    Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's
    State Safety Oversight Program (26-JUL-06, GAO-06-821).

    The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
    transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of
    rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight
    agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
    requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State
    Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the
    program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also
    provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross
    state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight
    agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-821
        ACCNO:   A57485
      TITLE:     Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance
    FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
         DATE:   07/26/2006
      SUBJECT:   Federal/state relations
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Performance measures
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Rail security
    	     Railroad safety
    	     Safety regulation
    	     State-administered programs
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Transportation
    	     Program implementation
    	     FTA State Safety Oversight Program

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    GAO-06-821

         * Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
           Representatives
              * July 2006
         * RAIL TRANSIT
              * Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety
                Oversight Program
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
              * Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
                   * FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight
                     Program
                   * State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail
                     Transit Agencies
                   * Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit
                     Safety and Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the
                     State Safety Oversight Program
              * Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as
                Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance
                Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight
                Program on Safety and Security
                   * Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight
                     Program as Worthwhile and Valuable
                   * FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not
                     Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight
                     Program on Safety and Security
              * FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State
                Safety Oversight Program
                   * Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff
                     Are Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers
                     of Staff
                   * Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's
                     Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations
              * Agency Comments
         * Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems
              * Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied
                Structures and Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently
              * Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative
                Challenges in Different Ways
         * List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They Oversee
         * Scope and Methodology
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
    Representatives

    July 2006

    RAIL TRANSIT

    Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight
    Program

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    July 26, 2006Letter

    The Honorable Don Young Chairman The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking
    Democratic Member Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
    Representatives

    Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to Federal
    Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts for less
    than 6 percent of all public transportation's accidents while providing
    almost 32 percent of all public transportation's passenger trips, making
    it one of the safest modes of public transportation. However, safety and
    security are still concerns, especially as the number of rail transit
    systems-and therefore the number of passengers riding rail
    transit-increases. For example, the number of rail transit systems in
    FTA's State Safety Oversight program increased from 32 in 1997 to 42 in
    2006, and as many as 7 new systems are expected to open in the next 3
    years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities and accidents has varied over
    the past few years. For example, while fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per
    year (with an approximate average of 40 per year) between 1999 and 2005,
    total reported accidents decreased 3 percent. Finally, recent acts of
    terrorism on European and Indian transit systems illustrate the need to
    maintain high levels of safety and security for transit.

    The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety
    and security of the nation's transportation system. For example, the
    Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several
    transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration
    (FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical
    standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective modes
    must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these agencies use
    federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to determine
    compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they issue. Finally,
    these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy fines to
    transportation operators who do not comply with regulations.

    FTA's oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT
    agencies. In 1982, FTA's role in transit safety evolved when Congress gave
    it the discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any operation
    financed by the agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to withhold funds
    until a plan for correcting the conditions had been approved, but did not
    give it power to levy fines or take legal actions against transit
    agencies.1 However, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
    suggested that states and localities take a more proactive role in
    overseeing transit safety, and that FTA closely monitor this state and
    local oversight.2 Subsequently, in 1991, Congress required FTA to (1)
    issue regulations requiring states to designate an oversight agency to
    oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies and (2) withhold
    federal funds if a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the
    resulting State Safety Oversight program, which became effective in 1997,
    FTA requires states to designate an oversight agency to implement FTA
    safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies. In addition, in
    2001, Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA), and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring
    security in all modes of transportation. While TSA's most public role to
    date has been its airport screening duties, the agency is taking several
    steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system, including developing a rail
    inspector force.

    To assist with Congress' oversight activities, we (1) describe how the
    State Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known
    about the impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, and
    (3) identify any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. In
    addition, you asked us to provide information on how the State Safety
    Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems cross state
    lines. See appendix I for a description of program implementation where
    transit systems cross state lines.

    To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range of
    stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public
    Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed
    program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the
    impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed FTA
    documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit
    agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges
    facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety
    oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail
    transit agencies.3 We visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit
    agencies. We selected these agencies to present a cross-section of transit
    and oversight agencies in major cities, smaller cities, states with
    several rail transit agencies, and states with only one rail system. In
    addition, 2 of the 17 transit agencies that we selected will soon begin
    operations to see how the program may be incorporated into new transit
    systems. Also, we selected 3 of the 17 because they cross state
    boundaries, so that we could determine how the program functions in these
    regions. We interviewed staff of the transit and oversight agencies we
    visited and reviewed relevant program documentation such as interagency
    agreements and program standards. We conducted our work from August 2005
    through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards. (See app. III for more detailed information on our
    methodology.)

    Results in Brief

    FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
    federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
    the safety and security of rail transit systems.

    o FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight agency and
    develops rules and guidance that those designated agencies are to use to
    perform their oversight. FTA's rules and guidance are generally based on a
    system safety approach to provide a comprehensive and organized approach
    to safety and security. In addition, FTA officials require that oversight
    agencies include risk management components in what they require of the
    transit agencies they oversee. FTA officials stated that these risk
    management components, such as hazard analysis and risk mitigation
    procedures, are applicable to transit and are similar to those used in
    other transportation mode safety approaches. Although FTA develops and
    enforces regulations, it neither directly oversees transit operations, nor
    provides funding for the program after state oversight agencies are
    designated.

    o The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee transit
    agencies' activities. Among other things, they review transit agencies'
    safety and security system plans, audit the transit agencies at least
    every 3 years, and conduct periodic reviews of safety and security trends.
    States have designated several different types of agencies to serve as
    state oversight agencies. Most commonly, states have designated their
    transportation departments to fulfill this function, but public utility
    commissions, public safety agencies, and regional transportation
    authorities also serve in this role. In terms of funding, although states
    can use federal New Starts4 funding to set up a new oversight agency,
    states must support the continuing operation of the oversight agency with
    other, generally non-federal, sources of funding. Officials in 17 of the
    24 state oversight agencies with whom we spoke reported that they use
    state funds for the program, while 10 of the 24 reported they charge the
    transit agency for oversight.

    o Transit agencies develop and implement safety and security plans, assess
    hazardous conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight agency,
    conduct self audits, and keep the state oversight agency apprised of
    corrective actions.

    o Federal agencies other than FTA have oversight responsibility for part
    of the safety and security of rail transit operations. Since 2003, the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had a role in transit security.
    DHS's Office of Grants and Training provides grants to transit and other
    local agencies to enhance security while TSA has security regulatory
    authority over rail transit agencies. TSA recently hired and is deploying
    a rail security inspector force to oversee compliance with existing
    security directives and any future regulations. In addition, FRA has
    jurisdiction to regulate the safety of portions of rail transit systems
    that share track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.

    Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety
    Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the
    safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited
    information showing its impact on safety and security. Officials at 23 of
    the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agency officials with
    whom we spoke believe the program is worthwhile. The transit agency
    officials primarily cite the importance of having state oversight agency
    staff "look over their shoulder," review safety and security trends, and
    require audits and corrective actions. Although many officials support the
    program, FTA's methods for obtaining information on transit safety and
    security (i.e., transit and oversight agency data and FTA audits of the
    oversight agencies) do not include performance measures and related
    program goals. FTA has not conducted audits every 3 years, as envisioned
    when the program began. According to FTA officials, they did not keep to
    their stated audit schedule because they were reassessing the priorities
    for the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FTA
    issued annual reports from 1999 through 2003 that track transit accident,
    crash, fatality, and other safety data; however, FTA officials have had
    difficulty identifying performance measures for the program and setting
    performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities and
    incidents, and the varying design of rail transit systems, such as street
    trolleys and heavy rail. Furthermore, FTA audited all oversight agencies
    at least once in the past 8 years (except those that began operations in
    2004 or later). They noted that while they conducted only four audits of
    oversight agencies from 2001 to 2004, they also conducted nine "safety and
    security readiness reviews" to ensure transit systems about to begin
    operations would be able to safely and securely begin passenger
    operations. Although the agency was focused on security after September
    11, 2001, this infrequent schedule limits FTA's ability to conduct
    oversight, including collecting information on the safety oversight
    agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the program. Recent
    changes in FTA's program regulations and leadership provide an opportunity
    to address this lack of information, performance measures, and program
    goals, and to resume its stated audit schedule. For example, FTA has
    issued a revision to the regulations governing the State Safety Oversight
    program, recommitted to the audit process, and signed a contract that
    includes developing performance measures by the end of fiscal year 2006
    and evaluating how new rail systems are implementing the program.5

    FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
    the amount of staff and the level of state oversight-staff expertise (and
    thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies) varies widely
    across the country. For example, one oversight agency requires its staff
    to have at least 5 years of rail transit experience. In contrast, another
    oversight agency assigned a state DOT transportation planner to work on
    safety and security oversight as a collateral duty. Although no officials
    identified a safety or security problem resulting from a lack of staff or
    expertise, officials from 16 of 24 state safety oversight agencies raised
    concerns about possibly not having enough qualified staff to carry out
    their oversight. Officials from three state oversight agencies stated that
    additional funding to hire more staff for this program would be helpful.
    Most transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe
    that federal funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum would
    improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency
    personnel. While FTA provides technical support on and supports the
    exchange of best practices for meeting its regulations, these activities
    do not include training on oversight approaches or providing funding to
    attend training classes. This contrasts with the approach taken by other
    DOT agencies, such as FRA and PHMSA, which provide free training or use
    agency funds to pay for state agency personnel to attend training
    sessions, in at least some instances. Although FTA considered addressing
    the lack of consistency in qualifications among state agencies in its
    recent regulations, FTA officials determined the agency lacks the legal
    authority to direct states to hire state safety oversight personnel with
    specific experience, training, or certification. A second challenge to
    implementing the program, according to officials from 20 of 24 state
    oversight agencies and 14 of 37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about
    the federal role in transit security given that TSA has no formally
    defined role in FTA's program-even though it is the lead agency on
    security matters and has regulatory authority over security activities in
    transportation including rail. Although TSA's program is still developing,
    several oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were
    concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that state
    safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on transit
    systems' security plans. Several transit agency officials described this
    as a particular concern due to the already limited resources they had
    available for responding to oversight activities. TSA and FTA recognize
    this concern and have begun discussions on how to coordinate their
    oversight efforts.

    To help ensure that FTA has sufficient information to evaluate the
    program's performance, we are recommending that FTA's new program
    leadership set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for
    maintaining FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies'
    performance at least once every 3 years. Also, to help oversight agency
    staff obtain adequate training to perform their duties, we are
    recommending that FTA develop a recommended training curriculum for
    oversight agency staff and work with oversight agencies to identify ways
    to address training deficiencies that exist among oversight agency staff.
    Finally, to reduce the potential for duplication of effort and confusion
    on the part of oversight and transit agencies regarding the security
    portion of the program, we are recommending that FTA and TSA coordinate
    their security oversight activities, including performing security audits
    in a coordinated fashion.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB
    provided comments generally concurring with the report. Furthermore, FTA
    and TSA officials stated that they are working to determine how to
    implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA provided a technical comment,
    which we included in the report.

    Background

    In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
    Act of 1991 (ISTEA),6 which added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act.7
    ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and security
    oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on December 27,
    1995,8 FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway
    Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule in
    this report), for improving the safety and security of rail transit
    agencies. State oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve
    transit agencies' safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by
    January 1, 1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they
    incorporated APTA's 1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System
    Safety Program Plans to describe steps the state oversight agencies should
    take in developing the program standards that transit agencies would have
    to meet.

    In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states
    affected by the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit
    safety and security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in
    the FTA rule. During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked
    with states to develop compliant programs that addressed FTA's
    requirements. Ten years after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA
    published a revision to it in the Federal Register on April 29, 2005. The
    FTA rule stated that oversight agencies had to comply with the revised
    rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions address, in part, the needs of a
    growing oversight community9 and NTSB's recommendations arising from
    transit accident investigations. For example, according to FTA and NTSB,
    NTSB found that the initial rule did not include the requirement that
    oversight agencies verify transit agencies are following safe and secure
    operating procedures by formally documenting how transit agency employees
    were performing specific work functions in compliance with the transit
    agency's rules and procedures-a process known as "proficiency and
    efficiency testing." Thus, the revised rule specifies what the state
    oversight agency must require of rail transit systems regarding such
    verification, and incorporates into the regulation material previously
    incorporated by reference to the APTA manual. Finally, the revised rule
    included additional information on ensuring rail transit security and
    emergency preparedness.

    FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State
    Safety Oversight program-and hired the current Program Manager in March
    2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in addition
    to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within the
    Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and
    oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA has devoted a
    Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a Training Manager,
    Data Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available to assist on an
    as-needed basis. FTA regional personnel are not formally involved with the
    program's day-to-day activities, though officials from several FTA
    Regional Offices help address specific compliance issues that occasionally
    arise at transit agencies. Also, staff in at least one FTA Regional Office
    have taken it upon themselves to take an active role supporting transit
    agencies and oversight agencies in meeting the program's requirements. In
    addition, regional staff help states with new transit agencies establish
    new oversight agencies, help new transit agencies create safety and
    security plans, and have helped facilitate disputes between oversight and
    transit agencies as needed. However, after a transit system begins
    operations, the program is primarily managed from FTA's headquarters
    office. FTA also relies on contractors to do many of the day-to-day
    activities ranging from developing and implementing FTA's audit program of
    state oversight agencies to developing and providing training classes on
    system safety.

    FTA's rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems
    operating in their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed
    guideway system as any light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail,
    inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is not
    regulated by FRA and

    o is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or
    receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49
    U.S.C. 5336); or

    o has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included
    in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding
    under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336).

    Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in
    the State Safety Oversight program.

    Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety Oversight
    Program

    FTA's rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as
    commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are
    therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight
    authority over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that share
    track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.10 Furthermore,
    the revised rule's definition of "rail fixed guideway system" includes
    systems built entirely without FTA capital funds, but that intend to
    receive FTA formula funding. Examples of these systems include Houston's
    METRORail system and the New Jersey Transit RiverLINE system. Rail transit
    operations that do not receive FTA formula funds are not subject to
    oversight through FTA's program. Las Vegas' monorail line does not receive
    FTA formula funds and therefore does not fall within the FTA program.
    However, some of the rail transit systems-including automated airport
    people-movers and sightseeing tramways-that are not subject to the FTA
    program may be subject to state-mandated oversight in certain states.

    FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has implications
    for their ability to provide oversight.11 According to statute, FTA cannot
    regulate safety and security operations at transit agencies except for
    purposes of national defense or in cases of regional or national
    emergency.12 In addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may,
    however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including
    safety- and security-related training, research, and demonstration
    projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through
    grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of
    grants, such as certain safety and security statutory and regulatory
    requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for noncompliance with the
    conditions of a grant.13 In relation to the State Safety Oversight
    program, both the authorizing statute and the FTA rule state FTA may
    withhold urbanized area program funds from states that do not meet the
    requirements of the program.14 For example, FTA invoked this authority and
    withheld federal funding from two states that failed to meet initial
    deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA withheld approximately $95
    million in federal funding from one state for its failure to designate a
    state safety oversight agency and approximately $2.3 million from another
    state for failure to meet the FTA rule's implementation deadlines.

    FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA oversees
    over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in addition to
    Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly enforce safety
    statutes or regulations against railroads using a "toolkit" of
    consequences, which vary in severity and are used to compel rail carriers
    to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly, FRA will issue a civil
    penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in compliance with a particular
    regulation. Depending on the infraction, however, FRA can also issue an
    emergency order (the strongest response to noncompliance) or it can cite a
    defect (a minor deficiency that needs to be addressed but is not egregious
    enough to warrant a fine). FRA officials stated that the agency trains and
    maintains its own cadre of safety inspectors that are authorized to
    conduct safety inspections at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per
    week. In addition to these inspectors, FRA manages a program called the
    State Rail Safety Participation Program which allows states to employ
    their own FRA-certified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations.

    Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), federal
    agencies should design programs with measurable goals that support the
    agency's strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift agencies' focus
    from simply monitoring activities undertaken to measuring the results of
    these activities. Each agency's strategic plan is to include a mission
    statement, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a description of
    how the agency intends to achieve these goals. To measure progress toward
    the strategic goals, we have previously reported that the agency should
    also have a plan for collecting data to measure and evaluate program
    performance.15 Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is difficult to
    determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended purpose and
    whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts should be
    increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere.

    Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program

    FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
    federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies
    collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems.
    Under the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and
    guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies
    to ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance
    and other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only
    limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly
    oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing
    safety and security plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents.
    Rail transit agencies are responsible for developing safety and security
    plans, reporting incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all
    other regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to
    FTA, federal agencies such as FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training,
    and TSA also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit
    safety and security.

    FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program

    FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach
    in developing the State Safety Oversight program.16 Federal, state, and
    rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit system is
    operated safely; each of these agencies has some monitoring
    responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and
    administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA is responsible
    for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight agencies are to
    use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is
    responsible for informing oversight and transit agencies of new program
    developments, facilitating and informing the transit and oversight
    agencies of available training through FTA or other organizations,
    facilitating information sharing among program participants, and providing
    technical assistance. One avenue FTA uses to provide these services is the
    annual meeting to which all program participants are invited. FTA also
    calls special meetings and communicates information to program
    participants via e-mail when applicable. (See fig. 2 showing roles and
    responsibilities of participants in the State Safety Oversight program.)

    Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State Safety
    Oversight Program

    FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-management
    approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and
    risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that each
    state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This
    is consistent with our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on
    where their assets can best be used, both in transportation security and
    safety. However, FTA recognizes that only parts of the State Safety
    Oversight program are risk-based. The parts of the program that are
    risk-based are the areas where it believes risk management is most
    applicable to safety and security. These areas are similar to those in
    which other transportation modes, such as aviation and pipelines, also use
    risk-based approaches. Areas that are not risk-based would include such
    things as requiring minimum standards for all transit agencies in the
    program, no matter their size or ridership.17

    While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with
    regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through audits and
    reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight agencies comply with
    the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when a
    state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the
    proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the
    required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in two
    instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight
    agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with
    the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA
    is responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit
    to (1) ensure they include all the required information (e.g.,
    descriptions of program resources, and causes of accidents and
    collisions), and (2) look for industry-wide safety and security trends or
    problems. FTA also has authority, under the FTA rule, to request
    additional information from oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore,
    FTA is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure
    they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits
    evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the
    FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating
    accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews
    properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is
    required. Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the
    operation of their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section
    5309 (New Starts program) funds-normally used to pay for transit-related
    capital expenses-to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency
    before a transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated this
    year that FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated for FTA
    audits to pay for one person from each oversight agency to attend training
    on the revisions to the FTA rule, which oversight agencies had to comply
    with by May 1, 2006.

    State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies

    In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are
    directly responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to
    the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight
    function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New Starts
    project involving a new rail transit system, or before the transit agency
    applies for funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas.
    States have designated several different types of agencies to serve as
    oversight agencies. Most frequently-in 17 cases-states have designated
    their departments of transportation to serve in this role, either due to
    their expertise on rail transportation, or because state officials
    believed they had no other agencies with transportation expertise. In
    three instances-California, Colorado, and Massachusetts-states have
    designated utilities commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit
    safety and security. Officials from these states stated that since these
    bodies already had regulatory and oversight authority over utilities in
    these states, it was a natural extension of their powers to add rail
    transit to the list of industries they oversee. In fact, the California
    Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has been overseeing railroads and rail
    transit in that state since 1911. The commission has issued and enforces
    several "general orders" that rail transit agencies in California must
    follow or face fines and suspended service. Two states have designated
    emergency management or public safety departments to oversee their rail
    transit agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two
    separate oversight agencies-both local transportation funding
    authorities-to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the
    state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail
    transit system runs between two states and the District of Columbia. These
    states and the District of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight
    Committee as the designated oversight agency.18 Finally, one state, New
    York, has given its oversight authority to its Public Transportation
    Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have authority similar to
    the public utilities commissions discussed above, but have no other
    mission than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New York. See
    appendix I for further discussion of multi-state operations. Also, see
    appendix II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail transit
    agencies they oversee.

    The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit
    agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies
    authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the
    oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies
    authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit
    agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five states
    where the oversight agencies have some enforcement authority over the rail
    transit agencies they oversee. In all cases, this was due to the
    regulatory authority states have granted their oversight agencies. For
    instance, state utilities commissions may have this authority written into
    their authorizing legislation. In other instances, states had given this
    authority to the oversight agency in state legislation. Officials from
    oversight agencies that have the authority to fine or otherwise punish
    rail transit agencies all stated that they rarely, if ever, use that
    authority, but each stated that they believed it gives their actions extra
    weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to the oversight agency
    more readily than they otherwise might. A majority of oversight agencies,
    19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such punitive authority, though
    officials from some oversight agencies stated they may be able to withhold
    grants their oversight agencies provide to the transit agencies they
    oversee.19 Although officials from several of these agencies stated that
    they believe they would be more effective if they did have enforcement
    authority, under the current program this authority would be granted by
    individual states.

    While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies
    with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of
    rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program,
    oversight agencies are responsible for the following:

    o Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit
    agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program standard
    "provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties concerning
    processes and procedures they must have in place to be in compliance with
    the State Safety Oversight program." FTA requirements for the program
    standard are procedural rather than technical. For example, the program
    standard must include, at a minimum, areas dealing with the oversight
    agency's responsibilities, how the program standard will be modified, how
    the oversight agency will oversee the transit agency's internal safety and
    security reviews, how the oversight agency will conduct the triennial
    audits, and requirements for the rail transit agency to report accidents.
    According to FTA, oversight agencies may choose to develop technical
    standards, such as requirements for the strength of track, crashworthiness
    of rail vehicles, or brightness of signals. In addition, the standard must
    contain sections describing how the oversight agency will investigate
    accidents, how the rail transit agency will develop a corrective action
    plan to address investigation and audit findings, and the minimum
    requirements in the agency's separate safety and security plans. FTA
    mandates that the transit agency's safety plan must include, among other
    requirements, a process for identifying, managing, and eliminating
    hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the transit agency's security plan
    must include, among other requirements, a process for managing threats and
    vulnerabilities, and a method for conducting internal security reviews.

    o Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual
    reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these plans
    and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure they meet
    the program requirements.

    o Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at
    least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to audit
    the rail transit agencies' implementation of their safety and security
    plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight agency that
    performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we found five others
    that perform the audit on a continuous basis, auditing the rail transit
    agency on a portion of their safety and security plans each year. FTA has
    approved both these alternative auditing schedules.

    o Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA
    requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and
    approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits.
    Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and eliminating
    hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the oversight
    agency outside the audit process.

    o Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to investigate
    accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or severity
    threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes leading to
    the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or allow the
    transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf.

    o Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule, oversight
    agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight
    activities, including results of accident investigations and the status of
    ongoing corrective actions.

    Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for
    meeting the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them.
    However, the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that
    oversight agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as
    developing separate system safety and security plans, performing internal
    safety and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a
    hazard-management process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight
    agencies within 2 hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are
    included in each oversight agency's program standard. The locations and
    types of transit agencies participating in the program are shown in figure
    3.

    Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
    State Safety Oversight Program

    Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and
    Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight
    Program

    In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit
    agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the
    safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is DHS'
    TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),20 passed by
    Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave
    TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including
    authority to issue security regulations.21 While TSA's most public
    transportation security duties are its airport screening and aviation
    related activities, TSA has taken steps to enhance rail transit security.
    For example, in May 2004, TSA issued security directives to rail transit
    agencies to ensure all agencies were implementing a consistent baseline of
    security. Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized
    by Congress.22 While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are
    still being determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and
    enforce compliance with the security directives by passenger rail
    agencies, as well as increase security awareness among rail transit
    agencies, riders, and others. The inspectors have begun outreach
    activities with rail transit systems aimed at enhancing security in rail
    and mass transit systems. TSA officials stated their responsibilities
    encompass the security of other rail systems, including freight rail,
    which is consistent with ATSA.

    In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and
    Training within DHS' Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring
    rail transit security through supporting security initiatives. The Office
    of Grants and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic
    Preparedness) is the primary federal source of security funding for
    passenger rail systems, and is the principal component of DHS responsible
    for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its
    mission to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism, the
    Office of Grants and Training provides training, funds for the purchase of
    equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical
    assistance, and other support to assist states, local jurisdictions (such
    as municipalities and transit agencies), and the private sector. The
    Office of Grants and Training has provided over $320 million to rail
    transit providers through the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit
    Security Grant Program.

    In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring
    transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its
    jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit system that share track with the
    general railroad system, or places where a rail transit system and the
    general railroad system share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing).23
    Rail transit systems that share track or grade crossings-or are subject to
    FRA regulations for other reasons-may apply to FRA for a waiver from these
    rules. According to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the
    same tracks and at the same time as general railroads, FRA would make the
    rail transit agency operating the vehicle meet the safety standards of the
    general railroads. This would likely require rail transit agencies to use
    much sturdier (and more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive
    for the rail transit agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have
    requested waivers from FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at
    different times than heavy freight trains, and will not be on the track at
    the same time, meaning the risk of collision is low or non-existent.
    According to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 10
    of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for them.24 After granting a
    waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA and the relevant transit and
    oversight agencies to address any safety questions or problems that arise.

    NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety,
    though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB has
    authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads,
    including rail transit agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to
    NTSB, within 2 hours, all accidents involving fatalities, multiple
    injuries, evacuations, or damage over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB
    officials stated they generally will investigate only the more serious
    accidents, such as those involving fatalities or injuries, or those
    involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations of
    rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to federal agencies
    or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led to the
    accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its recommendations, but NTSB
    states that, historically, agencies have implemented over 80 percent of
    its recommendations. NTSB also maintains expertise on transportation
    safety across all modes of transport and conducts studies on pressing
    issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both stated that they consult NTSB
    periodically when they have safety questions, in addition to reporting
    accidents to it.

    Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile;
    However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the
    Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security

    The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we
    spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and
    security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations
    about how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have
    limited statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or
    security. FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from
    sources such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight
    agencies, and its own audits of the oversight agencies. FTA has used
    national transit data and oversight agencies' annual reports to collate
    information on safety, including information about fatalities and the
    causes of incidents; FTA last issued a report summarizing this information
    in 2003. However, this data is not linked to any program goals or
    performance measures. FTA officials recognize the need for performance
    measures for its safety and security programs and are taking steps in 2006
    to begin to address this need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the
    oversight agencies every 3 years, it has not conducted these audits as
    frequently as it had planned (it has conducted eight since September
    2001). However, program officials stated they are committed to getting
    "back on track" to meet the planned schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes
    enough resources to conduct the planned audits, and develops and uses
    planned performance goals and measures to improve the program, will be
    important for future assessments of the program.

    Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as
    Worthwhile and Valuable

    Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's State
    Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps them
    maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit agency
    officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their
    safety and security is worthwhile. Several officials stated that it is
    important and beneficial to have an independent agency verify their safety
    and security progress. One transit agency official explained that the
    oversight agency helps transit officials to identify larger, or systemic,
    issues. In addition, the program provides support to exert extra influence
    on a transit agency's board of directors or senior management to get
    safety or security improvements implemented faster. Furthermore, officials
    identified specific examples illustrating how oversight agencies helped
    improve safety or security. Officials from 15 transit agencies explained
    that the program helped modify equipment to improve safety and security.
    For example, one transit agency had problems with train operators failing
    to stop at red light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety
    department exert enough influence with the transit agency's senior
    management to replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals
    that were brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials
    believe that FTA's program is an effective method for overseeing safety
    and security. Several officials said that having a state or local (rather
    than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security
    improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight
    staff.

    In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state
    safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State
    Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving
    transit systems' safety and security. Several officials commented that the
    program provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and
    avoid complacency. It also helps the transit agencies by providing an
    independent third party, since self oversight is not, in the officials'
    view, the best way to have an agency identify and resolve its safety and
    security issues. Furthermore, several officials commented that they
    believed the current system worked well, and that the program provides
    consistency and endows the state safety oversight agencies with enough
    authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the
    states carry out the program provides ongoing oversight in addition to
    formal audits, which helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and
    security issues.

    Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that,
    because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved
    safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided safety
    statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions at the
    San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC became

    its oversight agency, to 2005.25 Although FTA changed its definition of a
    reportable accident during this time period-making it impossible to
    determine exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety-both
    MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident CPUC's efforts had been a
    major factor in the reduction in accidents. A MUNI representative
    estimated that the reduction in accidents was more likely about 15
    percent, but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to develop a
    comprehensive safety program, which helped reduce accidents and increase
    the agency's focus on meeting safety goals. In another example, New York
    oversight officials stated that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fires
    were prevalent in New York City's transit system. After the New York State
    Legislature created the PTSB in 1984 to oversee public transportation
    safety in New York, the PTSB tracked incident numbers, approached the
    transit agency and, according to oversight and transit agency officials,
    was able to develop and implement an action plan which heightened the
    awareness of (and ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts
    occurred several decades ago, the data that might support the officials'
    statements were not easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and New
    York City transit officials all cited this as an early success of state
    oversight of rail transit.

    APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State Safety
    Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and security,
    the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry officials to
    surpass minimum standards and continue striving for improved safety and
    security.26 However, transit officials with whom we spoke often discussed
    the benefits of a federal program. For example, a transit agency official
    explained that a benefit of FTA's rule is that it standardized rail
    transit safety and security across the country. In addition, officials
    from 17 transit agencies reported that respective state safety oversight
    agencies imposed requirements above those required in FTA's requirement.
    For example, three state safety oversight agencies reported that they
    require transit agencies under their purview to have an "hours of service"
    type policy which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to
    rest. In addition, several oversight agencies have established more
    stringent reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA.
    For example, officials from two transit agencies reported that their
    oversight agencies require them to report accidents occurring in a rail
    yard, while two others stated that their oversight agencies require
    notification of any accident involving contact between vehicles, no matter
    how minor.

    FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not Have the Data
    to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security

    One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight
    program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through
    the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The
    reports include information on many different issues, including program
    resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any
    corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations.
    FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agency information, as
    well as national transit data, to publish its own annual reports from 1999
    to 2003. FTA's reports included ridership data, fatality and injury data,
    and the results of accident investigations to identify common incident
    causes. Although these reports may have informed oversight agencies about
    what safety or security problems existed, the information was not tied to
    any program goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued
    a report since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety,
    it is unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example,
    one state safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that
    FTA provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from
    oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify
    trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and
    collegial relationship with each other.

    According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better
    information and performance measures for its safety and security programs;
    also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has been looking
    for ways to improve the type of safety and security data it can collect,
    and how it can use the information to track program performance and
    progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA's 2006 business plan for its
    Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and
    implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to
    help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focused on
    performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA is working
    with a contractor to develop performance measures for the State Safety
    Oversight program. FTA officials stated that their contractor is working
    with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they use and
    find useful in tracking the safety and security of their systems. Although
    it may be difficult to identify such measures-many of the oversight
    agencies with whom we spoke do not have performance measures, either-this
    effort could allow FTA to more readily determine areas where the program
    is having a positive impact on transit safety and security, and areas
    where more focus is needed.

    Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that
    FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide
    detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought
    together information from these audits to provide information on the
    safety and security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the
    deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with oversight agency
    staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the
    suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has not conducted the
    audits frequently enough to provide a current picture of transit system
    safety and security, or to identify some challenges that oversight and
    transit agency officials raised during our interviews with them. FTA has
    audited each state safety oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at
    least once since the program began; two agencies were audited twice.
    According to the FTA contractor, they piloted the audit program in late
    1998 by conducting audits in three states with different legal authorities
    and a range of differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly
    scheduled audits began in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the
    audit program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and
    acknowledged that the agency's priorities shifted in the wake of the
    attacks. FTA has audited 8 of 24 existing oversight agencies since
    September 2001. However, during that time period, FTA also conducted nine
    security and safety reviews to evaluate whether new rail transit projects
    could enter operations safely and securely. In addition, the program had
    several staffing changes after 2001, causing some oversight and transit
    officials to state that the program did not seem to be a priority for
    FTA.27 According to FTA officials, including the Program Manager, who
    started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting audits in fiscal year
    2006 so it can use the money and time to help states comply with the
    revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach effort to this end,
    including a workshop for oversight agency officials to help ensure
    compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit schedule in fiscal
    year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to begin with the states
    that it has judged to have had the weakest program standards and
    procedures, based on their initial submission under the new rule.

    FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety
    Oversight Program

    Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges
    in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to manage the
    program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not
    confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail
    transit system safety and security and they are unsure the current
    training available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of
    staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the
    country. A second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that
    many transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how
    security issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be
    responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail
    transit security.

    Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are Adequately
    Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff

    While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with
    whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight
    program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that
    they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, 18 of 24
    oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated they believed additional
    training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and
    security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight
    agency staff varied widely across the country. For example, we found that
    11 of the 24 oversight agencies we examined had oversight staff that had
    no career or educational background in transit safety or security.
    Conversely, another 11 oversight agencies required their staff to have
    certain levels of experience or education. For example, while New York's
    PTSB requires its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety,
    the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its
    lead oversight staff person to have an engineering degree. According to
    some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or
    security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they
    were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and
    security. Therefore, it took them several years before they were confident
    that they knew enough about rail transit operations to provide effective
    oversight. These officials stated that if they left their positions, any
    new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge.

    Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are
    helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through
    overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training
    curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness.
    Officials from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training
    would be useful cited several examples of how additional training could
    benefit them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated
    that the training they had received in transit operations, accident
    investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had not received
    any training on how to perform specific oversight functions. Thus, they
    were unsure how to carry out their agencies' primary oversight role.
    Officials at a majority of oversight agencies (15 of 24) stated that they
    felt the training that had been made available to them either by FTA, the
    Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the National Transit Institute
    had been adequate.28 However, officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies
    also stated that they were somewhat unsure of which courses they should
    take to be effective in their oversight role. For example, several
    oversight agency personnel stated that, while FTA officials have
    encouraged oversight agencies' staff to obtain certifications from TSI in
    transit safety and security and have encouraged oversight agency staff to
    take selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not developed or recommended
    a course specifically related to oversight.

    Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency
    staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight
    agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel
    to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and
    travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI.29 Officials from
    10 of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds
    as one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.

    Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA
    provided some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for
    training they wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to
    spend their limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as
    staff overtime, travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring
    contractors. Several oversight agency officials also cited the example of
    other DOT agencies that provide free training or pay for state staff to
    travel to attend training. For example, 30 states participate in FRA's
    State Safety Participation Program. These states have inspectors who FRA
    has certified to enforce FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their
    initial and ongoing classroom training and state staff's travel to this
    training. In addition, the federal agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA,
    authorizes state-employed inspectors to inspect pipelines in many states.
    To help defray their costs, PHMSA provides up to 50 percent of a state's
    expenses in carrying out their pipeline safety program. PHMSA also
    recently paid for two inspectors from each state to attend training when
    it instituted a new inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA
    stated that providing funding to states to train their employees helps
    federal agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement activities,
    easing the states' burden of paying to enforce federal regulations. For
    the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies' personnel to travel to
    attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided
    technical assistance and shared best practices in meeting the requirements
    of the revised rule. This instance could provide a model for future
    funding of training or training-related travel for oversight agency
    personnel.

    FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training in
    transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety
    Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best
    practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies.
    However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training
    specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a recommended
    training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated that it would
    not be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also, FTA officials
    told us that they considered addressing the lack of consistency in
    oversight agency staff qualifications when they were revising the FTA rule
    in 2005. However, they stated they did not have the legal authority to
    direct states to require certain education, experience, or certifications
    for oversight agency staff. Also, these officials stated that FTA has not
    issued any guidance to states about what level of training is appropriate
    for oversight staff or what level of staffing is appropriate for an
    oversight agency. However, these officials noted that, despite the lack of
    formal guidance, FTA checks to ensure oversight agency personnel are
    adequately trained during its audits; in five instances, FTA has
    recommended that oversight agency staff take additional training. FTA
    officials also stated that FTA could issue informal guidance or
    recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of training their
    oversight staff should have.

    In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure
    about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a
    transit agency's operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of 24 oversight
    agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would help them do
    their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight agency personnel
    who were highly dedicated to performing oversight, even though they said
    they had no assistance and their states had limited resources to allocate
    to the task. Some staff took it upon themselves to stay informed about a
    transit agency's operations by staying in regular contact with transit
    agency personnel, attending transit agency safety meetings, and making
    regular inspections of the system-even though these tasks were not
    required by their oversight agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight
    agencies told us they had devoted the equivalent of less than one person
    working half-time to oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the
    oversight part of their job as a "collateral duty." Personnel from some of
    these oversight agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform
    the kind of active oversight that involved attending transit agency
    meetings, making spot inspections, and staying in regular contact with
    transit agency personnel. While in some of these instances, the transit
    agencies overseen are small, such as small streetcar lines, some of the
    transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have similar levels of
    oversight. For example, one state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time
    equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions is responsible for
    overseeing a major transit agency that averages nearly 200,000 daily
    passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time with the services
    of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of the transit
    agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to oversight
    functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies (including
    two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The oversight staff
    in this state reported that it was difficult to maintain active oversight
    when their responsibilities were so spread out. Furthermore, we found 13
    oversight agencies that estimated dedicating less than one full-time
    equivalent staff member to the oversight task. This meant that the person
    (or persons) assigned to the oversight tasks had other duties, in addition
    to oversight of a transit agency. Table 1 shows the amount of personnel
    oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies dedicate to
    oversight responsibilities. (See app. II for information on estimated FTE
    and transit system information for each state safety oversight agency and
    related transit agency).

    Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee
    Transit Agency Safety and Security

              Estimated FTEs          0.5 or less  0.6-1 1.1-3 3.1-5 Over 5 Total
    Number of oversight agencies            11      5     6     1      1    24

    Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.

    Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to this
    program, providing appropriate and continuing training and experience may
    increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states have to dedicate to
    this program.

    Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging Role
    in Transit Security Will Affect the Program

    Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and its
    rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As discussed
    above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over transportation security
    across all modes, and TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 rail
    inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and
    enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004.
    However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20
    stated they did not have a clear picture of who was responsible for
    overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37
    transit agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding
    transit security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were
    particularly concerned that TSA's rail inspectors would be duplicating
    their role in overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official
    stated that he felt transit agencies could begin to experience "audit
    fatigue" if both TSA and oversight agencies audited transit agencies'
    security practices. This official stated it would be more efficient if TSA
    and oversight agency staff audited transit agencies' security practices at
    the same time. Officials at several transit agencies were also confused
    about what standards they would be required to meet. For example, while
    oversight agencies are free to create their own standards, TSA issued rail
    security directives in May 2004-and could issue future directives or
    requirements that transit agencies must meet. Security officials at one
    transit agency specifically voiced concern that there could be conflicting
    security requirements and hoped that TSA would coordinate with oversight
    agencies' requirements and vice versa.

    TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at a
    meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May 2006.
    FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that they were
    committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating their
    respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as
    possible. However, as TSA is still developing their program, currently
    there is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight
    program, and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for
    their rail inspectors. While the FTA rule discusses requirements for a
    transit agency's security plan (e.g., a method for conducting internal
    security reviews and a process for determining security threats and
    vulnerabilities to a transit agency), and requires oversight agencies to
    include security performance in their audits of transit agencies, the FTA
    rule does not discuss TSA's specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA
    officials stated that exactly how TSA would participate in the program was
    still to be determined. However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they
    are committed to working together to ensure inspection activities are
    coordinated to foster consistency and minimize disruption to rail transit
    agency operations. Also, a TSA regional manager of rail inspectors with
    whom we spoke was unsure what the rail inspectors' role would be in
    relation to the program; in addition, the manager was unsure what the
    details of the program were, including the identity of the relevant
    oversight agencies for the region. However, he stated that he was working
    to learn these details, and that he and his staff had been in touch with
    transit agency security officials to introduce themselves and gather
    information.

    Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with
    transit and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were
    engaged in an ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to determine
    how the rail inspectors could best assist oversight agencies in reviewing
    transit agency security. TSA gave several examples of activities resulting
    from this coordination. For example, TSA reported that they had designated
    26 rail inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, TSA
    officials stated that they are working with FTA and the oversight agency
    from California to pilot a coordination approach they could use with
    oversight agencies across the country. Additionally, the director of the
    rail inspector program attended a meeting with representatives from almost
    all oversight agencies to discuss the concept of rail inspectors
    participating in oversight-agency audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA
    is working to bring the 26 TSA rail inspectors involved in the State
    Safety Oversight program to the next annual meeting for the program's
    participants, so that the rail inspectors can learn more about the program
    and develop a "game plan" for how the inspectors will participate in the
    program.

    Conclusions

    While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight
    program, most participants in the program consider it a success at
    improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can
    cite anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive impact.
    Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit and
    oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for demonstrating
    the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and security. As new
    leadership takes over administration of the program, this is an opportune
    time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact of the program,
    including determining a way to measure the impact of the program, setting
    performance goals, and developing and providing the means to meet a
    consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies.

    Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and
    qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although it
    is unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety and
    security. In other federally mandated transportation safety programs where
    states partner with the federal government to perform oversight duties,
    the federal government pays for a portion of the training expenses of
    oversight staff, (or for oversight staff to travel to attend training)
    because having well-trained state officials makes the federally mandated
    oversight more efficient and effective. Yet, in this program, FTA relies
    entirely on the states to determine how to fund their direct oversight of
    rail transit agencies and does not help defray their training or travel
    costs. While the program is generally thought of as bringing about
    positive change, these differing levels of training and qualifications are
    a cause for concern; it is conceivable that inadequately trained staff,
    especially staff that have no experience overseeing transit agency safety,
    might miss safety problems they otherwise would notice, or may be unable
    to effectively evaluate a transit agency's proposals for resolving
    existing safety problems (though it is not clear whether either of these
    have occurred). One way to help ensure that oversight agency staff have at
    least a basic understanding of how to oversee rail transit operations
    would be to evaluate the amount of training oversight agency staff have
    obtained and, subsequently, develop a training curriculum that FTA could
    recommend to oversight agency personnel. Also, since many oversight agency
    personnel have little experience conducting rail transit safety oversight,
    including the basic tenets of conducting oversight in the training
    curriculum would help ensure that oversight agency staff did not have to
    rely on transit agency personnel for advice on conducting oversight. In
    addition, FTA could review oversight staff qualifications in more detail
    during its audits of oversight agencies to help ensure oversight staff are
    adequately trained to perform their duties.

    Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the
    existence and deployment of TSA's rail inspectors will complicate security
    oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts to coordinate
    their activities and determine the roles and responsibilities of the rail
    inspectors, the official role of the rail inspectors in the State Safety
    Oversight program remains unclear. Therefore, it is understandable why
    transit and oversight agency officials fear possible duplication of
    effort, especially for activities such as reviewing security plans and
    auditing transit security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have
    had some difficulties coordinating their actions in the past,30 such
    concern is warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to address
    this issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are a positive
    step.

    Recommendations

    In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff
    resources to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient
    information to evaluate the performance of the program, and supports state
    oversight agencies in adequately training their staff to perform their
    oversight duties, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take
    the following two actions:

    o Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity
    presented by having new program leadership to set short- and long-term
    goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program is
    making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance goals for
    the agency's other approaches for evaluating the impact of this program on
    safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining FTA's stated
    schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once every 3 years.

    o Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency
    personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their
    activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment, work
    with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any deficiencies
    they identify. This strategy should include developing an appropriate
    training curriculum, including training on conducting oversight for
    oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies encouraging them
    to have their staff complete the training curriculum. If FTA determines
    that it does not have the authority to issue such guidance, it should seek
    such statutory authority from Congress.

    Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies
    about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the
    potential duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit agencies,
    we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant
    Secretary of TSA to:

    o coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to state
    oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities TSA
    develops for its rail inspectors; and

    o work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security audits
    whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help ensure
    effective coordination with these agencies.

    Agency Comments

    Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of
    this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred with
    the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are
    working to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA
    provided a technical comment which we included in the report.

    We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
    committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of
    Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
    request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
    Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices
    of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this
    report are listed in appendix IV.

    Katherine A. Siggerud Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

    Appendix I

    Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

    Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States-the Port
    Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St.
    Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in
    Washington, D.C.-cross state lines. Therefore, these systems require the
    collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety
    Oversight program or states can agree that one state will be responsible
    for oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state transit
    systems has a different structure to handle oversight responsibilities.
    The oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
    strategies to centralize decision making, streamline collaboration, and
    respond promptly to safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the
    Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency
    in the D.C. area, requires majority decision making by the six committee
    members of the agency, including at least one member from each
    jurisdiction, and has experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding
    to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring
    audit findings are addressed.

    Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and
    Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently

    Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each performs
    oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to
    serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state
    agencies-namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)
    agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation to serve as
    the sole oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink
    in St. Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through the St.
    Clair County Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri
    Department of Transportation); the two organizations share oversight
    duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from
    each jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.)
    provides oversight for WMATA.

    The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily
    and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's track is
    in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early
    2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania
    and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a
    regional transportation and economic development agency serving both
    southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA implemented
    organizational and functional changes, DRPA and PATCO leadership no longer
    believed that DRPA could perform its role as the designated oversight
    agency without facing conflicting interests. As a result, Pennsylvania and
    New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey Department of Transportation
    (NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight agency. This arrangement allows the
    oversight agency to take corrective action without seeking additional
    levels of approval from Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does
    keep Pennsylvania informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides
    some support to the NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions
    for the stations, passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania.
    PennDOT reports any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted
    during the performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through
    meetings or other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be
    performed by the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or
    directly by New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one
    part-time staff members to its oversight program, and while these staff
    members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their sole
    responsibilities for safety and oversight functions.

    The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis
    International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside
    Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system
    included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track
    in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials
    agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to provide
    safety and security oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001,
    MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which roughly
    equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this, the states
    agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a greater role in
    safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated the St. Clair
    County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. Clair is one of the
    few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight agency. The involvement of
    two separate oversight agencies could create challenges to effective
    implementation, but the agencies have taken steps to ensure close
    coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies have
    agreed to use only one uniform safety and security standard across the
    entire MetroLink system.1 According to area officials, this arrangement
    creates consistency throughout the system and allows both agencies to
    perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the
    agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial
    audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight
    agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate very
    closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there is one
    employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to safety and
    security oversight activities. Illinois has several employees who devote
    smaller percentages of their individual time to the program, but the
    Managing Director is primarily responsible for coordinating with Missouri.
    MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding to state safety oversight
    directives is a priority, and the agency works quickly to implement
    changes.

    WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the District
    of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of
    Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities through a
    collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed of six
    representatives-two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
    Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary duties, and their
    activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the
    case with staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any
    dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational experience.
    To gain access to additional experience and expertise in rail oversight,
    TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical knowledge, perform
    required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit recommendations are
    completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from, and must be approved by,
    each of the jurisdictions every year. The Washington Council of
    Governments processes TOC funds and handles its contracting procedures.
    These issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly
    funding and process its expenses.

    Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative Challenges in
    Different Ways

    The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have
    attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more
    collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
    strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,
    albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New
    Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's
    territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's staff.
    New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight
    program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and
    provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the implementation
    of any new safety or security processes. Although St. Louis has two
    agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies have made it
    a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent information to the
    transit agency, and they are coordinating activities so MetroLink is not
    burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. To do this, the
    Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact with each
    other. Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated
    to safety and security oversight, and the agencies have very good working
    relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could face
    challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and new
    employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In addition,
    officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had disagreements over
    safety or security standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it
    would be highly problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and
    Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the
    current arrangements have produced one set of standards, good
    communication, and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight
    agency staff in St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment
    where this system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well.

    In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making
    decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have contributed
    to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information requests.
    On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC's audit in
    late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to facilitate
    the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State Safety
    Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an extension
    by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August, FTA
    initiated its audit even though it had not received requested information,
    but was not able to complete the audit until the end of September, when it
    received all requested materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10
    areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues.
    According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held
    a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the
    remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating how
    many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA stated
    that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating procedures to
    address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition, TOC
    representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA found
    were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident investigation
    procedures and approving modifications, and could not be addressed within
    the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff emphasized that, although
    WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC audit recommendations or
    information requests, they were pleased with their relationship with WMATA
    and that WMATA was responsive to TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed
    that they recognized and appreciated the effort TOC had undertaken in
    addressing FTA's findings.

    TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track
    outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on at
    least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC
    members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA's
    initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the
    year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the
    consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their
    files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring
    additional funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions
    represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding
    quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its
    members, and at least one member from each jurisdiction, approving the
    action. Reaching such majority agreements can be time consuming since all
    members of TOC have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a
    concern when quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA's
    audit recommendations.

    TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,
    including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy
    process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of
    corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they
    believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and
    oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and
    proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the
    chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time on
    overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the
    administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a
    full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a
    full-time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However,
    funding this position could be a challenge and the administrator would
    need to have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.

    Appendix II

    List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They Oversee

    Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies

        State       State safety     Rail transit   City center   Type of         Annual
                  oversight agency      agency        served      system   ridership and
                   (estimated FTE)    (estimated                             directional
                                         FTE)                                route miles
    Single state
    systems
    Arkansas      Arkansas State    Central        Little Rock,  Trolley         159,458
                  Highway and       Arkansas       AR
                  Transportation    Transit                                          2.8
                  Department (0.5)  Authority
                                    (0.08)
    California    California Public Bay Area Rapid San           Heavy        99,296,028
                  Utilities         Transit (7)    Francisco, CA rail
                  Commission (9.6)                                                   209
                                    Los Angeles    Los Angeles,  Heavy        74,242,912
                                    County         CA            rail and
                                    Metropolitan                 light             141.6
                                    Transportation               rail
                                    Authority
                                    (1.5)
                                    San Francisco  San           Light        53,768,895
                                    Municipal      Francisco, CA rail,
                                    Railway (Muni)               trolley,           81.7
                                    (7)                          and cable
                                                                 car
                                    San Diego      San Diego, CA Light        29,334,362
                                    Trolley, Inc.                rail
                                    (0.9)                                           96.6
                                    Sacramento     Sacramento,   Light        12,008,620
                                    Regional       CA            rail
                                    Transit                                         58.4
                                    District (N/A)
                                    Santa Clara    San Jose, CA  Light         6,780,431
                                    Valley Transit               rail
                                    Authority                                       58.4
                                    (N/A)
    Colorado      Colorado Public   Denver         Denver, CO    Light        11,142,220
                  Utilities         Regional                     rail
                  Commission (1.2)  Transit                                         31.6
                                    District
                                    (1.25)
    Florida       Florida           Metro-Dade     Miami, FL     Heavy        26,479,423
                  Department of     Transit                      rail and
                  Transportation    Authority                    automated          53.5
                  (1)               (N/A)                        guideway
                                    Jacksonville   Jacksonville, Automated       736,510
                                    Transportation FL            guideway
                                    Authority                                        5.4
                                    (N/A)
                                    Hillsborough   Tampa, FL     Trolley         565,002
                                    Area Regional
                                    Transit (0.85)                                   4.8
    Georgia       Georgia           Metropolitan   Atlanta, GA   Heavy        70,984,053
                  Department of     Atlanta Rapid                rail
                  Transportation    Transit                                         96.1
                  (0.1)             Authority (6)
    Illinois      Regional          Chicago        Chicago, IL   Heavy       186,759,524
                  Transportation    Transit                      rail
                  Authority (1)     Authority (11)                                 206.3
    Louisiana     Louisiana         New Orleans    New Orleans,  Trolley       5,667,952
                  Department of     Regional       LA
                  Transportation    Transit                                         25.3
                  (0.1)a            Authority
                                    (N/A)
    Maryland      Maryland          Maryland       Baltimore, MD Heavy        18,059,117
                  Department of     Transit                      rail and
                  Transportation    Administration               light                87
                  (1.3)             (5)                          rail
    Massachusetts Massachusetts     Massachusetts  Boston, MA    Heavy       215,787,440
                  Department of     Bay                          rail,
                  Telecommunication Transportation               light             127.3
                  and Energy (2.67) Authority                    rail, and
                                    (5.1)                        trolley
    Michigan      Michigan          Detroit        Detroit, MI   Automated     1,340,646
                  Department of     Transit                      guideway
                  Transportation    Corporation                                      2.9
                  (0.5)             (Detroit
                                    People Mover)
                                    (1.1)
    Minnesota     Minnesota         Hiawatha Metro Minneapolis,  Light         7,901,668
                  Department of     Transit        MN            rail
                  Public Safety     (1-1.5)                                         24.4
                  (0.1)
    New Jersey    NJDOT (2-3)       New Jersey     Newark, NJ    Light        14,312,676
                                    Transit Newark               rail
                                    City Subway                                    99.9b
                                    (0.5)
                                    New Jersey     Jersey City,  Light
                                    Transit        NJ            rail
                                    Hudson-Bergen
                                    Light Rail
                                    (N/A)
                                    New Jersey     Trenton, NJ   Light
                                    Transit River                rail
                                    Line (2)
    New York      New York Public   New York City  New York      Heavy     1,803,536,486
                  Transportation    Transit (15)   City, NY      rail
                  Safety Board                                                     493.8
                  (3.5)
                                    Niagara        Buffalo, NY   Light         5,373,321
                                    Frontier                     rail
                                    Transit                                         12.4
                                    Authority
                                    (0.5)
    Ohio          Ohio Department   Greater        Cleveland, OH Heavy         8,236,840
                  of Transportation Cleveland                    rail and
                  (1)               Regional                     light              68.5
                                    Transit                      rail
                                    Authority
                                    (1.2)
    Oregon        Oregon Department Portland       Portland, OR  Light        34,755,147
                  of Transportation Tri-Met (10)                 rail
                  (1.2)             Portland       Portland, OR  Light             92.9b
                                    Streetcar                    rail
                                    (0.5)
    Pennsylvania  PennDOT (0.5)     Southeastern   Philadelphia, Heavy       113,252,100
                                    Pennsylvania   PA            rail,
                                    Transit                      light             141.1
                                    Authority (2)                rail, and
                                                                 trolley
                                    Port Authority Pittsburgh,   Light         8,072,099
                                    of Allegheny   PA            rail and
                                    County (0.3)                 inclined           45.8
                                                                 plane
                                    Cambria County Johnstown, PA Inclined         86,031
                                    Transit                      plane
                                    Authority (1)                                    0.3
    Puerto Rico   Puerto Rico State Puerto Rico    San Juan,     Heavy         2,182,668
                  Emergency and     Highway &      Puerto Rico   rail
                  Disaster          Transportation
                  Management Agency Authority Tren
                  (3)               Urbano (1.6)
    Tennessee     Tennessee         Chattanooga    Chattanooga,  Inclined        435,780
                  Department of     Area Rapid     TN            plane
                  Transportation    Transit                                            2
                  (0.25)            Authority
                                    (N/A)
                                    Memphis Area   Memphis, TN   Trolley       1,015,448
                                    Transit
                                    Authority                                         10
                                    (0.3)
    Texas         Texas Department  Galveston      Galveston, TX Light            47,706
                  of Transportation Island Transit               rail
                  (0.4)             (0.25)                                             4
                                    Dallas Area    Dallas, TX    Light        17,487,057
                                    Rapid Transit                rail and
                                    (0.75)                       trolley            87.7
                                    Metropolitan   Houston, TX   Light        10,233,638
                                    Transit                      rail
                                    Authority of                                    14.8
                                    Harris County
                                    (2)
    Utah          Utah Department   Utah Transit   Salt Lake     Light        13,101,791
                  of Transportation Authority      City, UT      rail
                  (0.8)             (1.5)                                           37.3
    Washington    Washington State  Sound Transit  Tacoma, WA    Light           884,895
                  Department of     Tacoma Link                  rail
                  Transportation    (N/A)                                            3.6
                  (0.35)            Seattle Center Seattle, WA   Automated    1,506,240c
                                    Monorail                     guideway
                                    (0.02)                                           1.8
    Wisconsin     Wisconsin         Kenosha        Kenosha, WI   Trolley          68,209
                  Department of     Transit (0.85)
                  Transportation                                                     1.9
                  (0.3)
    Multi-state
    systems
    Illinois and  St. Clair County  Bi-State       St. Louis, MO Light        15,648,233
    Missouri      Transit District  Development                  rail
                  (0.25-0.5) and    Agency (St.                                     75.8
                  Missouri          Louis Metro)
                  Department of     (2)
                  Transportation
                  (0.9)
    New Jersey    NJDOT (2-3)       PATCO (1)      Philadelphia, Heavy         9,362,839
    and                                            PA            rail
    Pennsylvania                                                                    31.5
    Maryland,     TOC (0.2)         WMATA (1)      Washington,   Heavy       259,430,055
    Virginia, and                                  D.C.          rail
    Washington,                                                                    206.6
    D.C.

    Source: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.

    Notes: FTE data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and
    transit agencies. The data do not include contractor staff that assist
    transit or oversight agencies, though several agencies reported using
    contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the
    total number of passengers boarding the rail system annually (also known
    as "unlinked passenger trips") as provided by FTA. Directional route
    miles-the miles of track in each direction over which transportation
    vehicles travel while carrying passengers-are current as of 2004, and were
    obtained from data published by FTA in the National Transit Database. The
    data in this table are presented for background purposes and were not
    verified. FTA defines trolley operations as "light rail" for statistical
    purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley operations and
    modern light rail operations, we have created separate categories for them
    in this chart. N/A = Not available

    aBecause we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE data was
    provided by FTA.

    b Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles represent
    the total for all systems within a transit agency.

    cAccording to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this table
    represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an extended
    period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In prior years
    the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 2 million.

    Appendix III

    Scope and Methodology

    To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal Transit
    Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail transit systems
    and what is known about the impact of the State Safety Oversight program
    on rail safety and security, we met with FTA management and consultants to
    discuss the history, mission, and design of the oversight program. In
    addition, we discussed system safety and risk management approaches used
    by FTA, but we did not independently verify that oversight agencies use
    these approaches. We met with officials from other federal agencies such
    as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);
    we also met with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), a
    transit industry association. We met with these organizations to determine
    how oversight responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent
    to which duplication of safety and security guidance existed among these
    agencies. We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor. To compare other
    transportation safety and security approaches to the oversight program, we
    interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from Canadian transit
    agencies.

    In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents, including
    rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State Safety Oversight
    program; the triennial audits FTA performs on oversight agencies;
    documents tracking the performance of corrective action items; and
    memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to facilitate safety
    oversight coordination. At the state level, we reviewed annual reports
    that the oversight agencies provide to FTA. When states were willing to
    share these documents, we reviewed audits performed by the oversight
    agencies on transit agencies (40 percent of the states provided these
    documents) and authorizing legislation, or executive action, creating the
    state safety oversight agency (more than 80 percent provided the
    legislation or executive action). To compare the State Safety Oversight
    program with other transportation safety approaches, we reviewed our past
    work on pipeline, aviation, motor carriers, and highway safety.

    To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program and
    also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted
    semi-structured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To
    determine the universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies
    under the State Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We
    compared FTA's list of transit systems to information published by APTA
    regarding rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that were
    under development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that had
    initiated service as "proposed," and we were able to resolve this
    discrepancy by comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency's
    website, which showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all
    transit and oversight agencies participating in the program that were in
    operation as of October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight
    agencies and 42 rail transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five
    oversight agencies, and 37 of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to
    participate in these interviews. The New Orleans Regional Transit
    Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana Department of Transportation
    (an oversight agency) requested that we exclude them from our review due
    to the difficulties posed by recovering from Hurricane Katrina, and we
    agreed to the request. Four additional transit agencies-the Jacksonville
    Transportation Authority, Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation
    Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and Hudson-Bergen Light Rail
    line-did not participate in our interviews. The semi-structured interview
    guide included questions concerning issues that could create challenges
    for the program such as an estimate of the number of FTE employees
    dedicated to the program, availability of FTA or other federally sponsored
    safety training to oversight agency employees, state funding schemes to
    support the program, the workload associated with audit responsibilities,
    the role of outside contractors to conduct the triennial reviews, employee
    turnover, and frequency of communication between the transit agencies and
    federal security agencies.

    The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the
    oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly referred
    to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular
    question is interpreted, the sources of information that are available to
    interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database or were
    analyzed, can introduce unwanted variability in the results obtained in
    these interviews. However, we took steps in the development of the
    interview questions, the data collection, and the data analysis to
    minimize these types of errors. For example, social science survey
    specialists developed the questions used in the interviews in
    collaboration with our own subject matter experts. Then, the questions
    were pretested to ensure that they were relevant, clearly stated, and easy
    to comprehend. When the data were analyzed, a second independent analyst
    checked all computer programs. Since the interviews were conducted using
    an electronic interviewing system, our interviewers entered answers
    obtained from officials directly into the electronic interview instrument.
    This eliminated the need to have the data keyed into a database by a third
    party, thus removing an additional source of error.

    We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of the
    challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8 oversight
    agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states with several
    rail transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this variety to
    witness a cross-section of transit agencies and observe the interactions
    the transit agencies had with their oversight agencies. Complete lists of
    the transit and oversight agencies we visited are in Table 3 and Table 4,
    respectively. To determine how the program functions in regions where
    transit systems cross state boundaries, we visited three systems that
    crossed state boundaries. To identify how the program may be incorporated
    into new transit systems, we visited two systems that are in the design or
    construction phase, and one oversight agency that will eventually oversee
    a transit agency yet to begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of
    information presented in the report about state oversight and transit
    agencies by asking for the agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior
    to the publication of the report. We conducted our work from August 2005
    through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This Review

           Rail transit agency         Urban area served    Multi-State  Not yet
                                                              region    operating
    Bay Area Rapid Transit       San Francisco/Oakland,
    (BART)                       California
    Bi-State Development Agency  St. Louis, Missouri          X
    (MetroLink)
    Chicago Transit Authority    Chicago, Illinois
    Kenosha Transit              Kenosha, Wisconsin
    Los Angeles County           Los Angeles, California
    Metropolitan Transportation
    Authority (LACMTA)
    Maryland Transit             Greater Washington, DC,
    Administration (MTA)         and Maryland
    New Jersey Transit River     Camden, New Jersey
    Line
    New York City Transit (NYCT) New York, New York
    North County Transit         San Diego/Oceanside, CA                 X
    District
    Port Authority Transit       Lindenwold, New Jersey       X
    Corporation (PATCO)          and Philadelphia,
                                    Pennsylvania
    Regional Public              Phoenix, AZ                             X
    Transportation Authority
    (Valley Metro)
    Sacramento Regional Transit  Sacramento, California
    District (SRTD)
    San Diego Trolley            San Diego, California
    San Francisco Municipal      San Francisco,
    Railway (MUNI)               California
    Santa Clara Valley           San Jose, California
    Transportation Authority
    (SCVTA)
    Southeastern Pennsylvania    Philadelphia,
    Transportation Authority     Pennsylvania
    (SEPTA)
    Washington Metropolitan Area Washington, D.C.             X
    Transit Authority (WMATA)

    Source: National Transit Database.

    Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
    Review

            State oversight agency        State(s) served   Multi-State  Not yet
                                                              region    operating
    Arizona Department of             Arizona                            X
    Transportation
    California Public Utilities       California
    Commission
    Missouri Department of            Missouri                X
    Transportation
    New Jersey Department of          New Jersey              X
    Transportation
    Oregon Department of              Oregon
    Transportation
    Regional Transportation Authority Illinois
    (RTA)
    St. Clair County Transit District Illinois                X
    (SCCTD)
    Tri-State Oversight Committee     District of             X
    (TOC)                             Columbia,
                                         Maryland, Virginia

    Source: GAO.

    Appendix IV

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Katherine A. Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov

    Staff Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant
    Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta; Stuart
    Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and Raymond Sendejas
    made key contributions to this report.

    (542068)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-821 .

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on (202) 512-2834 or
    siggerudk@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-821 , a report to Committee on Transportation and
    Infrastructure, House of Representatives

    July 2006

    RAIL TRANSIT

    Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight
    Program

    The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's
    transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail
    transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies
    following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this
    report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is
    designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges
    facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit
    systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state
    oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct FTA to (1)
    set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for maintaining
    the stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies and (2) develop and
    encourage completion of a recommended training curriculum for oversight
    agency staff. Also, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary of the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to coordinate their security
    oversight activities and audits with FTA and transit and oversight
    agencies. FTA and TSA generally concurred with the report and are
    considering how to implement the recommendations.

    FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other
    federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure
    the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to
    designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit
    agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible
    for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and
    reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard.
    While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their
    responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit
    agencies.

    Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit
    agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit
    agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as
    reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample
    anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not
    definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed
    performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as
    required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after
    the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated
    3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack
    of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it
    will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help
    determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents
    involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this
    task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will
    make auditing oversight agencies a top priority.

    FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
    expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from
    16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough
    qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom
    we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address
    this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about
    what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security,
    since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar
    function, which could result in duplication of effort.

    Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety Oversight
    Program
    *** End of document. ***