Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from
a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing	 
(22-NOV-05, GAO-06-84). 					 
                                                                 
The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century
needs. Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50	 
billion annually for the Navy to operate and maintain its forces 
and support around 376,000 military personnel. In recognizing	 
that the Navy faces affordability issues in sustaining readiness 
within its historical share of the defense budget, the Chief of  
Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet Response	 
Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet	 
Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain	 
readiness in ships and squadrons. GAO evaluated the extent to	 
which the Navy has (1) employed a sound management approach in	 
implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested and evaluated
the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve	 
implementation. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-84						        
    ACCNO:   A41918						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would     
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous	 
Testing 							 
     DATE:   11/22/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOD Fleet Response Plan				 

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GAO-06-84


Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 4
Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management Practices
9
Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
Developed Lessons Learned 12
Conclusions 20
Recommendations for Executive Action 21
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 26
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Figures

Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
Participate in an Exercise 5
Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide Eight
Carriers for Surge Deployments 8
Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process 14

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

November 22, 2005

Congressional Committees

A key goal of Navy senior leadership is to transform the Navy to better
meet 21st century security challenges. Since 2000, Congress has
appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and
maintain its forces and support around 376,000 active military personnel.
Nonetheless, the Navy recognizes it is facing affordability issues related
to sustaining readiness while developing and procuring several types of
new ships within its historical share of the defense budget. One area
where the Navy has made significant changes is in its operational posture.
In March 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations initiated the development of
a concept, which became known as the Fleet Response Plan,1 to enhance the
Navy's deployment readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan, as
implemented by Fleet Forces Command in May 2003, is designed to more
rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To
achieve this capability, the plan alters prior manning, maintenance, and
training practices to allow for a more responsive and ready naval force.
The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to
provide not only presence and engagement in forward areas, but also surge
a greater number of ships on short-notice in response to significant
crises without increasing the readiness budget. The Fleet Response Plan
modifies the Navy's pre-2001 rotational deployment policy, replacing
6-month routine deployments with more flexible deployment options for as
many as eight carrier strike groups when and where needed.

The Fleet Response Plan represents a major change in the way the Navy
manages its forces. Implementing large-scale change management
initiatives, such as organizational transformations, can be a complex
endeavor. Our prior work shows that failure to adequately address-and
often even consider-a wide variety of management issues is at the heart of
unsuccessful transformations. We have identified a number of key best
practices and lessons learned from major public and private sector
organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2 These sound
management practices include, for example, establishing a coherent mission
and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including
resource commitments; setting implementation goals and a timeline to build
momentum and show progress from day one; and establishing a communication
strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress.

1 The Fleet Response Plan is also known as the Fleet Readiness Program, or
simply "FRP."

We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and are
providing it to you because of your oversight of defense issues. We have
previously reported on the maintenance aspects of the Navy's Fleet
Response Plan.3 This report focuses on the following two questions: (1) To
what extent has the Navy employed a sound management approach in
implementing the Fleet Response Plan? (2) To what extent has the Navy
tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its Fleet Response Plan and
shared results to improve its implementation?

To assess the Navy's management approach in implementing the Fleet
Response Plan, we obtained and analyzed key messages, briefings, and
instructions on the Fleet Response Plan and interviewed Department of
Defense (DOD) and Navy headquarters and fleet officials, and compared the
Navy's approach with best practices for transformations of large
organizations. To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the
effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve its
implementation, we obtained briefings from and interviewed Navy officials,
reviewed and queried the Navy Lessons Learned System to determine relevant
lessons recorded, and examined Navy guidance on test and evaluation
efforts. We reviewed and validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data
and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
conducted our review from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The scope and
methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix
I.

2 See GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum on Mergers and Transformation:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).

3 See GAO, Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of
the Navy's Fleet Response Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2004).

                                Results in Brief

While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to establish the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive
management approach to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
implementation. Sound management practices that provide a framework for
implementing and managing programs include (1) establishing a coherent
mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation,
including resource commitments; (2) establishing a communication strategy
to create shared expectations and report related progress; and (3) setting
implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress.
The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some
aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established
strategic goals for progressive readiness levels for carrier strike
groups. However, the Navy has not established specific readiness goals for
the rest of the fleet or determined the resources needed to achieve its
goals, although it has stated the plan will be budget neutral. The Navy
also does not have an official written definition of the Fleet Response
Plan or communications strategy that clearly establishes a coherent
mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation,
including resource commitments. These sound management practices were not
fully implemented because senior leaders wanted to implement the Fleet
Response Plan as quickly as possible in response to the Chief of Naval
Operations' direction. Although Navy officials recently tasked the Center
for Naval Analyses to conduct the study to identify potential goals and
performance measures, it is not clear what the study will recommend or how
long it will take for the Navy to take action. Until an overall management
plan is developed, neither the Navy nor Congress may be able to determine
whether the Fleet Response Plan has effectively achieved its goals,
measure the plan's overall progress, or determine what resources are
needed to implement the plan.

In addition, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive set of plans
to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and has not developed formal
lessons learned from past exercises to evaluate the plan's effectiveness.
DOD has long recognized the importance of testing new concepts by using
war games and experimentation, and recent Navy guidance stresses the
importance of establishing a long-range plan for testing complex and novel
problems. The Navy has identified three loosely linked events that Navy
officials say demonstrate the viability of the plan. However, none of the
three events cited by the Navy were part of an overall test and evaluation
strategy to assess the value of the plan in increasing readiness. The Navy
has not developed an overarching test and evaluation plan because Navy
officials believe existing readiness reports provide adequate information
to assess the Fleet Response Plan. However, readiness reports do not
produce information on important factors such as costs, long-term
maintenance implications, or quality of life issues. Additionally, the
Navy did not analyze and evaluate the results of these three events and
submit formal lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned System. Without
systematic testing and evaluation and use of the lessons learned system,
the Navy's ability to validate a complex change like the Fleet Response
Plan, identify and correct problem areas, and disseminate lessons learned
throughout the fleet is limited. This not only prevents ship and command
staffs from learning from the experiences of others, but it also prevents
the Navy Lessons Learned System from possibly identifying problems and
patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level, Navy-wide
response.

To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, we recommend that
the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
performance measures. We also recommend that the Navy develop a
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
Fleet Response Plan has been successful. In its comments on a draft of
this report, DOD generally concurred with the report's recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive
management plan with goals and performance measures, citing several
actions it has underway or planned. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. However, DOD
does not plan to conduct no-notice surges as we recommended because it
views such exercises as unnecessary and costly. We continue to believe
that no-notice surges are important because they can serve as an effective
means of gauging whether the Navy is ready to respond to real world
events, which can occur with little notice. DOD comments and our
evaluation are discussed on pages 21 and 22.

                                   Background

Composition of a Carrier Strike Group

Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier
and its air wing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided
missile destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more supply
ships with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and spare parts).
These groups are formed and disestablished on an as needed basis, and
their compositions may differ though they contain similar types of ships.
Figure 1 shows a carrier strike group sailing in a group formation as it
prepares to participate in an exercise.

Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
Participate in an Exercise

Origin of the Fleet Response Plan

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy ships
and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas, usually for 6
months at a time. Most of the Navy's remaining units were not available
because they were in early stages of their maintenance or training cycles,
or because the Navy did not have good visibility of the readiness of these
units. This prompted the Chief of Naval Operations in March 2003 to task
the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to develop the Fleet Response Plan
concept to enhance the Navy's surge capability. The Chief of Naval
Operations approved the concept in May 2003 and further directed the
Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to be responsible and accountable for
effectively implementing the plan.

Fleet Response Plan Believed to Provide Increased and Flexible Readiness

The Fleet Response Plan emphasizes an increased level of readiness and the
ability to quickly deploy naval forces to respond to crises, conflicts, or
homeland defense needs. The plan applies broadly to the entire fleet;
however, it only sets specific requirements for carrier strike groups. For
example, the plan calls for eight carrier strike groups to be ready to
deploy within 90 days of notification. Six of them would be available to
deploy within 30 days and the other two within 90 days. This is commonly
referred to as the 6 + 2 goal. Under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has
developed a surge capability schedule that it uses to manage and identify
the level of training a ship has completed and its readiness to deploy.
The schedule contains three progressive readiness goals: emergency surge,
surge-ready, and routine deployable status.4 Each readiness goal specifies
phases of training that must be completed to achieve the goal. To be
placed in emergency surge status, a ship or an air squadron needs to have
completed its unit-level phase training. Achieving surge-ready status
requires the completion of integrated phase training. Attaining routine
deployable status requires achievement of all necessary capabilities,
completion of underway sustainment phase training, and certification of
the unit for forward deployed operations.5

The surge capabilities schedule provides a readiness snapshot for each
ship, allowing decision makers to quickly determine which ships are
available to meet the needs of the mission. Figure 2 illustrates how the
Navy notionally identifies the eight aircraft carriers available for surge
deployments. The carriers numbered 1 through 6 are expected to be ready to
deploy within 30 days notice. The carriers labeled "+1" and "+2" are
expected to able to surge within 90 days notice. The six surge-ready
carriers include two carriers on deployment (numbered 3 and 4), one
carrier that is part of the forward deployed naval force based in Japan
(number 6), and three carriers in the sustainment phase (numbered 1, 2,
and 5). These six carriers are expected to have completed postdeployment
depot-level maintenance and their unit-level phase training. The two
additional surge carriers are expected to have completed depot-level
maintenance but not to have completed unit-level phase training. The
remaining four carriers are in the maintenance phase or deep maintenance.6

4 Emergency surge status means a unit can be employed in case of urgent
need but does so at levels of operational risk correlating to the level of
capability achieved at the time of emergency surge. Surge-ready status
means that units are ready to be employed at more acceptable levels of
operational risk commensurate with the level of capability achieved at the
time of the requirement to surge. Routine deployable status means a unit
has achieved all required capabilities, completed underway training
requirements, and is certified for forward deployed operations.

5 Unit-level phase training focuses on completion of unit-level training
requirements, including team training both on board and ashore; unit-level
exercises in port and at sea; and unit inspections, assessments,
certifications, and qualifications. During this phase, a unit becomes
proficient in all required capabilities, meets the training commander's
certification criteria, and becomes ready for more complex integrated
training events. Integrated phase training brings individual units
together to conduct strike-group-level integrated training and operations
in a challenging operational environment as a foundation for performing
their anticipated deployed mission. Sustainment phase training exercises
units and staffs in multimission planning and execution, including the
ability to interoperate effectively in a wartime environment.

6 The maintenance phase consists of depot-level shipyard maintenance for a
period of 6 to 12 months. Deep maintenance is for a period of 2 to 3 years
for a nuclear-refueling overhaul.

Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide Eight
Carriers for Surge Deployments

Revised Fleet Response Plan Is Being Developed

Based on the Navy's experiences during the past 2 years, Fleet Forces
Command has convened a cross-functional working group to develop a refined
version of the Fleet Response Plan. This update, known as Fleet Response
Plan-Enhanced, is intended to further define the Fleet Response Plan,
modify terminology for progressive readiness states to better reflect
their meaning, tie in elements such as a human capital strategy, and
expand the focus of the plan beyond carrier strike groups to the entire
Navy. It may also extend the Fleet Response Plan's current employment
cycle length of 27 months. The Fleet Response Plan-Enhanced is still under
development at this time.

Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management Practices

The Navy's management approach in establishing the Fleet Response Plan as
its new readiness construct has not fully incorporated sound management
practices needed to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
implementation.7 Studies by several organizations have shown that
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use sound
management practices to assist agencies in measuring performance,
reporting results, and achieving desired outcomes. These practices provide
management with a framework for effectively implementing and managing
programs and shift program management focus from measuring program
activities and processes to measuring program outcomes. Sound management
practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and integrated
strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource
commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build
momentum and show progress from day one; and (3) establishing a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
progress.

The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some
aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established some
strategic goals needed to meet the intent of the plan, such as the
progressive readiness levels of emergency surge, surge-ready, and routine
deployable status. The Navy also has established specific training actions
to support these goals, such as that carrier strike groups must complete
unit-level training to be certified as emergency surge-ready. However,
other actions taken by the Navy do not fully incorporate these practices.
For example, the Navy has identified the 6 + 2 surge capability as a
readiness goal and performance measure for carrier strike groups, but no
such goal was established for the rest of the fleet. The Navy also has
some unofficial goals and performance measures regarding manning and
maintenance, but these unofficial goals and performance measures have not
been formally established. For example, briefings on the Fleet Response
Plan state that the Navy desires and needs fully manned ships (i.e.,
manning at 100 percent of a ship's requirement) for the program to be
successful. Moreover, according to Navy officials, the Navy has not
established milestones for achieving its results.

7 The Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
to provide for, among other things, the establishment of strategic
planning and performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L.
No. 103-62 (1993).

In addition, 2 years after initiating implementation of the Fleet Response
Plan, the Navy still does not have an official written definition of the
Fleet Response Plan that clearly establishes a coherent mission and
integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource
commitments. This definition would describe the Fleet Response Plan's
total scope and contain guidance with formal goals and performance
measures. The Navy recently has taken some action to address this area. In
February 2005, the Navy directed the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct
a study to develop formal definitions and guidance as well as identify
goals and performance measures for the plan. However, it remains to be
seen whether this study will be completed as planned by November 2005; if
it will recommend developing and implementing sound management practices,
such as goals, measures, milestones, and timelines; and whether any
management improvement recommendations made in the study will be
implemented by the Fleet Forces Command, the Navy command responsible for
implementing the Fleet Response Plan. Without goals, performance measures,
timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and guidance to help effectively manage
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and determine if the plan is
achieving its goals, the Navy may find it more difficult to implement the
Fleet Response Plan across the entire naval force.

Moreover, despite the Navy's unofficial goal that the Fleet Response Plan
be budget neutral, as articulated in briefings and by senior leaders, the
Navy has not yet clearly identified the resources needed to achieve its
goals or provided a rationale for how these resources will contribute to
achieving the expected level of performance. Navy officials have said that
current operations and maintenance funding levels, as well as manning at
100 percent of required positions, have contributed to successful
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan. However, officials do not know
what level of manning or funding is actually required for program success
over the long term to avoid any unintended consequences, such as greater
amounts of deferred maintenance. According to Navy officials, it is
difficult to attribute costs to the plan because there is no single budget
line item that tracks the costs associated with the Fleet Response Plan.
Without knowing the funding needed, the Navy may not be able to assess the
impact of possible future changes in funding on implementing the plan.
Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links costs with
performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may be
able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is actually achieving its
unofficial goal of being budget neutral.

Finally, the Navy also has not developed a comprehensive communications
strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and
seeks to genuinely engage them in a two-way exchange, which is a critical
step in successfully implementing cultural change or transformation. We
looked for formal mechanisms that communicated the details of the Fleet
Response Plan and spoke with personnel from carrier strike groups,
aircraft carriers, air wings and an air squadron, one surface combatant
ship, and other command staff.8 We found that while the Fleet Response
Plan was communicated extensively to senior-level officers, and the Navy
provided numerous briefings and messages related to the plan,
communication and understanding of the plan did not flow through to the
lower ranks. While the concept of the Fleet Response Plan is generally
understood by some senior-level officials, many of the lower grade
personnel on these ships were unaware of the scope, goals, and other
aspects of the plan. In the absence of clear communication throughout the
fleet via an overall communications strategy that could increase employee
awareness of the Fleet Response Plan, its successful implementation could
be impeded.

Sound management practices, such as those noted above, were not fully used
by the Navy because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the Fleet
Response Plan in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' desires.
However, without an overall management plan containing all of these
elements to guide the implementation of such a major change, it may be
difficult for the Navy and Congress to determine the extent to which the
Fleet Response Plan is achieving the desired results, measure its overall
progress, or determine the resources needed to implement the plan.

8 We met with people individually and in groups. Personnel included
commanding officers, executive officers, and senior and junior enlisted
personnel. Additionally, we met with command master chiefs and command
career counselors.

  Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or Developed
                                Lessons Learned

The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
implementation and success over time. The methodical testing, exercising,
and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an established practice
throughout the military to gain insight into how systems and capabilities
will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically
conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy
has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely
linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation
strategy, which impairs the Navy's ability to validate the plan and
evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its
lessons learned system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan
tests or as an analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and
improve implementation, which limits the Navy's ability to identify and
correct weaknesses across the fleet.

Methodical Tests and Evaluations of New Concepts Are Important

Methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and
concepts is an important and established practice throughout the military.
DOD has long recognized the importance of using tabletop exercises, war
games, and experimentation9 to explore military doctrine, operational
concepts, and organizational arrangements. Collectively, these tests and
experiments can provide important insight into how systems and
capabilities will perform in actual operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command,
which has lead responsibility for DOD experimentation on new concepts of
operation and technologies, states that its experimental efforts aim to
foster military innovation and improvement by exploring, developing, and
transferring new concepts and organizational ideas into operational
reality.

Particularly large and complex issues may require long-term testing and
evaluation that is guided by study plans. Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfighting Center has an electronic handbook that provides guidance for
conducting exercises and lays out the steps in an exercise life cycle:
design; planning; preparation; execution; and analysis, evaluation, and
reports. The Army also has well-established guidance10 governing service
studies, analyses, and evaluations that the Navy feels is representative
of best practices for military operations research. This provides an
important mechanism through which problems pertaining to critical issues
and other important matters are identified and explored to meet service
needs. As shown in figure 3, the Army's process involves six major steps
that create a methodical process for developing, conducting, documenting,
and evaluating a study. Following a formal study process enables data
evaluation and development of lessons learned that could be used to build
on the existing knowledge base. In a roundtable discussion with the Fleet
Forces Command on the rationale behind Summer Pulse 2004, the Navy's major
exercise for the Fleet Response Plan, a senior Navy official stated, "From
the concept, ... you need to exercise, ... you need to practice, ... you
need to demonstrate it to know you got it right and what lessons are there
to learn from how we did it."11

9 Tabletop exercises are analytical tools that require fewer resources
than full-fledged live exercises. They provide a means to develop both
immediate and long-term solutions among functional areas, to develop
standardization and interoperability of procedures, and to document best
practices for others to utilize.

10 Army Regulation 5-5, Army Studies and Analyses (June 30, 1996).

11 Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem, "Roundtable: Summer Pulse Discussions
With Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem," Summer Pulse `04 News Archive
(July 8, 2004),
http://www.cffc.navy.mil/summerpulse04/stufflebeem-transcript.htm.

Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process

Other governmental agencies, like GAO, and the private sector also rely on
detailed study plans, or data collection and analysis plans, to guide the
development of studies and experiments and the collection and analysis of
data, and to provide a feedback loop that links the outcomes of the study
or experiment event and subsequent analysis to the original goals and
objectives of the study or event. GAO guidance states that data collection
and analysis plans "should carry forward the overall logic of the study so
that the connection between the data that will be collected and the
answers to the study questions will become evident."12

12 See GAO, Quantitative Data Analysis: An Introduction, GAO/PEMD-10.1.11,
ch. 7 (Washington, D.C.: May 1992).

Recent Navy guidance also recognizes the need for a thorough evaluation of
complex initiatives. In April 2005, the Navy issued a Study Planning and
Conduct Guide assembled by the Navy Warfare Development Command.13 This
guide stresses the importance of establishing a long-range plan for
complex and novel problems and lays out the rationale for detailed study
plans for exercises and experiments, as they establish a structure in
which issues are explored and data are collected and analyzed in relation
to the established goals or objectives for the event. Furthermore, the
Navy's guide notes that random, inadequately prepared events and a
determination just to study the problem do not lead to successful
resolution of problems that may arise in programs and concepts that the
Navy is testing and evaluating.

Navy Events to Show Viability of the Fleet Response Plan Have Lacked Methodical
Testing and Evaluation

The Navy has not methodically conducted realistic tests of the Fleet
Response Plan to demonstrate the plan's viability and evaluate its
progress and success over time, instead relying on loosely linked events
and some routine data to demonstrate the viability of the plan. The events
identified by the Navy as successful tests of the Fleet Response Plan are
Summer Pulse 2004, the emergency deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,
and Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005, but of these events only Summer
Pulse 2004 was driven by the Fleet Response Plan with the intent of
demonstrating that large numbers of ships could be surged. In addition,
these events were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy that
yielded specific information from which to assess the value of the plan in
increasing readiness and meeting the new 6 + 2 surge capability goal for
carrier strike groups.

Summer Pulse 2004 encompassed a number of previously scheduled
deployments, exercises, and training events that took place between June
and August of 2004. The intent of Summer Pulse 2004 was to demonstrate the
Fleet Response Plan's new readiness construct and the Navy's ability to
deploy multiple carrier strike groups of varying levels of readiness.
However, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a methodical and realistic test of the
Fleet Response Plan for three reasons. First, Summer Pulse 2004 did not
follow best practices regarding study plans and the ability to evaluate
the impact and outcomes of the plan. The Navy did not develop a formal
study plan identifying study objectives, data collection requirements, and
analysis, or produce a comprehensive after-event report describing the
study's findings. Navy officials have stated that the elements of a formal
study plan were there for the individual deployments, exercises, and
training events constituting Summer Pulse 2004, but were not brought
together in a single package. While the Navy may have had the study
elements present for the individual exercises, they were not directly
linked to testing the Fleet Response Plan. Without such a comprehensive
study plan and overall evaluation, there is no ability to discern
potential impacts on fleet readiness, maintenance, personnel, and other
issues that are critical to the Fleet Response Plan's long-term success.
Second, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a realistic test because all
participating units had several months' warning of the event. As a result,
five carriers were already scheduled to be at sea and only two had to
surge. Because six ships are expected to be ready to deploy with as little
as 30 days' notice under the plan and two additional carriers within 90
days, a more realistic test of the Fleet Response Plan would include
no-notice or short-notice exercises.14 Such exercises conducted without
advance notification to the participants would provide the highest degree
of challenge and realism. Without such exercises, the Navy might not be
able to realistically practice and coordinate a full surge deployment.
Third, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a sufficient test because the Navy
involved only seven carriers instead of the eight carriers called for in
the plan. Therefore, it did not fully test the Navy's ability to meet
deployment requirements for the expected force.

13 The Navy Warfare Development Command's responsibilities include being a
champion for Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of
operations development in a naval, joint, and coalition environment;
coordinating the planning and implementation of the Navy's experimentation
process; managing development, approval, and rapid dissemination of naval,
joint, and allied doctrine; and managing the Navy's Lessons Learned
Program.

Another event cited by the Navy as evidence of the Fleet Response Plan's
success is the deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln carrier strike
group while it was in surge status in October 2004. Originally scheduled
to deploy in the spring of 2005, the Lincoln was deployed early to support
operations in the Pacific Command area of operation and provide aid to
areas devastated by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004. Navy
officials said that the Fleet Response Plan enabled the Navy to identify a
carrier to send to the Pacific and to quickly tailor its training package
based on its progressive readiness status. The Navy touted this rapid
response relief work by a strike group deployed during surge status as a
Fleet Response Plan success story. We agree that the Lincoln carrier
strike group was able to respond quickly. However, the extent to which
this event realistically tested the Fleet Response Plan's expectations for
surging one carrier strike group is not known. As with Summer Pulse 2004,
the Lincoln deployment was not a methodical test of the Fleet Response
Plan because there was no plan to systematically collect or analyze data
that would evaluate the outcomes of the Lincoln deployment against Fleet
Response Plan-related study goals.

14 No-notice exercises demonstrate participants' ability to rapidly
respond to unexpected situations. This type of exercise is valued because
it can lead to improvements in procedures by exercising participants in a
near-real-world context.

The Navy also pointed to a third event, its recent Global War on Terrorism
Surge 2005,15 as an indicator that the Fleet Response Plan works. The
Global War on Terrorism surge was a response to a request for forces16
from which the Navy is looking to glean Fleet Response Plan-related
information about what did and did not work when the ships return.
However, this is not a good test of the Fleet Response Plan because there
is no plan showing what specific data are being collected or what
analytical approaches are being employed to assess the ships' experiences.
As of September 2005, no other events had been scheduled to further test
and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan.

The Navy has not developed the kind of comprehensive plans to test and
evaluate the Fleet Response Plan as recommended by DOD and Navy guidance
and best practices because Navy officials have stated that existing
readiness reporting processes effectively evaluate the Fleet Response
Plan's success on a daily basis. They said after-action reports17 from
training exercises and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review18 assist with
this function. Navy officials explained that they implemented the Fleet
Response Plan the same way they had implemented the Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle, the predecessor to the Fleet Response Plan's Fleet
Readiness Training Plan. While this may be true, the Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle was focused on the specific training needed to prepare
units for their next deployment, not for implementing a new readiness
construct that emphasized surge versus routine deployments. Furthermore,
the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle did not contain stated goals whose
validity the Navy needed to test. In addition, ongoing readiness reports
do not provide information on important factors such as costs, long-term
maintenance implications, and quality of life issues.

15 In the spring of 2005, the Navy surged five ships in support of the
Global War on Terrorism to work with allies to detect, disrupt, and deny
international terrorist organizations the use of the maritime environment.
These ships will also work to build regional security and long-term
stability. The five ships are the U.S.S. Saipan (LHA 2), U.S.S. Nashville
(LPD 13), U.S.S. Nicholas (FFG 47), the U.S.S. Gunston Hall (LSD 44), and
the U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CG 58).

16 A request for forces is a special request by a geographic combatant
commander through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for forces in
addition to the normal, preapproved force deployments or forces assigned.

17 An after-action report is a professional discussion of an event,
focused on performance standards, that enables participants to discover
for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain
strengths and address weaknesses. It is a tool that leaders, trainers, and
units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task.

18 The Joint Quarterly Readiness Review is a quarterly readiness
assessment that identifies capability shortfalls and risks in mission
execution and identifies appropriate measures for risk reduction.

The Summer Pulse 2004, Lincoln surge deployment, and Global War on
Terrorism Surge 2005 testing events were not part of a methodical test and
evaluation approach. Therefore, the Navy is unable to convincingly use
these events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and determine whether the
plan has been successful in increasing readiness or achieving other goals.
Moreover, without effective evaluation of the Fleet Response Plan, the
Navy may be unable to identify and correct potential problem areas across
the fleet. Without a comprehensive long-range plan that establishes
methodical and realistic testing of the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy may
be unable to validate the Fleet Response Plan operational concept,
evaluate its progress and success over time, and ensure that it can
effectively meet Navy goals over the long term without any adverse,
unintended consequences for maintenance, quality of life, and fleet
readiness.

Navy Lessons Learned System's Repository and Analytic Resources Have Not Been
Used to Catalog and Share Fleet Response Plan Lessons

The formal Navy repository for lessons learned, the Navy Lessons Learned
System, has not been used to disseminate Fleet Response Plan-related
lessons learned or to analyze test results to evaluate the progress of the
plan and improve implementation. The Navy Lessons Learned System has been
designated by the Chief of Naval Operations as the singular Navy program
for the collection, validation, and distribution of unit feedback as well
as the correction of problems identified and derived from fleet
operations, exercises, and miscellaneous events. However, there are no
mechanisms or requirements in place to force ships, commands, and numbered
fleet staffs to submit all lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned
System, although such mechanisms exist for the submission of port visit
and other reports. For the events that the Navy cites as tests of the
Fleet Response Plan, it did not analyze and evaluate the results and
produce formal lessons learned to submit to the Navy Lessons Learned
System for recordation and analysis. Any evaluation done of the testing
events has not been incorporated into the Lessons Learned System,
preventing comprehensive analyses of lessons learned and identification of
problems and patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level,
Navy-wide response.

Some ship and carrier strike group staff informed us that they prefer
informal means of sharing lessons learned, because they feel the process
through which ships and commands have to submit lessons learned for
validation and inclusion in the database can be complex and indirect. This
may prevent ship and command staffs across the fleet from learning from
the experiences of others, but it also prevents the Navy Lessons Learned
System from performing comprehensive analyses of the lessons learned and
possibly identifying problems and patterns across the fleet that may
require a high-level Navy-wide response. In addition, the lessons learned
are recorded by mission or exercise (e.g., Operation Majestic Eagle) and
not by operational concept (e.g., the Fleet Response Plan), making
identification of Fleet Response Plan-specific lessons learned difficult
and inconsistent.

Over the last 10 years, we have issued several reports related to lessons
learned developed by the military. We have found that service guidance
does not always require standardized reporting of lessons learned19 and
lessons learned are not being used in training or analyzed to identify
trends and performance weaknesses.20 We emphasized that effective guidance
and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize
change and facilitate efficient operations. We found that despite the
existence of lessons learned programs in the military services and the
Joint Staff, units repeat many of the same mistakes during major training
exercises and operations. Our current review indicates that the Navy still
does not include all significant information in its lessons learned
database. Therefore, Navy analysts cannot use the database to perform
comprehensive analyses of operational concepts like the Fleet Response
Plan to evaluate progress and improve implementation.

19 See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training
Centers, GAO-05-8 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005), and Force Structure:
Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 11, 2004).

20 See GAO, Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid
Past Mistakes Is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 9, 1995).

Officials from the Navy Warfare Development Command stated that the Navy
is currently drafting a new Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
governing the Navy Lessons Learned System that will address some of these
issues.21 Navy Warfare Development Command officials hope that the new
instruction will result in several improvements over the current system.
First, they would like to see a dual reporting system, so that lessons
learned are simultaneously sent to the Navy Lessons Learned System for
preliminary evaluation when they are submitted to the numbered fleets for
validation. This would allow Navy Lessons Learned analysts to look at
unvarnished data for patterns or issues of interest to the Chief of Naval
Operations, without taking away the numbered fleets' validation processes.
In addition, officials would like to establish deadlines for the
submission of lessons learned to ensure timeliness. Not only will these
changes add value to the data stored in the Navy Lessons Learned System,
but they will keep the data flowing while ensuring that data are actually
submitted and not lost as they move up the chain of command. According to
Navy Lessons Learned officials, other branches of the military already
allow operators in the field to submit lessons learned directly to their
lessons learned systems, enabling value-added analysis and the timely
posting of information. By addressing these issues, the Navy can help
ensure that the lessons learned process will become more efficient, be a
command priority, and produce actionable results.

                                  Conclusions

Two years after implementing a major change in how it expects to operate
in the future, the Navy has not taken all of the steps needed to enable
the Navy or Congress to assess the effectiveness of the Fleet Response
Plan. As the Navy prepares to implement the Fleet Response Plan across the
entire naval force, it becomes increasingly important that the Navy
effectively manages this organizational transformation so that it can
determine if the plan is achieving its goals. The absence of a more
comprehensive overarching management plan to implement the Fleet Response
Plan has left essential questions about definitions, goals, performance
measures, guidance, timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and resources
unanswered, even though sound management practices recognize the need for
such elements to successfully guide activities and measure outcomes. The
absence of these elements could impede effective implementation of the
Fleet Response Plan. Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links
costs with performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor
Congress may be able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is budget
neutral. More effective communications throughout the fleet using an
overall communications strategy could increase employee awareness of the
plan and help ensure successful implementation.

21 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37D, currently being
drafted, would replace Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C,
March 19, 2001, Navy Lessons Learned System.

The Navy also has not developed a comprehensive long-range plan for
testing and evaluating the Fleet Response Plan. Without a well-developed
plan and methodical testing, the Navy may not be aware of all of the
constraints to successfully surging its forces to crises in a timely
manner. Moreover, the absence of an overarching testing and evaluation
plan that provides for data collection and analysis may impede the Navy's
ability to use its testing events to determine whether the Fleet Response
Plan has been successful in increasing readiness and to identify and
correct problem areas across the fleet. Failure to document and record the
results of testing and evaluation efforts in the Navy Lessons Learned
System could limit the Navy's ability to validate the value of the
concept, identify and correct performance weaknesses and trends across the
fleet, perform comprehensive analyses of lessons learned, and disseminate
these lessons and analyses throughout the fleet.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

To facilitate successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and
enhance readiness and ensure the Navy can determine whether the plan has
been successful in increasing readiness and is able to identify and
correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

           o  Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive
           overarching management plan based on sound management practices
           that will clearly define goals, measures, guidance, and resources
           needed for implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include
           the following elements:

                        o  establishing or revising Fleet Response Plan goals
                        that identify what Fleet Response Plan results are to
                        be expected and milestones for achieving these
                        results,
                        o  developing implementing guidance and performance
                        measures based on these goals,
                        o  identifying the costs and resources needed to
                        achieve each performance goal, and
                        o  communicating this information throughout the
                        Navy.

           o  Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive
           plan for methodical and realistic testing and evaluation of the
           Fleet Response Plan. Such a comprehensive plan should include a
           description of the following elements:

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally
           concurred with our recommendations and cited actions it will take
           to implement the recommendations.

           DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Navy should develop
           a comprehensive overarching management plan based on sound
           management practices that would clearly define the goals,
           measures, guidance, and resources needed for successful
           implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, including communicating
           this information throughout the Navy. DOD noted that the Navy has
           already taken action or has plans in place to act on this
           recommendation, and described several specific accomplishments and
           ongoing efforts in this regard. DOD also noted that the Navy
           intends to communicate through message traffic, white papers,
           instructions, lectures, and meetings with Navy leadership. We
           agree that these means of communication are an important part of
           an effective communication strategy; however, we do not believe
           that these methods of communication constitute a systemic strategy
           to ensure communication at all personnel levels. We believe the
           Navy would benefit from a comprehensive communication strategy
           that builds on its ongoing efforts, but encompasses additional
           actions to ensure awareness of the plan throughout the Navy.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to test and
           evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. DOD noted that it plans to use a
           variety of events and war games to evaluate the Fleet Response
           Plan, but it does not see a need to conduct no-notice surges to
           test the Fleet Response Plan. DOD stated that it believes
           no-notice surges are expensive and unnecessary and could lead to
           penalties on overall readiness and the ability to respond to
           emergent requirements. DOD also noted that the Navy has surged
           single carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and
           individual ships or units under the Fleet Response Plan, and it
           cited several examples of such surges. We commend the Navy's plans
           to use a variety of events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and
           its use of the Navy Lessons Learned System to report and evaluate
           the lessons learned in the Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005
           exercise held earlier this year. However, we continue to believe
           that no-notice surges are critical components of realistic testing
           and evaluation plans and that the benefits of such exercises can
           outweigh any additional costs associated with conducting such
           tests on a no-notice basis. Both we and Congress have long
           recognized the importance of no-notice exercises. For example, in
           a 1989 report, we noted that DOD was instituting no-notice
           exercises to assess the preparedness of combatant commands' state
           of training of their staffs and components.22 In addition, in 1990
           the Department of Energy conducted no-notice tests of security
           personnel in response to our work and out of recognition that such
           tests are the best way to assess a security force's ability at any
           given time.23 Furthermore, in recent years, the Department of
           Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and others have conducted
           no-notice exercises because they add realism and demonstrate how
           well organizations are actually prepared to respond to a given
           situation. Despite the importance of no-notice exercises, the Navy
           has not conducted no-notice exercises to test and evaluate the
           centerpiece surge goal of 6 + 2 for carrier strike groups. We
           believe that the smaller surges cited by DOD can provide insights
           into the surging process, but we do not believe that such surges
           can effectively test the Navy's readiness for a full 6 + 2 carrier
           strike group surge.

           DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have
           incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in
           appendix II of this report.

           We are sending copies of this report to other interested
           congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary
           of the Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
           will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
           the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov.

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
           contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

           Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

           List of Committees

           The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin
           Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
           Senate

           The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
           Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
           Appropriations United States Senate

           The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton
           Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
           Representatives

           The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P.
           Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee
           on Appropriations House of Representatives

           To assess the extent to which the Navy has employed a sound
           management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan, we
           interviewed Navy headquarters and fleet officials; received
           briefings from relevant officials; and reviewed key program
           documents. In the absence of a comprehensive planning document, we
           compared best practices for managing and implementing major
           efforts to key Navy messages, directives, instructions, and
           briefings, including, but not limited to, the Culture of Readiness
           message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations (March 2003); the
           Fleet Response Concept message sent by the Chief of Naval
           Operations (May 2003); the Fleet Response Plan Implementation
           message sent by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (May 2003);
           the Fleet Response Plan Implementation Progress message sent by
           the Commander, Third Fleet (September 2003); and the U.S. Fleet
           Forces Command's Fleet Training Strategy instruction (May 2002 and
           an undated draft). We also conducted meetings with several of the
           commanding officers, executive officers, and department heads of
           selected carrier strike groups, aircraft carriers, and air wings
           to obtain information on how the plan had been communicated, how
           the plan had changed their maintenance and training processes, the
           impact on their quality of life, the cost implications of the
           plan, and other factors.

           To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the
           effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to
           improve its implementation, we obtained briefings; interviewed
           Navy headquarters and fleet officials; and reviewed test and
           evaluation guidance for both the Navy and other federal agencies.
           To evaluate the three Fleet Response Plan demonstrations
           identified by the Navy, we interviewed officials from the Fleet
           Forces Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command, reviewed
           existing documentation on the demonstrations, queried the Navy
           Lessons Learned System for lessons learned from the
           demonstrations, and compared our findings to accepted best
           practices for tests and evaluations. Further, we reviewed Navy
           Lessons Learned System instructions and queried the system to
           determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to the Fleet
           Response Plan.

           We validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined
           the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted
           our review from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance
           with generally accepted government auditing standards at the
           following locations:

                        o  how operational tests, exercises, war games,
                        experiments, deployments, and other similar events
                        will be used to show the performance of the new
                        readiness plan under a variety of conditions,
                        including no-notice surges;
                        o  how data will be collected and analyzed for these
                        events and synthesized to evaluate program success
                        and improvements; and
                        o  how the Navy Lessons Learned System will collect
                        and synthesize lessons from these events to avoid
                        repeating mistakes and improve future operations.

           o  The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
           o  U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
           o  Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
           o  Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
           o  U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

                        o  Offices of the Fleet Forces Command
                        o  Commander, U.S. Second Fleet
                        o  Commander, Naval Air Forces
                        o  Commander, Submarine Forces
                        o  Commander, Naval Surface Force
                        o  U.S. Marine Corps Forces
                        o  Afloat Training Group
                        o  Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode
                        Island

           o  Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

                        o  Offices of the U.S. Pacific Fleet
                        o  Commander, Naval Submarine Force

           o  Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii

           We held group discussions with selected personnel such as
           commanding officers, executive officers/chief of staffs,
           department heads, and crew members from the following units, all
           located in the Norfolk, Virginia, area:

           o  U.S.S. Bulkeley
           o  U.S.S. Enterprise
           o  U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt
           o  U.S.S. Harry S. Truman
           o  Carrier Air Wing 3
           o  Carrier Air Wing 8
           o  Carrier Strike Group 2
           o  Carrier Strike Group 10

           Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]

           In addition to the contact named above, Richard Payne, Assistant
           Director; Renee Brown; Jonathan Clark; Nicole Collier; Dawn
           Godfrey; David Marroni; Bethann Ritter; Roderick Rodgers; John Van
           Schaik; and Rebecca Shea made significant contributions to this
           report.

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           Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
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                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

22 See GAO, Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS and
Combatant Commands, GAO/NSIAD-89-83 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 1989).

23 See GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos
and Other DOE Facilities, GAO/RCED-91-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11,
1990).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense  Appendix II:
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAOA  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                                  GAO Contact

                                Acknowledgments

(350625)

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Highlights of GAO-06-84, a report to congressional committees

November 2005

MILITARY READINESS

Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management
Approach and Rigorous Testing

The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century needs.
Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion annually for
the Navy to operate and maintain its forces and support around 376,000
military personnel. In recognizing that the Navy faces affordability
issues in sustaining readiness within its historical share of the defense
budget, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet
Response Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet
Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain readiness in
ships and squadrons.

GAO evaluated the extent to which the Navy has (1) employed a sound
management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested
and evaluated the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve
implementation.

What GAO Recommends

To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, GAO recommends
that the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
performance measures. GAO also recommends that the Navy develop a
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
plan has been successful. The Department of Defense generally agreed with
GAO's recommendations and described efforts to address them.

In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major
change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy's management
approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully
incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess
implementation. These practices include (1) establishing a coherent
mission and strategic goals, including resource commitments; (2) setting
implementation goals and a timeline; and (3) establishing a communication
strategy. While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to
implement the plan, it has not provided readiness goals for units other
than carrier strike groups; resource and maintenance goals; performance
measures and timelines; or a communications strategy. Sound management
practices were not fully developed because senior leaders wanted to
quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the security
environment. However, without an overall management plan containing all of
these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to determine whether its
efforts to improve the fleet's readiness are achieving the desired
results, adequately measuring overall progress, or identifying what
resources are needed to implement the Fleet Response Plan.

The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
implementation and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation of
new concepts is an established practice to gain insight into how systems
and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However, instead of
methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response
Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by
relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and
evaluation strategy. This approach could impair the Navy's ability to
validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition, the
Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results of its
Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool to evaluate the
progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy's
ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.

The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to Participate
in an Exercise
*** End of document. ***