Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must
Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role (31-JUL-06, GAO-06-812).
Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has taken steps to expand the role of the United States
Special Operations Command (Command) and its forces. In response,
the Command has transformed its headquarters to coordinate
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased funding and
the number of special operations forces positions. Given the
expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel
with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess:
(1) whether the Command has determined all of the personnel
requirements needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress
and challenges in meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of
deployments on the Command's ability to provide trained forces,
and the progress made in managing deployments. GAO performed its
work at the Special Operations Command and its service
components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and
examined policies and directives.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-812
ACCNO: A57740
TITLE: Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital
Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role
DATE: 07/31/2006
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Combat readiness
Counterterrorism
Military forces
Military personnel
Military personnel deployment
Military personnel retention
Military training
Personnel management
Personnel recruiting
Policy evaluation
Special forces
Special operations
Global War on Terrorism
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-812
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Special Operations Command Legislative Responsibilities
* Expanded Special Operations Command Mission
* Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
* Organization of Special Operations Forces
* Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel
* DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requi
* DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command's Headquarters
* Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Oper
* The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Hav
* Increased Recruiting Goals
* Expanded Training Capacity
* Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
* Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some
* Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Fo
* Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Perso
* Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to E
* More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for T
* Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and
* Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manag
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Speci
* Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
* Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 7
Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel Requirements
Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress 13
Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command
Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals 17
More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training;
Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect 29
Conclusions 37
Recommendations for Executive Action 38
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42
Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command 45
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 46
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49
Tables
Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps 11
Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty Special
Operations Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal
Year 2011 15
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special Operations
Forces Occupational Specialties Underfilled for Fiscal Years 2000 through
2005 22
Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed for
Training, Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005
31
Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command 45
Figures
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special Operations
Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component 10
Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces Deployed
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 30
Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed to
the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2005 31
Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and Completed,
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 34
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
July 31, 2006 July 31, 2006
The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Committee on
Government Reform House of Representatives The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special
Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to train and
equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the
department's geographic combatant commands.1 Since 2003, DOD has taken
several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command to lead
the department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, the
Command has been given the responsibility for planning and synchronizing
DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this expanded mission, the
Command has transformed its headquarters to improve the coordination of
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased the number of military
positions for special operations forces personnel by 12 percent since
fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report states that the department intends to further increase these forces
through fiscal year 2011.212 At DOD's request, the Congress has provided
the Special Operations Command with considerable increases in funding to
support its expanded mission and increase the size of its forces.
Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, funding for
the Command increased from more than $3.8 billion to more than $6.4
billion. The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States
Special Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to
train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the
department's geographic combatant commands. Since 2003, DOD has taken
several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command to lead
the department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, the
Command has been given the responsibility for planning and synchronizing
DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this expanded mission, the
Command has transformed its headquarters to improve the coordination of
counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased the number of military
positions for special operations forces personnel by 12 percent since
fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report states that the department intends to further increase these forces
through fiscal year 2011. At DOD's request, the Congress has provided the
Special Operations Command with considerable increases in funding to
support its expanded mission and increase the size of its forces.
Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, funding for
the Command increased from more than $3.8 billion to more than $6.4
billion.
Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are
specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations
are intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic
objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no
Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are
specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations
are intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic
objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no
conventional force requirement, and they often require covert,
clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. Each of the military services
provides special operations forces to the Special Operations Command, and
thus the military services and the Special Operations Command have a
shared responsibility to ensure that a sufficient number of special
operations forces personnel are available. For example, the military
services recruit new candidates for special operations training, while, in
general, the Special Operations Command provides the combat specialty
training for these forces.
1 The five geographic combatant commands-U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command-are responsible for U.S. military operations within their
areas.
2 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006).
Since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD has deployed
substantial numbers of special operations forces to conduct a range of
military operations. These forces have conducted combat missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq and, in addition, have helped train indigenous
military personnel in these countries and in other parts of the world,
including countries in Asia and Africa, to build the capabilities of
partner nations to combat terrorists more effectively within their own
countries. Several documents published by DOD, including the National
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism,3 emphasize the capabilities provided by special operations
forces. As a result, the increased pace of deployments for these forces is
likely to continue in the near term. Recently, the Special Operations
Command has taken steps to manage the impact of deployments, which has
included establishing policy guidelines for the frequency of personnel
deployments.
This report responds to your request and addresses the following
questions: (1) the extent to which the Special Operations Command has
determined personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission; (2)
what progress the military services and the Special Operations Command
have made since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining
special operations forces personnel, and what challenges they face to meet
future growth; and (3) the effect that deployments since fiscal year 2000
have had on the Special Operations Command's ability to provide an
adequate number of trained forces for the full range of its worldwide
missions, and what progress the Command has made in managing personnel
deployments.
3 See DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
(March 2005), and DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism (February 2006).
To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command has
identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded
mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials involved with
determining personnel requirements with the Special Operations Command,
and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components. We also met
with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for growth in Marine Corps
special operations forces. We analyzed the plans for growth in these
personnel through fiscal year 2011. To assess the progress the military
services and the Special Operations Command have made since fiscal year
2000 in increasing the number of special operations forces personnel, we
discussed the processes used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to recruit,
train, and retain these forces with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Special Operations Command, and the military
services. We focused on these processes for the active components of the
military services. To determine what challenges the military services and
the Special Operations Command face to meet future growth, we analyzed
personnel inventory levels for special operations forces in the active
component military services for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, and we
collected and analyzed data from the schools that train new special
operations forces personnel. In addition, we reviewed relevant Special
Operations Command directives and analyzed the annual reports prepared by
the service components to determine the extent to which the information in
these reports met reporting requirements. To assess the effect of
increased special operations forces deployments, we analyzed the trends in
the deployment of special operations forces for fiscal years 2000 through
2005, and we discussed the impact of deployments with officials from the
Special Operations Command and the military services. We reviewed
available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD
officials. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some concerns that
are discussed in this report; however, we concluded the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review from April
2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology is contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief
The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the
personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While the
Command has determined how many special operations forces personnel it
needs to meet increases in its warfighter units, it has not completed
analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters staff needed to train
and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters
staff needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist
networks. Nevertheless, the department has already made the decision to
increase the number of positions for the Command's headquarters, beginning
with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, by more than 75 percent.
However, this increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of
personnel requirements, given that the Command's analyses were ongoing at
the time of our review. We have previously reported that strategic
workforce planning is essential in that it aligns an organization's human
capital program with its current and emerging mission.4 Until these
analyses are completed, the Special Operations Command cannot provide
assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently
planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command's headquarters
will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the
Command's expanded mission. To address this challenge, GAO is recommending
that the Special Operations Command establish specific milestones for
completing its ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once
completed, make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel
increases for the Command's headquarters and related future funding
requests.
The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
progress from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005 in recruiting,
training, and retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the
military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome
persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of
newly trained special operations forces personnel for some specialties to
meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In
addition, the Special Operations Command does not have complete
information on the human capital challenges it is facing, including low
personnel inventory levels and training limitations, and the planned
corrective actions it needs to evaluate the success of its service
components' human capital approaches in meeting their growth targets. The
military services and the Special Operations Command have achieved
progress by increasing recruiting goals, training greater numbers of new
personnel, and using financial incentives to retain experienced personnel.
However, the military services and the Command face several challenges in
meeting future growth goals. For example, since fiscal year 2000, well
over half of the special operations forces specialties have been
underfilled each year, by an amount ranging from less than 5 percent to
more than 86 percent. As a result, hundreds of authorized positions have
been unfilled each year. Further, our analysis of data reported by the
Army, Navy, and Air Force schools that train new special operations forces
personnel shows the number of personnel who are graduating from these
schools is insufficient in some cases to meet current authorized personnel
levels or planned growth targets. The schools have been unable to graduate
a sufficient number of new special operations forces personnel for several
reasons, including recruiting an inadequate number of servicemembers who
attended the schools each year. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year
2005, for example, the Naval Special Warfare Command did not produce a
sufficient number of enlisted Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) personnel to meet
authorized personnel levels or future growth targets. In addition, our
review of the service components' annual reports required by the Special
Operations Command shows that the reports do not provide information the
Command needs to determine if the services have enough personnel to meet
current and future requirements. Without this information, the Special
Operations Command will be unable to evaluate whether the service
components' human capital management approaches, including their
recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in
meeting the planned growth targets. To address this challenge, GAO is
recommending that the Special Operations Command revise its directive for
its program to monitor the status of special operations forces to include
performance objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving
planned growth, and enforce all of the directive's reporting requirements.
4 GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced a
substantial increase in the number of personnel deployed for operations
and a simultaneous decrease in the number of personnel deployed for
training. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average
weekly number of special operations forces personnel who deployed to the
geographic combatant commands increased by 64 percent, or about 3,100
personnel. The majority have been deployed for operations in the U.S.
Central Command, which accounted for 85 percent of total overseas
deployments in fiscal year 2005. Our analysis also shows that from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, special operations forces deployed
less frequently for training. As a result of this decrease, special
operations forces personnel participated in fewer types of training
events, including theater engagement activities such as joint combined
exchange training.5 As we have previously reported, training overseas with
foreign forces is important, as it enables special operations forces
personnel to maintain language proficiency and familiarity with local
geography and cultures.6 Moreover, DOD documents regarding the
department's strategy for the Global War on Terrorism identify combined
training, such as joint combined exchange training, as an important
element for strengthening partner nations' counterterrorism capabilities.
To its credit, the Special Operations Command has taken action to manage
the challenge of increased deployments. In August 2005, the Command
established a policy that requires active duty personnel to remain at
least an equal amount of time at home as deployed. However, the Command's
service components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy.
This is because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that
the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment
policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy
service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of
information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without
consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have
the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments
of special operations forces, which affects the Command's ability to
maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special operations
forces personnel. To address this challenge, GAO is recommending that the
Special Operations Command clarify the methodology that the Command's
service components use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps
to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place that
utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with GAO's recommendations.
5 Joint combined exchange training is a program conducted overseas to
fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange
the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and host nation counterparts.
Training activities are designed to improve U.S. and host nation
capabilities.
6 GAO, Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined
Exchange Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999).
Background
Special Operations Command Legislative Responsibilities
In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service
special operations capability under a single command.7 In April 1987, the
Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with the
mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces to
DOD's geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S.
Code8 directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be
responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such
command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the
Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct certain
functions relating to special operations activities whether or not they
relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and
submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget
proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to
the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, direction, and
control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned forces; and
monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and
professional military education of special operations forces officers.
In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be
responsible for the following activities as they relate to special
operations: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3)
unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs,
(6) psychological operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian
assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such
as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.9
Appendix II defines these activities assigned to the Special Operations
Command. DOD has also assigned additional activities to the Special
Operations Command.
Expanded Special Operations Command Mission
Over the past 3 years, DOD has expanded the role of the Special Operations
Command to include responsibility for planning and leading the
department's efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to
training, organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special
operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders, the Command has
the mission to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global
operations against terrorist networks. The specific responsibilities
assigned to the Special Operations Command include:
7 Pub. L. No. 99-591, S: 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. S:
167).
8 10 U.S.C. S: 167(e).
9 10 U.S.C. S: 167(j).
o integrating DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and
operations against terrorist networks designated by the Secretary
of Defense;
o planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks;
o prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation
activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns
against designated terrorist networks in coordination with the
geographic combatant commanders;
o exercising command and control of operations in support of
selected campaigns, as directed; and
o providing military representation to U.S. national and
international agencies for matters related to U.S. and
multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks, as
directed by the Secretary of Defense.
In addition, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism10 establishes the approach DOD will take in fulfilling
its role within the larger national strategy for combating
terrorism. The strategy provides guidance on the department's
military objectives and their relative priority in the allocation
of resources. In addition, this strategy implements the
designation of the Special Operations Command as the supported
combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed,
executing global operations against terrorist networks.11
Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
The Special Operations Command has received considerable increases
in funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the Global War
on Terrorism. Specifically, funding for the Command has increased
from more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4
billion in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the Command received
more than $5 billion in supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2005. During this time, funding for military
personnel costs for the Special Operations Command increased by
more than $800 million, representing a 53 percent increase. DOD
plans further increases in funding for the Command. The
President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Special
Operations Command is $8 billion, and the department plans
additional increases for the Command through fiscal year 2011.
Organization of Special Operations Forces
The Special Operations Command is comprised of special operations
forces from each of the military services. In fiscal year 2005,
personnel authorizations for Army special operations forces
military personnel totaled more than 30,000, the Air Force 11,501,
the Navy 6,255, and the Marine Corps 79.12 Roughly one-third of
special operations forces military personnel were in DOD's reserve
components,13 including the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserve, and
the Army and Air National Guard.14 Figure 1 provides a summary of
DOD's special operations forces military authorizations in the
active component and reserve component.
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special
Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve
Component
Special operations forces are organized into several types of
units. For example, Army special operations forces are organized
into Special Forces, Rangers, Aviation, Civil Affairs,
Psychological Operations, and support units. Air Force special
operations forces are organized into fixed and rotary wing
aviation squadrons, special tactics squadrons, a combat aviation
advisor squadron, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron. Naval
Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams and SEAL Delivery
Vehicle Teams and Special Boat Teams. When fully operational,
Marine Corps special operations forces will include foreign
military training units and marine special operations companies.
Table 1 provides an overview and description of DOD's special
operations forces.
Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army,
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
Source: GAO.
Special operations forces personnel possess highly specialized
skill sets including cultural and regional awareness. Duty in
special operations is undertaken on a voluntary basis, and many
personnel volunteering for special operations, particularly those
in Army Special Forces and Air Force flight crews, have already
served for some time in the military before becoming qualified for
special operations forces. In order to become qualified, military
personnel must complete a rigorous assessment, selection, and
initial training process that, on average, takes between 12 and 24
months. This difficult training regime causes high attrition, and
often over 70 percent who start special operations training do not
finish. In general, servicemembers who are unable to complete the
special operations training return to their previously held
specialty or are retrained into another specialty, depending on
the needs of their military service.
The Special Operations Command's Army, Air Force, and Navy service
components have schools to train and develop special operations
forces. For example:
o The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, located at Ft. Bragg,
North Carolina, operates the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School. This school assesses, selects, and trains
Special Forces soldiers, and trains civil affairs and
psychological operations soldiers. In addition, the school
provides advanced special operations training courses.
o The Air Force Special Operations Command, located at Hurlburt
Field, Florida, has several subordinate training squadrons that
provide initial and advanced training for Air Force rotary and
fixed wing special operations pilots, special tactics personnel,
combat aviation advisors, and unmanned aerial vehicle personnel.
o The Naval Special Warfare Command, located on the Naval
Amphibious Base Coronado, California, operates the Naval Special
Warfare Center. This school trains SEAL candidates through the
Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL course and the SEAL Qualification
Course, and trains special warfare combatant crewmen through the
Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen course. In addition, the school
provides advanced special operations training courses.
Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel
Requirements Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress
The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of
the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission.
While the Command has determined the number of special operations
forces personnel who are needed to increase the number of its
warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine (a)
the number of headquarters staff needed to train and equip these
additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters staff
needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist
networks-a new mission for the Command. Although the Command's
analyses for these determinations were in progress at the time of
our review, DOD has nonetheless planned to increase the number of
positions for the Command's headquarters, and has requested
related funds beginning in fiscal year 2007.
DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requirements
for Additional Special Operations Forces Warfighters
Several recent DOD studies have concluded that additional special
operations forces warfighters are needed in order for the Special
Operations Command to achieve the national military objectives in
the Global War on Terrorism. A December 2002 report conducted by
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict15 found that efforts should
be made to expand the size of special operations forces and
institute a more sustainable rotational base of forces, while
realigning the force to meet current and future challenges.16
Furthermore, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
stated that one of the key programmatic decisions the department
proposes to launch in fiscal year 2007 is to increase special
operations forces to defeat terrorist networks.17
The Special Operations Command has determined the number of
special operations forces personnel needed to meet increases in
its warfighter units. To determine the requirements for special
operations forces warfighter units, the Command uses its Joint
Mission Analysis process. Based on planning scenarios provided by
DOD that special operations forces will be needed to support, the
Command determines the minimum number of warfighters necessary to
achieve its military objectives with the least amount of risk to
mission success. This level of special operations forces is the
baseline force used to measure risk, and is the starting point for
developing a more attainable force based on fiscal constraints.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, DOD increased the number of
positions for the Special Operations Command to augment the
increase in the number of its warfighter units. Specifically, from
fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, DOD increased the
number of military positions for special operations forces by more
than 5,000 positions, or about 12 percent. With these increases in
military positions, the Special Operations Command has also
increased the number of special operations forces units, including
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. DOD plans
to further increase the number of military positions for the
Command through fiscal year 2011, and the Command plans to
increase other special operations forces units such as Army
Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle
and intelligence squadrons.18 The increase in military positions
will also support the establishment of a Marine Corps component to
the Special Operations Command, which was approved in October
2005. Table 2 provides examples of increases in the number of
active duty special operations forces warfighter units from fiscal
year 2001 through fiscal year 2011.
Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty
Special Operations Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal Year 2001
through Fiscal Year 2011
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
aDOD plans call for the addition of four Special Forces battalions
during the fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011 Future Years
Defense Program, with a fifth Special Forces battalion to be added
during the fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013 Future Years
Defense Program.
DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command�s Headquarters to Meet
Expanded Mission, Although Analyses Are Still in Progress
DOD's budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes increases in
the number of personnel for the Special Operations Command's
headquarters, even though the Command had not completed studies
for headquarters' personnel requirements in two key areas. First,
the Commander of the Special Operations Command is responsible for
training assigned special operations forces, and developing and
acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment.19 Accordingly,
the Command believes that it has a commensurate need for
additional headquarters staff to perform these responsibilities to
support the increased number of warfighters necessary to win the
Global War on Terrorism. Second, DOD's decision to expand the
mission of the Special Operations Command calls for the Command to
be responsible for planning and synchronizing global actions
against terrorist networks. The Command further believes that it
needs additional headquarters personnel to fulfill this
responsibility.
The Special Operations Command determines personnel requirements
for its headquarters by conducting formal personnel studies. These
studies are directed and approved by the Special Operations
Command's leadership. The study teams conduct a variety of
analyses to determine personnel requirements and interview
individuals within the reviewed organization to determine the
tasks they perform and the level of effort necessary to fulfill
the workload requirements. The studies are used to validate the
personnel requirements and support data-based decisions for
allocating additional resources during the Special Operations
Command's planning, programming, and budgeting processes. The
Command is currently conducting studies to determine the number of
military and civilian personnel who are needed at its headquarters
to meet the Command's expanded responsibilities.
Although these studies were in progress at the time of our review,
DOD has already made the decision to increase the number of
military and civilian positions for the Command's headquarters,
beginning with its fiscal year 2007 budget request. According to
currently approved plans, DOD will increase the number of military
and civilian positions for the Special Operations Command
headquarters by more than 75 percent between fiscal years 2007 and
2011. These increases include more than 700 additional positions
for the Command's Center for Special Operations, which combines
the intelligence, operations, and planning functions at the
headquarters to plan and direct the Global War on Terrorism.
However, given the fact that the Command's internal analyses of
personnel requirements were ongoing at the time of our review, the
intended increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of
personnel requirements.
Our prior work has shown that strategic workforce planning
addresses two critical needs for an organization. First, strategic
workforce planning aligns an organization's human capital program
with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals.
Second, such planning develops long-term strategies for acquiring,
developing, and retaining the staff needed to achieve programmatic
goals. A key principle in strategic workforce planning calls for
determining the critical skills and competencies that will be
needed to achieve current and future programmatic results.20
However, until the Special Operations Command fully completes its
analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry out its
Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot
provide assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress
that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the
Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the
requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission.
Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations
Command Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals
The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and
retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the
military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome
persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient
numbers of newly trained special operations forces personnel in
some cases to meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special
operations forces personnel through fiscal year 2011. In addition,
the Special Operations Command does not have complete information
from its service components on human capital challenges, including
low personnel inventory levels and training limitations, and
planned corrective actions, which it needs to evaluate the success
of its service components' human capital approaches.
The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Have Taken
Measures to Recruit, Train, and Retain Greater Numbers of Special
Operations Forces Personnel
The military services and the Special Operations Command have
taken measures to recruit and train greater numbers of special
operations forces personnel. In addition, DOD has implemented a
set of initiatives intended to retain greater numbers of
experienced special operations forces personnel.
Increased Recruiting Goals
The Army and Navy have increased the recruiting goals for several
of their special operations forces occupational specialties.21
These goals are set by the military services to determine the
number of accessions, or new recruits, who will enter training
each year. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, the Army
increased the recruiting goal for active duty enlisted Special
Forces soldiers by 72 percent, or 1,300 recruits.22 Similarly, the
Navy increased its annual goal for enlisted SEAL recruits from 900
in fiscal year 2004 to 1,100 in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the
Navy established an annual goal for enlisted special warfare
combatant crewman recruits for the first time in fiscal year 2005.
To meet these recruiting goals, the military services have offered
enlistment bonuses to enlist a sufficient number of new recruits.
Collectively, the military services paid more than $28 million in
these bonuses during fiscal year 2005 to enlist servicemembers in
their special operations forces occupational specialties.
Beginning in fiscal year 2003, the Army offered these bonuses to
its initial accession Special Forces recruits and in fiscal year
2005 the Army paid up to $20,000 per soldier. Similarly, in fiscal
year 2005, the Air Force offered enlistment bonuses of up to
$10,000 to recruits in the combat controller and pararescue
occupational specialties. In fiscal year 2005, the Navy paid
enlistment bonuses for enlisted SEAL and special warfare combatant
crewman recruits up to a maximum of $15,000. The Army met or
exceeded its recruiting goals for active duty enlisted Special
Forces soldiers in 5 out of the 6 years between fiscal years 2000
and 2005. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Air
Force increased the number of enlisted airmen recruits for the
combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties by about
400 percent and 60 percent, respectively. In fiscal year 2005, the
Navy exceeded its recruiting goal for enlisted special warfare
combatant crewmen. However, while the Navy met its recruiting goal
for enlisted SEALs for fiscal year 2004, it met 80 percent of its
recruiting goal in fiscal year 2005.
Expanded Training Capacity
The Special Operations Command and the service components have
taken several actions to train greater numbers of special
operations forces recruits. For instance, the Command and the
service components have increased the number of instructors at
several special operations forces schools to produce a larger
number of newly trained personnel, with additional increases in
the number of instructors planned through fiscal year 2011. The
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, for example, hired 45
additional civilian instructors in fiscal year 2004 as part of its
Institutional Training Expansion program, and plans to add more
than 300 additional civilian instructors through fiscal year 2011.
Similarly, beginning in fiscal year 2006, the Naval Special
Warfare Command plans to add 145 military and civilian instructors
through fiscal year 2008.
The Special Operations Command's service components have also
expanded the capacity of some schools to train more students and
have reorganized some of their curricula so that their recruits
move through the training programs more efficiently. Beginning in
fiscal year 2006, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
increased the frequency of a phase of its Special Forces
qualification training that is focused on core battle skills. The
U.S. Army Special Operations Command plans to increase the
frequency of this phase from starting four courses per year, to
starting a new course approximately every 2 weeks. This increase
in frequency will expand the capacity of the training course from
1,800 student spaces to about 2,300 per year.
The Air Force Special Operations Command established a training
program in fiscal year 2001 to provide advanced skills training
for combat controllers. In addition, the training program was
intended to provide standardized training for special operations
pararescue personnel, special operations combat weathermen,23 and
special tactics officers. Since its inception, the program has
increased the graduation rate of combat controllers, and in
addition, the training program has provided special operations
pararescue airmen, combat weathermen, and special tactics officers
with advanced special operations training.
In fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare Command reorganized
the training course for SEALs intended to reduce student
attrition. Specifically, the Naval Special Warfare Command
eliminated the class administered during the winter months, which
historically had the highest attrition, while increasing the class
sizes for the remaining classes. In addition, the Naval Special
Warfare Command has begun providing focused training for those
students who have completed the most physically challenging
portion of the training but who require additional practice in
specific skills, rather than requiring students to begin the
training from the start.
In some cases, the Special Operations Command and the service
components have increased the number of newly trained special
operations forces personnel. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal
year 2005, for example, the school that trains new Special Forces
soldiers increased the number of active duty enlisted graduates by
138 percent, or 458 additional Special Forces soldiers.
Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
DOD has also taken action to retain experienced special operations
forces personnel in order to meet the planned growth in these
forces. According to the Special Operations Command, it cannot
accomplish planned growth solely by adding new special operations
forces personnel. Rather, the growth must be accomplished by
balancing an increase in the number of new personnel with the
retention of experienced special operations forces servicemembers.
In 2004, DOD authorized a set of financial incentives to retain
experienced special operations forces personnel. These incentives
include reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for personnel in
several special operations forces occupational specialties with 19
or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6
years. The military services spent more than $41 million in fiscal
year 2005 to retain 688 special operations forces servicemembers
with this reenlistment bonus, according to data provided by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Additionally, DOD authorized increases in special pays for
warfighters assigned to the Special Operations Command, for some
special operations forces personnel who remain on active duty with
more than 25 years of experience, and bonuses for new Special
Forces and Naval Special Warfare warrant officers.
Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some Special
Operations Forces Training Graduates May Limit the Special Operations
Command�s Ability to Meet Future Growth Targets
While the military services and the Special Operations Command
have taken steps to increase the number of newly trained special
operations forces personnel and to retain its experienced
operators, the military services and the Special Operations
Command face several human capital challenges in fully meeting
planned growth in special operations forces. These challenges
include persistently low personnel inventory levels for many
special operations forces occupational specialties and
insufficient numbers of new graduates in some cases to meet
current authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets.
Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Forces
Occupational Specialties May Limit Future Growth
We reported in November 2005 that DOD faced significant challenges
in recruiting and retaining servicemembers, and that the military
services were unable to meet authorized personnel levels for
certain occupational specialties, including several special
operations forces occupational specialties.24 At that time, we
reported that several of these specialties in the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps were underfilled for 5 out of the previous
6 fiscal years. Such occupational specialties included active duty
enlisted Army Special Forces assistant operations and intelligence
sergeants and Special Forces medical sergeants, enlisted Navy
SEALs and special warfare combatant crewmen, and enlisted Air
Force combat controllers and pararescue personnel. According to
DOD officials, the special operations forces occupational
specialties were underfilled for several reasons, including
extensive training or qualification requirements and recent
increases in the number of authorized personnel positions.
Our analysis of the personnel inventory levels for the special
operations forces active component occupational specialties
identified by the Special Operations Command's Directive 600-725
shows that hundreds of authorized positions for special operations
forces personnel within each of the Command's service components
have been persistently unfilled. As shown in table 3, from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 74 percent to 87 percent of
the active component occupational specialties in this directive
were underfilled, each year, by an amount ranging from less than 5
percent to more than 86 percent.26
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special
Operations Forces Occupational Specialties Underfilled for Fiscal
Years 2000 through 2005
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The increase in the number of active component occupational
specialties from fiscal years 2000 through 2005 is due to the fact
that U.S. Army data were unavailable for two specialties prior to
fiscal year 2002, and the military services introduced three new
specialties during this period.
In fiscal year 2005, more than 50 percent of these specialties
were underfilled by at least 10 percent. For example:
o personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted Special
Forces assistant operations and intelligence sergeants were
underfilled by 58 percent,
o personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted pararescue
airmen were underfilled by 27 percent, and
o personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted SEALs were
underfilled by 14 percent.
Given the military services' inability to fill current and past
positions in their special operations forces specialties, it may
be increasingly difficult to meet DOD's plan to increase the
number of special operations forces through fiscal year 2011.
During our review, the Special Operations Command's service
components provided data indicating that, in several cases, the
measures the military services and the Special Operations Command
are taking to recruit and train greater numbers of special
operations forces personnel may enable the military services and
the Command to meet the increases in the numbers of authorized
positions. However, the data also show that some of the special
operations forces specialties that are currently underfilled are
likely to remain so after additional authorizations have been
added. For example, Navy officials told us that although
additional authorizations for enlisted SEALs will be added by
fiscal year 2008, it will not be able to fill all of these
positions until at least 2011, at the earliest. Similarly, the Air
Force projects that the additional active duty enlisted combat
controller positions that have been added in fiscal year 2006 will
remain underfilled through at least fiscal year 2008.
Not only do current low personnel inventory levels suggest that
the military services and the Special Operations Command will be
challenged to meet planned growth goals, but officials told us
that low personnel levels in certain occupational specialties have
created challenges at the unit level as well. For example,
officials from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command told us
that low personnel inventories of Special Forces warrant officers
and medical sergeants have resulted in their having fewer numbers
of these personnel per unit, which has limited the manner in which
some Special Forces units have deployed on the battlefield.
Similarly, the low personnel inventory levels in the Air Force
combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties have
resulted in the Air Force's special tactics squadrons being
underfilled. According to Air Force officials, the low personnel
inventory levels in these units have increased the frequency of
personnel deployments, which has had an impact on the amount of
time available to conduct training and has adversely affected
retention.
Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Personnel
Graduates
One reason that personnel inventory levels have been low in
several special operations forces occupational specialties is the
schools that train new special operations forces personnel have
not graduated a sufficient number of these personnel, in some
cases, to meet authorized personnel levels. Furthermore, the
number of newly trained personnel in several special operations
forces specialties has been insufficient to meet planned growth
targets. For example:
o The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is not graduating
enough new pilots for the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment to meet future growth targets. In fiscal year 2005, the
Command graduated only 58 percent of the MH-47 Chinook helicopter
pilots and 47 percent of the MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter pilots
that the Army determined were needed to meet planned growth for
this unit. According to Army officials, the capacity of the school
that trains new pilots has been insufficient to meet the
requirements for future personnel levels. Officials stated that
the Special Operations Command has provided additional funding
beginning in fiscal year 2006 for the school to hire a greater
number of instructors, which will increase the capacity of the
school to train these pilots.
o The Air Force has not produced a sufficient number of active
duty enlisted special tactics personnel, such as combat
controllers and pararescue personnel. For example, from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Air Force trained only 53
percent of the active duty enlisted combat controllers and 40
percent of the active duty enlisted pararescue airmen needed to
meet authorized personnel levels. Air Force officials stated that
several constraints have limited the number of students who could
attend the schools that train these personnel. Officials explained
the Air Force has taken steps to increase the number of personnel
that will graduate from its special tactics training programs. For
example, in August 2005, the Air Force began construction on a new
classroom and aquatic facility to train greater numbers of combat
controllers, and it recently opened a new combat dive course to
meet both combat controller and pararescue training requirements.
Such measures are intended to reduce the constraints on the
ability of the Air Force to train new special tactics personnel.
o From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Naval
Special Warfare Command did not produce an adequate number of
enlisted SEALs to sustain authorized personnel levels. While the
Naval Special Warfare Command needed to graduate 200 new enlisted
SEALs each year to meet authorized personnel levels, only about
150 new enlisted personnel graduated each year during this period.
In addition, Navy officials stated that to meet the planned growth
for SEALs, the Naval Special Warfare Command must produce 250
enlisted SEALs annually. According to Navy officials, it has
recruited an insufficient number of enlisted candidates who could
successfully pass the physical test to qualify for SEAL training.
As a result, the Navy has not filled the SEAL school to capacity
each year, and this in turn has resulted in insufficient numbers
of graduates to fill the requirements for enlisted SEALs.
According to officials, the Navy began to implement several
measures in January 2006 that, in part, are intended to increase
the quantity and quality of enlisted recruits entering SEAL
training, thereby improving the chances that more of these
recruits will successfully graduate from the training.27
Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to Evaluate
Human Capital Initiatives
The Special Operations Command does not have complete information,
including measurable performance objectives and goals, to evaluate
the progress that the Command's service components have made in
meeting the human capital challenges that could impede the
Command's ability to achieve planned growth.
The Special Operations Command has an established program through
which it monitors the status of its personnel. The goal of the
program is to ensure there are sufficient numbers of special
operations forces personnel to meet current and future mission
requirements. The implementing directive28 requires the special
operations component commanders to provide the Special Operations
Command with annual reports that contain data on several topics
related to the human capital management of special operations
forces, including personnel inventory levels, accession plans,
reenlistments and loss management programs, and military education
opportunities for special operations forces officers. Command
officials told us they use these reports to monitor the status of
special operations forces.
Our analysis of the service components' annual reports for fiscal
years 2000 through 2005 shows that the reports provide some of the
information required by the directive, such as information on
personnel inventory levels and professional military education
opportunities. However, the reports have not provided information
for several key requirements called for by the directive that
would provide information on the service components' progress in
meeting the planned growth targets. For example, the service
components are required to provide accession plans for several of
the special operations occupational specialties, including Army
Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special tactics
personnel. The accession plans should provide detailed information
on the number of new accessions for initial training and
projections for the following year. Our review of the annual
reports shows that since fiscal year 2003, none of the service
components' submissions contained this information.
Additionally, the directive requires the service components to
provide detailed analyses to support each category discussed in
the annual report, including trends developed over recent years
and predictions for the future. Further, the annual reports should
fully discuss any concerns by describing the concern in context,
providing past actions taken to resolve the concern, and
presenting recommendations to address the concern in the future.
However, our analysis of the components' annual submissions shows
that the reports have often failed to provide detailed analyses of
their human capital challenges and the corrective actions that
should be taken to address these challenges. For instance:
o The U.S. Army Special Operations Command's annual report for
fiscal year 2005 did not identify a 79 percent personnel fill rate
for the Special Forces medical sergeant occupational specialty as
a challenge. However, officials with whom we spoke indicated that
insufficient numbers of these personnel have limited both the
operational capabilities of some deployed Special Forces units and
the ability to provide medical life-support to personnel in these
units. In other cases, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's
annual reports identified challenges but did not propose
corrective actions. For example, the report for fiscal year 2005
states a concern that, because the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment had insufficient training resources, it produced
only 50 percent of the requirement for MH-47 Chinook helicopter
pilots. However, the report did not discuss in detail what actions
should be taken to address this challenge.
o Since its fiscal year 2000 annual report, the Air Force Special
Operations Command has identified a concern that the experience
level of its rated pilots has been decreasing. As a result, there
have been an insufficient number of aircraft commanders and
instructor pilots within several of the special operations
squadrons. However, the Air Force Special Operations Command's
annual reports do not contain any information to support the
specific decrease in the number of experienced pilots in its
special operations forces units. Moreover, the reports do not
specify how the actions taken to address the issue have impacted
the level of experience of pilots, or what further actions are
needed to address this challenge. In addition, although the combat
controller and pararescue occupational specialties have been
underfilled since at least fiscal year 2000, the Air Force's
annual reports have not provided detailed information on the
specific actions that should be taken to overcome the challenges
of low personnel inventory levels in these specialties.
o The Naval Special Warfare Command's annual reports have
consistently identified a critical challenge regarding the
insufficient number of new enlisted Navy SEALs who have graduated
from the school each year. Further, the reports provide some
information on the actions taken in the previous fiscal year to
address this concern. However, the annual reports have not
included detailed information on the Naval Special Warfare
Command's accession plans, or the effects that recruit shortfalls
have had on personnel inventory levels, which are specifically
required by the directive.
Furthermore, the service components' annual reports lack
performance objectives and goals that link key personnel data with
future growth plans and assessments of personnel needs. Our prior
work has shown that high-performing organizations use relevant and
reliable data to determine performance objectives and goals that
enable them to evaluate the success of their human capital
approaches. These organizations identify current and future human
capital needs, including the appropriate number of employees, the
key competencies and skills mix for mission accomplishment, and
the appropriate deployment of staff across the organization, and
then create strategies for identifying and filling gaps.29
However, our analysis of the Command's Directive 600-7 shows that
the requirements for the annual reports do not include
instructions for the service components to develop performance
objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned
growth. As an example, the Command requires the service components
to provide personnel reenlistment data within these reports.
Specifically, the Command requires information and analysis on the
number of eligible special operations forces personnel who chose
to reenlist and comparative information on the number of personnel
reenlistments in each military service. However, the service
components' annual reports do not clearly link the number of
experienced warfighters who have been retained with the number who
are needed to meet planned growth. This is particularly important
because the parent military services have not set goals for the
reenlistments of their special operations forces personnel in a
way that is clearly linked with the planned growth in these
forces. Each of the active component military services tracks
retention according to years of service and whether a
servicemember is on a first, second, or subsequent enlistment.30
Moreover, the Special Operations Command has not established
specific performance objectives or goals for the special
operations forces retention initiative that DOD authorized in
December 2004. As a result, it is difficult to assess the progress
that DOD has had with this initiative in retaining a sufficient
number of experienced personnel to meet planned growth-a key
rationale for the initiative. Many of the special operations
forces servicemembers who were eligible for the bonuses offered as
part of this initiative did reenlist, as shown by information
provided to us. However, Special Operations Command officials were
unable to provide specific goals to measure the effectiveness of
the retention initiatives because they lacked clear performance
objectives that are linked to comprehensive analyses of personnel
needs.
Special Operations Command officials stated the Command had not
fully enforced the reporting requirements in its directive because
it is outdated and some of the information required in the annual
reports is less relevant, given the Command's expanded role in the
Global War on Terrorism. However, the Command most recently
updated this directive in April 2003, and at that time, it
maintained the annual reporting requirements. In addition,
officials stated that data and information on the status of
special operations forces personnel are available to the Special
Operations Command through other processes, including monthly and
quarterly readiness reports, monthly personnel status summaries,
and annual conferences hosted by the Command to discuss personnel
issues. The Defense Manpower Data Center also provides the Command
with analyses on the trends in the continuation rates of special
operations forces personnel.31 While these processes may provide
information on the status of special operations forces, they do
not provide detailed analyses and discussions of concerns and
corrective actions that are required by the Command's directive.
In addition, the annual reports are a means by which the Command
has provided information to stakeholders within the
department-including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the military services-on the status of special operations forces.
Without complete information on human capital challenges, the
Special Operations Command will be unable to determine whether the
service components' human capital management approaches, including
their recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be
effective in meeting the planned growth targets.
More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training;
Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect
Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced
a substantial increase in the deployment of personnel for
operations and a simultaneous decrease in the deployment of
personnel for training. To its credit, the Special Operations
Command has taken action to manage the challenge of increased
deployments by establishing a policy intended to maintain the
readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces
personnel. However, the Command's service components have not yet
consistently or fully implemented this policy.
Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and Decrease
in Training
The Special Operations Command Directive 525-132 establishes the
Command's policy to collect and monitor information on the
deployments of special operations forces personnel. Accordingly,
the Command gathers deployment information on a weekly basis from
the service components and the geographic combatant commands.
These reports include information on the number of special
operations forces personnel and special operations forces units
that are deployed around the world. In addition, the components
report the type of the deployment, such as deployments for
operations or for training. From these weekly updates, the Special
Operations Command develops a comprehensive deployed forces
report, which is presented to the Commander of the Special
Operations Command and included in updates for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Our review of Special Operations Command data shows that since
fiscal year 2000, deployments of special operations forces
personnel have substantially increased. Specifically, as shown in
figure 2, the average weekly number of deployed special operations
forces personnel was 64 percent, or about 3,100 personnel, greater
in fiscal year 2005 than in fiscal year 2000.
Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces
Deployed Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005
Our analysis also shows that the vast majority of recent
deployments outside of the United States were to the Central
Command area of responsibility, which accounted for 85 percent of
deployed special operations forces in fiscal year 2005.
Significantly, more than 99 percent of these deployments supported
ongoing combat operations. In contrast, in fiscal year 2000, only
20 percent of special operations forces deployments were to the
Central Command. As shown in figure 3, the percentage of special
operations forces personnel deployed to the European Command, the
Pacific Command, and the Southern Command decreased between fiscal
year 2000 and fiscal year 2005.
Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
10 DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
(February 2006).
11 In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander
refers to a commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in
response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
the context of a support-command relationship, the supported commander
receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and is
responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands what
assistance is required.
Organization of Special Operations Forces
12 In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of
a Marine Corps component to the Special Operations Command. Current DOD
plans call for Marine Corps special operations forces personnel to total
about 2,500 personnel by fiscal year 2011.
13 DOD's military forces consist of the active components (Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force) and the reserve and National Guard components
(Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,
Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve).
14 DOD plans call for the Special Operations Command to transfer all
reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel to
the U.S. Army Reserve Command by fiscal year 2007. Currently, all active
component and reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
forces are assigned to the Special Operations Command, even though the
reserve component forces primarily support conventional Army forces. The
Special Operations Command believes that reassigning the operational
control of these forces to the Army will enable conventional Army units to
train with their full complement of capabilities, including Civil Affairs
and Psychological Operations, prior to a deployment, thereby enhancing
combat readiness. The active component Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations forces, who support special operations forces, will continue to
be assigned to the Special Operations Command. In addition, the Command
will retain the responsibility for training reserve component Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel and the research and
development responsibility for Psychological Operations equipment.
Service
component Type of unit Description
Army Special Forces Perform foreign internal defense,
unconventional warfare, special
reconnaissance, direct action, and
counterterrorism operations
Rangers Light infantry units specializing in a
range of missions, including direct
action and personnel recovery
Rotary Wing Aviation Provide aviation support to special
operations forces
Civil Affairs Provide civil-military operations
support to general purpose forces and
special operations forces at the
tactical, operational, and strategic
levels
Psychological Plan and execute psychological
Operations operations at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels
Support and Provide combat service support to Army
Communication Units special operations forces or forces
supporting the geographic combatant
commander
Air Force Fixed Wing Aviation Multiple variants of the C-130
Squadrons modified for refueling, mobility,
psychological operations, and
precision strike
Rotary Wing Aviation Provide mobility for special operations
Squadrons forces and combat search and rescue
Special Tactics Combat controllers, pararescue, and
Squadrons combat weather personnel capable of
controlling fire support and providing
medical and weather support
Combat Aviation Assess, train, advise, and assist
Advisor Squadron foreign aviation forces in airpower
employment, sustainment, and force
integration
Unmanned Aerial Provide unmanned aerial vehicle support
Vehicle Squadron to special operations forces
Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Multipurpose units trained and
Teams equipped to conduct a variety of
missions in all operational
environments
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Specially trained personnel who operate
Teams and maintain various systems, including
dry dock shelters and SEAL delivery
vehicles
Special Boat Teams Special warfare combatant crewmen who
operate and maintain various naval
special warfare boats
Marine Corps Foreign Military Provide tailored military, combat
Training Units skills training, and advisor support
for identified foreign forces
Special Operations Perform special reconnaissance, direct
Companies action, and foreign internal defense
operations
Special Operations Provide specific support capabilities
Support Group for worldwide special operations
missions, including combined arms, K-9
support, communications support, and
combat service support
Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel Requirements Are
Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress
DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requirements for
Additional Special Operations Forces Warfighters
15 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on matters involving special operations.
16 DOD, Special Operations Forces Realignment Study (December 2002).
17 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006).
18 In addition to the increases in the number of new units, the Air Force
plans to increase the number of personnel in existing special tactics and
combat aviation advisor squadrons.
Number of
warfighter units
Service Fiscal year
component Type of unit Fiscal year 2001 2011
Army Special Forces Battalions 15 19a
Aviation Battalions 3 4
Ranger Companies 12 15
Civil Affairs Companies 5 16
Psychological Operations 12 17
Companies
Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 0 1
Intelligence Squadron 0 1
Navy SEAL Team Equivalents 8 10
Marine Corps Foreign Military Training 0 2
Companies
Marine Special Operations 0 9
Companies
DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command's Headquarters to Meet Expanded
Mission, Although Analyses Are Still in Progress
19 10 U.S.C. S:167(e).
20 GAO-04-39 .
Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command Face
Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals
The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Have Taken Measures to
Recruit, Train, and Retain Greater Numbers of Special Operations Forces
Personnel
Increased Recruiting Goals
21 The military services delineate their force structure through
occupational specialties, which represent the jobs that are necessary to
meet their specific missions.
Expanded Training Capacity
22 From fiscal years 2000 through 2001, all of the recruits for Army
Special Forces training were serving in the military. In fiscal year 2002,
the Army established a goal of 400 accessions for an initial accessions
program, which brings new Army recruits directly into Special Forces
training. The Army increased the goal for these recruits from 400 in
fiscal year 2002 to 1,500 in fiscal year 2005.
23 The Air Force trains pararescue and combat weather personnel for
conventional units and special operations forces units. In order to be
fully qualified for special operations missions, these personnel undergo
additional special tactics training.
Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations
Forces Training Graduates May Limit the Special Operations Command's Ability to
Meet Future Growth Targets
Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Forces Occupational
Specialties May Limit Future Growth
24 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
25 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7 identifies the occupational
specialties on which the Command's service components report personnel
data. The service components report these data to the Special Operations
Command on an annual basis.
26 Our analysis also shows that to a lesser extent, some active component
occupational specialties in the Command's directive were overfilled. For
example, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 9 percent to 21
percent of these specialties were overfilled each year by an amount
ranging from less than 5 percent to 80 percent. Except in a few cases,
these specialties were overfilled by less than 30 personnel.
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of occupational specialties 33 34 37 38 38 38
Number of occupational specialties 27 27 31 28 33 31
underfilled
Percentage of occupational specialties 82% 79% 84% 74% 87% 82%
underfilled
Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Personnel Graduates
Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to Evaluate Human
Capital Initiatives
27 These measures include requiring SEAL candidates to pass a physical
screening test prior to the issuance of a SEAL enlistment contract and
prior to shipping to Recruit Training Command; hiring former special
operations forces personnel at each Naval Recruiting District to test,
screen, and mentor SEAL candidates; increasing the initial enlistment
bonus for SEAL recruits to the maximum authorized level of $40,000; and
improving the amount of physical training time at basic training by 300
percent, among other initiatives.
28 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7, Monitorship Program Policy
and Procedures (April 2003).
29 GAO, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain
Momentum of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).
30 The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), midcareer (second or subsequent enlistment with up
to 10 years of service), and career (second or subsequent enlistment with
10 or more years of service). The Navy's retention categories are Zone A
(up to 6 years of service), Zone B (6 years to 10 years of service), Zone
C (10 to 14 years of service), Zone D (14 to 19 years of service), and
Zone E (20 or more years of service). Through June 2005, the Air Force
tracked retention by first term (first enlistment, regardless of length),
second term (second enlistment), and career (third or subsequent
enlistment). Beginning in July 2005, the Air Force changed from reporting
reenlistment rates as the primary retention measure to calculating a
retention metric, Average Career Length, which factors in losses that
occur at all years of service.
31 Continuation rates are calculated by determining the number of
personnel who remain on active duty from one year to the next, and are an
alternative method to track retention.
More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training; Special
Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect
Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and Decrease in Training
32 Special Operations Command Directive 525-1, Deployed Forces Report
(March 2004).
Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed to
the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2005
While special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in
deployments for operations, there has been a simultaneous decrease in
deployments for training. As shown in table 4, from fiscal year 2000
through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of special operations forces
personnel deployed for operations increased, while the percentage of
personnel deployed for training decreased.
Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed for
Training, Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005
Deployment Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
category year 2000 year 2001 year 2002 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005
Training 61% 58% 30% 16% 17% 17%
Operations 31% 31% 65% 81% 80% 80%
Other 8% 11% 5% 3% 3% 4%
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
The decrease in deployments for training appears to have had at least two
effects. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, for example, the
amount of time for which special operations forces deployed for training
to maintain proficiency in battle skills33 decreased by 50 percent.
Officials with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components told us
that since many of their units have been deployed to the Central Command
area of responsibility, they have had fewer opportunities to conduct
proficiency training for all mission tasks. As a result, special
operations forces units are focusing their training on the tasks that are
required for operations in the Central Command and are assuming some risk
by not training for other mission tasks. For example, officials with the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command told us that specialized training
such as military free fall and underwater combat operations have been
reduced to a minimum, since these skills are not required to support
ongoing operations.
Similarly, officials with the Air Force Special Operations Command stated
that increased deployments for operations had affected the ability of its
air crews and special tactics squadrons to achieve all required
mission-essential training. However, officials stated that this has not
degraded overall readiness, because not all of these training tasks are
currently being performed in the Central Command. In addition, officials
stated that if mission priorities were to shift away from the Central
Command and different missions needed to be performed, not all of its
special operations forces personnel would be required to have achieved
those training tasks in order for a mission to be successfully carried
out.
Additionally, although our analysis shows that special operations forces
deployed less frequently for skills proficiency training from fiscal year
2000 through fiscal year 2005, we were told that the amount of training
that special operations forces accomplished may not have been greatly
affected. In particular, we were told that Army special operations forces
units do not necessarily have to deploy in order to accomplish training
that can be done at their home station. In addition, the fact that many
special operations forces units are deploying for combat operations
results in ample opportunities to maintain proficiency in essential
skills. Officials with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command explained
that special operations forces no longer train to fight because they are
training as they fight. However, not all special operations forces can
accomplish training tasks at their home station. According to Naval
Special Warfare Command officials, Naval Special Warfare units do not have
adequate home station training ranges and are required to deploy in order
achieve most training tasks. Yet, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year
2005, the amount of time that Naval Special Warfare personnel deployed for
skills proficiency training decreased by more than 30 percent.
33 Battle skills proficiency training includes the deployment of
individuals or units for a range of purposes, such as advanced
occupational specialty training, language training, or unit battle drills.
Special operations forces have also deployed less frequently to train with
foreign military forces overseas. As we have previously reported, this
type of training is important because it enables special operations forces
to practice mission skills such as providing military instruction in a
foreign language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with
local geography and cultures, which are essential in the foreign internal
defense and unconventional warfare missions.34 These deployments of
special operations forces to train with the armed forces and other
security forces of friendly foreign countries are commonly referred to as
joint combined exchange training. Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year
2005, however, the amount of time in which special operations forces
personnel deployed for joint combined exchange training decreased by 53
percent.
Our analysis of DOD data reported to the Congress35 also shows the
participation of special operations forces in joint combined exchange
training events decreased since fiscal year 2000. As shown in figure 4,
from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the number of these events
that special operations forces completed decreased by about 50 percent.
Further analysis shows that the number of events conducted in most of the
geographic combatant command areas of responsibility decreased from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2005. Specifically, joint combined exchange
training events conducted in the European Command decreased by about 75
percent, while events conducted in the Southern Command and Pacific
Command also decreased during this time. Conversely, the number of such
training events conducted in the Central Command increased from 7
exercises in fiscal year 2000 to 14 exercises in fiscal year 2005.36
34 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 .
35 Section 2011 of Title 10, U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Defense
to submit an annual report to the Congress regarding training for which
expenses are paid under this section. The report is to include the type
and location of training conducted, the extent of participation by foreign
military forces, the relationship of that training to other overseas
training programs, a summary of expenditures under this section, and a
discussion of the unique military training benefit derived from the
training activities.
Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and Completed,
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005
The increase in the amount of time that special operations forces have
deployed to support operations in the Central Command has, to some extent,
resulted in an increase in the number of cancelled joint combined exchange
training events. Officials with the Special Operations Command, European
Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command with whom we spoke stated
that joint combined exchange training can be cancelled for various
reasons, including the availability of funding for the training, the
availability of host nation forces, or the operations tempo37 of U.S.
special operations forces. Officials stated, however, that due to the
increased requirement for special operations forces deployments to support
operations in the Central Command, there has been a corresponding increase
in the number of cancelled joint combined exchange training events. Our
analysis shows that from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the
percentage of cancelled training events due to the operations tempo of
special operations forces increased from 0 percent to more than 60
percent.
36 The Northern Command was established on October 1, 2002, to provide
command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate
military assistance to civil authorities. Special operations forces
conducted one joint combined exchange training event in the Northern
Command in fiscal year 2005.
37 Operations tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of a
unit or platform.
While the primary purpose of joint combined exchange training is to train
U.S. forces, this training can also have an ancillary benefit in that it
can be used by the geographic combatant commanders and ambassadors to
fulfill regional and country engagement objectives. For instance, the
geographic combatant commands use joint combined exchange training to help
achieve foreign engagement objectives in their designated areas of
responsibility. DOD documents regarding the department's strategy for the
Global War on Terrorism identify combined training, such as joint combined
exchange training, as an important element to strengthen partner nations'
counterterrorism capabilities. However, with continuing support being
required for operations in the Central Command's area of responsibility,
there have been fewer special operations forces available to execute these
types of training activities.
Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manage Increased
Deployments, but the Policy Has Not Been Consistently or Fully Implemented
The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of
increased personnel deployments. Monitoring the status of personnel
deployments has been an area of congressional and DOD concern. The
management of personnel tempo38 is important to the quality of life and
retention of military personnel. Section 991 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code
states that the deployment (or potential deployment) of a member of the
Armed Forces shall be managed. Moreover, DOD has recognized that failure
to effectively manage personnel tempo can result in the continued loss of
trained personnel, a consequent loss of readiness capability, and an
increased recruiting challenge. In addition, we have previously reported
that high personnel tempo for special operations forces can affect
readiness, retention, and morale.39
38 Personnel tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of any
one person.
39 GAO, Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and
Misuse, GAO/NSIAD-97-85 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1997).
In August 2005, the Special Operations Command established a policy
intended to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of active duty
special operations forces personnel.40 The policy requires the Command's
active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at their
home station as they do deployed for operations and training. The policy
also requires that the Special Operations Command's service components
develop internal tracking mechanisms to ensure that their active duty
special operations forces personnel remain within the policy's deployment
requirements.41 However, the Command's service components have not
consistently or fully implemented the deployment policy.
One challenge lies in the fact that the policy's guidelines are not clear.
Officials with the Command's service components noted a lack of clear
guidance regarding how the components should implement the deployment
guidelines, and consequently they were implementing it differently from
one another. For example, the policy does not identify the length of time
for which the components must ensure that personnel remain within the
deployment guidelines. In addition, it does not state whether a
servicemember must remain at a home station immediately following one
deployment for an equal amount of time before a next deployment. Because
of the lack of clear guidance, the Special Operations Command's service
components have had to interpret the intent of the policy's requirements
to ensure that their personnel remain in compliance.
A second challenge lies in the difficulty of achieving full
implementation. Officials with the Naval Special Warfare Command stated
that they have been unable to comply with the deployment guidelines
because personnel lack adequate home station training ranges.
Specifically, Naval Special Warfare personnel must deploy for both unit
training and operations. This combination of deployments has resulted in
personnel having exceeded the policy's requirement. Naval Special Warfare
Command officials indicated that they were working with the Special
Operations Command and the Navy to implement the deployment policy.
According to Navy officials, the Navy plans to provide the Naval Special
Warfare Command with additional funds to improve the home station ranges
used to train the SEAL force, which is anticipated to reduce the current
pace of operations tempo due to deployments for training. However, because
these personnel have been required to deploy for most unit training, they
have been unable to comply with the policy's requirement.
40 United States Special Operations Command Deployment Red Line Policy
(August 2, 2005).
41 According to the policy, a servicemember can volunteer for an exception
to the policy's requirement by signing a volunteer statement and having it
endorsed by his chain-of-command.
To determine whether special operations forces are meeting the intent of
the policy requires the service components to maintain internal tracking
systems with complete, valid, and reliable data on their personnel
deployments. However, officials with the Command's Army and Navy
components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the information
they use to track the individual deployments of their personnel.
While we did not independently validate the reliability of the data for
personnel deployments, an official with the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command stated the Army did not have a high level of confidence in the
data recorded by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's units in the
Army's system on personnel deployments. Officials told us that they are
developing a separate internal management tool in order to fully comply
with the deployment policy; however, that tool will not be ready until
July 2006.
Naval Special Warfare Command officials told us that comprehensive
reporting of personnel tempo information was suspended after the onset of
the Global War on Terrorism. The reporting of this information was
suspended because the Naval Special Warfare Command could not meet the
Navy's personnel tempo standards due to an increase in the pace of
deployments in support of ongoing operations. As a result, the Naval
Special Warfare Command does not have comprehensive and reliable data on
Naval Special Warfare personnel deployments. Officials stated that the
Naval Special Warfare Command was in the process of reestablishing
personnel tempo reporting with a goal of full reporting for all units by
the end of April 2006.
Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does
not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel
deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command's
ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special
operations forces personnel.
Conclusions
The decision by DOD to expand the responsibilities of the Special
Operations Command in the Global War on Terrorism has created new
challenges to determine personnel requirements and acquire, train, and
equip a greater number of warfighters to support ongoing military
operations. The Congress and DOD have provided resources to enable the
Command to augment its personnel. Given the Command's expanded mission,
however, it is critical that the Command complete its analyses of
personnel requirements and fully determine the number of personnel, who
possess the right knowledge and skill sets, for the Command to meet its
new role. Without this information, the Command cannot reasonably assure
the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that the currently planned
growth in the number of personnel for the Command will meet, exceed, or
fall short of the requirements necessary to carry out its expanded
mission.
The military services and the Special Operations Command have faced human
capital challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining a sufficient
number of these forces, and many of these challenges continue. In large
part, these challenges are attributable to the rigorous selection and
training processes set for these personnel. Nonetheless, we believe the
Command would be better able to address these challenges if it had a
clearer understanding of the progress its service components have made in
achieving planned growth, which is clearly linked with appropriate goals
and measures. Furthermore, the Command is attempting to meet its growth
goals at a time of heightened personnel deployments. However, the Command
is managing these deployments without reliable data. Such information
would further enable the Command to meet the full range of its missions
while maintaining the readiness, retention, and training of its personnel.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command, to
1. establish specific milestones for completing the Command's
ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed,
make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel
increases for the Command's headquarters and related future
funding requests;
2. revise the Command's directive for its program to monitor the
status of special operations forces to include performance
objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned
growth; and enforce all of the directive's reporting requirements;
and
3. clarify the methodology that the Command's service components
should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to
ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place
that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one
recommendation and partially concurred with our two remaining
recommendations. DOD's comments are included in appendix III. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Special
Operations Command to establish specific milestones for completing its
ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any
needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for the
Command's headquarters in related future funding requests. DOD stated that
the personnel requirements for the Command's headquarters are being
determined by an extensive study scheduled for completion in March 2007.
DOD stated that it will monitor the progress and validate the results of
this study, which we believe to be important steps. However, as we noted
in this report, DOD has already requested funding to substantially
increase the number of military and civilian positions at the Command's
headquarters beginning in fiscal year 2007, without the benefit of the
results from the Command's study of personnel needs. As a result, we would
expect DOD to re-evaluate its funding needs upon completion of the
Command's study, and adjust its requests accordingly.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to require the Special Operations
Command to revise the Command's directive for its program to monitor the
status of special operations forces, to include performance objectives,
goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned growth, and enforce
all of the directive's reporting requirements. DOD stated that the Special
Operations Command is updating the directive for its program to monitor
the status of special operations forces, and that the department and the
Command are continuously developing new tools and metrics to more
accurately measure the actual health of special operations forces. DOD
further stated that it is difficult to compare personnel data across the
services because each of the Command's service components presents data
using the metrics of its parent service, adding that it is highly
desirable to have each component format its service-derived data in a
common database. While we recognize the military services have different
metrics, the intent of our recommendation is that the Special Operations
Command develop a set of reporting metrics that would give the Command the
data it needs to monitor progress in meeting growth goals.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
Special Operations Command to clarify the methodology that its service
components use for enforcing the Command's deployment policy, and take
steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place
that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. DOD
stated that the Special Operations Command leadership and all of its
service components have implemented the Command's deployment policy, which
is in compliance with the department's force deployment rules for
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In addition, DOD stated
that the department will work toward developing a multi-service database
and metrics to standardize deployment and other metrics across the joint
community to overcome the challenge associated with the fact that each
service uses different metrics for calculating deployment time. While we
recognize the use of different metrics presents a challenge, our point, as
we state in this report, is that the Command's policy is unclear
concerning the length of time for which the components must ensure that
personnel remain within the deployment guidelines, and whether a
servicemember must remain at a home station immediately following one
deployment for an equal amount of time prior to a subsequent deployment.
As a result, the Command's service components have interpreted the intent
of the policy's requirements inconsistently. We continue to believe that
additional clarification to the Command's deployment policy is warranted
to assist its service components in ensuring that special operations
forces personnel remain in compliance with this policy. We also believe
that the planned actions to standardize deployment and other metrics
should include establishing procedures for recording reliable and relevant
data on personnel deployments since, as we reported, officials with two of
the Special Operations Command's service components did not have
confidence in the reliability of the information that was used to track
the individual deployments of their special operations forces personnel.
Such data are an important tool to enable the Command to maintain the
readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces personnel.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Sharon L. Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command (Command) has
identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded
mission, we identified the Joint Mission Analysis process and the
Command's formal manpower studies as the primary processes in which the
Command develops its force structure and personnel requirements. To assess
the plans to increase the number of special operations forces units and
personnel requirements for the Command's headquarters, we conducted site
visits and interviewed officials involved with determining personnel
requirements with the Special Operations Command, and the Army, Navy, and
Air Force service components. We also met with Marine Corps officials to
discuss plans for growth in Marine Corps special operations forces. We
analyzed the plans for growth in these personnel through fiscal year 2011.
We reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) documents identifying the
increases in the Special Operations Command's military authorizations and
funding since fiscal year 2000 and its plans for personnel growth through
fiscal year 2011. We reviewed past reports prepared by GAO that discuss
effective strategies for workforce planning. However, we were unable to
determine whether all of the Special Operations Command's personnel
requirements had been identified because, at the time of our review, the
Command had not completed all of its analyses of the personnel
requirements needed for its expanded mission responsibilities.
To assess the progress the military services and the Special Operations
Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of
special operations forces personnel, we discussed the processes used by
the military services and DOD to recruit, train, and retain these forces
with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special
Operations Command, and the military services. We focused on these
processes for the active components of the military services. To determine
what challenges the military services and the Special Operations Command
face to meet future growth, we analyzed personnel inventory levels for
special operations forces in the active component military services for
fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We collected and analyzed data to
determine whether the schools that train new special operations personnel
are producing enough newly trained personnel in order to meet current
authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets. We reviewed
relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed annual reports
prepared by the service components to determine the extent to which the
information in these reports met reporting requirements.
To assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments,
we analyzed deployment data from the Special Operations Command for fiscal
years 2000 through 2005. We analyzed the trends in deployments for
operations, training, and administrative activities and the trends in
deployments by geographic region. We discussed the impact of decreased
deployments for training and increased deployments for operations with
officials from the military services and the Special Operations Command.
We reviewed the Special Operations Command's policy to manage special
operations forces personnel deployments and conducted interviews with
component command officials to determine their ability to implement and
fully comply with this policy. We reviewed available data for
inconsistencies. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some
concerns which are discussed in this report. Specifically, some of the
personnel inventory data provided by the military service headquarters
were incomplete. To overcome this challenge, we gathered additional
information from the Special Operations Command's service components. In
addition, we interviewed officials with the service headquarters and the
Special Operations Command's service components who were knowledgeable
about the data to discuss the validity of the information provided to us.
We concluded the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives.
We conducted our review from April 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following
locations:
Army
o U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
o U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia
o U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina
Navy
o Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia
o Naval Recruiting Command, Millington, Tennessee
o Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California
Marine Corps
o U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Air Force
o U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
o Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base,
Texas
o Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida
Office of the Secretary of Defense
o Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington,
D.C.
o Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),
Washington, D.C.
o Office of the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict), Washington, D.C.
Unified Commands
o U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Germany
o U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
o U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
o U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida
o U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida
Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special
Operations Command
Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over
which the Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar
as they relate to special operations. Table 5 defines these
activities.
Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations
Command
Activity Description
Direct Action Short duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions undertaken to seize, destroy,
capture, recover, or inflict damage on
designated personnel or materials.
Strategic Reconnaissancea Reconnaissance and surveillance actions
conducted to obtain or verify, by visual
observation or other collection methods,
information concerning the capabilities,
intentions, and activities of an actual or
potential enemy or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area.
Unconventional Warfare A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary
operations, normally of long duration,
predominately conducted by indigenous or
surrogate forces that are organized, trained,
equipped, supported, and directed in varying
degrees by an external source.
Foreign Internal Defense Participation by civilian and military agencies
of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another government to free and protect
its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency.
Civil Affairs Operations that establish, maintain, influence,
or exploit relations between military forces,
government and nongovernment civilian
organizations and authorities, and the civilian
populace in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas
of operations in order to facilitate military
operations and consolidate and achieve U.S.
national objectives.
Psychological Operations Planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences
to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals.
Counterterrorism Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism.
Humanitarian Assistance Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the
results of natural or man-made disasters or
other endemic conditions such as human pain,
disease, hunger, or deprivation that might
present a serious threat to life or loss of
property. This assistance supplements or
complements the efforts of host nation civil
authorities or agencies that may have the
primary responsibility for providing this
assistance.
Theater Search and Rescue Actions performed to recover distressed
personnel during wartime or contingency
operations.
Other Activities Specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
Source: GAO.
aStrategic reconnaissance is commonly referred to as special
reconnaissance by DOD.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over
which the Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar
as they relate to special operations. Table 5 defines these
activities.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, David Moser, Assistant Director;
John Pendleton, Assistant Director; Colin Chambers, Jeremy Manion,
Stephanie Moriarty, Joseph Rutecki, Christopher Turner, Matthew
Ullengren, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin also made key
contributions to this report.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability OGAO�s Mission ffice, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
onstitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policand
provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to hCongress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. commitment to good
governm
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-812 .
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology,
click on the link above.
For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-812 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee
on Government Reform, House of Representatives
July 2006
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role
Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
taken steps to expand the role of the United States Special Operations
Command (Command) and its forces. In response, the Command has transformed
its headquarters to coordinate counterterrorism activities, and DOD has
increased funding and the number of special operations forces positions.
Given the expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel
with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess: (1)
whether the Command has determined all of the personnel requirements
needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress and challenges in
meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of deployments on the Command's
ability to provide trained forces, and the progress made in managing
deployments. GAO performed its work at the Special Operations Command and
its service components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and
examined policies and directives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to improve the information available to the
Special Operations Command to manage special operations forces personnel.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Although DOD plans to significantly increase the number of special
operations forces personnel, the Special Operations Command has not yet
fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its
expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed
to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses
to determine (a) how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip
these additional warfighters or (b) how many headquarters staff are needed
to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks-a new
mission for the Command. DOD plans to begin increasing the number of
headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its
fiscal year 2007 budget request. Until these analyses are completed, the
Special Operations Command cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of
personnel for the Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short
of the requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission.
The military services and the Special Operations Command have made
progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining
special operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently
low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained
personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DOD's plan to increase the
number of special operations forces. In addition, GAO's review of the
service components' annual reports required by the Special Operations
Command shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to
determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future
requirements. Without such information, the Command will be unable to
determine whether the service components' human capital management
approaches, including recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will
be effective in meeting the planned growth targets.
Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel
deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for
training has simultaneously decreased. The Special Operations Command has
taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in August
2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an equal
amount of time at home as deployed. But the Command's service components
have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because
the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components
must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy guidelines.
In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy service components
expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their information required
to track the deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and
reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have the
information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of
special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the
readiness, retention, and training of these personnel.
*** End of document. ***