we are now suggesting that Congress
    consider requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop such
    a process and report to Congress on command's progress in achieving
    desired outcomes. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
    appendix V and our evaluation of its comments is on page 38.

                                       Background

    USSTRATCOM's global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that are
    intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment
    brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats to
    U.S. national security. Unlike the command's nuclear deterrence and space
    operations missions, the command's global strike; integrated ballistic
    missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
    information operations; global command and control; and combating weapons
    of mass destruction missions had not been previously assigned to a unified
    command. These newer missions have been performed, mostly ad hoc, by
    multiple DOD organizations and the military services but did not have a
    primary joint sponsor and central focus within DOD.

    The command's most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted the
    day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its missions
    from its headquarters to several new subordinate organizations. USSTRATCOM
    intends that its latest organizational construct will provide greater
    focus, continuity, and performance for its missions and better accommodate
    the execution of the command's global responsibilities by reducing
    organizational layers and enabling communication and information to flow
    more easily from the most senior levels of leadership to those producing
    the information. The command envisions that this new organizational
    construct will reduce the cycle time for reaching and implementing
    decisions for its missions, increase the effectiveness of the products and
    services it provides in support of the regional combatant commands, and
    provide improved access to all of the command's capabilities. USSTRATCOM,
    for example, has recently established a joint space operations center,
    under its Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike,
    to more effectively respond to requests from regional combatant commands
    for space capabilities. As shown in figure 1, the current USSTRATCOM
    organization is comprised of a command headquarters, service component or
    supporting commands, joint functional component commands, centers, and
    task forces.

    Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization

    Notes: C2= command and control; JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command;
    WMD= weapons of mass destruction.

    Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM's headquarters would focus
    primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level
    integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans,
    managing command and control operations and support, and advocating for
    mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating
    objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining
    policy and concepts; and providing direction to the command's subordinate
    organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has responsibility
    for planning and deploying forces for the command's nuclear mission.

    The reorganization created four new joint functional component commands
    for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense; (3)
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network warfare.
    These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for operational and
    tactical-level planning and execution and management of forces. The new
    organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of
    Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations Center, and Joint Task
    Force for Global Network Operations that work with the command, the
    unified commands, and mission partners to provide operational solutions to
    mission-related problems.

    The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate
    organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to
    leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas.
    For example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint Functional
    Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance with
    the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., area to take
    advantage of the agency's capabilities and improve access and coordination
    with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To further strengthen the
    partnership between the organizations, the commander of the component
    command is also the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In
    response to intelligence information requests from the combatant
    commanders, the agency would globally prioritize intelligence collection
    requirements and the joint functional component command would then
    prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets to best meet those requirements. Appendix IV
    provides additional information about the command's key mission
    organizations.

    Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships
    with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM
    accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three service
    component commands-the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air Force Forces
    Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command-and the
    Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command. Unlike the other services, the
    Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting command rather than a designated
    service component command to USSTRATCOM.5 However, Fleet Forces Command's
    overarching responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with
    those of the other service components. Each service command acts as the
    primary focal point for its respective service capabilities and has
    responsibilities for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are
    organized, trained, and equipped to support the command in carrying out
    its missions and providing the administrative chain of command and control
    for its respective service forces.

    5The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint
    Publication 0-2, defines a service component command as a command
    consisting of the service component commander and all those service
    forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and
    installations under the command, including the support forces that have
    been assigned to a combatant command. Service component commands report
    directly to the Commander, USSTRATCOM. A supporting commander, in the
    context of a support command relationship, is a commander who aids,
    protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and is
    responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported
    commander.

    Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM's budget has grown
    significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in
    then-year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year
    2006, excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM
    service component commands and other supporting agencies.6 The command's
    annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by fiscal year
    2011. Table 1 details the command's historic and projected budget by major
    appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through 2011. The command's
    budget is comprised mostly of operation and maintenance funding, with
    lesser amounts of research and development and procurement funding
    associated with programs for intelligence, information operations, network
    warfare, command and control, and planning systems. Appendix I provides
    more details about USSTRATCOM's budget.

    Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
    2003 through 2011

    Total obligation authority in millions of then-year dollars
                                               Fiscal year
    Appropriations
    account          2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011
    Operation and
    Maintenance    $253.2 $353.5 $408.6 $417.3 $438.6 $442.6 $457.9 $467.6 $477.6
    Procurement      23.6   44.3   45.0   33.9   31.9   35.3   39.0   34.3   34.9
    Research and
    Development         0    8.8   36.2   49.2   51.4   37.6   34.9   38.3   38.9
    Totala         $276.8 $406.6 $489.9 $500.4 $521.9 $515.5 $531.8 $540.2 $551.4

    Source: USSTRATCOM.

    Notes: Data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 are actual command
    expenditures, data for fiscal year 2006 are funding distributions, and
    data for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 are funding projections current as
    of the President's budget submission for fiscal year 2006. Totals do not
    include Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps military personnel
    appropriations and appropriations made to USSTRATCOM service components
    and supporting agencies, because these appropriations are not managed by
    the command in performing its operations. aTotals may not add due to
    rounding.

    6Appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service component
    commands and other supporting agencies are not managed by the command in
    performing its operations, and are therefore not part of the command's
    annual budgets.

    Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM's authorized number of military and
    civilian positions7 has increased by about 300. As of October 2005, the
    command's overall authorized personnel level was composed of 2,947
    military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent were filled. Of the
    2,947 positions, military positions comprise about 72 percent of the
    positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the largest number of
    positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the remaining 28 percent
    (835). The command has begun to fill positions in its new mission
    organizations from within its existing authorized personnel levels by
    transferring positions from its headquarters to the new organizations over
    a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. The command's authorized
    personnel levels are made up of a relatively few number of skills,
    although the mix of military skills has changed since 2002. Additional
    information about USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel levels is in appendix
    II.

    USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are
                                       Incomplete

    USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has
    taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to prepare
    or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy; identify
    resources needed for mission planning and execution; and establish an
    organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide
    the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the command's
    actions are consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with
    high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that
    we have identified in our past work. However, further steps are needed to
    build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by
    the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the
    command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its
    exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully developed a robust exercise
    program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint
    Forces Command, which can provide planning, training, and exercise tools.
    In addition, while USSTRATCOM's leadership has provided general guidance
    to its mission organizations, it has not provided specific information or
    identified consistent requirements for achieving full operating capability
    and most of the command's new mission organizations have not established
    clear criteria for determining when they have reached this milestone.
    Also, while the command has adopted some key management principles, the
    command has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented
    performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command
    and in each of its mission areas.

    7USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel levels are defined as the number of
    authorized positions for civilian and uniformed military personnel that
    are funded by the services and assigned to the command.

    USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Missions

    Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its
    new missions and has taken a wide range of positive actions to integrate
    these missions into its organization, such as developing various plans,
    concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures and processes; identifying
    personnel and funding resources; developing new relationships; building
    communication networks; and providing education, training, and exercises.
    For example, the command has prepared concepts of operations for its
    missions and organization, such as operations for network warfare and
    global integrated missile defense, and has recently approved a concept of
    operations describing the processes it will use in integrating its diverse
    capabilities and providing warfighting options to regional combatant
    commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has taken other actions, including (1)
    establishing collaboration tools and processes to improve communication
    for planning, execution, and evaluation among its organizations and
    customers; (2) creating various processes and groups within the command to
    advocate for the capabilities necessary to accomplish its missions, such
    as advocating for modification of the Trident II missile to provide an
    improved near-term conventional global strike capability; and (3)
    upgrading and expanding its facilities, such as improvements to the
    command's headquarters command center. The command has also taken actions
    to demonstrate the value added of its missions for other combatant
    commands and DOD organizations. For example, to implement its mission
    responsibilities for preventing and defending against intrusions into
    DOD's critical information network systems, the command's Joint Task Force
    for Global Network Operations has recently instituted stringent use
    controls and trained system users to improve security and reduce
    vulnerabilities for these systems.

    As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several
    reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and
    provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the
    actions the command has taken to implement its latest reorganization are
    consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with
    high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that
    we have identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed,
    horizontal organizational structure that provides a greater external focus
    for its customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and openly
    shares information. As discussed earlier, its latest reorganization
    intends to leverage essential competencies of associated components and
    key supporting agencies and decentralize the responsibility of its
    headquarters for the day-to-day planning and execution of its primary
    mission areas to several interdependent mission organizations. While the
    command's mission organizations differ in the extent of their maturity,
    USSTRATCOM has focused considerable attention over the past year on
    establishing their responsibilities, command and agency relationships, and
    operational competencies, and assigning personnel to these new
    organizations. Its senior leadership has also taken an active and visible
    role in supporting the organizational changes underway.

    USSTRATCOM's Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Support Available from
    the U.S. Joint Forces Command

    USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate its
    missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all of its
    missions and new organizations. While the command is taking steps to
    address the challenges in more fully including its missions in its
    exercises, it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that
    integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's
    Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning, training, and
    exercise tools.8

      Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges

    USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began
    incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in November
    2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same exercise in its
    two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in November 2005, and Global
    Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an annual USSTRATCOM-sponsored
    command-post exercise, which involves the commander and his staff in
    testing and validating the communications within and between headquarters
    and simulated forces in deterring a military attack and employing forces
    as directed. The annual Global Thunder exercise is the command's main
    nuclear deterrence field training exercise, which uses actual forces in
    training commanders, staff, and individual units at all levels of their
    warfare skills. Another command-post exercise, Global Storm, is designed
    to cover the command's missions that are most relevant in the early stages
    of conflict, such as information operations and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance. The command plans to conduct this
    exercise annually depending on scheduling and resource considerations.

    8The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center assists the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commanders, and chiefs of
    the services in their preparation for joint warfare both in the
    conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint
    doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint exercises and training. It
    provides the core expertise to assist in the planning, execution, and
    assessment of joint exercises and training activities.

    The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise program
    across its missions and new organizations. However, the command is taking
    some actions to overcome these challenges, and some of these challenges
    should lessen over time as the command's missions and organizations
    mature. First, many of the command's operational concepts, directives, and
    instructions used in designing and executing exercises have not yet been
    approved, developed, or revised to reflect its new organization. For
    example, at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, some
    USSTRATCOM mission organizations were executing their processes and
    procedures without the benefit of complete and approved doctrine because
    several key concepts of operations for its missions, such as the concept
    of operations for horizontally integrating its missions, were still in
    draft form. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command has to prepare
    plans for an exercise many months in advance even if its doctrine
    continues to evolve. The officials said that USSTRATCOM incorporates any
    changes to doctrine and guidance as it develops its exercise plan, but
    these changes are more difficult to make as the plan becomes more complete
    and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM official told us that doctrine and
    guidance should become more stable and change less frequently as the
    command's missions, organization, and processes mature.

    Second, several of the command's new mission organizations are still being
    established, which has affected their ability to fully participate in the
    command's recent exercises and identify exercise objectives. For example,
    at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the new joint
    functional component commands had existed for less than 1 year, and the
    Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction had been established for
    only 3 months. According to the Chief of Staff for the intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance component, the component was not able to
    establish full connectivity during the exercise because it was still
    operating out of temporary facilities. Further, the new mission
    organizations were too immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked
    the established processes and procedures needed to plan their own
    objectives for the November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM
    officials. Instead, the new organizations' exercise objectives for the
    November 2005 Global Lightning exercise were established by the command's
    headquarters and linked to a broader set of critical tasks and
    responsibilities. Moreover, while the command's Center for Combating
    Weapons of Mass Destruction personnel participated extensively in the
    November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives
    had been developed for the center's mission area. To begin addressing the
    challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in exercise
    development, the command has advocated the establishment of an exercise or
    training group within each of its mission organizations and some groups
    have been created, such as in the space and global strike and integrated
    missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation for the next
    Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission organizations plan to
    be more involved in preparing exercise objectives for their mission areas
    and intend to send their personnel to training workshops conducted by the
    U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to learn how to
    develop these objectives.

    Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that fully
    covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so diverse and
    their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type and stage of a
    particular crisis. USSTRATCOM's intent is to design its exercises so as to
    integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities of its global
    missions to provide a range of options throughout the various stages of a
    crisis and possible conflict. For example, the command has found that some
    of its missions, such as information operations, quickly become overlooked
    during its exercises as events move from crisis into actual conflict.
    Moreover, the command believes that its exercise program needs to place
    greater emphasis on the early stages of a crisis because much of
    USSTRATCOM's daily operations are conducted before and just after a crisis
    has begun. To foster greater inclusion of its missions into its exercises,
    the command used a series of brief, scripted training events that preceded
    its first Global Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide
    opportunities to incorporate some of its missions, particularly
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005
    Global Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that
    extended from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers
    to prepare a scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command's
    missions. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that
    the annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events incorporate
    multiple missions to provide additional evaluation opportunities.
    Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm exercises to
    specifically focus on those missions that are most pertinent before
    conflict begins.

      Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identified

    USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available from
    the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain
    greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting
    Center to help the command address its challenges in executing a robust
    exercise program, the command and the center have not reached agreement on
    the extent of support the center will provide. Our past work has shown
    that robust exercise programs are important for assessing and improving
    mission capabilities, particularly when multiple organizations are
    involved in mission execution.9 Moreover, DOD's recently issued Strategic
    Plan for Transforming DOD Training10 supports an increased training focus
    for many missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of
    mass destruction, global strike, information operations, and ballistic
    missile defense.

    U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force
    training, and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to identify
    training requirements and methods, and for assisting them with executing
    exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint Forces Command,
    the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to combatant commands in
    identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for planning,
    implementing, and evaluating exercises. The center trains combatant
    command staff to better design exercise objectives that are clearly linked
    to the command's essential tasks. It can also send independent observer
    teams to an exercise to assess the command's performance and prepare
    after-action reports and related assessments. The Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for
    ensuring that DOD's joint training programs and resources are sufficient
    to produce ready forces and overseeing the implementation of DOD's
    training transformation strategy.

    USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint
    Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example, obtained
    limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global Thunder
    exercise, including teams to observe the participation and activities of
    its space and global strike component. However, USSTRATCOM's requirements
    have not been typically identified far enough in advance for the center to
    assign staff and commit resources in providing the full range of requested
    support. For example, command officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought
    extensive Joint Warfighting Center support for the November 2005 Global
    Lightning exercise, but the center had already committed to supporting a
    U.S. Northern Command exercise that was scheduled over the same time
    period. The center was able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such
    as providing simulated video news clippings to add context to the events
    in the exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning
    exercise to the U.S. Northern Command exercise.

    9For example, GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons
    Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170
    (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005) and Combating Terrorism: Selected
    Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 20, 2001).

    10DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2006).

    USSTRATCOM's relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still
    developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship
    with USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command's
    exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission,
    which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result, the
    center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM's program that
    it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans. However, to
    provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to more areas and
    aspects of its exercises, including activities involving the command's
    nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its security procedures
    to grant center observers temporary clearances during the exercises.

    The Joint Warfighting Center's recent support for USSTRATCOM's exercise
    program has helped the command to better define its requirements for
    future support, but these requirements continue to evolve. USSTRATCOM
    officials told us that since requirements for future support from the
    center have traditionally been determined from prior support experience,
    the command's limited relationship with the center in the past and the
    recent restructuring of the command's exercise program have not yet
    provided a basis for determining the support needed from the center. The
    officials said that the specific requirements for the center's assistance
    would be easier to determine as more exercises with the center's
    involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM official, a key
    exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise was to expose
    center personnel on a limited scale to the command's exercise program. At
    the same time, the command would gain exposure to the services provided by
    the center. A center official told us that this type of interaction with
    the center would help USSTRATCOM to better define and identify its future
    requirements for center support.

    Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support from the
    center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the Joint
    Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM's exercises
    each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the center has
    committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning and Global
    Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of observation
    teams to help the command evaluate its performance. However, as of March
    2006, center officials told us it was unclear how the center would adjust
    its current resources to support the November 2006 Global Lightning
    exercise because of the timing of that exercise and its linkage to a U.S.
    Pacific Command exercise, for which the center is already planning to
    provide support. In the long term, a center official told us that while
    the center plans to provide greater support to USSTRATCOM, the center can
    better plan and make resources available if it is provided with
    well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance as other commands do. As
    a result, without fully providing the U.S. Joint Forces Command with
    well-defined requirements to plan the necessary resources to support
    USSTRATCOM's program, USSTRATCOM may not be able to receive the supported
    needed to execute a robust exercise program to effectively implement its
    missions.

    New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Criteria for Declaring
    Full Operating Capability

    USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate
    organizations for assessing two key milestones-initial operating
    capability and full operating capability-used to implement these
    organizations. However, this guidance does not fully establish clear and
    well-documented objectives, goals, or criteria to use in determining when
    these milestones have been achieved. Our prior work shows that it is
    important that organizations undergoing major transformations provide
    clear and complete guidance to subordinate organizations on the
    requirements and expectations for successful implementation of
    organizational changes. Each of the new subordinate mission organizations
    has already declared initial operating capability-the first milestone in
    implementing these organizations. However, without applying specific
    criteria, such as the extent to which mission organizations are staffed
    and trained and their mission tasks implemented, in determining when full
    operating capability-the second milestone-is achieved, the command may not
    have an accurate understanding of the extent to which its mission
    organizations are prepared to effectively carry out their missions.

    After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued implementation
    directives that provide general guidance for establishing each of the five
    new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly describe the
    organizations' responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel and
    resources requirements, and schedules for implementation. Additionally,
    the command prepared an implementation plan that summarizes the
    implementation directives and provides additional direction for
    establishing the new subordinate organizations, including timelines and
    implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a reorganization management
    team working group comprised of representatives from headquarters and the
    new organizations to assist with and coordinate the reorganization
    activities.

    USSTRATCOM's implementation guidance11 calls for each new organization to
    declare initial operating capability and full operating capability, which
    are key milestones used to indicate the organization's progress in
    implementing plans, procedures, and structures and achieving the readiness
    required to perform its missions. In addition, the guidance provides some
    general criteria to follow before declaring initial operating capability
    or full operating capability. For example, the guidance requires that
    prior to the initial operating capability milestone, each new organization
    would develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of operations for
    the organization to manage and execute its assigned forces and missions,
    including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan for the
    transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires formal
    updates on the new organizations' progress toward achieving the milestones
    during quarterly command conferences.

    Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had
    achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional
    Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full operating
    capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations plan to reach
    this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007.

    11Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
    was established in August 2005, after the initial implementation guidance
    was issued, the center followed the same implementation process as the
    other four new organizations.

    Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
    Mission Organizations

                                                                        Date full
                                                      Date initial      operating
                                                         operating     capability
                                               Date     capability     planned or
    USSTRATCOM organization          established       achieved       achieved
    JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense January 2005     April 2005  February 2006
    JFCC-Intelligence,              January 2005       May 2005 September 2006
    Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance
    JFCC-Space and Global Strike    January 2005  November 2005  December 2006
    JFCC-Network Warfare            January 2005 September 2005   January 2007
    USSTRATCOM Center for Combating  August 2005  December 2005  December 2006
    Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Source: USSTRATCOM.

    Notes: Dates as of June 2006. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command.

    While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for achieving
    initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and specificity
    for reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has
    delegated authority for establishing the new mission organizations and
    decisions for declaring initial and full operating capability to the
    senior leaders of these organizations. Headquarters representatives of the
    reorganization management team told us that a good deal of subjectivity is
    involved in deciding when each milestone has been achieved. In addition,
    we found that the commander or director of each new organization has
    interpreted the milestones differently when developing the organization's
    approach and assessment criteria for achieving the milestones. For
    example, the criteria used by each organization to determine initial
    operating capability last year varied greatly among the organizations:

               o  The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and
               reconnaissance component declared reaching the milestone based on
               such factors as the component having its deputy commander in
               place, establishing the component's online Web portal that
               facilitates external communication across various classified
               links, and beginning its intelligence campaign planning support
               for three regional combatant commands.

               o  The commander of the integrated missile defense component
               declared reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of
               several documents, for example, ballistic missile defense
               emergency activation plans and a supporting plan for one of the
               command's contingency plans; undertaking the process of making
               operational several required functions, such as ballistic missile
               defense situational awareness and operational oversight of the
               ballistic missile defense command and control system; and assuming
               responsibility for performing most of its directed tasks.

               o  The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component
               told us the component declared initial operating capability on the
               basis that its mission responsibilities were already being
               performed by a predecessor organization that became the new
               component.

               o  Space and global strike component officials told us that the
               component based its initial operating capability decision largely
               on the results of its performance in events before and during
               USSTRATCOM's November 2005 Global Lightning exercise. However, the
               component did not publish and make available the criteria that
               would be used to evaluate the component's performance during the
               exercise, according to the component's chief of staff.

               Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used
               for determining full operating capability vary among the
               organizations. According to network warfare component officials,
               the component plans to base its full operating capability decision
               on 8 to 10 items that were explained during a briefing to
               USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005, which include the component
               having adequate staffing and funding; its tactics, techniques, and
               procedures guidance approved; and its functions, tasks, and
               authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff for the space and
               global strike component told us that the component has
               considerable criteria for evaluating full operating capability.
               For example, several concepts of operations related to the
               component's mission areas contain tasks that the component needs
               to perform. Other criteria include such goals as setting up a
               training program for new staff and developing a visual information
               panel in its command center. However, the official said that the
               component has not clearly assembled all of its criteria to make
               them readily accessible to those outside the component. The
               integrated missile defense component, which declared full
               operating capability in February 2006, used criteria that included
               the component's assuming responsibilities and tasks delineated in
               the USSTRATCOM implementation directive, completing facility
               construction, getting staff trained and certified, developing
               approved joint mission essential tasks, and initiating reporting
               of operational readiness. The component considered its full
               participation in USSTRATCOM's November 2005 Global Lightning
               exercise and the incorporation of the lessons learned from the
               exercise into its participation in a subsequent U.S. Pacific
               Command exercise as critical factors for declaring full operating
               capability.

               Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full
               operating capability are soon approaching, some of the new
               organizations have not fully developed the criteria that will be
               used to assess their milestone decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM
               Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction plans to achieve
               the milestone in December 2006, center officials told us in
               February 2006 that the center is still deciding how to define full
               operating capability. Similarly, the deputy commander for the
               intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component told us
               in April 2006 that the component, which plans to reach the
               milestone in September 2006, has not fully decided on the criteria
               it would use because the selection of criteria has not been a high
               priority among the component's implementation activities. However,
               the official told us that the component needs to have its criteria
               approved about 3 months before it decides to declare its milestone
               achieved.

               USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management
    			  Approach for Evaluating its Performance

    			  USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the
               command has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management
               approach for continuously assessing and benchmarking its
               performance in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
               actions to improve performance. Our prior work and the work of
               others show that organizations undertaking complex transformations
               can increase their likelihood of success by adopting a
               results-oriented management framework, which includes key
               management practices and results-oriented management tools to
               guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired
               outcomes.12 These tools and practices include establishing
               long-term goals and objectives and performance measures and
               criteria for assessing results and value added; strong and
               inspirational leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and
               provide a clear, consistent rationale for implementing the
               framework; and timelines to achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses
               different techniques to review its progress in implementing its
               missions and responsibilities, these techniques do not provide the
               range of quantifiable metrics and criteria needed to fully assess
               the command's progress toward achieving its goals and objectives
               and value added.

               The command's senior leadership has taken an active role in
               articulating and supporting the command's transformation, a factor
               that we have identified in prior work as critical to success. The
               Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of
               audiences to discuss the need for changing the way the command is
               organized in order to be more effective, and has described the
               needs and reasons for change in command concepts of operations and
               guidance. USSTRATCOM has also prepared guidance that assigns
               responsibility and describes the processes for implementing and
               integrating its missions. For example, to support its most recent
               reorganization, the command has prepared a draft integrating
               guidance document intended to provide a consolidated, objective
               framework describing how the command is organized, as well as its
               responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued
               a more detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept
               of operations to identify how it brings together all of its
               missions and capabilities to support national objectives. Our
               prior work has shown that successfully transforming organizations
               have leaders who define and articulate a compelling reason for
               change; set the direction, pace, and tone for transformation; and
               assign accountability for results.13

               The command has also created a collection of first principles to
               better align the command with national defense priorities, focus
               its efforts for integrating and synchronizing its missions, and
               provide advocacy for its missions as they mature. Table 3 provides
               USSTRATCOM's nine principles, which include establishing a
               globally focused organization built to collaborate with all
               elements of national power; establishing operationally
               interdependent components; and embracing effects-based operations.
               The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain several
               key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating
               weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities
               across the DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight,
               embrace horizontal integration; and (3) for global force
               management, optimize the employment of low-density and high-demand
               intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

    USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management Approach for
    Evaluating its Performance

    12See GAO, Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed
    to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts, GAO-06-232 (Washington,
    D.C.: Jan. 31, 2006).

    13 GAO-06-232 .

    Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles

    Principle
          1. Establish a globally focused organization built to collaborate with
          all elements of national power.
          2. Focus USSTRATCOM headquarters on strategic-level command and
          control, integration, and advocacy.
          3. Conduct decentralized operational/tactical-level planning and
          execution through USSTRATCOM components.
          4. Establish operationally interdependent components.
          5. Exploit mission-area-unique competencies in other organizations.
          6. Expand partnerships across departments, academia, industry, and
          allies.
          7. Create a USSTRATCOM web of global capabilities with multiple entry
          points.
          8. Leverage the full capabilities of a global command, control,
          communications, and computer architecture.
          9. Embrace effects-based operations.

    Source: USSTRATCOM.

    However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined,
    outcome-based goals and measures to indicate how the command will measure
    success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give its
    leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving the
    command's implementation efforts. While the command's first principles and
    areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing its implementation
    efforts, these principles are process-oriented, tactical goals, rather
    than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals and objectives that can
    provide the basis for determining the command's performance and progress.

    Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives are
    important for an organization to explain the results it expects, what it
    intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed.
    Outcome-based performance measures should be objective and results
    oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals. Measuring
    performance allows organizations to track progress toward goals and
    provides crucial information on which to base organizational and
    management decisions.14

    The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its
    performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its
    missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective and
    do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative and
    qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully assess
    progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation and
    corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to improve
    performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those goals that
    were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM's current processes result in
    largely subjective assessments and are intended to support more limited
    purposes. For example, according to an official responsible for
    coordinating the command's readiness reporting, the command has adapted
    its readiness reporting process to include inputs from each of the
    command's mission organizations and service components. The official said
    that this process gives the USSTRATCOM commander access to a broad
    perspective on the command's overall readiness. However, the readiness
    reports resulting from the process discuss the commander's subjective
    assessment of USSTRATCOM's ability to execute its missions, based on
    short-term internal and external factors affecting the command's
    operations. Similarly, the command's annual training assessments are
    subjective evaluations, based on observations of prior training,
    exercises, real-world operations, and other factors, which are used to set
    priorities for future training priorities.

    14 GAO-06-232 .

    USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet
    established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to fully
    assess the command's progress because the command is still sorting out the
    implementation of its new organizational construct. Although command
    officials stated they believe such metrics are needed and the command
    should begin to develop them, they have not yet developed a process or
    assigned responsibility for developing metrics. While the development of
    such metrics will present a significant challenge due to the complex
    nature of the command's missions, such an effort is needed so that the
    command can assess its progress and identify areas that need further
    improvement. For example USSTRATCOM officials believe they can and should
    develop metrics to assess the extent to which they are efficiently
    allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to
    optimize the use of high-demand aircraft. Without developing strategic
    goals and the full range of outcome-based performance measures, the
    command will lack a process to evaluate its performance, identify areas
    that may need improvement, and take corrective actions.

    USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide Outreach
                                        Strategy

    USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service
    component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for
    enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. Since its most
    recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its
    service component commands. However, the command's guidance is not always
    specific and service officials believe that additional guidance from
    USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define their responsibilities,
    expectations, and relationships with the command, particularly with its
    new mission organizations. In addition, USSTRATCOM lacks a commandwide
    strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach
    activities with the large number of commands and organizations it
    interacts with in executing its diverse missions. Without clear service
    component guidance and a comprehensive communications strategy,
    USSTRATCOM's service components will not have complete information on the
    command's expectations for their support and the command may not have the
    most effective approach for building relationships, promoting its
    capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other
    combatant commands and organizations.

    USSTRATCOM's Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Specific

    While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service components,
    Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they lack specific
    guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed information on their
    responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and relationships with the
    command and, particularly, its newer mission organizations. Our prior work
    has shown that it is important for organizations undergoing significant
    change to provide clear and complete guidance to their subordinate
    organizations. Without clearly defined, specific guidance, it can be
    difficult for the service components to effectively organize, plan, and
    identify resources to provide the expected support. Moreover, the lack of
    this guidance can also limit the understanding that USSTRATCOM's
    headquarters and its organizations have about the components'
    organizations, organizational relationships, and range of support they
    provide.

    USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its concepts
    of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through meetings and
    other activities between command and service component staffs, such as
    conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises. Guidance and
    expectations have also been provided during routine and crisis-oriented
    collaborative planning15 activities among the command's organizations and
    service components. However, USSTRATCOM Army component officials told us
    that much of the command's overall guidance, such as USSTRATCOM's standing
    operational order for its global strike mission and its overarching
    concept of operations, is too general and often does not provide enough
    specific information for the service components to fully understand the
    command's requirements and expectations.

    Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the
    overarching responsibilities for the command's service components, such as
    providing support for the command's operations and planning and advocacy
    activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the concept of
    operations for the space and global strike missions, provides additional
    responsibilities for each of the components that relate to a specific
    mission area or organization. In particular, this concept of operations
    assigns the Air Force service component responsibility for establishing an
    operations center for global strike planning and execution, and for
    performing day-to-day command and control of space forces assigned to the
    command. In contrast, much of the remaining guidance we reviewed provided
    few specific details on what is expected or required to carry out the
    components' responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel
    skills, planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed
    to effectively support the command.

    Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain
    references to the services are still in draft, such as the command's
    integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command's recent
    reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a concept for
    integrating its missions that included detailed annexes describing the how
    the command's service components were to monitor global events affecting
    U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and communicate information; predict
    likely consequences of military operations on U.S. and adversary forces;
    and plan and execute operations in support of each of the command's
    mission areas. However, according to a USSTRATCOM official the command
    leadership decided not to include specific expectations for its service
    components following the decision to reorganize the command and establish
    the joint functional component commands in late 2004. As a result, the
    command's most recently drafted guidance does not yet completely reflect
    service responsibilities and expectations and unique support that may be
    required to support USSTRATCOM's new organization. According to USSTRATCOM
    officials, the command does not plan to provide additional formal guidance
    to its service component organizations at this time.

    15The use of collaborative planning intends to create an environment that
    allows commanders to share planning data and generate integrated lists of
    courses of action in greatly compressed time frames, making options and
    recommendations readily available to the Secretary of Defense and the
    President.

    The relationships between the command's service components and new
    subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component
    officials told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not yet
    developed a full understanding of the Army service component's
    responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM's expectations may not be
    consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For example,
    the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM's Army service component told us
    that according to the Joint Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces policy
    publication,16 which clarifies all command relationships and other
    authorities, the Army's service component has responsibility for providing
    Army personnel with training in service-related tasks. The official told
    us the USSTRATCOM command assumed that training in the use of joint
    systems, such as secure communications lines operated by the USSTRATCOM
    command for integrated missile defense, would be done by the service
    component. However, the respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for
    providing any joint training to service personnel. The official said the
    Army could provide this training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in
    its guidance.

    Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond to
    USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly described in
    guidance and related documents. For example, USSTRATCOM cited a
    requirement in its draft concept of operations for a small Army detachment
    to be assigned to USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type of detachment based on
    that requirement. Similarly, the head of the Eighth Air Force's air
    operations center, which is part of the USSTRATCOM Air Force service
    component, told us that the component has clear guidance about its
    responsibilities to provide direct support to USSTRATCOM's space and
    global strike command, and therefore, has a clear understanding of what is
    required to support the component. The space and global strike command has
    provided information on the direct support expected from the Air Force in
    its concept of operations. However, the official said the requirements and
    expectations for supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such
    as the Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because
    USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force support
    for those organizations.

    16Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint
    Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2001).

    According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has not
    provided clear and specific guidance on the command's responsibilities and
    expectations, despite its unique relationship to USSTRATCOM. Officials of
    the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that the Fleet Forces Command has a
    unique relationship to USSTRATCOM because it is a supporting command and
    not a traditional service component. The officials said their command is
    not formally assigned to and under USSTRATCOM's operational chain of
    command, but rather their command provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the
    best use of Navy forces and capabilities in support of its missions. The
    officials said that clear and specific guidance is necessary to provide an
    understanding of their command's unique relationship to USSTRATCOM
    headquarters and organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation
    with the Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that
    clarifies the Fleet Forces Command's relationship with USSTRATCOM and its
    responsibilities, which include taking part in the command's collaborative
    planning processes, participating in its exercise program, and helping
    USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports. However, while this
    document helps to clarify the Navy component's support responsibilities,
    it neither sets priorities for the Fleet Forces Command nor includes
    mission-specific requirements.

    According to service officials, USSTRATCOM's unique organization, complex
    planning processes, and global focus are very different than more
    traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly defined
    geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more traditional
    regional combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a collaborative
    planning process, which is globally focused, and involves a much broader
    range of military capabilities. As this planning process continues to
    evolve, the role and involvement of the service components will change.
    For example, the director of the Army component's planning and exercise
    group told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not always
    provided well-documented requirements for certain Army capabilities, which
    has delayed the Army component's ability to provide the needed
    capabilities to these organizations. The official told us that in the
    summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both staffing its
    office and initially providing information operations capabilities to
    support command missions because USSTRATCOM had not documented the Army
    requirements for these capabilities. The Army official said that although
    the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has been satisfied with the Army's
    support for this mission area, greater clarity about USSTRATCOM's
    expectations would have helped the Army component to better identify its
    authorized personnel requirements and ensure that the required Army
    capabilities were more quickly available.

    Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces
    component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided, according
    to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the component does
    not need additional guidance at this time because the component has a more
    limited role and fewer responsibilities than the other services in
    supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The official said that the
    Marine Corps' component of about 20 people largely serves as a conduit to
    USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps representation and provide inputs, when
    needed, on command issues.

    USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy

    While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant commands
    and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the command because
    it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide outreach strategy to
    effectively manage these activities. Without an outreach strategy, the
    command and its organizations do not have a consistent, coordinated
    approach to use in developing and expanding relationships, educating other
    organizations on the command's capabilities, and providing the most
    effective level of support to other commands and organizations.

    In our prior work17 in identifying key practices adopted by organizations
    undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for
    organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that reaches
    out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in
    the organization's transformation. In particular, successfully transformed
    organizations have found that by communicating information early and
    often, organizations are able to build trust and increase understanding
    among their stakeholders about the purpose of planned changes.
    Organizations use these communication strategies to provide a common
    framework for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach throughout
    their organizations by clearly presenting the organization's rationale,
    specific objectives, and desired outcomes of outreach efforts. These
    strategies also cover the range of integrated information activities to be
    implemented and clearly articulate how all the various components of the
    strategy will be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the
    objectives most efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach
    strategies provide measurable criteria against which to evaluate the
    outcomes of organizations' outreach efforts and determine whether any
    adjustments are necessary.

    17 GAO-03-669 .

      Command Considers External Outreach Essential

    Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of commands
    and organizations in executing its diverse set of global missions, the
    command considers its external outreach efforts essential to (1) develop
    effective relationships and communications, (2) promote and educate others
    about the value of its missions and capabilities, and (3) obtain
    information on how the command can best support other organizations.
    USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide range of methods and
    activities to promote its missions and capabilities to combatant commands,
    military services, and DOD and other government organizations. These
    methods and activities include conferences and symposia, exercises and
    training events, senior leadership visits, exchange of liaison staff,
    routine meetings, and voice and electronic communication. The command has
    also established a strategic knowledge integration Web site, which is
    called SKIWeb, on DOD's classified computer network to provide information
    about the command and the status of its activities and allow open exchange
    among its staff and other individuals with access to the network.

    While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed good
    working relationships with other combatant commands and organizations
    across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that the
    command's missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully
    understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander's summary report for its
    November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the command has
    expended a great amount of effort in developing processes and strategies
    to integrate the command's missions, the organizations it supports,
    particularly other combatant commands, have a vague understanding of the
    "value added" by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The report states that
    USSTRATCOM's ability to provide capabilities and influence global events
    are not clearly understood, nor do some other commands' headquarters
    completely understand how to access that capability. For example, in
    observing the Global Lightning exercise, U.S. Central Command and other
    participants told us that they were unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in
    planning for global strike operations in their theater. However,
    USSTRATCOM officials said USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability
    options into global strike planning, particularly nonkinetic capability
    options18 such as computer network operations; other commands are just
    beginning to see the potential value of these options.

    Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held by
    other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear
    deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic Command,
    but has other essential missions that are global in scope and span all
    levels of military operations. While some missions, such as nuclear
    deterrence and military space, are well practiced and have established
    histories and interactions with outside organizations, others, such as its
    combating weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance missions, are less mature and still evolving. Further, many
    of USSTRATCOM authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities are still
    being refined, clarified, and demonstrated to other organizations in
    exercises and training events and in real-time military activities. For
    example, the deputy commander of USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM's evolving role in
    providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the regional
    combatant commands. The official said that some combatant commands have
    concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could affect their ability
    to exercise operational and tactical control over any assets assigned to
    their commands. According to the official, these commands do not yet
    understand that USSTRATCOM's role is to provide overall management for
    these assets rather than control their operational use.

    Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted with
    USSTRATCOM's new organizational construct, particularly the new
    subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day
    management of several command missions. The command's new organization
    does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which information flows
    vertically, that is used by other combatant commands. According to the
    Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows of information and
    command and control run counter to traditional military thinking, which
    prefers a vertical chain of command. While the new organizational
    structure has the potential to greatly expand the command's opportunities
    to conduct external outreach, relationships and communication links are
    still being developed or reestablished with other organizations.

    18Nonkinetic capabilities are those capabilities that produce effects
    without the direct use of the force or energy of moving objects, including
    such means as information operations, electromagnetic radiation, and
    directed energy.

      Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach

    Each of the command's organizations conduct numerous outreach activities
    daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and consistently
    conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. We also
    found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach for comprehensively
    collecting information on the needs and priorities of the combatant
    commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities, information
    which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can provide the most
    effective level of support.

    USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive outreach
    strategy to increase understanding among other combatant commands about
    the specific capabilities and contributions that the command can provide
    to their operations. Both of the command's summary reports for its October
    2004 and November 2005 Global Lightning exercises recommended development
    of an outreach strategy for identifying USSTRATCOM capabilities for the
    benefit of combatant commands and stakeholders. The November 2005 report
    recommended that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for
    conducting effective outreach and education of the command's capabilities.
    The report also recommended (1) improving the command's SKIWeb Web site to
    allow outside users to more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing
    briefings and seminar support to the Defense and interagency community,
    and (3) developing outreach products to provide key information about the
    command. The report states that much of the understanding and credibility
    of the command can be achieved though an effective outreach plan that is
    focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with the services
    to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global support
    capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that the command
    does not have any current plans to develop an outreach strategy as
    recommended in each of the two exercise reports.

    To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant
    commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach that
    could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the
    commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy. Under
    U.S. Joint Forces Command's approach, the command asks each of the other
    combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities for the type
    and level of support needed from the command in the coming year. These
    lists are incorporated into the command's annual plans and are used to
    make adjustments in its activities and resources to best meet the needs of
    its customers. During the year, the command schedules periodic updates
    with staffs of the other commands to determine to what extent the command
    is addressing these priorities or whether the priorities have changed. A
    USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible for coordinating the
    command's priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces Command told us that
    approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in communicating the command's
    priorities for support. The official said that USSTRATCOM added to the
    effectiveness of the approach by preparing a detailed matrix that
    identified and ranked the command's priorities and provided contact
    information for command staff.

                                      Conclusions

    USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President and the
    Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to more
    effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric
    threats to U.S. national security, including those involving weapons of
    mass destruction. While the command has made progress in implementing its
    global missions, its ability to strengthen implementation efforts and
    ensure that its leadership has critical information on the effectiveness
    of its missions and organizations will continue to be limited until it
    identifies long-term support requirements for its exercise program;
    establishes clear, consistent criteria for assessing the establishment of
    its newest mission organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented
    approach for evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command offers
    a range of capabilities and resources for supporting command exercises.
    Until it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from the
    U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command incorporates these
    requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will continue to lack a robust
    exercise program, which is essential for evaluating its capabilities and
    identifying areas in need of improvement. Additionally, absent clear,
    consistent guidance from the command, four new mission organizations that
    have not yet achieved full operating capability are establishing their own
    criteria for this milestone, which results in different understandings of
    what it means to reach this milestone and how it would be evaluated.
    Without establishing clear, consistent criteria at major points in
    implementation, the command cannot create a foundation on which to assess
    and measure the success of these organizations even after full operating
    capability has been declared. Further, while the command has adopted some
    elements of a results-oriented management approach, without a process that
    includes criteria and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission
    goals at all levels of its organization, the command will be limited in
    its ability to adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission
    areas, measure the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps
    and suggest corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future
    goals and milestones.

    Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and
    requirements, the service components will not have the information needed
    to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities required to
    support the command and respond to its requests and tasks in a timely way.
    In addition, in the absence of a commandwide communications strategy to
    conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to other commands and
    organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively develop and expand
    relationships, foster education about its capabilities, and provide the
    most effective level of support to other commands and organizations.
    Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach strategy a
    systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the combatant commands
    and organization it supports-similar to one used by the U.S. Joint Forces
    Command-USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to fully address the
    priorities for support of the other commands and organizations, improve
    feedback, and identify resources needed to respond to these priorities.

                                    Recommendations

    To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by the
    U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center in supporting
    USSTRATCOM's exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of Defense
    direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify and
    request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources required
    from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to support
    the command's program and to reach agreement with the U.S. Joint Forces
    Command on the support to be provided. We further recommend that the
    Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, (1) in the near
    term, to make any possible adjustments among the Joint Warfighting
    Center's current resources to more fully support USSTRATCOM's exercise
    program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM requirements for
    support in the center's plans to provide the full range of assistance
    necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a robust exercise program.

    To strengthen USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement its missions and provide
    greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the Secretary of
    Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to take the
    following four actions:

               o  Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional
               Component Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence,
               Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the
               USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that
               clearly defines full operating capability and provides specific,
               common criteria for determining what is required and how it will
               be assessed. This guidance should be developed, in consultation
               with these organizations, before each organization declares full
               operating capability.

               o  Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process
               for continuously assessing and benchmarking the command's overall
               progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
               corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to implement
               and integrate its missions. Develop or refine performance measures
               that clearly demonstrate performance results and ensure that those
               measures cascade down through the command; assign clear leadership
               with accountability and authority to implement and sustain the
               process; and develop and ensure that goals and objectives are
               clear and achievable and timelines are established. Set a specific
               time frame for completing development of this process.

               o  Provide additional guidance to the command's service components
               that clearly defines and provides more specific information about
               their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and
               expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and
               subordinate mission organizations. Set a specific time frame for
               approval of this guidance.

               o  Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to
               guide and coordinate USSTRATCOM's efforts to conduct outreach with
               other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to
               develop effective relationships and communications, promote and
               educate others about the value of its mission and capabilities,
               and obtain information on how the command can best support other
               commands and organizations. This strategy should include the
               command's rationale, specific objectives, desired outcomes, and
               strategies for conducting outreach with other commands and
               organizations, and criteria against which the command can evaluate
               the success of its efforts.

               Matter for Congressional Consideration

    			  Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the
               President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set
               of military options to more effectively respond to emerging
               threats to U.S. national security, Congress should consider
               requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a
               longer-term, comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented
               management process for continuously assessing and benchmarking the
               command's overall progress in achieving desired outcomes and for
               identifying corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to
               effectively carry out its missions, as outlined in our
               recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the Commander,
               U.S. Strategic Command, should

               o  develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are
               clear and achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving
               desired outcomes are established;

               o  develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate
               performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down
               through the command; and

               o  assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to
               implement and sustain the process.

               The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time
               frame for developing and implementing this process. Additionally,
               the Commander should periodically report to Congress on the
               command's progress in achieving desired outcomes.

               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    			  DOD's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
               Policy provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD
               generally agreed with our three recommendations regarding U.S.
               Joint Forces Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise program.
               DOD did not agree with our other four recommendations that
               USSTRATCOM provide clear and complete guidance to its joint
               functional component commands on achieving full operating
               capability; develop a comprehensive results-oriented management
               process to assess and benchmark the command's overall progress;
               provide additional guidance to its service components; and develop
               and implement a commandwide communications strategy. In regard to
               these four recommendations, DOD commented that measures are
               already in place that address the issues raised by the report. We
               disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the
               intent of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM
               has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe
               that the command's actions go far enough, are specific enough, or
               are sufficiently transparent in improving evaluation of the
               command's progress in implementing its mission areas, providing
               more complete guidance to its mission and service component
               organizations, and strengthening its external communications with
               other organizations and commands. Therefore, we believe our
               recommendations are still warranted and we have added a matter for
               congressional consideration for Congress to direct the Commander,
               U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and implement a longer-term
               results-oriented management process for assessing the command's
               overall progress and periodically reporting to Congress its
               progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD's comments are
               reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific
               information on DOD's comments on our recommendations and our
               assessment of these comments follows below.

               DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding
               USSTRATCOM's exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our
               recommendation that USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a
               timely manner, the long-term services and resources required from
               the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to
               support USSTRATCOM's exercise program. In its comments, DOD said
               that while the center had provided limited exercise planning,
               execution, and assessment support to USSTRATCOM, the command and
               the center have steadily built a relationship over the past year
               to support USSTRATCOM's seven mission areas and are jointly
               solving problems that hindered the center's support in previous
               USSTRATCOM exercises. The department partially agreed with our
               recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
               and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the
               near term make any possible adjustments among the Joint
               Warfighting Center's current resources to more fully support
               USSTRATCOM's program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy
               Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is
               currently conducting an in-depth review of the joint training
               programs to determine how it can provide better flexibility and
               synergism through joint training investments. DOD agreed with our
               recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
               and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the
               long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM's requirements for support into
               the Joint Warfighting Center's plans. DOD commented that its
               current review of joint training programs intends to match, to the
               greatest extent possible, joint training requirements and
               resources, including the training support provided by the U.S.
               Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while USSTRATCOM's
               requirements must compete with other training priorities for joint
               training funding, the center can better plan and make resources
               available if USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined
               requirements 3 to 5 years in advance.

               DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.
               Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint
               functional component commands that clearly defines full operating
               capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining
               what is required and how it will be assessed. DOD commented that
               the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has provided specific
               guidance in the form of a tailored implementation directive that
               assigns specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities
               to the components. DOD also said that the Commander is continuing
               to work closely with the component commanders to develop,
               implement, and assess the measures of progress by which full
               operating capability will be declared and will report to the
               Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for each
               mission area. We believe that the command's tailored
               implementation directives do not go far enough in providing clear
               and specific criteria for assessing whether specific duties,
               responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to each
               organization have been met. For example, during our review we
               found that the components had different interpretations as to what
               criteria might apply for declaring full operating capability. We
               believe that it is important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations
               to have a clear definition of full operating capability and the
               criteria, or measures of progress, in place as early as possible,
               by which the achievement of the milestone will be assessed for
               each of the new mission organizations. These criteria should be
               complete and readily accessible so the command and its mission
               organizations will have confidence in the extent that planned
               capabilities will be achieved at full operating capability. After
               declaring full operating capability, each of the new organizations
               will require further actions to more completely implement and
               enhance their mission capabilities and responsibilities.
               Establishing clear, documented criteria for assessing and
               measuring success for declaring full operating capability can
               provide a baseline and a sound foundation for assessing the future
               progress of the organization in carrying out its mission
               responsibilities.

               DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop
               a comprehensive results-oriented management process for
               continually assessing and benchmarking the command's overall
               progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
               corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to implement
               and integrate its missions. In its comments, DOD stated that a
               variety of directives, including concepts of operations,
               articulate the command's goals and objectives. The department also
               stated that the command conducts periodic exercises, external
               inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the command's
               effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission areas and
               achieving stated objectives. While these actions by USSTRATCOM may
               be helpful to the command's leadership, they do not represent a
               comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress in
               achieving desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our
               recommendation as being directed at the metrics to be used by the
               command's organizations in declaring full operating capability for
               its missions, which are scheduled to occur by early 2007. However,
               our recommendation calls for creation of a longer-term,
               comprehensive, results-oriented management process that would
               provide the command with a framework for continuously assessing
               its future progress in achieving desired outcomes in each of its
               mission areas and the command's overall goals and objectives.
               Because of the importance of the command's new role in providing
               expanded military options for addressing emerging threats, we
               continue to believe that creation of a results-oriented management
               process that establishes long-term goals and objectives,
               milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes,
               performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance results,
               and clear leadership to implement and sustain the process is
               needed. Therefore, we have included a matter for congressional
               consideration to require the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to
               develop such a process that would improve transparency and
               accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving
               desired outcomes in each of its mission areas.

               DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander,
               U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the
               command's service components that clearly defines and provides
               more specific information about their responsibilities,
               requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the
               command's headquarters and subordinate mission organizations. In
               its comments, DOD said that the duties and responsibilities of
               USSTRATCOM and its service components are documented in Joint
               Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. The department also
               stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the command and
               the services are provided by on-site service component
               representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint
               Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the
               relationships and authorities of the military services in
               supporting combatant commanders and by USSTRATCOM in various
               documents, we continue to believe that additional guidance from
               the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the command's service
               components is needed to provide clear and specific information
               about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and
               expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and
               subordinate mission organizations, particularly since the
               components have expressed a desire for further guidance from the
               command. As USSTRATCOM continues to implement its new organization
               and develop capabilities in each of its mission areas, this
               additional guidance can strengthen relationships with the services
               by (1) providing better information for the components in
               effectively organizing, planning, and identifying resources to
               support the command; and (2) increasing understanding among the
               command's headquarters and its organizations about the components'
               organizations, organizational relationships, and the range of
               support they provide.

               Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM
               develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to
               guide and coordinate the command's efforts to conduct outreach
               with other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations.
               DOD commented that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all
               its activities through its classified Web site; maintains a senior
               officer representative at each of the combatant commands and with
               the Joint Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous
               liaison activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated
               that Web-based mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is
               available on the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Web site. However, as
               discussed in our report, we found that while USSTRATCOM
               organizations routinely conduct outreach activities to promote its
               missions and capabilities, these activities are often not well
               coordinated and consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal
               benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM commander's summary
               reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning
               exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a
               comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among
               other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and
               contributions that the command can provide to their operations.
               The November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that
               the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting
               effective outreach and education of the command's capabilities.
               Therefore, we continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a
               commandwide communications strategy to provide a framework to
               effectively manage these activities and a common approach for
               conducting consistent and coordinated outreach across the command.

               We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
               committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
               Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander,
               U. S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to
               others upon request. In addition the report will be available at
               no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

               If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at
               (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
               Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
               on the last page of this report. Staff members who made key
               contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

               Janet A. St. Laurent Director Defense Capabilities and Management

               Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
    			  Strategic Command�s Budget

    			  This appendix provides information on trends and changes we
               identified in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM)
               historic and projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through
               2011.

               USSTRATCOM�s Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establishment

    			  Since its establishment in fiscal year 2003, USSTRATCOM's budget
               has grown significantly, from $276.8 million of total obligation
               authority in then-year dollars to $500.4 million in fiscal year
               2006, excluding military personnel funds. The command's budget
               comprises mostly operation and maintenance funding, with lesser
               amounts of research and development and procurement funding
               associated with programs for intelligence, information operations,
               network warfare, command and control, and planning systems.
               Funding projections prepared to support the fiscal year 2006
               President's budget submission show that USSTRATCOM's budget is
               expected to decline between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, from
               $521.9 million to $515.5 million, as research and development
               funding is reduced. However, beginning in fiscal year 2009, the
               command's budget is expected to increase each year to $551.4
               million in fiscal year 2011, as operation and maintenance funding
               increases by $35 million compared to the fiscal year 2008
               projection. Procurement funding projections remain relatively
               stable through fiscal year 2011.

               USSTRATCOM officials told us that the command's budget projections
               have changed since the President's fiscal year 2006 budget was
               submitted. However, these changes, prepared to support the
               President's fiscal year 2007 budget submission, had not been
               finalized at the time our work was completed in March 2006 because
               the Department of Defense (DOD) was still making adjustments to
               the command's budget projections for fiscal year 2007 and
               thereafter, even after the fiscal year 2007 budget was submitted.
               USSTRATCOM officials expect that the command's annual budgets for
               fiscal years 2007 though 2011 will be lower than the projections
               prepared for the fiscal year 2006 budget submission. At the same
               time, the command has been directed to allocate funding for new
               activities that had not been part of the fiscal year 2006
               submission, including $11 million to $13 million per year in new
               total obligation authority for mission activities for combating
               weapons of mass destruction and about $7 million per year for
               missile defense operations.

               Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities

    			  USSTRATCOM's budget increases have included new total obligation
               authority to fund the command's new mission responsibilities. For
               example, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget submission
               included $78.7 million in new funding for USSTRATCOM to support
               additional planning, command and control, and information
               operations responsibilities that were assigned to the command
               following the completion of DOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.1
               About $50.9 million of this request was for improvements to
               USSTRATCOM's command and control systems, including $25.9 million
               to upgrade the USSTRATCOM command center and about $10.5 million
               for a mobile command center capability. Of the remaining $27.8
               million, about $13.5 million was for new information operations
               activities and $14.3 million was to improve the command's planning
               systems. In addition to the funding associated with the Nuclear
               Posture Review, the fiscal year 2004 budget request included about
               $44.5 million for USSTRATCOM to support classified programs
               formerly managed by the Joint Staff and the Office of the
               Secretary of Defense.

               The fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budget requests included USSTRATCOM
               funding increases associated with new missions assigned to the
               command in January 2003-global strike; integrated missile defense;
               command, control, computers, communications, intelligence,
               surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD information operations.
               To support these new responsibilities, the fiscal year 2005 budget
               request included about $61.8 million in new total obligation
               authority. This amount included about $23 million in new operation
               and maintenance funding, which the USSTRATCOM commander had
               discretion to allocate among the command's missions, according to
               a command official. According to the official, the fiscal year
               2005 request also included about $15.3 million in new funding to
               support activities at the Joint Information Operations Center, and
               what would later become the Joint Task Force for Global Network
               Operations and the Joint Functional Component Command for
               Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The 2005 budget
               request also included additional increases to the command's
               planning and command and control systems. Similarly, the fiscal
               year 2006 budget request included about $33.7 million in new
               funding, mainly to support new information operations programs.

               USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Among Its
    			  Missions

    			  USSTRATCOM has recently developed an internal model to determine
               how its programs will be allocated to its various mission
               organizations and headquarters activities in DOD's budget and
               future funding plan. According to a USSTRATCOM official, the model
               is designed to help the command manage and prioritize its funding
               allocations and understand the risks associated with any changes
               made to its future funding plans. The command is using the model
               to allocate fiscal year 2006 funding to USSTRATCOM's subordinate
               organizations and headquarters divisions. According to information
               provided by command officials, the largest funding allocations for
               fiscal year 2006 are to support the Joint Functional Component
               Command for Space and Global Strike, followed by command and
               control activities performed at headquarters, including nuclear
               command and control. The smallest allocations are to support the
               Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence,
               Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Integrated Missile Defense.
               According to a command official, activities performed at
               headquarters to support one or more mission areas accounted for
               about 40 percent of the command's fiscal 2006 budget.

               Scope and Methodology

    			  To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in
               USSTRATCOM's budget since its establishment in October 2002 by
               obtaining and analyzing the command's historic, current, and
               projected funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data
               prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
               request, which were the most current official data available when
               we conducted and completed our work. We also discussed with
               USSTRATCOM officials anticipated changes to the budget resulting
               from the fiscal year 2007 President's budget request, and efforts
               taken by the command to identify how its funding is allocated by
               mission responsibility and subordinate organization. We took steps
               to assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis,
               including (1) performing electronic testing of required data
               elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared
               data source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
               about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
               reliable for our purposes.

               Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic
    			  Command Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level

    			  This appendix provides information on trends and changes we
               identified in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM)
               military and civilian authorized personnel levels1 since its
               establishment in October 2002. Our analysis shows that
               USSTRATCOM's overall authorized personnel level has remained
               relatively stable since 2002, and that the percentage of filled
               military and civilian positions has increased. The command is
               transferring positions to its new mission organizations from its
               headquarters organization, rather than increasing its overall
               commandwide authorized personnel level. Although the command has
               expanded the number of professional military skills2 of its
               authorized personnel, the majority of its military positions
               encompass relatively few types of skilled positions. We also
               determined that while Air Force and Navy military positions
               continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel, the
               proportion of civilian positions is increasing.

               Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stable
    			  and Percentage of Filled Positions Has Increased

    			  USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has remained relatively
               stable since the command's establishment in October 2002. The
               command's overall authorized personnel level has increased since
               that time by about 300 positions, through October 2005; however,
               the command expects to have slightly fewer positions than it
               started with by October 2006.

               The command's authorized personnel level increased from 2,646
               positions upon its establishment in October 2002 to 2,965
               authorized positions by October 2004. The largest increase
               occurred between October 2002 and October 2003, when the command
               added 318 positions, including 291 positions to support four
               additional missions-global strike; integrated missile defense;
               command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
               surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD information operations.
               Among these 291 positions, 108 positions were transferred to
               USSTRATCOM from the cruise missile support activities, which were
               formerly part of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific
               Command.

               In October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel decreased to
               2,947 positions, a reduction of 18 positions from October 2004, as
               the command transferred positions to other combatant commands to
               provide expertise in integrating USSTRATCOM's global missions into
               their theater operations. According to a command official, there
               was no authorized personnel level increase associated with the
               combating weapons of mass destruction responsibilities assigned to
               the command in January 2005. A larger reduction is expected by
               October 2006, mainly as a result of a planned transfer of about
               340 positions currently supporting intelligence activities, which
               would bring the command's authorized personnel to 2,605 positions,
               which is 41 fewer than authorized when the command was
               established.

               USSTRATCOM's ability to fill positions has increased steadily
               since the new command was established in 2002, when only 1,828, or
               69 percent of the command's 2,646 authorized positions, were
               initially filled. According to command officials, many of the
               service members and civilians from the former U.S. Space Command,
               located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, did not immediately
               transfer to USSTRATCOM headquarters, located near Omaha Nebraska,
               leaving many positions initially unfilled. However, as individuals
               transferred to the command, the rate of filled positions increased
               to 83 percent (2,467 filled positions) as of October 2003, 87
               percent (2,564 filled positions) in October 2004, and 91 percent
               (2,670 filled positions) in October 2005.

               Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met Within
    			  Existing Authorization

    			  To meet the staffing requirements for its five new mission
               organizations, USSTRATCOM is transferring positions to the new
               organizations from its headquarters, rather than seeking to
               increase its overall personnel authorization. To minimize the cost
               to the services of relocating people to fill the transferred
               positions, the command is first transferring positions that either
               do not need to be relocated or are not filled by service members,
               and then relocating and filling the remaining positions during the
               course of normal military personnel rotations. Under the command's
               plan, the first 30 percent of the transferred positions were to
               have been filled at each organization by September 2005, 60
               percent of the positions are to be filled by September 2006, and
               90 percent are to be filled by September 2007.

               By February 2006 the command had approved the transfer of 793
               positions to the new mission organizations. Of this number, about
               444 positions (56 percent) had been filled, including about 76
               percent of the 431 positions approved for the Joint Functional
               Component Command for Space and Global Strike, which is co-located
               with USSTRATCOM headquarters and where few positions needed to be
               relocated.3 In contrast, fewer than one-third of the positions had
               been filled at three of the four remaining organizations, which
               are not located in the Omaha, Nebraska, area, although a command
               official told us that he believes that positions at these
               organizations will be close to 60 percent filled by September
               2006, under current projections. To minimize the impact of not
               filling positions, officials told us that the supporting services
               and Defense agencies are providing the new organizations with
               their own filled positions, until USSTRATCOM positions are filled.
               Table 4 summarizes the status of filling positions at the new
               mission organizations as of February 2006.

               Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
               Organizations as of February 2006

                                             Positions Positions    Percentage of
    USSTRATCOM organization                approved    filled positions filled
    JFCC-Space and Global Strike                431       326               76
    JFCC-Network Warfare                        120        38               32
    JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance                              102        33               32
    JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense              90        34               38
    USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
    Weapons of Mass Destruction                  50        13               26

               Source: USSTRATCOM.

               Notes: Data do not include contractors or positions provided by
               supporting services and Defense agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional
               Component Command.

               USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Positions
    			  Remain Concentrated in Relatively Few Specialties

    			  USSTRATCOM has expanded the number of military skills of its
               authorized personnel since its establishment. As of January 2003,
               3 months after it was established, USSTRATCOM's authorized
               personnel included those with 241 different military skills; by
               January 2006, the command added 51 skills and lost 44 skills,
               leaving 248 different military skills at the command. Skills added
               by the command include Navy officer positions for information
               technology planning and Marine Corps officer positions for space
               operations, while those dropped include Air Force maintenance
               officer positions.

               While USSTRATCOM has changed the composition of its skill set,
               relatively few skills comprise the majority of the command's
               authorized military positions. For example, as of January 2006, 33
               of the command's 248 skills (13 percent) made up 1,364 of the
               command's 2,094 military positions (65 percent). USSTRATCOM
               officials told us that several of the most prevalent skills are
               easily adaptable and capable of being performed in a broad range
               of responsibilities. For example, Air Force space and missile
               operations officer positions increased from 134 in 2003 to 140 in
               2006, and this skill remains the largest military specialty at the
               command. The command also has increased the number of positions
               for Navy officers with warfare qualifications or air warfare
               qualifications skill designations, Army officers skilled in space
               operations, and Army officers specializing in information
               operations.

               Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of Civilian
    			  Positions Is Increasing

    			  USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel are mainly composed of Air Force
               and Navy positions, although the number and percentage of civilian
               positions have increased since the command was established. As of
               October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel included 2,112
               military and 835 civilian positions. Among the 2,112 authorized
               military positions:

               o  1,256 were Air Force positions (59 percent of the authorized
               military positions),
               o  564 were Navy positions (27 percent),
               o  227 were Army positions (11 percent), and
               o  65 were Marine Corps positions (3 percent).

               Since the command's establishment, the number and percentage of
               civilian positions relative to military positions have increased.
               From October 2002 to October 2005, civilian positions increased
               from 676 to 835, an increase of 26 to 28 percent of the command's
               overall authorized personnel level. The command expects to
               continue to increase the proportion of authorized civilian
               positions, particularly at USSTRATCOM headquarters, as positions
               are transferred to the new mission organizations and as a few
               hundred military positions are converted to civilian positions
               through October 2007. Command officials responsible for overseeing
               the reorganization told us that civilians have lower turnover
               rates than the military service members who regularly rotate
               through the command. The command believes that lower turnover
               among its civilian workforce will bring greater continuity and
               stability to the headquarters' chief responsibilities, including
               strategic-level planning and advocacy for new capabilities. Table
               5 presents the projected distribution of the command's civilian
               and military positions in October 2007.

                         Matter for Congressional Consideration

                           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    Appendix I: ChangesComma Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to
    the United States Strategic Command's Budget

    USSTRATCOM's Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establishment

    Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities

    1DOD's December 2001 report on the results of its Nuclear Posture Review
    introduced the concept of a New Triad of strategic capabilities that
    include a mix of nuclear and nonnuclear strike forces; defenses, including
    missile defense; and a responsive infrastructure, which are all enhanced
    by an integrated and adaptive approach to intelligence, planning, and
    command and control. As reflected in its expanding set of mission
    responsibilities, USSTRATCOM has a significant role in implementing the
    New Triad.

    USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Among Its Missions

                                 Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II: United Statesand Civilian Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends
    in the United States Strategic Command Military and Civilian Authorized
    Personnel Level

    Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stable and Percentage of
    Filled Positions Has Increased

    1USSTRATCOM's authorized military and civilian personnel level is the
    number of authorized positions for service members and civilians that are
    funded by the services and assigned to the command.

    2Military skills refer to personnel designations developed by each of the
    military services. In this report, "skill" refers to specific Air Force
    Specialty Codes, Army Areas of Concentration (officer) and Military
    Occupational Specialties (warrant officer and enlisted), Navy Billet
    Designator Codes (officer) and General Ratings (enlisted), and Marine
    Corps Military Occupational Specialties.

    Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met Within Existing
    Authorization

    USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Positions Remain
    Concentrated in Relatively Few Specialties

    3The space and global strike joint functional component command also has
    positions assigned to other locations, including the Cheyenne Mountain
    Operations Center, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and U.S. Joint Forces
    Command, Norfolk, Virginia.

    Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of Civilian Positions
    Is Increasing

    Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
    Positions in October 2007

                           Civilian  Military Percentagecivilian Percentagemilitary
    Organization       positions positions          positions          positions
    USSTRATCOM
    headquarters             616       592                 51                 49
    JFCC-Space and
    Global Strike             77       354                 18                 82
    Othera                    54       217                 20                 80
    Joint Information
    Operations Center         77       124                 38                 62
    JFCC-Network
    Warfare                   31        89                 26                 74
    JFCC-Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance            19        83                 19                 81
    Joint Task Force
    for Global Network
    Operations                69        63                 52                 48
    JFCC-Integrated
    Missile Defense           25        65                 28                 72
    USSTRATCOM Center
    for Combating
    Weapons of Mass
    Destruction               18        32                 36                 64
    Total                    986     1,619                 38                 62

    Source: USSTRATCOM.

    Notes: Projections current as of February 2006. Data include both military
    and civilian positions at USSTRATCOM headquarters and at other locations.
    They do not include contractors at USSTRATCOM headquarters, or contractors
    or positions at mission organizations that are provided by supporting
    services and agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command. aIncludes
    authorized personnel assigned to the National Airborne Operations Center,
    Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various combined
    task forces, Atlantic and Pacific cruise missile support activities;
    various liaison offices; and national laboratories.

                                 Scope and Methodology

    To determine how USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has changed since
    its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed USSTRATCOM projections
    and historic data that identify (1) the number of authorized civilian and
    military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM, (2) the number of authorized
    positions filled by individuals assigned to the command, and (3) the
    professional military skills associated with the command's military
    positions. The data we obtained include USSTRATCOM positions assigned to
    the command's headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska, its mission
    organizations, and to various other locations and assignments.4 We also
    obtained the command's projections for authorized personnel levels for the
    new mission organizations, and discussed these projections with officials
    responsible for managing the command's authorized personnel. In our
    analysis, we did not consider staff positions from organizations that are
    supporting several of USSTRATCOM's mission organizations, such as the Air
    Force Space Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data
    also do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to
    assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including (1)
    performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the
    data to another independently prepared data source, and (3) interviewing
    agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data
    were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

    4In addition to its headquarters and mission organizations, USSTRATCOM has
    authorized personnel assigned with the National Airborne Operations
    Center, Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various
    combined task forces; Atlantic and Pacific cruise missile support
    activities; liaison offices; and national laboratories.

    Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

    To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and
    assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of
    Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM guidance,
    plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and reports;
    implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission
    organizations; and documentation related to DOD's implementation of its
    New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also spoke
    with various officials involved in the command's implementation efforts
    about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible, we met with
    the command and other organizations' senior leadership to discuss and
    obtain their views on various command issues, including:

               o  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command;
               o  Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
               Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence
               Agency;
               o  Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network
               Warfare/Director, National Security Agency;
               o  Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
               Missile Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command;
               o  Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network
               Operations/Director, Defense Information Systems Agency;
               o  Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
               Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
               o  Commander, Air Force Space Command; and
               o  Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

               To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise
               program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the
               command's annual training plan, which describes the command's
               individual exercises, establishes an exercise schedule, and sets
               expectations for the participation of the command's mission
               organizations. For the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we
               reviewed the exercise plan, collection management plan,
               after-action report, and final exercise report. We also observed
               that exercise and discussed the exercise results with the
               participants. We also reviewed the collection management plan and
               the after-action report prepared for the April 2006 Global Thunder
               exercise, and after-action reports prepared for the April 2005
               Global Thunder, October 2004 Global Lightning, and October 2003
               Global Guardian exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint
               Staff that describe the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint
               Forces Command for supporting combatant command exercises. In
               addition we held discussions with command officials from the
               exercise and training branch and with other exercise observers to
               obtain their views on USSTRATCOM efforts to plan and schedule its
               exercises. We also met with officials from the new joint
               functional component commands as well as the Joint Task Force for
               Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
               Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges to more fully
               including their missions in the commands exercises and assist in
               our understanding of the extent to which the command's mission
               organizations were able to participate in the command's exercises.
               Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the
               command's exercise program since its establishment, and plans for
               the future. Finally, we met with officials from the U.S. Joint
               Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to determine the extent
               to which they have been involved in identifying requirements,
               objectives, methods, and tools for planning, implementing, and
               evaluating USSTRATCOM exercises to strengthen the design and
               execution of the command's exercises, such as participant training
               and independent observer team support and evaluation.

               To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission
               organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress
               toward achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents
               from the command and each of the new mission organizations. These
               documents included the command's implementation directives for
               each new mission organization and the overarching command
               reorganization implementation plan for the current reorganization.
               We also reviewed briefings from each of the mission organizations
               that gave status information on the organizations' efforts towards
               achieving full operating capability. We held discussions with
               USSTRATCOM officials who were part of the command's reorganization
               management team and with the senior leadership, when possible, to
               determine their roles and management approach in assisting the
               mission organizations' efforts to reach full operating capability
               and to obtain an understanding of what reaching full operating
               capability means as a milestone in developing the new USSTRATCOM
               organization. We met and held discussions with the senior staff of
               each mission organization on their criteria for measuring the
               organization's progress toward full operating capability.

               To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a
               results-oriented management approach to establish goals,
               continually track its progress, achieve better synergy among its
               missions, and gauge the results of its efforts, we reviewed key
               documentation and interviewed officials to determine what steps,
               if any, the command has taken to develop and follow this approach.
               We reviewed relevant GAO reports1 that identified and reviewed
               management approaches of other government and private sector
               organizations. We used the practices and implementation steps
               identified in these approaches as criteria for reviewing
               USSTRATCOM documents and for discussions with command officials
               about their approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM organization.
               We then compared USSTRATCOM's approach against these examples of
               success that we had identified in other organizations to determine
               the extent to which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place.

               We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first
               principles (i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the
               command's performance and those from its biannual readiness
               reporting and its annual training assessments. We reviewed the
               command's implementation plan and related directives for
               establishing USSTRATCOM's joint functional component commands. We
               compared these documents to implementation plans used by other
               organizations, including the U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S.
               Northern Command, and reorganization plans, such as the Report to
               Congress on the Plan for Organizing the National Nuclear Security
               Agency and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization
               Plan, to determine any differences in the elements and details for
               implementation that were considered in these plans and the extent
               to which they had developed, used, or planned to use outcome-based
               performance goals and measures.

               To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress
               defining organizational responsibilities and establishing
               relationships with other DOD commands and organizations, we
               obtained and reviewed relevant documents and spoke with various
               officials involved in implementing and advocating for the
               command's new missions about its roles and related plans and
               actions. To determine the extent to which the command has
               clarified the roles and expectations of its service component
               organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft
               integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and
               other documents. We met with officials from each of the command's
               service component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to
               which they believed the command's guidance and expectations was
               sufficiently clear about their supporting roles. We also discussed
               with command officials the extent to which guidance was provided
               to the service components through meetings and other activities.

               To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a common
               approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to
               numerous DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met
               with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in
               the command's directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met
               with senior leadership in all of the subordinate mission
               organizations to understand the extent to which a clear,
               coordinated, and unified outreach strategy is in place and to
               identify the range of methods and activities the command and its
               subordinate mission organizations use to engage and promote its
               missions and capabilities with combatant commands, military
               services, and DOD and other government organizations. We met with
               officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern
               Command and discussed command relationships, the ways that
               USSTRATCOM officials performed outreach with these organizations,
               sought their viewpoint on lessons that should be learned in
               communicating the command's missions and responsibilities, and
               their perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During USSTRATCOM's
               Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also obtained
               insights from participants on the command's effectiveness at
               performing its outreach activities.

               We also reviewed several GAO reports2 that addressed key practices
               organizations should implement during a significant reorganization
               or transformation. We used the reports to identify successful
               communication and outreach practices employed by other U.S. and
               foreign government organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM
               commander's summary report for its November 2005 Global Lightning
               exercise to identify any lessons learned, from participating in
               the exercise with two other combatant commands, on the success of
               the command's outreach efforts.

               During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and
               authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the
               resources, personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the
               command's missions. We took steps to assess the reliability of the
               data used in these analyses, including (1) performing electronic
               testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the data to other
               independently prepared data sources, and (3) interviewing agency
               officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the
               data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For additional
               methodological details about how we performed our analyses, see
               appendixes I and II. We performed our work from May 2005 through
               June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
               auditing standards.

               In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command's
               headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank
               organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides
               information on the organizations and offices contacted during our
               review.

    1Our prior work on organizational transformation includes GAO, Managing
    for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for
    Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005);
    GAO-03-293SP ; GAO-03-669 ; and Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy
    Needed to Address Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service,
    GAO-04-537 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004).

    2See for example, GAO-03-293SP , GAO-03-669, and GAO, Defense Management:
    Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations,
    GAO-05-629 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).

    Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review

    Organization/office contacted
    Department of Defense
          o  Office of the Secretary of Defense

                  o  International Security Policy

          o  Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff Directorate

                  o  J-1 (Manpower and Personnel)
                  o  J-3 (Operations)
                  o  J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy)

          o  Defense Information Systems Agency
          o  Defense Intelligence Agency
          o  Defense Threat Reduction Agency
          o  National Security Agency
    USSTRATCOM subordinate functional organization
          o  Joint Information Operations Center
          o  Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations
          o  USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
          o  Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike
          o  Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance,
          and Reconnaissance
          o  Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare
          o  Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
    USSTRATCOM service component/supporting command
          o  Department of the Air Force Headquarters
          o  U.S. Air Force Space Command
          o  Eighth Air Force
          o  U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command
          o  U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
          o  U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command
    Combatant command
          o  U.S. Northern Command
          o  U.S. Joint Forces Command

                  o  Joint Warfighting Center

          o  U.S. Central Command
    Other organization
          o  LMI Government Consulting
          o  RAND Corporation

    Source: GAO.

    Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations
    and Responsibilities

    The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is comprised
    of a command headquarters, joint functional component commands, task
    forces, and centers, which are located around one of four metropolitan
    areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado; San Antonio, Texas;
    and Washington, D.C.

    Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate Mission
    Organizations

    Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
    destruction.

    Each of the command's organizations is supported by a primary Defense
    agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary
    responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM organizations.

    Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities

    USSTRATCOM organization,                              Primary supporting
    location, and date                                    service or agency
    established              Primary responsibilities     partner
    USSTRATCOM headquarters  Responsible for exercising   Service component
    Offutt Air Force Base,   command authority over       commands, JFCCs,
    Nebr. October 2002       USSTRATCOM's joint           joint task forces,
                                functional component         and centers.
                                commands (JFCC), task
                                forces, and centers and has
                                strategic responsibility for
                                integrating all of
                                USSTRATCOM missions of space
                                operations; information
                                operations; integrated
                                missile defense; global
                                command and control;
                                intelligence, surveillance,
                                and reconnaissance; global
                                strike; and strategic
                                deterrence, and is the lead
                                combatant command for
                                integrating and
                                synchronizing DOD-wide
                                efforts in combating weapons
                                of mass destruction.
    JFCC-Integrated Missile  Responsible for planning,    The Commander, JFCC-
    Defense Shreiver Air     integrating, and             Integrated Missile
    Force Base, Colo.        coordinating global missile  Defense, is also the
    January 2005             defense operations and       Commander, U.S. Army
                                support. The command         Space and Missile
                                conducts the day-to-day      Defense Command
                                operations of assigned       /Army Forces
                                forces and coordinates       Strategic Command.
                                activities with associated
                                combatant commands, other
                                USSTRATCOM JFCCs, and the
                                Missile Defense Agency.
    JFCC-Intelligence,       Responsible for coordinating The Commander, JFCC-
    Surveillance, and        global intelligence          Intelligence,
    Reconnaissance Bolling   collection to address DOD    Surveillance, and
    Air Force Base, D.C.     worldwide operations and     Reconnaissance, is
    January 2005             national intelligence        also the Director,
                                requirements. It will serve  Defense Intelligence
                                as the focal point for the   Agency .
                                planning, execution, and
                                assessment of the military's
                                global intelligence,
                                surveillance, and
                                reconnaissance operations; a
                                key enabler to achieving
                                global situational
                                awareness.
    JFCC-Space and Global    Responsible for integrating  The Commander, JFCC-
    Strike Offutt Air Force  all elements of military     Space and Global
    Base, Nebr. January 2005 power to conduct, plan, and  Strike, is also the
                                present global strike        Commander, Eighth
                                effects and also direct the  Air Force.
                                deliberate planning and
                                execution of assigned space
                                operation missions. For
                                plans not aligned with a
                                specific mission set, the
                                command is tasked to work in
                                close coordination with
                                USSTRATCOM headquarters as
                                the lead component
                                responsible for the
                                integration and coordination
                                of capabilities provided by
                                all other JFCCs.
    JFCC-Network Warfare     Responsible for facilitating The Commander,
    Fort Meade, Md. January  cooperative engagement with  JFCC-Network
    2005                     other national entities in   Warfare, is also the
                                computer network defense and Director, National
                                network warfare as part of   Security Agency .
                                the global information
                                operations mission. This
                                coordinated approach to
                                information operations
                                involves two other important
                                supporting commands: Joint
                                Task Force for Global
                                Network Operations and Joint
                                Information Operations
                                Center.
    Joint Information        Responsible for integrating  The Commander, Joint
    Operations Centera       information operations into  Information
    Lackland Air Force Base, military plans and           Operations Center,
    Tex. September 19991     operations across the        is also the
                                spectrum of conflict.        Commander, Air
                                                             Intelligence Agency.
    Joint Task Force for     Responsible for supporting   The Commander, Joint
    Global Network           USSTRATCOM in defending      Task Force for
    Operations Arlington,    DOD's information            Global Network
    Va. August 2005          infrastructure. This is done Operations, is also
                                by integrating the task      the Director,
                                force's capabilities into    Defense Information
                                the operations of all DOD    Systems Agency.
                                computers, networks, and
                                systems used by DOD,
                                combatant commands,
                                services, and agencies.
    USSTRATCOM organization,                              Primary supporting
    location, and date                                    service or agency
    established              Primary responsibilities     partner
    USSTRATCOM Center for    Responsible for integrating  Director, USSTRATCOM
    Combating WMD Fort       and synchronizing DOD-wide   Center for Combating
    Belvoir, Va. August 2005 efforts in support of the    WMD, is also the
                                combating weapons of mass    Director, Defense
                                destruction (WMD) mission    Threat Reduction
                                and serves to plan,          Agency.
                                advocate, and advise the
                                Commander, USSTRATCOM, on
                                WMD-related matters. The
                                center provides
                                recommendations to dissuade,
                                deter, and prevent the
                                acquisition, development, or
                                use of WMD and associated
                                technology. Through
                                collaboration with U.S. and
                                allied organizations, the
                                center leverages
                                around-the-clock situational
                                awareness of worldwide WMD
                                and related activities, as
                                well as provides day-to-day
                                and operational crisis
                                support via the operations
                                center. The Defense Threat
                                Reduction Agency provides
                                critical reachback and
                                resources to the center and
                                USSTRATCOM, and other
                                combatant commands.

    Source: USSTRATCOM.

    Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
    destruction. a The Joint Information Operations Center was assigned to the
    new USSTRATCOM in October 2002.

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Now on p. 18.

    Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                                      GAO Contact

    Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

                                    Acknowledgments

    In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant
    Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M. Leissoo; Kevin L.
    O'Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski,
    Analyst-in-Charge, made key contributions to this report.

    (350628)

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    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-847 .

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    Highlights of GAO-06-847 , a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
    Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

    September 2006

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen
    Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization

    In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of
    the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter
    global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission
    areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was
    asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1)
    implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2)
    defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships
    with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To
    assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in
    implementing successful organizational transformations.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that USSTRATCOM take actions to provide more guidance to
    its mission and service component organizations, improve communications,
    and evaluate mission performance. DOD agreed with some recommendations but
    disagreed with others, including that it develop a results-oriented
    management process. Therefore, GAO included a matter for congressional
    consideration that would require DOD to develop such a process given the
    importance of the role assigned to USSTRATCOM.

    Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in
    implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as
    developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing
    processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and
    resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to
    build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by
    the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the
    command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and
    has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in
    its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more
    specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision.
    Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new
    missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust
    exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S.
    Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning,
    training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new
    mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining
    when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM
    has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results
    across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work
    examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each
    of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase
    their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are
    involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas
    should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the
    combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military
    options for responding to future threats-two key DOD goals.

    USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
    organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations
    that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However,
    it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component
    organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing
    outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some
    guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has
    not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not
    fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command.
    In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant
    commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively
    manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential
    for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that
    seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance
    and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service
    component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the
    command to build effective relationships with other commands.
    *** End of document. ***