Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must 
Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role (31-JUL-06, GAO-06-812).	 
                                                                 
Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense	 
(DOD) has taken steps to expand the role of the United States	 
Special Operations Command (Command) and its forces. In response,
the Command has transformed its headquarters to coordinate	 
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased funding and	 
the number of special operations forces positions. Given the	 
expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel  
with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess:
(1) whether the Command has determined all of the personnel	 
requirements needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress  
and challenges in meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of	 
deployments on the Command's ability to provide trained forces,  
and the progress made in managing deployments. GAO performed its 
work at the Special Operations Command and its service		 
components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and	 
examined policies and directives.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-812 					        
    ACCNO:   A57740						        
  TITLE:     Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital	      
Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role		 
     DATE:   07/31/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military personnel deployment			 
	     Military personnel retention			 
	     Military training					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Personnel recruiting				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Special forces					 
	     Special operations 				 
	     Global War on Terrorism				 

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GAO-06-812

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * Special Operations Command Legislative Responsibilities
          * Expanded Special Operations Command Mission
          * Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
          * Organization of Special Operations Forces
     * Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel
          * DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requi
          * DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command's Headquarters
     * Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Oper
          * The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Hav
               * Increased Recruiting Goals
               * Expanded Training Capacity
               * Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
          * Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some
               * Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Fo
               * Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Perso
          * Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to E
     * More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for T
          * Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and
          * Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manag
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Speci
     * Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 7
Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel Requirements
Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress 13
Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command
Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals 17
More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training;
Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect 29
Conclusions 37
Recommendations for Executive Action 38
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42
Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command 45
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 46
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49

Tables

Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps 11
Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty Special
Operations Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal
Year 2011 15
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special Operations
Forces Occupational Specialties Underfilled for Fiscal Years 2000 through
2005 22
Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed for
Training, Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005
31
Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command 45

Figures

Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special Operations
Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component 10
Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces Deployed
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 30
Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed to
the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2005 31
Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and Completed,
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 34

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 31, 2006 July 31, 2006

The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Committee on
Government Reform House of Representatives The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special
Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to train and
equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the
department's geographic combatant commands.1 Since 2003, DOD has taken
several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command to lead
the department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, the
Command has been given the responsibility for planning and synchronizing
DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this expanded mission, the
Command has transformed its headquarters to improve the coordination of
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased the number of military
positions for special operations forces personnel by 12 percent since
fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report states that the department intends to further increase these forces
through fiscal year 2011.212 At DOD's request, the Congress has provided
the Special Operations Command with considerable increases in funding to
support its expanded mission and increase the size of its forces.
Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, funding for
the Command increased from more than $3.8 billion to more than $6.4
billion. The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States
Special Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to
train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the
department's geographic combatant commands. Since 2003, DOD has taken
several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command to lead
the department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, the
Command has been given the responsibility for planning and synchronizing
DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this expanded mission, the
Command has transformed its headquarters to improve the coordination of
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased the number of military
positions for special operations forces personnel by 12 percent since
fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report states that the department intends to further increase these forces
through fiscal year 2011. At DOD's request, the Congress has provided the
Special Operations Command with considerable increases in funding to
support its expanded mission and increase the size of its forces.
Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, funding for
the Command increased from more than $3.8 billion to more than $6.4
billion.

Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are
specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations
are intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic
objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no
Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are
specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations
are intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic
objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no
conventional force requirement, and they often require covert,
clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. Each of the military services
provides special operations forces to the Special Operations Command, and
thus the military services and the Special Operations Command have a
shared responsibility to ensure that a sufficient number of special
operations forces personnel are available. For example, the military
services recruit new candidates for special operations training, while, in
general, the Special Operations Command provides the combat specialty
training for these forces.

1 The five geographic combatant commands-U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command-are responsible for U.S. military operations within their
areas.

2 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006).

Since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD has deployed
substantial numbers of special operations forces to conduct a range of
military operations. These forces have conducted combat missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq and, in addition, have helped train indigenous
military personnel in these countries and in other parts of the world,
including countries in Asia and Africa, to build the capabilities of
partner nations to combat terrorists more effectively within their own
countries. Several documents published by DOD, including the National
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism,3 emphasize the capabilities provided by special operations
forces. As a result, the increased pace of deployments for these forces is
likely to continue in the near term. Recently, the Special Operations
Command has taken steps to manage the impact of deployments, which has
included establishing policy guidelines for the frequency of personnel
deployments.

This report responds to your request and addresses the following
questions: (1) the extent to which the Special Operations Command has
determined personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission; (2)
what progress the military services and the Special Operations Command
have made since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining
special operations forces personnel, and what challenges they face to meet
future growth; and (3) the effect that deployments since fiscal year 2000
have had on the Special Operations Command's ability to provide an
adequate number of trained forces for the full range of its worldwide
missions, and what progress the Command has made in managing personnel
deployments.

3 See DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
(March 2005), and DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism (February 2006).

To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command has
identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded
mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials involved with
determining personnel requirements with the Special Operations Command,
and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components. We also met
with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for growth in Marine Corps
special operations forces. We analyzed the plans for growth in these
personnel through fiscal year 2011. To assess the progress the military
services and the Special Operations Command have made since fiscal year
2000 in increasing the number of special operations forces personnel, we
discussed the processes used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to recruit,
train, and retain these forces with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Special Operations Command, and the military
services. We focused on these processes for the active components of the
military services. To determine what challenges the military services and
the Special Operations Command face to meet future growth, we analyzed
personnel inventory levels for special operations forces in the active
component military services for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, and we
collected and analyzed data from the schools that train new special
operations forces personnel. In addition, we reviewed relevant Special
Operations Command directives and analyzed the annual reports prepared by
the service components to determine the extent to which the information in
these reports met reporting requirements. To assess the effect of
increased special operations forces deployments, we analyzed the trends in
the deployment of special operations forces for fiscal years 2000 through
2005, and we discussed the impact of deployments with officials from the
Special Operations Command and the military services. We reviewed
available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD
officials. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some concerns that
are discussed in this report; however, we concluded the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review from April
2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology is contained in appendix I.

                                Results in Brief

The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the
personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While the
Command has determined how many special operations forces personnel it
needs to meet increases in its warfighter units, it has not completed
analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters staff needed to train
and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters
staff needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist
networks. Nevertheless, the department has already made the decision to
increase the number of positions for the Command's headquarters, beginning
with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, by more than 75 percent.
However, this increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of
personnel requirements, given that the Command's analyses were ongoing at
the time of our review. We have previously reported that strategic
workforce planning is essential in that it aligns an organization's human
capital program with its current and emerging mission.4 Until these
analyses are completed, the Special Operations Command cannot provide
assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently
planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command's headquarters
will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the
Command's expanded mission. To address this challenge, GAO is recommending
that the Special Operations Command establish specific milestones for
completing its ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once
completed, make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel
increases for the Command's headquarters and related future funding
requests.

The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
progress from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005 in recruiting,
training, and retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the
military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome
persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of
newly trained special operations forces personnel for some specialties to
meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In
addition, the Special Operations Command does not have complete
information on the human capital challenges it is facing, including low
personnel inventory levels and training limitations, and the planned
corrective actions it needs to evaluate the success of its service
components' human capital approaches in meeting their growth targets. The
military services and the Special Operations Command have achieved
progress by increasing recruiting goals, training greater numbers of new
personnel, and using financial incentives to retain experienced personnel.
However, the military services and the Command face several challenges in
meeting future growth goals. For example, since fiscal year 2000, well
over half of the special operations forces specialties have been
underfilled each year, by an amount ranging from less than 5 percent to
more than 86 percent. As a result, hundreds of authorized positions have
been unfilled each year. Further, our analysis of data reported by the
Army, Navy, and Air Force schools that train new special operations forces
personnel shows the number of personnel who are graduating from these
schools is insufficient in some cases to meet current authorized personnel
levels or planned growth targets. The schools have been unable to graduate
a sufficient number of new special operations forces personnel for several
reasons, including recruiting an inadequate number of servicemembers who
attended the schools each year. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year
2005, for example, the Naval Special Warfare Command did not produce a
sufficient number of enlisted Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) personnel to meet
authorized personnel levels or future growth targets. In addition, our
review of the service components' annual reports required by the Special
Operations Command shows that the reports do not provide information the
Command needs to determine if the services have enough personnel to meet
current and future requirements. Without this information, the Special
Operations Command will be unable to evaluate whether the service
components' human capital management approaches, including their
recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in
meeting the planned growth targets. To address this challenge, GAO is
recommending that the Special Operations Command revise its directive for
its program to monitor the status of special operations forces to include
performance objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving
planned growth, and enforce all of the directive's reporting requirements.

4 GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced a
substantial increase in the number of personnel deployed for operations
and a simultaneous decrease in the number of personnel deployed for
training. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average
weekly number of special operations forces personnel who deployed to the
geographic combatant commands increased by 64 percent, or about 3,100
personnel. The majority have been deployed for operations in the U.S.
Central Command, which accounted for 85 percent of total overseas
deployments in fiscal year 2005. Our analysis also shows that from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, special operations forces deployed
less frequently for training. As a result of this decrease, special
operations forces personnel participated in fewer types of training
events, including theater engagement activities such as joint combined
exchange training.5 As we have previously reported, training overseas with
foreign forces is important, as it enables special operations forces
personnel to maintain language proficiency and familiarity with local
geography and cultures.6 Moreover, DOD documents regarding the
department's strategy for the Global War on Terrorism identify combined
training, such as joint combined exchange training, as an important
element for strengthening partner nations' counterterrorism capabilities.
To its credit, the Special Operations Command has taken action to manage
the challenge of increased deployments. In August 2005, the Command
established a policy that requires active duty personnel to remain at
least an equal amount of time at home as deployed. However, the Command's
service components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy.
This is because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that
the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment
policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy
service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of
information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without
consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have
the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments
of special operations forces, which affects the Command's ability to
maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special operations
forces personnel. To address this challenge, GAO is recommending that the
Special Operations Command clarify the methodology that the Command's
service components use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps
to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place that
utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with GAO's recommendations.

5 Joint combined exchange training is a program conducted overseas to
fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange
the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and host nation counterparts.
Training activities are designed to improve U.S. and host nation
capabilities.

6 GAO, Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined
Exchange Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999).

                                   Background

Special Operations Command Legislative Responsibilities

In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service
special operations capability under a single command.7 In April 1987, the
Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with the
mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces to
DOD's geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S.
Code8 directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be
responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such
command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the
Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct certain
functions relating to special operations activities whether or not they
relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and
submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget
proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to
the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, direction, and
control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned forces; and
monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and
professional military education of special operations forces officers.

In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be
responsible for the following activities as they relate to special
operations: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3)
unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs,
(6) psychological operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian
assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such
as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.9
Appendix II defines these activities assigned to the Special Operations
Command. DOD has also assigned additional activities to the Special
Operations Command.

Expanded Special Operations Command Mission

Over the past 3 years, DOD has expanded the role of the Special Operations
Command to include responsibility for planning and leading the
department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to
training, organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special
operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders, the Command has
the mission to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global
operations against terrorist networks. The specific responsibilities
assigned to the Special Operations Command include:

7 Pub. L. No. 99-591, S: 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. S:
167).

8 10 U.S.C. S: 167(e).

9 10 U.S.C. S: 167(j).

           o  integrating DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and
           operations against terrorist networks designated by the Secretary
           of Defense;
           o  planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks;
           o  prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation
           activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns
           against designated terrorist networks in coordination with the
           geographic combatant commanders;
           o  exercising command and control of operations in support of
           selected campaigns, as directed; and
           o  providing military representation to U.S. national and
           international agencies for matters related to U.S. and
           multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks, as
           directed by the Secretary of Defense.

           In addition, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
           Terrorism10 establishes the approach DOD will take in fulfilling
           its role within the larger national strategy for combating
           terrorism. The strategy provides guidance on the department's
           military objectives and their relative priority in the allocation
           of resources. In addition, this strategy implements the
           designation of the Special Operations Command as the supported
           combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed,
           executing global operations against terrorist networks.11

           Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
			  
			  The Special Operations Command has received considerable increases
           in funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the Global War
           on Terrorism. Specifically, funding for the Command has increased
           from more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4
           billion in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the Command received
           more than $5 billion in supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001
           through fiscal year 2005. During this time, funding for military
           personnel costs for the Special Operations Command increased by
           more than $800 million, representing a 53 percent increase. DOD
           plans further increases in funding for the Command. The
           President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Special
           Operations Command is $8 billion, and the department plans
           additional increases for the Command through fiscal year 2011.

           Organization of Special Operations Forces
			  
			  The Special Operations Command is comprised of special operations
           forces from each of the military services. In fiscal year 2005,
           personnel authorizations for Army special operations forces
           military personnel totaled more than 30,000, the Air Force 11,501,
           the Navy 6,255, and the Marine Corps 79.12 Roughly one-third of
           special operations forces military personnel were in DOD's reserve
           components,13 including the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserve, and
           the Army and Air National Guard.14 Figure 1 provides a summary of
           DOD's special operations forces military authorizations in the
           active component and reserve component.

           Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special
           Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve
           Component

           Special operations forces are organized into several types of
           units. For example, Army special operations forces are organized
           into Special Forces, Rangers, Aviation, Civil Affairs,
           Psychological Operations, and support units. Air Force special
           operations forces are organized into fixed and rotary wing
           aviation squadrons, special tactics squadrons, a combat aviation
           advisor squadron, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron. Naval
           Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams and SEAL Delivery
           Vehicle Teams and Special Boat Teams. When fully operational,
           Marine Corps special operations forces will include foreign
           military training units and marine special operations companies.
           Table 1 provides an overview and description of DOD's special
           operations forces.

           Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army,
           Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps

           Source: GAO.

           Special operations forces personnel possess highly specialized
           skill sets including cultural and regional awareness. Duty in
           special operations is undertaken on a voluntary basis, and many
           personnel volunteering for special operations, particularly those
           in Army Special Forces and Air Force flight crews, have already
           served for some time in the military before becoming qualified for
           special operations forces. In order to become qualified, military
           personnel must complete a rigorous assessment, selection, and
           initial training process that, on average, takes between 12 and 24
           months. This difficult training regime causes high attrition, and
           often over 70 percent who start special operations training do not
           finish. In general, servicemembers who are unable to complete the
           special operations training return to their previously held
           specialty or are retrained into another specialty, depending on
           the needs of their military service.

           The Special Operations Command's Army, Air Force, and Navy service
           components have schools to train and develop special operations
           forces. For example:

           o  The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, located at Ft. Bragg,
           North Carolina, operates the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
           Center and School. This school assesses, selects, and trains
           Special Forces soldiers, and trains civil affairs and
           psychological operations soldiers. In addition, the school
           provides advanced special operations training courses.
           o  The Air Force Special Operations Command, located at Hurlburt
           Field, Florida, has several subordinate training squadrons that
           provide initial and advanced training for Air Force rotary and
           fixed wing special operations pilots, special tactics personnel,
           combat aviation advisors, and unmanned aerial vehicle personnel.
           o  The Naval Special Warfare Command, located on the Naval
           Amphibious Base Coronado, California, operates the Naval Special
           Warfare Center. This school trains SEAL candidates through the
           Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL course and the SEAL Qualification
           Course, and trains special warfare combatant crewmen through the
           Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen course. In addition, the school
           provides advanced special operations training courses.

           Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel
			  Requirements Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress
			  
			  The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of
           the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission.
           While the Command has determined the number of special operations
           forces personnel who are needed to increase the number of its
           warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine (a)
           the number of headquarters staff needed to train and equip these
           additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters staff
           needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist
           networks-a new mission for the Command. Although the Command's
           analyses for these determinations were in progress at the time of
           our review, DOD has nonetheless planned to increase the number of
           positions for the Command's headquarters, and has requested
           related funds beginning in fiscal year 2007.

           DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requirements
			  for Additional Special Operations Forces Warfighters
			  
			  Several recent DOD studies have concluded that additional special
           operations forces warfighters are needed in order for the Special
           Operations Command to achieve the national military objectives in
           the Global War on Terrorism. A December 2002 report conducted by
           the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
           Operations and Low Intensity Conflict15 found that efforts should
           be made to expand the size of special operations forces and
           institute a more sustainable rotational base of forces, while
           realigning the force to meet current and future challenges.16
           Furthermore, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
           stated that one of the key programmatic decisions the department
           proposes to launch in fiscal year 2007 is to increase special
           operations forces to defeat terrorist networks.17

           The Special Operations Command has determined the number of
           special operations forces personnel needed to meet increases in
           its warfighter units. To determine the requirements for special
           operations forces warfighter units, the Command uses its Joint
           Mission Analysis process. Based on planning scenarios provided by
           DOD that special operations forces will be needed to support, the
           Command determines the minimum number of warfighters necessary to
           achieve its military objectives with the least amount of risk to
           mission success. This level of special operations forces is the
           baseline force used to measure risk, and is the starting point for
           developing a more attainable force based on fiscal constraints.

           Beginning in fiscal year 2002, DOD increased the number of
           positions for the Special Operations Command to augment the
           increase in the number of its warfighter units. Specifically, from
           fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, DOD increased the
           number of military positions for special operations forces by more
           than 5,000 positions, or about 12 percent. With these increases in
           military positions, the Special Operations Command has also
           increased the number of special operations forces units, including
           Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. DOD plans
           to further increase the number of military positions for the
           Command through fiscal year 2011, and the Command plans to
           increase other special operations forces units such as Army
           Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle
           and intelligence squadrons.18 The increase in military positions
           will also support the establishment of a Marine Corps component to
           the Special Operations Command, which was approved in October
           2005. Table 2 provides examples of increases in the number of
           active duty special operations forces warfighter units from fiscal
           year 2001 through fiscal year 2011.

           Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty
           Special Operations Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal Year 2001
           through Fiscal Year 2011

           Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

           aDOD plans call for the addition of four Special Forces battalions
           during the fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011 Future Years
           Defense Program, with a fifth Special Forces battalion to be added
           during the fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013 Future Years
           Defense Program.

           DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Commandï¿½s Headquarters to Meet
			  Expanded Mission, Although Analyses Are Still in Progress
			  
			  DOD's budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes increases in
           the number of personnel for the Special Operations Command's
           headquarters, even though the Command had not completed studies
           for headquarters' personnel requirements in two key areas. First,
           the Commander of the Special Operations Command is responsible for
           training assigned special operations forces, and developing and
           acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment.19 Accordingly,
           the Command believes that it has a commensurate need for
           additional headquarters staff to perform these responsibilities to
           support the increased number of warfighters necessary to win the
           Global War on Terrorism. Second, DOD's decision to expand the
           mission of the Special Operations Command calls for the Command to
           be responsible for planning and synchronizing global actions
           against terrorist networks. The Command further believes that it
           needs additional headquarters personnel to fulfill this
           responsibility.

           The Special Operations Command determines personnel requirements
           for its headquarters by conducting formal personnel studies. These
           studies are directed and approved by the Special Operations
           Command's leadership. The study teams conduct a variety of
           analyses to determine personnel requirements and interview
           individuals within the reviewed organization to determine the
           tasks they perform and the level of effort necessary to fulfill
           the workload requirements. The studies are used to validate the
           personnel requirements and support data-based decisions for
           allocating additional resources during the Special Operations
           Command's planning, programming, and budgeting processes. The
           Command is currently conducting studies to determine the number of
           military and civilian personnel who are needed at its headquarters
           to meet the Command's expanded responsibilities.

           Although these studies were in progress at the time of our review,
           DOD has already made the decision to increase the number of
           military and civilian positions for the Command's headquarters,
           beginning with its fiscal year 2007 budget request. According to
           currently approved plans, DOD will increase the number of military
           and civilian positions for the Special Operations Command
           headquarters by more than 75 percent between fiscal years 2007 and
           2011. These increases include more than 700 additional positions
           for the Command's Center for Special Operations, which combines
           the intelligence, operations, and planning functions at the
           headquarters to plan and direct the Global War on Terrorism.
           However, given the fact that the Command's internal analyses of
           personnel requirements were ongoing at the time of our review, the
           intended increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of
           personnel requirements.

           Our prior work has shown that strategic workforce planning
           addresses two critical needs for an organization. First, strategic
           workforce planning aligns an organization's human capital program
           with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals.
           Second, such planning develops long-term strategies for acquiring,
           developing, and retaining the staff needed to achieve programmatic
           goals. A key principle in strategic workforce planning calls for
           determining the critical skills and competencies that will be
           needed to achieve current and future programmatic results.20
           However, until the Special Operations Command fully completes its
           analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry out its
           Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot
           provide assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress
           that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the
           Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the
           requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission.

           Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations
			  Command Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals
			  
			  The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
           progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and
           retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the
           military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome
           persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient
           numbers of newly trained special operations forces personnel in
           some cases to meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special
           operations forces personnel through fiscal year 2011. In addition,
           the Special Operations Command does not have complete information
           from its service components on human capital challenges, including
           low personnel inventory levels and training limitations, and
           planned corrective actions, which it needs to evaluate the success
           of its service components' human capital approaches.

           The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Have Taken
			  Measures to Recruit, Train, and Retain Greater Numbers of Special
			  Operations Forces Personnel
			  
			  The military services and the Special Operations Command have
           taken measures to recruit and train greater numbers of special
           operations forces personnel. In addition, DOD has implemented a
           set of initiatives intended to retain greater numbers of
           experienced special operations forces personnel.

           Increased Recruiting Goals
			  
			  The Army and Navy have increased the recruiting goals for several
           of their special operations forces occupational specialties.21
           These goals are set by the military services to determine the
           number of accessions, or new recruits, who will enter training
           each year. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, the Army
           increased the recruiting goal for active duty enlisted Special
           Forces soldiers by 72 percent, or 1,300 recruits.22 Similarly, the
           Navy increased its annual goal for enlisted SEAL recruits from 900
           in fiscal year 2004 to 1,100 in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the
           Navy established an annual goal for enlisted special warfare
           combatant crewman recruits for the first time in fiscal year 2005.

           To meet these recruiting goals, the military services have offered
           enlistment bonuses to enlist a sufficient number of new recruits.
           Collectively, the military services paid more than $28 million in
           these bonuses during fiscal year 2005 to enlist servicemembers in
           their special operations forces occupational specialties.
           Beginning in fiscal year 2003, the Army offered these bonuses to
           its initial accession Special Forces recruits and in fiscal year
           2005 the Army paid up to $20,000 per soldier. Similarly, in fiscal
           year 2005, the Air Force offered enlistment bonuses of up to
           $10,000 to recruits in the combat controller and pararescue
           occupational specialties. In fiscal year 2005, the Navy paid
           enlistment bonuses for enlisted SEAL and special warfare combatant
           crewman recruits up to a maximum of $15,000. The Army met or
           exceeded its recruiting goals for active duty enlisted Special
           Forces soldiers in 5 out of the 6 years between fiscal years 2000
           and 2005. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Air
           Force increased the number of enlisted airmen recruits for the
           combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties by about
           400 percent and 60 percent, respectively. In fiscal year 2005, the
           Navy exceeded its recruiting goal for enlisted special warfare
           combatant crewmen. However, while the Navy met its recruiting goal
           for enlisted SEALs for fiscal year 2004, it met 80 percent of its
           recruiting goal in fiscal year 2005.

           Expanded Training Capacity
			  
			  The Special Operations Command and the service components have
           taken several actions to train greater numbers of special
           operations forces recruits. For instance, the Command and the
           service components have increased the number of instructors at
           several special operations forces schools to produce a larger
           number of newly trained personnel, with additional increases in
           the number of instructors planned through fiscal year 2011. The
           U.S. Army Special Operations Command, for example, hired 45
           additional civilian instructors in fiscal year 2004 as part of its
           Institutional Training Expansion program, and plans to add more
           than 300 additional civilian instructors through fiscal year 2011.
           Similarly, beginning in fiscal year 2006, the Naval Special
           Warfare Command plans to add 145 military and civilian instructors
           through fiscal year 2008.

           The Special Operations Command's service components have also
           expanded the capacity of some schools to train more students and
           have reorganized some of their curricula so that their recruits
           move through the training programs more efficiently. Beginning in
           fiscal year 2006, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
           increased the frequency of a phase of its Special Forces
           qualification training that is focused on core battle skills. The
           U.S. Army Special Operations Command plans to increase the
           frequency of this phase from starting four courses per year, to
           starting a new course approximately every 2 weeks. This increase
           in frequency will expand the capacity of the training course from
           1,800 student spaces to about 2,300 per year.

           The Air Force Special Operations Command established a training
           program in fiscal year 2001 to provide advanced skills training
           for combat controllers. In addition, the training program was
           intended to provide standardized training for special operations
           pararescue personnel, special operations combat weathermen,23 and
           special tactics officers. Since its inception, the program has
           increased the graduation rate of combat controllers, and in
           addition, the training program has provided special operations
           pararescue airmen, combat weathermen, and special tactics officers
           with advanced special operations training.

           In fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare Command reorganized
           the training course for SEALs intended to reduce student
           attrition. Specifically, the Naval Special Warfare Command
           eliminated the class administered during the winter months, which
           historically had the highest attrition, while increasing the class
           sizes for the remaining classes. In addition, the Naval Special
           Warfare Command has begun providing focused training for those
           students who have completed the most physically challenging
           portion of the training but who require additional practice in
           specific skills, rather than requiring students to begin the
           training from the start.

           In some cases, the Special Operations Command and the service
           components have increased the number of newly trained special
           operations forces personnel. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal
           year 2005, for example, the school that trains new Special Forces
           soldiers increased the number of active duty enlisted graduates by
           138 percent, or 458 additional Special Forces soldiers.

           Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
			  
			  DOD has also taken action to retain experienced special operations
           forces personnel in order to meet the planned growth in these
           forces. According to the Special Operations Command, it cannot
           accomplish planned growth solely by adding new special operations
           forces personnel. Rather, the growth must be accomplished by
           balancing an increase in the number of new personnel with the
           retention of experienced special operations forces servicemembers.
           In 2004, DOD authorized a set of financial incentives to retain
           experienced special operations forces personnel. These incentives
           include reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for personnel in
           several special operations forces occupational specialties with 19
           or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6
           years. The military services spent more than $41 million in fiscal
           year 2005 to retain 688 special operations forces servicemembers
           with this reenlistment bonus, according to data provided by the
           Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
           Additionally, DOD authorized increases in special pays for
           warfighters assigned to the Special Operations Command, for some
           special operations forces personnel who remain on active duty with
           more than 25 years of experience, and bonuses for new Special
           Forces and Naval Special Warfare warrant officers.

           Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some Special
			  Operations Forces Training Graduates May Limit the Special Operations
			  Commandï¿½s Ability to Meet Future Growth Targets
			  
			  While the military services and the Special Operations Command
           have taken steps to increase the number of newly trained special
           operations forces personnel and to retain its experienced
           operators, the military services and the Special Operations
           Command face several human capital challenges in fully meeting
           planned growth in special operations forces. These challenges
           include persistently low personnel inventory levels for many
           special operations forces occupational specialties and
           insufficient numbers of new graduates in some cases to meet
           current authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets.

           Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Forces
			  Occupational Specialties May Limit Future Growth
			  
			  We reported in November 2005 that DOD faced significant challenges
           in recruiting and retaining servicemembers, and that the military
           services were unable to meet authorized personnel levels for
           certain occupational specialties, including several special
           operations forces occupational specialties.24 At that time, we
           reported that several of these specialties in the Army, Air Force,
           Navy, and Marine Corps were underfilled for 5 out of the previous
           6 fiscal years. Such occupational specialties included active duty
           enlisted Army Special Forces assistant operations and intelligence
           sergeants and Special Forces medical sergeants, enlisted Navy
           SEALs and special warfare combatant crewmen, and enlisted Air
           Force combat controllers and pararescue personnel. According to
           DOD officials, the special operations forces occupational
           specialties were underfilled for several reasons, including
           extensive training or qualification requirements and recent
           increases in the number of authorized personnel positions.

           Our analysis of the personnel inventory levels for the special
           operations forces active component occupational specialties
           identified by the Special Operations Command's Directive 600-725
           shows that hundreds of authorized positions for special operations
           forces personnel within each of the Command's service components
           have been persistently unfilled. As shown in table 3, from fiscal
           year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 74 percent to 87 percent of
           the active component occupational specialties in this directive
           were underfilled, each year, by an amount ranging from less than 5
           percent to more than 86 percent.26

           Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special
           Operations Forces Occupational Specialties Underfilled for Fiscal
           Years 2000 through 2005

           Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

           Note: The increase in the number of active component occupational
           specialties from fiscal years 2000 through 2005 is due to the fact
           that U.S. Army data were unavailable for two specialties prior to
           fiscal year 2002, and the military services introduced three new
           specialties during this period.

           In fiscal year 2005, more than 50 percent of these specialties
           were underfilled by at least 10 percent. For example:

           o  personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted Special
           Forces assistant operations and intelligence sergeants were
           underfilled by 58 percent,
           o  personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted pararescue
           airmen were underfilled by 27 percent, and
           o  personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted SEALs were
           underfilled by 14 percent.

           Given the military services' inability to fill current and past
           positions in their special operations forces specialties, it may
           be increasingly difficult to meet DOD's plan to increase the
           number of special operations forces through fiscal year 2011.
           During our review, the Special Operations Command's service
           components provided data indicating that, in several cases, the
           measures the military services and the Special Operations Command
           are taking to recruit and train greater numbers of special
           operations forces personnel may enable the military services and
           the Command to meet the increases in the numbers of authorized
           positions. However, the data also show that some of the special
           operations forces specialties that are currently underfilled are
           likely to remain so after additional authorizations have been
           added. For example, Navy officials told us that although
           additional authorizations for enlisted SEALs will be added by
           fiscal year 2008, it will not be able to fill all of these
           positions until at least 2011, at the earliest. Similarly, the Air
           Force projects that the additional active duty enlisted combat
           controller positions that have been added in fiscal year 2006 will
           remain underfilled through at least fiscal year 2008.

           Not only do current low personnel inventory levels suggest that
           the military services and the Special Operations Command will be
           challenged to meet planned growth goals, but officials told us
           that low personnel levels in certain occupational specialties have
           created challenges at the unit level as well. For example,
           officials from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command told us
           that low personnel inventories of Special Forces warrant officers
           and medical sergeants have resulted in their having fewer numbers
           of these personnel per unit, which has limited the manner in which
           some Special Forces units have deployed on the battlefield.
           Similarly, the low personnel inventory levels in the Air Force
           combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties have
           resulted in the Air Force's special tactics squadrons being
           underfilled. According to Air Force officials, the low personnel
           inventory levels in these units have increased the frequency of
           personnel deployments, which has had an impact on the amount of
           time available to conduct training and has adversely affected
           retention.

           Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Personnel
			  Graduates
			  
			  One reason that personnel inventory levels have been low in
           several special operations forces occupational specialties is the
           schools that train new special operations forces personnel have
           not graduated a sufficient number of these personnel, in some
           cases, to meet authorized personnel levels. Furthermore, the
           number of newly trained personnel in several special operations
           forces specialties has been insufficient to meet planned growth
           targets. For example:

           o  The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is not graduating
           enough new pilots for the 160th Special Operations Aviation
           Regiment to meet future growth targets. In fiscal year 2005, the
           Command graduated only 58 percent of the MH-47 Chinook helicopter
           pilots and 47 percent of the MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter pilots
           that the Army determined were needed to meet planned growth for
           this unit. According to Army officials, the capacity of the school
           that trains new pilots has been insufficient to meet the
           requirements for future personnel levels. Officials stated that
           the Special Operations Command has provided additional funding
           beginning in fiscal year 2006 for the school to hire a greater
           number of instructors, which will increase the capacity of the
           school to train these pilots.
           o  The Air Force has not produced a sufficient number of active
           duty enlisted special tactics personnel, such as combat
           controllers and pararescue personnel. For example, from fiscal
           year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Air Force trained only 53
           percent of the active duty enlisted combat controllers and 40
           percent of the active duty enlisted pararescue airmen needed to
           meet authorized personnel levels. Air Force officials stated that
           several constraints have limited the number of students who could
           attend the schools that train these personnel. Officials explained
           the Air Force has taken steps to increase the number of personnel
           that will graduate from its special tactics training programs. For
           example, in August 2005, the Air Force began construction on a new
           classroom and aquatic facility to train greater numbers of combat
           controllers, and it recently opened a new combat dive course to
           meet both combat controller and pararescue training requirements.
           Such measures are intended to reduce the constraints on the
           ability of the Air Force to train new special tactics personnel.
           o  From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Naval
           Special Warfare Command did not produce an adequate number of
           enlisted SEALs to sustain authorized personnel levels. While the
           Naval Special Warfare Command needed to graduate 200 new enlisted
           SEALs each year to meet authorized personnel levels, only about
           150 new enlisted personnel graduated each year during this period.
           In addition, Navy officials stated that to meet the planned growth
           for SEALs, the Naval Special Warfare Command must produce 250
           enlisted SEALs annually. According to Navy officials, it has
           recruited an insufficient number of enlisted candidates who could
           successfully pass the physical test to qualify for SEAL training.
           As a result, the Navy has not filled the SEAL school to capacity
           each year, and this in turn has resulted in insufficient numbers
           of graduates to fill the requirements for enlisted SEALs.
           According to officials, the Navy began to implement several
           measures in January 2006 that, in part, are intended to increase
           the quantity and quality of enlisted recruits entering SEAL
           training, thereby improving the chances that more of these
           recruits will successfully graduate from the training.27

           Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to Evaluate
			  Human Capital Initiatives
			  
			  The Special Operations Command does not have complete information,
           including measurable performance objectives and goals, to evaluate
           the progress that the Command's service components have made in
           meeting the human capital challenges that could impede the
           Command's ability to achieve planned growth.

           The Special Operations Command has an established program through
           which it monitors the status of its personnel. The goal of the
           program is to ensure there are sufficient numbers of special
           operations forces personnel to meet current and future mission
           requirements. The implementing directive28 requires the special
           operations component commanders to provide the Special Operations
           Command with annual reports that contain data on several topics
           related to the human capital management of special operations
           forces, including personnel inventory levels, accession plans,
           reenlistments and loss management programs, and military education
           opportunities for special operations forces officers. Command
           officials told us they use these reports to monitor the status of
           special operations forces.

           Our analysis of the service components' annual reports for fiscal
           years 2000 through 2005 shows that the reports provide some of the
           information required by the directive, such as information on
           personnel inventory levels and professional military education
           opportunities. However, the reports have not provided information
           for several key requirements called for by the directive that
           would provide information on the service components' progress in
           meeting the planned growth targets. For example, the service
           components are required to provide accession plans for several of
           the special operations occupational specialties, including Army
           Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special tactics
           personnel. The accession plans should provide detailed information
           on the number of new accessions for initial training and
           projections for the following year. Our review of the annual
           reports shows that since fiscal year 2003, none of the service
           components' submissions contained this information.

           Additionally, the directive requires the service components to
           provide detailed analyses to support each category discussed in
           the annual report, including trends developed over recent years
           and predictions for the future. Further, the annual reports should
           fully discuss any concerns by describing the concern in context,
           providing past actions taken to resolve the concern, and
           presenting recommendations to address the concern in the future.
           However, our analysis of the components' annual submissions shows
           that the reports have often failed to provide detailed analyses of
           their human capital challenges and the corrective actions that
           should be taken to address these challenges. For instance:

           o  The U.S. Army Special Operations Command's annual report for
           fiscal year 2005 did not identify a 79 percent personnel fill rate
           for the Special Forces medical sergeant occupational specialty as
           a challenge. However, officials with whom we spoke indicated that
           insufficient numbers of these personnel have limited both the
           operational capabilities of some deployed Special Forces units and
           the ability to provide medical life-support to personnel in these
           units. In other cases, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's
           annual reports identified challenges but did not propose
           corrective actions. For example, the report for fiscal year 2005
           states a concern that, because the 160th Special Operations
           Aviation Regiment had insufficient training resources, it produced
           only 50 percent of the requirement for MH-47 Chinook helicopter
           pilots. However, the report did not discuss in detail what actions
           should be taken to address this challenge.
           o  Since its fiscal year 2000 annual report, the Air Force Special
           Operations Command has identified a concern that the experience
           level of its rated pilots has been decreasing. As a result, there
           have been an insufficient number of aircraft commanders and
           instructor pilots within several of the special operations
           squadrons. However, the Air Force Special Operations Command's
           annual reports do not contain any information to support the
           specific decrease in the number of experienced pilots in its
           special operations forces units. Moreover, the reports do not
           specify how the actions taken to address the issue have impacted
           the level of experience of pilots, or what further actions are
           needed to address this challenge. In addition, although the combat
           controller and pararescue occupational specialties have been
           underfilled since at least fiscal year 2000, the Air Force's
           annual reports have not provided detailed information on the
           specific actions that should be taken to overcome the challenges
           of low personnel inventory levels in these specialties.
           o  The Naval Special Warfare Command's annual reports have
           consistently identified a critical challenge regarding the
           insufficient number of new enlisted Navy SEALs who have graduated
           from the school each year. Further, the reports provide some
           information on the actions taken in the previous fiscal year to
           address this concern. However, the annual reports have not
           included detailed information on the Naval Special Warfare
           Command's accession plans, or the effects that recruit shortfalls
           have had on personnel inventory levels, which are specifically
           required by the directive.

           Furthermore, the service components' annual reports lack
           performance objectives and goals that link key personnel data with
           future growth plans and assessments of personnel needs. Our prior
           work has shown that high-performing organizations use relevant and
           reliable data to determine performance objectives and goals that
           enable them to evaluate the success of their human capital
           approaches. These organizations identify current and future human
           capital needs, including the appropriate number of employees, the
           key competencies and skills mix for mission accomplishment, and
           the appropriate deployment of staff across the organization, and
           then create strategies for identifying and filling gaps.29
           However, our analysis of the Command's Directive 600-7 shows that
           the requirements for the annual reports do not include
           instructions for the service components to develop performance
           objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned
           growth. As an example, the Command requires the service components
           to provide personnel reenlistment data within these reports.
           Specifically, the Command requires information and analysis on the
           number of eligible special operations forces personnel who chose
           to reenlist and comparative information on the number of personnel
           reenlistments in each military service. However, the service
           components' annual reports do not clearly link the number of
           experienced warfighters who have been retained with the number who
           are needed to meet planned growth. This is particularly important
           because the parent military services have not set goals for the
           reenlistments of their special operations forces personnel in a
           way that is clearly linked with the planned growth in these
           forces. Each of the active component military services tracks
           retention according to years of service and whether a
           servicemember is on a first, second, or subsequent enlistment.30

           Moreover, the Special Operations Command has not established
           specific performance objectives or goals for the special
           operations forces retention initiative that DOD authorized in
           December 2004. As a result, it is difficult to assess the progress
           that DOD has had with this initiative in retaining a sufficient
           number of experienced personnel to meet planned growth-a key
           rationale for the initiative. Many of the special operations
           forces servicemembers who were eligible for the bonuses offered as
           part of this initiative did reenlist, as shown by information
           provided to us. However, Special Operations Command officials were
           unable to provide specific goals to measure the effectiveness of
           the retention initiatives because they lacked clear performance
           objectives that are linked to comprehensive analyses of personnel
           needs.

           Special Operations Command officials stated the Command had not
           fully enforced the reporting requirements in its directive because
           it is outdated and some of the information required in the annual
           reports is less relevant, given the Command's expanded role in the
           Global War on Terrorism. However, the Command most recently
           updated this directive in April 2003, and at that time, it
           maintained the annual reporting requirements. In addition,
           officials stated that data and information on the status of
           special operations forces personnel are available to the Special
           Operations Command through other processes, including monthly and
           quarterly readiness reports, monthly personnel status summaries,
           and annual conferences hosted by the Command to discuss personnel
           issues. The Defense Manpower Data Center also provides the Command
           with analyses on the trends in the continuation rates of special
           operations forces personnel.31 While these processes may provide
           information on the status of special operations forces, they do
           not provide detailed analyses and discussions of concerns and
           corrective actions that are required by the Command's directive.
           In addition, the annual reports are a means by which the Command
           has provided information to stakeholders within the
           department-including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
           the military services-on the status of special operations forces.
           Without complete information on human capital challenges, the
           Special Operations Command will be unable to determine whether the
           service components' human capital management approaches, including
           their recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be
           effective in meeting the planned growth targets.

           More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training;
			  Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect
			  
			  Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced
           a substantial increase in the deployment of personnel for
           operations and a simultaneous decrease in the deployment of
           personnel for training. To its credit, the Special Operations
           Command has taken action to manage the challenge of increased
           deployments by establishing a policy intended to maintain the
           readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces
           personnel. However, the Command's service components have not yet
           consistently or fully implemented this policy.

           Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and Decrease
			  in Training
			  
			  The Special Operations Command Directive 525-132 establishes the
           Command's policy to collect and monitor information on the
           deployments of special operations forces personnel. Accordingly,
           the Command gathers deployment information on a weekly basis from
           the service components and the geographic combatant commands.
           These reports include information on the number of special
           operations forces personnel and special operations forces units
           that are deployed around the world. In addition, the components
           report the type of the deployment, such as deployments for
           operations or for training. From these weekly updates, the Special
           Operations Command develops a comprehensive deployed forces
           report, which is presented to the Commander of the Special
           Operations Command and included in updates for the Chairman of the
           Joint Chiefs of Staff.

           Our review of Special Operations Command data shows that since
           fiscal year 2000, deployments of special operations forces
           personnel have substantially increased. Specifically, as shown in
           figure 2, the average weekly number of deployed special operations
           forces personnel was 64 percent, or about 3,100 personnel, greater
           in fiscal year 2005 than in fiscal year 2000.

           Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces
           Deployed Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005

           Our analysis also shows that the vast majority of recent
           deployments outside of the United States were to the Central
           Command area of responsibility, which accounted for 85 percent of
           deployed special operations forces in fiscal year 2005.
           Significantly, more than 99 percent of these deployments supported
           ongoing combat operations. In contrast, in fiscal year 2000, only
           20 percent of special operations forces deployments were to the
           Central Command. As shown in figure 3, the percentage of special
           operations forces personnel deployed to the European Command, the
           Pacific Command, and the Southern Command decreased between fiscal
           year 2000 and fiscal year 2005.

Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities

10 DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
(February 2006).

11 In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander
refers to a commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in
response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
the context of a support-command relationship, the supported commander
receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and is
responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands what
assistance is required.

Organization of Special Operations Forces

12 In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of
a Marine Corps component to the Special Operations Command. Current DOD
plans call for Marine Corps special operations forces personnel to total
about 2,500 personnel by fiscal year 2011.

13 DOD's military forces consist of the active components (Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force) and the reserve and National Guard components
(Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,
Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve).

14 DOD plans call for the Special Operations Command to transfer all
reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel to
the U.S. Army Reserve Command by fiscal year 2007. Currently, all active
component and reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
forces are assigned to the Special Operations Command, even though the
reserve component forces primarily support conventional Army forces. The
Special Operations Command believes that reassigning the operational
control of these forces to the Army will enable conventional Army units to
train with their full complement of capabilities, including Civil Affairs
and Psychological Operations, prior to a deployment, thereby enhancing
combat readiness. The active component Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations forces, who support special operations forces, will continue to
be assigned to the Special Operations Command. In addition, the Command
will retain the responsibility for training reserve component Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel and the research and
development responsibility for Psychological Operations equipment.

Service                                                                 
component    Type of unit          Description                          
Army         Special Forces        Perform foreign internal defense,    
                                      unconventional warfare, special      
                                      reconnaissance, direct action, and   
                                      counterterrorism operations          
                Rangers               Light infantry units specializing in a
                                      range of missions, including direct  
                                      action and personnel recovery        
                Rotary Wing Aviation  Provide aviation support to special  
                                      operations forces                    
                Civil Affairs         Provide civil-military operations    
                                      support to general purpose forces and
                                      special operations forces at the     
                                      tactical, operational, and strategic 
                                      levels                               
                Psychological         Plan and execute psychological       
                Operations            operations at the tactical,          
                                      operational, and strategic levels    
                Support and           Provide combat service support to Army
                Communication Units   special operations forces or forces  
                                      supporting the geographic combatant  
                                      commander                            
Air Force    Fixed Wing Aviation   Multiple variants of the C-130       
                Squadrons             modified for refueling, mobility,    
                                      psychological operations, and        
                                      precision strike                     
                Rotary Wing Aviation  Provide mobility for special operations
                Squadrons             forces and combat search and rescue  
                Special Tactics       Combat controllers, pararescue, and  
                Squadrons             combat weather personnel capable of  
                                      controlling fire support and providing
                                      medical and weather support          
                Combat Aviation       Assess, train, advise, and assist    
                Advisor Squadron      foreign aviation forces in airpower  
                                      employment, sustainment, and force   
                                      integration                          
                Unmanned Aerial       Provide unmanned aerial vehicle support
                Vehicle Squadron      to special operations forces         
Navy         Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Multipurpose units trained and       
                Teams                 equipped to conduct a variety of     
                                      missions in all operational          
                                      environments                         
                SEAL Delivery Vehicle Specially trained personnel who operate
                Teams                 and maintain various systems, including
                                      dry dock shelters and SEAL delivery  
                                      vehicles                             
                Special Boat Teams    Special warfare combatant crewmen who
                                      operate and maintain various naval   
                                      special warfare boats                
Marine Corps Foreign Military      Provide tailored military, combat    
                Training Units        skills training, and advisor support 
                                      for identified foreign forces        
                Special Operations    Perform special reconnaissance, direct
                Companies             action, and foreign internal defense 
                                      operations                           
                Special Operations    Provide specific support capabilities
                Support Group         for worldwide special operations     
                                      missions, including combined arms, K-9
                                      support, communications support, and 
                                      combat service support               

 Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel Requirements Are
               Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress

DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requirements for
Additional Special Operations Forces Warfighters

15 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on matters involving special operations.

16 DOD, Special Operations Forces Realignment Study (December 2002).

17 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006).

18 In addition to the increases in the number of new units, the Air Force
plans to increase the number of personnel in existing special tactics and
combat aviation advisor squadrons.

                                                    Number of     
                                                 warfighter units 
Service                                                        Fiscal year 
component    Type of unit                     Fiscal year 2001        2011 
Army         Special Forces Battalions                      15         19a 
                Aviation Battalions                             3           4 
                Ranger Companies                               12          15 
                Civil Affairs Companies                         5          16 
                Psychological Operations                       12          17 
                Companies                                         
Air Force    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron                0           1 
                Intelligence Squadron                           0           1 
Navy         SEAL Team Equivalents                           8          10 
Marine Corps Foreign Military Training                       0           2 
                Companies                                         
                Marine Special Operations                       0           9 
                Companies                                         

DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command's Headquarters to Meet Expanded
Mission, Although Analyses Are Still in Progress

19 10 U.S.C. S:167(e).

20 GAO-04-39 .

Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command Face
                    Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals

The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Have Taken Measures to
Recruit, Train, and Retain Greater Numbers of Special Operations Forces
Personnel

  Increased Recruiting Goals

21 The military services delineate their force structure through
occupational specialties, which represent the jobs that are necessary to
meet their specific missions.

  Expanded Training Capacity

22 From fiscal years 2000 through 2001, all of the recruits for Army
Special Forces training were serving in the military. In fiscal year 2002,
the Army established a goal of 400 accessions for an initial accessions
program, which brings new Army recruits directly into Special Forces
training. The Army increased the goal for these recruits from 400 in
fiscal year 2002 to 1,500 in fiscal year 2005.

23 The Air Force trains pararescue and combat weather personnel for
conventional units and special operations forces units. In order to be
fully qualified for special operations missions, these personnel undergo
additional special tactics training.

  Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel

Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations
Forces Training Graduates May Limit the Special Operations Command's Ability to
Meet Future Growth Targets

  Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Forces Occupational
  Specialties May Limit Future Growth

24 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).

25 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7 identifies the occupational
specialties on which the Command's service components report personnel
data. The service components report these data to the Special Operations
Command on an annual basis.

26 Our analysis also shows that to a lesser extent, some active component
occupational specialties in the Command's directive were overfilled. For
example, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 9 percent to 21
percent of these specialties were overfilled each year by an amount
ranging from less than 5 percent to 80 percent. Except in a few cases,
these specialties were overfilled by less than 30 personnel.

Fiscal year                                  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of occupational specialties             33   34   37   38   38   38 
Number of occupational specialties             27   27   31   28   33   31 
underfilled                                                           
Percentage of occupational specialties        82%  79%  84%  74%  87%  82% 
underfilled                                                           

  Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Personnel Graduates

Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to Evaluate Human
Capital Initiatives

27 These measures include requiring SEAL candidates to pass a physical
screening test prior to the issuance of a SEAL enlistment contract and
prior to shipping to Recruit Training Command; hiring former special
operations forces personnel at each Naval Recruiting District to test,
screen, and mentor SEAL candidates; increasing the initial enlistment
bonus for SEAL recruits to the maximum authorized level of $40,000; and
improving the amount of physical training time at basic training by 300
percent, among other initiatives.

28 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7, Monitorship Program Policy
and Procedures (April 2003).

29 GAO, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain
Momentum of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).

30 The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), midcareer (second or subsequent enlistment with up
to 10 years of service), and career (second or subsequent enlistment with
10 or more years of service). The Navy's retention categories are Zone A
(up to 6 years of service), Zone B (6 years to 10 years of service), Zone
C (10 to 14 years of service), Zone D (14 to 19 years of service), and
Zone E (20 or more years of service). Through June 2005, the Air Force
tracked retention by first term (first enlistment, regardless of length),
second term (second enlistment), and career (third or subsequent
enlistment). Beginning in July 2005, the Air Force changed from reporting
reenlistment rates as the primary retention measure to calculating a
retention metric, Average Career Length, which factors in losses that
occur at all years of service.

31 Continuation rates are calculated by determining the number of
personnel who remain on active duty from one year to the next, and are an
alternative method to track retention.

  More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training; Special
              Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect

Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and Decrease in Training

32 Special Operations Command Directive 525-1, Deployed Forces Report
(March 2004).

Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed to
the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2005

While special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in
deployments for operations, there has been a simultaneous decrease in
deployments for training. As shown in table 4, from fiscal year 2000
through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of special operations forces
personnel deployed for operations increased, while the percentage of
personnel deployed for training decreased.

Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed for
Training, Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005

Deployment        Fiscal    Fiscal    Fiscal    Fiscal    Fiscal    Fiscal 
category       year 2000 year 2001 year 2002 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 
Training             61%       58%       30%       16%       17%       17% 
Operations           31%       31%       65%       81%       80%       80% 
Other                 8%       11%        5%        3%        3%        4% 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

The decrease in deployments for training appears to have had at least two
effects. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, for example, the
amount of time for which special operations forces deployed for training
to maintain proficiency in battle skills33 decreased by 50 percent.
Officials with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components told us
that since many of their units have been deployed to the Central Command
area of responsibility, they have had fewer opportunities to conduct
proficiency training for all mission tasks. As a result, special
operations forces units are focusing their training on the tasks that are
required for operations in the Central Command and are assuming some risk
by not training for other mission tasks. For example, officials with the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command told us that specialized training
such as military free fall and underwater combat operations have been
reduced to a minimum, since these skills are not required to support
ongoing operations.

Similarly, officials with the Air Force Special Operations Command stated
that increased deployments for operations had affected the ability of its
air crews and special tactics squadrons to achieve all required
mission-essential training. However, officials stated that this has not
degraded overall readiness, because not all of these training tasks are
currently being performed in the Central Command. In addition, officials
stated that if mission priorities were to shift away from the Central
Command and different missions needed to be performed, not all of its
special operations forces personnel would be required to have achieved
those training tasks in order for a mission to be successfully carried
out.

Additionally, although our analysis shows that special operations forces
deployed less frequently for skills proficiency training from fiscal year
2000 through fiscal year 2005, we were told that the amount of training
that special operations forces accomplished may not have been greatly
affected. In particular, we were told that Army special operations forces
units do not necessarily have to deploy in order to accomplish training
that can be done at their home station. In addition, the fact that many
special operations forces units are deploying for combat operations
results in ample opportunities to maintain proficiency in essential
skills. Officials with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command explained
that special operations forces no longer train to fight because they are
training as they fight. However, not all special operations forces can
accomplish training tasks at their home station. According to Naval
Special Warfare Command officials, Naval Special Warfare units do not have
adequate home station training ranges and are required to deploy in order
achieve most training tasks. Yet, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year
2005, the amount of time that Naval Special Warfare personnel deployed for
skills proficiency training decreased by more than 30 percent.

33 Battle skills proficiency training includes the deployment of
individuals or units for a range of purposes, such as advanced
occupational specialty training, language training, or unit battle drills.

Special operations forces have also deployed less frequently to train with
foreign military forces overseas. As we have previously reported, this
type of training is important because it enables special operations forces
to practice mission skills such as providing military instruction in a
foreign language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with
local geography and cultures, which are essential in the foreign internal
defense and unconventional warfare missions.34 These deployments of
special operations forces to train with the armed forces and other
security forces of friendly foreign countries are commonly referred to as
joint combined exchange training. Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year
2005, however, the amount of time in which special operations forces
personnel deployed for joint combined exchange training decreased by 53
percent.

Our analysis of DOD data reported to the Congress35 also shows the
participation of special operations forces in joint combined exchange
training events decreased since fiscal year 2000. As shown in figure 4,
from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the number of these events
that special operations forces completed decreased by about 50 percent.
Further analysis shows that the number of events conducted in most of the
geographic combatant command areas of responsibility decreased from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005. Specifically, joint combined exchange
training events conducted in the European Command decreased by about 75
percent, while events conducted in the Southern Command and Pacific
Command also decreased during this time. Conversely, the number of such
training events conducted in the Central Command increased from 7
exercises in fiscal year 2000 to 14 exercises in fiscal year 2005.36

34 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 .

35 Section 2011 of Title 10, U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Defense
to submit an annual report to the Congress regarding training for which
expenses are paid under this section. The report is to include the type
and location of training conducted, the extent of participation by foreign
military forces, the relationship of that training to other overseas
training programs, a summary of expenditures under this section, and a
discussion of the unique military training benefit derived from the
training activities.

Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and Completed,
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005

The increase in the amount of time that special operations forces have
deployed to support operations in the Central Command has, to some extent,
resulted in an increase in the number of cancelled joint combined exchange
training events. Officials with the Special Operations Command, European
Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command with whom we spoke stated
that joint combined exchange training can be cancelled for various
reasons, including the availability of funding for the training, the
availability of host nation forces, or the operations tempo37 of U.S.
special operations forces. Officials stated, however, that due to the
increased requirement for special operations forces deployments to support
operations in the Central Command, there has been a corresponding increase
in the number of cancelled joint combined exchange training events. Our
analysis shows that from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the
percentage of cancelled training events due to the operations tempo of
special operations forces increased from 0 percent to more than 60
percent.

36 The Northern Command was established on October 1, 2002, to provide
command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate
military assistance to civil authorities. Special operations forces
conducted one joint combined exchange training event in the Northern
Command in fiscal year 2005.

37 Operations tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of a
unit or platform.

While the primary purpose of joint combined exchange training is to train
U.S. forces, this training can also have an ancillary benefit in that it
can be used by the geographic combatant commanders and ambassadors to
fulfill regional and country engagement objectives. For instance, the
geographic combatant commands use joint combined exchange training to help
achieve foreign engagement objectives in their designated areas of
responsibility. DOD documents regarding the department's strategy for the
Global War on Terrorism identify combined training, such as joint combined
exchange training, as an important element to strengthen partner nations'
counterterrorism capabilities. However, with continuing support being
required for operations in the Central Command's area of responsibility,
there have been fewer special operations forces available to execute these
types of training activities.

Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manage Increased
Deployments, but the Policy Has Not Been Consistently or Fully Implemented

The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of
increased personnel deployments. Monitoring the status of personnel
deployments has been an area of congressional and DOD concern. The
management of personnel tempo38 is important to the quality of life and
retention of military personnel. Section 991 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code
states that the deployment (or potential deployment) of a member of the
Armed Forces shall be managed. Moreover, DOD has recognized that failure
to effectively manage personnel tempo can result in the continued loss of
trained personnel, a consequent loss of readiness capability, and an
increased recruiting challenge. In addition, we have previously reported
that high personnel tempo for special operations forces can affect
readiness, retention, and morale.39

38 Personnel tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of any
one person.

39 GAO, Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and
Misuse, GAO/NSIAD-97-85 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1997).

In August 2005, the Special Operations Command established a policy
intended to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of active duty
special operations forces personnel.40 The policy requires the Command's
active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at their
home station as they do deployed for operations and training. The policy
also requires that the Special Operations Command's service components
develop internal tracking mechanisms to ensure that their active duty
special operations forces personnel remain within the policy's deployment
requirements.41 However, the Command's service components have not
consistently or fully implemented the deployment policy.

One challenge lies in the fact that the policy's guidelines are not clear.
Officials with the Command's service components noted a lack of clear
guidance regarding how the components should implement the deployment
guidelines, and consequently they were implementing it differently from
one another. For example, the policy does not identify the length of time
for which the components must ensure that personnel remain within the
deployment guidelines. In addition, it does not state whether a
servicemember must remain at a home station immediately following one
deployment for an equal amount of time before a next deployment. Because
of the lack of clear guidance, the Special Operations Command's service
components have had to interpret the intent of the policy's requirements
to ensure that their personnel remain in compliance.

A second challenge lies in the difficulty of achieving full
implementation. Officials with the Naval Special Warfare Command stated
that they have been unable to comply with the deployment guidelines
because personnel lack adequate home station training ranges.
Specifically, Naval Special Warfare personnel must deploy for both unit
training and operations. This combination of deployments has resulted in
personnel having exceeded the policy's requirement. Naval Special Warfare
Command officials indicated that they were working with the Special
Operations Command and the Navy to implement the deployment policy.
According to Navy officials, the Navy plans to provide the Naval Special
Warfare Command with additional funds to improve the home station ranges
used to train the SEAL force, which is anticipated to reduce the current
pace of operations tempo due to deployments for training. However, because
these personnel have been required to deploy for most unit training, they
have been unable to comply with the policy's requirement.

40 United States Special Operations Command Deployment Red Line Policy
(August 2, 2005).

41 According to the policy, a servicemember can volunteer for an exception
to the policy's requirement by signing a volunteer statement and having it
endorsed by his chain-of-command.

To determine whether special operations forces are meeting the intent of
the policy requires the service components to maintain internal tracking
systems with complete, valid, and reliable data on their personnel
deployments. However, officials with the Command's Army and Navy
components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the information
they use to track the individual deployments of their personnel.

While we did not independently validate the reliability of the data for
personnel deployments, an official with the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command stated the Army did not have a high level of confidence in the
data recorded by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's units in the
Army's system on personnel deployments. Officials told us that they are
developing a separate internal management tool in order to fully comply
with the deployment policy; however, that tool will not be ready until
July 2006.

Naval Special Warfare Command officials told us that comprehensive
reporting of personnel tempo information was suspended after the onset of
the Global War on Terrorism. The reporting of this information was
suspended because the Naval Special Warfare Command could not meet the
Navy's personnel tempo standards due to an increase in the pace of
deployments in support of ongoing operations. As a result, the Naval
Special Warfare Command does not have comprehensive and reliable data on
Naval Special Warfare personnel deployments. Officials stated that the
Naval Special Warfare Command was in the process of reestablishing
personnel tempo reporting with a goal of full reporting for all units by
the end of April 2006.

Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does
not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel
deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command's
ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special
operations forces personnel.

                                  Conclusions

The decision by DOD to expand the responsibilities of the Special
Operations Command in the Global War on Terrorism has created new
challenges to determine personnel requirements and acquire, train, and
equip a greater number of warfighters to support ongoing military
operations. The Congress and DOD have provided resources to enable the
Command to augment its personnel. Given the Command's expanded mission,
however, it is critical that the Command complete its analyses of
personnel requirements and fully determine the number of personnel, who
possess the right knowledge and skill sets, for the Command to meet its
new role. Without this information, the Command cannot reasonably assure
the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that the currently planned
growth in the number of personnel for the Command will meet, exceed, or
fall short of the requirements necessary to carry out its expanded
mission.

The military services and the Special Operations Command have faced human
capital challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining a sufficient
number of these forces, and many of these challenges continue. In large
part, these challenges are attributable to the rigorous selection and
training processes set for these personnel. Nonetheless, we believe the
Command would be better able to address these challenges if it had a
clearer understanding of the progress its service components have made in
achieving planned growth, which is clearly linked with appropriate goals
and measures. Furthermore, the Command is attempting to meet its growth
goals at a time of heightened personnel deployments. However, the Command
is managing these deployments without reliable data. Such information
would further enable the Command to meet the full range of its missions
while maintaining the readiness, retention, and training of its personnel.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command, to

           1. establish specific milestones for completing the Command's
           ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed,
           make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel
           increases for the Command's headquarters and related future
           funding requests;
           2. revise the Command's directive for its program to monitor the
           status of special operations forces to include performance
           objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned
           growth; and enforce all of the directive's reporting requirements;
           and
           3. clarify the methodology that the Command's service components
           should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to
           ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place
           that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one
recommendation and partially concurred with our two remaining
recommendations. DOD's comments are included in appendix III. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Special
Operations Command to establish specific milestones for completing its
ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any
needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for the
Command's headquarters in related future funding requests. DOD stated that
the personnel requirements for the Command's headquarters are being
determined by an extensive study scheduled for completion in March 2007.
DOD stated that it will monitor the progress and validate the results of
this study, which we believe to be important steps. However, as we noted
in this report, DOD has already requested funding to substantially
increase the number of military and civilian positions at the Command's
headquarters beginning in fiscal year 2007, without the benefit of the
results from the Command's study of personnel needs. As a result, we would
expect DOD to re-evaluate its funding needs upon completion of the
Command's study, and adjust its requests accordingly.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to require the Special Operations
Command to revise the Command's directive for its program to monitor the
status of special operations forces, to include performance objectives,
goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned growth, and enforce
all of the directive's reporting requirements. DOD stated that the Special
Operations Command is updating the directive for its program to monitor
the status of special operations forces, and that the department and the
Command are continuously developing new tools and metrics to more
accurately measure the actual health of special operations forces. DOD
further stated that it is difficult to compare personnel data across the
services because each of the Command's service components presents data
using the metrics of its parent service, adding that it is highly
desirable to have each component format its service-derived data in a
common database. While we recognize the military services have different
metrics, the intent of our recommendation is that the Special Operations
Command develop a set of reporting metrics that would give the Command the
data it needs to monitor progress in meeting growth goals.

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
Special Operations Command to clarify the methodology that its service
components use for enforcing the Command's deployment policy, and take
steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place
that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. DOD
stated that the Special Operations Command leadership and all of its
service components have implemented the Command's deployment policy, which
is in compliance with the department's force deployment rules for
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In addition, DOD stated
that the department will work toward developing a multi-service database
and metrics to standardize deployment and other metrics across the joint
community to overcome the challenge associated with the fact that each
service uses different metrics for calculating deployment time. While we
recognize the use of different metrics presents a challenge, our point, as
we state in this report, is that the Command's policy is unclear
concerning the length of time for which the components must ensure that
personnel remain within the deployment guidelines, and whether a
servicemember must remain at a home station immediately following one
deployment for an equal amount of time prior to a subsequent deployment.
As a result, the Command's service components have interpreted the intent
of the policy's requirements inconsistently. We continue to believe that
additional clarification to the Command's deployment policy is warranted
to assist its service components in ensuring that special operations
forces personnel remain in compliance with this policy. We also believe
that the planned actions to standardize deployment and other metrics
should include establishing procedures for recording reliable and relevant
data on personnel deployments since, as we reported, officials with two of
the Special Operations Command's service components did not have
confidence in the reliability of the information that was used to track
the individual deployments of their special operations forces personnel.
Such data are an important tool to enable the Command to maintain the
readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces personnel.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Sharon L. Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command (Command) has
identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded
mission, we identified the Joint Mission Analysis process and the
Command's formal manpower studies as the primary processes in which the
Command develops its force structure and personnel requirements. To assess
the plans to increase the number of special operations forces units and
personnel requirements for the Command's headquarters, we conducted site
visits and interviewed officials involved with determining personnel
requirements with the Special Operations Command, and the Army, Navy, and
Air Force service components. We also met with Marine Corps officials to
discuss plans for growth in Marine Corps special operations forces. We
analyzed the plans for growth in these personnel through fiscal year 2011.
We reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) documents identifying the
increases in the Special Operations Command's military authorizations and
funding since fiscal year 2000 and its plans for personnel growth through
fiscal year 2011. We reviewed past reports prepared by GAO that discuss
effective strategies for workforce planning. However, we were unable to
determine whether all of the Special Operations Command's personnel
requirements had been identified because, at the time of our review, the
Command had not completed all of its analyses of the personnel
requirements needed for its expanded mission responsibilities.

To assess the progress the military services and the Special Operations
Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of
special operations forces personnel, we discussed the processes used by
the military services and DOD to recruit, train, and retain these forces
with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special
Operations Command, and the military services. We focused on these
processes for the active components of the military services. To determine
what challenges the military services and the Special Operations Command
face to meet future growth, we analyzed personnel inventory levels for
special operations forces in the active component military services for
fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We collected and analyzed data to
determine whether the schools that train new special operations personnel
are producing enough newly trained personnel in order to meet current
authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets. We reviewed
relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed annual reports
prepared by the service components to determine the extent to which the
information in these reports met reporting requirements.

To assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments,
we analyzed deployment data from the Special Operations Command for fiscal
years 2000 through 2005. We analyzed the trends in deployments for
operations, training, and administrative activities and the trends in
deployments by geographic region. We discussed the impact of decreased
deployments for training and increased deployments for operations with
officials from the military services and the Special Operations Command.
We reviewed the Special Operations Command's policy to manage special
operations forces personnel deployments and conducted interviews with
component command officials to determine their ability to implement and
fully comply with this policy. We reviewed available data for
inconsistencies. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some
concerns which are discussed in this report. Specifically, some of the
personnel inventory data provided by the military service headquarters
were incomplete. To overcome this challenge, we gathered additional
information from the Special Operations Command's service components. In
addition, we interviewed officials with the service headquarters and the
Special Operations Command's service components who were knowledgeable
about the data to discuss the validity of the information provided to us.
We concluded the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives.
We conducted our review from April 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following
locations:

Army

           o  U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
           o  U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia
           o  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North
           Carolina

           Navy

           o  Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia
           o  Naval Recruiting Command, Millington, Tennessee
           o  Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California

           Marine Corps

           o  U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

           Air Force

           o  U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
           o  Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base,
           Texas
           o  Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida

           Office of the Secretary of Defense

           o  Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington,
           D.C.
           o  Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),
           Washington, D.C.
           o  Office of the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low
           Intensity Conflict), Washington, D.C.

           Unified Commands

           o  U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Germany
           o  U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
           o  U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
           o  U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
           Florida
           o  U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida

Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special
Operations Command

           Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over
           which the Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar
           as they relate to special operations. Table 5 defines these
           activities.

Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command

Activity                  Description                                      
Direct Action             Short duration strikes and other small-scale     
                             offensive actions undertaken to seize, destroy,  
                             capture, recover, or inflict damage on           
                             designated personnel or materials.               
Strategic Reconnaissancea Reconnaissance and surveillance actions          
                             conducted to obtain or verify, by visual         
                             observation or other collection methods,         
                             information concerning the capabilities,         
                             intentions, and activities of an actual or       
                             potential enemy or to secure data concerning the 
                             meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic      
                             characteristics of a particular area.            
Unconventional Warfare    A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary    
                             operations, normally of long duration,           
                             predominately conducted by indigenous or         
                             surrogate forces that are organized, trained,    
                             equipped, supported, and directed in varying     
                             degrees by an external source.                   
Foreign Internal Defense  Participation by civilian and military agencies  
                             of a government in any of the action programs    
                             taken by another government to free and protect  
                             its society from subversion, lawlessness, and    
                             insurgency.                                      
Civil Affairs             Operations that establish, maintain, influence,  
                             or exploit relations between military forces,    
                             government and nongovernment civilian            
                             organizations and authorities, and the civilian  
                             populace in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas  
                             of operations in order to facilitate military    
                             operations and consolidate and achieve U.S.      
                             national objectives.                             
Psychological Operations  Planned operations to convey selected            
                             information and indicators to foreign audiences  
                             to influence their emotions, motives, objective  
                             reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of        
                             foreign governments, organizations, groups, and  
                             individuals.                                     
Counterterrorism          Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and  
                             respond to terrorism.                            
Humanitarian Assistance   Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the      
                             results of natural or man-made disasters or      
                             other endemic conditions such as human pain,     
                             disease, hunger, or deprivation that might       
                             present a serious threat to life or loss of      
                             property. This assistance supplements or         
                             complements the efforts of host nation civil     
                             authorities or agencies that may have the        
                             primary responsibility for providing this        
                             assistance.                                      
Theater Search and Rescue Actions performed to recover distressed          
                             personnel during wartime or contingency          
                             operations.                                      
Other Activities          Specified by the President or the Secretary of   
                             Defense.                                         

Source: GAO.

aStrategic reconnaissance is commonly referred to as special
reconnaissance by DOD.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

           Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over
           which the Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar
           as they relate to special operations. Table 5 defines these
           activities.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, David Moser, Assistant Director;
John Pendleton, Assistant Director; Colin Chambers, Jeremy Manion,
Stephanie Moriarty, Joseph Rutecki, Christopher Turner, Matthew
Ullengren, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin also made key
contributions to this report.

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onstitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policand
provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to hCongress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. commitment to good
governm

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-812 .

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology,
click on the link above.

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-812 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee
on Government Reform, House of Representatives

July 2006

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role

Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
taken steps to expand the role of the United States Special Operations
Command (Command) and its forces. In response, the Command has transformed
its headquarters to coordinate counterterrorism activities, and DOD has
increased funding and the number of special operations forces positions.
Given the expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel
with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess: (1)
whether the Command has determined all of the personnel requirements
needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress and challenges in
meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of deployments on the Command's
ability to provide trained forces, and the progress made in managing
deployments. GAO performed its work at the Special Operations Command and
its service components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and
examined policies and directives.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to improve the information available to the
Special Operations Command to manage special operations forces personnel.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with GAO's recommendations.

Although DOD plans to significantly increase the number of special
operations forces personnel, the Special Operations Command has not yet
fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its
expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed
to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses
to determine (a) how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip
these additional warfighters or (b) how many headquarters staff are needed
to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks-a new
mission for the Command. DOD plans to begin increasing the number of
headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its
fiscal year 2007 budget request.  Until these analyses are completed, the
Special Operations Command cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of
personnel for the Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short
of the requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission.

The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining
special operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently
low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained
personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DOD's plan to increase the
number of special operations forces. In addition, GAO's review of the
service components' annual reports required by the Special Operations
Command shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to
determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future
requirements. Without such information, the Command will be unable to
determine whether the service components' human capital management
approaches, including recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will
be effective in meeting the planned growth targets.

Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel
deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for
training has simultaneously decreased. The Special Operations Command has
taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in August
2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an equal
amount of time at home as deployed. But the Command's service components
have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because
the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components
must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy guidelines.
In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy service components
expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their information required
to track the deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and
reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have the
information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of
special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the
readiness, retention, and training of these personnel.
*** End of document. ***