    Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from
    a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing
    (22-NOV-05, GAO-06-84).

    The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century
    needs. Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50
    billion annually for the Navy to operate and maintain its forces
    and support around 376,000 military personnel. In recognizing
    that the Navy faces affordability issues in sustaining readiness
    within its historical share of the defense budget, the Chief of
    Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet Response
    Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet
    Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain
    readiness in ships and squadrons. GAO evaluated the extent to
    which the Navy has (1) employed a sound management approach in
    implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested and evaluated
    the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve
    implementation.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-84
        ACCNO:   A41918
      TITLE:     Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would
    Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous
    Testing
         DATE:   11/22/2005
      SUBJECT:   Combat readiness
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Defense contingency planning
    	     Internal controls
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Military forces
    	     Performance measures
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning
    	     DOD Fleet Response Plan

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    GAO-06-84

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 4
    Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management Practices
    9
    Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
    Developed Lessons Learned 12
    Conclusions 20
    Recommendations for Executive Action 21
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 26
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28
    Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33

    Figures

    Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
    Participate in an Exercise 5
    Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide Eight
    Carriers for Surge Deployments 8
    Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process 14

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    November 22, 2005

    Congressional Committees

    A key goal of Navy senior leadership is to transform the Navy to better
    meet 21st century security challenges. Since 2000, Congress has
    appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and
    maintain its forces and support around 376,000 active military personnel.
    Nonetheless, the Navy recognizes it is facing affordability issues related
    to sustaining readiness while developing and procuring several types of
    new ships within its historical share of the defense budget. One area
    where the Navy has made significant changes is in its operational posture.
    In March 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations initiated the development of
    a concept, which became known as the Fleet Response Plan,1 to enhance the
    Navy's deployment readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan, as
    implemented by Fleet Forces Command in May 2003, is designed to more
    rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To
    achieve this capability, the plan alters prior manning, maintenance, and
    training practices to allow for a more responsive and ready naval force.
    The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to
    provide not only presence and engagement in forward areas, but also surge
    a greater number of ships on short-notice in response to significant
    crises without increasing the readiness budget. The Fleet Response Plan
    modifies the Navy's pre-2001 rotational deployment policy, replacing
    6-month routine deployments with more flexible deployment options for as
    many as eight carrier strike groups when and where needed.

    The Fleet Response Plan represents a major change in the way the Navy
    manages its forces. Implementing large-scale change management
    initiatives, such as organizational transformations, can be a complex
    endeavor. Our prior work shows that failure to adequately address-and
    often even consider-a wide variety of management issues is at the heart of
    unsuccessful transformations. We have identified a number of key best
    practices and lessons learned from major public and private sector
    organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2 These sound
    management practices include, for example, establishing a coherent mission
    and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including
    resource commitments; setting implementation goals and a timeline to build
    momentum and show progress from day one; and establishing a communication
    strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress.

    1 The Fleet Response Plan is also known as the Fleet Readiness Program, or
    simply "FRP."

    We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and are
    providing it to you because of your oversight of defense issues. We have
    previously reported on the maintenance aspects of the Navy's Fleet
    Response Plan.3 This report focuses on the following two questions: (1) To
    what extent has the Navy employed a sound management approach in
    implementing the Fleet Response Plan? (2) To what extent has the Navy
    tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its Fleet Response Plan and
    shared results to improve its implementation?

    To assess the Navy's management approach in implementing the Fleet
    Response Plan, we obtained and analyzed key messages, briefings, and
    instructions on the Fleet Response Plan and interviewed Department of
    Defense (DOD) and Navy headquarters and fleet officials, and compared the
    Navy's approach with best practices for transformations of large
    organizations. To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the
    effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve its
    implementation, we obtained briefings from and interviewed Navy officials,
    reviewed and queried the Navy Lessons Learned System to determine relevant
    lessons recorded, and examined Navy guidance on test and evaluation
    efforts. We reviewed and validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data
    and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
    conducted our review from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. The scope and
    methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix
    I.

    2 See GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum on Mergers and Transformation:
    Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
    Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and
    Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
    Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
    2003).

    3 See GAO, Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of
    the Navy's Fleet Response Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
    2004).

                                    Results in Brief

    While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to establish the
    Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive
    management approach to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
    implementation. Sound management practices that provide a framework for
    implementing and managing programs include (1) establishing a coherent
    mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation,
    including resource commitments; (2) establishing a communication strategy
    to create shared expectations and report related progress; and (3) setting
    implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress.
    The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some
    aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established
    strategic goals for progressive readiness levels for carrier strike
    groups. However, the Navy has not established specific readiness goals for
    the rest of the fleet or determined the resources needed to achieve its
    goals, although it has stated the plan will be budget neutral. The Navy
    also does not have an official written definition of the Fleet Response
    Plan or communications strategy that clearly establishes a coherent
    mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation,
    including resource commitments. These sound management practices were not
    fully implemented because senior leaders wanted to implement the Fleet
    Response Plan as quickly as possible in response to the Chief of Naval
    Operations' direction. Although Navy officials recently tasked the Center
    for Naval Analyses to conduct the study to identify potential goals and
    performance measures, it is not clear what the study will recommend or how
    long it will take for the Navy to take action. Until an overall management
    plan is developed, neither the Navy nor Congress may be able to determine
    whether the Fleet Response Plan has effectively achieved its goals,
    measure the plan's overall progress, or determine what resources are
    needed to implement the plan.

    In addition, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive set of plans
    to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and has not developed formal
    lessons learned from past exercises to evaluate the plan's effectiveness.
    DOD has long recognized the importance of testing new concepts by using
    war games and experimentation, and recent Navy guidance stresses the
    importance of establishing a long-range plan for testing complex and novel
    problems. The Navy has identified three loosely linked events that Navy
    officials say demonstrate the viability of the plan. However, none of the
    three events cited by the Navy were part of an overall test and evaluation
    strategy to assess the value of the plan in increasing readiness. The Navy
    has not developed an overarching test and evaluation plan because Navy
    officials believe existing readiness reports provide adequate information
    to assess the Fleet Response Plan. However, readiness reports do not
    produce information on important factors such as costs, long-term
    maintenance implications, or quality of life issues. Additionally, the
    Navy did not analyze and evaluate the results of these three events and
    submit formal lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned System. Without
    systematic testing and evaluation and use of the lessons learned system,
    the Navy's ability to validate a complex change like the Fleet Response
    Plan, identify and correct problem areas, and disseminate lessons learned
    throughout the fleet is limited. This not only prevents ship and command
    staffs from learning from the experiences of others, but it also prevents
    the Navy Lessons Learned System from possibly identifying problems and
    patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level, Navy-wide
    response.

    To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, we recommend that
    the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
    performance measures. We also recommend that the Navy develop a
    comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
    Fleet Response Plan has been successful. In its comments on a draft of
    this report, DOD generally concurred with the report's recommendations.
    DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive
    management plan with goals and performance measures, citing several
    actions it has underway or planned. DOD partially concurred with our
    recommendation to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. However, DOD
    does not plan to conduct no-notice surges as we recommended because it
    views such exercises as unnecessary and costly. We continue to believe
    that no-notice surges are important because they can serve as an effective
    means of gauging whether the Navy is ready to respond to real world
    events, which can occur with little notice. DOD comments and our
    evaluation are discussed on pages 21 and 22.

                                       Background

    Composition of a Carrier Strike Group

    Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier
    and its air wing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided
    missile destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more supply
    ships with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and spare parts).
    These groups are formed and disestablished on an as needed basis, and
    their compositions may differ though they contain similar types of ships.
    Figure 1 shows a carrier strike group sailing in a group formation as it
    prepares to participate in an exercise.

    Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
    Participate in an Exercise

    Origin of the Fleet Response Plan

    Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy ships
    and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas, usually for 6
    months at a time. Most of the Navy's remaining units were not available
    because they were in early stages of their maintenance or training cycles,
    or because the Navy did not have good visibility of the readiness of these
    units. This prompted the Chief of Naval Operations in March 2003 to task
    the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to develop the Fleet Response Plan
    concept to enhance the Navy's surge capability. The Chief of Naval
    Operations approved the concept in May 2003 and further directed the
    Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to be responsible and accountable for
    effectively implementing the plan.

    Fleet Response Plan Believed to Provide Increased and Flexible Readiness

    The Fleet Response Plan emphasizes an increased level of readiness and the
    ability to quickly deploy naval forces to respond to crises, conflicts, or
    homeland defense needs. The plan applies broadly to the entire fleet;
    however, it only sets specific requirements for carrier strike groups. For
    example, the plan calls for eight carrier strike groups to be ready to
    deploy within 90 days of notification. Six of them would be available to
    deploy within 30 days and the other two within 90 days. This is commonly
    referred to as the 6 + 2 goal. Under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has
    developed a surge capability schedule that it uses to manage and identify
    the level of training a ship has completed and its readiness to deploy.
    The schedule contains three progressive readiness goals: emergency surge,
    surge-ready, and routine deployable status.4 Each readiness goal specifies
    phases of training that must be completed to achieve the goal. To be
    placed in emergency surge status, a ship or an air squadron needs to have
    completed its unit-level phase training. Achieving surge-ready status
    requires the completion of integrated phase training. Attaining routine
    deployable status requires achievement of all necessary capabilities,
    completion of underway sustainment phase training, and certification of
    the unit for forward deployed operations.5

    The surge capabilities schedule provides a readiness snapshot for each
    ship, allowing decision makers to quickly determine which ships are
    available to meet the needs of the mission. Figure 2 illustrates how the
    Navy notionally identifies the eight aircraft carriers available for surge
    deployments. The carriers numbered 1 through 6 are expected to be ready to
    deploy within 30 days notice. The carriers labeled "+1" and "+2" are
    expected to able to surge within 90 days notice. The six surge-ready
    carriers include two carriers on deployment (numbered 3 and 4), one
    carrier that is part of the forward deployed naval force based in Japan
    (number 6), and three carriers in the sustainment phase (numbered 1, 2,
    and 5). These six carriers are expected to have completed postdeployment
    depot-level maintenance and their unit-level phase training. The two
    additional surge carriers are expected to have completed depot-level
    maintenance but not to have completed unit-level phase training. The
    remaining four carriers are in the maintenance phase or deep maintenance.6

    4 Emergency surge status means a unit can be employed in case of urgent
    need but does so at levels of operational risk correlating to the level of
    capability achieved at the time of emergency surge. Surge-ready status
    means that units are ready to be employed at more acceptable levels of
    operational risk commensurate with the level of capability achieved at the
    time of the requirement to surge. Routine deployable status means a unit
    has achieved all required capabilities, completed underway training
    requirements, and is certified for forward deployed operations.

    5 Unit-level phase training focuses on completion of unit-level training
    requirements, including team training both on board and ashore; unit-level
    exercises in port and at sea; and unit inspections, assessments,
    certifications, and qualifications. During this phase, a unit becomes
    proficient in all required capabilities, meets the training commander's
    certification criteria, and becomes ready for more complex integrated
    training events. Integrated phase training brings individual units
    together to conduct strike-group-level integrated training and operations
    in a challenging operational environment as a foundation for performing
    their anticipated deployed mission. Sustainment phase training exercises
    units and staffs in multimission planning and execution, including the
    ability to interoperate effectively in a wartime environment.

    6 The maintenance phase consists of depot-level shipyard maintenance for a
    period of 6 to 12 months. Deep maintenance is for a period of 2 to 3 years
    for a nuclear-refueling overhaul.

    Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide Eight
    Carriers for Surge Deployments

    Revised Fleet Response Plan Is Being Developed

    Based on the Navy's experiences during the past 2 years, Fleet Forces
    Command has convened a cross-functional working group to develop a refined
    version of the Fleet Response Plan. This update, known as Fleet Response
    Plan-Enhanced, is intended to further define the Fleet Response Plan,
    modify terminology for progressive readiness states to better reflect
    their meaning, tie in elements such as a human capital strategy, and
    expand the focus of the plan beyond carrier strike groups to the entire
    Navy. It may also extend the Fleet Response Plan's current employment
    cycle length of 27 months. The Fleet Response Plan-Enhanced is still under
    development at this time.

    Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management Practices

    The Navy's management approach in establishing the Fleet Response Plan as
    its new readiness construct has not fully incorporated sound management
    practices needed to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
    implementation.7 Studies by several organizations have shown that
    successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use sound
    management practices to assist agencies in measuring performance,
    reporting results, and achieving desired outcomes. These practices provide
    management with a framework for effectively implementing and managing
    programs and shift program management focus from measuring program
    activities and processes to measuring program outcomes. Sound management
    practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and integrated
    strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource
    commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build
    momentum and show progress from day one; and (3) establishing a
    communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
    progress.

    The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some
    aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established some
    strategic goals needed to meet the intent of the plan, such as the
    progressive readiness levels of emergency surge, surge-ready, and routine
    deployable status. The Navy also has established specific training actions
    to support these goals, such as that carrier strike groups must complete
    unit-level training to be certified as emergency surge-ready. However,
    other actions taken by the Navy do not fully incorporate these practices.
    For example, the Navy has identified the 6 + 2 surge capability as a
    readiness goal and performance measure for carrier strike groups, but no
    such goal was established for the rest of the fleet. The Navy also has
    some unofficial goals and performance measures regarding manning and
    maintenance, but these unofficial goals and performance measures have not
    been formally established. For example, briefings on the Fleet Response
    Plan state that the Navy desires and needs fully manned ships (i.e.,
    manning at 100 percent of a ship's requirement) for the program to be
    successful. Moreover, according to Navy officials, the Navy has not
    established milestones for achieving its results.

    7 The Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
    to provide for, among other things, the establishment of strategic
    planning and performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L.
    No. 103-62 (1993).

    In addition, 2 years after initiating implementation of the Fleet Response
    Plan, the Navy still does not have an official written definition of the
    Fleet Response Plan that clearly establishes a coherent mission and
    integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource
    commitments. This definition would describe the Fleet Response Plan's
    total scope and contain guidance with formal goals and performance
    measures. The Navy recently has taken some action to address this area. In
    February 2005, the Navy directed the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct
    a study to develop formal definitions and guidance as well as identify
    goals and performance measures for the plan. However, it remains to be
    seen whether this study will be completed as planned by November 2005; if
    it will recommend developing and implementing sound management practices,
    such as goals, measures, milestones, and timelines; and whether any
    management improvement recommendations made in the study will be
    implemented by the Fleet Forces Command, the Navy command responsible for
    implementing the Fleet Response Plan. Without goals, performance measures,
    timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and guidance to help effectively manage
    implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and determine if the plan is
    achieving its goals, the Navy may find it more difficult to implement the
    Fleet Response Plan across the entire naval force.

    Moreover, despite the Navy's unofficial goal that the Fleet Response Plan
    be budget neutral, as articulated in briefings and by senior leaders, the
    Navy has not yet clearly identified the resources needed to achieve its
    goals or provided a rationale for how these resources will contribute to
    achieving the expected level of performance. Navy officials have said that
    current operations and maintenance funding levels, as well as manning at
    100 percent of required positions, have contributed to successful
    implementation of the Fleet Response Plan. However, officials do not know
    what level of manning or funding is actually required for program success
    over the long term to avoid any unintended consequences, such as greater
    amounts of deferred maintenance. According to Navy officials, it is
    difficult to attribute costs to the plan because there is no single budget
    line item that tracks the costs associated with the Fleet Response Plan.
    Without knowing the funding needed, the Navy may not be able to assess the
    impact of possible future changes in funding on implementing the plan.
    Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links costs with
    performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may be
    able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is actually achieving its
    unofficial goal of being budget neutral.

    Finally, the Navy also has not developed a comprehensive communications
    strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and
    seeks to genuinely engage them in a two-way exchange, which is a critical
    step in successfully implementing cultural change or transformation. We
    looked for formal mechanisms that communicated the details of the Fleet
    Response Plan and spoke with personnel from carrier strike groups,
    aircraft carriers, air wings and an air squadron, one surface combatant
    ship, and other command staff.8 We found that while the Fleet Response
    Plan was communicated extensively to senior-level officers, and the Navy
    provided numerous briefings and messages related to the plan,
    communication and understanding of the plan did not flow through to the
    lower ranks. While the concept of the Fleet Response Plan is generally
    understood by some senior-level officials, many of the lower grade
    personnel on these ships were unaware of the scope, goals, and other
    aspects of the plan. In the absence of clear communication throughout the
    fleet via an overall communications strategy that could increase employee
    awareness of the Fleet Response Plan, its successful implementation could
    be impeded.

    Sound management practices, such as those noted above, were not fully used
    by the Navy because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the Fleet
    Response Plan in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' desires.
    However, without an overall management plan containing all of these
    elements to guide the implementation of such a major change, it may be
    difficult for the Navy and Congress to determine the extent to which the
    Fleet Response Plan is achieving the desired results, measure its overall
    progress, or determine the resources needed to implement the plan.

    8 We met with people individually and in groups. Personnel included
    commanding officers, executive officers, and senior and junior enlisted
    personnel. Additionally, we met with command master chiefs and command
    career counselors.

      Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or Developed
                                    Lessons Learned

    The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
    developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
    implementation and success over time. The methodical testing, exercising,
    and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an established practice
    throughout the military to gain insight into how systems and capabilities
    will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically
    conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy
    has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely
    linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation
    strategy, which impairs the Navy's ability to validate the plan and
    evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its
    lessons learned system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan
    tests or as an analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and
    improve implementation, which limits the Navy's ability to identify and
    correct weaknesses across the fleet.

    Methodical Tests and Evaluations of New Concepts Are Important

    Methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and
    concepts is an important and established practice throughout the military.
    DOD has long recognized the importance of using tabletop exercises, war
    games, and experimentation9 to explore military doctrine, operational
    concepts, and organizational arrangements. Collectively, these tests and
    experiments can provide important insight into how systems and
    capabilities will perform in actual operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command,
    which has lead responsibility for DOD experimentation on new concepts of
    operation and technologies, states that its experimental efforts aim to
    foster military innovation and improvement by exploring, developing, and
    transferring new concepts and organizational ideas into operational
    reality.

    Particularly large and complex issues may require long-term testing and
    evaluation that is guided by study plans. Joint Forces Command's Joint
    Warfighting Center has an electronic handbook that provides guidance for
    conducting exercises and lays out the steps in an exercise life cycle:
    design; planning; preparation; execution; and analysis, evaluation, and
    reports. The Army also has well-established guidance10 governing service
    studies, analyses, and evaluations that the Navy feels is representative
    of best practices for military operations research. This provides an
    important mechanism through which problems pertaining to critical issues
    and other important matters are identified and explored to meet service
    needs. As shown in figure 3, the Army's process involves six major steps
    that create a methodical process for developing, conducting, documenting,
    and evaluating a study. Following a formal study process enables data
    evaluation and development of lessons learned that could be used to build
    on the existing knowledge base. In a roundtable discussion with the Fleet
    Forces Command on the rationale behind Summer Pulse 2004, the Navy's major
    exercise for the Fleet Response Plan, a senior Navy official stated, "From
    the concept, ... you need to exercise, ... you need to practice, ... you
    need to demonstrate it to know you got it right and what lessons are there
    to learn from how we did it."11

    9 Tabletop exercises are analytical tools that require fewer resources
    than full-fledged live exercises. They provide a means to develop both
    immediate and long-term solutions among functional areas, to develop
    standardization and interoperability of procedures, and to document best
    practices for others to utilize.

    10 Army Regulation 5-5, Army Studies and Analyses (June 30, 1996).

    11 Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem, "Roundtable: Summer Pulse Discussions
    With Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem," Summer Pulse `04 News Archive
    (July 8, 2004),
    http://www.cffc.navy.mil/summerpulse04/stufflebeem-transcript.htm.

    Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process

    Other governmental agencies, like GAO, and the private sector also rely on
    detailed study plans, or data collection and analysis plans, to guide the
    development of studies and experiments and the collection and analysis of
    data, and to provide a feedback loop that links the outcomes of the study
    or experiment event and subsequent analysis to the original goals and
    objectives of the study or event. GAO guidance states that data collection
    and analysis plans "should carry forward the overall logic of the study so
    that the connection between the data that will be collected and the
    answers to the study questions will become evident."12

    12 See GAO, Quantitative Data Analysis: An Introduction, GAO/PEMD-10.1.11,
    ch. 7 (Washington, D.C.: May 1992).

    Recent Navy guidance also recognizes the need for a thorough evaluation of
    complex initiatives. In April 2005, the Navy issued a Study Planning and
    Conduct Guide assembled by the Navy Warfare Development Command.13 This
    guide stresses the importance of establishing a long-range plan for
    complex and novel problems and lays out the rationale for detailed study
    plans for exercises and experiments, as they establish a structure in
    which issues are explored and data are collected and analyzed in relation
    to the established goals or objectives for the event. Furthermore, the
    Navy's guide notes that random, inadequately prepared events and a
    determination just to study the problem do not lead to successful
    resolution of problems that may arise in programs and concepts that the
    Navy is testing and evaluating.

    Navy Events to Show Viability of the Fleet Response Plan Have Lacked Methodical
    Testing and Evaluation

    The Navy has not methodically conducted realistic tests of the Fleet
    Response Plan to demonstrate the plan's viability and evaluate its
    progress and success over time, instead relying on loosely linked events
    and some routine data to demonstrate the viability of the plan. The events
    identified by the Navy as successful tests of the Fleet Response Plan are
    Summer Pulse 2004, the emergency deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,
    and Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005, but of these events only Summer
    Pulse 2004 was driven by the Fleet Response Plan with the intent of
    demonstrating that large numbers of ships could be surged. In addition,
    these events were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy that
    yielded specific information from which to assess the value of the plan in
    increasing readiness and meeting the new 6 + 2 surge capability goal for
    carrier strike groups.

    Summer Pulse 2004 encompassed a number of previously scheduled
    deployments, exercises, and training events that took place between June
    and August of 2004. The intent of Summer Pulse 2004 was to demonstrate the
    Fleet Response Plan's new readiness construct and the Navy's ability to
    deploy multiple carrier strike groups of varying levels of readiness.
    However, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a methodical and realistic test of the
    Fleet Response Plan for three reasons. First, Summer Pulse 2004 did not
    follow best practices regarding study plans and the ability to evaluate
    the impact and outcomes of the plan. The Navy did not develop a formal
    study plan identifying study objectives, data collection requirements, and
    analysis, or produce a comprehensive after-event report describing the
    study's findings. Navy officials have stated that the elements of a formal
    study plan were there for the individual deployments, exercises, and
    training events constituting Summer Pulse 2004, but were not brought
    together in a single package. While the Navy may have had the study
    elements present for the individual exercises, they were not directly
    linked to testing the Fleet Response Plan. Without such a comprehensive
    study plan and overall evaluation, there is no ability to discern
    potential impacts on fleet readiness, maintenance, personnel, and other
    issues that are critical to the Fleet Response Plan's long-term success.
    Second, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a realistic test because all
    participating units had several months' warning of the event. As a result,
    five carriers were already scheduled to be at sea and only two had to
    surge. Because six ships are expected to be ready to deploy with as little
    as 30 days' notice under the plan and two additional carriers within 90
    days, a more realistic test of the Fleet Response Plan would include
    no-notice or short-notice exercises.14 Such exercises conducted without
    advance notification to the participants would provide the highest degree
    of challenge and realism. Without such exercises, the Navy might not be
    able to realistically practice and coordinate a full surge deployment.
    Third, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a sufficient test because the Navy
    involved only seven carriers instead of the eight carriers called for in
    the plan. Therefore, it did not fully test the Navy's ability to meet
    deployment requirements for the expected force.

    13 The Navy Warfare Development Command's responsibilities include being a
    champion for Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of
    operations development in a naval, joint, and coalition environment;
    coordinating the planning and implementation of the Navy's experimentation
    process; managing development, approval, and rapid dissemination of naval,
    joint, and allied doctrine; and managing the Navy's Lessons Learned
    Program.

    Another event cited by the Navy as evidence of the Fleet Response Plan's
    success is the deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln carrier strike
    group while it was in surge status in October 2004. Originally scheduled
    to deploy in the spring of 2005, the Lincoln was deployed early to support
    operations in the Pacific Command area of operation and provide aid to
    areas devastated by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004. Navy
    officials said that the Fleet Response Plan enabled the Navy to identify a
    carrier to send to the Pacific and to quickly tailor its training package
    based on its progressive readiness status. The Navy touted this rapid
    response relief work by a strike group deployed during surge status as a
    Fleet Response Plan success story. We agree that the Lincoln carrier
    strike group was able to respond quickly. However, the extent to which
    this event realistically tested the Fleet Response Plan's expectations for
    surging one carrier strike group is not known. As with Summer Pulse 2004,
    the Lincoln deployment was not a methodical test of the Fleet Response
    Plan because there was no plan to systematically collect or analyze data
    that would evaluate the outcomes of the Lincoln deployment against Fleet
    Response Plan-related study goals.

    14 No-notice exercises demonstrate participants' ability to rapidly
    respond to unexpected situations. This type of exercise is valued because
    it can lead to improvements in procedures by exercising participants in a
    near-real-world context.

    The Navy also pointed to a third event, its recent Global War on Terrorism
    Surge 2005,15 as an indicator that the Fleet Response Plan works. The
    Global War on Terrorism surge was a response to a request for forces16
    from which the Navy is looking to glean Fleet Response Plan-related
    information about what did and did not work when the ships return.
    However, this is not a good test of the Fleet Response Plan because there
    is no plan showing what specific data are being collected or what
    analytical approaches are being employed to assess the ships' experiences.
    As of September 2005, no other events had been scheduled to further test
    and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan.

    The Navy has not developed the kind of comprehensive plans to test and
    evaluate the Fleet Response Plan as recommended by DOD and Navy guidance
    and best practices because Navy officials have stated that existing
    readiness reporting processes effectively evaluate the Fleet Response
    Plan's success on a daily basis. They said after-action reports17 from
    training exercises and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review18 assist with
    this function. Navy officials explained that they implemented the Fleet
    Response Plan the same way they had implemented the Inter-Deployment
    Training Cycle, the predecessor to the Fleet Response Plan's Fleet
    Readiness Training Plan. While this may be true, the Inter-Deployment
    Training Cycle was focused on the specific training needed to prepare
    units for their next deployment, not for implementing a new readiness
    construct that emphasized surge versus routine deployments. Furthermore,
    the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle did not contain stated goals whose
    validity the Navy needed to test. In addition, ongoing readiness reports
    do not provide information on important factors such as costs, long-term
    maintenance implications, and quality of life issues.

    15 In the spring of 2005, the Navy surged five ships in support of the
    Global War on Terrorism to work with allies to detect, disrupt, and deny
    international terrorist organizations the use of the maritime environment.
    These ships will also work to build regional security and long-term
    stability. The five ships are the U.S.S. Saipan (LHA 2), U.S.S. Nashville
    (LPD 13), U.S.S. Nicholas (FFG 47), the U.S.S. Gunston Hall (LSD 44), and
    the U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CG 58).

    16 A request for forces is a special request by a geographic combatant
    commander through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for forces in
    addition to the normal, preapproved force deployments or forces assigned.

    17 An after-action report is a professional discussion of an event,
    focused on performance standards, that enables participants to discover
    for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain
    strengths and address weaknesses. It is a tool that leaders, trainers, and
    units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task.

    18 The Joint Quarterly Readiness Review is a quarterly readiness
    assessment that identifies capability shortfalls and risks in mission
    execution and identifies appropriate measures for risk reduction.

    The Summer Pulse 2004, Lincoln surge deployment, and Global War on
    Terrorism Surge 2005 testing events were not part of a methodical test and
    evaluation approach. Therefore, the Navy is unable to convincingly use
    these events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and determine whether the
    plan has been successful in increasing readiness or achieving other goals.
    Moreover, without effective evaluation of the Fleet Response Plan, the
    Navy may be unable to identify and correct potential problem areas across
    the fleet. Without a comprehensive long-range plan that establishes
    methodical and realistic testing of the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy may
    be unable to validate the Fleet Response Plan operational concept,
    evaluate its progress and success over time, and ensure that it can
    effectively meet Navy goals over the long term without any adverse,
    unintended consequences for maintenance, quality of life, and fleet
    readiness.

    Navy Lessons Learned System's Repository and Analytic Resources Have Not Been
    Used to Catalog and Share Fleet Response Plan Lessons

    The formal Navy repository for lessons learned, the Navy Lessons Learned
    System, has not been used to disseminate Fleet Response Plan-related
    lessons learned or to analyze test results to evaluate the progress of the
    plan and improve implementation. The Navy Lessons Learned System has been
    designated by the Chief of Naval Operations as the singular Navy program
    for the collection, validation, and distribution of unit feedback as well
    as the correction of problems identified and derived from fleet
    operations, exercises, and miscellaneous events. However, there are no
    mechanisms or requirements in place to force ships, commands, and numbered
    fleet staffs to submit all lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned
    System, although such mechanisms exist for the submission of port visit
    and other reports. For the events that the Navy cites as tests of the
    Fleet Response Plan, it did not analyze and evaluate the results and
    produce formal lessons learned to submit to the Navy Lessons Learned
    System for recordation and analysis. Any evaluation done of the testing
    events has not been incorporated into the Lessons Learned System,
    preventing comprehensive analyses of lessons learned and identification of
    problems and patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level,
    Navy-wide response.

    Some ship and carrier strike group staff informed us that they prefer
    informal means of sharing lessons learned, because they feel the process
    through which ships and commands have to submit lessons learned for
    validation and inclusion in the database can be complex and indirect. This
    may prevent ship and command staffs across the fleet from learning from
    the experiences of others, but it also prevents the Navy Lessons Learned
    System from performing comprehensive analyses of the lessons learned and
    possibly identifying problems and patterns across the fleet that may
    require a high-level Navy-wide response. In addition, the lessons learned
    are recorded by mission or exercise (e.g., Operation Majestic Eagle) and
    not by operational concept (e.g., the Fleet Response Plan), making
    identification of Fleet Response Plan-specific lessons learned difficult
    and inconsistent.

    Over the last 10 years, we have issued several reports related to lessons
    learned developed by the military. We have found that service guidance
    does not always require standardized reporting of lessons learned19 and
    lessons learned are not being used in training or analyzed to identify
    trends and performance weaknesses.20 We emphasized that effective guidance
    and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize
    change and facilitate efficient operations. We found that despite the
    existence of lessons learned programs in the military services and the
    Joint Staff, units repeat many of the same mistakes during major training
    exercises and operations. Our current review indicates that the Navy still
    does not include all significant information in its lessons learned
    database. Therefore, Navy analysts cannot use the database to perform
    comprehensive analyses of operational concepts like the Fleet Response
    Plan to evaluate progress and improve implementation.

    19 See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to
    Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training
    Centers, GAO-05-8 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005), and Force Structure:
    Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
    Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.:
    Nov. 11, 2004).

    20 See GAO, Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid
    Past Mistakes Is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, D.C.:
    Aug. 9, 1995).

    Officials from the Navy Warfare Development Command stated that the Navy
    is currently drafting a new Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
    governing the Navy Lessons Learned System that will address some of these
    issues.21 Navy Warfare Development Command officials hope that the new
    instruction will result in several improvements over the current system.
    First, they would like to see a dual reporting system, so that lessons
    learned are simultaneously sent to the Navy Lessons Learned System for
    preliminary evaluation when they are submitted to the numbered fleets for
    validation. This would allow Navy Lessons Learned analysts to look at
    unvarnished data for patterns or issues of interest to the Chief of Naval
    Operations, without taking away the numbered fleets' validation processes.
    In addition, officials would like to establish deadlines for the
    submission of lessons learned to ensure timeliness. Not only will these
    changes add value to the data stored in the Navy Lessons Learned System,
    but they will keep the data flowing while ensuring that data are actually
    submitted and not lost as they move up the chain of command. According to
    Navy Lessons Learned officials, other branches of the military already
    allow operators in the field to submit lessons learned directly to their
    lessons learned systems, enabling value-added analysis and the timely
    posting of information. By addressing these issues, the Navy can help
    ensure that the lessons learned process will become more efficient, be a
    command priority, and produce actionable results.

                                      Conclusions

    Two years after implementing a major change in how it expects to operate
    in the future, the Navy has not taken all of the steps needed to enable
    the Navy or Congress to assess the effectiveness of the Fleet Response
    Plan. As the Navy prepares to implement the Fleet Response Plan across the
    entire naval force, it becomes increasingly important that the Navy
    effectively manages this organizational transformation so that it can
    determine if the plan is achieving its goals. The absence of a more
    comprehensive overarching management plan to implement the Fleet Response
    Plan has left essential questions about definitions, goals, performance
    measures, guidance, timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and resources
    unanswered, even though sound management practices recognize the need for
    such elements to successfully guide activities and measure outcomes. The
    absence of these elements could impede effective implementation of the
    Fleet Response Plan. Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links
    costs with performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor
    Congress may be able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is budget
    neutral. More effective communications throughout the fleet using an
    overall communications strategy could increase employee awareness of the
    plan and help ensure successful implementation.

    21 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37D, currently being
    drafted, would replace Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C,
    March 19, 2001, Navy Lessons Learned System.

    The Navy also has not developed a comprehensive long-range plan for
    testing and evaluating the Fleet Response Plan. Without a well-developed
    plan and methodical testing, the Navy may not be aware of all of the
    constraints to successfully surging its forces to crises in a timely
    manner. Moreover, the absence of an overarching testing and evaluation
    plan that provides for data collection and analysis may impede the Navy's
    ability to use its testing events to determine whether the Fleet Response
    Plan has been successful in increasing readiness and to identify and
    correct problem areas across the fleet. Failure to document and record the
    results of testing and evaluation efforts in the Navy Lessons Learned
    System could limit the Navy's ability to validate the value of the
    concept, identify and correct performance weaknesses and trends across the
    fleet, perform comprehensive analyses of lessons learned, and disseminate
    these lessons and analyses throughout the fleet.

                          Recommendations for Executive Action

    To facilitate successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and
    enhance readiness and ensure the Navy can determine whether the plan has
    been successful in increasing readiness and is able to identify and
    correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, we recommend
    that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

               o  Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive
               overarching management plan based on sound management practices
               that will clearly define goals, measures, guidance, and resources
               needed for implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include
               the following elements:

                            o  establishing or revising Fleet Response Plan goals
                            that identify what Fleet Response Plan results are to
                            be expected and milestones for achieving these
                            results,
                            o  developing implementing guidance and performance
                            measures based on these goals,
                            o  identifying the costs and resources needed to
                            achieve each performance goal, and
                            o  communicating this information throughout the
                            Navy.

               o  Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive
               plan for methodical and realistic testing and evaluation of the
               Fleet Response Plan. Such a comprehensive plan should include a
               description of the following elements:

               In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally
               concurred with our recommendations and cited actions it will take
               to implement the recommendations.

               DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Navy should develop
               a comprehensive overarching management plan based on sound
               management practices that would clearly define the goals,
               measures, guidance, and resources needed for successful
               implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, including communicating
               this information throughout the Navy. DOD noted that the Navy has
               already taken action or has plans in place to act on this
               recommendation, and described several specific accomplishments and
               ongoing efforts in this regard. DOD also noted that the Navy
               intends to communicate through message traffic, white papers,
               instructions, lectures, and meetings with Navy leadership. We
               agree that these means of communication are an important part of
               an effective communication strategy; however, we do not believe
               that these methods of communication constitute a systemic strategy
               to ensure communication at all personnel levels. We believe the
               Navy would benefit from a comprehensive communication strategy
               that builds on its ongoing efforts, but encompasses additional
               actions to ensure awareness of the plan throughout the Navy.

               DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to test and
               evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. DOD noted that it plans to use a
               variety of events and war games to evaluate the Fleet Response
               Plan, but it does not see a need to conduct no-notice surges to
               test the Fleet Response Plan. DOD stated that it believes
               no-notice surges are expensive and unnecessary and could lead to
               penalties on overall readiness and the ability to respond to
               emergent requirements. DOD also noted that the Navy has surged
               single carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and
               individual ships or units under the Fleet Response Plan, and it
               cited several examples of such surges. We commend the Navy's plans
               to use a variety of events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and
               its use of the Navy Lessons Learned System to report and evaluate
               the lessons learned in the Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005
               exercise held earlier this year. However, we continue to believe
               that no-notice surges are critical components of realistic testing
               and evaluation plans and that the benefits of such exercises can
               outweigh any additional costs associated with conducting such
               tests on a no-notice basis. Both we and Congress have long
               recognized the importance of no-notice exercises. For example, in
               a 1989 report, we noted that DOD was instituting no-notice
               exercises to assess the preparedness of combatant commands' state
               of training of their staffs and components.22 In addition, in 1990
               the Department of Energy conducted no-notice tests of security
               personnel in response to our work and out of recognition that such
               tests are the best way to assess a security force's ability at any
               given time.23 Furthermore, in recent years, the Department of
               Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and others have conducted
               no-notice exercises because they add realism and demonstrate how
               well organizations are actually prepared to respond to a given
               situation. Despite the importance of no-notice exercises, the Navy
               has not conducted no-notice exercises to test and evaluate the
               centerpiece surge goal of 6 + 2 for carrier strike groups. We
               believe that the smaller surges cited by DOD can provide insights
               into the surging process, but we do not believe that such surges
               can effectively test the Navy's readiness for a full 6 + 2 carrier
               strike group surge.

               DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have
               incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in
               appendix II of this report.

               We are sending copies of this report to other interested
               congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary
               of the Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
               will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
               the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
               http://www.gao.gov.

               If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
               contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points
               for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
               be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
               contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

               Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

               List of Committees

               The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin
               Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
               Senate

               The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
               Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
               Appropriations United States Senate

               The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton
               Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
               Representatives

               The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P.
               Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee
               on Appropriations House of Representatives

               To assess the extent to which the Navy has employed a sound
               management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan, we
               interviewed Navy headquarters and fleet officials; received
               briefings from relevant officials; and reviewed key program
               documents. In the absence of a comprehensive planning document, we
               compared best practices for managing and implementing major
               efforts to key Navy messages, directives, instructions, and
               briefings, including, but not limited to, the Culture of Readiness
               message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations (March 2003); the
               Fleet Response Concept message sent by the Chief of Naval
               Operations (May 2003); the Fleet Response Plan Implementation
               message sent by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (May 2003);
               the Fleet Response Plan Implementation Progress message sent by
               the Commander, Third Fleet (September 2003); and the U.S. Fleet
               Forces Command's Fleet Training Strategy instruction (May 2002 and
               an undated draft). We also conducted meetings with several of the
               commanding officers, executive officers, and department heads of
               selected carrier strike groups, aircraft carriers, and air wings
               to obtain information on how the plan had been communicated, how
               the plan had changed their maintenance and training processes, the
               impact on their quality of life, the cost implications of the
               plan, and other factors.

               To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the
               effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to
               improve its implementation, we obtained briefings; interviewed
               Navy headquarters and fleet officials; and reviewed test and
               evaluation guidance for both the Navy and other federal agencies.
               To evaluate the three Fleet Response Plan demonstrations
               identified by the Navy, we interviewed officials from the Fleet
               Forces Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command, reviewed
               existing documentation on the demonstrations, queried the Navy
               Lessons Learned System for lessons learned from the
               demonstrations, and compared our findings to accepted best
               practices for tests and evaluations. Further, we reviewed Navy
               Lessons Learned System instructions and queried the system to
               determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to the Fleet
               Response Plan.

               We validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined
               the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted
               our review from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance
               with generally accepted government auditing standards at the
               following locations:

                            o  how operational tests, exercises, war games,
                            experiments, deployments, and other similar events
                            will be used to show the performance of the new
                            readiness plan under a variety of conditions,
                            including no-notice surges;
                            o  how data will be collected and analyzed for these
                            events and synthesized to evaluate program success
                            and improvements; and
                            o  how the Navy Lessons Learned System will collect
                            and synthesize lessons from these events to avoid
                            repeating mistakes and improve future operations.

               o  The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
               o  U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
               o  Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
               o  Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
               o  U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

                            o  Offices of the Fleet Forces Command
                            o  Commander, U.S. Second Fleet
                            o  Commander, Naval Air Forces
                            o  Commander, Submarine Forces
                            o  Commander, Naval Surface Force
                            o  U.S. Marine Corps Forces
                            o  Afloat Training Group
                            o  Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode
                            Island

               o  Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

                            o  Offices of the U.S. Pacific Fleet
                            o  Commander, Naval Submarine Force

               o  Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii

               We held group discussions with selected personnel such as
               commanding officers, executive officers/chief of staffs,
               department heads, and crew members from the following units, all
               located in the Norfolk, Virginia, area:

               o  U.S.S. Bulkeley
               o  U.S.S. Enterprise
               o  U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt
               o  U.S.S. Harry S. Truman
               o  Carrier Air Wing 3
               o  Carrier Air Wing 8
               o  Carrier Strike Group 2
               o  Carrier Strike Group 10

               Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

               In addition to the contact named above, Richard Payne, Assistant
               Director; Renee Brown; Jonathan Clark; Nicole Collier; Dawn
               Godfrey; David Marroni; Bethann Ritter; Roderick Rodgers; John Van
               Schaik; and Rebecca Shea made significant contributions to this
               report.

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                           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    22 See GAO, Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS and
    Combatant Commands, GAO/NSIAD-89-83 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 1989).

    23 See GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos
    and Other DOE Facilities, GAO/RCED-91-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11,
    1990).

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense  Appendix II:
    Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: GAOA  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                                      GAO Contact

                                    Acknowledgments

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    Highlights of GAO-06-84, a report to congressional committees

    November 2005

    MILITARY READINESS

    Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management
    Approach and Rigorous Testing

    The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century needs.
    Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion annually for
    the Navy to operate and maintain its forces and support around 376,000
    military personnel. In recognizing that the Navy faces affordability
    issues in sustaining readiness within its historical share of the defense
    budget, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet
    Response Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet
    Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain readiness in
    ships and squadrons.

    GAO evaluated the extent to which the Navy has (1) employed a sound
    management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested
    and evaluated the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve
    implementation.

    What GAO Recommends

    To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, GAO recommends
    that the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
    performance measures. GAO also recommends that the Navy develop a
    comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
    plan has been successful. The Department of Defense generally agreed with
    GAO's recommendations and described efforts to address them.

    In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major
    change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy's management
    approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully
    incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess
    implementation. These practices include (1) establishing a coherent
    mission and strategic goals, including resource commitments; (2) setting
    implementation goals and a timeline; and (3) establishing a communication
    strategy. While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to
    implement the plan, it has not provided readiness goals for units other
    than carrier strike groups; resource and maintenance goals; performance
    measures and timelines; or a communications strategy. Sound management
    practices were not fully developed because senior leaders wanted to
    quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the security
    environment. However, without an overall management plan containing all of
    these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to determine whether its
    efforts to improve the fleet's readiness are achieving the desired
    results, adequately measuring overall progress, or identifying what
    resources are needed to implement the Fleet Response Plan.

    The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
    developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
    implementation and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation of
    new concepts is an established practice to gain insight into how systems
    and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However, instead of
    methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response
    Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by
    relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and
    evaluation strategy. This approach could impair the Navy's ability to
    validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition, the
    Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results of its
    Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool to evaluate the
    progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy's
    ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.

    The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to Participate
    in an Exercise
    *** End of document. ***