Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's  
State Safety Oversight Program (26-JUL-06, GAO-06-821). 	 
                                                                 
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of  
rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight 
agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 	 
requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State	 
Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the
program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also 
provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross
state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight	 
agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program. 	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-821 					        
    ACCNO:   A57485						        
  TITLE:     Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance
FTA's State Safety Oversight Program				 
     DATE:   07/26/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Federal/state relations				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Rail security					 
	     Railroad safety					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     State-administered programs			 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     FTA State Safety Oversight Program 		 

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GAO-06-821

     

     * Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
       Representatives
          * July 2006
     * RAIL TRANSIT
          * Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety
            Oversight Program
     * Contents
          * Results in Brief
          * Background
          * Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
               * FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight
                 Program
               * State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail
                 Transit Agencies
               * Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit
                 Safety and Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the
                 State Safety Oversight Program
          * Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as
            Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance
            Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight
            Program on Safety and Security
               * Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight
                 Program as Worthwhile and Valuable
               * FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not
                 Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight
                 Program on Safety and Security
          * FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State
            Safety Oversight Program
               * Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff
                 Are Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers
                 of Staff
               * Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's
                 Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program
          * Conclusions
          * Recommendations
          * Agency Comments
     * Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems
          * Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied
            Structures and Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently
          * Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative
            Challenges in Different Ways
     * List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They Oversee
     * Scope and Methodology
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

July 2006

RAIL TRANSIT

Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight
Program

Contents

Tables

Figures

July 26, 2006Letter

The Honorable Don Young Chairman The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking
Democratic Member Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
Representatives

Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts for less
than 6 percent of all public transportation's accidents while providing
almost 32 percent of all public transportation's passenger trips, making
it one of the safest modes of public transportation. However, safety and
security are still concerns, especially as the number of rail transit
systems-and therefore the number of passengers riding rail
transit-increases. For example, the number of rail transit systems in
FTA's State Safety Oversight program increased from 32 in 1997 to 42 in
2006, and as many as 7 new systems are expected to open in the next 3
years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities and accidents has varied over
the past few years. For example, while fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per
year (with an approximate average of 40 per year) between 1999 and 2005,
total reported accidents decreased 3 percent. Finally, recent acts of
terrorism on European and Indian transit systems illustrate the need to
maintain high levels of safety and security for transit.

The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety
and security of the nation's transportation system. For example, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several
transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical
standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective modes
must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these agencies use
federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to determine
compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they issue. Finally,
these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy fines to
transportation operators who do not comply with regulations.

FTA's oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT
agencies. In 1982, FTA's role in transit safety evolved when Congress gave
it the discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any operation
financed by the agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to withhold funds
until a plan for correcting the conditions had been approved, but did not
give it power to levy fines or take legal actions against transit
agencies.1 However, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
suggested that states and localities take a more proactive role in
overseeing transit safety, and that FTA closely monitor this state and
local oversight.2 Subsequently, in 1991, Congress required FTA to (1)
issue regulations requiring states to designate an oversight agency to
oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies and (2) withhold
federal funds if a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the
resulting State Safety Oversight program, which became effective in 1997,
FTA requires states to designate an oversight agency to implement FTA
safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies. In addition, in
2001, Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring
security in all modes of transportation. While TSA's most public role to
date has been its airport screening duties, the agency is taking several
steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system, including developing a rail
inspector force.

To assist with Congress' oversight activities, we (1) describe how the
State Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known
about the impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, and
(3) identify any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. In
addition, you asked us to provide information on how the State Safety
Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems cross state
lines. See appendix I for a description of program implementation where
transit systems cross state lines.

To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range of
stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed
program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the
impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed FTA
documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit
agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges
facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety
oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail
transit agencies.3 We visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit
agencies. We selected these agencies to present a cross-section of transit
and oversight agencies in major cities, smaller cities, states with
several rail transit agencies, and states with only one rail system. In
addition, 2 of the 17 transit agencies that we selected will soon begin
operations to see how the program may be incorporated into new transit
systems. Also, we selected 3 of the 17 because they cross state
boundaries, so that we could determine how the program functions in these
regions. We interviewed staff of the transit and oversight agencies we
visited and reviewed relevant program documentation such as interagency
agreements and program standards. We conducted our work from August 2005
through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. (See app. III for more detailed information on our
methodology.)

Results in Brief

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
the safety and security of rail transit systems.

o FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight agency and
develops rules and guidance that those designated agencies are to use to
perform their oversight. FTA's rules and guidance are generally based on a
system safety approach to provide a comprehensive and organized approach
to safety and security. In addition, FTA officials require that oversight
agencies include risk management components in what they require of the
transit agencies they oversee. FTA officials stated that these risk
management components, such as hazard analysis and risk mitigation
procedures, are applicable to transit and are similar to those used in
other transportation mode safety approaches. Although FTA develops and
enforces regulations, it neither directly oversees transit operations, nor
provides funding for the program after state oversight agencies are
designated.

o The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee transit
agencies' activities. Among other things, they review transit agencies'
safety and security system plans, audit the transit agencies at least
every 3 years, and conduct periodic reviews of safety and security trends.
States have designated several different types of agencies to serve as
state oversight agencies. Most commonly, states have designated their
transportation departments to fulfill this function, but public utility
commissions, public safety agencies, and regional transportation
authorities also serve in this role. In terms of funding, although states
can use federal New Starts4 funding to set up a new oversight agency,
states must support the continuing operation of the oversight agency with
other, generally non-federal, sources of funding. Officials in 17 of the
24 state oversight agencies with whom we spoke reported that they use
state funds for the program, while 10 of the 24 reported they charge the
transit agency for oversight.

o Transit agencies develop and implement safety and security plans, assess
hazardous conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight agency,
conduct self audits, and keep the state oversight agency apprised of
corrective actions.

o Federal agencies other than FTA have oversight responsibility for part
of the safety and security of rail transit operations. Since 2003, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had a role in transit security.
DHS's Office of Grants and Training provides grants to transit and other
local agencies to enhance security while TSA has security regulatory
authority over rail transit agencies. TSA recently hired and is deploying
a rail security inspector force to oversee compliance with existing
security directives and any future regulations. In addition, FRA has
jurisdiction to regulate the safety of portions of rail transit systems
that share track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.

Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety
Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the
safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited
information showing its impact on safety and security. Officials at 23 of
the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agency officials with
whom we spoke believe the program is worthwhile. The transit agency
officials primarily cite the importance of having state oversight agency
staff "look over their shoulder," review safety and security trends, and
require audits and corrective actions. Although many officials support the
program, FTA's methods for obtaining information on transit safety and
security (i.e., transit and oversight agency data and FTA audits of the
oversight agencies) do not include performance measures and related
program goals. FTA has not conducted audits every 3 years, as envisioned
when the program began. According to FTA officials, they did not keep to
their stated audit schedule because they were reassessing the priorities
for the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FTA
issued annual reports from 1999 through 2003 that track transit accident,
crash, fatality, and other safety data; however, FTA officials have had
difficulty identifying performance measures for the program and setting
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities and
incidents, and the varying design of rail transit systems, such as street
trolleys and heavy rail. Furthermore, FTA audited all oversight agencies
at least once in the past 8 years (except those that began operations in
2004 or later). They noted that while they conducted only four audits of
oversight agencies from 2001 to 2004, they also conducted nine "safety and
security readiness reviews" to ensure transit systems about to begin
operations would be able to safely and securely begin passenger
operations. Although the agency was focused on security after September
11, 2001, this infrequent schedule limits FTA's ability to conduct
oversight, including collecting information on the safety oversight
agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the program. Recent
changes in FTA's program regulations and leadership provide an opportunity
to address this lack of information, performance measures, and program
goals, and to resume its stated audit schedule. For example, FTA has
issued a revision to the regulations governing the State Safety Oversight
program, recommitted to the audit process, and signed a contract that
includes developing performance measures by the end of fiscal year 2006
and evaluating how new rail systems are implementing the program.5

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
the amount of staff and the level of state oversight-staff expertise (and
thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies) varies widely
across the country. For example, one oversight agency requires its staff
to have at least 5 years of rail transit experience. In contrast, another
oversight agency assigned a state DOT transportation planner to work on
safety and security oversight as a collateral duty. Although no officials
identified a safety or security problem resulting from a lack of staff or
expertise, officials from 16 of 24 state safety oversight agencies raised
concerns about possibly not having enough qualified staff to carry out
their oversight. Officials from three state oversight agencies stated that
additional funding to hire more staff for this program would be helpful.
Most transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe
that federal funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum would
improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency
personnel. While FTA provides technical support on and supports the
exchange of best practices for meeting its regulations, these activities
do not include training on oversight approaches or providing funding to
attend training classes. This contrasts with the approach taken by other
DOT agencies, such as FRA and PHMSA, which provide free training or use
agency funds to pay for state agency personnel to attend training
sessions, in at least some instances. Although FTA considered addressing
the lack of consistency in qualifications among state agencies in its
recent regulations, FTA officials determined the agency lacks the legal
authority to direct states to hire state safety oversight personnel with
specific experience, training, or certification. A second challenge to
implementing the program, according to officials from 20 of 24 state
oversight agencies and 14 of 37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about
the federal role in transit security given that TSA has no formally
defined role in FTA's program-even though it is the lead agency on
security matters and has regulatory authority over security activities in
transportation including rail. Although TSA's program is still developing,
several oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were
concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that state
safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on transit
systems' security plans. Several transit agency officials described this
as a particular concern due to the already limited resources they had
available for responding to oversight activities. TSA and FTA recognize
this concern and have begun discussions on how to coordinate their
oversight efforts.

To help ensure that FTA has sufficient information to evaluate the
program's performance, we are recommending that FTA's new program
leadership set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for
maintaining FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies'
performance at least once every 3 years. Also, to help oversight agency
staff obtain adequate training to perform their duties, we are
recommending that FTA develop a recommended training curriculum for
oversight agency staff and work with oversight agencies to identify ways
to address training deficiencies that exist among oversight agency staff.
Finally, to reduce the potential for duplication of effort and confusion
on the part of oversight and transit agencies regarding the security
portion of the program, we are recommending that FTA and TSA coordinate
their security oversight activities, including performing security audits
in a coordinated fashion.

In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB
provided comments generally concurring with the report. Furthermore, FTA
and TSA officials stated that they are working to determine how to
implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA provided a technical comment,
which we included in the report.

Background

In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA),6 which added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act.7
ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and security
oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on December 27,
1995,8 FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule in
this report), for improving the safety and security of rail transit
agencies. State oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve
transit agencies' safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by
January 1, 1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they
incorporated APTA's 1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System
Safety Program Plans to describe steps the state oversight agencies should
take in developing the program standards that transit agencies would have
to meet.

In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states
affected by the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit
safety and security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in
the FTA rule. During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked
with states to develop compliant programs that addressed FTA's
requirements. Ten years after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA
published a revision to it in the Federal Register on April 29, 2005. The
FTA rule stated that oversight agencies had to comply with the revised
rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions address, in part, the needs of a
growing oversight community9 and NTSB's recommendations arising from
transit accident investigations. For example, according to FTA and NTSB,
NTSB found that the initial rule did not include the requirement that
oversight agencies verify transit agencies are following safe and secure
operating procedures by formally documenting how transit agency employees
were performing specific work functions in compliance with the transit
agency's rules and procedures-a process known as "proficiency and
efficiency testing." Thus, the revised rule specifies what the state
oversight agency must require of rail transit systems regarding such
verification, and incorporates into the regulation material previously
incorporated by reference to the APTA manual. Finally, the revised rule
included additional information on ensuring rail transit security and
emergency preparedness.

FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State
Safety Oversight program-and hired the current Program Manager in March
2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in addition
to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within the
Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and
oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA has devoted a
Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a Training Manager,
Data Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available to assist on an
as-needed basis. FTA regional personnel are not formally involved with the
program's day-to-day activities, though officials from several FTA
Regional Offices help address specific compliance issues that occasionally
arise at transit agencies. Also, staff in at least one FTA Regional Office
have taken it upon themselves to take an active role supporting transit
agencies and oversight agencies in meeting the program's requirements. In
addition, regional staff help states with new transit agencies establish
new oversight agencies, help new transit agencies create safety and
security plans, and have helped facilitate disputes between oversight and
transit agencies as needed. However, after a transit system begins
operations, the program is primarily managed from FTA's headquarters
office. FTA also relies on contractors to do many of the day-to-day
activities ranging from developing and implementing FTA's audit program of
state oversight agencies to developing and providing training classes on
system safety.

FTA's rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems
operating in their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed
guideway system as any light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail,
inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is not
regulated by FRA and

o is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or
receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49
U.S.C. 5336); or

o has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included
in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding
under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336).

Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in
the State Safety Oversight program.

Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety Oversight
Program

FTA's rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as
commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are
therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight
authority over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that share
track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.10 Furthermore,
the revised rule's definition of "rail fixed guideway system" includes
systems built entirely without FTA capital funds, but that intend to
receive FTA formula funding. Examples of these systems include Houston's
METRORail system and the New Jersey Transit RiverLINE system. Rail transit
operations that do not receive FTA formula funds are not subject to
oversight through FTA's program. Las Vegas' monorail line does not receive
FTA formula funds and therefore does not fall within the FTA program.
However, some of the rail transit systems-including automated airport
people-movers and sightseeing tramways-that are not subject to the FTA
program may be subject to state-mandated oversight in certain states.

FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has implications
for their ability to provide oversight.11 According to statute, FTA cannot
regulate safety and security operations at transit agencies except for
purposes of national defense or in cases of regional or national
emergency.12 In addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may,
however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including
safety- and security-related training, research, and demonstration
projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through
grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of
grants, such as certain safety and security statutory and regulatory
requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for noncompliance with the
conditions of a grant.13 In relation to the State Safety Oversight
program, both the authorizing statute and the FTA rule state FTA may
withhold urbanized area program funds from states that do not meet the
requirements of the program.14 For example, FTA invoked this authority and
withheld federal funding from two states that failed to meet initial
deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA withheld approximately $95
million in federal funding from one state for its failure to designate a
state safety oversight agency and approximately $2.3 million from another
state for failure to meet the FTA rule's implementation deadlines.

FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA oversees
over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in addition to
Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly enforce safety
statutes or regulations against railroads using a "toolkit" of
consequences, which vary in severity and are used to compel rail carriers
to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly, FRA will issue a civil
penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in compliance with a particular
regulation. Depending on the infraction, however, FRA can also issue an
emergency order (the strongest response to noncompliance) or it can cite a
defect (a minor deficiency that needs to be addressed but is not egregious
enough to warrant a fine). FRA officials stated that the agency trains and
maintains its own cadre of safety inspectors that are authorized to
conduct safety inspections at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per
week. In addition to these inspectors, FRA manages a program called the
State Rail Safety Participation Program which allows states to employ
their own FRA-certified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations.

Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), federal
agencies should design programs with measurable goals that support the
agency's strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift agencies' focus
from simply monitoring activities undertaken to measuring the results of
these activities. Each agency's strategic plan is to include a mission
statement, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a description of
how the agency intends to achieve these goals. To measure progress toward
the strategic goals, we have previously reported that the agency should
also have a plan for collecting data to measure and evaluate program
performance.15 Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is difficult to
determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended purpose and
whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts should be
increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere.

Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies
collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems.
Under the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and
guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies
to ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance
and other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only
limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly
oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing
safety and security plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents.
Rail transit agencies are responsible for developing safety and security
plans, reporting incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all
other regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to
FTA, federal agencies such as FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training,
and TSA also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit
safety and security.

FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach
in developing the State Safety Oversight program.16 Federal, state, and
rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit system is
operated safely; each of these agencies has some monitoring
responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and
administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA is responsible
for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight agencies are to
use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is
responsible for informing oversight and transit agencies of new program
developments, facilitating and informing the transit and oversight
agencies of available training through FTA or other organizations,
facilitating information sharing among program participants, and providing
technical assistance. One avenue FTA uses to provide these services is the
annual meeting to which all program participants are invited. FTA also
calls special meetings and communicates information to program
participants via e-mail when applicable. (See fig. 2 showing roles and
responsibilities of participants in the State Safety Oversight program.)

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State Safety
Oversight Program

FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-management
approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that each
state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This
is consistent with our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on
where their assets can best be used, both in transportation security and
safety. However, FTA recognizes that only parts of the State Safety
Oversight program are risk-based. The parts of the program that are
risk-based are the areas where it believes risk management is most
applicable to safety and security. These areas are similar to those in
which other transportation modes, such as aviation and pipelines, also use
risk-based approaches. Areas that are not risk-based would include such
things as requiring minimum standards for all transit agencies in the
program, no matter their size or ridership.17

While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with
regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through audits and
reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight agencies comply with
the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when a
state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the
proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the
required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in two
instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight
agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with
the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA
is responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit
to (1) ensure they include all the required information (e.g.,
descriptions of program resources, and causes of accidents and
collisions), and (2) look for industry-wide safety and security trends or
problems. FTA also has authority, under the FTA rule, to request
additional information from oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore,
FTA is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure
they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits
evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the
FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating
accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews
properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is
required. Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the
operation of their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section
5309 (New Starts program) funds-normally used to pay for transit-related
capital expenses-to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency
before a transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated this
year that FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated for FTA
audits to pay for one person from each oversight agency to attend training
on the revisions to the FTA rule, which oversight agencies had to comply
with by May 1, 2006.

State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are
directly responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New Starts
project involving a new rail transit system, or before the transit agency
applies for funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas.
States have designated several different types of agencies to serve as
oversight agencies. Most frequently-in 17 cases-states have designated
their departments of transportation to serve in this role, either due to
their expertise on rail transportation, or because state officials
believed they had no other agencies with transportation expertise. In
three instances-California, Colorado, and Massachusetts-states have
designated utilities commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit
safety and security. Officials from these states stated that since these
bodies already had regulatory and oversight authority over utilities in
these states, it was a natural extension of their powers to add rail
transit to the list of industries they oversee. In fact, the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has been overseeing railroads and rail
transit in that state since 1911. The commission has issued and enforces
several "general orders" that rail transit agencies in California must
follow or face fines and suspended service. Two states have designated
emergency management or public safety departments to oversee their rail
transit agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two
separate oversight agencies-both local transportation funding
authorities-to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the
state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail
transit system runs between two states and the District of Columbia. These
states and the District of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight
Committee as the designated oversight agency.18 Finally, one state, New
York, has given its oversight authority to its Public Transportation
Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have authority similar to
the public utilities commissions discussed above, but have no other
mission than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New York. See
appendix I for further discussion of multi-state operations. Also, see
appendix II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail transit
agencies they oversee.

The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five states
where the oversight agencies have some enforcement authority over the rail
transit agencies they oversee. In all cases, this was due to the
regulatory authority states have granted their oversight agencies. For
instance, state utilities commissions may have this authority written into
their authorizing legislation. In other instances, states had given this
authority to the oversight agency in state legislation. Officials from
oversight agencies that have the authority to fine or otherwise punish
rail transit agencies all stated that they rarely, if ever, use that
authority, but each stated that they believed it gives their actions extra
weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to the oversight agency
more readily than they otherwise might. A majority of oversight agencies,
19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such punitive authority, though
officials from some oversight agencies stated they may be able to withhold
grants their oversight agencies provide to the transit agencies they
oversee.19 Although officials from several of these agencies stated that
they believe they would be more effective if they did have enforcement
authority, under the current program this authority would be granted by
individual states.

While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies
with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of
rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program,
oversight agencies are responsible for the following:

o Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit
agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program standard
"provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties concerning
processes and procedures they must have in place to be in compliance with
the State Safety Oversight program." FTA requirements for the program
standard are procedural rather than technical. For example, the program
standard must include, at a minimum, areas dealing with the oversight
agency's responsibilities, how the program standard will be modified, how
the oversight agency will oversee the transit agency's internal safety and
security reviews, how the oversight agency will conduct the triennial
audits, and requirements for the rail transit agency to report accidents.
According to FTA, oversight agencies may choose to develop technical
standards, such as requirements for the strength of track, crashworthiness
of rail vehicles, or brightness of signals. In addition, the standard must
contain sections describing how the oversight agency will investigate
accidents, how the rail transit agency will develop a corrective action
plan to address investigation and audit findings, and the minimum
requirements in the agency's separate safety and security plans. FTA
mandates that the transit agency's safety plan must include, among other
requirements, a process for identifying, managing, and eliminating
hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the transit agency's security plan
must include, among other requirements, a process for managing threats and
vulnerabilities, and a method for conducting internal security reviews.

o Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual
reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these plans
and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure they meet
the program requirements.

o Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at
least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to audit
the rail transit agencies' implementation of their safety and security
plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight agency that
performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we found five others
that perform the audit on a continuous basis, auditing the rail transit
agency on a portion of their safety and security plans each year. FTA has
approved both these alternative auditing schedules.

o Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA
requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and
approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits.
Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and eliminating
hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the oversight
agency outside the audit process.

o Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to investigate
accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or severity
threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes leading to
the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or allow the
transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf.

o Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule, oversight
agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight
activities, including results of accident investigations and the status of
ongoing corrective actions.

Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for
meeting the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them.
However, the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that
oversight agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as
developing separate system safety and security plans, performing internal
safety and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a
hazard-management process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight
agencies within 2 hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are
included in each oversight agency's program standard. The locations and
types of transit agencies participating in the program are shown in figure
3.

Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
State Safety Oversight Program

Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and
Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight
Program

In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit
agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the
safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is DHS'
TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),20 passed by
Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave
TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including
authority to issue security regulations.21 While TSA's most public
transportation security duties are its airport screening and aviation
related activities, TSA has taken steps to enhance rail transit security.
For example, in May 2004, TSA issued security directives to rail transit
agencies to ensure all agencies were implementing a consistent baseline of
security. Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized
by Congress.22 While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are
still being determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and
enforce compliance with the security directives by passenger rail
agencies, as well as increase security awareness among rail transit
agencies, riders, and others. The inspectors have begun outreach
activities with rail transit systems aimed at enhancing security in rail
and mass transit systems. TSA officials stated their responsibilities
encompass the security of other rail systems, including freight rail,
which is consistent with ATSA.

In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and
Training within DHS' Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring
rail transit security through supporting security initiatives. The Office
of Grants and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic
Preparedness) is the primary federal source of security funding for
passenger rail systems, and is the principal component of DHS responsible
for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its
mission to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism, the
Office of Grants and Training provides training, funds for the purchase of
equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical
assistance, and other support to assist states, local jurisdictions (such
as municipalities and transit agencies), and the private sector. The
Office of Grants and Training has provided over $320 million to rail
transit providers through the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit
Security Grant Program.

In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring
transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its
jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit system that share track with the
general railroad system, or places where a rail transit system and the
general railroad system share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing).23
Rail transit systems that share track or grade crossings-or are subject to
FRA regulations for other reasons-may apply to FRA for a waiver from these
rules. According to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the
same tracks and at the same time as general railroads, FRA would make the
rail transit agency operating the vehicle meet the safety standards of the
general railroads. This would likely require rail transit agencies to use
much sturdier (and more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive
for the rail transit agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have
requested waivers from FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at
different times than heavy freight trains, and will not be on the track at
the same time, meaning the risk of collision is low or non-existent.
According to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 10
of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for them.24 After granting a
waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA and the relevant transit and
oversight agencies to address any safety questions or problems that arise.

NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety,
though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB has
authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads,
including rail transit agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to
NTSB, within 2 hours, all accidents involving fatalities, multiple
injuries, evacuations, or damage over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB
officials stated they generally will investigate only the more serious
accidents, such as those involving fatalities or injuries, or those
involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations of
rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to federal agencies
or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led to the
accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its recommendations, but NTSB
states that, historically, agencies have implemented over 80 percent of
its recommendations. NTSB also maintains expertise on transportation
safety across all modes of transport and conducts studies on pressing
issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both stated that they consult NTSB
periodically when they have safety questions, in addition to reporting
accidents to it.

Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile;
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the
Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we
spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and
security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations
about how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have
limited statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or
security. FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from
sources such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight
agencies, and its own audits of the oversight agencies. FTA has used
national transit data and oversight agencies' annual reports to collate
information on safety, including information about fatalities and the
causes of incidents; FTA last issued a report summarizing this information
in 2003. However, this data is not linked to any program goals or
performance measures. FTA officials recognize the need for performance
measures for its safety and security programs and are taking steps in 2006
to begin to address this need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the
oversight agencies every 3 years, it has not conducted these audits as
frequently as it had planned (it has conducted eight since September
2001). However, program officials stated they are committed to getting
"back on track" to meet the planned schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes
enough resources to conduct the planned audits, and develops and uses
planned performance goals and measures to improve the program, will be
important for future assessments of the program.

Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as
Worthwhile and Valuable

Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's State
Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps them
maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit agency
officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their
safety and security is worthwhile. Several officials stated that it is
important and beneficial to have an independent agency verify their safety
and security progress. One transit agency official explained that the
oversight agency helps transit officials to identify larger, or systemic,
issues. In addition, the program provides support to exert extra influence
on a transit agency's board of directors or senior management to get
safety or security improvements implemented faster. Furthermore, officials
identified specific examples illustrating how oversight agencies helped
improve safety or security. Officials from 15 transit agencies explained
that the program helped modify equipment to improve safety and security.
For example, one transit agency had problems with train operators failing
to stop at red light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety
department exert enough influence with the transit agency's senior
management to replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals
that were brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials
believe that FTA's program is an effective method for overseeing safety
and security. Several officials said that having a state or local (rather
than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security
improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight
staff.

In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state
safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State
Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving
transit systems' safety and security. Several officials commented that the
program provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and
avoid complacency. It also helps the transit agencies by providing an
independent third party, since self oversight is not, in the officials'
view, the best way to have an agency identify and resolve its safety and
security issues. Furthermore, several officials commented that they
believed the current system worked well, and that the program provides
consistency and endows the state safety oversight agencies with enough
authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the
states carry out the program provides ongoing oversight in addition to
formal audits, which helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and
security issues.

Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that,
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved
safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided safety
statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions at the
San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC became

its oversight agency, to 2005.25 Although FTA changed its definition of a
reportable accident during this time period-making it impossible to
determine exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety-both
MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident CPUC's efforts had been a
major factor in the reduction in accidents. A MUNI representative
estimated that the reduction in accidents was more likely about 15
percent, but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to develop a
comprehensive safety program, which helped reduce accidents and increase
the agency's focus on meeting safety goals. In another example, New York
oversight officials stated that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fires
were prevalent in New York City's transit system. After the New York State
Legislature created the PTSB in 1984 to oversee public transportation
safety in New York, the PTSB tracked incident numbers, approached the
transit agency and, according to oversight and transit agency officials,
was able to develop and implement an action plan which heightened the
awareness of (and ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts
occurred several decades ago, the data that might support the officials'
statements were not easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and New
York City transit officials all cited this as an early success of state
oversight of rail transit.

APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State Safety
Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and security,
the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry officials to
surpass minimum standards and continue striving for improved safety and
security.26 However, transit officials with whom we spoke often discussed
the benefits of a federal program. For example, a transit agency official
explained that a benefit of FTA's rule is that it standardized rail
transit safety and security across the country. In addition, officials
from 17 transit agencies reported that respective state safety oversight
agencies imposed requirements above those required in FTA's requirement.
For example, three state safety oversight agencies reported that they
require transit agencies under their purview to have an "hours of service"
type policy which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to
rest. In addition, several oversight agencies have established more
stringent reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA.
For example, officials from two transit agencies reported that their
oversight agencies require them to report accidents occurring in a rail
yard, while two others stated that their oversight agencies require
notification of any accident involving contact between vehicles, no matter
how minor.

FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not Have the Data
to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through
the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The
reports include information on many different issues, including program
resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any
corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations.
FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agency information, as
well as national transit data, to publish its own annual reports from 1999
to 2003. FTA's reports included ridership data, fatality and injury data,
and the results of accident investigations to identify common incident
causes. Although these reports may have informed oversight agencies about
what safety or security problems existed, the information was not tied to
any program goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued
a report since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety,
it is unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example,
one state safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that
FTA provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from
oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify
trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and
collegial relationship with each other.

According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better
information and performance measures for its safety and security programs;
also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has been looking
for ways to improve the type of safety and security data it can collect,
and how it can use the information to track program performance and
progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA's 2006 business plan for its
Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and
implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to
help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focused on
performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA is working
with a contractor to develop performance measures for the State Safety
Oversight program. FTA officials stated that their contractor is working
with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they use and
find useful in tracking the safety and security of their systems. Although
it may be difficult to identify such measures-many of the oversight
agencies with whom we spoke do not have performance measures, either-this
effort could allow FTA to more readily determine areas where the program
is having a positive impact on transit safety and security, and areas
where more focus is needed.

Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that
FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide
detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought
together information from these audits to provide information on the
safety and security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the
deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with oversight agency
staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the
suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has not conducted the
audits frequently enough to provide a current picture of transit system
safety and security, or to identify some challenges that oversight and
transit agency officials raised during our interviews with them. FTA has
audited each state safety oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at
least once since the program began; two agencies were audited twice.
According to the FTA contractor, they piloted the audit program in late
1998 by conducting audits in three states with different legal authorities
and a range of differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly
scheduled audits began in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the
audit program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and
acknowledged that the agency's priorities shifted in the wake of the
attacks. FTA has audited 8 of 24 existing oversight agencies since
September 2001. However, during that time period, FTA also conducted nine
security and safety reviews to evaluate whether new rail transit projects
could enter operations safely and securely. In addition, the program had
several staffing changes after 2001, causing some oversight and transit
officials to state that the program did not seem to be a priority for
FTA.27 According to FTA officials, including the Program Manager, who
started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting audits in fiscal year
2006 so it can use the money and time to help states comply with the
revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach effort to this end,
including a workshop for oversight agency officials to help ensure
compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit schedule in fiscal
year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to begin with the states
that it has judged to have had the weakest program standards and
procedures, based on their initial submission under the new rule.

FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety
Oversight Program

Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges
in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to manage the
program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not
confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail
transit system safety and security and they are unsure the current
training available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of
staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the
country. A second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that
many transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how
security issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be
responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail
transit security.

Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are Adequately
Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff

While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with
whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight
program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that
they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, 18 of 24
oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated they believed additional
training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and
security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight
agency staff varied widely across the country. For example, we found that
11 of the 24 oversight agencies we examined had oversight staff that had
no career or educational background in transit safety or security.
Conversely, another 11 oversight agencies required their staff to have
certain levels of experience or education. For example, while New York's
PTSB requires its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety,
the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its
lead oversight staff person to have an engineering degree. According to
some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or
security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they
were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and
security. Therefore, it took them several years before they were confident
that they knew enough about rail transit operations to provide effective
oversight. These officials stated that if they left their positions, any
new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge.

Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are
helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through
overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness.
Officials from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training
would be useful cited several examples of how additional training could
benefit them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated
that the training they had received in transit operations, accident
investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had not received
any training on how to perform specific oversight functions. Thus, they
were unsure how to carry out their agencies' primary oversight role.
Officials at a majority of oversight agencies (15 of 24) stated that they
felt the training that had been made available to them either by FTA, the
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the National Transit Institute
had been adequate.28 However, officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies
also stated that they were somewhat unsure of which courses they should
take to be effective in their oversight role. For example, several
oversight agency personnel stated that, while FTA officials have
encouraged oversight agencies' staff to obtain certifications from TSI in
transit safety and security and have encouraged oversight agency staff to
take selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not developed or recommended
a course specifically related to oversight.

Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight
agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel
to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and
travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI.29 Officials from
10 of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds
as one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.

Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA
provided some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for
training they wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to
spend their limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as
staff overtime, travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring
contractors. Several oversight agency officials also cited the example of
other DOT agencies that provide free training or pay for state staff to
travel to attend training. For example, 30 states participate in FRA's
State Safety Participation Program. These states have inspectors who FRA
has certified to enforce FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their
initial and ongoing classroom training and state staff's travel to this
training. In addition, the federal agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA,
authorizes state-employed inspectors to inspect pipelines in many states.
To help defray their costs, PHMSA provides up to 50 percent of a state's
expenses in carrying out their pipeline safety program. PHMSA also
recently paid for two inspectors from each state to attend training when
it instituted a new inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA
stated that providing funding to states to train their employees helps
federal agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement activities,
easing the states' burden of paying to enforce federal regulations. For
the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies' personnel to travel to
attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided
technical assistance and shared best practices in meeting the requirements
of the revised rule. This instance could provide a model for future
funding of training or training-related travel for oversight agency
personnel.

FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training in
transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety
Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best
practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies.
However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training
specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a recommended
training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated that it would
not be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also, FTA officials
told us that they considered addressing the lack of consistency in
oversight agency staff qualifications when they were revising the FTA rule
in 2005. However, they stated they did not have the legal authority to
direct states to require certain education, experience, or certifications
for oversight agency staff. Also, these officials stated that FTA has not
issued any guidance to states about what level of training is appropriate
for oversight staff or what level of staffing is appropriate for an
oversight agency. However, these officials noted that, despite the lack of
formal guidance, FTA checks to ensure oversight agency personnel are
adequately trained during its audits; in five instances, FTA has
recommended that oversight agency staff take additional training. FTA
officials also stated that FTA could issue informal guidance or
recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of training their
oversight staff should have.

In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure
about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a
transit agency's operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of 24 oversight
agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would help them do
their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight agency personnel
who were highly dedicated to performing oversight, even though they said
they had no assistance and their states had limited resources to allocate
to the task. Some staff took it upon themselves to stay informed about a
transit agency's operations by staying in regular contact with transit
agency personnel, attending transit agency safety meetings, and making
regular inspections of the system-even though these tasks were not
required by their oversight agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight
agencies told us they had devoted the equivalent of less than one person
working half-time to oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the
oversight part of their job as a "collateral duty." Personnel from some of
these oversight agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform
the kind of active oversight that involved attending transit agency
meetings, making spot inspections, and staying in regular contact with
transit agency personnel. While in some of these instances, the transit
agencies overseen are small, such as small streetcar lines, some of the
transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have similar levels of
oversight. For example, one state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time
equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions is responsible for
overseeing a major transit agency that averages nearly 200,000 daily
passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time with the services
of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of the transit
agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to oversight
functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies (including
two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The oversight staff
in this state reported that it was difficult to maintain active oversight
when their responsibilities were so spread out. Furthermore, we found 13
oversight agencies that estimated dedicating less than one full-time
equivalent staff member to the oversight task. This meant that the person
(or persons) assigned to the oversight tasks had other duties, in addition
to oversight of a transit agency. Table 1 shows the amount of personnel
oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies dedicate to
oversight responsibilities. (See app. II for information on estimated FTE
and transit system information for each state safety oversight agency and
related transit agency).

Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee
Transit Agency Safety and Security

                                        

          Estimated FTEs          0.5 or less  0.6-1 1.1-3 3.1-5 Over 5 Total 
Number of oversight agencies            11      5     6     1      1    24 

Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.

Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to this
program, providing appropriate and continuing training and experience may
increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states have to dedicate to
this program.

Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging Role
in Transit Security Will Affect the Program

Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and its
rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As discussed
above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over transportation security
across all modes, and TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 rail
inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and
enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004.
However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20
stated they did not have a clear picture of who was responsible for
overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37
transit agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding
transit security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were
particularly concerned that TSA's rail inspectors would be duplicating
their role in overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official
stated that he felt transit agencies could begin to experience "audit
fatigue" if both TSA and oversight agencies audited transit agencies'
security practices. This official stated it would be more efficient if TSA
and oversight agency staff audited transit agencies' security practices at
the same time. Officials at several transit agencies were also confused
about what standards they would be required to meet. For example, while
oversight agencies are free to create their own standards, TSA issued rail
security directives in May 2004-and could issue future directives or
requirements that transit agencies must meet. Security officials at one
transit agency specifically voiced concern that there could be conflicting
security requirements and hoped that TSA would coordinate with oversight
agencies' requirements and vice versa.

TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at a
meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May 2006.
FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that they were
committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating their
respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as
possible. However, as TSA is still developing their program, currently
there is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight
program, and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for
their rail inspectors. While the FTA rule discusses requirements for a
transit agency's security plan (e.g., a method for conducting internal
security reviews and a process for determining security threats and
vulnerabilities to a transit agency), and requires oversight agencies to
include security performance in their audits of transit agencies, the FTA
rule does not discuss TSA's specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA
officials stated that exactly how TSA would participate in the program was
still to be determined. However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they
are committed to working together to ensure inspection activities are
coordinated to foster consistency and minimize disruption to rail transit
agency operations. Also, a TSA regional manager of rail inspectors with
whom we spoke was unsure what the rail inspectors' role would be in
relation to the program; in addition, the manager was unsure what the
details of the program were, including the identity of the relevant
oversight agencies for the region. However, he stated that he was working
to learn these details, and that he and his staff had been in touch with
transit agency security officials to introduce themselves and gather
information.

Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with
transit and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were
engaged in an ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to determine
how the rail inspectors could best assist oversight agencies in reviewing
transit agency security. TSA gave several examples of activities resulting
from this coordination. For example, TSA reported that they had designated
26 rail inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, TSA
officials stated that they are working with FTA and the oversight agency
from California to pilot a coordination approach they could use with
oversight agencies across the country. Additionally, the director of the
rail inspector program attended a meeting with representatives from almost
all oversight agencies to discuss the concept of rail inspectors
participating in oversight-agency audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA
is working to bring the 26 TSA rail inspectors involved in the State
Safety Oversight program to the next annual meeting for the program's
participants, so that the rail inspectors can learn more about the program
and develop a "game plan" for how the inspectors will participate in the
program.

Conclusions

While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight
program, most participants in the program consider it a success at
improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can
cite anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive impact.
Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit and
oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for demonstrating
the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and security. As new
leadership takes over administration of the program, this is an opportune
time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact of the program,
including determining a way to measure the impact of the program, setting
performance goals, and developing and providing the means to meet a
consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies.

Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and
qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although it
is unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety and
security. In other federally mandated transportation safety programs where
states partner with the federal government to perform oversight duties,
the federal government pays for a portion of the training expenses of
oversight staff, (or for oversight staff to travel to attend training)
because having well-trained state officials makes the federally mandated
oversight more efficient and effective. Yet, in this program, FTA relies
entirely on the states to determine how to fund their direct oversight of
rail transit agencies and does not help defray their training or travel
costs. While the program is generally thought of as bringing about
positive change, these differing levels of training and qualifications are
a cause for concern; it is conceivable that inadequately trained staff,
especially staff that have no experience overseeing transit agency safety,
might miss safety problems they otherwise would notice, or may be unable
to effectively evaluate a transit agency's proposals for resolving
existing safety problems (though it is not clear whether either of these
have occurred). One way to help ensure that oversight agency staff have at
least a basic understanding of how to oversee rail transit operations
would be to evaluate the amount of training oversight agency staff have
obtained and, subsequently, develop a training curriculum that FTA could
recommend to oversight agency personnel. Also, since many oversight agency
personnel have little experience conducting rail transit safety oversight,
including the basic tenets of conducting oversight in the training
curriculum would help ensure that oversight agency staff did not have to
rely on transit agency personnel for advice on conducting oversight. In
addition, FTA could review oversight staff qualifications in more detail
during its audits of oversight agencies to help ensure oversight staff are
adequately trained to perform their duties.

Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the
existence and deployment of TSA's rail inspectors will complicate security
oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts to coordinate
their activities and determine the roles and responsibilities of the rail
inspectors, the official role of the rail inspectors in the State Safety
Oversight program remains unclear. Therefore, it is understandable why
transit and oversight agency officials fear possible duplication of
effort, especially for activities such as reviewing security plans and
auditing transit security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have
had some difficulties coordinating their actions in the past,30 such
concern is warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to address
this issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are a positive
step.

Recommendations

In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff
resources to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient
information to evaluate the performance of the program, and supports state
oversight agencies in adequately training their staff to perform their
oversight duties, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take
the following two actions:

o Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity
presented by having new program leadership to set short- and long-term
goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program is
making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance goals for
the agency's other approaches for evaluating the impact of this program on
safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining FTA's stated
schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once every 3 years.

o Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency
personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their
activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment, work
with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any deficiencies
they identify. This strategy should include developing an appropriate
training curriculum, including training on conducting oversight for
oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies encouraging them
to have their staff complete the training curriculum. If FTA determines
that it does not have the authority to issue such guidance, it should seek
such statutory authority from Congress.

Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies
about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the
potential duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit agencies,
we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant
Secretary of TSA to:

o coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to state
oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities TSA
develops for its rail inspectors; and

o work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security audits
whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help ensure
effective coordination with these agencies.

Agency Comments

Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of
this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred with
the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are
working to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA
provided a technical comment which we included in the report.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IV.

Katherine A. Siggerud Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States-the Port
Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St.
Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in
Washington, D.C.-cross state lines. Therefore, these systems require the
collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety
Oversight program or states can agree that one state will be responsible
for oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state transit
systems has a different structure to handle oversight responsibilities.
The oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
strategies to centralize decision making, streamline collaboration, and
respond promptly to safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the
Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency
in the D.C. area, requires majority decision making by the six committee
members of the agency, including at least one member from each
jurisdiction, and has experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding
to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring
audit findings are addressed.

Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and
Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each performs
oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to
serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state
agencies-namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)
agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation to serve as
the sole oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink
in St. Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through the St.
Clair County Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri
Department of Transportation); the two organizations share oversight
duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from
each jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.)
provides oversight for WMATA.

The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily
and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's track is
in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early
2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania
and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a
regional transportation and economic development agency serving both
southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA implemented
organizational and functional changes, DRPA and PATCO leadership no longer
believed that DRPA could perform its role as the designated oversight
agency without facing conflicting interests. As a result, Pennsylvania and
New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey Department of Transportation
(NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight agency. This arrangement allows the
oversight agency to take corrective action without seeking additional
levels of approval from Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does
keep Pennsylvania informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides
some support to the NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions
for the stations, passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania.
PennDOT reports any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted
during the performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through
meetings or other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be
performed by the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or
directly by New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one
part-time staff members to its oversight program, and while these staff
members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their sole
responsibilities for safety and oversight functions.

The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system
included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track
in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials
agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to provide
safety and security oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001,
MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which roughly
equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this, the states
agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a greater role in
safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated the St. Clair
County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. Clair is one of the
few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight agency. The involvement of
two separate oversight agencies could create challenges to effective
implementation, but the agencies have taken steps to ensure close
coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies have
agreed to use only one uniform safety and security standard across the
entire MetroLink system.1 According to area officials, this arrangement
creates consistency throughout the system and allows both agencies to
perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the
agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial
audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate very
closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there is one
employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to safety and
security oversight activities. Illinois has several employees who devote
smaller percentages of their individual time to the program, but the
Managing Director is primarily responsible for coordinating with Missouri.
MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding to state safety oversight
directives is a priority, and the agency works quickly to implement
changes.

WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the District
of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of
Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities through a
collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed of six
representatives-two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary duties, and their
activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the
case with staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any
dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational experience.
To gain access to additional experience and expertise in rail oversight,
TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical knowledge, perform
required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit recommendations are
completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from, and must be approved by,
each of the jurisdictions every year. The Washington Council of
Governments processes TOC funds and handles its contracting procedures.
These issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly
funding and process its expenses.

Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative Challenges in
Different Ways

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have
attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's staff.
New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight
program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and
provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the implementation
of any new safety or security processes. Although St. Louis has two
agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies have made it
a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent information to the
transit agency, and they are coordinating activities so MetroLink is not
burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. To do this, the
Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact with each
other. Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated
to safety and security oversight, and the agencies have very good working
relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could face
challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and new
employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In addition,
officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had disagreements over
safety or security standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it
would be highly problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and
Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the
current arrangements have produced one set of standards, good
communication, and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight
agency staff in St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment
where this system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well.

In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have contributed
to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information requests.
On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC's audit in
late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to facilitate
the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State Safety
Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an extension
by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August, FTA
initiated its audit even though it had not received requested information,
but was not able to complete the audit until the end of September, when it
received all requested materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10
areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues.
According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held
a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating how
many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA stated
that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating procedures to
address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition, TOC
representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA found
were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident investigation
procedures and approving modifications, and could not be addressed within
the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff emphasized that, although
WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC audit recommendations or
information requests, they were pleased with their relationship with WMATA
and that WMATA was responsive to TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed
that they recognized and appreciated the effort TOC had undertaken in
addressing FTA's findings.

TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on at
least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC
members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA's
initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the
year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the
consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their
files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring
additional funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions
represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding
quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its
members, and at least one member from each jurisdiction, approving the
action. Reaching such majority agreements can be time consuming since all
members of TOC have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a
concern when quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA's
audit recommendations.

TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and
oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and
proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the
chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time on
overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the
administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a
full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a
full-time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However,
funding this position could be a challenge and the administrator would
need to have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.

Appendix II

List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They Oversee

Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies

                                        

    State       State safety     Rail transit   City center   Type of         Annual 
              oversight agency      agency        served      system   ridership and 
               (estimated FTE)    (estimated                             directional 
                                     FTE)                                route miles 
Single state                                                           
systems                                                                
Arkansas      Arkansas State    Central        Little Rock,  Trolley         159,458 
              Highway and       Arkansas       AR                                    
              Transportation    Transit                                          2.8 
              Department (0.5)  Authority                              
                                (0.08)                                 
California    California Public Bay Area Rapid San           Heavy        99,296,028 
              Utilities         Transit (7)    Francisco, CA rail                    
              Commission (9.6)                                                   209 
                                Los Angeles    Los Angeles,  Heavy        74,242,912 
                                County         CA            rail and                
                                Metropolitan                 light             141.6 
                                Transportation               rail      
                                Authority                              
                                (1.5)                                  
                                San Francisco  San           Light        53,768,895 
                                Municipal      Francisco, CA rail,                   
                                Railway (Muni)               trolley,           81.7 
                                (7)                          and cable 
                                                             car       
                                San Diego      San Diego, CA Light        29,334,362 
                                Trolley, Inc.                rail                    
                                (0.9)                                           96.6 
                                Sacramento     Sacramento,   Light        12,008,620 
                                Regional       CA            rail                    
                                Transit                                         58.4 
                                District (N/A)                         
                                Santa Clara    San Jose, CA  Light         6,780,431 
                                Valley Transit               rail                    
                                Authority                                       58.4 
                                (N/A)                                  
Colorado      Colorado Public   Denver         Denver, CO    Light        11,142,220 
              Utilities         Regional                     rail                    
              Commission (1.2)  Transit                                         31.6 
                                District                               
                                (1.25)                                 
Florida       Florida           Metro-Dade     Miami, FL     Heavy        26,479,423 
              Department of     Transit                      rail and                
              Transportation    Authority                    automated          53.5 
              (1)               (N/A)                        guideway  
                                Jacksonville   Jacksonville, Automated       736,510 
                                Transportation FL            guideway                
                                Authority                                        5.4 
                                (N/A)                                  
                                Hillsborough   Tampa, FL     Trolley         565,002 
                                Area Regional                                        
                                Transit (0.85)                                   4.8 
Georgia       Georgia           Metropolitan   Atlanta, GA   Heavy        70,984,053 
              Department of     Atlanta Rapid                rail                    
              Transportation    Transit                                         96.1 
              (0.1)             Authority (6)                          
Illinois      Regional          Chicago        Chicago, IL   Heavy       186,759,524 
              Transportation    Transit                      rail                    
              Authority (1)     Authority (11)                                 206.3 
Louisiana     Louisiana         New Orleans    New Orleans,  Trolley       5,667,952 
              Department of     Regional       LA                                    
              Transportation    Transit                                         25.3 
              (0.1)a            Authority                              
                                (N/A)                                  
Maryland      Maryland          Maryland       Baltimore, MD Heavy        18,059,117 
              Department of     Transit                      rail and                
              Transportation    Administration               light                87 
              (1.3)             (5)                          rail      
Massachusetts Massachusetts     Massachusetts  Boston, MA    Heavy       215,787,440 
              Department of     Bay                          rail,                   
              Telecommunication Transportation               light             127.3 
              and Energy (2.67) Authority                    rail, and 
                                (5.1)                        trolley   
Michigan      Michigan          Detroit        Detroit, MI   Automated     1,340,646 
              Department of     Transit                      guideway                
              Transportation    Corporation                                      2.9 
              (0.5)             (Detroit                               
                                People Mover)                          
                                (1.1)                                  
Minnesota     Minnesota         Hiawatha Metro Minneapolis,  Light         7,901,668 
              Department of     Transit        MN            rail                    
              Public Safety     (1-1.5)                                         24.4 
              (0.1)                                                    
New Jersey    NJDOT (2-3)       New Jersey     Newark, NJ    Light        14,312,676 
                                Transit Newark               rail                    
                                City Subway                                    99.9b 
                                (0.5)                                  
                                New Jersey     Jersey City,  Light     
                                Transit        NJ            rail      
                                Hudson-Bergen                          
                                Light Rail                             
                                (N/A)                                  
                                New Jersey     Trenton, NJ   Light     
                                Transit River                rail      
                                Line (2)                               
New York      New York Public   New York City  New York      Heavy     1,803,536,486 
              Transportation    Transit (15)   City, NY      rail                    
              Safety Board                                                     493.8 
              (3.5)                                                    
                                Niagara        Buffalo, NY   Light         5,373,321 
                                Frontier                     rail                    
                                Transit                                         12.4 
                                Authority                              
                                (0.5)                                  
Ohio          Ohio Department   Greater        Cleveland, OH Heavy         8,236,840 
              of Transportation Cleveland                    rail and                
              (1)               Regional                     light              68.5 
                                Transit                      rail      
                                Authority                              
                                (1.2)                                  
Oregon        Oregon Department Portland       Portland, OR  Light        34,755,147 
              of Transportation Tri-Met (10)                 rail                    
              (1.2)             Portland       Portland, OR  Light             92.9b 
                                Streetcar                    rail      
                                (0.5)                                  
Pennsylvania  PennDOT (0.5)     Southeastern   Philadelphia, Heavy       113,252,100 
                                Pennsylvania   PA            rail,                   
                                Transit                      light             141.1 
                                Authority (2)                rail, and 
                                                             trolley   
                                Port Authority Pittsburgh,   Light         8,072,099 
                                of Allegheny   PA            rail and                
                                County (0.3)                 inclined           45.8 
                                                             plane     
                                Cambria County Johnstown, PA Inclined         86,031 
                                Transit                      plane                   
                                Authority (1)                                    0.3 
Puerto Rico   Puerto Rico State Puerto Rico    San Juan,     Heavy         2,182,668 
              Emergency and     Highway &      Puerto Rico   rail      
              Disaster          Transportation                         
              Management Agency Authority Tren                         
              (3)               Urbano (1.6)                           
Tennessee     Tennessee         Chattanooga    Chattanooga,  Inclined        435,780 
              Department of     Area Rapid     TN            plane                   
              Transportation    Transit                                            2 
              (0.25)            Authority                              
                                (N/A)                                  
                                Memphis Area   Memphis, TN   Trolley       1,015,448 
                                Transit                                              
                                Authority                                         10 
                                (0.3)                                  
Texas         Texas Department  Galveston      Galveston, TX Light            47,706 
              of Transportation Island Transit               rail                    
              (0.4)             (0.25)                                             4 
                                Dallas Area    Dallas, TX    Light        17,487,057 
                                Rapid Transit                rail and                
                                (0.75)                       trolley            87.7 
                                Metropolitan   Houston, TX   Light        10,233,638 
                                Transit                      rail                    
                                Authority of                                    14.8 
                                Harris County                          
                                (2)                                    
Utah          Utah Department   Utah Transit   Salt Lake     Light        13,101,791 
              of Transportation Authority      City, UT      rail                    
              (0.8)             (1.5)                                           37.3 
Washington    Washington State  Sound Transit  Tacoma, WA    Light           884,895 
              Department of     Tacoma Link                  rail                    
              Transportation    (N/A)                                            3.6 
              (0.35)            Seattle Center Seattle, WA   Automated    1,506,240c 
                                Monorail                     guideway                
                                (0.02)                                           1.8 
Wisconsin     Wisconsin         Kenosha        Kenosha, WI   Trolley          68,209 
              Department of     Transit (0.85)                                       
              Transportation                                                     1.9 
              (0.3)                                                    
Multi-state                                                            
systems                                                                
Illinois and  St. Clair County  Bi-State       St. Louis, MO Light        15,648,233 
Missouri      Transit District  Development                  rail                    
              (0.25-0.5) and    Agency (St.                                     75.8 
              Missouri          Louis Metro)                           
              Department of     (2)                                    
              Transportation                                           
              (0.9)                                                    
New Jersey    NJDOT (2-3)       PATCO (1)      Philadelphia, Heavy         9,362,839 
and                                            PA            rail                    
Pennsylvania                                                                    31.5 
Maryland,     TOC (0.2)         WMATA (1)      Washington,   Heavy       259,430,055 
Virginia, and                                  D.C.          rail                    
Washington,                                                                    206.6 
D.C.                                                                   

Source: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.

Notes: FTE data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and
transit agencies. The data do not include contractor staff that assist
transit or oversight agencies, though several agencies reported using
contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the
total number of passengers boarding the rail system annually (also known
as "unlinked passenger trips") as provided by FTA. Directional route
miles-the miles of track in each direction over which transportation
vehicles travel while carrying passengers-are current as of 2004, and were
obtained from data published by FTA in the National Transit Database. The
data in this table are presented for background purposes and were not
verified. FTA defines trolley operations as "light rail" for statistical
purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley operations and
modern light rail operations, we have created separate categories for them
in this chart. N/A = Not available

aBecause we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE data was
provided by FTA.

b Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles represent
the total for all systems within a transit agency.

cAccording to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this table
represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an extended
period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In prior years
the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 2 million.

Appendix III

Scope and Methodology

To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail transit systems
and what is known about the impact of the State Safety Oversight program
on rail safety and security, we met with FTA management and consultants to
discuss the history, mission, and design of the oversight program. In
addition, we discussed system safety and risk management approaches used
by FTA, but we did not independently verify that oversight agencies use
these approaches. We met with officials from other federal agencies such
as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);
we also met with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), a
transit industry association. We met with these organizations to determine
how oversight responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent
to which duplication of safety and security guidance existed among these
agencies. We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor. To compare other
transportation safety and security approaches to the oversight program, we
interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from Canadian transit
agencies.

In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents, including
rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State Safety Oversight
program; the triennial audits FTA performs on oversight agencies;
documents tracking the performance of corrective action items; and
memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to facilitate safety
oversight coordination. At the state level, we reviewed annual reports
that the oversight agencies provide to FTA. When states were willing to
share these documents, we reviewed audits performed by the oversight
agencies on transit agencies (40 percent of the states provided these
documents) and authorizing legislation, or executive action, creating the
state safety oversight agency (more than 80 percent provided the
legislation or executive action). To compare the State Safety Oversight
program with other transportation safety approaches, we reviewed our past
work on pipeline, aviation, motor carriers, and highway safety.

To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program and
also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted
semi-structured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To
determine the universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies
under the State Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We
compared FTA's list of transit systems to information published by APTA
regarding rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that were
under development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that had
initiated service as "proposed," and we were able to resolve this
discrepancy by comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency's
website, which showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all
transit and oversight agencies participating in the program that were in
operation as of October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight
agencies and 42 rail transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five
oversight agencies, and 37 of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to
participate in these interviews. The New Orleans Regional Transit
Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana Department of Transportation
(an oversight agency) requested that we exclude them from our review due
to the difficulties posed by recovering from Hurricane Katrina, and we
agreed to the request. Four additional transit agencies-the Jacksonville
Transportation Authority, Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation
Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and Hudson-Bergen Light Rail
line-did not participate in our interviews. The semi-structured interview
guide included questions concerning issues that could create challenges
for the program such as an estimate of the number of FTE employees
dedicated to the program, availability of FTA or other federally sponsored
safety training to oversight agency employees, state funding schemes to
support the program, the workload associated with audit responsibilities,
the role of outside contractors to conduct the triennial reviews, employee
turnover, and frequency of communication between the transit agencies and
federal security agencies.

The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the
oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly referred
to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular
question is interpreted, the sources of information that are available to
interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database or were
analyzed, can introduce unwanted variability in the results obtained in
these interviews. However, we took steps in the development of the
interview questions, the data collection, and the data analysis to
minimize these types of errors. For example, social science survey
specialists developed the questions used in the interviews in
collaboration with our own subject matter experts. Then, the questions
were pretested to ensure that they were relevant, clearly stated, and easy
to comprehend. When the data were analyzed, a second independent analyst
checked all computer programs. Since the interviews were conducted using
an electronic interviewing system, our interviewers entered answers
obtained from officials directly into the electronic interview instrument.
This eliminated the need to have the data keyed into a database by a third
party, thus removing an additional source of error.

We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of the
challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8 oversight
agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states with several
rail transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this variety to
witness a cross-section of transit agencies and observe the interactions
the transit agencies had with their oversight agencies. Complete lists of
the transit and oversight agencies we visited are in Table 3 and Table 4,
respectively. To determine how the program functions in regions where
transit systems cross state boundaries, we visited three systems that
crossed state boundaries. To identify how the program may be incorporated
into new transit systems, we visited two systems that are in the design or
construction phase, and one oversight agency that will eventually oversee
a transit agency yet to begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of
information presented in the report about state oversight and transit
agencies by asking for the agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior
to the publication of the report. We conducted our work from August 2005
through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This Review

                                        

       Rail transit agency         Urban area served    Multi-State  Not yet  
                                                          region    operating 
Bay Area Rapid Transit       San Francisco/Oakland,              
(BART)                       California                          
Bi-State Development Agency  St. Louis, Missouri          X      
(MetroLink)                                                      
Chicago Transit Authority    Chicago, Illinois                   
Kenosha Transit              Kenosha, Wisconsin                  
Los Angeles County           Los Angeles, California             
Metropolitan Transportation                                      
Authority (LACMTA)                                               
Maryland Transit             Greater Washington, DC,             
Administration (MTA)         and Maryland                        
New Jersey Transit River     Camden, New Jersey                  
Line                                                             
New York City Transit (NYCT) New York, New York                  
North County Transit         San Diego/Oceanside, CA                 X     
District                                                         
Port Authority Transit       Lindenwold, New Jersey       X      
Corporation (PATCO)          and Philadelphia,                   
                                Pennsylvania                        
Regional Public              Phoenix, AZ                             X     
Transportation Authority                                         
(Valley Metro)                                                   
Sacramento Regional Transit  Sacramento, California              
District (SRTD)                                                  
San Diego Trolley            San Diego, California               
San Francisco Municipal      San Francisco,                      
Railway (MUNI)               California                          
Santa Clara Valley           San Jose, California                
Transportation Authority                                         
(SCVTA)                                                          
Southeastern Pennsylvania    Philadelphia,                       
Transportation Authority     Pennsylvania                        
(SEPTA)                                                          
Washington Metropolitan Area Washington, D.C.             X      
Transit Authority (WMATA)                                        

Source: National Transit Database.

Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
Review

                                        

        State oversight agency        State(s) served   Multi-State  Not yet  
                                                          region    operating 
Arizona Department of             Arizona                            X     
Transportation                                                   
California Public Utilities       California                     
Commission                                                       
Missouri Department of            Missouri                X      
Transportation                                                   
New Jersey Department of          New Jersey              X      
Transportation                                                   
Oregon Department of              Oregon                         
Transportation                                                   
Regional Transportation Authority Illinois                       
(RTA)                                                            
St. Clair County Transit District Illinois                X      
(SCCTD)                                                          
Tri-State Oversight Committee     District of             X      
(TOC)                             Columbia,                      
                                     Maryland, Virginia             

Source: GAO.

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Katherine A. Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant
Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta; Stuart
Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and Raymond Sendejas
made key contributions to this report.

(542068)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-821 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on (202) 512-2834 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-821 , a report to Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

July 2006

RAIL TRANSIT

Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight
Program

The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail
transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies
following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this
report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is
designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges
facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit
systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state
oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct FTA to (1)
set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for maintaining
the stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies and (2) develop and
encourage completion of a recommended training curriculum for oversight
agency staff. Also, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to coordinate their security
oversight activities and audits with FTA and transit and oversight
agencies. FTA and TSA generally concurred with the report and are
considering how to implement the recommendations.

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to
designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit
agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible
for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and
reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard.
While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their
responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit
agencies.

Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit
agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as
reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample
anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not
definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated
3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack
of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it
will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help
determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents
involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this
task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will
make auditing oversight agencies a top priority.

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from
16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough
qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom
we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address
this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about
what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security,
since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar
function, which could result in duplication of effort.

Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety Oversight
Program
*** End of document. ***